Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate Data
Released: 2010-06-29T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is managed by NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), which is managed by the Air Force. These satellites obtain environmental data that are processed to provide graphical weather images and specialized weather products. These satellite data are also the predominant input to numerical weather prediction models, which are a primary tool for forecasting weather days in advance—including forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes. The weather products and models are used to predict the potential impact of severe weather so that communities and emergency managers can help prevent and mitigate its effects. Polar satellites also provide data used to monitor environmental phenomena, such as ozone depletion and drought conditions, as well as data sets that are used by researchers for a variety of studies such as climate monitoring.

Unlike geostationary satellites, which maintain a fixed position relative to the earth, polar-orbiting satellites constantly circle the earth in an almost north-south orbit, providing global coverage of conditions that affect the weather and climate. Each satellite makes about 14 orbits a day. As the earth rotates beneath it, each satellite views the entire earth’s surface twice a day. Currently, there is one operational POES satellite and two operational DMSP satellites that are positioned so that they cross the equator in the early morning, midmorning, and early afternoon. In addition, the government is also relying on a European satellite, called the Meteorological Operational (MetOp) satellite. Together, they ensure that, for any region of the earth, the data provided to users are generally no more than 6 hours old. Besides the four operational satellites, six older satellites are in orbit that still collect some data and are available to provide limited backup to the operational satellites should they degrade or fail. The last POES satellite was launched in February 2009 and declared operational in early June 2009. The Air Force plans to launch its two remaining DMSP satellites as needed. Figure 1 illustrates the current ustrates the current operational polar satellite configuration. operational polar satellite configuration.

Polar Satellite Data and Products

Polar satellites gather a broad range of data that are transformed into a variety of products. Satellite sensors observe different bands of radiation wavelengths, called channels, which are used for remotely determining information about the earth’s atmosphere, land surface, oceans, and the space environment. When first received, satellite data are considered raw data. To make them usable, processing centers format the data so that they are time-sequenced and include earth location and calibration information. After formatting, these data are called raw data records. The centers further process these raw data records into channel-specific data sets, called sensor data records and temperature data records. These data records are then used to derive weather and climate products called environmental data records. These environmental data records include a wide range of atmospheric products detailing cloud coverage, temperature, humidity, and ozone distribution; land surface products showing snow cover, vegetation, and land use; ocean products depicting sea surface temperatures, sea ice, and wave height; and characterizations of the space environment. Combinations of these data records (raw, sensor, temperature, and environmental data records) are also used to derive more sophisticated products, including outputs from numerical weather models and assessments of climate trends. Figure 2 is a simplified depiction of the various stages of satellite data processing, and figure 3 depicts examples of two different weather products.

NPOESS Overview: Inception, Management Structure, and Acquisition Strategy

With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the two satellite programs into a single satellite program capable of satisfying both civilian and military requirements. The converged program, NPOESS, was considered critical to the nation’s ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global climate monitoring.

To manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency Integrated Program Office. Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain activities: NOAA has overall program management responsibility for the converged system and for satellite operations; the Air Force has the lead on the acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility for facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies into the converged system. NOAA and DOD share the cost of funding NPOESS, while NASA funds specific technology projects and studies. In addition, an Executive Committee—made up of the administrators of NOAA and NASA and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics—is responsible for providing policy guidance, ensuring agency support and funding, and exercising oversight authority. Figure 4 depicts the organizations that make up the NPOESS program office and lists their responsibilities.

NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated to cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from its inception in 1995 through 2018. The program includes satellite development, satellite launch and operation, and ground-based satellite data processing. When the NPOESS engineering, manufacturing, and development contract was awarded in August 2002, the cost estimate was adjusted to $7 billion.

Acquisition plans called for the procurement and launch of six satellites over the life of the program, as well as the integration of 13 instruments— consisting of 10 environmental sensors and 3 subsystems. Together, the sensors were to receive and transmit data on atmospheric, cloud cover, environmental, climatic, oceanographic, and solar-geophysical observations. The subsystems were to support non-environmental search and rescue efforts, system survivability, and environmental data collection activities.

In addition, a demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP), was planned to be launched several years before the first NPOESS satellite in order to reduce the risk associated with launching new sensor technologies and ensure continuity of climate data with NASA’s Earth Observing System satellites. NPP is a joint mission between the NPOESS program office and NASA. NPP was to host four NPOESS sensors and provide the program office and the processing centers an early opportunity to work with the sensors, ground control, and data processing systems.

When the NPOESS development contract was awarded in 2002, the schedule for launching the satellites was driven by a requirement that the NPOESS satellites be available to back up the final POES and DMSP satellites should anything go wrong during the planned launches of these satellites. Early program milestones included (1) launching NPP by May 2006, (2) having the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the final POES satellite launch then planned for March 2008, and (3) having the second NPOESS satellite available to back up the final DMSP satellite launch then planned for October 2009. If the NPOESS satellites were not needed to back up the final predecessor satellites, their anticipated launch dates would have been April 2009 and June 2011, respectively.

Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical Problems Led to a Decision to Restructure NPOESS in 2006

Over several years, we reported that NPOESS had experienced continued cost increases, schedule delays, and serious technical problems. By November 2005, we estimated that the cost of the program had grown from $7 billion to over $10 billion. In addition, the program was experiencing major technical problems with a critical imaging sensor that were expected to delay the launch date of the first satellite by almost 2 years. These issues ultimately required difficult decisions to be made about the program’s direction and capabilities.

The Nunn-McCurdy law requires DOD to take specific actions when a major defense acquisition program’s cost growth exceeds certain thresholds. Where applicable, the law requires the Secretary of Defense to certify the program to Congress when it is expected to overrun its current baseline by 25 percent or more. In November 2005, NPOESS breached the 25 percent threshold, and DOD was required to certify the program for it to continue. The requirements for certifying a program, as relevant here, involved a determination that (1) the program is essential to national security, (2) there are no alternatives to the program that will provide equal or greater military capability at less cost, (3) the new estimates of the program’s cost are reasonable, and (4) the management structure for the program is adequate to manage and control costs. DOD established tri- agency teams—made up of DOD, NOAA, and NASA experts—to work on each of the four elements of the certification process.

In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner agencies) certified a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to cost $12.5 billion through 2024—an increase of $4 billion more than the prior life-cycle cost estimate. This restructuring decision delayed the launch of NPP and the first two satellites (called C1 and C2) by roughly 3 to 5 years—a deviation from the requirement to have NPOESS satellites available to back up the final POES and DMSP satellites should anything go wrong during those launches. The restructured program also reduced the number of satellites to be produced by relying on European satellites for the midmorning orbit and planning to use NPOESS satellites in the early-morning and afternoon orbits. In addition, in order to reduce program complexity, the Nunn- McCurdy certification decision decreased the number of NPOESS instruments from 13 to 9 and reduced the functionality of 4 sensors. Table 1 summarizes the major program changes made by the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision and table 2 describes the sensors that were planned for NPP and NPOESS after the Nunn-McCurdy certification.

The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of the resulting weather and environmental products. In selecting sensors for the restructured program during the Nunn-McCurdy process, decision makers placed the highest priority on continuing current operational weather capabilities and a lower priority on obtaining selected environmental and climate measuring capabilities. As a result, the revised NPOESS system had significantly less capability for providing global climate, ocean, and space environment measures than was originally planned. Specifically, the number of environmental data records was decreased from 55 to 39, of which 6 were of a reduced quality. The 39 data records that remain include cloud base height, land surface temperature, precipitation type and rate, and sea surface winds. The 16 data records that were removed include cloud particle size and distribution, sea surface height, net solar radiation at the top of the atmosphere, and products to depict the electric fields in the space environment. The six data records that are of a reduced quality include ozone profile, soil moisture, and multiple products depicting energy in the space environment.

After the 2006 Nunn-McCurdy decision, the NPOESS Executive Committee decided to add selected sensors back to individual satellites in order to address concerns from the climate community about the loss of key climate data. In January 2008, the Committee approved plans to include the Clouds and the Earth’s Radiant Energy System sensor on the NPP satellite. In addition, in May 2008, the Committee approved plans to include a Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor on the C1 satellite. Table 3 shows which sensors were planned for NPP and the four satellites of the NPOESS program, called C1, C2, C3, and C4, as of May 2008. Program officials acknowledged that these configurations could change if other parties decide to develop the sensors that were canceled.

NPOESS Continued to Experience Management Challenges, Cost Overruns, and Schedule Delays after the 2006 Restructuring

After the program was restructured, the NPOESS program continued to experience cost growth, schedule delays, and management challenges. In April 2007, we reported that DOD’s plans to reassign the Program Executive Officer would unnecessarily increase risks to an already risky program. We also reported that, while the program office had made progress in restructuring NPOESS after the June 2006 Nunn-McCurdy certification decision, important tasks leading up to finalizing contract changes remained to be completed. Specifically, executive approval of key acquisition documents was about 6 months late at that time—due in part to the complexity of navigating three agencies’ approval processes. To address these issues, we recommended that DOD delay the reassignment of the Program Executive Officer until all sensors were delivered to NPP, and that the appropriate agency executives finalize key acquisition documents by the end of April 2007.

In May 2008, we reported that DOD had reassigned the Program Executive Officer and that key acquisition documents were more than a year late. We reiterated our prior recommendation that the agencies immediately complete the acquisition documents. In addition, we reported that poor workmanship and testing delays caused an 8-month slip to the expected delivery date of the Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) sensor. This late delivery caused a corresponding delay in the expected launch date of the NPP demonstration satellite, moving it to June 2010.

