Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration: Analysis of an Energy Department Task Force Report
Released: 2006-02-01T00:00:00

Background

The U.S. nuclear weapons complex (the Complex) consists of eight government-owned,contractor-operated sites (see Appendix) that study, maintain, and disassemble U.S. nuclearweapons. The National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA), a semiautonomous part of theDepartment of Energy (DOE), manages it. Some in Congress have expressed concern that the U.S.nuclear stockpile and the Complex are becoming increasingly difficult and costly to maintain, thatsecurity costs are rising sharply, and that the Complex is not sufficiently responsive to the needs ofits "customer," the Department of Defense (DOD). Further, they maintain, it is difficult for Congressto judge the merits of various large expenditures for the Complex, such as for major researchfacilities, without a long-term road map. (In this report, "site" refers to an entire laboratory or plant,or the Nevada Test Site, while "facility" refers to a structure within a site, such as for production ofa specific item or for experiments or computation.)

To address these concerns, the House Energy and Water Development AppropriationsSubcommittee asked the Secretary of Energy to conduct a study of the Complex looking out 25years, and to make recommendations on restructuring the Complex. The committee's report stated:

During the fiscal year 2005 budget hearings, theCommittee pressed the Secretary on the need for a systematic review of requirements for theweapons complex over the next twenty-five years, and the Secretary committed to conducting sucha review. The Secretary's report should assess the implications of the President's decisions on the sizeand composition of the stockpile, the cost and operational impacts of the new Design Basis Threat,and the personnel, facilities, and budgetary resources required to support the smaller stockpile. Thereport should evaluate opportunities for the consolidation of special nuclear materials, facilities, andoperations across the complex to minimize security requirements and the environmental impact ofcontinuing operations.

The Secretary should assemble a team of outside expertsto assist with this review. Prior reviews have largely been conducted by insiders from the weaponscomplex, who produce the predictable but not very credible recommendation that the Departmentshould preserve the status quo and maintain all existing facilities and capabilities. As part of thefive-year integrated budget plan for the entire Department that is directed elsewhere in this report,the Secretary will have to balance NNSA requirements against competing needs for other DOEprograms. This will require an objective review that is only possible with the help of independentexperts who are not, and have not been, part of the NNSA weapons complex.

The Committee directs the Secretary to submit a writtenreport on his findings and recommendations on the NNSA complex to the House and SenateCommittees on Appropriations and Armed Services not later than April 30, 2005. (1)

In response, the Secretary of Energy in January 2005 had the Secretary of Energy AdvisoryBoard (SEAB) form the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force (hereinafter referredto as the "Task Force" or "TF"). It issued a "draft final report" in July 2005. (2) After receiving comments,it transmitted the final report to SEAB on October 4 with no changes from the July version. A letterfrom David Overskei, Chairman of the Task Force, included clarifications on nuclear weapon storageand on production of a key component. Also on October 4, SEAB transmitted the report to theSecretary of Energy. (3)

The Task Force's View of, and Vision for, the Complex

The TF reported that there was no master plan guiding the Complex. Instead, it stated thatthere were redundant facilities within the Complex; excessive competition between the weaponslabs; an imbalance between the labs, with state-of-the-art experimental facilities, and the productionplants, with archaic equipment; and special nuclear material (SNM; see Appendix) at six of the eightComplex sites, increasing vulnerability to terrorist attack and raising security costs. The TF alsofound current warheads to have undesirable characteristics, such as designs offering less safety andless control over unauthorized use than DOD and DOE wanted, designs that approached too closelythe point at which they would fail, components that were difficult to manufacture, excessive use ofexotic or hazardous materials, and maintenance that would probably become ever more costly. These problems resulted in high costs. As a result, the Task Force concluded, "the status quo isneither technically credible, nor financially sustainable." (ix) (Throughout this report, numbers inparentheses refer to pages in the Task Force's report.)

The TF had a vision of a different Complex. "The Complex of 2030 should be an integrated,interdependent enterprise. The technical acuity and scientific innovation to meet unforeseenchallenges and threats to the nation's security are sustained by a Complex operating interactively andcontinuously conducting research, nonnuclear testing and weapon modernization, production, anddismantlement." (4) It would be responsive to the needs of its customer, DOD.

As a measure of responsiveness, the Complex will bedesigned to respond to any needed design change in less than 18 months, field a prototype [nuclearweapon] in less than 36 months, and go into full production in less than 48 months, and perform anunderground test at the [Nevada Test Site] within 18 months. By 2030 the Complex would be inequilibrium, producing and dismantling at a rate of 125 devices per year.(4)

The TF would restructure the Complex, closing some sites, building another, relocating someexperimental facilities, and making other such facilities available for use by Complex personnel. It would dismantle all Cold War-era weapons (the current stockpile) by 2030. The replacementwarheads and restructured Complex would, according to the TF, be safer, more secure, and lesscostly. The TF recommended proceeding briskly to implement this vision. "The Task Force visionis best achieved at the lowest risk to the nation's nuclear deterrent through an aggressive schedulefor achieving the 2030 vision, with near-term budget increases resulting in substantially largeraccumulated long-term budget reductions." (5)

Main Recommendations of the Task Force

To remedy the perceived problems and implement its vision, the TF made two main, relatedrecommendations. First, it created a master plan that would restructure the entire Complex. Theplan has several key elements.

A Consolidated Nuclear Production Center (CNPC) would produce allcomponents in the "nuclear explosive package," or NEP (see Appendix), including those made fromuranium, plutonium, and high explosives, and would assemble complete nuclear weapons. WhilePantex would dismantle current warheads by 2030, CNPC would dismantle the next generation ofwarheads. (vii, 4) CNPC would include a facility for fabrication of plutonium components; aseparate facility for fabrication of uranium components; a materials research laboratory; a facilityfor machining and testing all the insensitive high explosive for the Complex, though the explosiveitself might be procured from outside vendors or DOD; a building for weapons assembly anddisassembly; areas to store plutonium and pits; another building to store uranium and secondaries; and several other facilities. (14-16) CNPC would not store deployed warheads. (4)

The Y-12 Plant fabricates and stores uranium components, and assembles andstores secondaries. These functions would move to CNPC. It thus appears likely that Y-12 wouldclose.

Pantex could close. The TF states, "Upon dismantlement of the last of the Coldwar weapons, Pantex, if not the site of the CNPC, could be decommissioned." (19) While"dismantlement of the last Cold war weapon [is] envisioned to occur by 2030," (4) the TF alsoemphasizes accelerating dismantlement. (E2)

Kansas City Plant would not be part of CNPC. It would continue to producenonnuclear components (batteries, fuzes, bomb casings, etc.), but "as many components as practical[would] be procured from commercial vendors." (22)

The labs would become smaller. The TF states:

Technical staffing levels at the design laboratories can be significantlyreduced as the Complex leverages the years of investment in new,automated test and computational capabilities at the design laboratories.Perhaps greater impact on Complex staffing levels will be the efficiencyrealized by personnel moving into continuous design, plus weaponproduction and manufacturing cycles, which evolve into a family ofmodular nuclear weapons. (23)

Some large experimental and scientific facilities mightmove to CNPC or NTS, and duplicative facilities at more than one lab might be closed and theremaining facility of each type made into a user facility, i.e., available to staff of all labs. (viii, J1-J3) The TF raises the prospect that one of the two nuclear weapon physics labs -- Los Alamos NationalLaboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) -- might close: "thelong-term requirement for two physics design laboratories will be determined through overallComplex performance and needs." (4) Some lab facilities under consideration would move toCNPC. For example, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) building atLANL for R&D on uranium and plutonium, for which construction began in January 2006, wouldinstead be built at CNPC on grounds that other facilities to be placed in CNPC would have a similarcapability. LANL would instead have a "'CMRR lite,' designed for only laboratory sample levelsof material and amenable to commercial security." (21)

One lab would house high-end computing for the entire Complex, andComplex staff at other sites could use that site's resources by remote connection(20).

The Nevada Test Site might gain several experimental facilities (J1-J3), andis a possible site for CNPC.

Governance would be made more effective, in the TF's view, so as to "enablethe transformations needed for the Complex and the Stockpile." (25). DOD/NNSA Project Officers'Groups, which "are key elements in managing integration of a warhead with the weapon systemthroughout the entire life cycle," would have representation from the plants, (25) as is being donewith the Reliable Replacement Warhead program described below; NNSA would have moreindependence within DOE (26); NNSA offices at Complex sites would report to the DeputyAdministrator for Defense Programs rather than to the NNSA Administrator (27); business practiceswould change (27-32); and an Office of Transformation would be the "change agent" (viii) thatwould conduct risk-benefit and other analyses to support transformation of the Complex(33).

The problems that the TF found with the Complex are intertwined with the products theComplex supports. Accordingly, the second main recommendation of the Task Force is to proceedpromptly with a "family" of warheads designed to meet a different set of requirements andconstraints than current warheads. (For a detailed discussion of Reliable Replacement Warhead(RRW) program and the Life Extension Program (LEP), discussed in the balance of this section, see CRS Report RL32929 , Nuclear Weapons: The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program , byJonathan Medalia.)

Current warheads were designed and manufactured during the Cold War to meet Cold Warrequirements within the constraints of the time. DOD needed warheads with high explosive yieldand that had high yield to weight, that is, they achieved their yield in the lightest package. They werealso tightly constrained as to size and shape. To meet those goals, nuclear weapon designers usedsophisticated design features, exotic and hazardous materials, and hard-to-produce components, andpushed designs close to points where they would fail. While these weapons are complex, nucleartesting gave designers confidence in their performance.

However, the last U.S. nuclear test was held in September 1992; the United States hasobserved a test moratorium since then. To maintain Cold War-era weapons without testing, theComplex undertakes LEPs. When certain key weapon components deteriorate or otherwise needreplacement, an LEP seeks to remanufacture these components as closely as possible to the originalspecifications. The reason is that nuclear testing confirmed the safety and reliability of the designs;now, without testing, NNSA chooses to minimize loss of confidence in warheads that useremanufactured components by minimizing changes so as to keep the components as close to theiroriginal test-proven "pedigree" as possible.

There is considerable debate about whether LEPs will be able to maintain existing warheadsindefinitely. Supporters argue that for nine years the Secretaries of Energy and Defense have beenable to certify that the stockpile remains safe and reliable without resorting to nuclear testing. Theyhave been able to do this because of the existing Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) and key partsof it, surveillance of warheads to monitor for defects and Life Extension Programs. These variousprograms have greatly increased knowledge of weapons performance and potential problems, andknowledge of specific weapon types has likewise increased with experience. Supporters thereforebelieve that LEP should enable the United States to maintain warheads indefinitely without testing.

