National Security Personnel: Committed Leadership Is Needed for Implementation of Interagency Rotation Program
Released: 2015-11-17T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Statutory Requirements and Organizational Responsibilities for the Section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program

Section 1107 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 established the Committee on National Security Personnel within the Executive Office of the President. The Committee was required to include, at a minimum, representatives from OMB, OPM, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, DOD, and the Departments of State and Homeland Security. As part of the implementation of the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program, the statute required the policies, processes, and procedures included in the Strategy to provide that the program be carried out in at least two Interagency Communities of Interest—Emergency Management and Stabilization and Reconstruction—and that no fewer than 20 executive branch employees be assigned to participate in the program in each of the first 4 fiscal years after the enactment of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013—fiscal years 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. Section 1107 indicated that the purpose of the program was to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the government by fostering greater interagency experience among executive branch personnel on national security and homeland security matters involving more than one agency.

Section 1107 defines an “Interagency Community of Interest” as positions in the executive branch of the government that (1) as a group, are positions within multiple agencies of the executive branch of government; and (2) have significant responsibility for the same substantive, functional, or regional subject area related to national security or homeland security that requires integration of the positions and activities in that area across multiple agencies to ensure that the executive branch of the government operates as a single, cohesive enterprise to maximize mission success and minimize cost. Additionally, the Strategy defines “Community of Practice” as a Community of Interest that has, among other things, identified members to engage in joint activities, experiences, and discussions and share information as an identified network. For example, according to the charter for the Emergency Management Community of Practice, the community will advance whole-of-government goals pertaining to national preparedness through unified, collaborative, interagency approaches to the prevention of, protection from, response to, recovery from, and mitigation of manmade and natural disasters. This will be accomplished by providing integrated education, training, and experiential activities to promote familiarization with emergency management missions, operations, and interagency structures across the federal government and to optimize operational planning and execution.

The National Security Professional Development Program

Prior to the establishment of the section 1107 program, in May 2007, Executive Order 13434 established the National Security Professional Development Executive Steering Committee and designated OPM as its chair. Executive Order 13434 also called for the development of a strategy that set forth a framework that would become the National Security Professional Development (NSPD) Program—we will discuss the status of this program later in the report. The NSPD Program’s goal was to promote the education, training, and experience of current and future professionals in national security positions. To facilitate the implementation of the NSPD Program, the Executive Steering Committee established an Integration Office, which was originally housed at DOD and staffed by employees from other departments and agencies on temporary detail assignment. In 2012, the NSPD Integration Office was moved from DOD to OPM. Appendix I provides key dates in the establishment and implementation of both the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program and NSPD Program.

GAO’s Prior Work on Interagency Coordination and Collaboration Efforts

In 2010, we identified 225 professional development activities available for national security professionals that have a goal of improving interagency collaboration. Of the 225 activities, 7 were interagency rotation programs. Five of these seven programs involved rotating personnel between civilian agencies and the defense community. During that review, many departments and agencies reported the existence of other interagency assignments, but we found that the departments and agencies did not manage these as professional development programs and they lacked an explicit goal of improving interagency collaboration. The NSPD Program, which resulted from Executive Order 13434, was included as one of the professional development activities identified by this review.

GAO also has a large body of work on the need for interagency coordination and collaboration to facilitate the federal government’s response to natural disasters and homeland security issues, among other things. Although this body of work does not directly call for an interagency rotation program similar to the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program, it highlights the continued importance of improving interagency coordination and collaboration, more than a decade after catastrophic events such as the terrorist attacks of September 2001 and Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. For example, in 2006, we found that key issues with the federal response to Hurricane Katrina—the largest, most destructive natural disaster in our nation’s history—were reminiscent of the issues identified in the wake of Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Among other things, clearly defining and communicating leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for catastrophic event response and clarifying and applying procedures for activating the National Response Plan could have improved the federal government’s response efforts after Hurricane Katrina. See Appendix II for additional information on our prior work identifying the need for interagency coordination and collaboration.