In June 2008, we also reported that the program’s life-cycle costs, estimated at $12.5 billion, were expected to rise by approximately $1 billion because of problems experienced in the development of the VIIRS and Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS) sensors, the need to revise outdated operations and support cost estimates, and the need to modify information security requirements on ground systems. Program officials subsequently modified their life-cycle cost estimate in December 2008 to $13.95 billion, which included about $1.15 billion for revised pre- and post- launch operations and support costs and about $300 million to address development issues. The revised cost estimate did not include funds to modify information security requirements.

In June 2009, we added to our previous concerns about the tri-agency oversight of the NPOESS program. Specifically, we reported that the Executive Committee was ineffective because the DOD acquisition executive did not attend committee meetings; the committee did not track its action items to closure; and many of the committee’s decisions did not achieve desired outcomes. We also reported that the life-cycle cost estimate of $13.95 billion was expected to rise by another $1 billion, and the schedules for NPP and the first two NPOESS satellites were expected to be delayed by 7, 14, and 5 months, respectively. (See table 4 for the history of cost and schedule estimates for the program.) We recommended that the DOD Executive Committee member attend and participate in Executive Committee meetings, and that the Executive Committee better track and manage risk and action items. Additionally, we recommended that the program develop plans to mitigate the risk of gaps in satellite continuity and establish a realistic time frame for revising the program’s cost and schedule baselines.

To address risks and challenges, the NPOESS Executive Committee sponsored a series of reviews of the program. Two of the reviews, conducted in 2007 and 2008, examined the feasibility of alternative management strategies. Both of these reviews recommended against changing the prime contractor and made recommendations to improve other aspects of program management—including the government’s executive and program management and the contractor’s management. In the fall of 2008, an independent review team assessed the program and delivered its final report in June 2009. Among other things, the independent review team found that the program had a low probability of success, the continuity of data was at risk, and the priorities of DOD and NOAA were not aligned. The team recommended using NPP data operationally to mitigate potential gaps in coverage, co-locating the program at an acquisition center, and involving the White House to resolve priority differences. In March 2009, in response to a draft of the review team’s report, the NPOESS Executive Committee decided to use NPP data operationally.

Executive Office Review Led to a Decision to Disband the NPOESS Program

In August 2009, the Executive Office of the President formed a task force, led by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), to investigate the management and acquisition options that would improve the NPOESS program. Specifically, the task force sought to identify a governance structure that would address the problems in schedule and budget, and the risk of a loss of satellite data due to delays in launching the satellites. In performing its review, the task force worked with NOAA, DOD, and NASA representatives and attended Executive Committee meetings.

In February 2010, the Director of OSTP announced that NOAA and DOD will no longer jointly procure the NPOESS satellite system; instead, each agency would plan and acquire its own satellite system. Specifically, NOAA is to be responsible for the afternoon orbit and the observations planned for the first and third NPOESS satellites. DOD is to be responsible for the morning orbit and the observations planned for the second and fourth NPOESS satellites. The partnership with the European satellite agencies for the midmorning orbit is to continue as planned. In addition, the task force explained that partnerships between DOD, NOAA, and NASA should continue and encouraged the agencies to continue joint efforts in the areas that have been successful in the past, such as the command and control of the satellites. Moving forward, while NOAA and DOD develop plans for separate acquisitions, the development of key components of the NPOESS program is continuing. Specifically, the program is continuing to develop the instruments and ground systems supporting NPP and selected components of the first two NPOESS satellites, which will likely be needed by the NOAA and DOD follow-on programs.

Agencies Have Begun Planning for Separate Acquisitions, but the Impact of This New Approach Is Not Fully Known and Key Transition Risks Exist

NOAA and DOD have begun planning to transition the NPOESS program to separate acquisitions, but the agencies are at different stages in planning and neither has finalized its plans. NOAA has developed preliminary plans for a new program to fulfill the requirements of the afternoon NPOESS orbit. DOD has just begun planning how it will meet the requirements of the morning orbit, and expects to have initial decisions on how it will proceed in acquiring the spacecraft and sensors by June 2010 and October 2010, respectively. Because neither agency has completed its plans, the impact of the decision to disband the program on expected costs, schedules, and promised capabilities has not yet been fully determined. However, it is likely that the decision will further delay the first satellite’s launch schedule, add to the overall cost, and remove selected capabilities. Moving forward, the agencies face key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to two separate programs. These risks include the loss of key staff and capabilities, added delays in negotiating contract changes and establishing new program offices, the loss of support for the other agency’s requirements, and insufficient oversight of new program management. Until these risks are effectively mitigated, it is likely that the satellite programs’ costs will continue to grow and launch dates will continue to be delayed. Further delays are likely to jeopardize the availability and continuity of weather and climate data.

