Countering Violent Extremism: Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts
Released: 2017-04-06T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Violent Extremists in the United States

White supremacists, anti-government extremists, radical Islamist extremists, and other ideologically inspired domestic violent extremists have been active in the United States for decades. Examples of attacks include the 1993 World Trade Center bombing by radical Islamists, in which 6 persons were killed; and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building by anti-government far right individuals, in which 168 lives were lost. The September 11, 2001, attacks account for the largest number of fatalities in the United States in a single or closely- related attack resulting from violent extremism in recent decades. While the September 11, 2001, attacks were perpetrated by foreign violent extremists, from September 12, 2001 through December 31, 2016, attacks by domestic or “homegrown” violent extremists in the United States resulted in 225 fatalities, according to the ECDB. Of these, 106 were killed by far right violent extremists in 62 separate incidents, and 119 were victims of radical Islamist violent extremists in 23 separate incidents. Figure 1 shows the locations and number of fatalities involved in these incidents. A detailed list of the incidents can be found in appendix II. According to the ECDB, activities of far left wing violent extremist groups did not result in any fatalities during this period.

Since September 12, 2001, the number of fatalities caused by domestic violent extremists has ranged from 1 to 49 in a given year. As shown in figure 2, fatalities resulting from attacks by far right wing violet extremists have exceeded those caused by radical Islamist violent extremists in 10 of the 15 years, and were the same in 3 of the years since September 12, 2001. Of the 85 violent extremist incidents that resulted in death since September 12, 2001, far right wing violent extremist groups were responsible for 62 (73 percent) while radical Islamist violent extremists were responsible for 23 (27 percent). The total number of fatalities is about the same for far right wing violent extremists and radical Islamist violent extremists over the approximately 15-year period (106 and 119, respectively). However, 41 percent of the deaths attributable to radical Islamist violent extremists occurred in a single event—an attack at an Orlando, Florida night club in 2016 (see fig. 2). Details on the locations and dates of the attacks can be found in appendix II.

The U.S. Approach to Countering Domestic Violent Extremism

In October 2016, the federal government defined the U.S. approach to countering violent extremism as proactive actions to counter efforts by extremists to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize followers to violence. The three parts of the U.S. approach to CVE efforts are: (1) empowering communities and civil society; (2) messaging and counter–messaging; and (3) addressing causes and driving factors. CVE activities are different from traditional counterterrorism efforts, such as collecting intelligence, gathering evidence, making arrests, and responding to incidents, in that they generally focus on preventing an individual from finding or acting out on a motive for committing a crime, as shown in figure 3. In February 2015, the White House released a fact sheet stating that CVE encompasses the preventative aspects of counterterrorism as well as interventions to undermine the attraction of violent extremist movements and ideologies that seek to promote violence.

According to the national strategy, CVE actions intend to address the conditions and reduce the factors that most likely contribute to recruitment and radicalization by violent extremists. CVE efforts, as defined by the White House, are not to include gathering intelligence or performing investigations for the purpose of criminal prosecution. CVE efforts aim to address the root causes of violent extremism through community engagement, including:

Building awareness—through briefings on the drivers and indicators of radicalization and recruitment to violence. For example, U.S. Attorney’s and DHS offices host community outreach meetings in which they provide information on identifying suspicious activity.

Countering violent extremist narratives—directly addressing and countering violent extremist recruitment messages, such as encouraging alternative messages from community groups online. For example, DOJ partnered with the International Association of Chiefs of Police to produce awareness briefs on countering online radicalization.

Emphasizing community led intervention—supporting community efforts to disrupt the radicalization process before an individual engages in criminal activity. For example, the FBI aims to provide tools and resources to communities to help them identify social workers and mental health professionals who can help support at-risk individuals and prevent them from becoming radicalized.

