Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Address Gaps in Homeland Defense and Civil Support Guidance
Released: 2012-10-25T00:00:00

Letter

Background

DOD’s Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions

DOD conducts a number of homeland defense and civil support missions. Examples of DOD’s homeland defense missions include defending against threats to the homeland from, among other things, international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and cyber operations aimed at DOD computer networks. Examples of DOD’s civil support missions include responding to major disasters and emergencies (both natural and man-made); restoring public health and services and civil order, such as animal/plant disease eradication and counterdrug operations; and providing support for national special events, such as the political conventions and international summits. See figure 1.

DOD is a supporting agency which provides assistance to the lead federal agency for a specific civil support mission. DOD provides support to DHS and other federal agencies for the defense portion of the federal response to a major disaster or emergency or special event when (1) state, local, and other federal resources are overwhelmed or unique defense capabilities are required; (2) assistance is requested by the lead federal agency; or (3) U.S. Northern Command is directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense. The federal government’s response to major disasters and emergencies in the United States is guided by DHS’s National Response Framework, which involves a tiered series of responses, beginning with local authorities, state authorities, and outside assistance from other states. In accordance with the National Response Framework and applicable laws including the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), various federal agencies may play lead or supporting roles, based on their authorities and resources, and the nature of the threat or incident. For example, DHS manages the federal response to terrorist attacks and major disasters. In some instances, national defense assets may be needed to assist DHS or another agency in the national response to an incident. Defense resources are committed after DOD is directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense. When deciding to commit defense resources to a request for assistance by a lead federal agency, DOD officials evaluate the request against 6 criteria: legality, lethality, risk, cost, military readiness, and appropriateness of the circumstances. If it is determined that defense assistance is appropriate, typically U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command are responsible for leading DOD’s response within their designated areas of responsibility. In most cases, support will be localized, limited, and specific. Figure 2 illustrates relevant portions of the areas of responsibility for U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command A number of DOD organizations have key roles and responsibilities in the homeland defense and civil support missions. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs serves as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on homeland defense and civil support matters, among other things. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense responsible for formulating and coordinating DOD strategy and policy on issues such as countering weapons of mass destruction, nuclear deterrence and missile defense, cyber security and space policy. The Joint Staff oversees joint doctrine development within DOD, including the joint publications for homeland defense and civil support. U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command are the two DOD geographic combatant commands primarily responsible for carrying out DOD’s homeland defense and civil support missions. U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Command, a sub-unified combatant command under U.S. Strategic Command, coordinate with U.S. Northern Command and DHS for domestic incidents with a cyber component. The military services typically provide the personnel and equipment to carry out homeland defense and civil support missions.

Table 1 describes the DOD organizations that have key roles and responsibilities in homeland defense and civil support and the organizations’ roles for these missions.

According to DOD officials, dual-status commanders—military officers who coordinate state and federal responses to events for civil support missions—have been used for select planned and special events since 2004. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 provided that a dual-status commander should be the usual and customary command and control arrangement in situations when the armed forces and national guard are employed simultaneously in support of civil authorities, including missions involving major disasters and emergencies. The Act indicates that, when an officer is appointed as a dual-status commander, he or she serves on federal active duty, sometimes referred to as Title 10 status, as well as on duty in or with the National Guard of a state, sometimes referred to as Title 32 status. A dual-status commander can be appointed in one of two ways: 1) an active duty Army or Air Force officer may be detailed to the Army National Guard or Air National Guard respectively, or 2) an Army or Air National Guard Officer may be called to active duty. The Secretary of Defense must authorize, and the Governor must consent to, designation of an officer to serve as a dual-status commander. When operating in Title 32 status, National Guard personnel, including dual-status commanders, are under the command and control of the state governor. DOD and National Guard personnel operating in Title 10 status, including dual-status commanders, are under the command and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense. Dual-status commanders—whether Army National Guard, Air National Guard, Army or Air Force—exercise command on behalf of and receive orders from both the Federal and the state chains of command. The dual-status commander is the intermediate link between these two separate chains of command.

The Council of Governors was established by Executive Order 13528 in January 2010. its property. The council when called upon, provides views, information, and advice on matters involving the National Guard of the various states, homeland defense, civil support, synchronization and integration of state and federal military activities in the United States, and other matters of mutual interest pertaining to National Guard, homeland defense, and civil support activities.

