Maritime Security: Information-Sharing Efforts Are Improving
Released: 2006-07-10T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Ports Are Important and Vulnerable

Ports play an important role in the nation’s economy and security. Ports are used to import and export cargo worth hundreds of billions of dollars; generating jobs, both directly and indirectly, for Americans and our trading partners. Ports, which include inland waterways, are used to move cargo containers, and bulk agricultural, mineral, petroleum, and paper products. Ports are also important to national security by hosting naval bases and vessels and facilitating the movement of military equipment and supplying troops deployed overseas.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the nation’s 361 seaports have been increasingly viewed as potential targets for future terrorist attacks. Ports are vulnerable because they are sprawling, interwoven with complex transportation networks, close to crowded metropolitan areas, and easily accessible. Ports contain a number of specific facilities that could be targeted by terrorists, including military vessels and bases, cruise ships, passenger ferries, terminals, dams and locks, factories, office buildings, power plants, refineries, sports complexes, and other critical infrastructure.

Multiple Jurisdictions Are Involved

The responsibility for protecting ports from a terrorist attack is a shared responsibility that crosses jurisdictional boundaries, with federal, state, and local organizations involved. For example, at the federal level, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has overall homeland security responsibility, and the Coast Guard, an agency of the department, has lead responsibility for maritime security. Port authorities provide protection through designated port police forces, private security companies, and coordination with local law enforcement agencies. Private sector stakeholders play a major role in identifying and addressing the vulnerabilities in and around their facilities, which may include oil refineries, cargo facilities, and other property adjacent to navigable waterways.

Information Sharing Is Important

Information sharing among federal, state, and local officials is central to port security activities. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 recognizes that the federal government relies on state and local personnel to help protect against terrorist attacks, and these officials need homeland security information to prevent and prepare for such attacks.

Information sharing between federal officials and nonfederal officials can involve information collected by federal intelligence agencies. In order to gain access to classified information, state and local law enforcement officials generally need to apply for and receive approval to have a federal security clearance. As implemented by the Coast Guard, the primary criterion for granting access to classified information is an individual’s need to know, which is defined as the determination made by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function. To obtain a security clearance, an applicant must complete a detailed questionnaire that asks for information on all previous employment, residences, and foreign travel and contacts that reach back 7 years. After submitting the questionnaire, the applicant then undergoes a variety of screenings and checks.

Area Maritime Security Committees

The Maritime Transportation Security Act, passed in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and with the recognition that ports contain many potential security targets, provided for area maritime security committees—composed of federal, state, local, and industry members—to be established by the Coast Guard at ports across the country. A primary goal of these committees is to assist the local Captain of the Port—the senior Coast Guard officer who leads the committee—to develop a security plan—called an area maritime security plan—to address the vulnerabilities and risks in that port zone. The committees also serve as a link for communicating threats and disseminating security information to port stakeholders. As of June 2006, the Coast Guard organized 46 area maritime security committees, covering the nation’s 361 ports.

Interagency Operational Centers

Another approach at improving information sharing and port security operations involves interagency operational centers—command centers that bring together the intelligence and operational efforts of various federal and nonfederal participants. These centers are to provide intelligence information and real-time operational data from sensors, radars, and cameras at one location to federal and nonfederal participants 24 hours a day. These interagency operational centers represent an effort to improve awareness of incoming vessels, port facilities, and port operations. In general, these centers are jointly operated by federal and nonfederal law enforcement officials. The centers can have command and control capabilities that can be used to communicate information to vessels, aircraft, and other vehicles and stations involved in port security operations.

Port-Level Information Sharing Supported by National-Level Intelligence

While area maritime security committees and interagency operational centers are port-level organizations, they are supported by, and provide support to, a national-level intelligence infrastructure. National-level departments and agencies in the intelligence and law enforcement communities may offer information that ultimately could be useful to members of area maritime security committees or interagency operational centers at the port level. These intelligence and law enforcement agencies conduct maritime threat identification and dissemination efforts in support of tactical and operational maritime and port security efforts, but most have missions broader than maritime activities as well. In addition, some agencies also have regional or field offices involved in information gathering and sharing.

Area Maritime Security Committees Have Improved Information Sharing

Ports Reviewed Showed Improvements in Timeliness, Completeness, and Usefulness of Shared Information

Area maritime security committees have provided a structure to improve the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information sharing. A primary function served by the committees was to develop security plans for port areas—called area maritime security plans. The goal of these plans was to identify vulnerabilities to a terrorist attack in and around a port location and to develop strategies for protecting a wide range of facilities and infrastructure. In doing so, the committees established new procedures for sharing information by holding meetings on a regular basis, issuing electronic bulletins on suspicious activities around port facilities, and sharing key documents, including vulnerability assessments and the portwide security plan itself, according to committee participants. Also, participants noted that these committees allowed for both formal and informal stakeholder networking, which contributes to improvements in information sharing.

