Elections: Action Plans Needed to Fully Address Challenges in Electronic Absentee Voting Initiatives for Military and Overseas Citizens
Released: 2007-06-14T00:00:00

Letter

Background

The U.S. election system is highly decentralized and relies on a complex interaction of people, processes, and technology. Voters, local election jurisdictions (which number over 10,000), states and territories, and the federal government all play important roles in the election process. The process, however, is primarily the responsibility of the individual states and territories and their election jurisdictions. As we reported in our 2006 testimony, states and territories have considerable discretion in how they organize the elections process; this is reflected in the diversity of procedures and deadlines that states and jurisdictions establish for voter registration and absentee voting. Furthermore, these states and jurisdictions use a variety of voting techniques, from paper ballots to faxes and e-mails. We also reported that the voter is ultimately responsible for being aware of and understanding the absentee voting process and taking the actions necessary to participate in it.

The UOCAVA established that members of the military and their dependents of voting age living away from their legal residences (in or outside the United States) and American citizens who no longer maintain a permanent residence in the United States are eligible to participate by absentee ballot in all federal elections. According to DOD, the act covers more than 6 million people. Executive Order and DOD guidance related to the act include the following: Executive Order 12642, dated June 8, 1988, made the Secretary of Defense, or his designee, responsible for carrying out the federal functions under UOCAVA, including (1) compiling and distributing information on state absentee voting procedures, (2) designing absentee registration and voting materials, (3) working with state and local election officials, and (4) reporting to Congress and the President after each presidential election on the effectiveness of the program’s activities (including a statistical analysis of UOCAVA voters’ participation).

DOD Directive 1000.4, updated April 14, 2004, assigned the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness responsibility for administering and overseeing the program, and it established the FVAP to manage the program. In 2006, FVAP officials told us that they were authorized a full-time staff of 13 and had a fiscal year budget of approximately $3.8 million.

FVAP facilitates the absentee voting process for UOCAVA voters; its mission is to (1) inform and educate U.S. citizens worldwide about their right to vote, (2) foster voter participation, and (3) enhance and protect the integrity of the electoral process at the federal, state, and local levels. FVAP also, among other things, provides training opportunities for Voting Assistance Officers (service, State Department, and overseas citizen organization officials who carry out the implementation of their respective voting assistance programs); prescribes, coordinates, and distributes voting materials, such as the Federal Post Card Application (the registration and absentee ballot request form for UOCAVA voters); and provides for alternatives to regular mail, including Express Mail and the use of electronic solutions.

The Election Assistance Commission, which was established by the Help America Vote Act of 2002, also contributes to the absentee voting process. The act specifically established the Commission as a national clearinghouse for election information and procedures and assigned it responsibility for developing voting system guidelines for the entire election process. The act also specifies that the development of voluntary voting system guidelines should be informed by research and development in remote access voting, including voting through the Internet, and the security of computers, networks and data storage. In 2005, the Commission issued guidelines that, among other things, addressed gaps in the security measures of prior standards. However, these guidelines do not comprehensively address telecommunications and networking services or their related security weaknesses, such as those related to the Internet. The act also amended UOCAVA to require states to report to the Commission, after each regularly scheduled general election for federal office, on the aggregate number of (1) absentee ballots transmitted to absentee uniformed services voters and overseas voters for the election and (2) ballots returned by those voters and cast in the election. The Commission collects this information through its biennial state surveys of election data.

DOD, the Commission, and organizations representing UOCAVA voters have noted that these voters may effectively become disenfranchised because the multistep process for voting by absentee ballot—which relies primarily on mail—can take too long, especially for mobile servicemembers and overseas citizens or those deployed to or living in remote areas. Congress and DOD have taken action to facilitate the use of alternatives to mail, including electronic means such as fax, e-mail, and the Internet. Figure 1 shows (1) the laws designed to facilitate the use of electronic capabilities for UOCAVA voters and (2) some of DOD’s efforts, either voluntary or in response to a statute, to provide electronic capabilities to these voters during fiscal years 2000 through 2007.

FVAP stated that it implemented the Voting Over the Internet project in 2000 as a small-scale pilot project to provide military personnel and their dependents and overseas citizens covered under UOCAVA the ability to securely register to vote, request and receive ballots from local election officials, and vote via the Internet. DOD voluntarily developed the project as a small-scale proof-of-concept Internet voting project. This project enabled 84 voters to vote over the Internet—the first time that binding votes were cast in this manner. While the project demonstrated that it was possible for a limited number of voters to cast ballots online, DOD’s report concluded that security concerns needed to be addressed before it could expand remote (i.e., Internet) voting to a larger population.

In 2001, Congress noted that the Voting Over the Internet project had demonstrated that the Internet could be used to enhance absentee voting. To continue the examination of a secure, easy-to-use Internet voting system as an alternative to the regular mail process, Congress mandated, in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2002, that DOD conduct a large-scale Internet- based absentee voting demonstration project to be used for the 2002 or 2004 federal election. DOD responded to this mandate by creating the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE) for Internet-based absentee registration and voting; SERVE used a system architecture similar to the one used for the Voting Over the Internet project. However, as we previously reported, a minority report published by four members of the Security Peer Review Group—a group of 10 computer election security experts that FVAP assembled to evaluate SERVE—publicly raised concerns about the security of the system because of its use of the Internet. The four members suggested that SERVE be terminated because potential security problems left the information in the system vulnerable to cyber attacks that could disclose votes or personal voter information. Furthermore, they cautioned against the development of future electronic voting systems until the security of both the Internet and the world’s home computer infrastructure had been improved. Because DOD did not want to call into question the integrity of votes that would have been cast via SERVE, the Deputy Secretary of Defense terminated the project in early 2004, and DOD did not use it in the November 2004 election.

