Army Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Rebuilding Personnel, Equipping, and Training
Released: 2019-02-06T00:00:00

Letter

Background

DOD has reported that more than a decade of conflict, budget uncertainty, and reductions in force structure have degraded military readiness. In response, DOD has made rebuilding the readiness of the military forces a top priority. The 2018 National Defense Strategy states that the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition with China and Russia. Further, the strategy stresses that restoring and retaining readiness for large-scale combat is critical to success in this emerging security environment. Nevertheless, DOD reported that readiness of the total military force remains low and has remained so since 2013. In June 2017, we found that Army readiness goals and timelines for rebuilding readiness are not clear for all portions of the force, especially for the reserve component, although the Army is making progress in these areas.

Across the department, DOD has made progress in developing a plan to rebuild the readiness of the military force, with the military services providing regular input on the status of their readiness recovery efforts. In August 2018, we reported that the Office of the Secretary of Defense developed a Readiness Recovery Framework that the department is using to guide the services’ efforts, and plans and to regularly assess, validate, and monitor readiness recovery. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services have recently revised readiness goals and accompanying recovery strategies, metrics, and milestones to align with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance. According to The Army Strategy, the Army projects that it will reach its readiness goals by 2022, at which point its priority is expected to shift to modernization. We have ongoing work assessing DOD’s progress in achieving its overall readiness goals in each of five warfighting domains: ground, sea, air, space, and cyberspace.

The number one stated goal of Army leadership is readiness, including recovering the readiness lost from years of sustained conflict while preparing for potential large-scale combat operations against a global competitor such as Russia or China. These efforts are occurring in a challenging context that requires DOD to make difficult decisions regarding how best to address continuing operational demands while preparing for future challenges. An important aspect of this, across all of the military services, is determining an appropriate balance between maintaining and upgrading legacy weapon systems currently in operational use, and modernizing to ensure the ability to outpace advancing competitors. Our work has shown that the Army has improved ground force readiness in recent years; however, the Army has also identified capability shortcomings in its weapon systems and platforms that have yet to be addressed through its modernization efforts.

In an effort to achieve higher, more consistent levels of readiness over longer time periods, the Army is implementing a redesigned way to generate forces called the sustainable readiness concept. A key part of the concept includes determining readiness objectives by unit type, which are developed by comparing the numbers of key unit types against planned and potential warfighting demands. In addition, since 2014 the Army has invested significantly in stocks of warfighting equipment that are being stored in Europe, and has begun deploying armored formations to the continent on a continuous basis for training and exercises to enhance its readiness against potential Russian aggression.

As the Army works to rebuild and sustain higher readiness of its current force, the service is moving to update its doctrine, equipment, and formations to conduct operations in a more complex warfighting environment. The Army believes that it must be able to operate not only on land against potential adversaries, but also have the capability to act against them in other domains, namely air, sea, cyber, and space. The new Army Operating Concept, published in December 2018, describes how the Army would operate in a “multi-domain” environment. It identifies readiness as being key to deterring aggression from potential adversaries and, should conflict occur, addresses how Army forces would operate in multiple domains to penetrate anti-access and area denial systems. To support this concept, the Army’s modernization strategy aims to build the next generation of weapon systems and platforms that are more agile, lethal, resilient, and sustainable on the future battlefield. We have ongoing work reviewing the Army’s efforts to develop its multi-domain operations concept and to field capabilities to support such operations.

The Army Has Increased Personnel and Force Structure, but Manning and Management Challenges Remain

The Army is growing slightly from a previously-planned size of 980,000 uniformed personnel to just over 1 million personnel. The Army is also adjusting its force structure to address increasing operational risks as it prepares for potential combat operations against a major adversary. However, our work shows that the Army faces challenges in filling and maintaining key skills in a number of areas, and in managing the time Army personnel spend away from their home station.