NOAA and DOD Have Begun Planning for Their Separate Acquisitions, but the Impact on Cost, Schedule, and Capabilities Is Not Fully Known

NOAA and DOD have begun planning to transition the NPOESS program to separate acquisitions, but the two agencies are at different stages in planning. NOAA has developed preliminary plans for its new satellite acquisition program—called the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS). Specifically, NOAA developed plans for two satellites to fly in the afternoon orbit. NOAA plans to have the first JPSS satellite, formerly NPOESS C1, available for launch in 2015, and the second JPSS satellite, formerly NPOESS C3, available for launch in 2018. NOAA will also provide the ground systems for both the JPSS and DOD programs. Current plans estimate that the life-cycle cost of the JPSS program will be approximately $11.9 billion, which includes $2.9 billion in NOAA funds spent on NPOESS through fiscal year 2010.

NOAA is also considering technical changes to the program that involve the size of the spacecraft and the sensors to be included on each of the satellites. Specifically, NOAA is considering using a smaller spacecraft than the one planned for NPOESS. NOAA is also considering removing sensors that were planned for the NPOESS C1 and C3 satellites and obtaining those data from other sources, including international satellites. Table 5 includes preliminary plans for which sensors will be accommodated on the JPSS satellites.

The management of the JPSS satellites will also change from that of the NPOESS satellites. NOAA plans to transfer the management of acquisition from the NPOESS program office to NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, so that it can be co-located at a space system acquisition center as advocated by the NPOESS independent review team. According to NOAA officials, the agency will provide direction, requirements, and budget to NASA. NOAA will also provide staff, including a program director and program scientist. A NASA employee will function as program manager. In addition, NOAA has developed a team to lead the transition from NPOESS to JPSS and has included representatives from NOAA, NASA, and DOD. Because this team has just been formed, they have not yet fully developed plans to guide the transition. NOAA officials plan to begin transitioning in July, and complete the transition plan—including cost and schedule estimates—by the end of September.

DOD is at an earlier stage in its planning process, in part because it has more time before the first satellite in the morning orbit is needed. DOD officials are currently reviewing requirements for the morning orbit and plan to define how to proceed by the end of June 2010. After this review is completed, DOD plans to analyze alternatives for meeting the requirements and to develop a plan for the chosen alternative. DOD anticipates making a decision on whether to use the NPOESS spacecraft by June 2010 and to make a decision on which sensors it will include— including the Space Environment Monitor and the Microwave Imager/Sounder—by October 2010. DOD acquisition officials expect to begin the program in fiscal year 2013.

Table 6 compares key attributes of the NPOESS program when it was restructured in 2006 to the NPOESS program at the time of the task force decision in 2010 and to preliminary plans for the separate NOAA and DOD acquisitions.

Because neither agency has finalized plans for its acquisition, the full impact of the task force decision on the expected cost, schedule, and capabilities is unknown. However, it appears likely that the combined cost of the separate acquisitions could be higher than the last NPOESS estimate, the schedule for the first satellite’s launch will be later than the last NPOESS estimate, and selected capabilities will be removed from the program.

Cost: NOAA anticipates that the JPSS program will cost approximately $11.9 billion to complete through 2024. Although this estimated cost is less than the baselined cost of the NPOESS program, DOD will still need to fund and develop satellites to meet the requirements for the early morning orbit. DOD’s initial estimates are for its new program to cost almost $5 billion through fiscal year 2015. Thus, it is likely that the cost of the two acquisitions will exceed the baselined life-cycle cost of the NPOESS program.

Schedule: Neither NOAA nor DOD have finalized plans that show the full impact of the restructuring on the schedule for satellite development. We have previously reported that restructuring a program like NPOESS could take significant time to accomplish, due in part to the time taken revising, renegotiating, or developing important acquisition documents, including contracts and interagency agreements. With important decisions and negotiations still pending, it is likely that the expected launch date of the first JPSS satellite will be delayed.

Capabilities: Neither agency has made final decisions on the full set of sensors—or which satellites will accommodate them—for their respective satellite programs. Until those decisions are made, it will not be possible to determine the capabilities that these satellites will and will not provide.

Timely decisions on cost, schedule, and capabilities would allow both acquisitions to move forward and satellite data users to start planning for any data shortfalls they may experience. Until DOD and NOAA finalize their plans, it is not clear whether the new acquisitions will meet the requirements of both civilian and military users.

NOAA and DOD Face Key Transition Risks That Threaten Satellite Continuity

Moving forward, the agencies face key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to their new programs. These risks include the loss of key staff and capabilities, delays resulting from negotiating contract changes and establishing new program offices, the loss of support for both agencies’ requirements, and insufficient oversight of new program management.

Loss of key staff and capabilities—The NPOESS program office is composed of NOAA, NASA, Air Force, and contractor staff with knowledge and experience in spacecraft procurement and integration, ground systems, sensors, data products, systems engineering, budgeting, and cost analysis. These individuals have knowledge and experience in the status, risks, and lessons learned from the NPOESS program. This knowledge will be critical to moving the program forward both during and after the transition period. However, program office staff have already begun leaving—or looking for other employment—due to the uncertainties about the future of the program office. Unless NOAA is proactive in retaining these staff, the new program may waste valuable time if staff must relearn program details and may repeat mistakes made and lose lessons learned by prior program staff.