Our continuing work on the Coast Guard and maritime security, while not specifically focused on information sharing, has continued to indicate that area maritime security committees are a useful tool for exchanging information. For example, we have done work at eight additional ports and found that stakeholders were still using the committees as a structured means to regularly share information about threat conditions and operational issues. In addition, Coast Guard personnel and port stakeholders are using the area maritime security committees to coordinate security and response training and exercises. Also, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Coast Guard officials shared information collaboratively through their area maritime security committees to determine when it was appropriate to close and then reopen a port for commerce.

Committees Have Flexibility in Their Structure and in the Way in Which They Share Information

While the committees are required to follow the same guidance regarding their structure, purpose, and processes, each of the committees is allowed the flexibility to assemble and operate in a way that reflects the needs of its port area. Each port is unique in many ways, including the geographic area covered and the type of operations that take place there. These port- specific differences influence the number of members that participate, the types of state and local organizations that members represent, and the way in which information is shared.

Interagency Operational Centers Have Also Improved Information Sharing

Centers Process and Share Information on Operations

Information sharing at interagency operational centers represents a step toward further improving information sharing, according to participants at the centers we visited. They said maritime security committees have improved information sharing primarily through a planning process that identifies vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies, as well as through development of two-way communication mechanisms to share threat information on an as-needed basis. In contrast, interagency operational centers can provide a continuous flow of information about maritime activities and involve various agencies directly in operational decisions using this information. Radar, sensors, and cameras offer representations of vessels and facilities. Other data are available from intelligence sources and include data on vessels, cargo, and crew.

Greater information sharing among participants at these centers has also enhanced operational collaboration, according to participants. Unlike the area maritime security committees, these centers are operational in nature—that is, they have a unified or joint command structure designed to receive information and act on it. At the centers we visited, representatives from the various agencies work side by side, each having access to databases and other sources of information from their respective agencies. Officials said such centers help leverage the resources and authorities of the respective agencies. For example, if the Coast Guard determines that a vessel should be boarded and inspected, other federal and nonfederal agencies might join in the boarding to assess the vessel or its cargo, crew, or passengers for violations relating to their areas of jurisdiction or responsibility.

Variations across Centers Affect Information Sharing

The types of information and the way information is shared vary at the centers we visited, depending on their purpose and mission, leadership and organization, membership, technology, and resources, according to officials at the centers. In our report of April 2005, we detailed three interagency operational centers at Charleston, South Carolina; Norfolk, Virginia; and San Diego, California. As of June 2006, the Coast Guard has two additional interagency command centers under construction in Jacksonville, Florida, and Seattle, Washington. Both are being established as Sector Command Centers—joint with the U.S. Navy—and are expected to be operational in 2006.

Of the interagency centers we visited, the Charleston center had a port security purpose, so its missions were all security related. It was led by DOJ, and its membership included 4 federal agencies and 16 state and local agencies. The San Diego center had a more general purpose, so it had multiple missions to include not just port security, but search and rescue, environmental response, drug interdiction, and other law enforcement activities. It was led by the Coast Guard, and its membership included 2 federal agencies and 1 local agency. The Norfolk center had a port security purpose, but its mission was focused primarily on force protection for the Navy. It was led by the Coast Guard, and its membership included 2 federal agencies and no state or local agencies. As a result, the Charleston center shared information that focused on law enforcement and intelligence related to port security among a very broad group of federal, state, and local agency officials. The San Diego center shared information on a broader scope of activities (beyond security) among a smaller group of federal and local agency officials. The Norfolk center shared the most focused information (security information related to force protection) among two federal agencies.

The centers also shared different information because of their technologies and resources. The San Diego and Norfolk centers had an array of standard and new Coast Guard technology systems and access to Coast Guard and various national databases, while the Charleston center had these as well as additional systems and databases. For example, the Charleston center had access to and shared information on Customs and Border Protection’s databases on incoming cargo containers from the National Targeting Center. In addition, Charleston had a pilot project with the Department of Energy to test radiation detection technology that provided additional information to share. The Charleston center was funded by a special appropriation that allowed it to use federal funds to pay for state and local agency salaries. This arrangement boosted the participation of state and local agencies, and thus information sharing beyond the federal government, according to port stakeholders in Charleston. While the San Diego center also had 24-hour participation by the local harbor patrol, that agency was paying its own salaries.