Committee on National Security Personnel’s Strategy Addressed Most Statutory Requirements, but Implementation of the Program Has Languished

In March 2014, the Committee issued the Strategy required by section 1107 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013. The Strategy complies with most of the statutory requirements and describes the basic policies, processes, and procedures for the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program. However, implementation of the program has languished because there has been limited leadership and oversight of the program, and no national security personnel had been assigned for rotations as of September 2015. The departments and agencies also cited various actions that needed to be taken in order for the section 1107 program to be implemented in a timely manner. Examples of these actions include the development and issuance of guidance outlined in the Strategy.

The Committee on National Security Personnel Developed and Issued a Strategy that Addresses Most of the Statutory Requirements

In addition to establishing the Committee on National Security Personnel, section 1107 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 required the Committee to develop and issue a National Security Human Capital Strategy that provided for the implementation of an interagency rotation program. On March 29, 2014, the Committee issued the required National Security Human Capital Strategy—entitled The Human Capital Strategy for Interagency Personnel Rotations.

Our analysis of the Committee’s actions and the Strategy showed that they address most of the statutory requirements set forth in section 1107. Section 1107 included 19 requirements related to the development and issuance of the Strategy and the subsequent implementation and monitoring of the section 1107 program. However, for 2 of these requirements we had no basis to judge, because these requirements are contingent on actions that had not yet occurred, and, therefore, we did not assess these requirements.

We found that the Committee’s actions and its Strategy address 13 of the 17 statutory requirements we assessed, for example, by (1) including provisions that specifically address the requirements, such as by including specific policy requirements; (2) assigning various departments and agencies tasks, such as developing policy or guidance; and (3) directing other organizations, including the Communities of Practice, to carry out the section 1107 program. We also found that the Committee’s actions and the Strategy partially address 2 and do not address 2 of the 17 statutory requirements we assessed. Appendix III includes our assessment of the Committee’s and Strategy’s compliance with each of the 17 section 1107 requirements we could assess.

Among the 13 requirements addressed, we found that the Strategy identifies Interagency Communities of Interest for the purposes of carrying out the section 1107 program. The Strategy specifically identifies the two Communities called for in section 1107—Emergency Management and Stabilization and Reconstruction—but also names other possible Communities, including cyber-security, climate change adaptation, and energy security, among others. We also found that the Strategy discusses (1) training and education requirements; (2) prerequisites or requirements for participation; and (3) performance measures, reporting requirements, and other accountability devices associated with participation in and evaluation of the program.

We found that the Strategy partially addresses 2 of the 17 requirements. Those are the requirements that (1) the Committee issue a National Security Human Capital Strategy within 270 days of enactment of the statute and (2) the Strategy designate agencies to be included or excluded from the program. The Committee issued the Strategy on March 29, 2014, but it was 6 months late and, therefore, did not meet the required deadline. In addition, the Strategy states that the Committee will determine which departments and agencies will participate as each Community is formed, and that a process will be described in further detail in a subsequent part of the Strategy. We determined that these statements make reference to a process for making decisions about which agencies and departments will participate; however, we found that the Strategy does not designate which departments and agencies will be included or excluded, as called for in section 1107. The Strategy does, however, state that agencies with national security missions will incorporate the Strategy into their training priorities.

We found that the Strategy does not address 2 of the 17 requirements. Specifically, it does not address the requirements for the Strategy’s policies, processes, and procedures to provide that in each of the 4 fiscal years after enactment of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 (1) the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program shall be carried out in at least two Communities of Interest—one of which should be Emergency Management and the other Stabilization and Reconstruction; and (2) at least 20 employees should be assigned to participate in the program. We found that the Strategy only reiterates that the statute identifies the Emergency Management and the Stabilization and Reconstruction Communities and allows for additional Communities to be added, subject to approval by the Committee. However, the Strategy does not provide that, at a minimum, the program would be carried out in at least the two designated Interagency Communities of Interest or by at least 20 employees in each of the first 4 fiscal years after the NDAA was enacted. Specifically, the Strategy is silent on the number of participants that would rotate through the program and does not provide assurance that the rotations should occur each year in at least the two named Communities. As we discuss further in the next section, to date, no rotations have occurred under the section 1107 program.