The points raised in these security reviews are consistent with concerns we raised in our 2001 reports. We found that broad application of Internet voting presented formidable social and technological challenges. In particular, we noted that challenges to remote Internet voting involve securing voter identification information and ensuring that voters secure the computer on which they vote. We also reported that because voting requires more stringent controls than other electronic transactions, such as online banking, Internet voting systems face greater security challenges than other Internet systems. Furthermore, we found that remote Internet voting was recognized as the least protective of ballot secrecy and voter privacy and was most at risk from denial of service and malicious software, such as computer viruses. While opinions of groups considering the pros and cons of Internet voting were not unanimous, we found that they agreed in principle on major issues, including considering security to be the primary technical challenge for Internet voting. Because of serious concerns about protecting the security and privacy of the voted ballot, we concluded that Internet-based registration and voting would not likely be implemented on a large scale in the near future.

In the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress amended the requirement for the Internet-based absentee voting demonstration project by permitting DOD to delay its implementation until the first federal election after the Election Assistance Commission developed guidelines for the project. The conference report for the act stated that, although Congress recognized the technical challenges of Internet voting, SERVE was an important prototype that should not be abandoned.

DOD Initiatives Assist UOCAVA Voters, but Certain Weaknesses May Limit Their Effectiveness

Since the 2000 federal election, DOD has established several initiatives as alternatives to the by-mail process to facilitate voter registration and ballot request, receipt of a ballot, and submission of a voted ballot by electronic means—such as fax and e-mail—for UOCAVA voters. These include the Electronic Transmission Service’s fax to e-mail and e-mail to fax conversion enhancement (hereafter referred to as the e-mail to fax conversion feature); the 2004 Interim Voting Assistance System (IVAS); the 2006 Integrated Voting Alternative Site (also called IVAS); DOD’s online voting assistance guidance; and online forms to register, request, receive, or submit ballots. While these efforts provide valuable guidance, services, and information to UOCAVA voters, some of them had limited participation rates or exhibited weaknesses in security, consistency, and accuracy that might hinder their use and effectiveness. DOD officials have acknowledged these weaknesses and they began taking action to address them during the course of our review.

Electronic Transmission Service’s E-mail to Fax Conversion Capability Facilitates Transmission of Voting Materials but Does Not Fully Comply with Information Security Requirements

The electronic transmission service is a fax forwarding system, established by FVAP in 1990, that allows UOCAVA voters and state and local election officials, where permitted by law, to fax election materials to each other. These voters and election officials can use this service and do not have to pay long distance fees for faxing out of state, because DOD provides the service through a toll-free line. In 2003, after discussions with Mississippi state officials and a Mississippi National Guard unit, FVAP added the e-mail to fax conversion capability to its electronic transmission service. These officials asked FVAP for help in transmitting voting materials because, by state law, Mississippi allowed only faxing as an electronic means of transmission—a capability that the Guard unit would not have while it was deployed to Iraq. The e-mail to fax conversion feature allows UOCAVA voters who do not have access to a facsimile machine to send ballot requests, via e-mail, to DOD’s Electronic Transmission Service, which converts e-mail attachments to faxes and sends them to local election officials. In return, local election officials can send ballots to the Electronic Transmission Service conversion feature by fax; the conversion feature then converts the fax to an e-mail attachment and sends it to the voter.

FVAP stated that it notifies states and territories whenever it converts an e-mail containing voting materials to a fax, or vice versa, so that the state or territory can decide whether or not to accept it. Table 1 shows Electronic Transmission Service activity for the conversion feature for 2004 and 2006.

Although FVAP has made progress in assisting servicemembers to transmit voting materials with the e-mail to fax conversion enhancement, FVAP officials told us they have not fully complied with certain information security requirements in the Interim DOD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process. This guidance requires DOD components, among other things, to implement controls and to certify and accredit such e-mail systems.

FVAP officials initially stated that the information security guidance did not apply to the conversion feature; they saw it as an enhancement to the original Electronic Transmission Service’s fax system. During the course of our review, however, FVAP officials said they consulted with officials responsible for DOD’s information assurance certification and accreditation and concluded that the requirements did, in fact, apply. These officials stated that, by the end of fiscal year 2007, they plan to award a contract to obtain services to meet the information security requirements. The FVAP officials further stated that, while they do not have the required documentation—such as risk assessments or certification tests and accreditations—they have taken some measures to ensure security. We note that the statement of work for FVAP’s April 29, 2005, contract for the Electronic Transmission Service recognizes the sensitivity of the data associated with election materials and includes provisions for certain security functions, such as ensuring that adequate steps are taken to prevent unauthorized access or manipulation of the data. Until FVAP performs and documents the security assessments and certifications, however, it has not taken all the necessary measures to secure its system and comply with DOD’s information security requirements.

