Employment Verification: Federal Agencies Have Improved E-Verify, but Significant Challenges Remain
Released: 2011-02-10T00:00:00

Letter

USCIS and SSA Have Reduced TNCs, but the Accuracy of E-Verify Continues to Be Limited by Both Inconsistent Recording of Employees’ Names and Fraud

USCIS has reduced TNCs from 8 percent for the period June 2004 through March 2007 to almost 2.6 percent in fiscal year 2009. As shown in figure 1, in fiscal year 2009, about 2.6 percent or over 211,000 of newly hired employees received either a SSA or USCIS TNC, including about 0.3 percent who were determined to be work eligible after they contested a TNC and resolved errors or inaccuracies in their records, and about 2.3 percent, or about 189,000, who received a final nonconfirmation because their employment eligibility status remained unresolved. For the approximately 2.3 percent who received a final nonconfirmation, USCIS was unable to determine how many of these employees (1) were authorized employees who did not take action to resolve a TNC because they were not informed by their employers of their right to contest the TNC, (2) independently decided not to contest the TNC, or (3) were not eligible to work.

USCIS has reduced TNCs and increased E-Verify accuracy by, among other things, expanding the number of databases that E-Verify can query and instituting quality control procedures to screen for data entry errors. However, erroneous TNCs continue to occur, in part, because of inaccuracies and inconsistencies in how personal information is recorded on employee documents, in government databases, or both. While some actions have been taken to address name-related TNCs, more could be done. Specifically, USCIS could better position employees to avoid an erroneous TNC by disseminating information to employees on the importance of providing consistent name information and how to record their names consistently. In our December 2010 report, we recommended that USCIS disseminate information to employees on the potential for name mismatches to result in erroneous TNCs and how to record their names consistently. USCIS concurred with our recommendation and outlined actions to address it. For example, USCIS commented that in November 2010 it began to distribute the U.S. Citizenship Welcome Packet at all naturalization ceremonies to advise new citizens to update their records with SSA. USCIS also commented that it has commissioned a study, to be completed in the third quarter of fiscal year 2011, to determine how to enhance its name-matching algorithms. USCIS’s actions for reducing the likelihood of name-related erroneous TNCs are useful steps, but they do not fully address the intent of the recommendation because they do not provide specific information to employees on how to prevent a name-related TNC. See our December 2010 report for more details.

In addition, identity fraud remains a challenge because employers may not be able to determine if employees are presenting genuine identity and employment eligibility documents that are borrowed or stolen. E-Verify also cannot detect cases in which an unscrupulous employer assists unauthorized employees. USCIS has taken actions to address fraud, most notably with the fiscal year 2007 implementation of the photo matching tool for permanent residency cards and employment authorization documents and the September 2010 addition to the matching tool of passport photographs. Although the photo tool has some limitations, it can help reduce some fraud associated with the use of genuine documents in which the original photograph is substituted for another. To help combat identity fraud, USCIS is also seeking to obtain driver’s license data from states and planning to develop a program that would allow victims of identity theft to “lock” their Social Security numbers within E-Verify until they need them to obtain employment authorization. Combating identity fraud through the use of biometrics, such as through fingerprint or facial recognition, has been included in proposed legislation before Congress as an element of comprehensive immigration reform, but implementing a biometric system has its own set of challenges, including those associated with cost and civil liberties. Resolving these issues will be important if this technology is to be effectively implemented in combating identity fraud in the employment verification process.

An effective employment authorization system requires a credible worksite enforcement program to ensure employer compliance with applicable immigration laws; however USCIS is challenged in ensuring employer compliance with E-Verify requirements for several reasons. For example, USCIS cannot monitor the extent to which employers follow program rules because USCIS does not have a presence in employers’ workplaces. USCIS is further limited by its existing technology infrastructure, which provides limited ability to analyze patterns and trends in the data that could be indicative of employer misuse of E-Verify. USCIS has minimal avenue for recourse if employers do not respond or remedy noncompliant behavior after a contact from USCIS compliance staff because it has limited authority to investigate employer misuse and no authority to impose penalties against such employers, other than terminating those who knowingly use the system for an unauthorized purpose. For enforcement action for violations of immigration laws, USCIS relies on Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to investigate, sanction, and prosecute employers. However, ICE has reported that it has limited resources to investigate and sanction employers that knowingly hire unauthorized workers or those that knowingly violate E-Verify program rules. Instead, according to senior ICE officials, ICE agents seek to maximize limited resources by applying risk assessment principles to worksite enforcement cases and focusing on detecting and removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites.