DOD Supports DHS in Domestic Cyber Preparedness and Response

DHS leads interagency efforts to identify and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities, and DOD provides support to DHS in carrying out its responsibilities. DHS developed the interim National Cyber Incident , which outlines domestic cyber incident response Response Plancoordination and execution among federal, state and territorial, and local governments, and the private sector.

Some DOD Homeland Defense and Civil Support Mission Guidance Is Outdated or Incomplete, and No Routine Process Exists to Ensure Regular Updating

DOD has issued numerous policies and guidance related to its homeland defense and civil support missions; however some of it is outdated or incomplete, and no process exists to ensure updates are made to its primary homeland defense and civil support strategy. Specifically, DOD’s primary strategy for how it will respond to an attack on the homeland or provide support to civil authorities in the event of a major disaster or emergency has not been updated since 2005 and no process exists to require such updating. Further, DOD’s existing homeland defense and civil support guidance does not incorporate important details related to the dual-status commander construct and the department’s response to a domestic cyber incident, such as its roles and responsibilities. While gaps still exist with DOD’s strategy and guidance related to the dual-status command and domestic cyber, DOD has contributed to some national- level homeland defense and civil support guidance. Table 2 shows some of the key department and national level policies and guidance DOD uses to plan for its homeland defense and civil support missions, and when the guidance was last issued or updated.

DOD has established processes to issue and regularly update its directives and joint publications for homeland defense and civil support missions, but the department has not updated its primary strategy for these missions—the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support— since it was initially issued in 2005, and it does not have a process similar While DOD plans to that for its directives and joint publications to do so.to issue an updated strategy in the fall of 2012 in response to a 2010 GAO recommendation and internal department discussions, it has not yet developed a process to assess the need for future updates. DOD Instruction 5025.01 DOD Directives Program, issued in 2007 (incorporating changes made in 2010), requires DOD organizations to review their directives, instructions, manuals, and administrative instructions prior to the 5th anniversary of their publication date to ensure that they are necessary, current, and consistent with DOD policy, existing law, and statutory authority. As a part of this process, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs updated its guidance for defense support to civil authorities in December 2010 with the issuance of DOD Directive 3025.18. This directive replaced or supplemented several directives, one of which had not been updated since 1993.

The Joint Staff has also established a process to update joint doctrine. Joint Staff officials stated that joint doctrine should not be more than 5 years old to maintain relevancy, and at the time of our review the Joint Staff had identified as a goal to have 100 percent of the joint publications updated within the last 5 years. According to DOD officials, this process includes requesting feedback across DOD regarding the currency of joint publications every 2 years. In August 2010, the Joint Staff determined that the joint publication on homeland defense, Joint Publication 3-27 needed a complete revision based on feedback they received from the joint doctrine development community. The joint publication on civil support, Joint Publication 3-28, is also being revised. U.S. Northern Command is leading efforts to update the 2007 joint publications on homeland defense and civil support in coordination with the Joint Staff and other members of the joint doctrine community. According to Joint Staff officials, the revised joint publications are expected to reflect changes in national and department priorities and incorporate lessons learned from exercises and events such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5120.02C, Joint Doctrine Development System (Jan 2012).

Joint Staff officials told us that the publications are scheduled to be issued in May 2013.

In contrast, DOD’s primary strategy for homeland defense and civil support is 7 years old. According to DOD’s joint doctrine development instruction, national military strategies, such as DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, and joint doctrine should be closely linked because strategies define the desired outcome for joint doctrine. Moreover, GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and prior GAO audit work state that, to be effective, In the guidance—including strategies—should be current and complete.intervening years since the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs issued the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, key national- and department-level guidance has been issued and significant civil support events have occurred that are not reflected in the department’s primary strategy. For example, the homeland defense and civil support strategy does not address U.S. Cyber Command’s role in domestic cyber incidents because the command was established in 2009, 4 years after the issuance of the strategy. Additionally, DOD’s homeland defense and civil support strategy does not incorporate the restructured Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Enterprise.

Gaps Remain in Guidance Concerning DOD’s Dual- Status Commander Construct

DOD has issued some guidance on the dual-status commander construct; however, gaps remain concerning the use and availability of dual-status commanders. Dual-status commanders—military officers who serve as an intermediate link between the separate chains of command for state and federal forces—have authority over both National Guard forces under state control and active duty forces under federal control DOD has been using during a civil support incident or special event.dual-status commanders for select planned and special events since 2004. For example, DOD officials stated that dual-status commanders were appointed for the 2004 G-8 Summit in Atlanta, Georgia, the 2005 border security exercise Operation Winter Freeze along the U.S.- Canadian border, and the 2010 National Scout Jamboree at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia. In addition to these planned events, DOD used the dual-status commander for the 2012 Colorado wildfire response.