The Army Is Adding End Strength and Capacity to Its Force, Reversing a Planned Decline

In 2016, we reported that the Army was planning to reduce its end strength from a high of about 1.11 million uniformed personnel in fiscal year 2011 to an end strength of 980,000 by fiscal year 2018. The Army stated that at this level it could execute the National Defense Strategy, but at significant risk. Army leadership testified in March 2015 that if there were further end strength reductions, the Army would not be able to execute the defense strategic guidance. We reported in 2016 that the Army needed to assess the risks associated with the planned reductions and better document its force-planning process. The Army concurred with both of our recommendations, changed the way it assessed risk, and made adjustments to its force structure based on these assessments.

After our 2016 report, Congress partly reversed these planned reductions by authorizing end-strength increases in fiscal years 2017 through 2019. The principal increase occurred in 2017, when Congress authorized an end strength of 1.018 million uniformed personnel, or 28,000 more than the Army had planned for that year. The Army’s authorized end strength since 2011, including planned end strength in 2017 and 2018, are summarized in figure 1.

Additionally, as we found since our 2016 report was published, the Army has added or plans to add capacity, including converting two infantry brigades into armored brigades and activating two new Mobile Short Range Air Defense battalions by fiscal year 2022, to better prepare the force for large-scale combat against major adversaries. Also, to support combat forces during a conflict, the Army is activating additional combat sustainment formations that are responsible for supply, distribution, and transportation. Our ongoing work has found that over the next few years the Army is building or plans to build several new cyber and electronic warfare units to operate at various levels within the force to make the Army more effective in contested environments.

The Army Faces Challenges in Meeting Authorized End Strength, Filling Key Skills Shortages and Managing Personnel Time Away from Home

According to the Chief of Staff of the Army, in a January 2019 speech, the Army has used its end strength increases to increase the manning of combat units. The goal of Army leadership is to fill operational units to 100 percent by the end of fiscal year 2019, and 105 percent by the end of fiscal year 2020. However, in preparing this statement we found that, in three of the past four years, the Army has fallen short of meeting its overall end strength authorizations. Army officials told us that these differences from the authorized end strength fall under the Secretary of Defense’s authority to reduce the end strengths by a certain amount. Moreover, these officials added that in 2015 and 2016, the Army was drawing down end strength and planning further reductions. However, the Army fell short of its end strength authorization by 0.38 percent in 2017, and fell short again by 2.56 percent in 2018. The percentage differences between authorized and actual end strength for the total Army, from 2015 through 2018, are summarized in figure 2.

As we prepared this statement, Army officials told us that the primary reason why it has struggled to meet its authorized end strength is because it has had difficulty meeting recruiting goals, which have negatively affected the Army’s ability to expand the force. For example, Army officials told us the Army was short of its goal for 2018 by 6,500 new recruits for the regular Army. Army officials told us that the Army does not expect to be able to achieve its authorized end strength for fiscal year 2019. Looking ahead, the Army is considering revisions to its expansion plans and now expects to reach a new end strength goal by 2025.

In addition to challenges in meeting authorized end strength, our past and ongoing work indicates that the Army faces challenges in filling and maintaining key skills in a number of areas, and in managing the time Army personnel spend away from their home station. Both of these challenges can negatively affect readiness. For example:

Accelerated activation of Security Force Assistance Brigades led to manning challenges. In December 2018, we reported that the Army’s decision to deploy the first security force assistance brigade 8 months earlier than planned posed challenges to manning the unit. The Army currently plans to activate up to six of these brigades (one in the U.S. Army National Guard) by the end of fiscal year 2019. The Army views the Security Force Assistance Brigades to be critical to restoring the readiness of its combat forces. Prior to their formation, the Army met security force assistance missions by, among other things, pulling senior leaders and other personnel with specific ranks and skills from active-duty brigades, which compromised their readiness for large-scale combat.