Federal law includes a number of separate statutes that provide privacy protections for certain information. The major requirements for the protection of personal privacy by federal agencies come from two laws: the Privacy Act of 1974 and the privacy provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002. Section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002 requires agencies, among other things, to conduct privacy impact assessments before developing, upgrading, or procuring information technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates personally identifiable information. DOD developed departmentwide guidance—the DOD Privacy Impact Assessment Guidance—for implementing the privacy impact assessment requirements mandated in the E-Government Act of 2002. In this guidance, DOD directs the components to adhere to the requirements prescribed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)—Guidance for Implementing the Privacy Provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002. FVAP officials stated that they had not conducted a privacy impact assessment for the Electronic Transmission Service’s e-mail to fax conversion enhancement, but they told us that a privacy impact assessment will be done as part of the previously mentioned contract to meet information security requirements. A privacy impact assessment would identify specific privacy risks to help determine what controls are needed to mitigate those risks associated with the Electronic Transmission Service. Furthermore, building in controls to mitigate risks could ensure that personal information that is transmitted is only used for a specified purpose. FVAP noted that when information is sent by e-mail, the conversion feature retains the following information: full name, fax number, city, state, zip code, and e-mail addresses. FVAP’s Electronic Transmission Service retains this personally identifiable information both to provide transmission verification or confirmation to users and to comply with election document retention requirements under the Civil Rights Act of 1960.

DOD’s Electronic Ballot Request and Receipt Initiatives Had Limitations in Participation and Security

In September 2004, just 2 months prior to the election, DOD voluntarily implemented what it reported as a secure electronic system for voters to request and receive ballots—the Interim Voting Assistance System (IVAS)—as an alternative to the traditional mail process. IVAS was open to active duty servicemembers, their voting age dependents, and DOD overseas personnel who were registered in a state or territory participating in the project and enrolled in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System—a DOD-managed database that includes over 23 million records pertaining to active duty and reserve military and their family members, retired military, DOD civil service personnel, and DOD contractors. DOD had limited IVAS participation to UOCAVA voters who were affiliated with DOD because their identities could be verified in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System. Voters obtained their state or territory ballots through IVAS by logging on to a special Web site and then requesting ballots from their participating local election jurisdictions. After the local election officials approved the requests and the ballots were finalized, IVAS notified voters via e-mail that the ballots were available to download and print. DOD reported that 108 counties in eight states and one territory agreed to participate in this 2004 IVAS; however, only 17 citizens downloaded their ballots from the site during the 2004 election. FVAP officials noted that participation was low, in part because this IVAS was implemented just 2 months before the election. FVAP further reported that many states did not participate—for a variety of reasons, including state legislative restrictions, workload surrounding regular election responsibilities, and lack of Internet access. FVAP officials noted that this system, which was maintained through the conclusion of the election, cost $576,000.

In September 2006—again, just 2 months before the next general election—FVAP launched a follow-on Integrated Voting Alternative Site, also called IVAS, in response to a June 2006 legislative mandate to reestablish the 2004 IVAS. This 2006 IVAS expanded on the 2004 effort, by providing information on electronic ballot request and receipt options for all UOCAVA citizens in all 55 states and territories. It also provided two tools that registered voters could access through the FVAP Web site, using DOD or military identification, to request or receive ballots from local election officials. As with the 2004 IVAS, local election officials used information in these tools to verify the identity of UOCAVA voters who used them. The first tool—called Tool 1—contained a ballot request form only, accessed through DOD’s Web site, which voters could fill out and download to their computers. Voters could then send the downloaded form to the local election officials either by regular mail, fax, or unsecured e-mail, per state or territory requirements. FVAP officials reported to Congress that no information on the number of users was available on the use of Tool 1 because the department was no longer involved in the process once the voter downloaded the ballot request and they, essentially, had no visibility into what transpired directly between the voter and the election officials.

The second tool—called Tool 2—provided a ballot request and receipt capability for voters, similar to the 2004 IVAS, which also allowed voters to fill out ballot request forms online, send them to local election officials through a secure line, and receive their state or territory ballots from the local election officials through a secured server. Again, no voted ballots were transmitted through this IVAS system given that it was not designed for that purpose. Absentee voters, instead, would return voted ballots, outside of IVAS, in accordance with state law. Tool 2 had a tracking feature which showed that 63 voters had requested ballots through the system. Of these, local election officials approved and made their state or territory ballots available to 35 UOCAVA voters. However, of the 35 sent out, local election officials reported that only 8 voted ballots were traced back to the IVAS Tool 2, in part because this IVAS was implemented just 2 months before the election. DOD reported that the total cost for the 2006 IVAS was about $1.1 million, and given that the tools were used only to request or receive ballots for the November 2006 elections, DOD removed the tools from FVAP’s Web site in January 2007. Table 2 compares and provides additional details on the two tools.

Officials within Congress, and others, have expressed concerns that voters could be exposed to a heightened risk of identity theft if they used Tool 1 to send voting materials that contain personally identifiable information (including Social Security number, date of birth, and address), by unsecured e-mail. FVAP officials acknowledged in their December 2006 report to Congress that Tool 1 was less secure, but said (1) DOD was providing access to a capability that states already provide, (2) most states and territories only required the last four digits of the Social Security number on the ballot requests, and (3) Tool 1 displayed a cautionary statement that voters had to read to go on with the request process; this cautionary statement explained the risk associated with e-mailing ballot requests and that the government assumed no liability if voters did so. While we confirmed a cautionary statement related to the transmission of personal data did exist for Tool 1, it did not advise voters, after submitting their ballot request, to remove voting materials that they have stored on their computers. For example, voters using Internet cafes overseas could have been subject to identity theft if they did not delete their personal information from the computer and a subsequent user gained access to the stored file. FVAP officials acknowledged that users were not advised of the risks of storing personal voting information on their computers, and these officials stated that they will incorporate lessons learned, such as adding a cautionary statement in any future ballot request system.