NNSA questions the long-term viability of LEP. According to Ambassador Linton Brooks,Administrator of NNSA, "it is becoming more difficult and costly to certify warhead remanufacture. The evolution away from tested designs resulting from the inevitable accumulations of small changesover the extended lifetimes of these systems means that we can count on increasing uncertainty inthe long-term certification of warheads in the stockpile." (5) LEP also, it is argued, imposes high costs on the Complex. The TFstates, "To support this unique stockpile, the Complex must maintain parts, materials, processes, andeven tools that are no longer in common use to ensure a capability to respond to any stockpileproblems. Thus, our current stockpile is extraordinarily expensive to monitor and to maintain." (11)

Because of the costs and potential uncertainties associated with the types of warheads beingmaintained, Representative David Hobson, Chairman of the House Energy and Water DevelopmentAppropriations Subcommittee, proposed a new approach, the Reliable Replacement Warhead(RRW) program. The FY2005 budget request had included no funds for RRW, and other committeereports for FY2005 had not referenced it. Instead, RRW made its first legislative appearance in theFY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-447 , which provided $9.0 million for thepurpose. For FY2006, NNSA requested $9.4 million for RRW and Congress appropriated $25.0million.

The RRW program would design warheads taking into account the great changes inrequirements and missions affecting warheads since the end of the Cold War. There is less need forhigh yield or for a high yield-to-weight ratio. Accepting reductions in yield and yield-to-weight, itis argued, would enable weapon designers to move away from the complicated designs,hard-to-manufacture components, and exotic materials that characterized Cold War weapons. Instead, the TF recommends setting a number of design parameters, including "certification without[underground nuclear testing] ... inexpensive manufacture and disassembly ... ease of maintenance... maximizing component reuse and minimizing life-cycle costs." (8) The TF views "[i]mmediatedesign of a Reliable Replacement Warhead" as "the most important element for transforming theStockpile." (13)

RRW advocates believe that these characteristics would benefit the Complex. In their view,simpler, easier-to-manufacture designs could be made with simpler equipment, would use less floorspace, and would have higher throughput. Reduction in hazardous and exotic materials wouldreduce the threat to worker and environmental safety, permitting a reduction in equipment and floorspace. Designing nuclear explosive packages to incorporate use control and use denial featureswould reduce the amount of physical security required. (6) These factors would also be expected to reduce cost.

Discussion of Task Force Recommendations

In the Task Force scenario, construction of a modernized Complex would be simpler and lesscostly with several facilities built at a single site. The TF anticipates that operating costs would belower for a single new CNPC than for several facilities dating back a half-century or more. Withsecurity designed into warheads and facilities alike, rather than retrofitted, the TF projects thatphysical security costs would be lower. It holds that new equipment should be more efficient thana combination of new and old equipment, and that removing most fissile material from Los Alamosand Livermore should reduce their security costs. Making many experimental facilities into userfacilities, to the extent that that differs from current practice, might reduce costs. Further, in thisview, the shift to RRW could offer savings and increased confidence in design, production,maintenance, and certification. Yet some observers maintain that some TF recommendations mayprove difficult or impossible to implement. The balance of this report discusses some of the TaskForce recommendations.

Reliable Replacement Warhead programrecommendations. The TF makes a recommendation that it believes "is the mostimportant element for transforming the Stockpile":

The Task Force endorses the immediate initiation of themodernization of the stockpile through the design of the Reliable Replacement Warhead. This shouldlead to a family of modern nuclear weapons, designed with greater margin to meet militaryrequirements while incorporating state-of-the-art surety requirements. ... The Task Forcerecommends that a new version of the RRW, incorporating new design concepts and surety features,[be] initiated on planned five-year cycles. This family of weapons will form the basis of thesustainable stockpile of the future. (13)

Congressional language calling for the TF report stated that the report "should assess theimplications of the President's decisions on the size and composition of the stockpile ..." (7) These decisions were to beinputs for the TF, which would then determine how to restructure the Complex to implement them. Similarly, the Secretary of Energy, in a letter to the TF chair, wanted the TF to provide "options andrecommendations by the end of April 2005 to modernize, consolidate, and where possible, reducecosts of the infrastructure and facilities across the NWC [nuclear weapons complex] based on recentstockpile reductions and new security Design Basis Threat requirements." (8) While the TF made numerousrecommendations on the Complex, key recommendations concerned the stockpile itself -- thatNNSA proceed with RRW and that DOD change the characteristics it required of warheads in orderto facilitate manufacture: "The DOD should work to relax the military characteristics of its nuclearweapons, in order to generate the design space necessary for NNSA to develop high-margin,manufacturable designs for the future stockpile." (34) Some feel the TF may have exceeded itsmandate by recommending how to redesign nuclear weapons. For example, SEAB noted concernsabout the TF's work on RRW: "A number of SEAB members believe that the issue of a ReliableReplacement Warhead (RRW) will need further study by the Department of Energy and theAdministration." (9)

On the other hand, Complex and warheads are linked. The goal of the Complex is to designand manufacture a product, and characteristics of the product will necessarily shape the Complex. A Complex intended to produce reliable replacement warheads would be expected to differ from oneintended to conduct life extension programs. There is a case to be made for shaping the Complexto support RRWs. The TF finds "the status quo is neither technically credible, nor financiallysustainable." (ix) Further, Ambassador Linton Brooks, Administrator of NNSA, said that the currentstockpile is the wrong one for today's needs technically, militarily, and politically, and from thestandpoints of longevity, cost, and physical security. (10) If current warheads are as problematic as claimed -- thoughothers disagree, as noted earlier -- perhaps it makes sense to design a Complex to support analternative warhead type.

Yet it may well have been appropriate for the TF to have shaped a Complex to support LEPsas well as RRWs, perhaps with a path for the Complex to transition to supporting only RRWs ifCongress and the Administration later decide to proceed exclusively with that warhead type. WhileCongress and the Administration support RRW at this early stage, that is not the same as acommitment to deploy even one RRW type, let alone an all-RRW stockpile. It may turn out that thefuture stockpile will be all-RRW, but no final decision on whether to manufacture and deploy eventhe first RRW can be made for several years or more. Indeed, no choice among RRW design optionsis expected until November 2006. (11) If for some reason the Administration decides not to proceedwith RRW, a likely fallback position would be to continue maintaining existing warheads using LEP. In any event, the Complex will probably conduct LEPs of current warheads for many years. It thuscan be argued that it is premature to design a Complex based on the assumption that RRW willproceed.

The five-year cycle plan that the TF suggests could offer significant benefits for DOD andNNSA. Continuous design, certification, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons wouldexercise the Complex, provide real-world training to scientific and production staff, minimizeage-related defects in weapons, and permit the introduction of new design features into the stockpile. Developing and maintaining skills would increase DOD's confidence in the Complex. Confidencethat the Complex could produce warheads in time to respond to adversary efforts to develop threatsto the United States -- the responsive infrastructure that the December 2001 Nuclear Posture Reviewcalled for -- would permit DOD to reduce the number of reserve warheads it maintains as a hedgeto augment the force if needed. Confidence in the reliability of the new warheads would permitDOD to reduce the number of warheads it maintains as reliability backups in case problems emergewith deployed warheads. Reducing warhead numbers and incorporating new use-control featurescould reduce DOD's security costs, saving large sums.

In other ways, however, continuous design and production might impose high costs. (a) RRWs are supposed to be easier to maintain than current warheads. Replacing one generation ofRRWs with another, as the TF suggests (7), rather than maintaining the first would appear to forgothe maintenance advantage while incurring large costs for designing and producing new warheadsand dismantling those being replaced. (b) Some claim that RRW might permit a stockpile of fewerdesigns. While at least two warhead types are currently available for each type of delivery system,one RRW design might be used on more than one type of delivery system. That approach could savemoney by reducing the number of designs and spare units in the stockpile, simplifying productionand maintenance, and permitting a smaller Complex. That advantage could be lost if a steady streamof RRW designs entered and left the stockpile. (c) First-generation RRWs would presumablyincorporate large gains in technology made since the last warhead was designed two decades ago. If those RRWs meet the high standards required to be certified for the stockpile, though, technicalgains from subsequent generations might be modest. (d) An ongoing production and replacementprogram would require a larger and more costly Complex than that needed to producefirst-generation RRWs and maintain them for decades through LEPs. (e) Such a program might raiseproliferation concerns, as discussed below.

The TF introduces a new element into the RRW program, a block transition.

A transition strategy emerging from the DOD wouldput the nation on a new path toward the sustainable stockpile. This strategy, already endorsed by theNuclear Weapons Council[ (12) ], is based on the RRW concept. An RRW weapon design isresponsive to an existing weapon mission, but moves the stockpile toward the sustainable stockpileof the future. Its introduction is made possible by segmenting the current LEPs into discrete "blocks."Block 1 would incorporate the current LEP design but would be truncated much sooner thannormally planned and transitioned to the block 2 design (RRW-1), which would include some, butprobably not all, attributes of the future stockpile. As soon as practical, block 2 would be transitionedto block 3 (RRW-2), which would incorporate all the attributes of the future stockpile.Implementation of this RRW block change strategy, system by system, would ensure a smoothtransition to a sustainable nuclear stockpile, and eventually to a stockpile designed for moderndeterrence. (12-13)

Block 2 could provide a faster route to upgrading the stockpile than a move directly to Block3. It would presumably incorporate features that were easier to design and manufacture, leavingmore difficult ones for Block 3. As a steppingstone to Block 3, Block 2 would in effect function asa pilot project that would reveal potential difficulties in design and manufacture, thus facilitatingdesign and manufacture of subsequent RRWs and lowering their costs. Block 2 would also beconsistent with the TF's proposal for an ongoing cycle of design and manufacture, with Block 2warheads done in the first cycle and Block 3 warheads in the next.

It is, however, hard to know if these advantages would materialize because the TF does notprovide a clear definition of Block 2. Even though Block 2 could involve billions of dollars for newwarheads, the only references to it in the entire report are in the paragraph quoted above (along witha brief mention on page 34). Block 2 warheads would apparently include some features of currentdesigns and some features of RRW designs, but it is not clear which changes would render a warhead"Block 2."

Warheads using components outside the nuclear explosive package, such asradars, that have been modified from the original design would probably not be considered as Block2. Such components are tested extensively in the laboratory as part of existingLEPs.