The Army has had difficulty filling new cyber and electronic warfare units. During our ongoing work, we have found that the Army has had difficulty filling new formations with personnel to conduct operations in the cyber domain, including electronic warfare. In October 2018, the Army activated part of a Multi-Domain Task Force, which is focused on intelligence, information, cyber, electronic warfare, and space missions and is being used in major exercises in the Pacific region. However, Army headquarters officials told us that the Army activated the unit as a pilot, or a test, unit and with an accelerated timeline to learn how the new formation should be structured, equipped, and trained. Based on our ongoing work, filling the unit with personnel with the right skills has been a slow process. Near the end of January 2019 the unit was staffed at 50 percent, and the Army projects it will reach 75 percent by August 2019, according to Army headquarters officials. The officials added that many of the shortages are in senior level and cyber positions. Meanwhile, Army documentation obtained during our ongoing work shows that the service is considering options for creating more task forces for other regions. Additionally, there are plans for new cyber and electronic warfare force structure supporting Brigade Combat Teams. Army officials stated that these will be fielded in an accelerated manner as well, adding that filling these units could be challenging because cyber personnel are in high demand. Army headquarters officials said they are exploring options to address the challenges.

Army depots have had difficulty filling and maintaining critical skills in their workforces. For our December 2018 report, officials told us that Army depots experienced consistent challenges in hiring critical personnel. Also, we reported that workload fluctuations usually resulted in too little workload to maintain proficiency in certain skills. For example, we reported that a hiring freeze at Corpus Christi Army Depot in 2017 caused shortages of civilian flight test pilots, who are responsible for test flights before returning aircraft to service after maintenance. The Army, however, had not assessed how effective the depots have been at hiring, training, and retaining the critical skills of their workforce. We recommended that the Army do this, as personnel challenges such as these have affected depots’ ability to meet mission requirements and created maintenance delays for some equipment. The Army concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would assess the effectiveness of the depots’ hiring, training, and retention programs to ensure Army requirements are met and critical skills are maintained.

The Army has had difficulty manning ballistic missile defense units. As we reported in October 2017, the Army’s Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense forces have been in high demand for many years. Army officials told us at the time that with reductions in end strength, the Army in 2016 stopped its practice of assigning extra personnel to these units to ensure operational requirements would be met. Army officials stated that the high aptitude standards and specialized nature of operating Patriot and THAAD systems reduced the number of eligible recruits. Officials also stated that enlistment shortfalls could have long-term effects on these forces’ operations and career development. Since we issued our report, Army officials told us that fewer-than-expected new recruits had advanced into Patriot and THAAD career fields in 2018, but the Army was forecasting improvements.

High personnel tempos can negatively affect personnel. In 2018, we reported that the pace of operations has had a negative effect on Army readiness, including Brigade Combat Teams and Combat Aviation Brigades. We also reported that managing personnel tempo—the amount of time that individual service members spend away from home on official duties—had been a persistent challenge for the Army. In 2015, the Army issued a regulation identifying a personnel tempo threshold for its service members, but officials told us that the threshold is not enforced and stated the regulation was published only to emphasize that personnel tempo data was a priority. We found that personnel tempo data collected by DOD was incomplete. However, we estimated from the data that at least 41 percent of Army service members who were away from their home station in fiscal year 2016 were away for more than 7 months. Because time away from home can stress the force, we recommended that DOD or the Army take steps to clarify and follow personnel tempo guidance on thresholds, and also take steps to emphasize the collection of complete and reliable personnel tempo data to allow monitoring. DOD concurred with both recommendations.

The Army Is Developing New Warfighting Concepts and Modernizing Equipment, but Faces Challenges in Maintenance Timeliness and Managing Modernization Efforts

The Army Is Developing Concepts for Future Warfare and Modernizing Its Equipment to Support Future Readiness

The Army is in the process of updating and developing new concepts and equipment to deal with a future environment that will be increasingly lethal, competitive, complex, and dynamic. The Army anticipates that it will have to contend with a resurgent Russia and a rising China, as well as regional challenges from North Korea and Iran. According to the Army, these adversaries have improved their military capabilities, in particular their ability to prevent U.S. forces from massing close to the potential battlefield, thereby eroding advantages that the Army has enjoyed for decades. Once deployed, the Army stated it expects that its forces will be constantly under surveillance and potentially under attack.