Recognizing that most CVE activities occur at the community level, DHS and DOJ officials leading the CVE Task Force describe the federal role in CVE as a combination of providing research funding and training materials, and educating the public through activities such as DHS or DOJ hosted community briefings in which specific threats and warning signs of violent extremism are shared. According to FBI officials, these outreach efforts also provide an opportunity to build relationships in the community and help clarify the FBI’s role in engaging community organizations. According to DHS officials, DHS also conducts regular community engagement roundtables in multiple cities that provide a forum for communities to comment on and hear information about Department activities, including CVE. In addition to community meetings, education of the public is to occur through a multiplicity of outreach channels, including websites, social media, conferences, and communications to state and local governments, including law enforcement entities.

Organization of CVE Programs and Initiatives Have Undergone Recent Changes

Since 2010, federal agencies have initiated several steps towards countering violent extremism. In November 2010, a National Engagement Task Force, led by DHS and DOJ, was established to help coordinate community engagement efforts to counter violent extremism. The task force was to include all departments and agencies involved in relevant community engagement efforts and focus on compiling local, national, and international best practices and disseminating these out to the field, especially to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. The task force was also responsible for connecting field-based federal components involved in community engagement to maximize partnerships, coordination, and resource- sharing. According to DHS officials, the National Engagement Task Force disbanded in 2013.

In September 2015, DHS recognized that its CVE efforts were scattered across a number of components and lacked specific goals and tangible measures of success. DHS created the Office of Community Partnerships (OCP) to consolidate its programs, foster greater involvement of the technology sector and philanthropic efforts to support private CVE efforts, and to enhance DHS grant-making in the area. At the same time, federal agencies involved in CVE recognized that the CVE landscape had changed since the issuance of the national strategy and SIP in late 2011. According to DHS and DOJ officials, ISIS had emerged as a threat, and an increase in internet recruiting by violent extremist groups since 2011 required an update to the SIP. In 2015, NCTC led a review to ensure that the federal government was optimally organized to carry out the CVE mission. According to DOJ and DHS officials leading CVE activities, the review validated the objectives of the 2011 strategy, but identified gaps in its implementation. Specifically, representatives from 10 departments and agencies contributing to CVE efforts identified four needs: infrastructure to coordinate and prioritize CVE activities across the federal government and with stakeholders; clear responsibility, accountability, and communication internally and with the public; broad participation of departments and agencies outside national security lanes; and a process to assess, prioritize, and allocate resources to maximize impact.

In response, in January 2016, a new CVE task force was created to coordinate government efforts and partnerships to prevent violent extremism in the United States. The CVE Task Force is a permanent interagency task force hosted by DHS with overall leadership provided by DHS and DOJ. Staffing is to be provided by representatives from DHS, DOJ, FBI, NCTC, and other supporting departments and agencies. The Task Force is administratively housed at DHS and is to rotate leadership between DHS and DOJ bi-annually. The interagency CVE Task Force was established to: (1) synchronize and integrate whole-of-government CVE programs and activities; (2) conduct ongoing strategic planning; and (3) assess and evaluate CVE efforts.

In October 2016, the Task Force, through the White House, issued an updated SIP for the 2011 national strategy. The 2016 SIP outlines the general lines of effort that partnering agencies will aim to undertake to guide their coordination of federal efforts and implement the national strategy. These lines of effort include:

Research and Analysis: The Task Force is to coordinate federal support for ongoing and future CVE research. Since 2011, DHS has funded 98 CVE related research projects and DOJ has funded 25. Coordination through this line of effort aims to prevent overlap and duplication while identifying guidelines for future evaluations. This line of effort also aims to identify and share guidelines for designing, implementing, and evaluating CVE programs.

Engagements and Technical Assistance: The Task Force is to coordinate federal outreach to and engagement with communities. DHS, FBI, U.S. Attorneys, and other departments regularly provide information to local community and law enforcement leaders. To date, much of the information provided has been from the individual perspective of each agency and its mission rather than a coordinated CVE mission. This line of effort aims to coordinate these outreach efforts to synchronize the messages that are reaching the communities.

Interventions: This line of effort aims to develop intervention options to include alternative pathways or “off-ramps” for individuals who appear to be moving toward violent action but who have not yet engaged in criminal activity. Law enforcement officials are looking for ways to support community led programs, particularly when they focus on juveniles and others who have the potential to be redirected away from violence. The CVE Task Force, in coordination with DOJ and the FBI, aim to support local multidisciplinary intervention approaches.