Delays in negotiating contract changes and establishing new programs—We have previously reported that restructuring a program like NPOESS could take significant time to accomplish, due in part to the time taken revising, renegotiating, or developing important acquisition documents, including contracts and interagency agreements. According to NOAA officials, the plan for JPSS may require negotiations with contractors and between contractors and their subcontractors. In addition, both NOAA and DOD will need to establish and fully staff program offices to facilitate and manage the transition and new programs. However, these contract and program changes have not yet occurred and it is not clear when they will occur. These changes could take significant time to complete. Meanwhile, the NPOESS program office continues to support—and fund—development activities that may not be used in the new programs, because neither NOAA nor DOD have made key decisions on the technologies, such as the spacecraft and sensors, that will be included on the new programs. Until decisions are made on how the program is to proceed with contract changes and terminations, the contractors and program office cannot implement the chosen solution and some decisions, such as the ability to hold schedule slips to a minimum, could become much more difficult.

Failure to support the other agency’s requirements—As a joint program, NPOESS was expected to fulfill many military, civilian, and research requirements for environmental data. The task force decision to restructure NPOESS noted that decisions on future satellite programs should ensure the continuity of critical satellite data. However, because the requirements of NOAA and DOD are different, the agencies may develop programs that meet their own needs but not the other’s. DOD, NOAA, and NASA will still need to work together to ensure that requirements are known, agreed upon, and managed, and that changes in their respective program’s capabilities do not degrade the continuity requirements. For example, NOAA officials reported that they do not plan to include the Microwave Imager/Sounder in their follow-on program and will instead procure data from a different sensor on an international satellite. However, it is not clear that NOAA’s plans will meet the needs of all of DOD’s users, including the Navy and Army. Similarly, it is not clear that DOD will continue to support the climate community’s requirements for highly calibrated and accurate measurements. If the agencies cannot find a way to build a partnership that facilitates both efficient and effective decision-making on data continuity needs, the data continuity needs of both agencies may not be adequately incorporated into the new programs.

Insufficient oversight of new program management—Under its new JPSS program, NOAA plans to transfer parts of the NPOESS program to NASA, but it has not yet defined how it will oversee NASA’s efforts. Transferring the program to NASA will not necessarily resolve existing cost, schedule, and subcontractor management issues. We recently reported that the acquisition challenges faced in major NASA acquisitions are similar to the ones faced by DOD acquisitions, including NPOESS. Specifically, we reported that NASA has consistently underestimated time and cost and has not adequately managed risk factors such as contractor performance. Because of these issues, we listed NASA’s acquisition management as a high-risk area in 1990, and it remains a high-risk area today. In addition, our work on the GOES I-M satellite series found that NOAA did not have the ability to make quick decisions on problems because portions of the procurement were managed by NASA.

Specifically, this management approach limited NOAA’s insight and management involvement in the procurement of major elements of the system. NOAA officials reported that they are developing a management control plan with NASA and intend to perform an independent review of this plan when it is completed. They could not provide a time frame for its completion. Without strong NOAA oversight of NASA’s management of program components, JPSS may continue to face the same cost, schedule, and contract management challenges as the NPOESS program.

While NOAA, NASA, and DOD acknowledge that there are risks associated with the transition to new programs, they have not yet established plans to mitigate these risks. Until these risks are effectively mitigated, it is likely that the satellite programs’ costs will continue to grow and launch dates will continue to be delayed. Further launch delays are likely to jeopardize the availability and continuity of weather and climate data. For example, the POES satellite currently in the afternoon orbit is expected to reach the end of its lifespan at the end of 2012. If NPP is delayed, there could be a gap in polar satellite observations in the afternoon orbit. Similarly, a delay in the launch of the first JPSS satellite may lead to a gap in satellite data after NPP reaches the end of its lifespan.

Data continuity gaps pose different implications for DOD and NOAA. For both agencies, a loss of satellite data represents a reduction in weather forecasting capabilities. Within the military, satellite data and products allow military planners and tactical users to focus on anticipating and exploiting atmospheric and space environmental conditions. For example, accurate wind and temperature forecasts are critical to any decision to launch an aircraft that will need mid-flight refueling. For NOAA, satellite data and products are provided to weather forecasters for use in issuing weather forecasts and warnings to the public and to support our nation’s aviation, agriculture, and maritime communities. NOAA also faces risks in losing longer-term climate observations. Maintaining the continuity of climate and space data over decades is important to identify long-term environmental cycles (such as the 11-year solar cycle and multiyear ocean cycles, including the El Niño effect) and their impacts, and to detect trends in global warming. Figure 5 shows the current and planned satellites and highlights gaps where the constellation is at risk.