To counter the adversaries’ threats, the Army is focusing on updating warfighting concepts and modernizing the force. In December 2018, the Army published a new Army Operating Concept that is specifically designed to deter and defeat China and Russia, and addresses large- scale ground combat. The concept emphasizes that the Army must demonstrate its readiness to conduct multi-domain operations—such as ground, air, and cyber—as a key part of deterring adversaries from escalation.

To support its readiness for future missions in this complex environment, the Army has begun to update or upgrade multiple weapon systems. In April 2018, the Army published its Army Modernization Strategy, which identified six priorities that are key to operationalizing multi-domain operations, including long-range precision fires and next generation combat vehicles, as shown in table 1. All six of these priorities involve modernizing equipment and/or acquiring new equipment with improved capabilities.

The Army has identified the need to make changes to how it develops and acquires new weapons systems. To that end, the Army established the Army Futures Command to provide unity of command, accountability, and modernization at the speed and scale required to prevail in future conflicts.

The Army Faces Equipping Challenges Due to Maintenance and Modernization Management Issues

Our prior work has found that the Army has faced challenges with managing maintenance efforts and developing requirements for future weapon systems. Some of the challenges include the following:

The Army lacks an implementation plan to guide its retrograde and reset activities, which could lead to inconsistent reset efforts. As we reported in May 2016, officials from different Army entities disagreed about which documents constituted their guidance for implementing retrograde and reset, suggesting that there was confusion about the Army’s strategies for these activities. We recommended that the Army develop an implementation plan for its retrograde and reset efforts. In August 2018, however, we reported that the Army did not have plans to act on this recommendation. According to one official, this was because guidance and plans are adjusted based on the unique circumstances of each situation. Given the Army’s drawdown of equipment used during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is coming to a close, we continue to believe that an implementation plan for retrograde and reset of equipment used during any future operations would help ensure that the Army more consistently and effectively budgets for and distributes resources.

The Army has not comprehensively assessed the causes of reset maintenance delays for Patriot equipment, which can limit unit training time. In June 2018, we reported that of seven Patriot battalions undergoing reset in fiscal years 2014 through 2017, only one received all of its equipment back from depot maintenance within the Army’s policy of 180 days, as shown in figure 3.

Since delays in returning equipment to units can reduce units’ training time, we recommended that the Army analyze the various factors affecting reset delays—such as equipment arriving late to the depot, supply chain delays, and worker errors—to identify their relative importance and inform corrective actions. The Army concurred with our recommendation, stating that it will identify and address factors that may affect reset timeliness.

The Army’s near-term modernization efforts face management challenges. In September 2018, we reported that the Army had not established processes for evaluating its modernization efforts against its overarching objective of outpacing rapidly advancing competitors, such as Russia or China. Also, we found that the Army had not fully estimated the costs of its near-term modernization efforts. Further, we found that the Army’s April 2018 modernization strategy report set near-term goals for closing critical capability gaps and a longer term, overarching objective of being able to decisively defeat major adversaries. The strategy also identified the cost of key modernization investments through fiscal year 2023, but did not discuss tens of billions in already-programmed modernization-related investments, or describe how the funding would support upgrades for existing weapon systems. Moreover, the strategy did not disclose the extent to which the Army had relied on Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) appropriations for upgrading weapon systems. Army officials told us at the time that the Army had been preparing to analyze its efforts to address specific warfighting capability gaps, but had not decided on an overall evaluation approach. Additionally, officials told us that the Army planned to reflect its analysis of near-term modernization investments in the fiscal year 2020 budget submission. We recommended that the Army (1) develop a plan to finalize the processes for evaluating how its near-term investments contribute to the Army’s ability to decisively defeat a major adversary, and (2) finalize its cost analysis of near-term investments and report those costs to Congress. The Army concurred with our recommendations.