DOD has coordinated with stakeholders at the state and federal levels to issue guidance for the dual-status commander construct. For example, in 2010, DOD worked with DHS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Council of Governors to develop the Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort. The plan provides a framework for state and federal agencies to coordinate their response to domestic incidents and describes the general arrangement of the dual-status commander construct. Among other things, the plan discusses how dual-status commanders can respond to planned and unplanned events, and it identifies the need for specialized training and certification. In addition, according to DOD officials, from August 2011 to February 2012, DOD signed memoranda of agreement with 51 of 54 states and territoriesFurthermore, in February 2012, U.S. Northern Command issued a concept of operations which, among other things, establishes criteria for dual-status commander designation and training requirements. U.S. Northern Command has also worked with the National Guard Bureau to establish a curriculum that includes a sequenced schedule of classes for dual-status commander training and certification. .

Nevertheless, gaps in guidance remain because DOD has not yet developed comprehensive policies and procedures regarding the use and availability of dual-status commanders. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 states that the dual-status commander “should be the usual and customary command and control arrangement” when federal military forces and National Guard forces are employed simultaneously in support of civil authorities in the United States. However, DOD has not identified specific criteria and conditions for when the Secretary of Defense would agree with the governors of the affected states to appoint a dual-status commander. Some combatant command officials told us that the dual-status commander construct may not be appropriate for all scenarios and that other existing command and control arrangements can be used in responding to certain major disasters or emergencies. For example, U.S. Pacific Command officials stated that in 2011 when the tsunami warning resulting from the earthquake that struck Japan was issued in Hawaii, no dual-status commander was appointed; rather, U.S. Pacific Command coordinated its response in Hawaii directly with that state’s authorities.

Additionally, gaps in guidance remain for the use of dual-status commanders for incidents affecting multiple states and territories, including complex catastrophes, because DOD has not yet developed policies and procedures for these scenarios. The Joint Action Plan cites the significant likelihood that DOD will be called on to support responses to major disasters and emergencies affecting multiple states and territories. The Joint Action Plan states that past multistate emergencies such as Hurricane Katrina demonstrate that a coordinated and expeditious state-federal response is crucial to saving and sustaining lives, and it indicates that DOD and the several states will address the use of the dual-status commanders for such scenarios. However, DOD’s concept of operations does not address how to use a dual-status commander in these scenarios. According to DOD, they are continuing to work with the Council of Governors to address the use of dual-status commanders in complex catastrophes affecting multiple states.

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. meeting, the council and federal officials agreed to a goal of at least 3 trained and certified dual-status commander candidates with at least one being a general officer for each of the 54 U.S. states and territories, thus providing primary and alternate dual-status commanders. As figure 4 shows, all 54 U.S. states and territories have at least one trained and certified dual-status commander, 70 percent (38 of 54) have two or more trained and certified commanders, and 13 percent (7 of 54) have three or more commanders. As of June 2012, all of the trained and certified dual- status commanders shown in Figure 3 were National Guard officers.

According to Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs and National Guard officials, maintaining a pipeline of trained and certified dual-status commanders drawn exclusively from the National Guard may be a challenge. The National Guard has a limited number of officers from which to select dual- status commanders, and these National Guard officers have other roles and responsibilities that may preclude them from being immediately available for an unplanned incident requiring a civil support response. For example, some individuals trained and certified to be dual-status commanders serve as airline pilots and may not be in the area when a dual-status commander is needed. During Hurricane Irene in 2011, the trained and certified dual-status commander from one of the affected states was at a training exercise and unavailable. While the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 made it clear that dual- status commanders could be appointed from among the National Guard or active duty federal officers, as of May 2012, no active duty dual-status commanders have been trained and certified thus far. Office of Secretary of Defense and military service officials told us that it may be helpful to have an active duty federal dual-status commander for incidents affecting multiple states, such as a complex catastrophe. They stated that an active duty federal dual-status commander might have greater flexibility moving between multiple states and territories affected by an incident and might offer a broader, national perspective consistent with the Secretary of Defense’s and the President’s priorities. Training and certifying active duty dual-status commanders would increase the number of dual-status commanders and increase the likelihood that a dual-status commander will be available to serve when needed.

