Emergency Communications: Effectiveness of the Post-Katrina Interagency Coordination Group Could Be Enhanced
Released: 2016-08-15T00:00:00

Letter

Background

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established DHS and required the agency, among other things, to build a comprehensive national incident management system comprising all levels of government and to consolidate existing federal government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated national response plan. DHS developed the National Response Framework that identified core capabilities necessary to ensure national preparedness, such as operational planning at the federal and state level and emergency communications capabilities that enable emergency responders to effectively communicate with each other. States and localities provide the first response to any disaster and thus must plan and coordinate, across state lines, and with federal entities as well. States have developed plans and made efforts to coordinate in support of emergency communications. For example, state plans, called Statewide Communication Interoperability Plans, are intended to define the current and future direction for interoperable and emergency communications within the state.

In addition to DHS, other federal agencies play a role in supporting emergency communications during disasters. Specifically, FCC manages the use of spectrum by non-federal entities, including commercial enterprises and state and local governments, and administers policies related to 911 and E911 services. The Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is responsible for managing spectrum used by the federal government and can temporarily assign spectrum during an emergency to aid the response. Along with FCC, NTIA deploys personnel to support disasters in response to a mission assignment from DHS. Furthermore, the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet), an independent authority within NTIA, is in the process of planning for the deployment of a high-speed, interoperable nationwide wireless broadband network for use by federal, state, tribal, and local public safety personnel.

Congress passed PKEMRA in 2006 to address issues that arose during Hurricane Katrina, including emergency communications issues. PKEMRA contains 10 emergency communications provisions that, according to our 2008 report and updates we obtained from DHS, have all been implemented, as shown in table 1. In this report, we focus on the first three emergency communications provisions listed in the table, requirements that are related to planning and federal coordination.

While all of these PKEMRA provisions have been addressed, DHS continues to meet the requirements of some provisions, for example:

Grant program coordination: DHS, in conjunction with other agencies, coordinates grant guidance across the government annually through SAFECOM’s Guidance on Emergency Communications Grants. The guidance provides grantees with directions on applying for funds to improve emergency communications and the current standards for grant award recipients. DHS developed the guidance to align with the first NECP and it now reflects the most recent NECP.

Interoperability research and development: Since PKEMRA, DHS has conducted research and development to support emergency communications interoperability. Among other things, DHS is responsible for establishing research, development, testing, and evaluation programs for improving interoperable emergency communications.

Assessments and reports: DHS intends to issues the next biennial progress report in November 2016.

Implementation of PKEMRA Provisions Has Enhanced Federal Support for State and Local Emergency Communications Efforts, but Federal Coordination Could Be Improved

Enhanced Federal Support for State and Local Emergency Communications Efforts

Office of Emergency Communications (OEC)

OEC has enhanced support of state and local planning and other emergency communications activities. OEC has taken a number of steps aimed at ensuring that federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies have the plans, resources, and training they need to support interoperable emergency communications. After being established in 2007, OEC focused on enhancing the interoperability and continuity of land mobile radio systems. However, OEC’s scope has expanded since then to include other technologies used to communicate and share information during emergencies, including devices that have advanced telecommunications capabilities, such as broadband access. OEC has developed policy and guidance supporting emergency communications across all levels of government and various types of technologies. Table 2 describes key guidance OEC has provided to state and local entities.

In addition to developing policy and guidance, OEC has provided technical assistance in the form of training, tools, and online and on-site assistance for federal, state, local, and tribal emergency responders. According to OEC, the technical assistance is designed to support interoperable emergency communications by helping states develop and implement their statewide plans to enhance emergency communications, standard operating procedures, and communications unit training, among other things. All states responding to our survey reported receiving technical assistance provided by OEC, and almost all of those states were satisfied with the support they received from OEC. For example in response to our survey, one state commented that OEC had provided invaluable training for the state’s first responders and assistance to the state’s governing authority.

National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP)

According to DHS, the PKEMRA provision requiring the NECP has improved state and local emergency communications activities, including governance and planning. The NECP, first issued by DHS in 2008, served as the first national strategy aimed at improving emergency communications interoperability and provided a road map to improve emergency communications capabilities. For example, the 2008 NECP encouraged states to have standard operating procedures for specified events. To assist the states in this effort, OEC developed a toolkit that provides general guidance and tools for state communications planners in developing a plan for special events and made a variety of templates available online for states to use in developing standard operating procedures.