Finally, there were two statutory requirements for which we had no basis to judge. These are requirements for (1) the heads of each participating agency to help ensure that strong preference is given to those who participate in interagency rotational service when selecting individuals for senior positions; and (2) the Committee to assess and report on the established performance measures by September 30, 2015. With regard to the first requirement, because no rotations have occurred under the section 1107 program, we cannot assess whether agency heads have given such a preference to participants. With regard to the second requirement to assess and report on established performance measures, as discussed in the next section of this report, because the section 1107 program has not been implemented, we could not assess compliance with this requirement due to the reporting date. Further, our draft report and the report on performance measures were due on the same day.

Agencies and Organizations Have Taken Limited Steps to Address Assigned Roles, Responsibilities, and Tasks to Implement the Interagency Rotation Program

Agencies and organizations have taken limited steps to address the roles, responsibilities, and tasks assigned to them in the Strategy for implementing the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program, and they had not implemented that program as of September 2015. More specifically, no rotational assignments have occurred. By September 30, 2015, at least 40 employees should have been assigned to rotational assignments (20 each in fiscal years 2014 and 2015). Agency officials report that, as of September 2015, no employees had been assigned to rotations under the section 1107 program. According to officials we spoke with and documents we reviewed, the program’s implementation is behind schedule because (1) there has been limited leadership and oversight over its implementation and (2) a number of actions need to be completed to address some of the roles, responsibilities, and tasks assigned to the departments and agencies.

As noted above, the Committee on National Security Personnel issued the Strategy that assigned specific roles, responsibilities, and tasks to the various entities—OPM; the NSPD Executive Steering Committee, which OPM chairs; the participating departments and agencies; and the Communities of Practice—to implement the section 1107 Program.

Table 1 summarizes the major roles, responsibilities, and tasks the Strategy assigned to the departments, agencies, and other organizations, as well as those the Committee reserved for itself.

We identified other roles, responsibilities, and tasks assigned to the departments and agencies, among others, during our review of supporting documentation, including meeting minutes, organization charters, and implementation plans. For example, the charter for the Emergency Management Community of Practice states that OPM will lead the Committee to implement an interagency rotation system that complies with the law. The charter also states, for example, that the Department of Homeland Security will designate the Community Manager for the Emergency Management Community of Practice. We also found that assignments were made to departments and agencies during NSPD Executive Steering Committee meetings. These assignments were documented in the form of action items included in the minutes of the meetings and included creating inventories of current rotational assignment opportunities from participating departments and agencies and developing further guidance on personnel issues from OPM.

We found, however, that implementation of the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program is behind schedule because there has been limited leadership and oversight in place to guide the implementation effort and because a number of actions need to be completed to address some of the roles, responsibilities, and tasks assigned to the departments and agencies to help ensure the program is implemented in a timely manner. Officials we spoke with from OPM and the departments were not aware of the existence of a charter or similar document for the Committee, which we would expect to identify an organizational structure that clearly defines key areas of authority and responsibility and establish appropriate lines of reporting. With regard to leadership, officials we spoke with stated that the section 1107 program has not been a priority for those individuals currently overseeing the Committee. OPM officials also told us that they are not responsible for the performance of the section 1107 program because (1) they are not the lead for the Committee on National Security Personnel and (2) the NSPD Executive Steering Committee, which holds joint meetings with the Committee on National Security Personnel, is more of a collaborative effort of the participants. However, officials from multiple participating departments stated that they perceive OPM to be the lead for the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program and look to the agency for leadership based on its role in the oversight of federal government personnel issues. Neither section 1107 or the Strategy specifies who should be the lead or chair for the Committee on National Security Personnel; however, OPM has been designated the chair of the NSPD Executive Steering Committee and, more importantly, the Strategy specifically identifies that the Committee will work with OPM to implement the Strategy.