Communications and Digital Strategy: Recognizing that general CVE information and resources are not easily accessible by stakeholders, the CVE Task Force aims to create a new online platform, including a public website, to ensure stakeholders around the country are able to quickly and easily understand national CVE efforts. This platform aims to serve as the national digital CVE clearinghouse by centralizing and streamlining access to training; research, analysis, and lessons learned; financial resources and grant information; networks and communities of interest; and intervention resources.

According to the 2016 SIP, the lines of effort were developed to align with the three priority action areas outlined in the 2011 national strategy and SIP: (1) enhancing engagement with and support to local communities; (2) building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism; and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals. Also in October 2016, DHS issued its own strategy outlining the specific actions it aims to take to meet its CVE mission. Figure 4 shows a timeline of federal CVE milestones and activities.

CVE Funding

Consistent with direction in the 2011 National Strategy, federal CVE efforts have generally been initiated by leveraging existing programs and without a specific CVE budget. For example, activities that address violence in schools or hate crimes in communities may be relevant to constraining or averting violent extremism, but receive funding as part of a different program. In fiscal year 2016, the DHS Office of Community Partnerships operated with a $3.1 million budget and focused on raising awareness of violent extremists’ threats in communities, building relationships with community organizations that are conducting CVE efforts, and coordinating CVE efforts within DHS. Additionally, DHS’s fiscal year 2016 appropriation included $50 million to address emergent threats from violent extremism and from complex, coordinated terrorist attacks. Of the $50 million,

DHS awarded $10 million through a competitive grant program

DHS designated $1 million for a Joint Counterterrorism Workshop;

DHS designated the remaining $39 million to be competitively awarded under the existing Homeland Security Grant Program.

Almost Half of Planned 2011 CVE Tasks Were Implemented, but Work Remains

Developed to help execute the 2011 National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, the 2011 SIP detailed federal agency roles and responsibilities for current and future CVE efforts. The SIP outlined 44 tasks to address CVE domestically and called for the creation of an Assessment Working Group to measure CVE’s progress and effectiveness. From our analysis of agency documentation and other evidence as to whether tasks had been implemented, we determined that agencies implemented almost half of the 44 domestically-focused tasks identified in the 2011 SIP. Specifically, from December 2011 through December 2016, federal agencies implemented 19 tasks, had 23 tasks in progress, and had not yet taken action on 2 tasks (see fig. 5 below and app. III for additional details).

While progress was made in implementing the tasks, the Assessment Working Group was never formed according to DHS and DOJ officials responsible for implementing the SIP. Moreover, as of December 2016, there had been no comprehensive assessment of the federal government’s CVE efforts’ effectiveness.

The 44 domestically-oriented tasks identified in the 2011 SIP were focused on addressing three core CVE objectives: community outreach, research and training, and capacity building. Below is a description of progress made and challenges remaining by core CVE objective.

Community Outreach

Community outreach aims to enhance federal engagement and support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremism. For example, community outreach might include expanding relationships with local business and communities to identify or prevent violent extremism or integrating CVE activities into community-oriented policing efforts.

Of the 17 community outreach tasks in the SIP, we determined that agencies implemented 8 tasks and 9 remain in progress. In general, agencies implemented tasks focused on expanding CVE efforts in local communities and identifying ways to increase funding for CVE activities, among other things. For example, DOJ expanded CVE activities to communities targeted by violent extremism through a series of outreach meetings led by the U.S. Attorney’s offices. Further, both DHS and DOJ identified funding within existing appropriations to incorporate CVE into eligible public safety and community resilience grants.

However, community outreach tasks that remained in progress include tasks related to reaching communities in the digital environment. For example, DHS aims to build relationships with the high-tech and social media industry and continues to meet with officials to discuss how to address violent extremism online. In providing a status update on such activities, DHS recognized this as an area that continues to need attention.