Without complete guidance on the use and availability of dual-status commanders, including when it is appropriate to deviate from the “usual and customary arrangement,” it remains unclear when a different command and control arrangement would be more appropriate to provide a unity of effort between state and federal forces in civil support events. Also, without guidance on a process to determine the appropriate mix of individuals trained and certified to be dual-status commanders from the National Guard and active duty federal officers for the 54 U.S. states and territories, DOD’s ability to adequately prepare for and effectively use dual-status commanders for a range of civil support events, including those affecting multiple states, may be hindered.

DOD Relies on its Broad Civil Support Guidance for Domestic Cyber Incidents

DOD has issued some guidance on preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents. DOD relies on its broad civil support mission guidance, which is also used for incidents such as responding to hurricanes and forest fires, to prepare for and respond to domestic cyber incidents. DOD Directive 3025.18, Defense Support to Civil Authorities, issued in 2010, describes how the department generally responds to requests for civil support and includes a broad description of the department’s roles and responsibilities for civil support. DOD’s 2007 joint publication on civil support provides further details on the department’s civil support mission, including an operational framework of how DOD prepares and responds to requests for assistance, a decision matrix for evaluating requests, and a broad description of the department’s roles and responsibilities. In addition to the civil support directive and joint publication, in 2010 the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security signed a memorandum of agreement that outlines how the two agencies collaborate and coordinate cyberspace activities including those related to a domestic cyber incident.of Defense and DHS officials told us that the agreement has helped clarify the roles and responsibilities of the agencies.

Although DOD has some civil support guidance and an agreement with DHS for preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents, these documents do not provide some aspects of how DOD will support a domestic cyber incident. First, DOD’s civil support mission guidance does not clearly define the department’s roles and responsibilities during a domestic cyber incident. According to GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and prior GAO audit work, effective guidance should be current, complete, and establish roles and responsibilities necessary to achieve an organization’s missions and objectives. DOD’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report acknowledges that DOD needs more clearly defined roles and responsibilities for operating in cyberspace. While DOD’s guidance for its civil support mission broadly describes how the department can support other federal agencies during a civil support incident, DOD has not updated its civil support guidance to reflect current DOD cyber roles and responsibilities. For example, DOD’s joint publication on civil support was issued 2 years before U.S. Cyber Command was established in 2009.

In addition, the chartering directives for the Offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs have assigned overlapping roles and responsibilities for preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents. Specifically, both DOD offices are responsible for coordinating and overseeing the department’s cyber policy. Additionally, DOD’s 2010 directive on civil support designates the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs as the appropriate lead for civil support missions in general to include domestic cyber incidents. However, DOD officials told us that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs was the appropriate department lead for domestic cyber incidents and that this office was created after DOD published its 2009 chartering directive for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs. DOD officials said they plan to omit the overlap when they update the 2009 directive. DOD officials told us that current national-level exercises involving DOD, DHS, and other federal agencies should help DOD clarify its roles and responsibilities and subsequently update its guidance for domestic cyber incidents. Nonetheless, until DOD clearly defines roles and responsibilities, the department risks a delayed response while its officials determine which entities to involve in responding to potentially time critical domestic cyber incidents. Moreover, multiple DOD entities may be performing overlapping planning functions, since it is not clear which office has lead responsibility.

Second, DOD has not taken adequate steps to ensure that its guidance aligns with national-level guidance and preparations for domestic cyber incidents. DOD has contributed to DHS national-level cyber response plans, including the National Cyber Incident Response Plan and the National Response Framework’s Cyber Annex. However, DOD has not updated its own civil support mission guidance to ensure that it is consistent with national plans and preparations for domestic cyber incidents. Without guidance that aligns with national level plans and preparations, DOD’s ability to support DHS during a domestic cyber incident could be hindered.