Officials from departments and agencies we interviewed told us that an office to oversee the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program has not been established, but was needed. The managers for all three currently existing Communities of Practice also identified the need for a program office to help oversee and ensure the accountability of the implementation efforts, among other things. Further, officials told us that the individuals who have been tasked with carrying out the implementation of the section 1107 program and sit on the Committee have other responsibilities. For those individuals, responsibilities associated with the section 1107 program are collateral duties. Officials noted that the meetings of the NSPD Executive Steering Committee, which, as noted above, are held jointly with the Committee on National Security Personnel, are infrequent—with meetings being scheduled with only a few weeks’ notice or canceled. They also stated that very little communication or progress occurs on any task between meetings, further slowing the implementation of the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program.

Several documents identify OPM’s leadership roles with regard to developing further guidance and implementing the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program, but we found that the existing leadership structure is not providing needed oversight of the program’s implementation. For example, OPM has an additional leadership role, in its capacity as the chair of the NSPD Executive Steering Committee, to provide oversight over the Communities of Practice through periodic updates from the Communities. As of September 2015, three Communities of Practice—Emergency Management, Federal Operations Centers, and Defense Intelligence and Security—had been approved by the NSPD Executive Steering Committee, which OPM chairs, and for which the NSPD Executive Steering Committee would have oversight responsibilities. One Community Manager stated that in 2014, when the Intelligence Community, which had previously established the Joint Duty Assignment program, submitted a charter for the Defense Intelligence and Security Community of Practice to be considered and approved by the NSPD Executive Steering Committee, it took OPM—as chair of the NSPD Executive Steering Committee—months to process the request and move it forward to the Committee on National Security Personnel for final approval, delaying the establishment of the community. According to OPM officials, Community Managers’ oral presentations at the NSPD Executive Steering Committee meetings provide the necessary oversight of the actions of the Communities of Practice. However, two of the three Communities’ charters require that additional written reports be provided to the NSPD Executive Steering Committee for oversight. One Community Manager reported that he had only been invited to provide oversight updates at the meetings starting in 2015, despite serving in the role since December 2013. That same manager had previously been unaware that the Strategy had been issued and that the Strategy required the Communities to develop performance metrics. Further, that Community Manager also stated the NSPD Executive Steering Committee recently began requesting information on the community’s performance metrics and first sent a document template in mid-August 2015 that requested performance information by the end of that month.

Department and agency officials we spoke with also cited a number of actions that are needed in order for them to complete some of their assigned roles, responsibilities, and tasks, including steps that need to be taken and in what order to implement the section 1107 program. For example, OPM officials stated that their agency has not yet issued the personnel guidance required by the Strategy, but were unable to provide timeframes for when the guidance would be issued. Officials from participating departments told us they could not proceed with taking action on their tasks because they were waiting for further guidance from OPM. Those officials also told us that their departments have not taken steps to update previous lists of identified national security positions and personnel—another assigned task—because, according to officials from one of the departments, they are waiting for further guidance from OPM on the criteria for selecting employees and positions for participation in the program. Department officials also told us that they are waiting for guidance on how to develop policies for providing preference to those employees who had previously participated in the section 1107 program when they apply for senior level positions. DOD officials stated that they, as well as representatives from other departments and agencies, have requested guidance from OPM at least twice at NSPD Executive Steering Committee meetings and had not, as of September 2015, received such guidance. When asked about the need for such guidance, OPM officials stated that the departments and agencies do not need additional guidance from OPM to proceed with their assigned roles, responsibilities, and tasks under the Strategy. Although section 1107 requires the head of each agency to take certain actions to incorporate preference for the selection of individuals to senior positions and the Strategy requires the departments and agencies to select personnel and positions to participate in the program, confusion about such roles, responsibilities, and tasks has contributed to delays in the section 1107 program’s implementation.