Warheads designed around newly-made pits of selected old designs might becounted as Block 2. Because the state of the art in design and manufacture has advancedconsiderably over the years, pit designs from several decades ago might be simpler to manufacturethan current designs that press the state of the art. The fact that they have been tested wouldfacilitate certification. On the other hand, they would not have some key RRW features and woulddivert resources from Block 3 RRWs.

Warheads designed around old pits might be considered as Block 2, but inaddition to the drawbacks noted above the warheads would have a short service life if the pits usedwere near the end of their service lives.

The most certain approaches to certifying a replacement warhead without nuclear testing are,at one extreme, to replicate the original design as closely as possible or, at the other, to create a newdesign that is simple enough to permit high confidence. In order to maximize yield to weight andachieve other design goals, all components of Cold War-era warheads are designed to work togetherwith little performance margin to spare. With such tight design, small changes in materials ormanufacturing processes can reduce confidence in performance. That is why the Complex goes togreat lengths to minimize differences from original specifications when designing and producingreplacement components. Despite the absence of nuclear testing, the labs have been certifying, forcontinued use in the stockpile, current warhead designs that incorporate replacement componentsthat are not exact replications. At the same time, the labs believe that they will be able to certifyRRWs without testing by designing in greater performance margins. In contrast, the labs have saidnothing to indicate that they could certify anything between these extremes, such as Block 2warheads. As a result, any potential advantages from a Block 2 replacement warhead might be lostowing to difficulty in certification or in acceptability to DOD. It might be argued that a surer pathto confidence in replacement warheads would be to skip Block 2 and move to Block 3 directly.

Even if the three-block approach could be done successfully, it would apparently result inthree distinct designs -- one LEP, one RRW, and one in between -- for each warhead type, forexample, W76 Block 1, 2, and 3. Block 2 would be neither the original weapon, with which theComplex has extensive experience, nor the final RRW, which would be in the stockpile for years tocome, but a transient, interim design. Sustaining, producing, and maintaining the three designswould appear to require far more Complex resources than would be required for one design perwarhead type.

Steve Henry, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, in the Officeof the Secretary of Defense, stated that the Nuclear Weapons Council voted to study the feasibilityof a Reliable Replacement Warhead and, if the study proved successful, to endorse a transitiondirectly from LEPs of current-design warheads to the RRW program. A Council study groupconsidered other options, including Block 2, but did not recommend them to the Council becausethose options could not achieve critical RRW program goals such as enhancements to safety and usecontrol. In addition, the study group was concerned that pursuing a Block 2 option would be costlyand could delay the RRW program beyond the time when nuclear weapon designers withunderground test experience would retire, raising certification difficulties. (13) Therefore, Block 2 is onlya recommendation of the Task Force, not of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

Cost issues. To analyze costs of itsrecommendations, the TF set forth three cases.

A baseline case with a flat budget in FY2005 dollars for the period 2006-2030. If the baseline budget is the FY2006 request for the Complex, the TF finds that the total cost for2006-2030 would be some $170 billion. The TF rejects this case because it would not lead to theTF's vision for the future Complex, "thereby representing a very high risk option for maintaining thenation's nuclear deterrent." (E1)

A "Complex Transformation in Place" case involving minor changes to theComplex and the stockpile. There would be no consolidation of SNM, and no CNPC. Existingproduction facilities would continue in place. RRW begins, but most LEPs continue. Like thebaseline, this case would not lead to the TF vision for the future Complex because "the physicalplant, especially the production facilities, will not be transformed into the 21st Century." The TFstates that this option involves risks, especially beyond 2020 when pit lifetime, warhead reliability,and dismantlement become issues. The TF calculates that this case would cost about $5 billion morethan the baseline case in 2005 dollars. (E1)

A "Revolutionary Complex Transformation" case involving consolidation ofSNM, maximum acceleration of CNPC, and implementation of the other TF recommendations. TheTF finds this case would cost $10 billion total above the baseline case for the period 2006-2015, butwould save $25 billion for 2016-2030, saving $15 billion over the 25-year period. About half theextra $10 billion is to accelerate dismantlement, and half to accelerate CNPC. The case wouldmanage risk by having RRW proceed "on a responsive schedule." The results are sensitive toassumptions on the extent of LEPs, CNPC operating efficiencies, reductions in physical securitycosts, and efficiencies from improved business practices. Costs could be reduced by delaying thestart of CNPC operations, closing some facilities, and reductions in force at the labs, etc., but the TFfinds that such steps would increase risk. (E2-E3)

In its analysis, the TF judges that the baseline case involves high risks, that minor tweaks tothe Complex in the Transformation in Place case increase cost and risk, that a large upfrontinvestment would yield large savings some years from now, and that the calculated costs and savingsdepend heavily on various assumptions. Its Revolutionary Transformation case shows thatproceeding with Complex modernization and RRW in tandem would reduce both cost and risk. Thelatter case makes a $5 billion investment to accelerate dismantlement of warheads. The TFconcludes that so doing "reduces the significant security and storage cost burden on the Complex."(24) Further, the TF would have Pantex dismantle existing weapons, and "Upon dismantlement ofthe last of the Cold war weapons, Pantex, if not the site of the CNPC, could be decommissioned."(19) Finding that savings from accelerating dismantlement would exceed the $5 billion that the TFallocates to that purpose would be significant.

These cost and schedule estimates, however, could prove optimistic for a number of reasons.

Because the TF plan would represent a major change to Complex sites, theiroperation, and their facilities, under current law DOE would have to prepare a programmaticenvironmental impact statement (EIS). Because the plan would affect facilities and missions ofseveral sites, DOE would have to prepare site-wide EISs for sites with new facilities. DOE wouldalso have to prepare site-specific EISs for individual facilities. Meeting the various requirementsof the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is time-consuming. DOE would also be requiredto comply with environmental laws of states in which facilities would be built, (14) which could lead to furtherdelays.

Lawsuits have been used to challenge EISs dealing with nuclear matters. Alawsuit over an EIS led to a preliminary injunction that halted construction of a major experimentalfacility at LANL (the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrotest Facility) from January 1995 to April 1996,for example. (15) Anylawsuits would add to the cost of the TF alternative, and would cause delays.

The TF states, "Historically, DOE projects are either 'under-estimated' or have'scope creep' that drive the projects above their budgeted estimates. Historical DOE completedconstruction costs are in the range of $13,900 to $33,000 per square foot of construction. This widerange calls into question the accuracy of estimates of CNPC cost, and thus of savings. The TFprojects MPF [Modern Pit Facility; see "Pit Production Issues," below] to cost in the range of$14,400 to $19,400 per square foot." (H2) Estimating MPF cost at the bottom of the historical rangeof DOE construction costs seems highly optimistic given that it is probably the facility within CNPCthat would have the highest requirements for safety and security, and produces one of the mostdifficult-to-manufacture components of a nuclear weapon.

A combination of delays and cost growth would increase investment costs andshorten the period through 2030 in which operational savings could accrue, tipping the balancebetween investment costs and operational savings toward the former.

The TF proposes reducing the footprint of MPF as one option to reduce cost.(H5) Much of the cost of a Complex facility is for planning, proceeding through the NEPA process,selecting a site, obtaining the needed permits, designing the facility, and (especially for SNMfacilities) providing the requisite security. If NNSA later needed to add capacity at MPF, it wouldbe much more costly and time-consuming to secure any needed permits, perhaps repeat the NEPAprocess, redesign the facility, shut it down if construction so required, and finally undertake theconstruction, than it would be to build extra floor space at the outset and install equipment later ifrequired. It is thus arguable that MPF should be built with more floor space than is needed initially,rather than the minimum.

According to the report, "[t]he Task Force used budget details from the FY2006 NNSA Congressional budget submission (Appendix D) to form the basis of financialcomparisons and estimates made within this report." (xi) The FY2006 NNSA budget submissiongoes through FY2010; it seems an insufficient basis for estimating costs and savings going out aquarter-century. That document also appears to have limited value for estimating RRW expenseseven for the period it covers. The projected RRW budget for FY2006-FY2010 in the FY2006 requestsimply uses the amounts that would have been allocated to the Advanced Concepts Initiative, anuclear weapons research and study program that Congress terminated in the FY2005 ConsolidatedAppropriations Act ( P.L. 108-447 ), because NNSA did not have sufficient time between the signingof that act in early December 2004, which contained initial funds for RRW, and the submission ofthe budget request in early February 2005 to prepare a detailed program and budget forRRW.

Forgoing the value of sunk costs. The Complexhas developed over more than 60 years. During that time, it has accumulated many buildings andmuch equipment and infrastructure. Given that history, the Complex is probably far less efficientthan a Complex of new design and construction would be. The Complex that the TF recommendswould incorporate new facilities, eliminate redundant ones, and probably close some sites. Thesesteps are predicted to reduce operational costs, including security. The TF anticipates thatconducting manufacturing using modern processes, in new buildings, making easier-to-manufacturecomponents for RRWs, would save large sums.

On the other hand, the United States has invested many billions of dollars in the Complexover the years. It could be argued that abandoning some of this investment -- which has been builtand is now operating -- on the basis of an analysis showing reduced operating costs over the long runwould be taking a budgetary risk. By closing some major facilities, and perhaps some sites, sunkcosts would certainly be lost; whether reduced operating costs would exceed the costs of closingexisting facilities and building new ones is less certain and, as the TF notes, depends heavily on theassumptions used. Following are examples of sites and facilities whose sunk costs might be lostunder the TF plan.

LANL has spent more than a decade to restore pit production operations at itsTechnical Area 55 (TA-55) facility. LANL delivered a certifiable pit in 2003 and expects to delivera certified pit for the W88 warhead in 2007. The TF estimates that TA-55 is operating at about 5percent efficiency. (H1) It states, "Modern manufacturing techniques ... if applied rigorously couldyield unprecedented reductions in TA-55 pit manufacturing costs and cycle time." (H1) While thebase rate is unclear, if TA-55 could produce pits at a 20-fold higher rate, should MPF be built? TheTF would upgrade TA-55 for production, no doubt at considerable expense. Yet it appears that theTF would not use TA-55 for pit production once CNPC is operational. The SNM manufacturingfacility at CNPC "will be ... the sole SNM production and manufacturing facility for the Complex"(15); "NNSA should contract for the management of pit production at the new CNPC that alsocovers interim pit production at TA-55"; "NNSA should focus TA-55 on pit production until CNPCis fully operational ..." (35); and "NNSA should commit to producing 50 production pits per yearthat go into the stockpile from TA-55 beginning in 2012 and continuing until a replacement pitproduction facility can meet the needs of the stockpile." (34) Bringing in a separate contractor tomanage pit production at TA-55 (and CNPC), as the TF recommends (35), might disrupt ongoingpit operations. Once NNSA halted pit production at TA-55, more expense would presumably beincurred to convert its production space back to R&D.