Coast Guard Continues to Develop Sector Command Centers at Ports

In April 2005, we reported that the Coast Guard planned to develop up to 40 of its own operational centers—called sector command centers—at additional ports. These command centers would provide local port activities with a unified command and improve awareness of the maritime domain through a variety of technologies. As of June 2006, the Coast Guard reported to us that 35 sector command centers have been created, and that these centers are the primary conduit for daily collaboration and coordination between the Coast Guard and its port partner agencies. The Coast Guard also reported that it has implemented a maritime monitoring system—known as the Common Operating Picture system—that fuses data from different sources. According to the Coast Guard, this system is the primary tool for Coast Guard commanders in the field to attain maritime domain awareness.

In April 2005, we also reported that the Coast Guard requested in fiscal year 2006 over $5 million in funding to improve awareness of the maritime domain by continuing to evaluate the potential expansion of sector command centers to other port locations, and requested additional funding to train personnel in Common Operating Picture deployment at command centers and to modify facilities to implement the picture in command centers. In June 2006, the Coast Guard reported to us that no additional funding for this program was requested for fiscal year 2007.

Coast Guard Report on Interagency Operational Centers

Congress directed the Coast Guard to report on the existing interagency operational centers, covering such matters as the composition and operational characteristics of existing centers and the number, location, and cost of such new centers as may be required to implement maritime transportation security plans and maritime intelligence activities. This report, called for by February 2005, was issued by the Coast Guard in April 2005. While the report addresses the information sought by Congress, the report did not define the relationship between interagency operational centers and the Coast Guard’s own sector command centers.

Port stakeholders reported to us the following issues as important factors to consider in any expansion of interagency operational centers: (1) purpose and mission—the centers could serve a variety of overall purposes, as well as support a wide number of specific missions; (2) leadership and organization—the centers could be led by several potential departments or agencies and be organized a variety of ways; (3) membership—the centers could vary in membership in terms of federal, state, local, or private sector participants and their level of involvement; (4) technology deployed—the centers could deploy a variety of technologies in terms of networks, computers, communications, sensors, and databases; and (5) resource requirements—the centers could also vary in terms of resource requirements, which agency funds the resources, and how resources are prioritized.

Other Ad Hoc Arrangements for Interagency Information- Sharing

Our work identified other interagency arrangements that facilitate information sharing and interagency operations in the maritime environment. One example is a predesignated single-mission task force, which becomes operational when needed. DHS established the Homeland Security Task Force, South-East—a working group consisting of federal and nonfederal agencies with appropriate geographic and jurisdictional responsibilities that have the mission to respond to any mass migration of immigrants affecting southeast Florida. When a mass migration event occurs, the task force is activated and becomes a full-time interagency effort to share information and coordinate operations to implement a contingency plan.

Another example of an interagency arrangement for information sharing can occur in single-agency operational centers that become interagency to respond to specific events. For example, the Coast Guard has its own command centers for both District Seven and Sector Miami, located in Miami, Florida. While these centers normally focus on a variety of Coast Guard missions and are not normally interagency in structure, they have established protocols with other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to activate a unified or incident command structure should it be needed. These Coast Guard centers make it possible to host interagency operations because they have extra space and equipment that allow for surge capabilities and virtual connectivity with each partner agency.

Interagency Information- Sharing Concerns Go Beyond Maritime Area

While our findings on maritime information sharing are generally positive, we have some concerns regarding interagency information sharing that go far beyond the maritime issue area. In January 2005, we designated information sharing for homeland security as a high-risk area because the federal government still faces formidable challenges in gathering, identifying, analyzing, and disseminating key information within and among federal and nonfederal entities. While we recognize the efforts that some agencies have undertaken to break out of information “silos” and better share information, we reported in 2006 that more than 4 years after September 11, the nation still lacks comprehensive policies and processes to improve the sharing of information that is critical to protecting our homeland. We made several recommendations to the Director of National Intelligence, who is now primarily responsible for this effort, to ensure effective implementation of congressional information sharing mandates.

We continue to review agencies and programs that have the goal of improving information sharing among federal, state, and local partners. For example, we have ongoing work assessing DHS’ efforts to enhance coordination and collaboration among interagency operations centers that operate around the clock to provide situational awareness. We plan to report on this later this year. Also, we have just begun work on state fusion centers--which are locations where homeland security-related information can be collected and analyzed--and their links to their relevant federal counterparts, which we plan to report on in 2007.