The Army has been unable to ensure that requirements for new warfighting capabilities are feasible. In June 2017, we reported that the Army had prioritized combat readiness and rebuilding force structure over resourcing its requirements development process to meet future readiness needs. We reported that even though the Army made some improvements in this area, officials were unable to ensure requirements for major defense acquisition programs were well-informed and feasible because of workforce constraints. For example, we found that the Army’s requirements development workforce declined by 22 percent from 2008 to 2017, with some requirements development centers reporting more significant reductions. In that report, we recommended that the Army assess the resources necessary for the requirements development process and determine whether shortfalls can be addressed given other funding priorities. The Army concurred with our recommendation. In 2018, Army officials told us that the Army plans to implement this recommendation once Army Futures Command is fully operational and key Army development entities are reorganized under its command.

The Army has not fully applied leading practices for technology development in its modernization efforts. We reported in January 2019 that while the Army has generally applied leading practices identified by GAO to its modernization efforts, it may be beginning weapon systems development at a lower level of maturity than what leading practices recommend. As we concluded in that report, establishing Army Futures Command creates unique opportunities for the Army to improve its modernization efforts. However, proceeding into weapon systems development before technology is sufficiently mature raises the risk that the resulting systems could experience cost increases, delivery delays, or failure to deliver desired capabilities. The Army concurred with our four recommendations to apply leading practices and lessons learned as it moves forward with its modernization efforts. In its response to our January 2019 report, the Army stated that it would conduct operational technology demonstrations and was exploring a train-the-trainer program, among other actions.

The Army Has Made Progress Implementing Its Training Priorities and Addressing Past Issues, but Faces Some Implementation Challenges

Our prior work has shown that the Army has made progress in preparing the force for large-scale combat operations by increasing training exercises and reducing mandatory training requirements. It also has addressed past issues we reported on, including making better use of virtual training devices and accounting for the training needs of supporting units in its Pacific Pathways exercises. Moreover, our prior and ongoing work has shown that the Army faces implementation challenges in training new units that the Army plans to field on shortened schedules.

The Army Has Made Progress Implementing Its Training Priorities and Addressing Past Challenges

Army units are receiving more frequent training for large-scale combat. Our prior work has shown that the Army has made progress in preparing the force for large-scale combat by increasing training exercises. After a decade of focusing its training on counterinsurgency operations, the Army assessed that opportunities to train thousands of company commanders, field-grade officers, and battalion commanders on tasks related to large-scale combat were lost. However, in August 2016, we reported that the Army increased the number of brigades that had completed a decisive-action exercise from one brigade combat team in fiscal year 2011 to 14 brigade combat teams in fiscal year 2015, while at the same time decreasing training for counterinsurgency. We noted in a September 2016 report that a key part of the Army’s plan to rebuild readiness was to ensure that soldiers have repeated training experience on their core competencies. Since we completed our work, the Army is funding up to 26 brigade combat teams to go through a decisive-action training event at its combat training centers in fiscal year 2019.

Mandatory training and directed tasks have been reduced. In August 2016, we also reported that the Army had determined that mandatory training requirements and directed tasks were too numerous and were creating challenges for commanders in balancing their units’ training time with these other requirements. Additionally, we identified steps the Army had taken to make these requirements less burdensome. We reported, for example, that the Army had delegated authority to two-star commanders to exempt units, as needed, from certain mandatory training. We reported that the Army had begun to lock in a unit’s planned training six weeks in advance, in an effort to protect units from external tasks that could affect training schedules of brigades and their subordinate units. The early setting of training schedules was intended to prevent an external task from interfering with that training. We did not make any recommendations related to reducing mandatory training; however; since we completed our work, the Secretary of the Army has directed the elimination of numerous individual training requirements, such as eliminating certain requirements to train in avoiding accidents, and other administrative tasks, such as maintaining a physical reference library of corrosion prevention and control publications.