Online Voting Guidance Is Useful but Some Inconsistencies Exist in the Links

In addition to these initiatives, DOD also has established the FVAP Web site, which contains information on FVAP programs and links to assist UOCAVA voters in the voting process. Specifically, these links access FVAP’s online guidance, including several versions of FVAP’s biennial Voting Assistance Guide, shown in figure 2.

This guide tells the UOCAVA voter how to register, request a ballot, receive a ballot, and vote the ballot electronically—including by e-mail or fax—where state or territory law allows this. One link on FVAP’s Web site had a full-text version of the guide, so that a Voting Action Officer or other user could download and print the entire guide and use it to provide assistance to absentee voters from various states and jurisdictions. Another link goes to a Web page containing “State-by-State Instructions,” where two additional links—one a PDF guide, the other an HTML version—are provided for each state or territory. This allows voters to read or print off only their own state’s or territory’s instructions and to have a choice of formats. Another link goes to the Integrated Voting Alternative Site—this site provides information for the 55 states and territories regarding the electronic ballot request and receipt options available to UOCAVA voters. FVAP’s Web site also has another link to News Releases, which contains updates on changes to the guidance, including changes to state laws that affect UOCAVA voters. Finally, a link goes to FVAP’s Voting Assistance Guide Errata Sheets—this contains changes that have been made to the archived Voting Assistance Guide since its last printing.

Our review of the FVAP Web site, however, revealed inconsistencies in some of the information about electronic transmission options that the voters could access through different links on the site. Our analysis specifically showed that, while not widespread, for 14 of the 55 states or territories, some of the guidance regarding requirements for electronic transmission was inconsistent and could be misleading, as the following examples illustrate: For the state of California, we found that three of the FVAP links correctly stated that only overseas military and overseas civilian voters were eligible to receive or return a ballot by fax; a fourth link, however, did not include this restriction. As a result, military personnel stationed in the United States, but away from their state of residence, might conclude— incorrectly—that they were eligible to vote by fax. FVAP officials acknowledged this discrepancy and updated the information reached from the fourth link on January 25, 2007, to reflect the fact that uniformed servicemembers must be residing or deployed overseas to be able to receive and send ballots by fax.

For the state of Colorado, we identified a news release that was issued on October 18, 2006, announcing a new initiative to allow uniformed servicemembers deployed outside the United States to request, receive, and return absentee ballots via e-mail. One other FVAP link reflected this change; however, four other links did not capture this change. FVAP officials acknowledged this discrepancy, updated two of the links, and issued an errata sheet on January 22, 2007. FVAP officials did not update the third link—the 2006-2007 Voting Assistance Guide accessed through the publications link on their Web site—stating that it was considered an archive document and was not intended for update. However, DOD did not clearly identify this link as an archived document; as a result, this link could mislead voters who relied on it. FVAP officials later acknowledged that the archived version of the 2006-2007 Voting Assistance Guide could have been labeled better, and eventually deleted this version from their Web site.

Appendix II provides details on the inconsistencies we found on FVAP’s Web sites for 14 states and identifies the links, along with DOD’s responses regarding each. Under internal control guidance, organizations are to apply policies and procedures consistently. As noted previously, while the inconsistencies were not widespread, the fact that inconsistencies exist at all could lead UOCAVA voters— especially busy voters residing or deployed in remote locations—to rely on incorrect information and therefore adversely affect their ability to vote. Agency officials acknowledged these discrepancies and addressed them during the course of our review.

Online Voting Forms

In addition, FVAP administers two online forms, (1) the Federal Post Card Application, which allows absentee voters to register to vote or request ballots; and (2) the Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot, which allows absentee voters to vote even if they have not yet received the absentee ballot they requested from their state or territory. The Federal Post Card Application has been online since 1999, in PDF format, and is postage-free within the U.S. mail system when appropriate markings, provided on FVAP’s web site, are used. The online Federal Post Card Application allows voters to download a PDF version to their computers to complete, e-mail, print, sign, and send to their local election official via mail. Some state and local election officials we spoke with indicated that the online version of the Federal Post Card Application has many benefits because it is easy to fill out and read, and it provides sufficient space for the voter to write in.

A UOCAVA voter can also use the Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot as a backup ballot when the state or territory has not sent a regular absentee ballot in time for the voter to participate in the election. On October 21, 2004, just a few weeks before the national election, FVAP issued a news release announcing the electronic version of the ballot as an emergency ballot. The Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 amended the eligibility criteria in UOCAVA to allow states and territories to accept the Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot under a broader range of circumstances. Prior to the change, a UOCAVA citizen had to be outside of the United States, have applied for a regular absentee ballot early enough to meet state election deadlines, and not have received it from the state. Under the new criteria, the Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot can be used by military servicemembers and their dependents stationed in the United States, as well as by military personnel, their dependents, and citizens living overseas.