The TF envisions decommissioning Pantex after it completes dismantlementof Cold War weapons, unless Pantex is the site of CNPC. (19) But Pantex could still performweapons assembly and disassembly. It also stores thousands of pits from dismantled weapons. Would any security and operations savings resulting from building a Pantex-like facility at CNPCoutweigh the investment costs of that new facility, as well as the cost of decontaminating anddecommissioning Pantex and moving pits stored at Pantex to CNPC?

One type of experiment that LANL and LLNL perform is hydrodynamictesting, in which a pit using surrogate material instead of plutonium is imploded and measurementsare taken using powerful high-speed x-rays and other types of diagnostic equipment. Theseexperiments are conducted at two large, costly facilities: the Dual Axis Radiographic HydrodynamicTest (DARHT) Facility at LANL and at the Contained Firing Facility (CFF) at LLNL's Site 300,some 15 miles from the lab. (16) These sites conduct many smaller-scale experiments as well. "The Task Force believes that the NTS should become the only Complex site for combined HE andCategory I and II SNM testing. Consolidation of both facilities [DARHT and Site 300] into oneHydrodynamic Testing User Facility at the NTS, incorporating containment and radiography ...,could save significant costs." (17) (21) Having one facility instead of two would presumably yieldsavings in operations and security. Further, it could prove difficult to secure the permitting neededto conduct tests using plutonium at DARHT or CFF, should such tests be desired. On the otherhand, the two facilities are integrated into the work of the labs, and have ample work conductingtests without plutonium. Moving a large, delicate experimental facility to NTS could prove difficultand costly. The sunk costs of the two facilities would be lost. The NEPA process and any attendantlawsuits could delay construction. The purpose of the two axes in DARHT, each of which wouldtake x-ray photos of an imploding surrogate pit, is to have a time sequence of the implosion or athree-dimensional radiograph. This information would be of value for LEP or RRW. DARHT'ssecond axis is to be completed in 2008. (18) Halting work on DARHT and moving it to NTS threatens todelay pit experiments for years. A possible alternative, many years out, would be to build successorfacilities to DARHT and CFF at NTS; even then, removing the existing facilities from their labswould make it harder for hydrodynamic experiments to draw on lab resources.

Workforce issues. Throughout the report, the TFrecognizes the importance of a strong workforce for the Complex. It finds that the Complex is"rapidly losing experienced nuclear design experts." (1) It "was delighted to find a generation ofyoung people entering the Complex." (3) It notes, "The enduring key to maintaining a safe, reliablestockpile of nuclear weapons is the quality of people ..." (22) Some of its recommendations aremade with a goal of strengthening expertise. It stresses "the absolute necessity of resuming designactivities now, such that those who still have the benefit of real testing experience can mentor thenext-generation designers in the Complex." (23)

Several of its recommendations, however, might undercut this workforce, or seem to rely ona workforce that may not exist.

The TF states that "as the Complex is transformed, it will need to develop atalent pool of personnel experienced in modern production technologies and processes. ... The TaskForce believes that these personnel should come from a commercial high-tech background, not fromwithin the Complex." (23) The plants have modern equipment -- and workers trained to operate it-- as well as old equipment, yet the recommendation could be viewed as downplaying the value ofthe workers' skills, many of which are unique to the Complex. Suggesting that workers' skills maynot meet current needs, and implying that existing workers will not be trained in the skills needed,could be seen as showing a lack of confidence in the workforce that could harm morale. Even RRWwill require a workforce experienced in handling and machining SNM. It is also not clear thatpersonnel with "a commercial high-tech background" would have the expertise to work on nuclearweapons production, or that they would want to do so, as the specialized skills required might bedifficult to market in the civilian economy, narrowing their career options.

The TF would locate CNPC in a sparsely-populated area in order to reduce theeffect that a terrorist attack on the facility would have on nearby communities. It considers LLNL,LANL, Y-12, and Pantex "sufficiently close to residential and commercial structures such that anypartially successful terrorist attack on these sites may cause collateral damage to the surroundingcivilian population and associated ... assets." (19) If LANL, Y-12, and Pantex are considered toodensely populated for safety, CNPC would have to be located in an even more rural area. Yet itcould prove difficult to hire thousands of people in a rural area who "come from a commercialhigh-tech background," and could take years to provide the requisite security clearances and training. The problem would be eased somewhat by the length of time needed to buildCNPC.

The TF envisions the Complex producing and dismantling 125 warheads peryear, and states, "[a] second shift would provide surge capacity in pit production or weapon assemblyshould it be required." (5) It does not indicate the source of workers to constitute the projectedsecond shift, a potential problem in rural areas. Would the Complex train a second cadre of peoplewith these skills, and then provide them with work sufficient to maintain these skills, so they wouldbe available if needed? Manufacturing typically requires some depth of personnel to back up workerswho are ill, on vacation, in training, etc., but it is unclear if these added personnel would suffice tooperate an entire shift, especially for an extended time.

The director of LANL suggests that establishing CNPC would likely encounterhigh costs, major technical risks, and delays, all of which "would severely disrupt skilled personnelacross the complex and could sharply curtail the ability of the complex to recruit and retain the nextgeneration workforce." (19)

Implications for the nuclear weapons laboratories. The role of the nuclear weapons laboratories and the resources they require have been perenniallycontentious issues. Some have argued for raising or lowering the amount spent on experimentalfacilities, for reducing funds for independent research, for limiting nonweapons work, and the like. Some are concerned that having two physics design labs, Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore,results in excessive redundancy, cost, and competitiveness.

In this regard, the TF shows an ambivalence concerning competition and cooperation at thelabs. Regarding competition: "the current Complex needs to initiate a design competitionimmediately for a family of modern replacement weapons," (4) and "Each weapon designincorporated into a block change should be the result of a formal competition between LANL andLLNL, each supported by SNL [Sandia National Laboratories]." (34) Regarding cooperation:"Within the Complex, the physics design laboratories [LANL and LLNL] aggressively seekindependence rather than cooperative interdependence, resulting in redundant programs andfacilities, increasing costs and reducing productivity; and the production sites are under funded." (vi)Regarding both: "The challenges to the Complex will require competition for the best designconcepts, followed by cooperation in implementing the winning design and cooperation in thecertification." (19) Of particular concern,

The three design laboratories ... routinely compete witheach other and set their own requirements as justification for new facilities and redundant researchfunding in the fear that one laboratory may become superior. The net result is that the Complex sitesare competing for programmatic funds and priorities rather than relying upon their divergent andcomplementary strengths and thereby operating as a truly interdependent team, with shared successand rewards. (2)

The TF recommends a number of changes to the labs that seek to reduce redundancy, savemoney, and foster cooperation.

It would eliminate many research facilities and capabilities from the labs inorder to consolidate them. It would store all Category I and II quantities of SNM at CNPC (4), moveR&D on Category I and II quantities of SNM to CNPC (15), close TA-55 as a pit production plant(15), move R&D on all but small quantities of explosives to CNPC or NTS (15), and considerconsolidating the type of experiments done by DARHT and Site 300 at NTS. (21,J3)

The TF proposes that "there be only one capability [i.e., high-end] [computing]machine location in the Complex. A single location would more effectively leverage staff andinfrastructure. Users would be, and should be, highly distributed. This would tend to enhanceexpertise and substantially reduce operating costs. ..." (20)

The TF favors making some large facilities at a single lab into user facilities-- that is, shared-use facilities -- that would be run by the host lab but available to users from otherlabs. It proposes that "NNSA can reduce operating costs and promote teamwork by designatingmany of its facilities as User Facilities. Examples of such facilities are the high-energy densitydevices (e.g., the NIF [LLNL's National Ignition Facility], the Z-Machine [at Sandia], Omega [a laserfacility at the University of Rochester]), as well as the facilities involved in such activities ashydrotesting (Site 300 and the DARHT facility), HE [high explosives] testing, SNM testing, andtritium research." (28) Further, "over the last 12 years, the science-based Stockpile StewardshipProgram has made an enormous investment in new capability and test facilities in the three designlaboratories. The Task Force believes that these are valuable Complex assets and should be operatedas assets for the benefit of the Complex, not the host site." (20)

The TF calls for "elimination of redundant non-weapons relevant research andtesting." (33)

The TF accepts the prospect of smaller labs: "The weapons laboratories of thefuture will likely have smaller nuclear weapons program staff than they have today."(19)

Critics of the TF report are likely to raise a number of issues concerning theserecommendations.

Regarding user facilities, some current laboratory facilities have been operatedin this manner for many years. The labs treat major facilities such as NIF, Sandia's Z Machine, andthe Los Alamos Neutron Science Center as national assets. Because it would be too costly toreplicate, maintain, and staff them at two or three labs, they are instead made available for use byComplex staff, and in some cases by academic and industrial researchers.

The TF would have lab scientists travel to CNPC or NTS to do some work. This would result in additional effort, expenditure of time, and costs, and would separate work atthose sites from other relevant equipment and expertise at the labs. It is also uncertain if these sitescould provide the needed support. The TF states that CNPC would include a center for research onSNM as a user facility for laboratory staff, and "CNPC staff would provide all requisite equipmentand technical support staff to support the design laboratories' science and engineering users." (15)But the existing facilities at the labs for SNM R&D have been developed over many years throughscientific, administrative, budgetary, and political reviews and are integrated into the work of thelabs. Critics believe it would be difficult to bring the required support into being at CNPC, a newsite whose prime mission would be production rather than R&D.