Research and Training

Research and training relates to understanding the threat of violent extremism, sharing information, and leveraging it to train government and law enforcement officials. For example, activities under research and training might include funding or conducting analysis on CVE-related topics or developing training curriculums for CVE stakeholders.

Of the 19 research and training tasks we assessed in the SIP, we determined that agencies implemented 9 tasks, had 9 tasks in progress, and had not yet taken action on 1 task. Agencies implemented activities related to continuing research on CVE and integrating CVE training into federal law enforcement training, among other things. For example, DHS, through its Science and Technology Directorate, continued its research and reporting on violent extremist root causes and funded an open source database on terrorism as stated in the SIP. DHS also implemented a task related to integrating CVE content into counter-terrorism training conducted at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Additionally, NCTC implemented tasks related to expanding awareness briefings to state and local law enforcement, and developing and reviewing guidance on CVE training, while the FBI implemented a task regarding the completion of a CVE coordination office.

Further, tasks related to training non-security federal partners to incorporate CVE training remain in progress. For example, DHS was given responsibility for collaborating with non-security federal partners to build CVE training modules that can be incorporated into existing programs related to public safety, violence prevention, and resilience. DHS acknowledged this task needs attention and noted that, while initial steps were taken, the interagency effort needs to better define roles and opportunities for future collaborations. However, agencies have not yet taken action on implementing CVE in federal prisons.

Capacity Building

Capacity building tasks relate to investments of resources into communities to enhance the effectiveness and future sustainability of their CVE efforts. Capacity building might, for example, include expanding the use of informational briefings to a wider audience or outreach to former violent extremists to counter violent narratives.

Of the 8 capacity building tasks we assessed in the SIP, we determined that agencies implemented 2 tasks, 5 tasks were in progress, and action had not yet been taken on 1 task. For example, one of the implemented capacity building tasks included providing regular briefings on CVE to Congress and others. In implementing this task, DHS participated in over two dozen briefings and hearings for Congress.

Capacity building tasks that were in progress included brokering connections with the private sector and building a public website on community resilience and CVE, among others. DHS had, for example, taken steps to broker connections with the private sector. DHS officials also noted making initial progress with YouTube and the Los Angeles Police Department in developing campaigns against violent extremism, but recognized this as an area that continues to need attention. Despite progress in 7 of 8 capacity building tasks, action had not yet been taken on a task related to learning from former violent extremists to directly challenge violent extremist narratives. According to DHS officials, legal issues regarding access to former violent extremists are being explored and DOJ will lead this task moving forward.

The Federal CVE Effort Lacks a Cohesive Strategy with Measureable Outcomes and a Process for Assessing Progress

A Cohesive CVE Strategy with Measurable Outcomes Has Not Been Established

Although we were able to determine the status of the 44 domestically focused CVE tasks from the 2011 SIP, we could not determine the extent to which the United States is better off today as a result of its CVE effort than it was in 2011. That is because no cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes has been established to guide the multi-agency CVE effort towards its goals.

Neither the 2011 SIP nor its 2016 update provides a cohesive strategy— one that sets forth a coordinated and collaborative effort among partner agencies—that includes measurable outcomes. For example, the 2016 SIP includes a task on strengthening collaboration with the private sector and academia to pursue CVE-relevant communications tools and capabilities. The task describes the benefits of such collaboration, but does not include any information on how the task will be implemented, timeframes for implementation, desired outcomes, or indicators for measuring progress towards those outcomes. Similarly, the 2016 SIP includes a task on identifying and supporting the development of disengagement and rehabilitation programs. While the SIP describes research conducted in partnership with one such program that provides pathways out of violent extremism, it does not include any information on how the federal government will identify other groups and what kind of support they might provide. Absent defined measureable outcomes, it is unclear how these tasks will be implemented and how they will measurably contribute to achieving the federal CVE goals.

