Commercial Vehicle Security: Risk-Based Approach Needed to Secure the Commercial Vehicle Sector
Released: 2009-03-27T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Certain characteristics of commercial trucks and buses make them inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks and therefore difficult to secure. The commercial trucking and bus industries are open by design, with multiple access points and terminals so that vehicles can move large numbers of people and volumes of goods quickly. The openness of this sector and the large numbers of riders and quantities of goods on vehicles with access to metropolitan areas or tourist destinations also make them both difficult to secure and attractive targets for terrorists because of the potential for mass casualties and economic damage and disruption. In addition, the multitude of private commercial truck and bus companies and their diversity in size and cargo complicate efforts to develop security measures and mitigation strategies that are appropriate for the entire industry.

Between 1997 and 2008 there were 510 terrorist-related commercial truck and bus bombing attacks worldwide, killing over 6,000 people, with 106 bombings occurring during 2007 alone, killing over 2,500 people. Of the 510 bombings since 1997, 364 have been bus bombings and 146 have been truck bombings; 156 have been in Iraq and 354 have been in countries other than Iraq. In 2007, the use of truck bombs as a terrorist tactic more than tripled and resulted in 2072 deaths. While trucks were involved in just 29 percent of the bombings since 1997, they accounted for 56 percent of the deaths. Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) are vehicles loaded with a range of explosive materials that are detonated when they reach their target. VBIEDs can also be used to explode flammable fuel trucks, and disperse toxic substances. Terrorists have used a variety of trucks—rental, refrigerator, cement, dump, sewerage, gasoline tanker, trucks with chlorine and propane tanks, and fire engines—to attack a broad range of critical infrastructure, including police and military facilities, playgrounds, childcare centers, hotels, and bridges. Worldwide, commercial buses have also been attacked numerous times, including in Israel, England, Iraq, the Philippines, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, India, Russia, and Pakistan. In the United States, terrorists used a commercial truck containing fertilizer-based explosives to attack the World Trade Center in 1993, killing 6 and injuring 1,000 people. Two years later, a similar attack occurred at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing 168 people and injuring more than 800. Terrorists have also targeted overseas U.S. military personnel with commercial VBIEDs at the Marine barracks in Lebanon (1983), Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia (1996), and at U.S. embassies in Kuwait (1983), Lebanon (1984), Kenya (1998), and Tanzania (1998). Figure 2 charts the number of worldwide bombings involving commercial truck or buses since the 1997. See appendix II for more information on truck and bus bombing incidents.

Stakeholder Roles and Responsibilities

DHS and DOT share responsibility for securing the commercial vehicle sector. Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DOT was the primary federal entity involved in regulating commercial vehicles. In response to September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001, which created and conferred upon TSA broad responsibility for securing all transportation sectors. In 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, which established DHS, transferred TSA into DHS, and gave DHS responsibility for protecting the nation from terrorism, including securing the nation’s transportation systems. Although TSA is the lead agency responsible for the security of commercial vehicles, including those carrying hazardous materials, DOT maintains a regulatory role with respect to hazardous materials. Specifically, DOT continues to issue and enforce regulations governing the safe transportation of hazardous materials. In addition, the Homeland Security Act expanded DOT’s responsibility to include ensuring the security, as well as the safety, of the transportation of hazardous materials. Accordingly, within DOT, PHMSA is responsible for developing, implementing, and revising security plan requirements for carriers of hazardous materials, while FMCSA inspectors enforce these regulations through reviews of the content and implementation of these security plans.

In 2004, based on a recommendation we made, DHS and DOT entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to delineate the agencies’ roles and responsibilities with respect to transportation security. In 2006, TSA and PHMSA completed an annex to the MOU related to the transportation of hazardous materials. This annex identifies TSA as the lead federal entity for the security of the transportation of hazardous materials, and PHMSA as responsible for promulgating and enforcing regulations and administering a national program of safety and security related to the transportation of hazardous materials. In addition, the 9/11 Commission Act requires that, by August 2008, DHS and DOT complete an annex to the MOU that would govern the roles of the two agencies regarding the security of commercial motor vehicles.

State and local governments also play a key role in securing commercial vehicles. States own, operate, and have law enforcement jurisdiction over significant portions of the infrastructure—including highways, tunnels, and bridges—that commercial vehicles use. Further, state and local governments respond to emergencies involving commercial vehicles which travel within and through their jurisdictions daily. Many states also have departments of homeland security with firsthand knowledge of hazardous materials shippers and routing, local smuggling operations, and individuals and groups to be monitored for security reasons. Some states also have fusion centers that collect relevant law enforcement and intelligence information to coordinate the dissemination of alerts and assist in emergency response. State transportation and law enforcement officials also conduct vehicle safety inspections and compliance reviews, sometimes in coordination with FMCSA.

Although all levels of government are involved in the security of commercial vehicles, primary responsibility for securing commercial vehicles rests with the individual commercial vehicle companies themselves. Truck and bus companies have responsibility for the security of day-to-day operations. As part of these operations, they ensure that company personnel, vehicles, and terminals---as well as all of the material and passengers they transport----are secured. Faced with tight competition, low margins, and, in some sectors, high driver turnover, some industry officials that we interviewed stated that devoting resources to security has remained a challenge. A variety of national organizations represent commercial trucking and motor coach industry interests. Many of these organizations disseminate pertinent security bulletin information from DHS and DOT to their members. Some have also developed and provided their members with security information and tools—such as security check lists and handbooks—to meet members’ security needs. See appendix III for a list of the major industry associations representing the truck and motor coach industries interviewed by GAO.

Legislation and Regulations Governing the Security of Commercial Vehicles

Although ATSA, passed in November 2001, includes numerous requirements for TSA regarding securing commercial aviation, it does not include any specific requirements related to the security of land transportation sectors. However, with regard to all sectors of transportation, ATSA generally requires TSA to: receive, assess, and distribute intelligence information related to transportation security; assess threats to transportation security and develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with those threats, including coordinating countermeasures with other federal organizations; and, enforce security-related regulations and requirements.

Other legislation, specifically the USA PATRIOT Act and the 9/11 Commission Act, requires TSA to take specific actions to ensure the security of commercial vehicles. The USA PATRIOT Act provides that a state may not issue to any individual a license to transport hazardous materials unless that individual is determined not to pose a security risk. TSA regulations require that drivers who transport hazardous materials undergo a security threat assessment that consists of an evaluation of a driver’s criminal history, immigration status, mental capacity, and connections to terrorism to determine if the driver poses a security risk. The 9/11 Commission Act also requires that the Secretary of Homeland Security, by August 2008, submit a report to Congress that includes, among other things, a security risk assessment on the trucking industry, an assessment of industry best practices to enhance security, and an assessment of actions already taken by both public and private entities to address identified security risks. The act also mandates that the Secretary develop a tracking program for motor carrier shipments of hazardous materials by February 2008. With regard to intercity buses, the act requires that the Secretary issue regulations by February 2009 requiring high-risk, over-the-road bus operators to conduct vulnerability assessments and develop and implement security plans. The act further mandates that the Secretary of Homeland Security issue regulations by February 2008 requiring all over-the-road bus operators to develop and implement security training programs for frontline employees, and that the Secretary establish a security exercise program for over-the-road bus transportation. The act also requires DOT to take specific actions related to the security of commercial vehicles. For example, the Act requires that the Secretary of Transportation, by August 2008, analyze the highway routing of hazardous materials, and develop guidance to identify and reduce safety and security risks.

DOT’s PHMSA has issued regulations intended to strengthen the security of the transportation of hazardous materials. The regulations require persons who transport or offer for transportation certain hazardous materials to develop and implement security plans. Security plans must assess the security risks associated with transporting these hazardous materials and include measures to address those risks. At a minimum, the plan must include measures to (1) confirm information provided by job applicants hired for positions that involve access to and handling of hazardous materials covered by the security plan, (2) respond to the assessed risk that unauthorized persons may gain access to hazardous materials, and (3) address the assessed risk associated with the shipment of hazardous materials from origin to destination. The regulations also require that all employees who directly affect hazardous materials transportation safety receive training that provides awareness of security risks associated with hazardous materials transportation and of methods designed to enhance transportation security. Such training is also to instruct employees on how to recognize and respond to possible security threats. Additionally, each employee of a firm required to have a security plan must be trained concerning the plan and its implementation.

DHS funding for commercial vehicle security consists of a general appropriation to TSA for its entire surface transportation security program, which includes commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure, rail and mass transit, and pipeline, as well as and appropriations to the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) for truck and bus security grant programs. Annual appropriations to TSA for surface transportation security for fiscal years 2006 through 2009 are presented in table 1.

The number of TSA full-time employees (FTEs) dedicated to highway and motor carrier security—which includes both commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure—has remained at about 19 FTEs annually since fiscal year 2002.

Commercial Trucking Industry

TSA estimates that there are approximately 1.2 million commercial trucking companies in the United States. Trucks transport the majority of freight shipped in the United States: by tonnage, 65 percent of total domestic freight; by revenue, 75 percent. According to TSA, 75 percent of U.S. communities depend solely on trucking to transport commodities. Trucks and buses have access to nearly 4 million miles of roadway in the United States. Trucking companies range in size from a single truck to several thousand trucks. According to DOT 2004 data, which are the most current available, 87 percent of trucking companies operated 6 or fewer trucks, while 96 percent operated 20 or fewer. DOT estimates that about 40,000 new commercial trucking companies enter the industry annually. As of August 2008, nearly 11.9 million commercial trucks were registered with DOT. Trucks come in a large variety of configurations and cargo body types to perform a wide range of tasks. Some trucks are used for local tasks such as construction, landscaping, or local package delivery, while others are used for transporting cargo over-the-road or for long hauls. For a more complete summary of DOT data on commercial trucking and bus firms, trucks and buses, and drivers, see appendix V.

The trucking industry is diverse, involving several different sectors and including for-hire and private fleets, truckload and less-than-truckload carriers, bulk transport, hazardous materials, rental and leasing, and others. For-hire firms are those for which trucking is their primary business, while private fleets are generally used to support another business activity, such as grocery chains and construction. According to a 2002 DOT survey, for-hire trucks represented 47 percent of the industry, while private fleets represented 53 percent. While truckload carriers move loads from point to point, less-than-truckload carriers pick up smaller shipments and consolidate them at freight terminals. Bulk transport firms move bulk commodities such as gasoline, cement and corn syrup in large trailers specifically designed for each type of commodity. Truck rental and leasing companies also are part of the commercial trucking industry. Consumer rental companies rent trucks to walk-in customers for short periods of time and represent 15 percent of the rental and leasing industry. Commercial rental and leasing companies generally lease trucks for a year or longer and account for the remaining 85 percent of the rental and leasing industry.

With respect to the transportation of hazardous materials, of an estimated 1.2 million commercial vehicle firms, 60,682 are registered as hazardous materials carriers, or about 5 percent of the commercial vehicle industry, and 1,778,833 drivers are licensed to transport hazardous materials. Hazardous materials are transported by truck almost 800,000 times a day, and 94 percent of hazardous material shipments are by trucks, which transport approximately 54 percent of hazardous materials volume (tons). DOT PHMSA classifies hazardous materials under 9 different classes of hazards. Most hazardous materials shipments by truck involve flammable liquids such as gasoline (81.8 percent), followed by gases (8.4 percent) and corrosive materials (4.4 percent). Class 6 toxic poisons include Toxic Inhalation Hazards (TIH) but comprise only 0.2 percent of hazardous materials transported by truck. The shipment of security sensitive hazardous materials such as Toxic Inhalation Hazards is of particular concern to TSA, although the agency estimates that they represent just .000058 percent of the commercial vehicle industry. Eighty-one percent of the Toxic Inhalation Hazards transported by truck is anhydrous ammonia and 10 percent is chlorine.

Commercial Bus Industry

Commercial bus companies represent less than 1 percent of the commercial vehicle industry, but according to TSA estimates, carry 775 million passengers annually. Intercity buses, or motor coaches, include buses with regularly scheduled routes, as well as tour and charter bus companies. In August 2008, DOT reported that there were 3,948 motor coach carriers, with 75,285 buses. Of these carriers, fewer than 100 are intercity bus companies, which transport passengers from city to city on scheduled routes, while the remaining carriers operate tour and charter buses. Most bus companies (95 percent) are small operators with fewer than 25 buses. Intercity buses, or motor coaches, serve all large metropolitan areas and travel in close proximity to some of the nation’s most visible and populated sites, such as sporting events and arenas, major tourist attractions, and national landmarks. A few intercity bus carriers also travel internationally to Canada and Mexico. According to a study commissioned by DOT, the accessibility and open nature of the motor coach industry make it difficult to protect these assets, and the level of security afforded to the infrastructure of the motor coach industry is relatively low compared to the commercial aviation sector, despite the fact that the motor coach industry handles more passengers a year.

Risk Management Approach to Guide Homeland Security Investments

HSPD-7 directed the Secretary of DHS to establish uniform policies, approaches, guidelines, and methodologies for integrating federal infrastructure protection and risk management activities. Recognizing that each sector possesses its own unique characteristics and risk landscape, HSPD-7 designates Federal Government Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs) for each of the critical infrastructure sectors to work with DHS to improve critical infrastructure security. On June 30, 2006, DHS released the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), which developed—in accordance with HSPD-7—a risk-based framework for the development of Sector-Specific (SSA) strategic plans. The NIPP defines roles and responsibilities for security partners in carrying out critical infrastructure and key resources protection activities through the application of risk management principles. Figure 3 illustrates the several interrelated activities of the risk management framework as defined by the NIPP, including setting security goals and performance targets, identifying key assets and sector information, and assessing risk information including both general and specific threat information, potential vulnerabilities, and the potential consequences of a successful terrorist attack. The NIPP requires that federal agencies use this information to inform the selection of risk-based priorities and continuous improvement of security strategies and programs to protect people and critical infrastructure through the reduction of risks from acts of terrorism.