NPOESS Development Continues, but Demonstration Satellite Has Been Delayed and New Challenges Threaten Further Delays

While NOAA and DOD are establishing plans for separate acquisitions, the development of key NPOESS components is continuing. In recent months, the critical VIIRS sensor has been completed and integrated onto the NPP spacecraft. In addition, the program continues to work on components of the first and second NPOESS satellites, including sensors and ground systems. These components may be transferred to NOAA and DOD to become part of their respective follow-on programs. However, the expected launch date of the NPP satellite has been delayed by 9 months due to technical issues in the development of a key sensor, and the development of the VIIRS sensor for the first NPOESS satellite is experiencing cost overruns. In addition, the program is slowing down and may stop work on key components in order to address potential contract liabilities and funding constraints. This would further delay the launches of the NPP satellite and the first NOAA and DOD satellites under their new programs.

NPOESS Components Making Progress, but Technical Issues Have Delayed NPP Launch

In recent months, selected components of the NPOESS program have made progress. Specifically, the program completed the development of the critical VIIRS sensor and delivered it to NASA for integration onto the NPP satellite. Four of the five sensors intended for NPP are now on the spacecraft. In addition, the program has continued to develop key sensors intended for the first NPOESS satellite (VIIRS, CrIS, OMPS, and the Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder sensors), and a key sensor for the second NPOESS satellite (the Microwave Imager/Sounder). These components may be transferred to NOAA and DOD to become part of their respective follow-on programs.

However, the program experienced technical issues on the Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS) sensor intended for the NPP satellite. Specifically, in January 2009 after the CrIS sensor completed its thermal vacuum tests, an anomaly was discovered on a circuit card that then led to the discovery of unrelated design flaws on two additional circuit cards. During final testing of new parts in August 2009, components intended for CrIS were damaged after the subcontractor failed to adhere to proper test processes. After investigating the problem and possible solutions for several months, the program decided to replace damaged parts and send the instrument through a limited thermal vacuum test. In total, this testing error resulted in an 11-month delay in the delivery of CrIS and a 9-month delay to the NPP satellite launch date (bringing it to September 2011, at the earliest). In addition, the program continues to face technical challenges and cost overruns in developing the VIIRS sensor for the first NPOESS satellite. Details on the status of key components for NPP and the first two NPOESS satellites are provided in table 7.

New Challenges Threaten Further Delays

In the months leading up to an official transition from the NPOESS program to the successor NOAA and DOD programs, NPOESS officials face key challenges that further threaten environmental satellite continuity. Specifically, the NPOESS program is slowing down and may stop work on key components in order to address potential contract liabilities and funding constraints. According to agency officials, the prime contract includes a clause requiring termination liability be funded in the current year’s budget. This means that if NPOESS development were to continue according to schedule, the program would need to stop all development work in August 2010 in order to fund the approximately $84 million in potential termination liability for this year. To mitigate this risk, in April 2010, the prime contractor was directed to slow down work on all development activities so that work could continue through the end of the fiscal year.

In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 placed limitations on the amount of DOD funding available to the program until certain requirements were met. Although the program met those requirements in March 2010, agency officials noted that DOD funding could be rescinded if not obligated quickly. According to program officials, if these funds are rescinded, DOD may have to terminate the NPOESS contract by the end of the fiscal year.

Slowing or stopping work under either scenario could further delay the launches of the NPP satellite and the first NOAA and DOD satellites under their new programs. However, officials have not established detailed priorities among different components to guide any work stoppages. Unless selected components are able to continue scheduled development, the launches of NPP and the first few satellites could be further delayed.

Limitations on the Demonstration Satellite May Adversely Affect the Usefulness of Its Data

As originally designed, NPP was planned to reduce the risk associated with launching new sensor technologies in the NPOESS program and to ensure continuity of climate data with NASA’s Earth Observing System satellites. Therefore, NPP was not expected to be an operational satellite used for weather forecasting. However, in March 2009, delays in the expected launch of the first NPOESS satellite led the Executive Committee to decide to use NPP data operationally. Because the NPP demonstration satellite was not designed as an operational asset, it has several limitations. These limitations include fewer ground-based data processing systems, fewer security controls, and a shorter satellite lifespan than current or planned operational satellites. These design limitations mean that in some cases, NPP’s data will not be as timely and useful as current polar satellites or as secure as planned satellites. In addition, there is a risk of a gap in the nation’s climate and weather data should the NPP satellite or its sensors fail before the next satellite is launched. Agency officials acknowledge these limitations and are assessing options to make NPP data more timely and secure.

NPP Will Have Fewer Ground-Based Data Processing Systems than NPOESS

While NOAA, NASA, and DOD plan to have a ground-based data processing system in each of four central data processing centers when NPOESS (or its successors’) satellites are in operation, the data processing system will be in only two of the centers for the NPP demonstration satellite. This arrangement means that the two centers that do not have the data processing systems will experience a lag in obtaining NPP data. Specifically, under current operations, the four satellite data processing centers receive polar satellite data within about 100 to 150 minutes. NPP’s data will be available to the two centers with the data processing system within approximately 140 minutes; it will be available to the two other centers within about 170 minutes. This presents a delay of 20 to 70 minutes from current operations for the two centers without the data processing system.