In 2014, DHS released its second NECP, which contains the following five goals:

Governance and leadership: Enhance decision making, coordination, and planning for emergency communications through strong governance structures and leadership.

Planning and procedures: Update plans and procedures to improve emergency responder communications and readiness in a dynamic- operating environment.

Training and exercises: Improve responders’ ability to coordinate and communicate through training and exercise programs that use all available technologies and target gaps in emergency communications.

Operational coordination: Ensure operational effectiveness through the coordination of communications capabilities, resources, and personnel from across the whole community.

Research and development: Coordinate research, development, testing, and evaluation activities to develop innovative emergency communications capabilities that support the needs of emergency responders.

DHS has taken various actions to support states’ efforts to address these goals. For example, with respect to the first goal, DHS issued The Governance Guide for State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Emergency Communications Officials. This guide identified challenges related to emergency communications governance, as well as best practices and recommendations to overcome these challenges. In addition, OEC completed the 911 Governance and Planning Case Study, which examined the governance, planning, and funding challenges that states are facing regarding 911 and made a number of recommendations for OEC to improve coordination. DHS has taken steps towards addressing the other NECP goals. For example, related to the planning and procedures goal, DHS has coordinated with the Department of Transportation to identify risks and mitigation strategies to enhance the continuity and operability of emergency communications. Among other things, DHS has also partnered with FirstNet to conduct an assessment of the potential cybersecurity challenges facing the public safety broadband network. According to DHS, it will provide information on additional progress on meeting the NECP goals in its biennial report to Congress scheduled to be completed in November 2016.

Although the ECPC Follows Most Key Features of Collaboration, It Could Enhance Its Effectiveness

The ECPC, the interagency collaborative group established by PKEMRA, provides a venue for coordinating federal emergency communications efforts. The ECPC works to improve coordination and information sharing among federal emergency communications programs. It does this by serving as the focal point for emergency communications issues across the federal agencies, supporting the coordination of federal programs, such as grant programs, and serving as a clearing house for emergency communications information, among other responsibilities. There are 14 member agencies of the ECPC that have staff on an Executive Committee responsible for setting the ECPC’s priorities. In addition, the ECPC has a Steering Committee and focus groups that develop plans to address the priorities. Currently, there are three focus groups examining issues related to grants, research and development, and 911 issues. The focus groups report on their issues at Executive Committee and Steering Committee meetings and in the Annual Strategic Assessment. DHS serves as the administrative leader of the ECPC, organizes the ECPC quarterly and other meetings, and drafts the Annual Strategic Assessment and other documents.

In a 2012 report, we examined interagency collaborative mechanisms, such as interagency groups, and identified certain key features and issues to consider when implementing these mechanisms. We reported that following leading collaboration practices can enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies. For this report, we compared the ECPC’s collaboration efforts with six of these key features and issues to consider, as shown in table 3.

We found the ECPC’s efforts were consistent with the key features related to leadership, participants, resources, and written guidance and agreements. However, the ECPC’s efforts were not completely consistent with the key features related to (1) outcomes and accountability, and (2) clarity of roles and responsibilities, as explained below.

Outcomes and Accountability

The ECPC has not documented its strategic goals and outcomes. We previously reported that establishing shared outcomes and goals that resonate with, and are agreed upon by all participants, is essential to achieving outcomes in interagency groups, but can also be challenging. Participants each bring different views, organizational cultures, missions, and ways of operating. Participants may even disagree on the nature of the problem or issue being addressed. Furthermore, agency officials involved in several of the interagency groups we previously reviewed cautioned that if agencies do not have a vested interest in the outcomes, and if outcomes are not aligned with agency objectives, participant agencies would not invest their limited time and resources. However, by establishing outcomes and strategic goals based on the group’s shared interests, a collaborative group can shape its vision and define its own purpose, and when articulated and understood by the group, this shared purpose provides a reason to participate. Although DHS identified four long-term goals for the ECPC in response to our questions, these goals do not appear in the ECPC charter, program plan, or Annual Strategic Assessment. In May 2016, DHS officials told us the ECPC’s Executive Committee agreed to develop a strategic plan to highlight the ECPC’s goals and provide additional guidance for the focus groups. However, the DHS officials could not specify a time frame for completion. Without clearly defined strategic goals, the member agencies might not understand the ECPC’s goals or have a chance to ensure that the goals align with their own agencies’ purposes and goals. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether all member agencies have agreed on the ECPC’s goals and outcomes. In fact, ECPC member agencies we spoke with were able to provide a general idea about the ECPC’s purpose but could not articulate its specific goals.