The NIPP risk management framework consists of the following interrelated activities: Set security goals: Define specific outcomes, conditions, end points, or performance targets that collectively constitute an effective protective posture. Identify assets, systems, networks, and functions: Develop an inventory of the assets, systems, and networks that comprise the nation’s critical infrastructure, key resources, and critical functions. Collect information pertinent to risk management that takes into account the fundamental characteristics of each sector.

Assess risks: Determine risk by combining potential direct and indirect consequences of a terrorist attack or other hazards (including seasonal changes in consequences, and dependencies and interdependencies associated with each identified asset, system, or network), known vulnerabilities to various potential attack vectors, and general or specific threat information.

Prioritize: Aggregate and analyze risk assessment results to develop a comprehensive picture of asset, system, and network risk; establish priorities based on risk; and determine protection and business continuity initiatives that provide the greatest mitigation of risk. Implement protective programs: Select sector-appropriate protective actions or programs to reduce or manage the risk identified, and secure the resources needed to address priorities.

Measure effectiveness: Use metrics and other evaluation procedures at the national and sector levels to measure progress and assess the effectiveness of the national Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources protection program in improving protection, managing risk, and increasing resiliency.

TSA Has Begun Conducting Risk Assessments of the Commercial Vehicle Sector, but Has Not Completed These Efforts or Fully Used the Results to Support Its Security Strategy

TSA has taken actions to assess the security risks associated with the commercial vehicle sector, including assessing threats, initiating vulnerability assessments, and developing best security practices, but more work remains to fully assess the security risks of commercial trucks and buses, and to ensure that this information is used to inform TSA’s security strategy. Although TSA has completed a variety of threat assessments and is in the process of developing several threat scenarios with likelihood estimates, its key annual threat assessments do not include information about the likelihood of a terrorist attack method on a particular asset, system or network, as required by the NIPP. However, in September 2008, TSA reported that in response to the 9/11 Commission Act mandate that it submit a risk assessment report on commercial trucking security TSA was planning to use threat scenarios with likelihood assessments for highway and motor carriers. TSA has also cosponsored a large number of vulnerability assessments through a pilot initiative in the state of Missouri. However, TSA has made limited progress and has not established a plan or time frame for conducting a vulnerability assessment of the commercial vehicle sector nationwide. Moreover, TSA has not determined how it will address the June 2006 recommendations of the Missouri Pilot Program evaluation report regarding the ways in which future vulnerability assessments can be strengthened. As a result, the agency cannot ensure that its CSR efforts will fully identify the vulnerabilities of the sector. Standards for internal controls in the federal government require that findings and deficiencies reported in audits and other reviews be promptly reviewed, resolved, and corrected within established time frames. In addition, TSA has not conducted assessments of consequences of a terrorist attack on the commercial vehicle sector, or developed a plan to conduct sectorwide consequence assessments. The TSSP calls for a sectorwide approach and strategies to managing security risks, and TSA has identified one of its strategic goals as conducting an inventory of the security status of the nation’s highway and motor carrier systems. In addition, standard practices in program and project management call for developing a road map, or a program plan, to achieve programmatic results within a specified time frame or milestones. TSA has not completed a sectorwide risk assessment of the commercial vehicle sector or determined the extent to which additional risk assessment efforts are needed, nor has it developed a plan or a time frame for doing so, including an assessment of the resources required to support these efforts. In addition, TSA has not fully used available information from its ongoing risk assessments to develop and implement its security strategy. As a result, TSA cannot be assured that its approach for securing the commercial vehicle sector is aligned with the highest priority security needs. Moreover, TSA has not completed a report as required by the 9/11 Commission Act on various aspects of commercial vehicle security.

TSA Developed Threat Assessments of the Commercial Vehicle Sector, but Generally Did Not Identify the Likelihood of Specific Threats as Required by the NIPP

TSA has and continues to conduct threat assessments of the commercial vehicle sector by reviewing known terrorist goals and capabilities, and is in the process of strengthening its efforts by developing more specific threat likelihood information to inform agency risk assessment efforts. TSA’s Office of Intelligence (OI) develops a variety of products identifying the threats from terrorism, from annual threat assessments on each transportation sector to weekly field intelligence summaries and daily briefings. OI also disseminates additional threat and suspicious incident information to key federal and nonfederal stakeholders as needed related to the commercial vehicle sector. To date, these threat assessments have found an increase in truck and bus terrorist incidents abroad and that VBIEDs were the most likely tactic. TSA OI officials stated that they continue to regard common VBIEDs as a greater threat than attacks using hazardous materials such as chlorine. OI further reported that the July 2005 bus bombing in London demonstrated the capability and intent of terrorists to bomb passenger buses in Western nations.

While TSA’s threat assessments provide detailed summaries of recent attacks and incidents of interest, and are useful to TSA in informing its strategy for securing commercial vehicles, they do not include information on the likelihood of various types of threats. The NIPP requires that in the context of terrorist risk assessments, the threat component of the analysis be calculated based on the estimated likelihood of a terrorist attack method on a particular asset, system, or network. The estimate of this likelihood is to be based on an analysis of intent and capability of a defined adversary, such as a terrorist group. However, TSA has not included likelihood estimates in its annual threat assessments for the highway and motor carrier sector. In 2006, TSA developed rankings of the likelihood of various tactics—such as attacks using VBIEDs, VBIED- assisted hazardous materials, and other threats—for highway and commercial vehicles. However, TSA subsequently excluded these likelihood assessments in its 2008 annual threat assessment for the highway sector and did not provide us with the rationale for this decision. OI told us that it developed likelihood estimates for specific threat scenarios used in the draft National Transportation Sector Risk Assessment (NTSRA). NTSRA is being conducted by TSA to assess risks across the entire U.S. transportation system and contains nine high-level scenarios and threat likelihood estimates related to commercial vehicles. Of these high-level scenarios, eight involve VBIEDs, and one involves hazardous materials. OI rated the intent and capability of terrorists to perform each threat scenario to provide their estimate of the relative likelihood of each scenario. However, TSA officials could not identify when the NTSRA will be finalized. In addition, in June 2008, OI reported that it would provide likelihood assessments for threat scenarios that were to be conducted in response to a mandate in the 9/11 Commission Act that DHS submit a risk assessment report on the commercial trucking sector.

While more extensive threat scenarios are being developed for the commercial vehicle sector, including likelihood estimates, TSA’s annual threat assessments do not include information on the likelihood of threat. HMC officials stated that this lack of specific threat information continues to challenge agency risk managers. Without more information on the likelihood of the various threats, there is limited assurance that TSA is focusing its efforts on the activities that pose the greatest threat. Officials stated that they may incorporate likelihood estimates in the annual highway and motor carrier threat assessments in the future, but did not have specific plans to do so.

TSA Has Begun to Conduct Industry Vulnerability Assessments of the Commercial Vehicle Sector, but Its Efforts Are in the Early Stages

TSA has begun conducting vulnerability assessments of the commercial vehicle sector, but its efforts are in the early stages. In addition, the agency has not determined the extent to which additional vulnerability assessments are needed, and does not have a strategy or time frame for assessing sectorwide vulnerabilities. HSPD-7 requires each Sector-Specific Agency to conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments of its sector. In addition, the NIPP states that DHS is responsible for ensuring that comprehensive vulnerability assessments are performed for critical infrastructure and key resources that are deemed nationally critical, and the TSSP further emphasizes a sectorwide system-based approach to risk management. To determine the vulnerability of commercial vehicles as targets or as weapons to attack critical infrastructure in the United States, TSA has begun conducting vulnerability assessments known as Corporate Security Reviews (CSRs). TSA initiated the CSR program in November 2005 to: (1) develop best practices for securing the commercial vehicle industry through discussions with carrier representatives and site visits to carrier facilities; (2) collect and maintain data that will allow TSA HMC to assess various aspects of security across the trucking and motor coach industries through statistical analysis of survey data; (3) identify security gaps and opportunities for improvement; (4) promote security awareness and collaboration with the commercial vehicle industry; (5) provide guidance to motor carriers on their relative level of risk exposure; and (6) determine the costs and benefits of risk mitigation activities.

As of September 2008, TSA had conducted 100 CSRs of motor carriers, including 15 motor coach companies, 20 school bus companies/districts, and 65 trucking companies. These CSRs were of large firms that were identified by industry stakeholders as having the best security practices in the industry and that agreed to participate in the CSRs on a voluntary basis. TSA conducts these reviews by sending teams of two to four people from TSA headquarters to a trucking or bus company, for one or two days, to analyze the company security plan and mitigation procedures, and make informal recommendations to strengthen security based on a draft of best security practices TSA developed. At the conclusion of the CSRs, TSA prepares summary reports of its findings and informal recommendations. TSA also developed a draft best security practices in February 2006 for trucking firms based on the results of early CSRs, as well as on TSA staff expertise, industry stakeholder input, and best security practices from other transportation sectors such as rail and pipeline, according to officials. These draft best practices include measures companies can take to conduct threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments. They also provide guidance on developing a security plan and strengthening personnel security, training, hazardous materials storage, physical security countermeasures, cyber security, and emergency response exercises. However, according to TSA officials, the agency has delayed issuing these draft best practices in final form until it can complete and incorporate public and industry comments on draft security guidance specifically for carriers of hazardous materials. The 9/11 Commission Act requires that DHS, by August 2008, submit a report to Congress that includes, among other things, an assessment of trucking industry best practices to enhance security. TSA reported that as of September 2008, it had not finalized these best practices, but they hoped to complete a template within 4 months. Officials stated that they plan to develop a flexible list of best practices that firms can adapt based on their line of work, size, and circumstances.

TSA began a second CSR effort in April 2006 through a pilot project with the state of Missouri which greatly expanded the number of firms reviewed, and extended the reviews to smaller, more diverse firms. Objectives of the pilot were to promote security awareness, collect information on the security status of participating firms, and promote public and private collaboration among federal, state, and private sector stakeholders. TSA partnered with the State of Missouri, FMCSA’s Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program, and the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) to train Missouri state safety inspectors to conduct these CSRs. DOT funded the CSRs and assisted Missouri in the selection of firms to be reviewed and interviewed. The CSRs performed by TSA headquarters staff were of large companies known to have more robust security measures in place, while the Missouri CSRs were generally conducted on small firms that are most common in the industry. Reviewing the security practices of these small firms can require inspectors to travel to remote locations all over the state. For example, one Missouri CSR we attended assessed a small landscaping company with 12 trucks, while another CSR assessed an owner-operator with a single truck in front of his house (fig. 4). Although these reviews remained voluntary, they were conducted in conjunction with mandatory safety reviews that Missouri inspectors routinely conduct on commercial vehicle trucking and motor coach firms. Motor carriers were selected for Missouri CSRs based on either their safety records as evaluated by FMCSA, or because they were newly registered firms. TSA officials stated that partnering with the state’s safety inspections enabled TSA to review a more diverse group of firms than it did during the original CSRs. Typically, the Missouri pilot CSRs involved site visits with structured interviews using a questionnaire based on TSA’s draft best security practices, and generally lasted less than an hour compared to one or two days as was the case with the original CSRs. The Missouri CSR pilot concluded in February 2007; however, TSA has continued to partner with Missouri and FMCSA to implement a permanent CSR program in the state. TSA told us that as of September 2008, 3,420 CSRs had been completed in Missouri.

In September 2006, TSA awarded a contract to evaluate the extent to which the Missouri CSR pilot program met its objectives, and whether the firms reviewed had implemented effective security measures. The report reviewed the 1,251 CSRs conducted by Missouri inspectors from April 2006 through February 2007, including 1,231 trucking companies (98.4 percent), 18 motor coach companies (1.4 percent), and 2 school bus operators (0.2 percent). The evaluation reviewed each firm’s responses to the CSR questionnaire and assigned it an overall security score based on the security measures the firm reported having in place that were consistent with TSA’s draft best security practices. The contractor reported on the results of the study in June 2007 and concluded among other things, that: the interviewed carriers did not have extensive security procedures in place; small carriers and owner operators had implemented fewer security measures than larger carriers; and hazardous materials carriers identified by the contractor had implemented most of the security measures on the TSA CSR questionnaire.

The evaluation report also found that while both motor coaches and nonpassenger motor carriers had low scores, motor coaches scored somewhat higher than nonpassenger motor carriers. The report concluded that the program had achieved its objectives of promoting security awareness, collecting information on the security status of participating commercial vehicle firms, and promoting public and private sector collaboration among federal, state, and private sector stakeholders. However, the report also concluded that the Missouri sample was not representative of the commercial vehicle industry in Missouri or of the industry nationwide. The report further concluded that since the CSRs were based on best practices developed for much larger firms, the CSR data did not completely reflect overall security practices and capabilities for small carriers. Missouri officials we interviewed concurred that the CSR sample was not representative of Missouri firms since the majority of carriers that do not encounter safety problems would not be included in their CSR reviews. The evaluation report of the Missouri CSR pilot made a number of recommendations to TSA to expand and improve the CSR program. These recommendations included that TSA: review and address CSR pilot program deficiencies; develop a set of best practices and baseline security standards that is risk- based and appropriate for different sizes and types of firms; improve the CSR questionnaire to make it more effective in capturing security practices and vulnerabilities of both small and large carriers; develop a deployment strategy to expand the Missouri pilot program to other carriers and other states; develop a statistically sound methodology for selecting companies for CSRs as it evaluates the commercial vehicle industry nationwide by conducting a random sample of motor carriers; work with FMCSA to leverage each other’s resources and possibly merge security inspection programs; and develop a CSR Web portal to provide a more tailored CSR questionnaire to address different industry sector security needs.