Absence of Internet Absentee Voting Guidelines Has Hindered Development of the Mandated Internet- Based Absentee Voting Demonstration Project

The Election Assistance Commission has not yet developed the Internet absentee voting guidelines, and because it is required by law to develop them for DOD’s use in the secure, Internet-based, absentee voting demonstration project, DOD has not moved ahead with the project. Commission officials told us that they have not yet developed the required Internet absentee voting guidelines because the Commission has been working on other priorities—including standards for electronic voting machines, challenges associated with these electronic voting machines, and a process for certification and accreditation—and it lacks the resources to work on the Internet absentee voting guidelines or the mandated study of the issues and challenges for Internet technology at the same time. Although the Internet voting study is now underway, the Commission has said that it will not be completed until September 2007 and thus does not have the results it needs to establish time frames or a plan for developing the guidelines. Regarding the demonstration project, DOD officials stated that they had not taken action to develop this project because the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 requires the Commission to develop the guidelines first. DOD officials stated that, in an effort to assist the Commission in developing the Internet absentee voting guidelines, they have provided information on prior Internet voting efforts, along with challenges associated with these Internet voting efforts and views on how to mitigate those challenges.

The Commission Has Not Developed Internet Absentee Voting Guidelines because of Other Priorities, Constraints on Resources, and Lack of DOD Information

Commission officials stated that they have not developed Internet absentee voting guidelines because the Commission and the organizations that would normally provide assistance to it are directing their constrained resources to other priorities. This includes addressing challenges associated with electronic voting machines and establishing a process for certification and accreditation. Additionally, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 requires the Commission’s Technical Guidelines Development Committee to assist the Executive Director of the Commission in developing voluntary voting system guidelines. The act also requires the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology to provide the Development Committee with technical support in developing those guidelines, including research and development related to computer and network security, voter privacy, remote access voting (including voting through the Internet), and voting fraud.

Commission officials told us, however, that the Development Committee has not been able to work on Internet absentee voting guidelines for UOCAVA voters because it had other priorities and constraints on its resources. In light of the Development Committee’s low priority for working on the Internet absentee voting guidelines, officials from the Commission asked officials from the National Institute of Standards and Technology to assist with developing the guidelines. However, officials from the National Institute of Standards and Technology said that they could not provide support because they also lacked sufficient resources at the time. Commission officials told us that, at the time of our review, the National Institute of Standards and Technology was also using its resources to work with the Development Committee on the current voluntary voting guidelines and would not have sufficient resources to work on Internet absentee voting guidelines until after July 2007.

Additionally, Commission officials stated that they were waiting for DOD to provide information that describes the type of system around which the guidelines should be developed. DOD officials, however, stated that they gave the Commission reports that provided the framework for the Internet-based absentee voting system they envisioned. Specifically, these DOD officials told us that they provided the Commission, in 2004, with a report on their 2000 proof of concept for Internet-based voting called “Voting Over the Internet,” and in March 2006, they provided the Commission with an internal DOD document assessing the terminated SERVE project. DOD and Commission officials told us that they had not communicated in depth on the guidelines and the DOD system before our review.

The Election Assistance Commission Has Started a Study as a Precursor to the Internet Absentee Voting Guidelines

To gain a better understanding of the Internet voting environment, in September 2006, the Commission started an Internet voting study as a precursor to developing the Internet absentee voting guidelines. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 required the Commission to conduct this study to determine the issues and challenges presented by incorporating communications and Internet technology into elections, including the potential for election fraud, and to issue a report no later than June 29, 2004. However, the Commission did not meet this reporting date. Commission officials told us that they were unable to complete the study sooner—or even begin it—because of the resource constraints they have worked under since the Commission’s inception, and because they were working on other priorities. They noted, for example, that under the act, the Commission was to be established by February 26, 2003, but the Commissioners were not appointed until almost a year later, in December, 2003. They also told us that, although 23 employees were allocated to the Commission, they had to build up staff gradually, starting in January 2004, by hiring two employees each month. Accordingly, Commission officials testified in June 2004 that, as a result of these constraints, the Commission was able to meet only some of its mandates, such as developing the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. As a result, the Commission was not able to conduct the Internet voting study in a timely manner.

Commission officials stated that the Internet voting study, which was underway during the course of our review, includes several case studies to monitor current Internet voting usage and electronic transmission of ballots. The four states participating in this part of the study are Florida, Montana, South Carolina, and Illinois. The study also includes (1) a survey of UOCAVA voters to collect information on their level of interest in electronic voting and (2) a conference to gather states’ experiences on topics such as Internet voting, electronic transmission of ballots, security risks for voting systems, and verification of voters’ identities. Commission officials told us that they plan to issue a final report on the Internet voting study in September 2007.

The Commission Does Not Have a Plan for Assessing Security Issues and Developing Internet Absentee Voting Guidelines

The Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 did not establish a deadline by which the Commission was to complete the Internet absentee voting guidelines, and the Commission has not set time frames for itself, primarily because it has been working on guidelines for current voting systems. Additionally, as stated previously, the Commission has not completed the precursor Internet voting study to identify critical issues and challenges such as those related to security and privacy. Also, it has not established a plan, in conjunction with major stakeholders like DOD, to develop appropriate guidelines for Internet voting with specific tasks that would address security risks such as those identified in its study and other security evaluations and reports, as well as time frames and milestones.

In previous reports, we have noted that leading organizations develop long-term results-oriented plans that involve all stakeholders and identify specific tasks, milestones, time frames, and contingency plans; this practice is also embodied in the underlying principles of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. Similarly, without a plan for the UOCAVA Internet absentee voting guidelines—including specific tasks, time frames, milestones, necessary resources, and alternatives—the Commission cannot inform Congress, FVAP, and local election officials when it will meet the mandate to develop the required guidelines. As we previously noted, some technologies may not yet be mature enough to support Internet voting. Therefore, the plan for developing Internet absentee voting guidelines may require an incremental approach that reflects emerging solutions to security and privacy challenges, as well as changing views on acceptable levels of risk and cost.