Also with respect to outcomes and accountability, the ECPC does not track or monitor its recommendations. The ECPC uses its Annual Strategic Assessment to: (1) provide information on federal coordination efforts, (2) define opportunities for improving federal emergency communications, and (3) report on progress implementing some of the focus groups’ recommendations. For example, the ECPC grants focus group made nine recommendations for federal grant program managers, including that the managers should use the ECPC Financial Assistance Reference Guide when planning and developing grant documents, and should invest in standards-based equipment. According to DHS, the grants focus group conducts annual surveys of member agencies to assess whether the agencies had implemented any of these recommendations. However, recommendations made by the other ECPC focus groups are not tracked, and therefore it is unclear the extent to which the recommendations have been implemented by ECPC’s member agencies. For example, the research and development focus group identified five recommendations in 2015 that were aimed at improving collaboration and information sharing around research and development for emergency communications. Specifically, one recommendation was for agencies to share technology profiles to prevent duplicative research. However, it is voluntary for member agencies to implement the focus group’s recommendations, and it is unknown whether agencies are sharing their technology profiles or if duplicative research is being conducted. According to DHS officials, the ECPC does not have a mechanism to determine whether the focus groups’ recommendations are implemented because it is up to the member agencies to decide if they will implement recommendations and if so, to track them on an individual basis. We have previously reported about the importance of federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts to publicly report performance information as a tool for accountability. By having a mechanism to track the focus groups’ recommendations, the ECPC would have the means to monitor progress in achieving them.

Clarity of Roles and Responsibilities

The ECPC has not clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of its member agencies. We previously reported that clarifying the roles of all member agencies will help establish an understanding of who will do what in support of the collaborative group. In addition, member agencies’ commitment to their defined roles helps the group overcome barriers to working in the collaborative group and can facilitate decision making within the group. The roles can be described in laws, policies, memorandums of understanding, or other documentation. As described in the ECPC charter, DHS is the administrator of the ECPC; however, it is unclear whether all member agencies have defined and agreed upon their respective roles and responsibilities. For example, the Department of Labor is a member of the ECPC, but according to DHS, it might not be clear to all members why the Department of Labor is a participating member. Similarly, officials from the General Services Administration told us they do not know the roles of the other ECPC members and could only speak to us about their own agency’s role. DHS officials told us it would be beneficial to have member agencies’ roles and responsibilities clearly defined but expressed concern that some members, who participate voluntarily, might not want defined responsibilities if such responsibilities would require additional staff time and resources. Nevertheless, lacking defined roles and responsibilities may result in member agencies’ not knowing their roles and responsibilities or those of other members, which may create additional barriers to effectively working together.

State Emergency Communications Planning Has Improved Since PKEMRA, but States Face Funding and Other Challenges

States’ Planning and Governance Structures have Improved since PKEMRA

States, the District of Columbia, and territories (hereafter, states) responding to our survey reported that to better prepare for emergency communications during disasters, they have: (1) developed emergency communications plans, (2) established the Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC) positions, and (3) implemented governance structures to oversee emergency communications planning.

States’ Emergency Communications Plans

States have made progress since PKEMRA in establishing emergency communications plans. Based on survey responses, prior to the enactment of PKEMRA in 2006, only a few states had emergency communications plans in place. In 2007, OEC began requiring states to have a Statewide Communications Interoperability Plan (SCIP) to be eligible for DHS’s Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program. These state emergency communications plans are intended to be comprehensive strategic plans that outline the current and future emergency communications environment in a state. The NECP encourages states to align their plans with the emergency communications goals in the NECP to establish a link between national communications priorities and state emergency communications planning. Of the states responding to our survey, 51 reported having a SCIP, and 36 state plans were implemented after PKEMRA’s enactment. In addition to the SCIP, 16 states reported having other planning documents that support operational plans for emergency communications in addition to the high-level strategic plan the SCIP represents. For example, some states reported using tactical documents such as the Tactical Interoperability Communications Plan as their primary emergency communications planning document.