Coast Guard Making Progress Granting Security Clearances

Lack of Security Clearances May Limit Ability to Confront Terrorist Threats

According to the Coast Guard and state and local officials we contacted for our 2005 report, the shared partnership between the federal government and state and local entities may fall short of its potential to fight terrorism because of the lack of security clearances. If state and local officials lack security clearances, the information they possess may be incomplete. According to Coast Guard and nonfederal officials, the lack of access to classified information may limit these officials’ ability to deter, prevent, and respond to a potential terrorist attack.

While security clearances for nonfederal officials who participate in interagency operational centers are sponsored by DOJ and DHS, the Coast Guard sponsors security clearances for members of area maritime security committees. For the purposes of our 2005 report, we examined in more detail the Coast Guard’s efforts to address the lack of security clearances among members of area maritime security committees.

Coast Guard Continues to Take Steps to Grant Additional Clearances to State, Local, and Industry Officials

In April 2005, we reported that as part of its effort to improve information sharing at ports, the Coast Guard initiated a program in July 2004 to sponsor security clearances for members of area maritime security committees, but nonfederal officials have been slow in submitting their applications for a security clearance. We also reported that as of February 2005, only 28 of 359 nonfederal committee members who had a need to know had submitted the application forms for a security clearance. As shown in table 1, as of June 2006, of the 467 nonfederal committee members who had a need to know, 197 had submitted security clearance applications—20 received interim clearances, and 168 were granted a final clearance, which allows access to classified material.

Data Are Being Used to More Effectively Manage the Security Clearance Program

A key component of a good management system is to have relevant, reliable, and timely information available to assess performance over time and to correct deficiencies as they occur. The Coast Guard has two databases that contain information on the status of security clearances for state, local, and industry officials. The first database is a commercial off- the-shelf system that contains information on the status of all applications that have been submitted to the Coast Guard Security Center, such as whether a security clearance has been issued or whether personnel security investigations have been conducted. We reported in April 2005 that the Coast Guard was testing the database for use by field staff, but had not granted field staff access to the database. As of June 2006, the Coast Guard granted access to this database—named Checkmate—to field staff. The second database—an internally developed spreadsheet on the area maritime committee participants—summarizes information on the status of the security clearance program, such as whether officials have submitted their application forms and whether they have received their clearances.

We reported in 2005 that these Coast Guard has databases could be used to manage the state, local, and industry security clearance program, but that formal procedures for using the data as a management tool to follow up on possible problems at the national or local level to verify the status of clearances had not been developed by the Coast Guard. While it is unclear that the Coast Guard developed formal procedures, as of June 2006, the Coast Guard reported that it has developed guidance for using its data on committee participants. According to the Coast Guard, the guidance released to field commands regarding the state, local, and industry security clearance program clarified the process for nonfederal area maritime security committee members to receive clearances and specifically outlined responsibilities for working with applicants on completing required paperwork, including the application packages. The Coast Guard reported that as a result of this guidance, the number of received and processed security clearance packages for area maritime security committee members has increased.

Concluding Observations

As we reported in April 2005, and reaffirm today, effective information sharing among members of area maritime security committees and participants in interagency operational centers can enhance the partnership between federal and nonfederal officials, and it can improve the leveraging of resources across jurisdictional boundaries for deterring, preventing, or responding to a possible terrorist attack at the nation’s ports. The Coast Guard has recognized the importance of granting security clearances to nonfederal officials as a means to improve information sharing, and although we reported in 2005 that progress in moving these officials through the application process had been slow, it appears that as of June 2006 the Coast Guard’s efforts to process security clearances to nonfederal officials has improved considerably. However, continued management attention and guidance about the security clearance process would strengthen the program, and it would reduce the risk that nonfederal officials may have incomplete information as they carry out their law enforcement activities.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time.

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

For information about this testimony, please contact Stephen L. Caldwell Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-9610, or at caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found at the last page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Susan Quinlan, David Alexander, Neil Asaba, Juliana Bahus, Christine Davis, Kevin Heinz, Lori Kmetz, Emily Pickrell, Albert Schmidt, Amy Sheller, Stan Stenersen, and April Thompson.

Related GAO Products

Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations, and Future Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006.

Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005.

Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.

Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.

Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and Management Concerns Remain. GAO-05-161. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2005.

Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2005.

Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2004.

Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004.

Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System. GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004.

Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.

Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year 2005 and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004.

Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.

Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2003.

Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security. GAO-04-315R. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003.

Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.

Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington D.C.: August 27, 2003.

Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2003.

Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports. GAO-02-955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.

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