DOD Has Not Developed a Secure, Internet-based, Absentee Voting Demonstration Project

Similarly, DOD has not developed a secure, Internet-based absentee voting demonstration project, as Congress mandated in the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005. DOD reported that the principal objective of the Internet-based electronic demonstration project was to assess the use of such technologies to improve UOCAVA participation in elections. The department planned to conduct the project during the first general election for federal office after the Commission has established Internet voting guidelines for the project. However, DOD has not moved forward with the electronic demonstration project because, by law, the Commission must first develop the Internet absentee voting guidelines.

DOD officials stated, as mentioned previously, that they provided information to assist the Commission in developing the guidelines, and Commission officials acknowledged that DOD had provided them with a report on “Voting Over the Internet,” DOD’s assessment of its November 2000 Internet-based voting project, in 2004—the first year of the Commission’s operation. DOD also provided the Commission with an internal document that contained information on its SERVE project. However, Commission officials told us that they did not receive the SERVE document until June 2006. This document discussed challenges DOD identified with Internet voting, which included security threats such as computer viruses, malicious insider attacks, and inadvertent errors that could disrupt system performance.

In 2001, we also identified several challenges to Internet voting, such as privacy and security. As previously mentioned, we reported that broad application of Internet voting faced formidable challenges, including the difficulty of providing adequate voter privacy—that is, protecting the voter’s ability to cast a ballot without being observed. We further reported that, although not unanimous on all issues, groups considering the pros and cons of Internet voting were in consensus in identifying security as the primary technical challenge for Internet voting. We also reported that, because of the security risks involved, Internet voting would not likely be implemented on a large scale in the near future. Moreover, DOD officials told us that even if the Commission had developed Internet voting guidelines at the time of our review, DOD would not have been able to develop a secure, Internet-based, electronic demonstration project in time for the 2008 presidential election. DOD officials said that—depending on the Internet voting guidelines provided by the Commission—the final system design, full development, testing and deployment phases would take an estimated 24 to 60 months. Furthermore, deployment of any system requires participation of the military services, which have many additional, competing priorities that may cause delays in deployment. Given that less than 17 months remain before the November 2008 election, FVAP officials said there is insufficient time to advertise and launch the Internet-based electronic demonstration project.

DOD Was Developing Plans to Expand the Use of Electronic Voting Technology in the Future, but Sound Management Practices Are Key

We observed that DOD was developing, but had not yet completed, plans to expand the use of electronic voting technology for UOCAVA voters use in federal elections through November 2010, as required by the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007. DOD officials told us that they anticipated providing the plans to Congress, in accordance with the act, by May 15, 2007. Because electronic voting initiatives for the absentee voting process (fax, e-mail, and Internet) involve numerous stakeholders at the federal level—including DOD and the Commission—as well as the various state and local levels, developing a plan is key. Implementation of new electronic voting initiatives requires careful planning, particularly in light of the remote location of troops, the application of new technology, and the lead time required for implementation. As DOD develops these plans, employing a comprehensive strategic approach that incorporates sound management principles could provide a framework for DOD’s plans. Our analyses of DOD and Commission documents and our interviews— including those with officials from these agencies, organizations representing UOCAVA voters, and state and local election officials—show that DOD did not obtain sufficient stakeholder involvement in planning its recent electronic voting initiatives—the 2004 and 2006 IVAS initiatives. In fact, Commission officials mentioned that DOD’s recent initiatives took a “top down” approach and did not seek input from the Commission or from local jurisdictions during the planning stage. DOD officials noted that both the 2004 and 2006 IVAS initiatives were planned, designed, advertised, and implemented just months before those two elections. In the case of the 2006 IVAS, however, the department reported that it developed the system within 79 days of passage of the mandate—June 2006—and noted that it was in fact responsive to that mandate. The Commission and state and local election officials noted that the aggressive schedules for these latest electronic initiatives did not allow sufficient time to enable full participation, training, and dissemination of information on the efforts. Additionally, at the time of our review, DOD officials said they had not yet established interim tasks that address issues such as security and privacy, milestones, time frames, and contingency plans.

The principles of sound management used by leading organizations and embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 provide a methodology to establish a results-oriented framework for DOD to develop its detailed plans. Such a framework would provide a firm foundation for DOD’s long-term plan for electronic voting initiatives. Some of the key management principles include (1) involving stakeholders when defining the mission and outcomes, (2) identifying specific actions and tasks, such as monitoring and assessing security of the initiatives, (3) developing schedules and time frames for tasks, and (4) evaluating the overall effort, with specific processes to allow for adjustments and changes. Furthermore, as we reported in one of our executive guides, leading organizations plan for a continuous cycle of risk management. This includes determining needs, assessing security risks, implementing policies and controls, promoting awareness, and monitoring and evaluating controls. Combined with effective leadership, these principles provide decision makers with a framework to guide program efforts and the means to determine if these efforts are achieving the desired results.

In its December 2006 report to Congress on IVAS, DOD stated the following: Development of a long-term strategic plan was necessary to ensure that all related initiatives were effectively integrated, but this was dependent on having sufficient time to assess, improve, and evaluate new or evolving electronic alternatives.

Major recommendations for its future electronic voting projects would include, for example, recognizing the variation in state and local laws, procedures, and systems; identifying and mitigating actual and perceived risks, by educating people about risk management practices; and building consensus among key stakeholders.