Because of this delay, NPP data will not be as useful to DOD as the data from legacy DMSP and POES satellites. DOD officials reported that they plan to incorporate NPP data when and where they can to supplement data from the legacy satellites. However, DOD’s centers will not be able to incorporate NPP data into all of their operational products, due to the time delay. For example, officials from one data processing center reported that the delay in obtaining NPP data could adversely affect their atmospheric and oceanographic numerical weather prediction capabilities. This situation would be exacerbated if POES or DMSP satellites fail in orbit before the first NPOESS/JPSS satellite is launched because the DOD centers may not be able to use NPP data to make up for the data loss. According to DOD officials, the three DOD centers are currently investigating options to shorten the time it will take for the data to go from the one center with the data processing system to the other two that lack the system, but do not have a timeline for making decisions on how to proceed. NASA officials reported that there are other options for shortening the time lag. For example, JPSS officials are considering accelerating the development of the data processing systems in their new program. This could allow all four centers to have a processing system shortly after NPP is launched and would eliminate the additional time lag for two of the centers.

NPP Was Designed Using Information Security Guidelines That Are Now Outdated

When originally designed, the NPP ground systems included information security controls that were based on the DOD security requirements that existed at that time. However, these standards—approved in 1998—do not include all of the security controls applicable to newer systems. According to NOAA officials, the limitations in NPP’s security controls relate primarily to the risk of data loss, denial-of-service, and continuity of operations, rather than a risk to the command and control of the satellite.

In 2008, program officials evaluated the security requirements of the NPOESS program. Specifically, they evaluated whether to increase the security controls before the NPP launch, before the first NPOESS satellite launch, or before the second NPOESS satellite launch. They decided against updating the NPP security requirements, because it would cost the program up to $280 million to make such a change, and could risk NPP’s scheduled launch date. According to NOAA officials, they recently evaluated the impact of the weaknesses in NPP’s security controls and made decisions on a majority of security controls in April 2010.

NPP’s Expected Life Span Is Shorter than That of NPOESS

The NPP satellite was only designed to support a 5-year mission life, unlike the 7-year mission life of the NPOESS satellites. Because NPP’s design life is only 5 years, it has the potential to fail before the next satellite is launched. If NPP launches as planned in October 2011, the satellite, based on current design, may remain functional until 2016. Thus, data from the next polar-orbiting satellite may be needed as early as 2016.

Although the first JPSS satellite launch is planned for 2015, it may need a year or more to perform an on-orbit accuracy check. Thus, it is very likely that there will be gaps in climate and weather data if NPP cannot survive beyond its design life. Further delays in the development and launch of the next satellite will increase the risk of a gap. NOAA officials acknowledge this limitation and are evaluating ways to mitigate the risk of a gap. NASA officials reported that the NPP spacecraft is based on a legac design; thus, they estimate that the spacecraft will likely last for 7 years or more. However, they questioned the reliability of key sensors— particularly VIIRS, CrIS, and OMPS—on NPP, due to poor workmanship and mission assurance weaknesses during development.

Conclusions

At the end of this fiscal year, the federal government will have spent 16 years and over $5 billion to combine two legacy satellite programs into one, yet will not have launched a single satellite. Faced with expected cost growth exceeding $8 billion, schedule delays of over 5 years, and continuing tri-agency management challenges, a task force led by the President’s Office of Science and Technology Policy decided to disband NPOESS so that NOAA and DOD could pursue separate satellite acquisitions. While the two agencies are scrambling to develop plans for their respective programs, it is not yet clear what the programs will deliver, when, and at what cost. Timely decisions on cost, schedule, and capabilities are needed to allow both acquisitions to move forward. As the agencies develop plans for their respective satellite programs, they face risks associated with the loss of critical staff with knowledge and experience, delays in negotiating contract changes and setting up new program offices, the two agencies not fulfilling each other’s core requirements, and insufficient program oversight. Neither agency has developed plans to mitigate these risks.

Until the transition is completed, the NPOESS program is continuing to develop components of the NPP satellite and components of the first two satellites. However, program officials reported that they have slowed all development work, and may need to stop work on these deliverables because of potential contract liabilities and funding constraints. Slowing or stopping work could further delay the satellites’ launches, and the program has not developed a prioritized list of what to stop first to mitigate impacts on satellite launches. Until it does so, there may be an increased risk of gaps in satellite data.

Because NPP was built to be a demonstration satellite, its data may not be as timely and useful as current polar satellites and not as secure as planned satellites. In addition, the limited lifespan of NPP further increases the risk of gaps in climate and weather data. Agency officials acknowledge these limitations and are assessing options to make NPP data more timely, but do not have time frames for deciding among alternative options.