The 2014 NECP encouraged states to update their plans and procedures to enhance emergency communications during disasters, and 46 states responding to our survey reported that they had updated their plans. States reported updating their plans for various reasons, including reflecting routine review processes, technological advancement, and changes in state governance, among others. According to DHS, as of the end of fiscal year 2015, OEC worked with 53 states and territories to update their SCIPs to align with the 2014 NECP. In response to our survey, 50 states reported being satisfied with the level of support for emergency communications planning they received from OEC.

Further, as shown in table 4, most of the states responding to our survey reported that they now have plans that contain the key elements of the SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum. The NECP considers the SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum as the essential foundation for achieving the NECP goals.

According to the NECP, first responders’ proficiency with communications equipment and their ability to execute policies, plans, and procedures can improve with training and exercises. In response to our survey, 40 states reported conducting training and exercises based on their emergency communications plans. Furthermore, the NECP notes that training and exercises helps emergency responders be properly prepared to respond to disasters and 43 states reported that they are likely to use their emergency communications plans when responding to future disasters.

Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC) Position

Since PKEMRA, states have made considerable progress in establishing a key coordinator position. The SWIC provides a single point of contact for statewide emergency communications activities. The NECP identifies the SWIC as a key stakeholder in emergency communications. In 2008, DHS noted that the lack of SWICs in each state was a primary obstacle to improving emergency communications and recommended that every state have a SWIC within 12 months. All but two states responding to our survey reported that they now have a SWIC. DHS officials stressed the importance of the SWIC position and told us that SWICs can contribute to emergency communications initiatives by supporting the development of governance structures, standard operating procedures, and high-level policy. In addition, SWICs can coordinate grants and other types of funding and training and exercises, and support implementation of the SCIPs.

Although DHS has stressed the importance of the SWIC position, according to our survey, most SWICs now have responsibilities outside those of the SWIC role. In December 2009, according to DHS, 44 states had a full time SWIC, but most survey respondents reported that their SWICs now have other non-SWIC responsibilities. In particular, 37 states responding to our survey have SWICs with additional non-SWIC related responsibilities. For example, 21 SWICs are also the FirstNet Single Point of Contact. States funded the SWIC position in part by the Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program. According to DHS, funds were not appropriated for this grant program after 2010. Subsequently, funding dedicated to improving interoperability was used for other DHS grant programs that supported improving emergency preparedness, which included interoperable emergency communications. According to our survey results, 26 SWIC positions are funded by federal grants, state grants, or a combination of both federal and state grants. In April 2016, the House of Representatives acknowledged the importance of the SWIC position by passing the Promoting Resilience and Efficiency in Preparing for Attacks and Responding to Emergencies Act, which includes a provision that would require states to have a SWIC position or delegate the responsibilities to other individuals.

Governance Structures

Since PKEMRA, the NECP identified the need for formal governance structures to manage the systems of people, organizations, and technologies that need to collaborate to effectively plan for emergency communications during disasters, and most states responding to our survey reported that they have governance structures in place. According to DHS, governance structures should include key emergency communications stakeholders such as emergency communications leaders, multiple agencies, jurisdictions, disciplines, subject matter experts, and private sector entities, among others to enhance information sharing and ensure emergency communications needs are represented. Almost all of states (49) responding to our survey reported having governance structures in place that include key stakeholders. For example, 48 states reported that their governance bodies include emergency responders from local agencies while 33 states reported that non-government stakeholders, such as the Red Cross, are included. In response to our survey, 24 states reported that their governance bodies meet 3 to 7 times a year, and the governance bodies for 16 other states meet 8 to 12 times a year while the remaining states with governance structures meet less than 3 times a year.