Consistent with the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, establishing a cohesive strategy that includes measurable outcomes can provide agencies with a clear direction for successful implementation of activities in multi-agency cross-cutting efforts. Participants in multi-agency efforts each bring different views, organizational cultures, missions, and ways of operating. They may even disagree on the nature of the problem or issue being addressed. As such, developing a mutually agreed-upon cohesive strategy with measureable outcomes can strengthen agencies’ commitment to working collaboratively and enhance the effectiveness of the CVE effort while keeping stakeholders engaged and invested.

Absent a cohesive strategy with defined measureable outcomes, CVE partner agencies have been left to develop and take their own individual actions without a clear understanding of whether and to what extent their actions will reduce violent extremism in the United States. For example, agencies such as the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services are listed in the SIP as two of the agencies with responsibility for implementing the 2016 SIP. However, the tasks for which they are listed as partners do not include measurable outcomes to guide implementation. As another example, in 2016 DHS issued its own CVE strategy for the department intended to align with the 2016 SIP. It is specific to DHS components and programs, establishes goals, outcomes, and milestones, and states that DHS will assess progress. However, DHS’s CVE strategy does not demonstrate how these activities will integrate with the overall federal CVE effort. Further, it establishes goals and outcomes for only one of the many departments responsible for CVE. DHS and DOJ officials speaking on behalf of the CVE Task Force stated that, as of November 2016, they had not determined if other stakeholder agencies, such as DOJ, the Department of Education, or the Department of Health and Human Services, would be developing similar strategies.

In January 2016, the CVE Task Force was established as the multi- agency body charged with coordinating government efforts and partnerships to prevent violent extremism in the United States. As such, it is best positioned to work with federal stakeholders in developing a cohesive strategy with measureable outcomes. More details on the CVE Task Force are provided in the following section. Our previous work has shown that agencies across the federal government have benefited from applying such strategies to cross cutting programs. By developing a cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes, CVE stakeholders will be better able to guide their efforts to ensure measurable progress is made in CVE.

No Process for Assessing Overall CVE Progress Is In Place

The CVE Task Force has not established a process for assessing whether the federal government’s CVE efforts are working. Establishing a process for assessing progress is a consistent practice of successful multi-agency collaborative efforts we have previously reviewed.

Moreover, such assessments can help identify successful implementation and gaps across agencies.

Recognizing the need for assessing the effects of CVE activities, the 2011 SIP described a process in which departments and agencies were to be responsible for assessing their specific activities in coordination with an Assessment Working Group. Agencies were to develop a process for identifying gaps, areas of limited progress, resource needs, and any additional factors resulting from new information on the dynamics of radicalization to violence. Further, the progress of the participating agencies was to be evaluated and reported annually to the President. However, according to DHS and DOJ officials, the Assessment Working Group was never created and the process described in the SIP was not developed. As a result, no process or method for assessing the federal CVE effort’s progress and holding stakeholders accountable was established.

Absent a mechanism for assessing the federal CVE effort, in 2015 NCTC, along with 10 federal agencies, including DHS and DOJ, undertook an effort to review progress agencies had made in implementing their CVE responsibilities. According to DHS and DOJ officials, the review, along with those of the supporting agencies, helped identify areas for continued focus and improvement in fulfilling the CVE effort. Specifically, the review team identified the need for clear responsibility and accountability across the government and with the public. It also identified the need for a process to assess, prioritize, and allocate resources to maximize impact, among other needs.

Informed by these efforts, in January 2016 the CVE Task Force was established as a permanent interagency task force with overall leadership provided by DHS and DOJ. As previously described, the task force was charged with coordinating government efforts and partnerships to prevent violent extremism in the United States. Moreover, the CVE Task Force was assigned responsibility for synchronizing and integrating CVE programs and activities and assessing and evaluating them. The CVE Task Force worked with its partner agencies to develop the 2016 SIP but did not identify a process or method for assessing whether the overall CVE effort is working. Instead, the SIP states that it will use prior evaluations of individual programs to develop guidelines for departments and agencies to evaluate their own programs. Moreover, according to CVE Task Force officials, they do not believe that assessing the overall effectiveness of the federal CVE effort is their responsibility.