As stated previously, Commission officials told us that, for recent initiatives, DOD did not seek input from the Commission or local jurisdictions during the planning stage of these efforts. Without a proactive, integrated, long-term, results-oriented plan that involves all major stakeholders; includes goals, interim tasks—such as identifying security risks and addressing privacy concerns—milestones, time frames, and contingency plans; and follows the sound management practices used by leading organizations, DOD is not in a position to address congressional expectations to establish secure and private electronic and Internet-based voting initiatives.

Conclusions

It is imperative that the 6 million Americans who are covered under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act have the opportunity to exercise their right to vote—one of the hallmarks of a democratic society. The fact that time is an issue with absentee voting by regular mail has led many to look toward electronic and Internet voting, which represent the next generation of voting technology, as alternatives. While these alternatives may expedite the absentee voting process, they are more vulnerable to privacy and security compromises than the conventional methods now in use. Electronic and Internet voting require safeguards to limit such vulnerabilities and prevent compromises to votes from intentional actions or inadvertent errors. However, available safeguards may not adequately reduce the risks of compromise. To date, the Election Assistance Commission has not assessed the risks or possible safeguards for Internet voting, nor has it developed corresponding guidelines that define minimum Internet voting capabilities and safeguards to be considered by the election community. Furthermore, electronic and Internet-based absentee voting can be challenging for UOCAVA voters, who reside at multiple locations across the globe. These voters are also registered to vote in thousands of local jurisdictions across 55 states and territories that employ varying levels of technology—from paper ballots to faxes and e-mail. DOD faces significant challenges in leveraging electronic and Internet technology to facilitate this complex, global absentee voting process. Delays in developing guidelines and a demonstration project have resulted in two presidential elections passing without significant progress in moving toward expanded use of electronic and Internet absentee voting. DOD officials told us it is now too late in the cycle to implement significant changes before the 2008 election. The challenges of coordinating among numerous stakeholders—including DOD, the Commission, and state and local election officials, as well as organizations representing UOCAVA voters—are substantial, and, to date, efforts to involve stakeholders in the planning stage of DOD’s recent initiatives have fallen short. This delay has left an expectation gap between what Congress required and what has been accomplished so far. Several steps would have to be taken to overcome these challenges, including better coordination between the Commission and DOD regarding their complementary roles in developing Internet voting guidelines and the mandated demonstration project. Unless the Commission and DOD move in a timely manner to assess the technology risks, develop guidelines that address the risks, coordinate among election stakeholders, and establish and execute prudent plans, they are unlikely to meet the expectations of Congress and military and overseas voters to establish a secure and private electronic and Internet-based UOCAVA voting environment.

Recommendations for DOD

To improve the security and accuracy of DOD’s electronic and Internet initiatives, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to take the following four actions: Comply with the information security requirements in the DOD Certification and Accreditation Process guidance. Incorporate lessons learned into plans for future systems such as those we identified, including adding cautionary statements to future ballot request and receipt systems to warn UOCAVA voters to remove personal data from their computers. Institutionalize a process to review online UOCAVA guidance to ensure that DOD provides accurate and consistent information to UOCAVA voters.

Create an integrated, comprehensive, long-term, results-oriented plan for future electronic voting programs that specifies, among other things, the goals to be achieved along with tasks including identifying safeguards for the security and privacy of all DOD’s voting systems—both electronic and Internet. The plan should also specify milestones, time frames, and contingencies; synchronize them with planned development of the Commission’s guidelines for Internet voting; and be developed in conjunction with major stakeholders—including state and local election officials, the Election Assistance Commission, overseas voting groups, and each of the armed services. The plan should also include initiatives that will be done well in advance of federal elections, to allow adequate time for training and dissemination of information on the options available to UOCAVA voters.

Recommendations for the Election Assistance Commission

To improve the Election Assistance Commission’s efforts to comply with the direction from Congress to develop the Internet absentee voting guidelines, we recommend that the Commission take the following two actions: Determine, in conjunction with major stakeholders like DOD, whether the Commission’s 2007 Internet voting study and any other Commission efforts related to Internet or electronic voting are applicable to DOD’s plans for Internet-based voting, and incorporate them where appropriate. Develop and execute, in conjunction with major stakeholders—including state and local election officials and DOD—a results-oriented action plan that specifies, among other things, goals, tasks, milestones, time frames, and contingencies that appropriately address the risks found in the UOCAVA voting environment—especially risks related to security and privacy.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our recommendations to (1) comply with the information security requirements, (2) incorporate lessons learned into plans for future systems—to include adding cautionary statements to warn UOCAVA voters to remove personal data from their computers, (3) institutionalize a process to review online UOCAVA guidance, and (4) create a comprehensive, results-oriented, long-term plan for future electronic voting initiatives. The department said that it will contract for services to comply with the information security requirements and will incorporate identified lessons learned into future registration, ballot request, and ballot receipt systems. The department said that it has already streamlined its online guidance by, among other things, eliminating the archived “Publications” version of the Voting Assistance Guide entirely; it will also establish a revised review process for online information. DOD noted that these changes will reduce the possibility of human error and simplify the review and verification process of online information. Finally, DOD stated that it was in full support of a long-term, comprehensive plan for future electronic voting projects that would allow for sufficient time to involve the major stakeholders, train, and disseminate information and ultimately serve UOCAVA voters. The department said it looked forward to working on this multiyear project plan in cooperation with the Election Assistance Commission, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and other major stakeholders. It further stated that FVAP, the Commission, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology are scheduling a meeting to lay the groundwork for the plan. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the final report, as appropriate.