Funding and Other Challenges Remain

In our survey, we asked states about the challenges that affect their ability to ensure operable and continuous emergency communications during disasters and states identified a lack of funding as the primary challenge. In particular, 48 states responding to our survey indicated that a lack of funding sometimes or always affected their state’s ability to ensure operable and continuous emergency communications during disasters. In written comments, 12 states specifically identified the need for dedicated funding for emergency communications including funds to support the role of the SWIC. For example, one state reported that when it no longer received federal funding for emergency communications, the state lost its full time SWIC position, support personnel, and governance group. In addition, 45 states responding to our survey mentioned that the lack of staffing sometimes or always presented a challenge for their states. In the written responses, one state indicated that the lack of staffing was difficult to address because of the funding issue, while another indicated the state was under a hiring freeze. In other written responses to our survey, states identified additional challenges. For example, six states mentioned issues with technology, such as challenges in learning to use different radio systems and understanding new and emerging technologies.

We also asked the states if they have experienced interoperability difficulties when communicating or attempting to communicate with federal partners during disasters. In response, 23 states reported that they have experienced difficulties and noted in written comments that the issues included a lack of understanding by federal responders about the local radio systems, federal radios not configured to the interoperable channels or talk groups, and federal responders not using the statewide system. Furthermore, two states noted a lack of planning between federal and state entities prior to emergencies that led to federal responders trying to figure out the systems during the emergency.

Some states responding to our survey reported that they have taken action to address challenges related to funding, technology, and interoperability concerns with federal partners. First, related to funding, some states reported pursuing state level funding and grants to continue emergency communications governance and planning, including funding the SWIC position and building statewide emergency communications systems. Second, some states reported addressing technology challenges through training and upgrading old communication systems. For example, one state reported that his state provides training to emergency responders on radio operations and how to effectively use talk groups. Another state reported his state is upgrading its 26-year old land mobile radio system so that emergency responders can more effectively communicate within the state and during emergencies. Lastly, some states reported that they are trying to address interoperability issues through training and the purchase of interoperable equipment. For example, the training can improve coordination with federal and other users that can result in improved interoperability during emergencies. In addition, by purchasing interoperable equipment, emergency personnel could have fewer issues connecting with emergency responders at all levels of government. One state indicated that his state provided information on interoperable equipment to local entities to promote the purchase of such equipment. According to DHS officials, they continue to provide training programs to the states to help improve interoperability.

Conclusions

PKEMRA established the ECPC to improve coordination and information sharing among federal emergency communications programs. As a collaborative entity, we found that while the ECPC’s efforts were consistent with most of the key features for effective collaboration, its efforts were not completely consistent with key features related to outcomes and accountability and clarity of roles and responsibilities. Regarding outcomes and accountability, the ECPC has not documented its strategic goals or established a mechanism to track the outcomes of the focus group’s recommendations. DHS officials told us the ECPC has agreed to develop a strategic plan that would contain goals for the ECPC, but there is no firm timetable for such a plan to be completed. Lacking clearly defined strategic goals, the ECPC’s member agencies might not understand the ECPC’s goals or have a chance to ensure that the goals align with their own agencies’ purposes and goals. Furthermore, the ECPC’s focus groups have spent time and resources to make recommendations for improving emergency communications, but we found the focus groups’ recommendations, such as those related to federal grant programs and research and development efforts, are implemented at the discretion of the member agencies. Without a mechanism to track the recommendations, it is unclear the extent to which the recommendations are being implemented by the member agencies, and the ECPC is missing an opportunity to monitor its efforts. Regarding clarity of roles and responsibilities, the ECPC has not defined the member agencies’ roles and responsibilities, and some member agencies do not know the roles and responsibilities of other members, a situation that may create barriers to working together effectively. Clearly defining the members’ respective roles and responsibilities would help to provide an understanding of who will do what to support the ECPC’s efforts and facilitate decision making.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve the effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of the ECPC’s efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, as the administrative leader of the ECPC, take the following actions: clearly document the ECPC’s strategic goals; establish a mechanism to track progress by the ECPC’s member agencies in implementing the ECPC’s recommendations; and clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the ECPC’s member agencies.

Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, Commerce, and FCC for their review and comment. In response, DHS provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix III. In written comments, DHS concurred with our recommendations and provided an attachment describing the actions it would take to implement the recommendations. DHS noted that enhancing the communications capabilities for emergency responders is one of its top priorities and that DHS will use the recommendations provided in our report to enhance a DHS initiative aimed at remediating many of the foremost emergency communications challenges facing our nation. Separately, DHS, Commerce, and FCC provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Commerce, the Chairman of FCC, and appropriate congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or members of your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report focuses on three Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) emergency communications provisions related to planning and federal coordination: the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC), the National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP), and the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center (ECPC). Specifically, we examined (1) federal efforts to implement these PKEMRA emergency communications provisions and (2) how states’ emergency communications planning has changed since PKEMRA and what challenges remain for the states.