Moving forward with the approach identified in the 2016 SIP is likely to continue to limit the federal government’s understanding of progress made in CVE efforts to that of individual activities rather than the entirety of the federal CVE effort. Agencies have conducted assessments of the effectiveness of some individual CVE programs. However, those assessments do not address the overarching effectiveness of the CVE effort. In addition, efforts to evaluate individual CVE initiatives alone will not provide an overall assessment of progress made in the federal CVE effort. For example, DOJ funded an evaluation of a community-based CVE programming effort led by the World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE). The evaluation assessed WORDE’s effectiveness in promoting positive social integration and encouraging public safety in Montgomery County, Maryland. The evaluation looked at community-based participation in CVE programs, community awareness of risk factors of radicalization to violent extremism, and the community’s natural inclinations in response to these factors. The evaluation provides some insights into how WORDE’s program worked in Montgomery County, Maryland, but not the overall federal CVE effort.

Absent a consistent process for assessing the federal CVE effort as a whole, the federal government lacks the information needed to truly assess the extent to which the WORDE effort and others have countered violent extremism. Further, stakeholders will be limited in their efforts to identify successes and gaps and allocate or leverage resources effectively. Given that the CVE Task Force, as a permanent interagency body, is charged with synchronizing and integrating CVE programs and activities and assessing and evaluating them, the CVE Task Force should establish a process for assessing overall progress in CVE, including its effectiveness.

Conclusions

Combatting violent extremism is of critical importance for the United States. Extremist attacks of all kinds can have perilous effects on the perceived safety of our nation. It is therefore imperative that the United States employ effective means for preventing and deterring violent extremism and related attacks. To help confront this critical need, in 2011 the President issued a CVE strategy and corresponding implementation plan. However, over 5 years have passed and the federal government has not developed a cohesive strategy among stakeholder agencies that provides measurable outcomes to guide the collaborative implementation of CVE activities. While the CVE Task Force provided a forum for coordination and led the effort to develop a new SIP, the plan does not provide stakeholder agencies with specific direction and measures to identify successes and gaps in the implementation of their activities. In the absence of a cohesive strategy, DHS has developed its own strategy, while no such roadmap is in place for the collaborative implementation of activities by all stakeholder agencies. As the entity responsible for the synchronization and integration of CVE programs across the government, the CVE Task Force is well positioned to develop a cohesive strategy that provides all stakeholder agencies with a clear path forward in achieving the federal CVE effort’s desired outcomes.

The CVE Task Force, established in part to assess and evaluate CVE programs, has also not established an approach for assessing overall progress. Without consistent measures and methodologies for evaluating CVE as a whole, the federal government lacks the necessary information needed to assess the extent to which stakeholder agencies are achieving their goals. Without this information, stakeholders will not be able to identify successes and gaps and allocate or leverage resources effectively. When dealing with programs and activities that are designed to keep Americans safe from the threat of violent extremism, agency leaders and policy makers need to be able to know how well the federal government is doing in implementing these activities. Establishing an approach for assessing progress of the overall CVE effort can help the CVE Task Force enhance understanding of progress made as a result of CVE.

Recommendations

To help identify what domestic CVE efforts are to achieve and the extent to which investments in CVE result in measureable success, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General—as heads of the two lead agencies responsible for coordinating CVE efforts—should direct the CVE Task Force to: 1. Develop a cohesive strategy that includes measurable outcomes for 2. Establish and implement a process to assess overall progress in CVE, including its effectiveness.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security (DHS), and Justice (DOJ) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). In its written comments, reproduced in appendix IV, DHS concurred with both of our recommendations. In comments provided in an email from the DOJ Audit Liaison, DOJ also concurred with both recommendations. In addition, DHS, DOJ, and ODNI provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. The Departments of Education and Health and Human Services did not comment on the report.

DHS, in its letter, concurred with our recommendation to develop a cohesive strategy that includes outcomes for CVE activities. DHS also recognized that additional strategic-level performance documentation will improve coordination and collaboration tasks among partner agencies, as well as define how cross-cutting tasks will be implemented and how they will measurably contribute to achieving federal CVE goals. DHS noted that the CVE Task Force is developing measurable outcomes to support and guide the development of performance, effectiveness, and benchmarks for federally sponsored CVE efforts. DHS stated that the CVE Task Force plans to report on the progress of implementing the 2016 Strategic Implementation Plan in January 2018. DOJ also concurred with the recommendation in comments received by email.