Two years after these recommendations were made, TSA has taken limited steps to implement them, although officials stated that they were continuing to review the recommendations. As a result, the agency cannot ensure that its CSR efforts will fully identify sector vulnerabilities. Standards for internal controls in the federal government require that findings and deficiencies reported in audits and other reviews be promptly reviewed, resolved, and corrected within established time frames. The Missouri evaluation report’s recommendation that TSA develop a statistically sound methodology for selecting companies to review was consistent with TSA’s original goal that CSRs collect data that enable statistical analysis. In September 2008, TSA officials stated that they had worked out agreements with Michigan and Colorado to begin conducting CSRs in these states, beginning with training officers in October 2008. However, TSA did not have a plan in place or time frame for assessing industry-wide vulnerabilities. The lead official for risk assessment with TSA HMC stated that the agency would like to conduct a vulnerability assessment of a valid nationwide sample of the commercial vehicle industry, but that it lacked the resources to do so. TSA officials further stated that to further expand its CSR efforts, it has initiated a program to train Federal Security Director personnel (FSDs) at 3 airports to conduct CSRs on commercial vehicles in the airports’ surrounding areas. Officials told us that FSDs had completed 5 CSRs during fiscal year 2008.

Without completing industry vulnerability assessments as required by HSPD-7 and the NIPP, TSA cannot complete an overall assessment of the industry security risks. For example, instead of assessing the vulnerabilities of the entire commercial vehicle sector, at the direction of TSA management, TSA HMC is currently focusing all of their CSR efforts on the hazardous materials transportation sector. However, TSA’s pilot study on Missouri firms found that hazardous materials transportation companies reviewed by the contractor performed much better than other companies in terms of implementing security measures to mitigate potential vulnerabilities.

TSA Has Not Begun to Conduct Consequence Assessments of the Commercial Vehicle Sector

TSA has collected some relevant information necessary for estimating the impact of potential attacks involving the commercial vehicle sector, but has not conducted consequence assessments of potential terrorist attacks or leveraged the consequence assessment efforts of others. The DHS NIPP defines consequence assessment as the worst reasonable adverse impact of a successful terrorist attack. According to the NIPP, risk assessments should include consequence assessments to measure the negative effects on public health and safety, the economy, public confidence in institutions, and the functioning of government that can be expected if an asset, system, or network is damaged, destroyed, or disrupted by a terrorist attack. The TSA’s TSSP also requires that risk analysis include a consideration of consequences. Terrorism involving commercial vehicles can affect a broad range of targets, including not only trucks and buses, but also freight and passengers, terminals, truck stops, and rest areas. In addition to the commercial vehicle system being attacked, commercial vehicles can be used to attack other assets. When used as VBIEDs with explosives or fuel, for example, commercial vehicles can be used to target highway, buildings, and other critical infrastructure. A powerful truck bomb can destroy from a considerable distance. For example, Khobar Towers was attacked from 80 feet away (fig. 5).

Truck VBIED attacks can also target large numbers of people, as was the case with the coordinated attack of several truck bombs in Northern Iraq on August 14, 2007, that killed approximately 500 people, or to assassinate individuals such the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Worldwide, buses have been the target of bombings---some involving suicide bombers---on numerous occasions, such as the attack on former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto at a mass rally in Pakistan.

TSA officials stated that they cannot conduct consequence assessments of the commercial vehicle sector because truck bombs can be used to attack most of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Accordingly, officials stated that the number of potential consequences of terrorist attacks is too great to practically assess. Although TSA has not conducted consequence assessments of the commercial vehicle sector, the agency has acquired data from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the U.S. Army on evacuation distances for various-sized shipments of explosives and flammable substances, and PHMSA’s Emergency Response Guidebook for first responders to hazardous materials incidents that could be applied to future consequence assessments. TSA officials acknowledged that obtaining data on evacuation distances is only a first step in conducting consequence assessments. Evacuation distance provides one measure of the potential consequences of a terrorist attack by defining the danger zone surrounding an attack by a particular type and size of explosive or flammable materials. For example, according to U.S. Army data, the building evacuation distance for such a worst case scenario truck bomb would be a minimum of 1,570 feet, and the minimum outdoor evacuation of people would be 7000 feet. Using another example, a fireball from a fuel truck can threaten both structures and people; accordingly, ATF guidance suggests a minimum evacuation distance of 6,500 feet. In comparison, a tank truck of anhydrous ammonia, which represents 81 percent of Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH) shipments, has a smaller recommended standoff distance of 2,112 feet, and the recommended standoff distance for chlorine, which is the next most common form of Toxic Inhalation Hazard, is 3,168 feet. However, other guidance, such as the PHMSA’s Emergency Response Guidebook, provides different data based on initial isolation distances and much larger maximum nighttime protective action distances. TSA reported that it is working with various federal partners and industry stakeholders to establish a uniform and scientific assessment of potential consequences of VBIEDs and the discharge of TIH materials. Although TSA has not conducted consequence assessments of the commercial vehicle sector, OI officials stated that, in their judgment, the likely consequences of common VBIED attacks were greater than VBIED attacks using TIH materials because attempts to date to use VBIEDs to vaporize chlorine into a gaseous inhalation hazard have been largely unsuccessful, have caused little damage, and resulted in few casualties. On the other hand, according to officials, VBIEDs using a number of different explosives and incendiary materials have repeatedly been successfully used to kill people.

TSA officials stated that the agency also has not leveraged DHS’s ongoing nationwide risk assessment efforts to obtain consequence information. For example, recognizing that each sector of our country’s critical infrastructure possesses its own unique characteristics, operating models, and risk landscape, pursuant to HSPD-7, the NIPP designates 18 critical infrastructure sectors and the agencies responsible for each of the sectors to work with DHS to implement a risk management framework for the sector and develop protective programs. Each of the 18 sectors has issued Sector Annual Reports (SARs) of their risk management activities, including consequence assessments, which HMC could draw upon to support the assessment of VBIED and hazardous materials consequences for other critical infrastructure sectors. For example, the 2007 sector annual reports identified the following for select sectors: Commercial Nuclear Power Sector: The Department of Energy employs a Comprehensive Review Program to analyze facilities that it considers potential terrorist targets. The Nuclear Sector Annual Report indicated that as of May 2007, reviews had been completed of the vulnerabilities and potential consequences of an attack on 52 of 65 commercial nuclear reactors.

Dams Sector: The 2007 Dams Sector Annual Report identified that all security measures were in place at 152 of 254 Army Corps of Engineers dams, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission reported having completed risk assessments on its 1,200 most security-sensitive dams. The report also called for improved blast-damage estimates for VBIEDs on certain dams and levees that are potential targets for terrorist attacks.

The Chemical Sector: The 2007 Chemical Sector Annual Report, which was based in part on industry risk assessments, identified that VBIEDs are a particular concern because of their portability, size, and potential to cause grave damage.

In addition, DHS’s 2007 Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment (SHIRA) assessed the highest risk scenarios targeting the nation’s 18 critical infrastructure/key resources sectors, and highlighted attack methods with cross-sector implications. The SHIRA used threat assessments from the intelligence community and vulnerability and consequence assessments from the SSAs to identify the attack methods that pose the highest risk to the respective sectors. TSA HMC could use the SHIRA data to identify which sectors are most at risk from VBIEDs and hazardous materials and then coordinate with those SSAs on their vulnerability and consequence assessment efforts. TSA HMC could also use a variety of other relevant assessments to obtain consequence information. These include the agency’s Aviation Domain Risk Assessment which also considers consequences for a wide range of attack scenarios including VBIEDs, the Department of Energy’s risk assessments of nuclear weapons facilities, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s assessments of commercial nuclear power plants. Similar information is also available from the Federal Risk Assessment Working Group, a federal risk assessment information clearinghouse that shares information about completed and ongoing risk assessments through regular meetings and a Web portal. TSA did not comment on why it has not developed a plan for completing consequence assessments, or why it was not leveraging the analysis of potential consequences included in these risk assessments.

An Incomplete Risk Assessment Impedes TSA’s Ability to Identify Effective Risk Reduction Efforts

As discussed earlier in this report, TSA has identified one of its strategic goals as taking an inventory of the security status of the nation’s highway and motor carrier systems, but it has not developed a plan or a time frame for completing a risk assessment of the commercial vehicle sector. Based on general guidance in the NIPP, the TSSP states that TSA’s plan for risk assessment should use a combination of both expert and field-level risk assessment techniques to guide its risk management efforts. Expert risk assessments are based on national risk priorities and strategic risk objectives, scenario analyses and the expert judgment of agency officials, national assessments, and annual threat assessments. Field-level risk assessments include state and local assessments, and field inspections such as TSA’s CSRs and DOT Security Contact Reviews (SCRs). Expert assessments and field assessments have the same goal of identifying where the greatest risk mitigation measures are needed.

As previously discussed, TSA is conducting nine high-level scenarios related to commercial vehicles, and has contracted to have more threat scenarios conducted to assess commercial trucking security risks in response to a mandate in the 9/11 Commission Act. While these expert assessments, if implemented effectively, should give TSA insights into the security risks of the industry, they will likely provide limited information on what sectors or companies are most at risk and what mitigation practices are currently in place, unless they are further supported by field- level risk assessments consistent with the TSSP.

As stated previously, TSA is in the early stages of conducting CSRs and the majority of CSRs have to date been conducted in a single state, Missouri. Although TSA is working to expand both its threat scenarios and CSRs, progress to date has been limited. TSA also has not reported on the scope and method of risk assessments required for the commercial vehicle sector. Specifically, it has not reported what mix of expert and field-level risk assessments it intends to use and how it plans to integrate the two.

Standard practices in program and project management include developing a road map, or a program plan, to achieve programmatic results within a specified time frame or milestones. TSA officials recognize that the agency needs more complete and accurate risk assessment information to inform its security strategy. However, TSA has not developed a plan or a time frame for completing a risk assessment of the commercial vehicle sector, including the level of resources required to complete the assessment and the appropriate scope of the assessment including determining the combination of threat scenarios and field-level vulnerability assessments it intends to use.

The NIPP requires that it and the TSSP be reviewed and undergo periodic interim updates as required, and reviewed and reissued every 3 years or more frequently as needed and directed by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Accordingly, the TSSP states that it will undergo periodic updates and eventually align with the NIPP triennial update cycle. The Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier Modal Annex also states that the Government Coordination Council (GCC) and SCC are to submit revisions to the annex on an annual basis, and the GCC and SCC are to conduct a complete revision of the annex every 3 years. HMC began its revision process by updating the TSSP Highway Infrastructure and Motorcarrier Annex in 2008 to allow time for the revised strategy to be reviewed by the GCC, SCC, and various working groups and will submit it for review by the third quarter of 2009. The quality of this and future revisions of the annex will depend in large measure on the progress of risk assessments of the commercial vehicle sector and their utilization by TSA managers to inform their risk mitigation efforts.

HMC officials stated that without complete risk assessments, they were directed by TSA and DHS leadership to base their strategy for securing the commercial vehicle sector on an examination of the security risks posed by the shipment of hazardous materials. However, agency officials could not identify why TSA and DHS leadership made this distinction, and the rationale for this directive is unclear. HMC officials also cited several additional reasons for focusing their security efforts on commercial vehicles transporting hazardous materials, including the professional judgment of its staff in the motor carrier industry; risk assessments TSA conducted for other transportation sectors, particularly rail; and legislative requirements, in particular the USA PATRIOT Act. However, the applicability of rail risk assessments to highways is unclear because VBIEDs trucks can directly access and attack most buildings in the United States, whereas rail cannot. Rail shipments also typically ship freight, including Toxic Inhalation Hazards, in far larger quantities than can be carried on a truck. Regarding congressional direction, the USA PATRIOT Act required TSA to perform a background check for all applicants for an endorsement of their commercial driver’s licenses to allow them to carry hazardous materials, but did not direct TSA to focus its commercial vehicle security efforts on hazardous materials. Moreover, available risk assessment information suggests alternatives or additions to the agency’s current focus on commercial vehicle transport of hazardous materials. TSA OI officials have consistently reported that VBIEDs are a greater threat to the United States than hazardous materials, including Toxic Inhalation Hazards. In addition, the evaluation of the Missouri CSR found that truck companies that transport hazardous materials stood out from other truck companies as having implemented most of TSA’s security procedures, and concluded that hazardous materials transporting companies were leaders related to the commercial vehicle sector. In addition, in October 2007 DHS Secretary Chertoff stated that IEDs remained a terrorist weapon of choice since they were easy to make, difficult to defend against, and could cause untold destruction. TSA OI officials stated that they continue to regard common VBIEDs as a greater threat than attacks using hazardous materials such as chlorine. Evacuation data also suggest that VBIEDs can have potentially broader impact than trucks carrying many forms of Toxic Inhalation Hazards. Without an existing strategy that is based on available risk assessment information, TSA cannot be assured that its current approach, which is focused on hazardous materials, is aligned with the highest priority security needs of the commercial vehicle sector.

Government and Industry Have Taken Actions to Strengthen the Security of Commercial Vehicles, but TSA Has Not Completely Assessed the Effectiveness of Its Actions

Key government and industry stakeholders have taken actions to strengthen the security of the commercial vehicles sector, but TSA has not assessed the effectiveness of its actions. At the federal level, DHS and DOT have implemented a number of programs designed to strengthen commercial vehicle security, particularly programs for the protection of hazardous materials. States, individually and collectively, through their state transportation and law enforcement associations, have also worked to strengthen the security of commercial vehicles. In addition, most of the private truck and motor coach industry associations we contacted stated that they were assisting their members in strengthening security by providing those members with guidance on best practices. TSA also contracted for an evaluation of the Missouri pilot CSRs that found the industry security practices were not extensive, but noted that the sample of firms in the pilot was not representative of the entire industry. Our site visits to 26 commercial truck and bus companies found that most had implemented basic security measures, including some form of personnel security and background checks, terminal security, locks and access controls, trailer seals, and communications and tracking equipment. TSA has begun developing output-based performance measures to gauge progress on achieving milestones and other program activities for its security programs, but the agency has not developed measures and data to monitor outcomes, that is, the extent to which these programs have mitigated security risks and strengthened commercial vehicle security. The TSSP identifies that performance measures of strategic goals and objectives should be outcome-based, but notes that interim output measures may be used during the early years of the program when baseline data on the program’s performance are being acquired. Without more complete performance measures, TSA will be limited in assessing the effectiveness of federal commercial vehicle security programs. TSA officials agreed that opportunities exist to develop outcome-based performance measures for its commercial vehicle security programs, and stated that they would like to do so in the future.