As noted, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Building atLANL would conduct research on plutonium and uranium. LANL's director has expressed concernthat limiting this building to Categories III and IV quantities of SNM, as the TF recommends, "will(1) eliminate the capability to do the necessary suite of actinide chemistry required to meet pitproduction mission requirements, (2) would not allow secure access to and storage of necessaryquantities of SNM critical for interim pit manufacturing capacity, and therefore, (3) undermine thedevelopment and deployment of RRW." (20)

LANL's director is also concerned about changes affecting key experimentalfacilities. "RRW design certification will push the limits of current predictive tools. The SEABrecommends that these critically important tools be consolidated, transferred or eliminated -- puttingRRW at risk." (21)

The TF approach raises more general issues as well. Regarding the labs'cooperation/competition relationship, LANL and LLNL cooperate in many ways, such as peer reviewof weapon designs, joint use of computational and experimental facilities, and collaboration onscientific research. At the same time, they are, by design and evolution, competitive in their mostimportant strength, nuclear weapon design. During the Cold War, they created competing designsin response to military requirements for new weapons. In these competitions, Sandia's Albuquerquebranch teamed with LANL, and Sandia's Livermore branch teamed with LLNL. This competitioncontinues with the design for RRW. Many analysts believe that design competition is especiallyimportant now that nuclear testing is not available to check warhead performance. In this view,competitions require competitors; nuclear weapon design competitions require rival labs in order toexplore differing approaches and to challenge competing design teams. Redundant facilities at thetwo labs help make competition possible by providing each lab with a similar base of resources. Some supporting the current laboratory system hold that if the TF wants competition, there must beredundancy because it would be difficult to have one without the other.

Even more than research facilities, the core strength of the labs is arguably their ability tobring many disciplines to bear on weapon problems. Each lab is a community with each memberdrawing on the skills of many others, and each contributing to the research needs of many others. Because of the complexity of nuclear weapons, solving a typical weapon problem draws on manyskills resident at a lab, including physics, chemistry, metallurgy, computer operation, computermodeling, engineering (mechanical, chemical, electrical), instrumentation, and experimentation. Designing a weapon also draws on many skills. Similarly, research facilities support multiple areasof expertise. Only a few laboratory staff may operate an experimental facility, computer center,research laboratory building, and the like, but a single experiment may draw on many skills and maycontribute data valuable to staff in many areas of the weapons program. Accordingly, some areconcerned that removing one major scientific resource would be likely to disrupt work in a numberof areas.

The TF would shift resources in a number of crucial areas of weapons science. It wouldremove a high-end computation facility from most labs, and would move much work on SNM andHE from the labs to CNPC and NTS. SNM, high explosives, experimentation, and computation arecritical to nuclear weapon labs, and are often interdependent. A nuclear explosion requires HE andSNM. Experimentation provides data on the behavior of nuclear weapons. Computer modelingintegrates data from experiments, scientific theory, and past nuclear tests to improve understandingof weapons performance and of the relevant theory. The TF would move Category I and II SNM toCNPC and NTS. Yet LLNL and LANL are currently conducting so-called accelerated agingexperiments on plutonium to provide a better estimate of pit life, which is crucial for determiningfuture pit production requirements. These experiments use more than Category II amounts ofplutonium, so the TF plan would seem to bar that work from the labs. Both labs dismantle pits,which have a Category I quantity of SNM, to inspect them for age-related changes. The TF wouldapparently move pit production from TA-55 to CNPC, yet TA-55 could arguably be used toexperiment with production methods and as a pilot plant, in addition to serving as a backup to MPF. Some believe that removing major scientific facilities from the labs could impair recruiting;laboratory staff have stated for many years that outstanding scientific facilities attract outstandingrecruits. For example, a goal of the Laser Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship program at LosAlamos is to "[e]xploit excellent high-quality science in recruiting." (22)

While the TF envisions the prospect of a smaller weapons program staff, critics of the TFreport maintain that a nuclear weapons laboratory requires a certain set of skills regardless ofstockpile size. They point out that staffing assumptions based on the more limited range of skillsthat the TF seems to believe may be required by the RRW concept implicitly rest on otherassumptions: that the RRW concept will appear, after study, able to meet its goals; that theAdministration and Congress will choose to replace many current warheads with RRWs; and thatdesigning and engineering such new warheads will require a smaller skill set than is needed tomaintain existing designs. They question whether such far-reaching assumptions should be a presentbasis for planning future lab needs.

Regarding the possible impact of improvements in computing on reducing numbers oflaboratory staff, the TF states, "Technical staffing levels at the design laboratories can besignificantly reduced as the Complex leverages the years of investment in new, automated test andcomputational capabilities at the design laboratories." (23) Improved computing has greatlyincreased the capability of lab staff so they are able to do better work, and presumably more workper hour. This does not necessarily mean that fewer people are needed. Laboratory staff state thata chemist cannot do the work of a weapon designer, a designer who specializes in a weapon'sprimary stage cannot design a secondary stage, and computers cannot mentor new staff. They alsoquestion whether automated test equipment and enhanced computational capabilities would permitsignificant reductions in technical staff at the labs.

Having a high-end computer at each lab offers important benefits. It helps each lab recruitand retain talented computer specialists, who are attracted by the opportunity to work on suchmachines. Having top computation talent at each lab makes computer specialists more easilyaccessible to specialists in the many (if not all) disciplines who depend on high-end computing. Itcan be argued that providing high-end machines for all the labs permits them to try differentapproaches to computer and software design, and aids competition between the labs. A Complexrelying on one high-end computer center could face the risk that connectivity to the labs would failor become overloaded. Because it takes several years to design, program, and install high-endcomputers and make them operational, managers of a single high-end computer center serving theentire Complex might be unwilling or unable to introduce new machines very often. In contrast,supporters of the current laboratory system maintain that with each lab having its own high-endcomputers, which may phase in at different times, a high-capability computer is likely to beintroduced into the Complex more often than would be the case with a single Complex-widecomputation site. Clearly, supporting one location instead of four would save on procurement,operation, and maintenance; at issue is whether the savings outweigh the benefits of the currentapproach.

Laboratory staff have stated over the years that sharply curtailing non-weapons work, as theTF proposes, would harm the labs. The labs conduct much non-weapons research. Some is relatedto security, such as nonproliferation, conventional defense technology, and homeland security. Forexample, weapons scientists help interpret intelligence data relevant to nuclear proliferation andstudy how to disarm potential terrorist nuclear weapons. (23) The labs perform other work in areas such as energy, globalclimate modeling, the human genome, traffic flow modeling, and basic research. Such work aidsrecruiting. Interviews with laboratory staff suggest that few graduate students start out intending todo nuclear weapons work, but as postdoctoral fellows some come to the labs to work onnon-weapons-relevant projects and then move to classified weapons work. (24) Permitting staff to dosome work that they and their laboratory deem as having high potential value aids morale, skilldevelopment, and retention, as well as leading to useful new technologies. Critics maintain thatremoving non-weapons work could harm weapons work because the two often benefit from eachother's resources and efforts.

Implications for the plants. The TF, many ofwhose members have over the course of their careers done some work in industry, (25) was sensitive to perceivedproblems at the plants. It "found the production side of the Complex operating from World War IIera facilities, lacking in modern-day production technology and striving to optimize performancewith antiquated equipment and facilities." (1) Congress and NNSA recognize these problems as welland have begun to address them by, among other things, directing part of the budget to the plants forspecific purposes and including a Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program, for which$150.9 million was appropriated for FY2006. CNPC proposes a more comprehensive solution, withCNPC for nuclear components and more contracting out for nonnuclear ones.

The industrial model that the TF applies to the plants, however, may have some deficienciesin dealing with nuclear weapons production. For one, as an organizing principle, cost has beenaccorded a lower ranking in the design and production of nuclear weapons than in other areas ofindustry. The TF states, "Strong leaders and healthy organizations must have a commitment tosuccess, not perfection. Successful businesses know when products and services are good enough,and recognize that cost is one of the metrics for excellent performance." (25) And, "aggressive costgoals are achievable on new weapon component designs, and a cost goal adds a healthy degree ofdiscipline to the design process." (9) Many would maintain that, when designing and manufacturingnuclear weapons, in contrast to many commercial products, only something close to perfection isgood enough. During the Cold War, cost was much less important than warhead safety andreliability. While cost is a more salient consideration now, nuclear weapon experts hold that safetyand reliability are, and will remain, of greater importance. The TF also suggests a design-to-costmodel, which may not be appropriate to the Complex. "Upon DOD and NNSA acceptance oflife-cycle cost estimates, 'design/produce-to-cost' metrics can be established for the Complex." (14)Yet there is no design-to-cost equation for the Complex. CNPC is to perform specific tasks, manyof which are at the state of the art and unique to the Complex, at the lowest price; if that price isgreater than the targeted design cost, what happens?

The TF recommends outsourcing of nonnuclear components. "[T]he Complex is stronglyencouraged to purchase these components and assemblies from commercial industrial vendors to thedegree practical given classification and security requirements." (14) While this has been done foryears to a limited extent, expanding the scope of outsourcing could encounter many problems. Qualifying vendors -- such as by assuring compliance with quality assurance standards, obtainingsecurity clearances for workers, and installing security apparatus for facilities -- would beburdensome to companies even if NNSA bore the monetary costs. Some nonnuclear componentswould be procured in small lots that would be economically unattractive to vendors. Some wouldbe of old design, or would use nonstandard manufacturing techniques, so would not provide skillsor equipment of value to the vendor in commercial work. Removing a substantial amount of workon nonnuclear components from the Kansas City Plant (KCP) could harm the operations of thatplant. KCP contracts out for some nonnuclear components, but is set up to produce the full rangeof them. If KCP's workload drops significantly, it would have difficulty maintaining a diverse setof skills. These problems could become significant: a large shrinkage of the plant could putproduction of certain nuclear weapon components at risk if a key vendor went out of business orchose not to continue its work.

One TF recommendation on outsourcing might be seen as a potential conflict of interest. Inkeeping with its approach to outsourcing nonnuclear components, the TF recommends outsourcingproduction of beryllium and beryllium oxide components "immediately if services can be obtainedfrom quality commercial vendors" (22). A TF member is Director of Technology at Brush Wellman(iii); that company bills itself as "the only fully integrated producer of beryllium and beryllium oxidein the world." (26)

The TF would also outsource storage of components to save money on security. "For securitycost savings, most of these [nonnuclear] components would be stored at the commercial vendor'slocation or another Complex facility but consistent with just-in-time commercial practices." (16)However, total security cost could arguably be higher if components were made at dozens ofindustrial plants, each of which would seemingly have to be secured, rather than at KCP, which hassecurity in place. And elaborate procedures for accounting for these components as they work theirway through the transportation system might hamper just-in-time deliveries.