DHS also concurred with our recommendation to establish and implement a process to assess overall progress in CVE, including its effectiveness. DHS, in its comment letter, recognized that such a process will drive an understanding of the contributions of individual activities in the federal CVE effort. In DHS’s response, the department maintained that the CVE Task Force will not be engaged in specific evaluations of its members or partners, but instead will develop resource guides on methodologies and measures that federal and non-government partners can use in evaluating their own CVE efforts. As noted in our report, the CVE Task Force’s approach of providing guidance on evaluations might enhance the evaluation efforts of individual programs, but establishing a process that assesses progress and effectiveness across the federal CVE effort can provide better insight into the successes and gaps within this multi- agency collaborative effort. DOJ also concurred with the recommendation in comments received by email.

We are sending copies of this report to Secretary of Education, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of National Intelligence and appropriate congressional committees and members, and other interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions, please contact Diana Maurer at (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made significant contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report addresses the extent to which (1) the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and other key stakeholders tasked with Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in the United States have implemented the 2011 Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) and (2) the federal government has developed a strategy to implement CVE activities, and the CVE Task Force has developed a process for assessing overall progress.

To assess the extent to which DHS, DOJ, and other key stakeholders tasked with CVE in the United States implemented the 2011 SIP, we collected and analyzed information from each agency responsible for leading a task in the 2011 SIP, which included DHS, DOJ, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The FBI was treated as a lead agency for reporting purposes because it was listed as a lead agency in the SIP. These four agencies were responsible for domestic CVE activities and were collectively responsible for implementing 44 out of the 47 tasks in the SIP. We did not analyze the implementation of 3 of the 47 tasks because they were international in scope and led by an agency outside of the four agencies responsible for domestic CVE. Specifically, we did not analyze the Department of Treasury’s efforts to address terrorism financing, the Department of Defense’s effort to provide training to military personnel, and the State Department’s international exchange program. GAO asked for information from each lead agency on actions taken from December 2011 through December 2016 to address their assigned activities in the 2011 SIP. Based on information provided, one analyst analyzed each agency’s action(s) to determine whether each task in the SIP had been implemented, was still in progress, or had not been addressed. A separate analyst independently reviewed each assessment and narrative. If there was disagreement on a rating, a third analyst reviewed that information and made a determination on the final rating. Upon preliminary completion of the appendix table, GAO sent the table to DHS, DOJ, FBI, and NCTC and incorporated technical comments as appropriate. The results of this assessment are shown in appendix III.

To determine the extent to which the federal government has developed a strategy to implement CVE activities and the CVE Task Force has developed a process for assessing overall progress, we reviewed the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, the 2011 and 2016 Strategic Implementation Plans for the strategy, and other documents related to the creation and activities of the CVE Task Force. Specifically, we reviewed these documents to identify whether measurable outcomes and associated metrics had been defined. We interviewed officials from the stakeholder agencies including DHS, DOJ, the Department of Education, the Department of Health and Human Services, FBI, and NCTC to discuss their approaches to CVE and their roles and responsibilities as part of the federal CVE effort. We compared the practices of the Task Force to selected leading practices of multi-agency collaborative efforts identified in prior GAO work as well as selected practices in the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010. Practices were selected for comparison based on their applicability to the CVE Task Force. For context and perspectives on how CVE activities were implemented in local areas we interviewed a non-generalizable group of community organizations selected based on their location in the three pilot cities that have adopted CVE frameworks: Los Angeles, California; Boston, Massachusetts; and Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota.