The Federal Government, States, and Private Industry Have Taken Action to Enhance the Security of Commercial Vehicles

A variety of federal programs have been implemented to enhance the security of the commercial vehicle sector. Several of these programs have been implemented by TSA and other DHS components, others by DOT, and several jointly by DHS and DOT. Overall, these programs are designed to assess commercial vehicle industry security risks, develop guidance on how to prevent and deter attacks, improve security planning for an effective response to a potential terrorist attack, enhance cost-effective risk mitigation efforts, and support research on commercial vehicle security technology. States, both individually and as members of transportation alliances with other states, have expanded their activities to secure the commercial vehicle sector as a part of broader homeland security activities. In addition, many commercial vehicle companies receive guidance on security awareness and best practices from industry associations. According to TSA’s pilot study of CSRs in Missouri, except for firms transporting hazardous materials, most commercial vehicle companies have implemented a limited number of security measures.

DHS and DOT Security Programs

In addition to CSRs, TSA and other DHS components have a number of programs underway designed to strengthen the security of commercial vehicles: the Truck Security Grant Program (TSP), the Intercity Bus Security Grant Program, Security Action Items (SAIs), and Hazardous Materials Driver Background Check Program. The TSP provides grants that fund programs to train and support drivers, commercial vehicle firms, and other members of the commercial vehicle industry in how to detect and report security threats, and how to avoid becoming a target of terrorist activity. TSP is administered by DHS’s Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Grant Programs Directorate. From fiscal years 2004 through 2008, the principal activity funded by the TSP was the American Trucking Associations’ Highway Watch Program, which provided drivers with security awareness training and support. In May 2008, however, a new grantee was selected. DHS also established an Intercity Bus Security Grant Program to distribute grant money to eligible stakeholders for protecting intercity bus systems and the traveling public from terrorism. Current priorities focus on enhanced planning, passenger and baggage screening programs, facility security enhancements, vehicle and driver protection, and training and exercises. In addition, TSA is consulting with industry stakeholders and PHMSA to develop SAIs, or voluntary security practices and standards, intended to improve security for trucks carrying security-sensitive hazardous materials. The SAIs are intended to allow TSA to communicate the key elements of effective transportation security to the industry as voluntary practices, and TSA will use CSRs to gauge whether voluntary practices are sufficient or if regulation is needed. TSA released its voluntary SAIs for hazardous materials carriers in June 2008. For example, it recommended using team drivers for shipments of the most security sensitive explosives, toxic inhalation hazards, poisons, and radioactive materials.

The USA PATRIOT Act passed in October 2001 prohibited states from issuing Hazardous Materials Endorsements (HME) for a commercial driver’s license to anyone not successfully completing a background check. In response, DHS developed rules regarding how the background checks will be conducted and implemented a hazardous materials driver background check assessment program to determine whether a driver poses a security risk. We have previously reported on the problem of drivers who have job-hopped to circumvent the drug testing results associated with background checks, including hazardous materials drivers. As of October 2008, TSA had completed background checks for 990,961 out of approximately 2.7 million hazardous materials drivers, and 8,699 applicants have been denied HMEs since the beginning of the program.

In addition to DHS, at the federal level, DOT has several commercial vehicle security programs underway: Security Contact Reviews (SCR), Security Sensitivity Visits (SSV), and the Hazardous Materials Safety Permit Program. FMCSA conducts SCRs, or compliance reviews, of commercial vehicle firms carrying hazardous materials. PHMSA regulations require shippers and carriers of certain hazardous materials to develop and implement security plans. At a minimum, these plans must address personnel, access, and enroute security. FMCSA SCRs review company security plans as part of ongoing safety inspections. FMCSA also conducts SSVs, or educational security discussions, with carriers of small amounts of hazardous materials that do not require posting hazardous materials placards on their trucks. As of September 2008, FMCSA had conducted 7,802 SCRs and 13,411 SSVs since the inception of the programs. Federal law also directed DOT to implement the Hazardous Materials Safety Permit Program to produce a safe and secure environment to transport certain types of hazardous materials. The Hazardous Materials Safety Permit Program requires certain motor carriers to maintain a security program and establish a system of enroute communication.

In addition to CSRs, TSA and DOT also work collaboratively on several projects involving the security of commercial vehicles, including FMCSA and TSA research and development efforts for commercial vehicle security technologies. Both FMCSA and TSA have also completed pilot studies of tracking systems for commercial trucks carrying hazardous materials. For example, FMCSA completed a study of existing technologies in December 2004 evaluating wireless communications systems, including global positioning satellite tracking and other technologies that allow companies to monitor the location of their trucks and buses. TSA is testing tracking and identification systems, theft detection and alert systems, motor vehicle disabling systems, and systems to prevent unauthorized operation of trucks and unauthorized access to their cargos. The 9/11 Commission Act requires that DHS provide a report to Congress by August 2008, that includes, among other things, assessments of (1) the economic impact that security upgrades of trucks, truck equipment, or truck facilities may have on the trucking industry, including independent owner-operators; (2) ongoing research by public and private entities and the need for additional research on truck security; and (3) the current status of secure truck parking. TSA officials stated that they are working on developing this report but have not completed it. The 9/11 Commission Act also required that DHS develop a tracking program for motor carrier shipments of hazardous materials by February 2008. TSA officials reported that they worked with DOT and implemented a program to facilitate truck tracking in January 2008. However, TSA stated that while the 9/11 Commission Act mandated the tracking program and authorized $21 million over 3 years for its activities, it was never implemented because no funds were appropriated for the program.

The 9/11 Commission Act also had a number of mandates regarding the security of over-the-road buses, including that DHS issue regulations by February 2008 requiring all over-the-road bus operators to develop and implement security training programs for frontline employees, and that DHS establish a security exercise program for over-the-road bus transportation. The 9/11 Commission Act further requires that DHS issue regulations by February 2009 requiring high-risk over-the-road bus operators to conduct vulnerability assessments and develop and implement security plans. TSA officials stated that they were preparing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that, if finalized, would require high-risk, over-the-road bus operators to conduct vulnerability assessments, and develop security plans and training plans.

State Actions

States are responsible for securing highway infrastructure, including highways, bridges, and tunnels, and for ensuring the security and safety of these roadways. State officials work on security issues within their individual states and with other states through several national associations. State transportation officials— through the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO)— and state law enforcement officials— through the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA)— have worked collectively to strengthen the security of commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure through various expert committees and the implementation of joint initiatives with TSA and DOT. AASHTO formed a Special Committee on Transportation Security that has sponsored highway and commercial vehicle security research at the National Academies of Science. AASHTO also conducts surveys of state DOT security efforts, priorities, and identified needs. AASHTO’s August 2007 survey found that many state departments of transportation still needed basic training on integrating homeland security considerations in the planning process; detecting, deterring, and mitigating homeland security threats; and assessing transportation network homeland security vulnerabilities and risks. CVSA’s state law enforcement members have also organized committees on Transportation Security, Information Systems, Intelligent Transportation Systems, Hazardous Materials, Passenger Carrier, and Training to pool and provide expertise to promote best practices, new programs, and the consistent application of regulations. For example, the purpose of the CVSA’s Transportation Security Committee is to enhance homeland security by providing a forum to identify, develop, implement, and evaluate education, enforcement, and information-sharing strategies for enhancing commercial motor vehicle security. CVSA’s Program Initiatives committee originated the idea of conducting a CSR pilot in Missouri.

We interviewed transportation, law enforcement, and homeland security officials responsible for commercial vehicle security from eight states to determine the nature and extent of their security efforts. These officials stated that they generally focused on law enforcement, protection of highway infrastructure, conducting inspections of commercial vehicles, and monitoring threats of all kinds. Officials in each state stated that they understood the major transportation security risks in their state. For example, officials from one state that has numerous chemical plants expressed particular concern about the shipment of these chemicals, while officials from another state with extensive military bases expressed concern about shipments of nuclear weapons and waste. Officials from yet another state with numerous explosives plants were more concerned about the transportation of explosives. State and local authorities have also created 58 fusion centers around the country to blend relevant law enforcement and intelligence information analysis and coordinate federal, state, and local security measures in order to reduce threats in local communities. DHS analysts work with state and local authorities at fusion centers to facilitate the two-way flow of information on all types of hazards. DHS has provided staff and more than $254 million to state and local governments to support these centers and facilitate the two-way flow of information between DHS and the states. Although states have a number of security efforts involving the commercial vehicle sector, none of the state officials whom we interviewed (with the exception of those from Missouri) reported conducting formal vulnerability assessments of the commercial vehicle sector in their states.

Private Sector Security Actions

Industry associations we interviewed were actively assisting their members in strengthening the security of the commercial vehicle sector.

We met with 12 of the industry associations representing the commercial vehicle industry, including trucking, motor coaches, shipping, and unions, 9 of which were members of TSA’s SCC. TSA relies on the SCC and its industry association members to facilitate communications between the agency and the commercial vehicle industry, and to assist in the development of sector strategies, plans, and policies. Eight of these industry associations reported that they regularly provided federal officials with their industry’s perspective on proposed regulations and legislation. Additionally, 8 of the 12 associations reported that they were proactively providing security guidance to their members, which included guidance on security best practices, security awareness, and security self- assessments. In addition, about a third of the associations we reviewed reported providing training, security bulletins, and 24-hour hotlines for their members. TSA supports several of these industry initiatives, including working with trade associations to develop and distribute security brochures for their members.

As discussed earlier in this report, the Missouri CSR Pilot evaluation showed that firms carrying hazardous materials were complying with regulations and implementing more security measures to mitigate their risks than other commercial vehicle firms. In contrast, the study further found that truck companies not transporting hazardous materials were implementing few of TSA’s best security practices. During our site visits to 20 truck and 6 bus companies, ranging in size from the nation’s largest commercial vehicle company with 27,453 trucks to an owner-operator with a single truck, we found that most had some form of personnel security procedures and background checks in place, as well as terminal security, communications systems, and truck tracking systems. Overall, the types of security practices among the commercial trucking companies we visited were similar, but the prevalence and sophistication of these practices varied. The range of security practices that companies were using included requiring drivers to lock doors and inspect cargo; cargo seals; driver background checks; vehicle tracking technology; terminal fencing, cameras, and gates; access controls, such as employee identification badges, sign-in and sign-out sheets, or electronic key cards; en route security measures; and driver training. Large corporations and small one-truck owner-operators generally used differently scaled security approaches to the same problem. For example, while a cell phone can suffice for the communications needs of a small operator, a large company may invest in integrated communications and tracking technologies. Conversely, where a large company may have a well-lit, gated terminal monitored by security cameras and guards, a small operator may lock the door of the vehicle and have a watch dog on the premises. In another example, small, independent owner-operator firms may rely solely on emergency responders such as 911 and state patrol hotlines, while larger firms may have dispatchers and in-house security specialists on duty 24 hours a day.

TSA Uses Performance Measures to Monitor Its Efforts in Securing Commercial Vehicles, but Lacks Effectiveness Measures for Key Security Programs

TSA has begun developing measures that gauge the completion of its program activities, but could improve its efforts by collecting data that would measure the effectiveness of its programs in strengthening commercial vehicle security. Performance measures are indicators, statistics, or metrics used to gauge program performance. Output measures summarize the direct products and services delivered by a program, while outcome measures try to gauge the results of products and services delivered by a program. TSA has begun developing and using performance measures to assess the progress of commercial vehicle security programs, but does not have outcome data to monitor how effectively its programs are achieving their intended purpose, as suggested by GPRA. The TSSP also states that performance measures of strategic goals and objectives should be outcome-based, but notes that interim output measures may be used during the early years of the program while baseline data on the program’s performance are being acquired. The TSSP also requires that TSA form a Performance Measurement Joint Working Group to recommend the appropriate mix of output and outcome measures for agency programs, outcome monitoring techniques, and standardize measures across transportation sectors. As of August 2008, TSA had formed the transportation sectorwide working group, and according to officials the group was instrumental in developing and reporting on the transportation sector’s core, programmatic, and partnership metrics required by the NIPP. However, the joint measurement group for the highway and motor carrier sector had not been formed to develop outcome measures for commercial vehicle security programs.

Currently, TSA HMC collects performance data on its own programs, while other commercial vehicle security programs are monitored by other DHS or DOT components. At our suggestion, TSA officials stated they plan to work out an agreement with DOT to receive performance measurement data for DOT security programs, stating that performance data for these programs are important and necessary for an overall view of the impact of federal security programs. TSA officials stated they would request that TSA and DOT share performance measurement data for commercial security programs as the DHS and DOT MOU is updated. The annex to improve coordination and data sharing between TSA and PHMSA was signed in October 2008. Table 2 summarizes the various federal commercial vehicle security programs and the agency responsible for administering the program and measuring its progress.

TSA’s HMC established output measures for all five of its commercial vehicle security programs to assist the agency in gauging the performance of these programs. As of September 30, 2008, TSA reported that it had completed: 100 percent of the target goal of 24 CSRs per year, 100 percent of the SAI goal of developing voluntary guidelines to reduce risk and enhance the security of high-risk hazardous materials, 52 percent of hazardous materials driver’s license endorsement security threat assessment background checks, and 100 percent of the work in developing a pilot Truck Tracking Center.