The recommendations could affect Pantex. "Upon dismantlement of the last of the Cold warweapons, Pantex, if not the site of the CNPC, could be decommissioned. For the sustainablestockpile, the ongoing dismantlement of all future RRW based weapons would be conducted at theCNPC." (19) CNPC would contain facilities for the main operations now at Pantex: weaponsassembly and disassembly, explosive component fabrication, and storage of pits. (15-16)

The TF would consolidate most if not all of Y-12's weapons work at CNPC, including afoundry for highly enriched uranium (HEU; see Appendix), a Uranium Production Facility, assemblyof secondaries, storage of HEU and secondaries, and HEU R&D. (15-16) The TF would also moveberyllium work from Y-12 and LANL to CNPC or would contract it out. (J1-J3) This consolidationwould eliminate many if not all of Y-12's critical weapon functions, calling into question therationale for retaining Y-12.

Potential consequences of closing existing plants and building a new CNPC could includepolitical pressure from constituents on NIMBY (not in my back yard) and KIMBY (keep it in myback yard) grounds. CNPC would provide construction and operating jobs for the region chosen,but fear of many new nuclear facilities, even at an existing site, might lead to public protests. WhenNNSA sought public comments on siting MPF as part of the environmental impact process, theOffice of the Governor of Nevada strongly opposed siting MPF at NTS. (27) Conversely, closingexisting sites could arouse public opposition. Sites for the Complex were built in the 1940s and1950s and are major employers.

Pit production issues. The "pit" is the fissile coreof a nuclear weapon's primary stage (see Appendix). The United States has been unable to producepits certified for use in deployed nuclear weapons since 1989, when the only large-scale pitproduction site in the Complex, Rocky Flats Plant (CO), closed. (28) NNSA argues that pitsdeteriorate over time and must eventually be replaced. Critics believe that NNSA may beunderestimating pit life, but do not dispute the need for eventual pit replacement. (29) Accordingly, NNSA seeksa way to produce pits on a scale sufficient to sustain the stockpile. At present, LANL is building afew pits at TA-55, which was designed for plutonium R&D. These pits have not yet been certifiedfor use in the stockpile because development of the procedures needed to have high confidence incertification has not yet been completed. NNSA does not view TA-55 as having sufficient capacityfor the long term; instead, NNSA has planned for a Modern Pit Facility, or MPF, with a capacity of125 pits per year. The TF would locate all of MPF's functions at CNPC. (15)

As discussed below, congressional actions have raised questions about the future of MPF. That facility might proceed; on the other hand, a decision not to proceed with it would call intoquestion the future of CNPC because MPF would arguably be CNPC's most important facility. TheTF analysis of MPF and TA-55 is discussed here to cast light on the role of TA-55 andconsiderations involved in establishing a pit production program.

The schedule and capacity required for pit production hinge on several factors.

Pit life: The TF states that the pits in the stockpile were made between 1978and 1990 (actually 1989), and that the best current estimate of pit life from the weapons labs is aminimum of 45 to 60 years. (12) "Thus the entire stockpile may need to be 'turned-over' by 2035 to2050 depending on the acceptable level of uncertainty in pit lifetime." (12)

Stockpile size: The TF analyzes the CNPC schedule needed to support astockpile of 2,200 active and 1,000 inactive warheads. (17) It finds that to support that stockpilewith a pit life of 45 years and a production rate of 125 pits per year, CNPC must be "functional" by2014; with a pit life of 60 years, that date shifts to 2034. (17). Either case assumes that TA-55produces 50 pits per year (17) from 2012 until a replacement pit facility came on line. (34) A largerstockpile would require that MPF have more capacity or (in theory) an earlier operationaldate.

TA-55 capacity. NNSA plans to have TA-55 reach a capacity of 10 pits peryear by the end of FY2007. (30) The TF envisions boosting that capacity to 50 pits per year byFY2012. (34) A higher capacity at TA-55 would permit a lower capacity at MPF or a delay inreaching a given capacity at MPF. Alternatively, it appears that the TF would close production atTA-55 when CNPC opens, as noted earlier; if TA-55 were kept open, then it and MPF could meetstockpile requirements more easily than MPF alone. Without MPF, TA-55 would require a verylarge increase in capacity to maintain a stockpile of 3,200 warheads.

Ability to reuse pits. The TF states that "reuse of 'young' plutonium pits (lessthan 45 years old) and of canned secondary assemblies should be evaluated ..." (9) Reusing "young"pits would reduce the number of pits that would have to be made before then, perhaps permitting adelay in MPF until pit life and future weapon requirements became clearer. In contrast, if TA-55 isto be the sole U.S. pit facility, its capacity would have to be increased sharply even if "young" pitsare used.

Much more capacity is needed than simply enough to provide pits for directstockpile use. Under the Moscow Treaty, the United States and Russia will each have 1,700 to 2,200operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by the end of 2012; other warheads would beneeded for tactical missions and for nondeployed reserves. The TF assumes a stockpile of 3,200warheads NNSA notes that additional pits must be manufactured because some units will bescrapped because of manufacturing defects, while others will be needed to meet requirements for (a)replacements for pits destroyed in the course of evaluating the condition of pits in the stockpile overmany years, (b) pits reserved for later evaluation, (c) pits to prove manufacturing processes at thestart of production of each type of pit, and (d) "pits built and destructively tested during steady-stateproduction to assure product quality." (31)

In the TF plan, NNSA would select a site for CNPC "expeditiously" starting in FY2006, (23)and the entire CNPC would need to be "functional" by 2014 under assumptions noted above. (17)This plan, however, has several problematic elements.

First, it is not known whether Congress would support MPF or, by extension, CNPC. In theFY2004 conference report on the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-137 ,conferees reduced the request for MPF by $12.0 million, to $10.8 million, on grounds that "until theCongress reviews the revised future Stockpile plan it is premature to pursue further decisionsregarding the Modern Pit Facility." (32) The conferees' statement on P.L. 108-447 , the FY2005Consolidated Appropriations Act, included the following: "The conferees agree that funding forModern Pit Facility cannot be used to select a construction site in fiscal year 2005." (33) The House AppropriationsCommittee report on FY2006 energy and water appropriations stated, "The Committee continues tooppose the Department [of Energy]'s accelerated efforts to site and begin construction activities ona modern pit facility ... The Committee will consider a modern pit facility site and design only whenthe detailed analysis of the pit aging experiments and the concomitant capacity requirements tied tothe long-term stockpile size are determined." (34) The Senate Appropriations Committee report on FY2006 energyand water appropriations stated,

the Committee disagrees with the purported [TaskForce] proposal to consolidate all of the nuclear material and the entire weapons manufacturingcapability, including the construction of a Modern Pit Facility, at a single location. There are verystrong opinions in Congress regarding the siting of a new pit facility or changing the militarycapability of the existing weapons. As such, the Committee believes it is unlikely that Congresswould support such comprehensive reforms as currently proposed by the NNSA Complex studypanel. (35)

The FY2006 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act conference report stated, "Theconference agreement provides no funding for the modern pit facility. The conferees direct theAdministrator of the NNSA to undertake a review of the pit program to focus on improving themanufacturing capability at TA-55." (36) On the other hand, Representative Hobson, who as Chairmanof the House Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee has taken the lead onseveral issues on nuclear weapons and the Complex, said in an address of December 2005 that hefocused on the need to define MPF rather than opposing that facility per se :

We'll probably build a modern pit facility, but we needto know what size we're going to build first and how many we're going to build. ... I'm not opposedto building a new modern pit facility, but this numbers thing drove me nuts and until we get there,we're just not going to do it. (37)

Consequently, the TF recommendation to greatly accelerate the current pit production scheduledespite congressional opposition to MPF, unresolved concerns over MPF characteristics, and sharpconstraints on capacity at TA-55 would appear problematic.

Second, it may be difficult to find a site for CNPC; for example, as noted earlier, the Officeof the Governor of Nevada opposed siting MPF at NTS. Even if a site is found, it would take yearsto complete the NEPA process, obtain the needed permits, design and build the facility, and prepareit for operation. Lawsuits by national nongovernmental organizations or local groups could furtherdelay site selection.

Third, the TF's estimates of capacity and schedule for MPF and TA-55 are at odds with thoseof NNSA. The TF states,

A classified Supplement 2 analyzes the issue of timingfor the CNPC for a stockpile of 2200 active and 1000 reserve and the expected pit manufacturingcapacity of the future Complex. The conclusion is that if the NNSA is required to: 1) protect a pitlifetime of 45 years, 2) support the above stockpile numbers, and 3) demonstrate production ratesof 125 production pits to the stockpile per year, the CNPC must be functional by 2014. If one acceptsthe uncertainty of pit lifetime of 60 years, the CNPC can be delayed to 2034. In either case TA-55is assumed to be producing 50 production pits to the stockpile per year. (17) [footnote 2 in text:] Classified Supplement to the NWCITF Report Recommendationsfor the Nuclear Weapons Complex of the Future .

In contrast, NNSA states, "A minimum production capacity of about 125 pits per year startingin 2021 ... is required to support a reduced stockpile as reflected in the June 2004 Stockpile Planassuming a 60-year pit lifetime," and "The current NNSA planning approach for an MPF of 125 pitsper year with production starting in 2021 is not sufficient for pit lifetimes of 40 or 50 years, or forlarger long-term stockpiles." (38) NNSA would start construction in 2012. (39) NNSA notes that morepits must be produced than the number headed for the stockpile, as discussed earlier. Some wouldbe spares, or withheld to examine later for aging problems, or destined to replace pits that a detailedevaluation renders unusable. Others would be rejected because of manufacturing defects. The TFenvisions an annual MPF production rate of 125 pits to the stockpile, (40) while NNSA envisionsMPF producing 125 total pits per year. Thus the capacity of the TF's MPF would be substantiallylarger than that of NNSA's MPF. NNSA's plan for MPF is to start construction in 2012 andfull-scale production in 2021; the TF calls for an operational MPF with a capacity well beyond 125pits per year 7 years ahead of NNSA's schedule.

At the same time, the TF envisions modifying TA-55 to produce 50 pits per year by 2012. It is not clear that that is feasible. NNSA's goal is to have TA-55 produce 10 pits per year by the endof FY2007, (41) and isplanning to increase that figure to 30-40 per year "sometime after 2010," according to a report of aninterview with Ambassador Brooks. (42) Modifying TA-55 to produce 50 pits per year starting in 2012would require a larger investment, and the schedule might prove difficult to meet.