To determine federal efforts to implement the three PKEMRA emergency communications provisions, we reviewed our 2008 report and other relevant reports and documentation from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), such as DHS’s biennial reports to Congress on emergency communications, and reports from other agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 911 and Enhanced 911 services report. We also reviewed the NECP from 2008 and the subsequent reports on the progress meeting its goals, as well as the 2014 NECP. We interviewed officials from DHS, FCC, and the Department of Commerce (Commerce) to determine their roles and the progress implementing the provisions. We compiled information from the reports and interviews to assess how the provisions were implemented and if they were fully implemented. To understand the ECPC’s collaborative practices, we reviewed the ECPC charter, program plan, and Annual Strategic Assessments prepared for Congress, and interviewed ECPC member agencies. Specifically, we interviewed 5 of 14 ECPC member agencies (DHS, FCC, Commerce, the Department of Transportation, and the General Services Administration) to determine their roles on the ECPC, their understanding of the ECPC goals, and the member agencies’ responsibilities. We selected agencies to interview with a range of emergency communications experience, and the views we obtained do not necessarily represent the views of all ECPC member agencies. We assessed the ECPC’s collaborative efforts against six of seven key considerations for implementing collaborative mechanisms that we identified in a September 2012 report.

To understand how state emergency communications planning has changed since PKEMRA and the challenges states still face, we surveyed Statewide Interoperability Coordinators (SWIC) in 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 5 territories. The list of SWICs was obtained from DHS and confirmed via email. We conducted a web-based survey that addressed issues pertaining to state planning, governance, and challenges, specifically asking about the Statewide Communications Interoperability Plan (SCIP) and other emergency communications plans, and the role of the SWIC. To ensure the survey questions were clear and logical, we pretested the survey with three states: North Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. These states were selected based on the types of disasters facing the states, the number of recent disasters, and geographic diversity. We administered our survey from February 2016 to April 2016 and received 52 responses for a 93 percent response rate. American Samoa, Massachusetts, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Puerto Rico did not respond to our survey. In addition, we interviewed selected SWICs from Kentucky and Wyoming to understand how the SCIPs and other emergency communications plans are used in preparing for emergencies. We selected these SWICs to interview based on geographic region, an occurrence of a recent disaster in the state, and because the Wyoming SWIC was the chair of the National Council of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators. We conducted semi-structured interviews with each SWIC to understand if they had a SCIP, how they used the SCIP, the governance structures the state uses to manage emergency communications, and the challenges their states encounter with emergency communications during disasters.

Appendix II: Survey of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators

The questions we asked in our survey of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators and the aggregate results of responses to the closed-ended questions are shown below. We do not provide results for the open-ended questions. We received 52 completed survey responses. However, all respondents did not have the opportunity to answer each question because of skip patterns, and some respondents decided not to respond to particular questions. For a more detailed discussion of our survey methodology see appendix I. 1. Does your state have a Statewide Communications Interoperability Plan (SCIP)? 1a. If no, why doesn’t your state have a SCIP? (Written responses not included) 1b. Does your state have a primary planning document for ensuring operable and interoperable emergency communications during disasters in your state?

1c. Is your SCIP your primary plan to ensure operable and interoperable emergency communications during disasters in your state? 1d. If no, what, is your primary planning document for ensuring, operable, and interoperable emergency communications during disasters in your state? (Written responses not included) 2. What year was the emergency communications plan implemented?

3. Has your state used the emergency communications plan in response to disasters?

3a. If the emergency communications plan has never been used in response to disasters, why not? (Written responses not included) 4. Has your state used the emergency communications plan during training exercises?

4a. If the emergency communications plan has never been used during training exercises, why not? (Written responses not included) 5. Are you likely to use the emergency communications plan in response to disasters in the future? 6. Has the emergency communications plan been updated since it was initially implemented? 6a. When was the emergency communications plan last updated? 6b. Why was the emergency response plan updated? (Written responses not included) 6c. Do you think your plan needs to be updated?