Output-based measures can be useful to TSA for program management purposes, as they can identify whether programs are producing a desired level of output and meeting established milestones. However, they do not measure TSA’s success in achieving the ultimate goal of enhancing the security of the commercial vehicle sector. For example, while TSA tracks the number of CSRs completed by its staff or as part of the Missouri CSR program, it has not attempted to measure the effect these programs are having. Missouri officials have suggested that a sample of firms that participated in the CSR program should be revisited to determine the extent to which their security-related practices improved after completing a CSR. Such information could provide TSA with a measure of the effectiveness of its key commercial vehicle security program. In January 2009, TSA stated that it was planning to conduct baseline and follow-on CSRs on hazardous material transporters to measure changes in preparedness.

We recognize that TSA faces challenges in developing outcome measures to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of its security programs that rely on the participation of many public and private entities. In addition, it can be difficult to develop performance measures to gauge the impact of a program in deterring terrorism. Nonetheless, outcome measures of programs designed to mitigate vulnerabilities and consequences are possible. For example, the domain awareness of drivers could be measured both before and after participating in the Trucking Security Grant program.

Furthermore, as we have previously reported, a focus on results as envisioned by GPRA means that federal agencies are to look beyond their organizational boundaries and coordinate with other agencies to ensure that their efforts are aligned. The planning processes under GPRA provide a means for agencies to ensure that their goals for crosscutting programs complement those of other agencies; program strategies are mutually reinforcing; and, as appropriate, common or complementary performance measures are used. High-performing organizations use their performance management systems to strengthen accountability for results, specifically by placing greater emphasis on fostering the necessary collaboration both within and across organizational boundaries to achieve results.

TSA officials agreed that opportunities exist to develop outcome performance measures for the agency’s commercial vehicle security programs, and stated that they would like to do so in the future. We previously reported that DHS often lacked the performance information to determine where to target program resources to improve performance, but was taking steps to strengthen their performance measures. GAO is currently working with DHS, including TSA, to provide input on the department’s performance measurement efforts based on our work at the department.

TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Coordinate with Federal, State, and Industry Stakeholders Regarding the Security of the Commercial Vehicle Sector, but Further Actions Can Enhance Coordination

While TSA has taken actions to improve coordination with federal, state, and industry stakeholders to strengthen commercial vehicle security, more can be done to ensure that these coordination efforts enhance security for the sector. Leading practices for collaborating agencies that we have previously identified offer suggestions for strengthening coordination with other public and private sector stakeholders. These key practices include, for example, defining common outcomes and complementary strategies; agreeing on roles and responsibilities; leveraging stakeholder resources; and developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on the results of the collaborative effort. DHS and DOT signed an agreement that established broad areas of responsibility regarding the security of the transportation network, as we previously recommended. TSA supported the creation of an intergovernmental and industry council to gather feedback and input about security planning, among other efforts. TSA has made limited progress in leveraging FMCSA resources and resolving potentially duplicative security inspections, but in October 2008 signed an agreement to enhance coordination with FMCSA. Although TSA has successfully leveraged resources in the State of Missouri to conduct CSR vulnerability assessments, it has made limited progress in coordinating the expansion of CSRs to other states. Some state and industry officials we interviewed expressed concerns about TSA’s coordination and communication with the sector on developing a security strategy, and fully defining roles and responsibilities for the industry. Since many owner operators are hard to contact, some suggested that TSA enhance its Web site to better communicate directly with the industry’s many small operators. Moreover, the Missouri CSR pilot evaluation similarly suggested that TSA consider developing a two-way Web portal to allow firms to fill out CSR questionnaires. TSA officials stated that they have taken steps to interact with industry regarding the security of the sector, and have also leveraged industry expertise to strengthen security. However, TSA has not developed a means to monitor the effectiveness of its coordination actions with this very large and diverse sector. Without enhanced coordination, TSA will have difficulty expanding its vulnerability assessments to other states.

DHS and DOT Have Entered into Formal Agreements and Taken Other Actions to Enhance Coordination

DHS and DOT have taken actions toward coordinating their efforts to strengthen commercial vehicle security. In September 2004, DHS and DOT signed a MOU that established broad areas of responsibility for each department related to the security of the transportation sector, and specified roles and responsibilities to strengthen their cooperation and coordination. For instance, under the MOU, DOT recognized that DHS has primary responsibility for transportation security while it plays a supporting role, providing technical assistance and supporting DHS in the implementation of its security policies as allowed by DOT statutory authorities. Furthermore, the MOU states that DHS is to establish national transportation security performance goals and, to the extent practicable, appropriate security measures for each transportation sector to achieve an integrated national transportation security system. The MOU responds to our previous work which emphasized the need for greater coordination between DOT and DHS on transportation security efforts and recommended that the two departments establish an MOU to, among other things, delineate the roles, responsibilities, and funding authorities of the each department.

In August 2006, TSA and PHMSA signed an annex to the DHS and DOT MOU, identifying their respective roles and responsibilities related to research and development, training, outreach, risk assessments, and technical assistance involving hazardous materials transportation security. According to this agreement, the parties commit themselves to seeking consensus on measures to reduce risk and minimize consequences of emergencies, sharing information that may concern the interests of the other party, and coordinating the development of transportation security- related guidelines. The annex further specified that TSA and PHMSA will, among other things: base security planning on risk, seek consensus concerning measures to reduce risk, and coordinate in the development of standards, regulations, guidelines, and directives; coordinate on observations and recommended security measures; explore opportunities for collaboration in inspection and enforcement share information during an emergency.

Consistent with this agreement, PHMSA and TSA worked together to develop recommended security measures for hazardous materials carriers.

As we have previously identified, an effectively implemented leveraging of stakeholder resources is a key practice for enhancing collaboration. According to leading practices for collaborating agencies, such parties bring different levels of resources and capacities to the collective effort; therefore, the parties should identify the types of resources necessary to initiate or sustain their collective effort, as well as assess each party’s relative strengths and limitations. In 2003, working with TSA, PHMSA established a set of security plan requirements for hazardous materials carriers that addressed the elements of en route security, unauthorized access, and personnel security. TSA later expanded upon PHMSA’s requirements and, in consultation with PHMSA, drafted a set of voluntary security standards, called Security Action Items (SAIs), specifying the level of security suggested for each type of security-sensitive hazardous materials, or hazardous materials transported by motor vehicles whose potential consequences from an act of terrorism may result in detrimental effects to the economy, communities, critical infrastructure, or individuals of the United States. TSA reported that these SAIs were finalized in June 2008 and distributed to stakeholders. TSA further worked with PHMSA to develop guidance on security-sensitive hazardous materials.

TSA also established a GCC in April 2006 to monitor and evaluate the results of federal highway and motor carrier security programs, as required by the NIPP. We previously identified the need for collaborating agencies to create a mechanism to monitor and evaluate their efforts and to assist them in identifying areas for improvement. If implemented effectively, reporting on these collaborative activities can help key decision makers obtain feedback for improving both policy and operational effectiveness. The GCC consists of federal agencies and associations representing state and local transportation and law enforcement officials, and motor vehicle administrators with responsibilities directly related to commercial vehicle security. (For a complete list of GCC members, see app. VI). The GCC is intended to coordinate strategies, activities, and communications among its member entities, and establish policies, guidelines, metrics, and performance criteria. The highway sector GCC meets approximately once monthly, and both FMCSA and PHMSA officials expressed general satisfaction with the GCC.

DHS and DOT Can Strengthen Efforts to Leverage Resources and Avoid Duplication of Effort

Although DHS and DOT have established agreements and developed complementary strategies to strengthen security of the commercial vehicles sector, gaps remain that hamper their ability to more effectively coordinate their efforts. Specifically, the two departments have not fully agreed on a strategy to leverage resources and eliminate potential duplication of effort and to share inspection information for monitoring security programs.

TSA and FMCSA have shared roles and responsibilities regarding the enhancement of commercial vehicle security, but have different capabilities and resources. TSA HMC has a staff allocation of 19 FTEs. These staff are responsible for all aspects of commercial vehicle and highway infrastructure security including developing best practices, conducting risk assessments, and establishing policy. HMC is also responsible for school bus security. FMCSA has 650 to 700 staff deployed in the field nationwide to conduct inspections, enforce Federal Motor Carrier safety regulations and hazardous materials transportation safety and security regulations, and coordinate with state safety inspectors. Moreover, TSA and FMCSA have similar inspection programs, both of which are currently focused on hazardous materials transportation. As discussed earlier in this report, TSA operates the CSR program designed to review the security efforts and vulnerabilities of all types of commercial vehicle firms, and FMCSA conducts security compliance inspections (SCRs) of hazardous materials carriers.

The 9/11 Commission Act requires that DOT consult with DHS to limit, to the extent practicable, duplicative reviews of the hazardous materials security plans. TSA and FMCSA officials stated that they have discussed how best to leverage FMCSA’s ongoing inspections programs and the feasibility of merging the two inspection programs. Officials reported that their interactions to date have focused on how best to take advantage of the similarities between these programs to more efficiently and effectively use agency resources, reduce potentially duplicative efforts, and minimize the burden on the industry. TSA officials stated that one obstacle to merging the two programs is that hazardous materials transportation companies are required to participate in FMCSA’s SCRs because they are subject to DOT’s hazardous materials regulations, while TSA’s CSRs are a voluntary effort. However, both agencies’ programs share voluntary and mandatory aspects. For example, along with SCRs, FMCSA also conducts Security Sensitivity Visits, which as discussed earlier in this report are voluntary, educational security reviews of firms carrying small amounts of hazardous materials. Moreover, TSA’s Missouri pilot successfully demonstrated that voluntary security reviews could be appended to mandatory safety reviews, and that state safety inspectors could be trained to conduct CSR security reviews. TSA officials further stated that the agency’s CSR reviews include a detailed assessment of the adequacy of security plans, whereas FMCSA reviews are intended to ensure a firm’s compliance with its written security plan, but are not an assessment of its adequacy. Another obstacle, according to TSA officials, is associated with how the two agencies view their missions and resource sharing. TSA believes utilizing FMCSA resources, infrastructure, and databases may be cost effective. However, DOT officials told us that the primary role of FMCSA’s inspectors is safety rather than security. One industry association we interviewed stated that they were working with FMCSA and TSA to merge their commercial vehicle security programs because association officials believed it would reduce duplication and be more efficient for both government and industry. By leveraging resources with FMCSA, TSA may be able to address other priorities, such as conducting additional vulnerability assessments, improving security mitigation programs beyond the hazardous materials sector, and addressing highway infrastructure protection.

TSA and FMCSA also do not have a process in place to share information important to monitoring the results of security programs, consistent with leading practices for collaborating agencies. For example, the agencies are not comparing and contrasting their findings from commercial vehicle security inspections. Both TSA and FMCSA concurred that they could benefit from better sharing of information and have discussed developing a unified database for storing and sharing information on CSR and SCRs. Without a process in place to share information on the results of their security programs, TSA will not have a complete picture of the effectiveness of federal programs to secure the sector. FMCSA also maintains other data and information that could potentially be useful to TSA in its effort to understand and analyze the commercial trucking and motor coach industries. For example, the Missouri CSR program selected carriers with particularly bad safety records for review, but TSA does not have general, direct access to these data. FMCSA also maintains the Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS) database of all interstate, and some intrastate companies, and all carriers of hazardous materials. Access to MCMIS data could assist TSA in addressing the NIPP requirement that the agency develop an inventory of assets as a basis for conducting vulnerability and consequence assessments. In addition, as TSA expands its CSRs of hazardous materials transporters, DOT may benefit from knowing which firms TSA has reviewed to avoid duplication of effort.

Although TSA and PHMSA have signed an annex detailing how they will collaborate, TSA and FMCSA officials stated that they did not establish a similar agreement because the agencies coordinated with each other well, and an annex was not necessary. However, with enactment of the 9/11 Commission Act, TSA and FMCSA were required to complete an annex by August 2008 that defined the processes that will be used to promote communications and efficiency, and avoid duplication of effort. An annex to the MOU between TSA and FMCSA might help reduce possible duplication of effort in inspection programs, as well as facilitate the development of a process for sharing data to monitor program results. TSA and FMCSA officials signed an annex to the MOU in October 2008.

The TSSP also requires that the GCC and the SCC create several joint working groups for research and development, performance measurement, intelligence, and risk. These groups are to improve coordination and prioritization of TSA’s research and development efforts, address the inherent difficulties in measuring and assessing the performance of security mitigation programs, develop sector-specific metrics, and coordinate and integrate intelligence efforts. However, the creation of these committees has been delayed, according to TSA officials. Without promptly developing joint working groups, TSA increases the risk that collaborative work and progress in these areas will be delayed. TSA officials stated that as of September 2008, the Joint Working Groups for Highway and Motor Carrier had not been officially approved.

TSA Has Increased Vulnerability Assessments by Collaborating with the State of Missouri, but Has Not Developed a Plan to Expand the Approach to the Other States

TSA has leveraged resources to enhance its capabilities to perform CSR vulnerability assessments through collaboration with the state of Missouri, and recently reached agreements with Michigan and Colorado to conduct CSRs, but has faced challenges in expanding this collaborative effort to other states. These state coordination challenges have the potential to significantly delay progress in expanding vulnerability assessments to other states. TSA officials stated that it was continuing to explore opportunities to expand the CSR program from Missouri to other states, and to leverage state field inspector and law enforcement resources.

TSA also does not have a direct mechanism for coordinating its strategy with the states related to commercial vehicle security planning, and some state officials we spoke to expressed dissatisfaction with TSA’s coordination efforts. The agency relies on several GCC-member associations that represent state and local transportation and law enforcement officials to coordinate with states. However, all of these state GCC stakeholders identified concerns about the adequacy of TSA coordination efforts. For example, CVSA, which represents state law enforcement officials at the GCC, stated that the GCC is not an effective means of communication and coordination, and that direct communication with the states was minimal. As a result, CVSA transportation security officials stated that they were not fully informed about TSA’s risk management strategy. CVSA officials further stated, in September 2008, that while coordination with TSA had improved after TSA’s staffing stabilized, they continued to be concerned that the federal government was more engaged in helping states ensure safety rather than security. They also questioned whether TSA had dedicated sufficient resources to commercial vehicle security, or had the expertise to lead federal efforts to expand vulnerability assessments nationwide. CVSA officials stated that since DOT had the resources but not the authority to oversee commercial vehicle security, it is difficult for either agency to assist the states.