Recommendations for Executive Action

In order to ensure that the transition from NPOESS to its successor programs is efficiently and effectively managed, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce take the following four actions: direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to expedite decisions on the expected cost, schedule, and capabilities of their planned programs; direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to develop plans to address key transition risks, including the loss of skilled staff, delays in contract negotiations and setting up new program offices, loss of support for the other agency’s requirements, and oversight of new program management; direct the NPOESS program office to develop priorities for work slowdown and stoppage to allow the activities that are most important to maintaining launch schedules to continue; and direct NOAA and DOD officials to develop time frames for making key decisions on—or accepting the risks related to—the timeliness of NPP’s data.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of Commerce, who transmitted NOAA’s comments (see app. II), the Director of Space and Intelligence within DOD (see app. III), and the Associate Administrator for the Science Mission Directorate of NASA (see app. IV). In addition, a senior policy analyst from the Office of Science and Technology Policy/Executive Office of the President provided technical comments on a draft of this report via email, which we incorporated as appropriate.

In their comments, both NOAA and DOD agreed with our recommendations and identified plans to implement them. For example, NOAA plans to work with NASA to develop requirements and acquisition plans, identify the organization and staffing, and establish a cost and schedule baseline for JPSS. In addition, DOD officials reported that the agency plans to make decisions on capability, cost, and schedule following a series of meetings taking place in June 2010.

In addition, regarding the potential need to slow down or stop work on the NPOESS program to deal with potential contract liabilities and funding constraints, NOAA, NASA, and DOD reported that the NPOESS program office has identified priorities for work stoppage so that key activities could continue. At the end of March 2010, the program executive officer provided high-level guidance on the priorities of the program, such as ensuring that NPP development continues and ensuring that key sensor development is transferred to the JPSS program. Subsequently, program officials stated that the contractor agreed to slow all of its development work through the end of the fiscal year to avoid a work stoppage. However, slowing all work activities does not reflect a prioritization of the most important activities. Unless the key activities that are on the critical path are able to continue scheduled development, the launches of NPP and the first few satellites could be further delayed.

NASA also commented on our finding that NOAA would need to provide enhanced oversight of NASA’s management of the JPSS program. We called for enhanced oversight based, in part, on NASA’s history of poor performance in managing major acquisitions. NASA officials asserted that the proper basis for comparison should not be their leading edge research missions, but, instead, should be the operational environmental satellite missions it has developed for NOAA in the past. NASA noted that its role in JPSS will be structured similar to the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) and Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) programs, where NOAA and NASA have a long and effective partnership. However, we believe that enhanced oversight is warranted. The JPSS program differs from the recent POES and GOES programs in that it includes leading edge sensor technologies. The complexity of these sensor technologies has been a key reason for the cost growth and schedule delays experienced to date on the NPOESS program. In addition, the program continues to discover technical problems on the sensors currently being developed for the follow-on programs. Thus, it will be important for both NOAA and NASA to ensure that the subcontractors are adequately managed so that technical, cost, and schedule issues are minimized or mitigated.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from the date of this letter. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of NASA, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested parties. In addition, this report will be available on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512- 9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to (1) assess efforts to plan for separate satellite acquisitions; (2) evaluate the status and risks of key program components still under development; and (3) evaluate implications of using the demonstration satellite’s data operationally.

To assess efforts to plan for separate satellite acquisitions, we reviewed the presidential directive that established the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) as well as materials related to the program restructuring in 2006. We also reviewed the White House task force’s terms of reference and final decision to disband the NPOESS program. We reviewed preliminary plans for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) new program to replace two of the NPOESS satellites. We compared the strategy and plans to best practices for program planning and requirements management and met with members of the task force responsible for the final restructuring decision. We also interviewed agency officials from the Department of Defense (DOD), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and NOAA, as well as members of the NPOESS task force and the NPOESS program office.

To evaluate the status and risks of key program components, we reviewed briefings, weekly updates, and monthly program management reports. We reviewed cost reports and program risk management documents and interviewed program officials to determine program and program segment risks that could negatively affect the program’s ability to maintain the current schedule and cost estimates. We also interviewed agency officials from DOD, NASA, and NOAA and the NPOESS program office to determine the status and risks of the key program segments. We also observed senior-level management review meetings to obtain information on the status of the NPOESS program.

To evaluate plans for and implications of using the demonstration satellite’s data operationally, we reviewed program documentation for using the demonstration satellite’s data and compared them to plans for using the NPOESS satellite data. Additionally, we interviewed program office, NOAA, NASA, and DOD officials about plans for using the data.

We primarily performed our work at the NPOESS Integrated Program Office and at DOD, NASA, and NOAA offices in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. In addition, we conducted work at the Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center in Monterey, California; the Naval Oceanographic Office in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi; and the Air Force Weather Agency in Omaha, Nebraska.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to May 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Colleen Phillips, Assistant Director; Kate Agatone; Neil Doherty; Franklin Jackson; Lee McCracken; and Matthew Strain made key contributions to this report.