DHS Has Instituted Employee Privacy Protections for E-Verify, but Resolving Erroneous TNCs Can Be Challenging

USCIS has taken actions to institute safeguards for the privacy of personal information for employees who are processed through E-Verify, but has not established mechanisms for employees to identify and access personal information maintained by DHS that may lead to an erroneous TNC, or for E-Verify staff to correct such information. To safeguard the privacy of personal information for employees who are processed through E-Verify, USCIS has addressed the Fair Information Practice Principles, which are the basis for DHS’s privacy policy. For example, USCIS published privacy notices in 2009 and 2010 that defined parameters, including setting limits on DHS’s collection and use of personal information for the E-Verify program.

Notwithstanding the efforts made by USCIS to address privacy concerns, employees are limited in their ability to identify and access personal information maintained by DHS that may lead to an erroneous TNC. In our December 2010 report, we recommended that USCIS develop procedures to enable employees to access personal information and correct inaccuracies or inconsistencies in such information within DHS databases. USCIS concurred and identified steps that it is taking to address this issue, such as developing a pilot program to assist employees receiving TNCs to request a records update, referring individuals who receive a TNC to local USCIS or CBP offices and ports of entry to correct records when inconsistent or inaccurate information is identified, and developing a Self-Check program to allow individuals to check their own work authorization status against SSA and DHS databases prior to applying for a job. However, we do not believe that the steps underway fully address the intent of our recommendation because, among other things, USCIS does not have operating procedures in place for USCIS staff to explain to employees what personal information produced the TNC or what specific steps they should take to correct the information. We encourage USCIS to continue its efforts to develop procedures enabling employees to access and correct inaccurate and inconsistent personal information in DHS databases.

USCIS and SSA Have Taken Actions to Prepare for Mandatory Implementation of E- Verify, but Face Challenges in Estimating Costs

USCIS and SSA have taken actions to prepare for possible mandatory implementation of E-Verify for all employers nationwide by addressing key practices for effectively managing E-Verify system capacity and availability and coordinating with each other in operating E-Verify. However, USCIS and SSA face challenges in accurately estimating E-Verify costs. Our analysis showed that USCIS’s E-Verify estimates partially met three of four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate and minimally met one characteristic. As a result, we found that USCIS is at increased risk of not making informed investment decisions, understanding system affordability, and developing justifiable budget requests for future E-Verify use and potential mandatory implementation if it. To ensure that USCIS has a sound basis for making decisions about resource investments for E- Verify and securing sufficient resources, in our December 2010 report, we recommended that the Director of USCIS ensure that a life-cycle cost estimate for E-Verify is developed in a manner that reflects the four characteristics of a reliable estimate consistent with best practices. USCIS concurred and senior program officials told us that USCIS, among other things, has contracted with a federally funded research and development center to develop an independent cost estimate of the life-cycle costs of E- Verify to better comply with our cost-estimating guidance.

Our analysis showed that SSA’s E-Verify estimates substantially met three of four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate. However, we found that SSA’s cost estimates are partially credible because SSA may not be able to provide assurance to USCIS that it can provide the required level of support for E-Verify operations if it experiences cost overruns within any one fiscal year. In our December 2010 report, we recommended that the Commissioner of SSA assess the risk around SSA’s E-Verify workload estimate, in accordance with best practices, to ensure that SSA can accurately project costs associated with its E-Verify workload and provide the required level of support to USCIS and E-Verify operations. SSA did not concur, and stated that it assesses the risk around its workload cost estimates and, if E-Verify were to become mandatory, SSA would adapt its budget models and recalculate estimated costs based on the new projected E-Verify workload volume. As discussed in our December 2010 report, SSA does not conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis that uses statistical models to quantitatively determine the extent of variability around its cost estimate or identify the limitations associated with the assumptions used to create the estimate. Thus, we continue to believe that SSA should adopt this best practice for estimating risks to help it reduce the potential for experiencing cost overruns for E-Verify.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be pleased to respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have.

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Richard M. Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. In addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony are Evi Rezmovic, Assistant Director; Christine Hanson; Sara Margraf; and Linda Miller. Additionally, key contributors to our December 2010 report include Blake Ainsworth, David Alexander, Tonia Brown, Frances Cook, Marisol Cruz, John de Ferrari, Julian King, Danielle Pakdaman, David Plocher, Karen Richey, Robert Robinson, Douglas Sloane, Stacey Steele, Desiree Cunningham, Vanessa Taylor, Teresa Tucker, and Ashley Vaughan.

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