The Army is making better use of virtual devices to train and prepare units. In the same 2016 report, we identified a number of challenges the Army faced in using virtual training devices to help units prepare for major conflict. Using such devices is important because of the challenges of training for combat in a live environment, such as limited range availability and resource constraints. We reported that the Army had taken some steps to improve the integration of virtual training devices into its operational training. However, our work identified several factors that limited the Army’s ability to conduct training with virtual training devices, including outdated virtual training policies, a lack of guidance for analyzing the effectiveness of virtual training devices, and the need to better integrate devices in training strategies. As of January 2019, the Army has implemented two of the three recommendations we made in our report. Specifically, the Army published a training analysis best- practices guide, analyzed virtual training devices’ effectiveness, and analyzed regular Army formations’ readiness training models, among other steps to implement these recommendations. Additionally, the Army further plans to modify its policy on virtual training devices in 2021, which would require that training developers consider the amount of time available to train with or expected usage rates of new virtual training devices. Further, in preparing this statement, Army officials told us that the Army has used acquisition authorities provided by Congress to prototype new technologies to replace existing simulators. It is investing in these prototypes based on the usage rates of the older training equipment, and at the same time involving operational forces in the prototyping for their feedback and to help inform requirements.

The Army is taking some steps to improve its Pacific Pathways initiative. In November 2016, we reported on an initiative, known as Pacific Pathways, intended to strengthen relationships with allies and build readiness by combining certain exercises with partner nations. The Army began the Pacific Pathways initiative—which deploys a battalion-size task force to the Asia-Pacific region to conduct multiple exercises over 90 days—as a way of building the readiness of its participating units. We found that the size and complexity of the operations under Pacific Pathways created potentially unique training opportunities for supporting units—such as transportation units—to exercise the capabilities they would be required to provide in a contingency. However, we found that the Army could improve its approach by fully synchronizing Army plans, stakeholders, and objectives into the exercises. The Army has implemented two of the recommendations that we made in our report to modify processes and guidance so that stakeholders are integrated into the planning, and also to seek and incorporate the training objectives of supporting units. U.S. Army Pacific officials have stated that they do not plan to implement the recommendation to perform a cost-benefit analysis of Pacific Pathways because it is not required.

The Army Faces Challenges with Training Pilots for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), and Personnel for New Cyber Units

Our prior and ongoing work has identified some challenges that the Army faces in training personnel in particular specialties, especially as it stands up new units on shortened schedules. These include:

A lack of training facilities and airspace creates challenges for UAS pilot training and further steps could be taken to enhance pilot candidate selection. In January 2017, we reported that the Army’s UAS pilot training strategy did not account for some challenges the Army faced, such as a lack of adequate training facilities and limited available airspace. The Army used flexibilities to overcome some of these challenges, but at the time of our report it was too early to tell whether these flexibilities would be enough to overcome training shortfalls. In addition, we found that the way the Army assessed whether service members were good candidates for UAS pilot training could have been improved. For example, we reported that the Army used only 3 of the 78 identified competencies that an Army-Air Force research team identified as “moderately,” “highly,” or “extremely important” for UAS pilots. We made recommendations on these issues, and DOD partially concurred, stating that although the actions we recommended were prudent or already an integral part of workforce management, additional Army guidance would be unnecessary.

Fielding and deploying new types of units can pose challenges to training. The accelerated pace at which the Army is creating new units can pose challenges to training and readiness. As previously discussed, the Army is activating new units to sustain readiness and to operate in a more complex environment. However, the Army’s approach can pose training challenges, and negatively affect readiness. Also, our ongoing work indicates that the Army is fielding new cyber units at an accelerated pace, resulting in the units not having either fully trained personnel or the equipment to conduct training, according to Army officials. For example, the Army is planning to add uniformed personnel who specialize in cyber operations to its combat units and as part of newly established Multi- Domain Task Forces, but there is not yet a clear understanding of the tasks they will have to perform or an updated training strategy to support them, according to Army officials. Army officials stated that this will affect the readiness of the units to perform their missions, but they are taking steps to clarify and update these issues. - - - - - In sum, while the Army has made progress in rebuilding readiness, it continues to face challenges meeting its goals. Moreover, the Army will need to balance the readiness of its existing force with plans to grow and modernize. We have made 44 recommendations that the Army has generally concurred with; the Army has implemented 7 of them, and taken actions to begin implementing many others. These recommendations provide a partial roadmap to address important readiness challenges, and implementing our recommendations to improve the management of personnel, equipment maintenance, and training would help the Army meet current threats and assist it as it refocuses on readiness for large- scale combat operations. In addition, sustained management attention and continued congressional oversight will be needed to ensure that the Army demonstrates progress in addressing its personnel, equipment, and training challenges.

Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Kaine, and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

If you or your staff have questions about this testimony, please contact John H. Pendleton, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.

Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Kevin O’Neill (Assistant Director), Matthew Spiers (Analyst In Charge), Steven Bagley, Rebecca Beale, Cynthia Grant, Kris Keener, Alberto Leff, Amie Lesser, Jon R. Ludwigson, Shahrzad Nikoo, Marcus Oliver, Richard Powelson, James A. Reynolds, Cary Russell, Michael Silver, Matthew Ullengren, Nicole Volchko, Erik Wilkins-McKee, Matthew Young, and Delia Zee.

Appendix I: Implementation Status of Prior GAO Recommendations Related to Army Readiness

Over the past 4 years, we issued several reports related to Army readiness that are cited in this statement. Table 2 summarizes the status of key GAO recommendations related to Army and DOD components in coordination with the Army since 2016, which include a total of 44 recommendations. The Department of Defense has implemented 7 of these recommendations to date. For each of the reports, the specific recommendations and their implementation status are summarized in tables 3 through 19.

Related Prior GAO Work

Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army Futures Command Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132. Washington, D.C.: January 23, 2019.

DOD Depot Workforce: Services Need to Assess the Effectiveness of Their Initiative to Maintain Critical Skills [Reissued with revisions on December 26, 2018.], GAO-19-51. Washington, D.C.: December 14, 2018.

Navy and Marine Corps: Rebuilding Ship, Submarine, and Aviation Readiness Will Require Time and Sustained Management Attention, GAO-19-225T. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2018.

Air Force Readiness: Actions Needed to Rebuild Readiness and Prepare for the Future, GAO-19-120T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2018.

Army Modernization: Actions Needed to Measure Progress and to Fully Identify Near-Term Costs, GAO-18-604SU. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2018.

Military Readiness: Analysis of Maintenance Delays Needed to Improve Availability of Patriot Equipment for Training, GAO-18-447. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2018.

Military Readiness: Clear Policy and Reliable Data Would Help DOD Better Manage Service Members’ Time Away from Home, GAO-18-253. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2018.

European Reassurance Initiative: DOD Needs to Prioritize Posture Initiatives and Plan for and Report their Future Cost, GAO-18-128. Washington, D.C.: December 8, 2017.

Military Readiness: Personnel Shortfalls and Persistent Operational Demands Strain Army Missile Defense Units and Personnel, GAO-18-168SU. Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2017.

Army Weapon Systems Requirements: Need to Address Workforce Shortfalls to Make Necessary Improvements, GAO-17-568. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2017.

Supply Chain Management: DOD Could More Efficiently Use Its Distribution Centers, GAO-17-449. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2017.

Army Readiness: Progress Made Implementing New Concept, but Actions Needed to Improve Results, GAO-17-458SU. Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2017.

Unmanned Aerial Systems: Air Force and Army Should Improve Strategic Human Capital Planning for Pilot Workforces, GAO-17-53. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2017.

Comprehensive Assessment and Planning Needed to Capture Benefits Relative to Costs and Enhance Value for Participating Units [Reissued on November 30, 2016], GAO-17-126. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2016.

Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan, GAO-16-841. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2016.

Patriot Modernization: Oversight Mechanism Needed to Track Progress and Provide Accountability, GAO-16-488. Washington, D.C.: August 25, 2016.

Army Training: Efforts to Adjust Training Requirements Should Consider the Use of Virtual Training Devices, GAO-16-636. Washington, D.C.: August 16, 2016.

Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Incorporate Elements of a Strategic Management Planning Framework into Retrograde and Reset Guidance, GAO-16-414. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2016.

Army Planning: Comprehensive Risk Assessment Needed for Planned Changes to the Army’s Force Structure, GAO-16-327. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2016.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.