Conclusions

In the absence of clear and current guidance on DOD’s critical and evolving homeland defense and civil support missions, DOD may continue to lack the ability to effectively plan and respond to incidents such as a domestic cyber attack or major disaster. While DOD has made some progress in issuing and updating relevant guidance to support its critical homeland defense and civil support missions, DOD still lacks the necessary framework for some of its most critical missions and a process to assess the currency of its strategy for these missions. Threats to the homeland and major disasters and emergencies, such as cyber attacks and earthquakes, frequently are unpredictable and occur with little or no notice. Maintaining up to date and comprehensive strategy and guidance will better position DOD to plan for and respond to myriad homeland defense threats and challenges. Without a strategy that accurately reflects the department’s current approach to homeland defense and civil support, such as the creation of U.S. Cyber Command, DOD officials lack essential information to prepare for these critical missions. Further, while DOD’s efforts to implement the dual-status commander construct could result in a more streamlined, comprehensive response to major disasters and emergencies, particularly those affecting multiple states and territories, until DOD clarifies how it plans to use dual-status commanders and develops a process for determining the appropriate mix of National Guard and active duty federal officers that it needs, the value of this construct will be diminished. Finally, without specific guidance on DOD’s response to domestic cyber incidents, including clearly defined roles and responsibilities, DOD may be unable to quickly and effectively support DHS during domestic cyber attacks. As a result, DHS’s ability to effectively respond to domestic cyber attacks and minimize their impact may be hindered. Enhancing DOD’s overall preparedness, including developing and maintaining current and complete guidance for its homeland defense and civil support missions, would contribute to a more efficient national response to major disasters and emergencies and a more cost-effective use of federal resources for these critical missions.

Recommendations for Executive Action

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, to develop a process to periodically assess the currency of its Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support and to ensure that updates, when needed, are completed in a timely manner.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs and in collaboration with other appropriate stakeholders such as U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and the National Guard Bureau, to develop implementation guidance on the dual-status commander construct that, at a minimum, includes: more specific criteria for determining when and how to use dual-status commanders, especially for civil support incidents affecting multiple states and territories and a process for determining the appropriate mix of National Guard and active duty federal officers to meet DOD’s anticipated needs.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to work with U.S. Strategic Command and its subordinate Cyber Command, DHS, and other relevant stakeholders to update guidance on preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents to align with national-level guidance. Such guidance should, at a minimum, include a description of DOD’s roles and responsibilities.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD concurred or partially concurred with all of our recommendations and stated that there are ongoing activities to address our recommendations. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. In addition, DOD provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report as appropriate.

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, to develop a process to periodically assess the currency of its Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support and to ensure that updates, when needed, are completed in a timely manner. DOD stated that it recognizes the need to ensure that strategic guidance is clear and timely, and that going forward it will conduct an annual review to determine the currency of the homeland defense and civil support strategy. We believe that this review will better position DOD to plan for and respond to its critical homeland defense and civil support missions.

DOD also concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs and in collaboration with other appropriate stakeholders such as U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and the National Guard Bureau, to develop implementation guidance on the dual- status commander construct. In its written response, DOD stated that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs has drafted a DOD instruction that, among other things, establishes specific criteria for determining how and when to use dual- status commanders, as well as whom to authorize as dual-status commanders. We believe this instruction, when it is issued, will fill existing gaps in guidance on the use and availability of dual-status commanders that should result in a more streamlined, comprehensive department response to major disasters and emergencies.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to work with U.S. Strategic Command and its subordinate Cyber Command, DHS, and other relevant stakeholders to update guidance on preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents to align with national-level guidance. In its written response, DOD agreed that some of its cyber guidance needs updating to ensure that the military services, combatant commands, and other DOD organizations are aware of their responsibilities relative to domestic cyber incidents. Although DOD acknowledged that there may be competing guidance within the chartering directives for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, it stated that there is no confusion within the Office of the Secretary of Defense regarding who manages cyber policy. However, DOD did agree to further clarify cyber policy responsibilities when it next updates these two chartering directives. We believe that further clarification of DOD organizations’ roles and responsibilities in guidance will enhance the department’s ability to support DHS during significant domestic cyber incidents. We believe that DOD’s response meets the intent of our recommendation.

We also provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS concurred with our recommendation that DOD coordinate with them to update guidance on preparing for and responding to a domestic cyber incident. DHS said it will coordinate with DOD as it updates its guidance. DHS’s comments are printed in their entirety in appendix III.