We conducted this performance audit from October 2015 to April 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Violent Extremist Attacks in the United States that Resulted in Fatalities, September 12, 2001 through December 31, 2016

This appendix provides details on the violent extremist attacks in the United States based on the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) data and as described in the background section of this report. Specifically, tables 1 and 2 show a description, date, location and number of victim fatalities for each far right and radical Islamist attack between September 12, 2001 and December 31, 2016. During this period, no persons in the United States were killed in attacks carried out by persons believed to be motivated by extremist environmental beliefs, extremist “animal liberation” beliefs, or extremist far left beliefs. The information on these attacks, including the motivations of the attackers, is from the ECDB, maintained by National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), at the University of Maryland. START is a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Center of Excellence. The ECDB tracks violent extremist incidents in the United States since 1990. For our analysis, we included the time period from September 12, 2001 through December 31, 2016, to show violent extremist attacks that have occurred since the September 11, 2001 attacks. We assessed the reliability of this data source through review of database documentation and interviews with the ECDB principle investigators. We discussed cases with the ECDB investigators to clarify details as needed. We determined that this data source was sufficiently reliable for providing background information on the problem of violent extremism in the United States, including the number of attacks and fatalities by ideological motivation (far right or radical Islamist), year and location.

Far right violent extremist attackers are characterized by ECDB as having beliefs that include some or all of the following:

Fiercely nationalistic (as opposed to universal and international in

Suspicious of centralized federal authority;

Reverent of individual liberty (especially right to own guns; be free of

Belief in conspiracy theories that involve a grave threat to national sovereignty and/or personal liberty;

Belief that one’s personal and/or national “way of life” is under attack and is either already lost or that the threat is imminent; and

Belief in the need to be prepared for an attack either by participating in or supporting the need for paramilitary preparations and training or survivalism.

In addition, according to the ECDB, many persons having violent extreme far right views express support for some version of white supremacy, the Ku Klux Klan, and neo-Nazism.

According to the ECDB, attackers with violent radical Islamist beliefs were generally those who professed some form of belief in or allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Qa’ida, or other (radical) Islamist- associated terrorist entities. ECDB’s determination of these beliefs are based on statements made by attackers prior to, during, or after their attacks that showed a belief in violent extremist interpretations of Islam, or evidence gathered by police and other sources about the attackers.

According to the ECDB, all information in the database is collected from publicly available sources, including mass media reports. ECDB analyzes this information using a standardized and consistent methodology to characterize each attack in terms of the ideological motivation. In addition, ECDB rates the confidence in this assessment of ideological motivations using standard definitions of the factors that lead a confidence level on a scale from 0 to 4, where 0 is the lowest level of confidence and 4 is the highest level of confidence. During our reliability assessment, it was determined that the far right-motivated attacks included 12 incidents where there was unclear evidence about the motivation of the attacker; these 12 were excluded from our analysis.

Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

In August 2011, the White House issued the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States followed by The National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) in December 2011. The SIP designated the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) as leads or partners for the 44 domestically-focused tasks identified in the 2011 SIP. From December 2011 through December 2016, federal agencies implemented 19 tasks, had 23 tasks in progress, and had not yet taken action on 2 tasks. The tasks fall under three categories: community outreach, research and training, and capacity building.

The SIP identified 18 community outreach tasks to be implemented by federal agencies. Community outreach aims to enhance federal engagement and support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremism. For example, community outreach might include expanding relationships with local business and communities to identify or prevent violent extremism or integrating CVE activities into community- oriented policing efforts.

The SIP identified 20 research and training tasks to be implemented by federal agencies. Research and training relates to understanding the threat of violent extremism, sharing information, and leveraging it to train government and law enforcement officials. We analyzed implementation of 19 research and training tasks in the SIP to determine the extent they had been implemented by the responsible agency(s).

The SIP identified 9 capacity building tasks to be implemented by federal agencies. Capacity building might include outreach to former violent extremists to counter violent narratives. We analyzed the implementation of 8 capacity building tasks in the SIP to determine the extent to which they had been implemented by the responsible agency(s).

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Joseph Cruz (Assistant Director), Eric Hauswirth, Kevin Heinz, Tyler Kent, Thomas Lombardi, Jonathan Tumin, Amber Sinclair, and Adam Vogt made significant contributions to the report.