Another key association, AASHTO, which represents state transportation officials at the GCC, stated that state security planners are given insufficient attention and information by TSA and other DHS components relating to security. Specifically, AASHTO officials stated that TSA had not communicated its strategy or initiatives to secure commercial vehicles, and that while AASHTO has tried to discuss what role the states play in transportation security with DHS and TSA, neither has been responsive in providing fully defined roles. Several officials we spoke with during our interviews with state DOTs also expressed concerns regarding whether the GCC is a sufficient mechanism for TSA to coordinate with the 50 states and were also critical of TSA’s leadership and communication related to commercial vehicle security. For example, one state noted that TSA’s slow pace in providing guidance was causing it to delay the implementation of its programs for fear such programs would conflict with TSA initiatives. TSA officials stated that the agency had coordinated with states to the extent possible with available resources—having one staff member responsible for federal, state, and industry coordination.

TSA Has Worked to Strengthen Partnerships with the Commercial Vehicle Industry, but Stakeholders Identified Coordination Challenges, and the Effects of Existing Coordination Efforts Are Unknown

TSA has made progress in involving industry in their strategy for strengthening commercial vehicle security by supporting the formation of an industry stakeholder council and through ongoing outreach efforts and meetings with industry officials. However, as discussed earlier in this report, industry officials we interviewed stated that they generally desired greater communication with TSA. More specifically, the officials noted that they did not fully understand TSA’s strategy for securing the commercial vehicle sector, or what roles and responsibilities the agency expected from industry. Additionally, TSA does not have any measures of the effectiveness of its efforts to coordinate with its many stakeholders, which limits its ability to determine whether its ongoing efforts to collaborate are appropriate and adequate for this very large and diverse transportation sector. Without strengthening communication and coordination with industry, TSA will not be able to fully leverage the resources of its stakeholders. Four of the leading practices for collaborating agencies we previously identified to help improve coordination among federal agencies could also be applied to improve federal collaboration with industry stakeholders—defining a common outcome and complementary strategies, agreeing on roles and responsibilities, leveraging stakeholder resources, and monitoring results.

TSA coordinates with the commercial vehicles sector through an industry council and industry associations. To (1) overcome the challenge of working in partnership with such a large and diverse group of stakeholders, (2) understand the current security practices of these industries, and (3) gather industry input and feedback, TSA supported the creation of the Highway and Motor Carrier Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) in June 2006. The SCC represents three private industry groups: highway passenger and school bus carriers, highway freight carriers, and highway infrastructure owners and builders, and facilitates communications within the industry and between the industry and TSA. According to members, its purpose is to represent a broad cross-section of the industry, and there is no limit on the number of organizations that can participate. As of September 2008, the SCC had convened eight times since its first meeting in August 2006, and holds separate meetings to address issues requiring a quick response. Apart from the SCC, TSA has also collaborated with several industry trade associations to develop and distribute security brochures and guides for their membership. For example, TSA assisted the Truck Rental and Leasing Association in developing its Security Awareness and Self-Assessment Guide.

Although TSA has made progress in coordinating with industry stakeholders, challenges remain. Specifically, SCC officials stated that the council was dissatisfied with TSA’s level of coordination with the SCC on the development of a strategy for enhancing commercial vehicle security. For example, the SCC leadership stated that the SCC was excluded from key stages of drafting revisions to the initial TSSP annex. The TSSP states that its initial goals and objectives would be developed by TSA, and be informed by comments and suggestions from the SCC, and going forward the TSSP annex states that the GCC and SCC are to prepare future revisions of the TSA strategy in the TSSP annex. SCC officials said that TSA did not consult with them regarding the development of key strategic objectives, known as Strategic Risk Objectives, or the Highway and Motor Carrier Annual Report regarding progress made and goals for the next year. These officials stated that overall coordination was better on trucking issues than for motor coach. Furthermore, industry and company officials we interviewed also expressed concerns about TSA’s coordination efforts regarding its strategy Specifically, officials from 9 of the 12 industry associations and 20 of the 26 truck and bus companies we interviewed, some of whom were also members of the SCC, stated that they were not familiar with TSA’s strategy and/or ongoing efforts to secure the commercial vehicle sector, and that TSA could strengthen its coordination with industry. Officials stated that in some cases, a lack of information led industry associations to hesitate in implementing security actions and dedicating resources to additional security measures that TSA may determine are not necessary or identify other required measures that must be implemented instead. Finally, SCC officials stated that TSA had not explicitly defined roles and responsibilities for the committee, its members, or the industry. Several industry association representatives also expressed similar confusion over their responsibilities and roles in securing the commercial vehicle sector. TSA officials stated that the SCC was not consulted in the development of the Highway and Motorcarrier Annex because TSA did not have enough time to include them. However, the SCC disagreed stating that TSA had received an extension on when the annex was due. TSA officials also said that they were not surprised by the uncertainty about their strategy for securing the sector because TSA’s focus has been largely on developing security programs rather than communicating its security strategy to industry. TSA officials stated that going forward, they will work with the SCC as it revises the Highway and Motor Carrier Annex to the TSSP. The SCC leadership stated that during the revision to the latest HMC annual report, TSA was much more open to SCC’s input.

Our previous work on effective interagency collaboration has demonstrated that to achieve a common outcome, collaborating agencies need to establish strategies that work in concert with those of their partners or are joint in nature. Our prior work has further shown that collaboration can be enhanced when parties work together to define and agree on their respective roles and responsibilities, including how the collaborative effort will be led. Responsibility for securing the commercial vehicle sector involves collaboration between governmental and nongovernmental entities that typically have not worked together before on these issues. A fully defined outcome and strategy facilitates overcoming significant differences in organizational missions, cultures, and established ways of doing business. Without defining a common outcome and strategy, individual organizations increase the risk of developing strategies for securing the commercial vehicles industry that differ and conflict rather than help organizations better align their activities and resources to accomplish a common outcome. Fully defining and clarifying respective roles and responsibilities will be important to ensure that TSA and industry understand who will do what regarding securing the commercial vehicle sector, and help to reconcile differing perceptions of leadership that exist among stakeholders.

SCC representatives stated that TSA has not maintained active communication with the committee, resulting in missed opportunities to take advantage of their potential contributions, including leveraging of their expertise and resources. TSA officials stated that given the SCC’s recent establishment, it may be too soon to fairly assess the effectiveness of their interactions with the council. Most companies we spoke with stated that they rarely heard from TSA if at all, although they were generally much more familiar with FMCSA with whom they have worked for years. Some company officials suggested that TSA develop a direct means of communicating with the industry, such as through e-mail or a robust Web page. The Missouri Pilot Program Evaluation Report also recommended that TSA develop a Web portal to improve coordination and communication with the industry. The lack of communications and coordination could limit the effectiveness of standards and measures meant to enhance the security of commercial vehicles.

TSA officials stated that the agency has conducted outreach with private industry to, among other things, coordinate its overall strategy and roles and responsibilities. According to officials, TSA has made numerous resources available to private industry stakeholders through the Homeland Security Information Network and more recently through TSA’s Highway and Motor Carrier Web site link. Additionally, TSA reported that officials from the HMC are continually attending association conferences and workshops to educate and share TSA’s strategy, goals, and policies. To further improve communications, TSA reported that it has conducted 14 monthly conference calls since 2007 with attendees varying from 10 to 20 stakeholder participants. TSA officials stated that, while minor issues regarding specific lines of communication may have existed, in their opinion, the general level of coordination with the industry has been successful and that they were unaware of any significant private sector stakeholder misunderstandings of the agency’s security strategy, efforts, or their own roles and responsibilities.

While TSA’s actions should help strengthen coordination with the commercial vehicle industry, the extent of any effect of these efforts is unknown because, according to TSA officials, the agency has not developed an approach to evaluate the effectiveness of its coordination efforts. Specifically, TSA does not have measures of how coordination efforts such as its current Web site, its participation in conferences, its efforts to coordinate with states, the GCC, and SCC result in a better understanding of TSA strategy and definitions of roles and responsibilities within the commercial vehicle sector. We have previously reported that collaborative efforts can be enhanced and sustained when they include mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation to assist stakeholders in identifying areas for improvement. Without such an evaluation, TSA will be hindered in determining whether its ongoing efforts to collaborate with the commercial vehicle industry are appropriate and effective for enhancing the security of this very large and diverse transportation sector.

Conclusions

The nature, size, and complexity of the nation’s commercial vehicle sector highlights the need for federal and state governments and the private sector to work together to secure this transportation sector. The importance of the nation’s commercial trucking and motor coach industries and concerns about their security, coupled with finite homeland security resources, underscores the need for TSA to employ a risk management approach to prioritize its security efforts so that an appropriate balance between costs and security is obtained. TSA has taken steps in implementing a risk management approach by assessing threats to and from the commercial vehicle sector, conducting some vulnerability assessments, and initiating the development of best practices to secure the sector. Despite these achievements, much work remains to fully address the security risks of commercial trucks and motor coaches, and to ensure that this information is used to inform TSA’s security strategy. TSA has not yet completed annual threat assessments with estimations of the likelihood of various threats or tactics, nor established a plan and a time frame for completing vulnerability assessments of the commercial vehicle industry and its diverse sectors and firms, to include considering the recommendations of the Missouri Pilot Program Evaluation. TSA also has not developed a plan to conduct consequence assessments, or leveraged the consequence assessments of other sectors. Further, TSA has not determined the extent to which additional risk assessments are needed, or the resources needed to support these efforts. Although TSA is having threat scenarios conducted to inform a preliminary risk assessment of the industry, these assessments will likely provide limited information on what sectors or companies are most at risk, and what mitigation practices are currently in place, unless they are further supported by field-level risk assessments, such as CSRs, consistent with the TSSP. As a result of not having specific threat assessments or complete vulnerability and consequence assessments, the agency is limited in its ability to determine the most pressing security needs, and to use this information to guide its security strategy. While working to develop complete risk assessments, it is important that TSA assess and use available information as the basis for its interim decisions. For example, information currently available from existing threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments suggest alternatives or additions to the agency’s current focus on commercial vehicle transport of hazardous materials. TSA has recently begun the process of revising its strategy for 2009 and beyond; however, without completed risk assessments, its revised strategy may not be appropriately targeted. Until TSA completes assessments of this very large and highly diverse transportation sector, and uses this information to inform its security strategy, it will be limited in its ability to assure Congress that existing funds are being spent in the most efficient and effective manner.

TSA has developed a range of programs to strengthen truck and bus security, but has not developed outcome measures to assess how effectively the programs have improved security. Without such performance measures, TSA cannot monitor and evaluate whether or not these programs are achieving results in enhancing commercial vehicle security, nor communicate this progress to industry stakeholders, Congress, policymakers, and taxpayers.

With 50 states and over a million diverse industry stakeholders, securing commercial vehicles can pose considerable communication challenges and lead to confusion about roles and responsibilities. Ultimately, the security of the industry is maintained by the companies themselves, and if TSA is to secure the sector it must do so by working with the industry. Coordination and communications techniques that might work well in other transportation sectors may be insufficient for the larger, more complex commercial vehicle industry. TSA has taken steps to coordinate with government and industry stakeholders, and has had some noteworthy successes such as the Missouri CSR program. However, both industry and state officials we interviewed stated that more needed to be done to enhance federal leadership and better ensure that federal, state, and industry actions and investments designed to enhance security are properly focused and prioritized. TSA communicates with states primarily through associations of state law enforcement and transportation officials who participate in the GCC. However, opportunities exist for more effective coordination with states to expand the Missouri CSR to other states, and for TSA to leverage FMCSA’s resources in conducting field inspections. TSA could address industry concerns about communication of its strategy, roles, and responsibilities, as well as better leverage industry expertise, by working more collaboratively with industry representatives and improving communication with the nation’s many small owner-operators and midsized firms. In addition, because TSA does not monitor and measure the effectiveness of its coordination and communications efforts, it cannot be sure that it is addressing stakeholder concerns. By improving coordination with DOT, the states, and the industry, TSA could build a solid foundation for strengthening the security of the commercial vehicle sector.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To assist the Transportation Security Administration in more fully evaluating, selecting, and implementing commercial vehicle security risk mitigation activities, and to help strengthen the security of commercial vehicles in the United States and leverage the knowledge and practices employed by key federal and nonfederal stakeholders, we recommend that the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration take the following four actions: 1. Establish a plan and a time frame for completing risk assessments of the commercial vehicle sector, and use this information to support future updates to the Transportation Sector Strategic Plan, to include conducting: to the extent feasible, assessments that include information about the likelihood of a terrorist attack method on a particular asset, system, or network as required by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan; a vulnerability assessment of the commercial vehicle sector, including: assessing the scope and method of assessments required to gauge the sector’s vulnerabilities; considering the findings and recommendations of the Missouri pilot evaluation report to strengthen future Corporate Security Reviews; and enhancing direct coordination with state governments to expand the Transportation Security Administration’s field inspection Corporate Security Review capacities; consequence assessments of the commercial vehicle sector, or developing alternative strategies to assess potential consequences of attacks, such as coordinating with other Sector-Specific Agencies to leverage their consequence assessment efforts. 2. In future updates to the Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier Annex to the Transportation Sector Security Plan, clarify the basis for the agency’s security strategy of focusing on the transportation of hazardous materials, the relative risk of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices to the sector, and, based on the relative risk of these threats, any risk mitigation activities to be implemented to address them. 3. Develop outcome-based performance measures, to the extent possible, to assess the effectiveness of federal programs to enhance the security of the commercial vehicle sector. 4. Establish a process to strengthen coordination with the commercial vehicle industry, including ensuring that the roles and responsibilities of industry and government are fully defined and clearly communicated; new approaches to enhance communication are considered; and monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of its coordination efforts.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOT for review and comment. On January 15, 2009, DOT provided technical oral comments which we incorporated as appropriate. On February 6, 2009, we received written comments on the draft report from DHS, which are reproduced in full in appendix II. DHS concurred with our findings and recommendations and discussed efforts underway to address them.