As discussed under "Forgoing the value of sunk costs," the TF would shut production atTA-55 when MPF opens at CNPC, which could (in the TF plan) be as early as 2014. If MPFproceeds, the logic of spending large sums to turn TA-55 into a production facility and then closingit for production after only 2 years is open to question on several grounds. Most of the potentialvalue of the investment would be lost. After converting TA-55 so that its main mission wasproduction, it might be desirable, at added cost, to reconvert it back to a research facility onceproduction halted because plutonium facilities are extremely costly and TA-55 is the largest suchfacility in the Complex. If MPF were to open, TA-55's production capacity would appear to be ofpotential value in many ways: as an engineering facility to test new production techniques, as a pilotplant to test and improve the producibility of new pits, as a surge producer in case the internationalsituation called for added capacity, as a source of extra production to fix unanticipated warheadproblems without disrupting MPF's production schedule, as a "boutique" producer of small lots ofpits for new or modified nuclear weapons, and as a backup production facility in case MPF must shutdown so as to avoid a total halt to weapons production as occurred when Rocky Flats pit productionended.

Finally, the TF raises the prospect that newer pits could be reused. If this is the case, thenfewer new pits would be needed. As a result, the capacity required by a pit facility could be reducedor the pit production schedule extended.

Security. In the TF plan, CNPC would be theonly site in the Complex for Category I and II SNM. (14, 15) This material would be moved fromPantex and Y-12 (assuming CNPC is not located at either site), and from LANL and LLNL. Partof the rationale is to reduce security costs. CNPC would probably achieve that objective. Whetherit would "reduce the overall threat to the Complex" (vii) is less clear. It would reduce the numberof sites and communities "that could be targets of terrorist attacks," (24) but reducing the numberof potential terrorist targets would seem to increase security only if there is concern about thepossibility of an attack on multiple Complex sites at the same time. If terrorists could attack onlyone site, having more sites with fewer assets at each would make each site a lower-value target,which could reduce the risk of attack on any one site. Conversely, locating many facilities at a singlesite would seem to make that site a more attractive terrorist target. It is far from certain that anyComplex site would rise to the top of a terrorist target list given that these sites are well defendedand large in area.

A related TF goal is that "consolidation would result in reduction of risk to adjacent civilianpopulations. Currently, the LLNL, LANL, Y-12, and Pantex sites are sufficiently close to residentialand commercial structures such that any partially successful terrorist attack on these sites may causecollateral damage to the surrounding civilian population and associated public and private assets."(19) Of these four sites, only LLNL is located in a densely-populated area, yet the TF's considerationof relocating plutonium R&D to LLNL (35) would require increasing the inventory of plutonium atthat laboratory. For the threat of SNM release to occur as a result of terrorist attack on a Complexsite, several steps would be required. Terrorists would have to attack the site, which would bedifficult given site security. They would have to gain access to SNM, which additional securityfeatures would render very difficult. They would then have to seize and detonate a bomb, althoughthere are few complete weapons in the Complex other than at Pantex and complete weapons are wellprotected. Alternatively, they might try to seize and disperse SNM as a dirty bomb, but SNM is apoor choice for a dirty bomb because it is very much less radioactive or accessible than suchradioactive materials as cobalt-60 or cesium-137. Reducing risk to adjacent population thus seemsa questionable rationale for CNPC.

Nonproliferation. Critics hold that the TF reportmight adversely affect U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts. The lead sentence of the report statesthat the goal of the nuclear weapons program has "shifted to sustaining existing warheads for theindefinite future," (v) even though states party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, including theUnited States, agreed in Article VI to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measuresrelating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." The TFrecommends continuous design and production on "a family of modular nuclear weapons." (23) Thismight likewise be interpreted as inconsistent with the NPT. The TF says it is "confident that theComplex can now design a nuclear weapon that is certifiable without the need for undergroundtesting." (vi) This has been true since 1945; designers were so confident in the Hiroshima bomb thatit was dropped without a test of its design. At the same time, some who hope to reduce the numberof U.S. nuclear weapons fear that the Stockpile Stewardship Program is intended to enable theUnited States to design weapons without testing; (43) the TF statement might be taken as support of this point. TheTF recommends considering placing key SNM facilities underground (17), even though the UnitedStates has expressed concern about Iran's and North Korea's practice of hiding their nuclear facilitiesunderground and has conducted research on a nuclear earth penetrator weapon to destroy buriedfacilities.

Assessment of nuclear weapon issues. Criticsmight call into question several TF statements on nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons program,and the Complex.

The report states, "As weapon designs move away from the UGT [underground nuclear test]experience base toward high-margin, conservative designs, the issue of final stockpile certificationbecomes increasingly important." (10) Nuclear weapon experts maintain that "final" stockpilecertification may become more or less difficult, but never more or less important, asserting that ithas always been of the utmost importance.

"The TA-55 facility is not being run as a production unit, but rather as a research andcompliance driven facility. Productivity is about 5% of what would be required and achievable ofan industrial operation in the same facility with the same task." (H1) A high production rate,however, was not the goal of TA-55's pit production program. After Rocky Flats closed, DOE couldhave converted part of TA-55 to more efficient production by taking out existing equipment andinstalling new production lines, but that could have taken years and been expensive. Instead, DOEchose to utilize existing equipment and space at a loss of efficiency but with less expense andquicker time to begin limited production. TA-55 is a pilot plant installed in an R&D building toprove out the processes to make a certifiable pit. Until the processes can be shown to work, and pitscan be certified, and a decision on MPF can be taken, and a decision reached on where to conductplutonium R&D, and the type of pits to be produced (current or RRW designs) is decided, criticsargue, there is little point in incurring the expense of redoing TA-55 for a 20-fold increase inproduction.

In trying to arrive at industrial benchmarks for production of plutonium components at MPF,the TF stated:

Since there is little commercial experience withplutonium, the Study Group [a TF subgroup] looked at beryllium manufacturing. Berylliumcomponents are used in current primary designs and have very similar machining requirements andtolerances to the plutonium parts. A number of the casting techniques are different, but notsufficiently different that the physical nature of the building is altered. Rather, the hazardous natureof Be and Pu make handling specifications and restrictions similar, thus a lot of the buildingrequirements are similar, and other than the forging and casting equipment, the machining andmetrology equipment is virtually identical. (H1)

However, beryllium and plutonium are very different. Beryllium is light and stable, whileplutonium is heavy and radioactive. Weapon scientists note other differences. Concerns overcriticality (the possibility that too much plutonium in a small volume could lead to a small nuclearchain reaction) and security drive every aspect of planning a plutonium facility. Radioactivitydictates spacing between plutonium processing stations to limit worker exposure to radiation. Plutonium hemispheres must be joined together to form a pit; a LANL metallurgist stated thatwelding processes used to join beryllium components are very different than those used to joinplutonium components. Equipment for forging and casting differs for the two metals, as the TFnotes. (H1) Applications for commercial beryllium parts are not at all like those for plutoniumcomponents. Plutonium has different metallurgical characteristics at different temperatures andpressures; for example, like ice, plutonium increases in volume when it solidifies. Since plutoniumis radioactive, leaks during handling can be detected constantly in real time, unlike beryllium, so thatprocesses for handling the two metals are very different. Industrial methods for handling berylliumare not necessarily an ideal model. The Toledo Blade reported health and safety problems resultingfrom beryllium exposure at a plant in Elmore, Ohio, and elsewhere. (44)

The TF states, "The current lack of teamwork and trust is manifested in unnecessaryredundancy of missions and facilities at various sites and an inability to harness the talent of theComplex to solve critical problems." (28) Concern with these stated problems underlies many TFrecommendations. Supporters of the current Complex, however, would raise questions about theTF's statement. They would maintain that:

LANL and LLNL have for decades competed on nuclear weapon design, asnoted earlier. This institutionalized competition should not be characterized as a failure ofteamwork.

Despite this competition, there are many examples of teamwork between thelabs. LANL and LLNL conduct peer review as part of the annual assessment process in support ofweapon certification; this peer review will arguably be critical as the laboratories proceed with workon RRW. LANL teams with SNL/New Mexico, and LLNL with SNL/California, in developingwarheads. Staff from the labs use each other's experimental facilities, and cooperate in many aspectsof weapons and non-weapons science.

The labs partner much more with the plants than they did during the Cold War. Lab and plant staff frequently said that during the Cold War, the labs would design components withlittle regard for ease of manufacture and "throw the designs over the fence" to the plants, leaving thelatter to make the components despite difficulties. Now, labs and plants exhibit much more concernabout ease of manufacture. For example, the two design teams routinely consult with the plants onthis topic, ease of manufacture is a goal of RRW, and plant representatives participate in the RRWProject Officers' Group, the focal point of RRW activity.

Redundancy has value in certain instances. For example, Rocky Flats Plantwas the only site in the Complex that made pits for the stockpile. When production at Rocky FlatsPlant halted in 1989, the Complex could no longer produce nuclear weapons. As a result, "Today,the United States is the only nuclear weapons power without a production-level capability tomanufacture plutonium pits for the nuclear arsenal." (45)

Supporters of the current Complex maintain that there are many examples tocounter the TF statement that the Complex is unable to solve problems: the ability of the Complexto create scores of warhead designs, and to produce many thousands of units, during the Cold War;the ability of the Complex to increase its understanding of nuclear weapon behavior through the SSP;and the ability of the Complex to maintain the nuclear stockpile after the Cold War so that DOE andDOD could certify its safety and reliability annually for nine years so far. Another example is theability of the Complex to recapture the pit manufacturing process despite a long hiatus between1989, when Rocky Flats manufactured the last "certified" pit, 2003, when LANL delivered the first"certifiable" pit, and 2007, when LANL is scheduled to deliver its first "certified" pit. (46)

The Task Force "found a Complex of varied strengths and weaknesses, with little evidenceof a master plan." (vi) Task Force critics acknowledge that there is no single, overarching,multi-decade master plan, but maintain that that lack is inevitable. From their perspective, theAdministration's Nuclear Posture Review of December 2001 sought a responsive infrastructure, andin fact the Complex has responded to, and been shaped by, many political and technicaldevelopments over the past six decades: World War II, the start of the Cold War, the prospect ofdeveloping the hydrogen bomb, Sputnik, the massive buildup and subsequent reductions of nuclearforces, the end of the Cold War, the development of modern information technology, and the globalwar on terrorism, to name a few. They note that the Administration and Congress have respondedover the years by funding new programs and facilities at Complex sites to obtain capabilities neededat the time. Just as the foregoing developments did not exhibit a master plan, so too were manyresponses necessarily ad hoc . At the same time, major facilities typically take years to build, so therehas necessarily been some long-term planning as well.