In its written comments, the Election Assistance Commission concurred with our recommendations to (1) determine the applicability of the Commission’s 2007 Internet voting study and other Commission studies to DOD’s plans for Internet-based voting, and (2) develop and execute a results-oriented action plan to provide guidelines that appropriately address the risks found in the UOCAVA voting environment. The Commission stated that it has already met with FVAP and the National Institute of Standards and Technology and agreed to develop a time line for creating the UOCAVA guidelines. The Commission’s comments are reprinted in appendix IV.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) and the Commissioners of the Election Assistance Commission. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

Should you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5559. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess DOD’s electronic initiatives, we reviewed and analyzed relevant laws, directives, and guidance. These included DOD Directive 1000.4, Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), updated April 14, 2004; and DOD’s Interim Department of Defense (DOD) Certification and Accreditation (C&A) Process Guidance, dated July 6, 2006. We also reviewed applicable requirements documents for DOD’s electronic efforts, as well as relevant reports by GAO, DOD, FVAP, the DOD Inspector General, and others, including A Security Analysis of the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE), dated January 21, 2004. In addition, we reviewed FVAP’s 2006-2007 Voting Assistance Guide and its Web site to ascertain what type of information on electronic voting alternatives is provided to UOCAVA citizens.

We interviewed key program officials at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), the Business Transformation Agency, the Defense Manpower Data Center, and Voting Action Officers from several service headquarters. We also contacted officials from (1) election organizations, including the National Association of Secretaries of State and Joint Election Officials Liaison Committee and (2) organizations representing UOCAVA voters, including those from the National Defense Committee and the Overseas Vote Foundation. We made contact with officials from 14 of the 16 state and local election offices we called to obtain their perspectives on DOD’s initiatives. Specifically, we included all 11 states that had participated in DOD’s 2006 Integrated Voting Alternative Site— some of which participated in SERVE and other DOD programs and initiatives. We also included three other states that had 10 or more military bases and had participated in SERVE though not in IVAS. Table 3 lists the states we contacted and the programs in which these states participated.

To determine the Commission’s efforts to develop Internet voting guidelines and DOD’s efforts to develop the secure, Internet-based, absentee voting demonstration project, we reviewed and analyzed relevant laws, Commission reports, and to the extent they existed, the Commission’s strategic plan and other documents to ascertain its plans and efforts to develop Internet voting guidelines for UOCAVA voters. We also reviewed and analyzed various DOD requirements documents, GAO reports, internal DOD reports, and other reports related to DOD’s prior Internet-based absentee voting initiatives—Voting Over the Internet and SERVE—to ascertain, among other things, challenges and benefits associated with Internet voting efforts. Additionally, we interviewed key program officials within FVAP, including the Director and Deputy Director of FVAP and the Project Manager for SERVE, who is currently retired, along with officials on DOD’s private sector Security Peer Review Group. We also spoke with officials on the Commission’s Technical Guidelines Development Committee and with the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

To ascertain DOD’s efforts to develop plans to expand the use of electronic voting technologies in the future, we reviewed and analyzed laws, guidance, and reports to determine DOD’s current and future plans for the Internet-based absentee voting demonstration project. Additionally, we examined, to the extent they existed, DOD’s strategic plan and other documentation to determine its current and future plans for the Internet- based absentee voting demonstration project. We also interviewed responsible officials within DOD about these plans—including the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Director and Deputy Director of FVAP.

We conducted our work from August 2006 through April 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Examples of the Inconsistent Voting Assistance Guidance on DOD’s Web Site

During the course of our review, we compared and analyzed the voting assistance guidance provided on DOD’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) Web site that covered electronic alternatives to mail. The online links we reviewed included FVAP’s: (1) 2006-2007 Voting Assistance Guide (VAG)—a PDF version; (2) 2006-2007 VAG—an HTML version; (3) the archived 2006-2007 VAG—a PDF version dated October 25, 2005; (4) changes to the archived 2006-2007 VAG—called Errata Sheets; (5) News Releases; and (6) the 2006 Integrated Voting Alternative Site (IVAS). While not widespread, for 14 of the 55 states and territories, we found differences in some of the guidance provided on these links. Table 4 shows the differences we identified.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: Comments from the Election Assistance Commission

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, David E. Moser, Assistant Director; Marion A. Gatling; Pawnee A. Davis; Amber M. Lopez; Joanne Landesman; Paula A. Moore; John K. Needham, John J. Smale; and Julia C. Matta made key contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products

Elections: All Levels of Government Are Needed to Address Electronic Voting System Challenges. GAO-07-576T. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2007.

Elections: DOD Expands Voting Assistance to Military Absentee Voters, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-1134T. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2006.

Elections: The Nation’s Evolving Election System as Reflected in the November 2004 General Election. GAO-06-450. Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2006.

Election Reform: Nine States’ Experiences Implementing Federal Requirements for Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists. GAO-06-247. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2006.

Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing Voter Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote. GAO-05-997. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2005.

Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under W ay, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed. GAO-05-956. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2005.

Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists. GAO-05-478. Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005.

Department of Justice’s Activities to Address Past Election-Related Voting Irregularities. GAO-04-1041R. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2004.

Elections: Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents Challenges. GAO-04-975T. Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004.

Elections: Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas Citizens Should Be Improved. GAO-01-1026. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001.

Elections: The Scope of Congressional Authority in Election Administration. GAO-01-470. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2001.