Regarding our recommendation that TSA establish a plan and a time frame for completing risk assessments of the commercial vehicle sector, and use this information to support future updates to the Transportation Sector Strategic Plan, DHS concurred and stated that TSA is actively conducting risk assessments of the major components of the commercial vehicle sector as required by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, and provided a timetable for completing these scenario-based risk assessments. According to TSA, these assessments will examine specific scenarios involving the commercial vehicle sector and will include information on the likelihood of a terrorist attack. We are pleased that TSA is beginning to conduct risk scenario assessments on various parts of the industry. However, we continue to believe that TSA needs to expand its use of threat likelihood estimates to the extent feasible. For example, we believe that TSA should address the feasibility of annual sector threat assessments including likelihood estimates. TSA also stated that it is planning to conduct annual field-level vulnerability assessment CSRs on a statistically valid sample of hazardous materials carriers. While we support these efforts, as we noted in the report carriers transporting hazardous materials represent only a small fraction of the industry. Therefore, we believe that TSA should also assess the scope and method of its vulnerability assessments for the entire sector, beginning with establishing the mix of expert scenarios and field assessments it deems most appropriate. In response to our recommendation that TSA conduct consequence assessments of the commercial vehicle sector or develop alternative strategies to assess potential consequences of attacks such as coordinating with other sector-specific agencies to leverage their consequence assessment efforts, TSA concurred and stated that it will examine consequence information based on the scenarios that have been developed, consult with public and private sector subject matter experts, and, when appropriate, consult with sector-specific agencies.

DHS concurred with our recommendation that in future updates to the Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier Annex to the Transportation Sector Security Plan, they should clarify the basis for the agency’s security strategy of focusing on the transportation of hazardous materials, the relative risk of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices in the sector, and, based on the relative risk of these threats, any risk mitigation activities that should be implemented to address them. TSA stated that it intends to include risk-based clarification of the security strategies in future updates to the plan. According to TSA, for the past 2 years it has focused primarily on the transportation of hazardous materials. However, ongoing industry risk assessments and regulatory efforts may shift the current strategies, and communicating these strategies in the annex to all stakeholders will be critical to successful implementation of the plan. We believe that these efforts will help strengthen TSA’s strategy for securing the sector. We further believe that it will be important for TSA to clarify the basis for its strategy and any shift in that strategy based on assessments of the relative risks.

DHS concurred with our recommendation that TSA develop, to the extent possible, outcome-based performance measures to assess the effectiveness of federal programs to enhance the security of the commercial vehicle sector. DHS stated that TSA recognizes the importance of establishing outcome-based performance measures and described ongoing efforts. TSA stated that it intends to conduct annual CSRs on hazardous materials motor carriers to measure changes in industry security. While these activities will help TSA strengthen its ability to assess the effectiveness of ongoing security measures, we believe that the impact of TSA’s programs on the progress of the rest of the commercial vehicle sector should be measured as well.

DHS also concurred with our recommendation that TSA establish a process to strengthen coordination with the commercial vehicle industry, including ensuring that the roles and responsibilities of industry and government are fully defined and clearly communicated; new approaches to enhance communication are considered; and the effectiveness of its coordination efforts are monitored and assessed. DHS noted that TSA recognizes the importance of strong working relationships with both industry and other government agencies, and that through its work with coordination councils TSA has established a coordination process that continues to mature and develop. Finally, DHS noted that these coordination efforts are only 17 months old, hence performance measurement processes continue to be refined. We believe that given the size and complexity of the commercial vehicle sector, and the concerns expressed by various stakeholders, new approaches to enhance communication are important. As such, TSA should develop a process to monitor and assess the effectiveness of its coordination efforts.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of the Department of Transportation, and other interested parties. This report will also be available at no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VIII.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of our review were to answer the following questions: (1) To what extent has TSA assessed the security risks associated with commercial vehicles and used this information to develop and implement a security strategy? (2) What security actions have key government and private sector stakeholders taken to mitigate identified risks to commercial vehicle security, and to what extent has TSA measured the effectiveness of its actions? (3) To what extent has TSA coordinated its strategy and efforts for securing commercial vehicles with other federal entities, states and private sector stakeholders?

Federal Risk Assessment Activities

To review the extent to which the federal government has assessed security risks associated with commercial vehicles and used this information to develop and implement its security strategy, we analyzed DHS and DOT strategic and security planning documents such as the NIPP, the TSSP and its Highway and Motor Carrier Annex; performance documents including annual reports such as DHS’s 2008 Performance Budget Overview and TSA HMC’s Annual Reports and quarterly risk reduction reports; and risk assessment documentation—including assessments of threat, vulnerability, and standoff and evacuation distances. We interviewed officials from DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate; TSA’s Office of Highway and Motor Carriers, Office of Risk Management and Strategic Planning, Office of Intelligence, and Office of Cargo Policy; DOT’s Office of Intelligence and Security; PHMSA’s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety; FMCSA’s Office of Emergency Preparedness and Security; and DOT’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics.

To assess TSA’s threat assessments, we analyzed its annual threat assessments and other intelligence products, and met with officials of TSA’s Office of Intelligence. We also assessed documentation and interviewed TSA’s HMC officials regarding the agency’s use of the threat assessments for planning its vulnerability and consequence assessments. We also met with TSA’s Risk Management Division and reviewed its use of estimates regarding the likelihood of certain types of specific threats for high-level NTSRA scenarios, and more systematic use of threat scenarios and likelihood estimates for the Aviation Domain Risk Assessment. To evaluate TSA’s vulnerability assessments, we reviewed TSA’s draft best practices, its vulnerability assessments known as Corporate Security Reviews (CSRs), and CSR questionnaires and reports. We also met with TSA HMC officials and interviewed officials from truck and bus companies that had undergone CSRs. To assess TSA’s CSR pilot program, we attended two Missouri Pilot CSRs and analyzed the TSA-sponsored evaluation report of the CSR pilot. At the conclusion of the two CSRs we observed, we interviewed company officials about what they learned from the CSR, how germane it was to their security needs, and how appropriate TSA’s suggested security measures were for their operating and business environment. We also met with Missouri state department of transportation and law enforcement officials and FMCSA field officers in Missouri to discuss their experiences with implementing the pilot and conducting CSRs. We also discussed the usefulness of the CSRs with officials from 12 leading industry trade associations representing the different sectors of the industry including, trucking companies, owner- operators, private truck companies, the bus industry, tank truck operators, hazardous materials shippers, rental and leasing firms, and unions. To review DOT’s SCR inspections of hazardous material security plan implementation, we reviewed the SCR questionnaire, gathered data from agency Performance and Accountability Reports regarding their annual progress, and met with DOT FMCSA’s Office of Emergency Preparedness and Security. We also analyzed FMCSA-sponsored vulnerability assessment of the U.S. motor coach Industry. We also reviewed the completeness of DOT MCMIS and BTS data on the population, or national inventory, of commercial vehicle firms, trucks, and drivers, because to determine industry vulnerabilities requires the development of a well- defined inventory or population of industry firms and assets. For more information, see appendix V.

To evaluate TSA’s consequence assessments, we analyzed DHS, DOD, and ATF data about standoff distances for VBIED explosions, tanker fuel truck fireballs, and TIH evacuation distances. We also interviewed officials from TSA’s HMC and DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate about their consequence assessment efforts. To explore the feasibility of TSA leveraging the consequence efforts of other sectors, we also reviewed the 17 Critical Infrastructure Sector Annual Reports for 2006 and 2007, and the Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment report which identifies the sectors most at risk from VBIEDs.

To determine how, if at all, TSA used its risk assessments to inform its strategy for securing commercial vehicles, we reviewed its strategic plan, the TSSP annex, annual reports, and other related documents. We also interviewed HMC officials, and compared their actions to DHS risk management guidance in the NIPP and TSSP. The quality of TSA’s CSR inspection data was previously assessed by the Missouri Pilot Evaluation. We reviewed the pilot evaluation and concurred with its conclusion that the Missouri sample was not representative of the commercial vehicle industry in Missouri or of the industry nationwide. To evaluate the extent to which TSA had a plan or a time frame to complete a comprehensive risk assessment of the commercial vehicle sector, we used standard practices in program and project management, which include developing a road map or a program plan to achieve programmatic results within a specified time frame or milestones. To evaluate TSA’s progress in addressing the Missouri CSR Pilot evaluation, we used GAO’s standards for internal controls in the federal government, which require that findings and deficiencies reported in audits and other reviews be promptly reviewed, resolved, and corrected within established time frames.

Government and Private Sector Security Actions

To determine the actions the federal government and state and local governments have taken to mitigate commercial vehicle security risks, and the extent to which these actions are consistent with TSA’s security strategy, we reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from TSA’s Office of Highway and Motor Carrier and the Office of Cargo Policy; DOT PHMSA’s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety; FMCSA’s Office of Emergency Preparedness and Security; FHWA Transportation Security Office; and the FTA Office of Safety and Security. We also interviewed officials from eight states and conducted site visits to five. We selected the states in a nonprobability sample based on their characteristics, proximity to critical infrastructure and potential terrorist targets, such as large population centers, and the amount of hazardous materials (in tons) originating in the state. As a result, we cannot generalize the results to all states. However, we believe that observations obtained from these visits provided us with a greater understanding of the states’ operations and perspectives. We gathered information from each regarding their actions to mitigate security risks, and any challenges they face in strengthening security.

To identify industry actions taken to secure the commercial vehicle sector, we analyzed TSA’s draft best practices and Security Action Items, and reviewed TSA CSR and FMCSA SCR and SSV inspection data. We also interviewed officials from 12 industry associations that represent trucking firms and truck drivers, truck manufacturers, truck rental and leasing companies, hazardous materials shippers, and intercity and tour bus companies to see what actions, if any, the association and its members were taking. We also reviewed security guidance industry trade associations had developed and provided to their members. To supplement what federal and industry associations told us and to observe industry operations firsthand, we also conducted site visits to 26 commercial truck and bus owner-operators. These companies were selected by a nonprobability sample based on: size, using the number of vehicles (tractors, or power units for trucking companies, and buses for motor coach companies) as an indicator; geographic location, noting the region’s characteristics, proximity to critical infrastructure and potential terrorist targets such as large population centers, and the amount of hazardous materials (in tons) originating in the state; and type of operations, using the quantity of hazardous materials transported as an indicator for trucking companies.

Because we used a nonprobability sample of owner-operators and states, the information we obtained from these interviews and visits cannot be generalized to all commercial vehicle companies. However, we believe that observations obtained from these visits provided us with a greater understanding of the industry’s operations and perspectives. The 20 trucking companies we visited included hazardous materials carriers, nonhazardous materials carriers, and carriers that transported both hazardous materials and nonhazardous materials. The 6 motor coach companies we visited included companies that offer intercity services, and tour and charter services, as well as companies that do both. During our site visits to bus and trucking companies, we interviewed officials and inspected a range of security measures.

To assess how the effectiveness of federal programs to reduce risk was being monitored, we analyzed DHS and DOT strategic planning and budgeting documents and performance data and interviewed officials from TSA’s HMC, the Transportation Sector Network Management Business Management Office, and the DHS Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Grants Program Directorate. To determine what performance measurement data DOT had developed that TSA could potentially use to monitor the progress of these commercial vehicle security programs, we interviewed officials from FMCSA’s Analysis Division and Strategic Planning and Program Evaluation Division. We also compared TSA’s efforts to evaluate its programs with guidance on performance measurement contained in the GPRA and the TSSP.

Coordination and Collaboration Efforts

To review the extent to which the federal government has coordinated its strategy for securing commercial vehicles internally and with private sector stakeholders, we analyzed DHS’s memorandum of understanding with DOT and subsequent annex with PHMSA that identifies the roles and responsibilities of DHS and DOT related to commercial vehicle and hazardous materials transportation security. In addition, we reviewed statutes related to DHS and DOT roles and responsibilities, as well as regulations and associated comments provided during rulemaking procedures for commercial vehicle security programs and requirements. We also interviewed officials from TSA’s Office of Intelligence, Risk Management Division, the Office of Highway and Motor Carrier, and the Office of Cargo Policy; and DOT’s PHMSA and FMCSA to obtain information on their current and planned efforts to secure commercial vehicles, as well as their collaborative efforts across agencies and with the private sector. We also interviewed members of the SCC and the private firms we visited to obtain their views regarding the effectiveness of TSA’s coordination efforts, and discussed their views with TSA officials. Finally, we compared TSA’s efforts to collaborate and coordinate with stakeholders to key practices that we had previously developed as leading practices of collaborating agencies.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2006 through February 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. (The methodology used to gather our data on the incidents of truck and bus bombing is summarized in app. II).

Appendix II: Incidents of Truck and Bus Bombings from 1997 to 2008

This appendix provides information on the analysis we conducted to determine the incidents of truck and bus bombings presented in this report. It provides information on the methodology used to identify incidents worldwide and the detailed results of our analysis.

Methodology Used to Identify Bombing Incidents

We used open sources, such as press and wire service reports, to determine the extent of bus and truck bombings. We first reviewed the general strengths and weakness of different open-source databases and consulted open source search experts. We reviewed eight databases and chose to use four based on the breadth and completeness of their media sources, years, and geographic coverage; whether they contained sufficient detail to verify that the event was a truck or bus bombing; and whether they allowed for independent verification of source information. We also wanted databases that had, or enabled, control methods to ensure minimization of false positives and duplicates, and standardized criteria for incident inclusion.