According to the TF, "dismantlement ... is a central element in nuclear threat reduction anddeterrence. As the Complex embarks on a continuous production strategy and replaces the Cold warstockpile, the nation needs to dismantle the retired Cold war weapons to demonstrate to its citizens,the Congress, and the world that the deployment of an improved sustainable stockpile is not thebeginning of stockpile growth." (19) Yet there is no link between deterrence and dismantlement. In the long history of U.S. nuclear weapons policies and programs, U.S. arms control and weaponemployment policies have focused on U.S. deployed forces, perceived U.S. will and intent to usethem, and the potential to increase their numbers or capabilities, not on the ability to dismantle them. Similarly, the Nuclear Posture Review of late 2001 links infrastructure (such as the Complex) todeterrence, but this linkage results from the ability of the infrastructure to maintain existing warheadsor make new ones, not from its ability to dismantle them.

Warheads are removed from deployed forces as a byproduct of treaties and other agreementsthat reduce deployed forces, as a result of a determination that certain types of warheads or theirdelivery systems are no longer needed, or, during the Cold War, because they were replaced bynewer models. Some of these warheads are kept in an inactive status, available for use; others areretired. Stockpile size has dropped because fewer and fewer warheads are deemed necessary fordeterrence or other military requirements. The end of the Cold War, for example, led to a sharpreduction in the number of potential targets and therefore in the number of weapons needed. By oneanalysis, the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile has been falling steadily since 1966, and even moresharply since 1989. (47) This trend may continue. President Bush said, "I am committed to achieving a credible deterrentwith the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs,including our obligations to our allies. My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces." (48) Such reductions indeployed forces might lead to further stockpile reductions, though not necessarily in any precisenumerical relationship.

While many retired warheads are dismantled, dismantlement is not required by treaty, but ismore a housekeeping matter to reduce the cost and effort for maintenance, storage, and security. Current methods used at Pantex to dismantle "the Cold war stockpile" provide no physical basis for"demonstrat[ing] to the world that the overall number of nuclear weapons is being reduced, therebyreducing the nuclear threat" (24) because there is no transparency, such as international monitorsobserving dismantlement. If there were continuous production, as the TF suggests, dismantlementwould demonstrate a net reduction "to [U.S.] citizens, the Congress, and the world" only if observerscould monitor both dismantlement and new production and found that the former exceeded the latter. In contrast, the United States has for decades demonstrated "threat reduction" through verifiabledismantlement of delivery vehicles and associated equipment (e.g., bombers, intercontinentalballistic missile silos, and missile submarines).

Moreover, there is no link between dismantlement and force reduction. Different stockpilesizes can support the same deployed force, and it is that force that figures in U.S. deterrent policy. Further, most current dismantlement is happening to warhead types totally removed fromdeployment over the last two decades, not to warhead types still deployed.

Task Force assumptions. The TF makes a numberof assumptions on LEP and RRW that may prove correct, but further details are required to makethe case convincingly. Accordingly, some would view it as premature to adopt recommendationsbased on them.

The Task Force assumes that the current method for repairing problems with existingwarheads, the LEP, will be increasingly costly over the long term. (v) It notes that many warheadscontain toxic materials, that the Complex must maintain materials and equipment no longer incurrent use, and that "[t]he LEP strategy requires that the Complex retain or re-acquire capabilitiesand processes that are necessary to refurbish weapons designed and built many years ago." (11-12) While it would be costly to maintain the stockpile using LEP, the TF does not show why it wouldbe increasingly costly. An alternate possibility is that while the first LEP of a warhead type mightbe costly and difficult, second and subsequent LEPs of that warhead might be easier and cheaper. In that scenario, several thing would occur between the first and second LEPs. SSP would learnmore about weapons science in the intervening decades. The surveillance program would providefurther information on the specific warhead. Details of conducting the LEP on that warhead typewould be recorded, software instructions to production machines would be stored, and keyequipment and materials would be stockpiled.

A related point involves the longevity of the stockpile under LEP. The TF argues that LEP"will sustain the viability of the Cold war stockpile for a while, but it will not achieve [a] future,sustainable stockpile ..." (12) Some are concerned that an accumulation of small changes withseveral LEPs could lead to insufficient confidence to certify warheads in the absence of nucleartesting. In this view, the very lack of adequate evidence on the future effectiveness of LEP,combined with the absence of a Complex with adequate capacity, poses a risk that an unexpectedfailure of a warhead type could undermine the deterrent force. On the other hand, if SSP, includingsurveillance and LEP, have been able to sustain the stockpile for about a decade, LEP supporters ask,why should it not be able to do so for longer? Indeed, NNSA's goal for LEP is to extend warheadlife by 20 to 30 years. (49) To that end, it has conducted an LEP of an intercontinental ballistic missile warhead (W87) and isconducting LEPs of a gravity bomb (B61), a submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead (W76),and a cruise missile warhead (W80) (50) -- that is, an LEP for each major type of nuclear delivery system.

The Task Force recommends that the United States should proceed immediately with RRW. The recommendation rests on assumptions that the labs can come up with a workable design forRRW, that the weapon can be produced at acceptable cost and on an acceptable schedule, and thatthe design can be certified without nuclear testing. Further, the TF assumes that the cost ofrefurbishing existing weapons through LEP will exceed the cost of designing and certifying RRW,setting up new production lines to manufacture it, and producing thousands of newly-built units. TheTF also assumes that the status quo is not "financially sustainable." (ix) Clearly, the status quo iscostly. It is one thing, though, to estimate that a particular course of action would cost a certainamount; to call it unaffordable appears to be a subjective judgment.

Appendix: Nuclear Weapons and the Nuclear Weapons Complex

This Appendix describes key terms, concepts, sites, and facilities as an aid to readers notfamiliar with them.

Current strategic (long-range) and most tactical nuclear weapons are of a two-stagedesign. (51) The firststage, the "primary," is an atomic bomb similar in concept to the bomb dropped on Nagasaki. Itprovides the energy needed to trigger the second stage, or "secondary."

The primary has a hollow core, often called a "pit," made of fissile weapons-grade plutonium(with a high content of isotope number 239). It is surrounded by a layer of chemical explosivedesigned to generate a symmetrical inward-moving (implosion) shock front. When the explosiveis detonated, the implosion compresses the plutonium, greatly increasing its density and causing itto become supercritical, so that it creates a runaway nuclear chain reaction. Neutrons drive thisreaction by causing plutonium atoms to fission, releasing more neutrons. To increase the fractionof plutonium that fissions -- boosting the yield of the primary -- a neutron generator injects neutronsdirectly into the fissioning plutonium. In addition, "boost gas," a mixture of deuterium and tritium(isotopes of hydrogen) gases, is injected into the pit; the intense heat and pressure of the implosioncause the gas to undergo fusion, generating a great many neutrons. The chain reaction can last onlya moment before the force of the nuclear explosion drives the plutonium outward so that it can nolonger support a chain reaction.

A metal "radiation case" channels the energy of the primary to the secondary stage, whichcontains lithium deuteride and other materials. The energy from the primary implodes the secondary,causing fission and fusion reactions that release most of the energy of a nuclear explosion.

The primary, radiation case, and secondary comprise the "nuclear explosive package." Thousands of other "nonnuclear" components, however, are needed to create a weapon. Theseinclude a case for the bomb or warhead, an arming, firing, and fuzing system, and a means of linkingthe weapon to its delivery system.

The Hiroshima bomb used a simpler "gun assembly" design, in which one subcritical massof highly enriched uranium (i.e., highly enriched in the fissile isotope 235) was shot down a gunbarrel into another subcritical mass of highly enriched uranium, forming a critical mass and causinga nuclear explosion. Highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium are referred to asspecial nuclear material, or SNM.

Nuclear weapons were designed, tested, and manufactured by the nuclear weapons complex,which is composed of eight government-owned contractor-operated sites: Los Alamos NationalLaboratory (NM) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (CA), which design nuclearexplosive packages; Sandia National Laboratories (NM and CA), which design the nonnuclearcomponents that turn the nuclear explosive package into a weapon; Y-12 Plant (TN), which producesuranium components and secondaries; Kansas City Plant (MO), which produces many of thenonnuclear components; Savannah River Site (SC), which processes tritium from stockpiledweapons to remove decay products; Pantex Plant (TX), which assembles and disassembles nuclearweapons; and the Nevada Test Site, which used to conduct nuclear tests but now conducts otherweapons-related experiments that do not produce a nuclear yield. These sites are now involved inmaintaining existing nuclear weapons. A federal agency, the National Nuclear SecurityAdministration (NNSA), a semiautonomous part of the Department of Energy, manages the nuclearweapons program and the Complex.

Pit production is the most controversial aspect of nuclear weapons production, and the onemost closely linked to the Reliable Replacement Warhead program. Rocky Flats Plant (CO) usedto produce pits, but that work was halted in 1989 due to safety concerns. Since then, the UnitedStates has not made any pits that have been certified for use in stockpiled warheads. Once RockyFlats pits were used up, the United States has been unable to make entire new warheads.

Los Alamos has established a small-scale pit production plant at its plutonium facility,Technical Area 55 (TA-55). TA-55 has produced several pits, but Los Alamos has not completedthe work needed to certify them for use in the stockpile. NNSA anticipates that that work will becompleted in FY2007, and that TA-55 will achieve a capacity of 10 pits per year beginning inFY2007. NNSA has plans to increase TA-55's capacity to 30-40 pits per year sometime after 2010.

NNSA, however, believes that that number is inadequate to support the stockpile, andproposes a new Modern Pit Facility (MPF) to provide more capacity: "A 125 pit per year MPF withfull production starting in 2021 (on-time) is the minimum capacity to support the President's reduced2012 stockpile assuming a 60-year pit lifetime." (52) In NNSA's view, because of the long lead time needed to designand build a pit facility, planning for MPF should continue as a hedge against unexpected problemswith pits in the stockpile. Others challenge that plan, arguing that if pit lifetime proves longer thananticipated, or if the future stockpile declines more than anticipated, an expanded TA-55 wouldsuffice, so that the United States should delay a decision on MPF until future pit requirementsbecome clearer. The FY2006 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, P.L. 109-103 ,deleted funds for MPF; conferees on the measure directed NNSA to "focus on improving themanufacturing capability at TA-55." On the other hand, Representative David Hobson, Chairmanof the House Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee and a key player onnuclear weapons issues, stated in December 2005 that he does not oppose MPF but wants to haveit defined more clearly before proceeding. The future of MPF thus appears uncertain.

Glossary: Abbreviations