6d. If yes, why hasn’t the emergency response plan been updated? (Written responses not included)

Elements of the Emergency Communications Plan 7. Does your emergency communications plan address the following elements?

Planning (standard operating procedures, protocols)

Technology (data and voice elements, common applications, base sharing, custom applications, swapping radios, gateways)

Usage (how often interoperability communications are used in planned events, localized emergency incidents, regional incidents, and daily use)

8. Does your emergency communications plan address the following types of events?

Significant events (i.e., terrorist attacks, major disaster, and other emergencies that pose the greatest risk to the state)

Routine events (i.e., localized emergency incidents, regional emergency incidents, special events, large public gatherings, state and national exercise)

If “Other standardized elements” is checked, what other elements are contained in your operating protocols and procedures? (Written responses not included)

Planning and Standard Operating Procedures 9. Does your emergency communications plan contain the following standardized elements in your operating protocols and procedures?

If “Other standardized elements” is checked, what other elements are contained in your operating protocols and procedures? (Written responses not included) 10. Does your state have a Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC)?

10a. What best describes the SWIC in your state?

10b. If “Other” is checked, what describes the SWIC in your state? (Written responses not included) 10c. How, if at all, have current SWIC responsibilities changed in the past 5 years?

10d. If “Other change” is checked, what other SWIC responsibilities have changed in the past 5 years? (Written responses not included) 10e. Does the SWIC also serve in the role of the FirstNet state Point of Contact (SPOC)?

10f. How is the SWIC position in your state funded? 10g. To what extent have the following factors contributed to your state NOT having a SWIC?

If “Other factor” is checked, what other factors contributed to your state not having a SWIC? (Written responses not included) 11. Does your state have a governance body supporting emergency communications planning? 11a. Generally, how often does the governance body in your state meet to discuss planning efforts to ensure emergency communications during disasters?

11b. Are public safety representatives from the following categories represented in your governance body?

International (states/territories near national boarders)

Non-Government (i.e., American Red Cross, public safety association groups, etc.)

11c. If no, what entities and individuals are responsible for overseeing emergency communications in the state? (Written responses not included) 12. Generally, how involved are the public safety representatives from the following categories in the planning and coordinating efforts to ensure continuous operable emergency communications in your state?

International (states/territories near national boarders)

Non-Government (i.e., American Red Cross, public safety association groups, etc.)

13. In developing and/or maintaining your state’s emergency communications plan, have you received technical assistance services offered by the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) within the Department of Homeland Security?

No (requested not received)

No (not requested)

14. Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the level of support for emergency communications planning from the OEC? 15. Have you experienced interoperability difficulties when communicating or attempting to communicate with federal partners during disasters? 15a. If yes, what interoperability difficulties did you experience when communicating or attempting to communicate with federal partners? (Written responses not included) 16. Since 2008, has your state received federal grant funding in support of emergency communications?

16a. What areas did the grant funding support?

Planning (standard operating procedures, protocols)

Technology (data and voice elements, common applications, base sharing, custom applications, swapping radios, gateways)

Usage (how often interoperability communications are used in planned events, localized emergency incidents, regional incidents, and daily use)

17. How, if at all, has the federal grant funding your state received in support of emergency communications changed in the past 5 years?

No change- (about the same)

18. What additional federal efforts, if any, are needed to help ensure operable, interoperable, and continuous emergency communications in your state during disasters? (Written responses not included) 19. Generally, how often, if at all, do the following challenges affect your state’s ability to ensure operable and continuous emergency communications during disasters in your state?

If “Other challenge” is checked, what other challenges affect your state’s ability to ensure operable and continuous emergency communications during disasters? (Written responses not included) 20. What actions, if any, has your state taken to address the items you identified as challenges in question 19? (Written responses not included) 21. What actions, if any, can the federal government take to address the items you identified as challenges in question 19? (Written responses not included) 22. If you would like to expand upon any of your responses to the questions above, or have any other comments about your state’s planning efforts to ensure operable and interoperable emergency communications, please enter them below. (Written responses not included)

Appendix III: Comments from Department of Homeland Security

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Sally Moino (Assistant Director), Enyinnaya David Aja, Cynae Derose, Eric Hudson, Cheryl Peterson, Kelly Rubin, Erik Shive, Andrew Stavisky, and Nancy Zearfoss made key contributions to this report.