We narrowed our selection of databases to the Open Source Center (OSC), Nexis, Global Terrorism Database (GTD), and Dialog databases. OSC is the official open-source clearinghouse for the U.S. government that monitors, translates, and disseminates within the U.S. government openly available news and information from non-U.S. media sources. It has state of the art language translation capabilities, so articles are usually translated into English by native-speaker linguists. Nexis, Major World Newspapers provides access to 5 billion searchable documents from more than 40,000 legal, news, and business sources. GTD is an open-source database gathering information on terrorist incidents around the world since 1970. We made limited use of the earlier, first version called GTD 1 and only for 1997 when we could corroborate the incidents it identified with additional sources found in Nexis. Our primary database was the more rigorous GTD2, which currently covers terrorism events from 1998 to 2004. GTD2 is based on the OSC and Nexis databases, which it evaluated as the best general databases. GTD2 entries have to be based on multiple independent open-source reports or a single “highly credible” source. GTD2 has a configurable definition of terrorism that includes more than one definition of the phenomenon; control methods in place to ensure minimization of false positives; a standardized criteria for incident inclusion that is documented in a formal and publicly available codebook; and a ranking system for media sources. Dialog is an online database that allows for an extensive search of a variety of databases and collections using powerful search language. Dialog’s ability to identify very specific information made it an ideal second source to search for additional documentation on known but not fully documented events.

We then explored the capabilities of these databases over time with a small pilot, conducting searches on truck and bus bombings in one individual year in each of three decades, specifically the years 1987, 1996, and 2002, and explored which search terms and strategies produced the best results for each database. We assessed the possible threats to validity and confirmed that these were the pertinent issues with an open-source terrorism data expert. Our analysis plan addressed a variety of threats to validity and their mitigation: False positives – Unclassified data on terrorist events are largely gathered through open-source data, typically press reports. Since press reports may not be the most reliable, we used several databases that use reputable sources and decision rules for the inclusion of their entries. Entries we accepted had to be based on a highly reliable source, or multiple sources. Supporting articles had to directly confirm whether the incident was a truck or bus bombing as well as the incident date, location, and the number killed.

History – Electronic search engines and archives have improved over time.

Therefore, data across 25 years, since the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, may not be comparable. Based on our pilot data, we only included incidents from 1997, by which time both Nexis and GTD were well developed and reliable.

Language - All languages may not be equally covered. GTD uses the Open Source Center which is based entirely on foreign sources and has strong translation capabilities among its staff.

Synonyms - Multiple English terms may be used for bus, truck and bomb (e.g., bus vs. lorry). GTD uses extensive Boolean search terms with search strings using hundreds of terms and synonyms. Nexis and Dialog enable similar searches with wildcard strings. We applied GTD search strings to Nexis and Dialog to cover more current events not yet included in GTD.

Geography - Some areas (e.g. Africa) may not be covered as well.

However, we looked for a very particular type of incident that was highly likely to be the lead story where it occurred and picked up by the wires.

Dates -Reporting date vs. actual dates. Reporting dates on global time can lead to confusion. GTD and OSC have date protocols to minimize date error. Since our unit of analysis is years, this error was of little risk.

Breaking reports vs. “final” reports - Initial reports usually have less confirmation of the number killed. When conflicting reports cannot be reconciled, we used the lower number of reported killed. GTD also uses the lowest number. Incidents in a military area may not be terrorism - The GTD makes a distinction between combatants and noncombatants. We screened out events involving active combatants. However, we included incidents directed at civilians or other targets in active war zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Incident duplication – Using multiple sources could inadvertently lead to incident duplication. GTD has a protocol to eliminate duplicates and Nexis also enables electronic duplication vetting. In addition, duplications were screened manually and the entire dataset was verified by independent staff.

Search strategy

We originally hoped to list the incidents since the Beirut bombings of 1983, but given the less rigorous methodology of GTD1, the limited archival coverage of Nexis prior to 1996, and the limitations of other databases we decided to drop 1983 through 1996. Due to the evolving coverage of these databases, we had to employ three different search strategies to cover the years from 1997 to 2007.

Time period: 1997 Primary search database: Global Terrorism Database “GTD1” Secondary search database: Nexis’ Major World Newspapers By 1997, Nexis sources were sufficiently developed and available online to augment GTD1, which did not list supporting sources.

Time period: 1998-2004 Primary search database: Global Terrorism Database “GTD2” GTD2 incorporates OSC and Nexis in a systematic manner and additional searches of these sources were not necessary.

Time period: 2005-present Primary search database: Nexis’ Major World Newspapers Secondary search database: Individual newswires database in Dialog Third search database: Open Source Center For our study we searched the GTD2 for attacks utilizing or against a commercial vehicle, either truck, bus, or bus station or bus stand, specifically with explosives (VBIEDs, IED’s, suicide bomber(s), bombs, grenades, roadside bombs, landmines, and rockets). When searching Nexis we used the same search factors but with a Boolean search string. For years in our study outside the GTD year range, we duplicated their search and inclusion methodology. As a final check, we compared our results with Department of State and Department of Defense terrorism lists and timelines. We believe that these various steps successfully mitigated the various threats to validity and enabled us to compile information on the incidents of truck and bus bombings since 1997 with confidence.

The results of our search are summarized in figure 2 and detailed in table 3 below. Some additional trends are summarized in the figures below. Truck and bus bombings are compared in figure 6, which shows that while bus bombings have historically been more common, the incidence of truck bombings has sharply increased since 2004 and peaked in 2007.

Figure 7 summarizes how the sharp increase in bombing deaths in 2007 was due to the increase in truck bombings.

We only counted incidents involving noncombatants, but most of the sharp rise in deaths in truck and bus bombings that occurred in 2007 was due to bombings in Iraq.

Appendix III: Commercial Vehicle Industry Trade Associations GAO Contacted

American Chemistry Council (ACC)

American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)

American Trucking Associations (ATA)

Chlorine Institute (CI)

International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT)

National Private Truck Council (NPTC)

National Tank Truck Carriers (NTTC)

Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association (OOIDA)

Truck Manufacturers Association (TMA)

Truck Rental and Leasing Association (TRALA)

United Motorcoach Association (UMA)

Appendix IV: DHS and DOT Commercial Vehicle Security Programs Designed to Strengthen Commercial Vehicle Security

In addition to Corporate Security Reviews, TSA and DHS have four key programs designed to strengthen the security of the commercial vehicle industry. DOT also has four programs underway to strengthen commercial vehicle security and TSA and DOT are working collaboratively on several projects for securing commercial vehicles. Each of these programs and projects are discussed below.

DHS Security Programs

Trucking Security Program: The Trucking Security Program (TSP) provides grants that fund programs to train and support the members of the commercial vehicle industry in how to detect and report security threats, and how to avoid becoming a target for terrorist activity. TSP is administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Grant Programs Directorate within DHS. As of May 2008, DHS has provided nearly $78 million in TSP grants since 2003. Congress appropriated $16 million to fund this trucking security grant program for fiscal year 2008, and $8 million for fiscal year 2009. For fiscal years 2004-2008 the principal activity funded by the TSP was the American Trucking Associations’ Highway Watch program to improve security awareness in the commercial vehicle industry. In May 2008, however, a new grantee, the HMS Company of Alexandria, Virginia was selected.

Security Action Items (SAIs): TSA consulted with DOT and industry stakeholders to develop SAIs, or voluntary security practices, intended to improve security for trucks carrying security-sensitive hazardous materials. TSA eventually plans to also develop SAIs for motor coaches and school buses. According to TSA officials, the SAIs will allow TSA to communicate the key elements of effective transportation security as voluntary practices; TSA officials will use CSRs to gauge whether voluntary practices are sufficient or if regulation is needed.

Hazardous Materials Driver Background Check Program: A Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME) authorizes an individual to transport hazardous materials for commerce. The USA PATRIOT Act, enacted in October 2001, prohibits states from issuing HMEs for a commercial driver’s license to applicants who have not successfully completed background checks. In response, TSA implemented the hazardous materials driver security threat assessment program which evaluates the hazardous materials driver’s criminal history, immigration status, mental capacity, and connection with terrorism to determine whether that driver poses a security risk.

Intercity Bus Security Grant Program: This DHS program distributes grant money to eligible stakeholders to protect intercity bus systems and the traveling public from terrorism. Current priorities focus on enhanced security planning, passenger and baggage screening programs, facility security enhancements, vehicle and driver protection, as well as training and exercises. A total of $11.5 million was appropriated for fiscal year 2008 and $12 million for fiscal year 2009. A total of $11.5 million was appropriated for fiscal year 2008 and $12 million for fiscal year 2009.

DOT Security Programs

Security Plans and Training: DOT regulations require shippers and carriers of certain hazardous materials to develop and implement security plans. The regulations permit a company to implement a security plan tailored to its specific circumstances and operations. At a minimum, a security plan must address personnel, access, and en route security. All shippers and carriers must also ensure that employee training includes a security awareness component. In response to an industry petition that certain hazardous materials posing little or no security risk be removed from the list of hazardous materials for which security plans are required, DOT is reevaluating the security plan regulations.

Security Contact Reviews (SCRs): Through its SCRs, FMCSA conducts compliance reviews of the security plans for hazardous materials transport required by DOT hazardous materials regulations. FMCSA conducts SCRs on all hazardous materials motor carriers that transport placardable amounts of hazardous materials. As of September, 2008, FMCSA had conducted 7,802 SCRs since the inception of the programs.

Hazardous Materials Safety Permit Program: Federal law directed FMCSA to implement the hazardous materials permit program to produce a safe and secure environment to transport certain types of hazardous materials. The program requires certain motor carriers to maintain a security program and establish a system of enroute communication. This program uses the SCRs to collect data on motor carrier ability to secure hazardous materials.

Sensitive Security Visits (SSVs): FMCSA conducts SSVs as educational security discussions with motor carriers that carry small amounts of hazardous materials that do not require posting hazardous materials placards on their trucks. These visits discuss best practices for hazardous materials transportation and provide informal suggestions for improvement. As of September, 2008, FMCSA had conducted 13,411 SSVs since the inception of the programs.

TSA and DOT Joint Security Programs

TSA Missouri CSR Pilot: This pilot program conducts abbreviated CSRs of trucking and motor coach companies using state inspectors. For more details of the Missouri CSR program, see pages 26-31.

FMCSA and TSA Truck Tracking Security Pilots: FMCSA and TSA have concluded hazardous materials truck-tracking pilots. FMCSA completed a study of existing technologies in December 2004, evaluating wireless communications systems, including global positioning satellite (GPS) tracking and other technologies that allow companies to monitor the location of their trucks and buses. TSA also tested tracking and identification systems, theft detection and alert systems, motor vehicle disabling systems, and systems to prevent unauthorized operation of trucks and unauthorized access to their cargos. The 9/11 Commission Act mandated that the Secretary develop a tracking program for motor carrier shipments of hazardous materials by February 2008. TSA officials reported that they worked with DOT to meet this mandate and completed a program to facilitate truck tracking on January 10, 2008.

Hazardous Materials Research Involving Security Initiatives: DOT and DHS sponsor research on emerging technology that could potentially be used to enhance the safety and security of hazardous materials transportation. This research involves evaluation of potential truck- disabling technologies, radiation detection devices, hazardous materials routing, and software to assist in hazardous materials incident response.

Additional Programs: DHS and TSA also have a number of smaller programs to augment motor carrier security and programs in the planning stages. TSA has several projects on screening applicants for Commercial Drivers Licenses (CDLs) and Hazardous Materials Endorsements on CDLs. These include the Universal CDL Vetting Project, which will assess the feasibility of implementing watch list checks of 9 million commercial driver records. Through the Rental Truck Vetting Operational Study and Analysis, TSA is assessing technologies to screen rental truck customers against the DHS and FBI Watch List. To address the lack of security- related domain awareness, TSA and DHS also have developed several projects: Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) Roadside Law Enforcement Transportation Security Awareness, and the Hazmat Motor Carrier Security Self-Assessment Training Project which distributed security self-assessment training on CDs to approximately 75,000 hazardous materials motor carriers and shippers. Through the Commercial Truck Insurance Initiative, TSA is coordinating with insurance companies to develop methods and measures to provide companies incentives to improve security.

Appendix V: DOT Data on the Commercial Vehicle Industry

DOT maintains data on carriers and commercial vehicles registered with DOT. However, the data on intrastate operations is incomplete and unreliable because FMCSA does not have authority to regulate intrastate operations that are not involved in the transport of hazardous materials. Firms that operate exclusively within a single state do not have to register with DOT unless they are in the 25 states that require all commercial vehicles to register with DOT, or transport hazardous materials. This means that DOT does not have data on approximately half the nation’s intrastate carriers. Second, firms frequently do not keep their registrations current, and as a result the currency and accuracy of DOT’s records are not assured and many of its registrations are inactive. “Inactive” means that carriers had no inspections, crashes, enforcement actions, compliance reviews, safety audits, or registration applications with DOT for 3 years. DOT does not know which firms have gone out of business and which have simply failed to maintain their registrations. These incomplete data on the population of commercial vehicle firms will present some additional challenges to TSA for conducting a truly representative sample of industry assessments.

Appendix VI: Highway and Motor Carrier GCC Membership List

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Acknowledgments

Glenn Davis and Robert White, Assistant Directors, and Dan Rodriguez and Jason Schwartz, Analysts-in-Charge worked with Cathleen Berrick to manage this assignment. Gary Malavenda made significant contributions to many aspects of the work. Tracey King provided legal and regulatory support. Shamia Woods analyzed federal, state, and industry actions. Jennifer Cooper analyzed TSA’s cooperation efforts. Elizabeth Curda provided assistance on performance measurement and collaboration. Anish Bhatt and Joanna Berry helped in the design, methodology, and pilot test of the incidents of bus and truck bombings. Colleen Candrl helped in the design and conducted the searches on the incidents of bus and truck bombings. Evan Gilman, Virginia Chanley, and Anna Maria Ortiz provided additional design and methodological support.