As agreed with your offices, we plan no further distribution of this report until 1 day from the report date. At that time, we will distribute this report to the Secretary of Defense and other relevant DOD officials. We are also sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees. The report is also available on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4523 or at leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in Appendix IV.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has issued current and comprehensive guidance, we reviewed homeland defense and civil support doctrine, policy, and strategy and other relevant documentation, and met with officials from DOD and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to discuss the currency of the department’s guidance and identify any potential gaps in the guidance that may exist. Specifically, we assessed national-level and DOD homeland defense and civil support guidance against emerging issues in our discussions with DOD, combatant command, and military service officials including the dual-status commander construct and domestic cyber. We also reviewed the assessments DOD received from the members of the joint doctrine community to determine which emerging issues prompted complete revisions of the joint publications on homeland defense and civil support and how these issues were addressed in other sources of guidance including directives, strategies, joint operating concepts, and national- level guidance. In addition, we reviewed recently issued GAO reports on homeland defense and civil support, and excluded potential gaps in guidance that were duplicative to those recently reported. Table 3 lists the offices we met with during this review.

To determine potential gaps in DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support and the impact of any identified gaps, we compared the strategy against priorities articulated in current, overarching national- and department-level strategies and policies—including the National Response Framework, the National Security Strategy, the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, and the Quadrennial Defense Review Report. We also met with DOD officials and assessed relevant documentation, such as the instructions on joint doctrine development and updating directives, to determine the extent that the department had established and utilized a process to maintain current guidance. We used our assessment and discussion with DOD officials to determine the impact these established processes had on DOD’s ability to maintain current doctrine and directives. Finally, we determined which key policy changes occurred since the strategy was released and the impact of not incorporating those changes in DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.

To assess gaps within the dual-status commander construct and domestic cyber, we identified best practices in prior GAO reports and high-level DOD guidance, and to determine the extent that DOD demonstrated these practices, we reviewed related documents, and we interviewed DOD and DHS officials. Specifically, we analyzed data provided by U.S. Northern Command, including the current number of individuals trained and certified as dual-status commanders and processes used to train and certify them. We used this data to determine how DOD was planning to use dual-status commanders and to what extent they determined the appropriate mix of active duty and National Guard dual-status commanders. We also assessed current guidance against information obtained in interviews with knowledgeable Joint Staff, Office of Secretary of Defense, combatant command, and military service officials to determine how DOD was planning to address identified gaps. To determine the currency and completeness of the department’s guidance for domestic cyber incidents, we reviewed relevant guidance and met with DOD and DHS officials to discuss gaps and the impact of gaps on civil support for cyber incident responses. We determined which offices in DOD had a role for domestic cyber, reviewed relevant DOD directives outlining those roles, and analyzed whether there was any overlap within those offices or additional clarification that was needed. We compared this assessment to discussions with knowledgeable DOD and DHS officials to determine how DOD was planning to address any identified gaps.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to September 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above Marc Schwartz, Assistant Director; Katherine Arnold; Tommy Baril; Jennifer Cheung; Susan Ditto; Gina Flacco; William Jenkins; Jennifer Neer; Michael Silver; Amie Steele; and Michael Willems made key contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products

Homeland Defense: Continued Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations. GAO-12-311. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2012.

Homeland Defense and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Steps Could Enhance the Effectiveness of the National Guard’s Life Saving Response Forces. GAO-12-114. Washington, D.C.: December 7, 2011.

Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Coordination for Maritime Operations. GAO-11-661. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2011.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic, Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness. GAO-11-621. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2011.

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions. GAO-10-364. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.

Homeland Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to Support Civil Authorities during Disasters. GAO-10-386. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.

Homeland Defense: Planning, Resourcing, and Training Issues Challenge DOD’s Response to Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive Incidents. GAO 10-123. Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2009.

Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be Improved. GAO-09-849. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.

National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts. GAO-09-369. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2009.

Emergency Management: Observations on DHS’s Preparedness for Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-08-868T. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008.

National Response Framework: FEMA Needs Policies and Procedures to Better Integrate Non-Federal Stakeholders in the Revision Process. GAO-08-768. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008.

Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern Command’s Coordination with States and the National Guards Bureau, but Gaps Remain. GAO-08-252. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.

Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues. GAO-08-251. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.

Continuity of Operations: Selected Agencies Tested Various Capabilities during 2006 Governmentwide Exercise. GAO-08-105. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2007.

Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Action to Address Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion Centers. GAO-07-1241T. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2007.

Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007.

Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands’ Preparedness Efforts Could Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk Mitigation. GAO-07-696. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007.

Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. GAO-07-395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006.

Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support Teams’ Mission and Address Management Challenges. GAO-06-498. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006.

Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2006.

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges Associated with major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2006.

GAO’S Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2006.

Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All- Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2005.

Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2005.