In 2012, we found that federal departments and agencies use a variety of mechanisms to implement interagency collaborative efforts that can be used to address a range of purposes including policy development, program implementation, oversight and monitoring, information sharing and communication, and building organizational capacity. Specifically, we found that, to implement interagency collaborative mechanisms, federal agencies should, among other things, consider (1) leadership; (2) clarity of roles and responsibilities, and (3) outcomes and accountability. Such considerations should include plans to sustain leadership over time, clearly identified and agreed upon roles and responsibilities, and tracking and monitoring of progress. In addition, with regard to actions not taken by the departments and agencies to implement the program, internal control standards state that management needs to comprehensively identify risks and should consider all significant interactions to accomplishing a stated objective. Risk identification methods may include qualitative and quantitative ranking activities, management conferences, and considerations of findings from audits and other assessments, among other things.

Without committed leadership and oversight from all of the relevant entities—most specifically, the Committee on National Security Personnel and OPM—to oversee the implementation of the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program and actions taken on necessary steps to proceed with the program’s implementation, it is unlikely that the goals of section 1107 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 will be addressed and that the section 1107 program will be implemented within the specified timeframes. Further, the executive branch will not be positioned to realize the expected benefits of the program, which could include improved interagency coordination and integration in preparing for and responding to national security challenges, among other things.

Conclusions

Over a decade after catastrophic events such as the terrorist attacks of September 2001 and Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, interagency coordination and integration continue to be a challenge for the federal government’s national security and homeland security missions. Providing opportunities for national security personnel to gain interagency experience can benefit not only those individuals, but also enhance interagency coordination and integration. The section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program for national security personnel, when implemented, could support these goals. However, limited leadership and oversight, as well as inaction on a number of assigned roles, responsibilities, and tasks have caused the program’s implementation to languish. Until OPM, the Committee on National Security Personnel, departments and agencies, and other organizations take actions necessary to move forward with implementation, the program is likely to remain unrealized. Without a clear leadership structure for the Committee that can work with departments and agencies to identify and take action on any steps that are necessary for the program’s implementation, Congress’s intentions for the program and the benefits that could stem from it will also remain unfulfilled.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To provide greater assurance that the Interagency Rotation Program for national security personnel will be implemented as provided in section 1107 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, in collaboration with the Committee on National Security Personnel, take the following two actions: (1) establish a clear leadership and oversight structure to guide future (2) work with the departments and agencies to identify and take action on necessary next steps to proceed with the program’s implementation, including developing and issuing required guidance for implementation within identified timeframes.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided OPM, OMB, DOD, the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Security Council with a draft of this report for comment. OMB, DOD, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Security Council had no comments on our draft report. The Department of State provided technical comments, which we considered and incorporated where appropriate. In comments on a draft of this report, OPM partially concurred with one recommendation and concurred with the second recommendation. OPM’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix IV.

In its response, OPM stated that our draft report made recommendations only to OPM, despite section 1107 establishing the Committee within the Executive Office of the President and delegating program and policy responsibilities to the heads of participating departments and agencies. We believe that this characterization misconstrues our recommendations. As our report shows, OPM’s role with regard to the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program includes responsibilities specific to OPM, but also responsibilities to act in collaboration with other departments and agencies based on its roles as a member of the Committee on National Security Personnel and as the Chair of the NSPD Executive Steering Committee. To that end, both of our recommendations were not directed solely to OPM, but rather to OPM in collaboration with the Committee on National Security Personnel, as a joint effort. As specified in section 1107, the Committee is comprised of multiple departments and agencies, including OPM, OMB, and DOD, among others. Moreover, our second recommendation also includes working with the departments and agencies when identifying and taking action on next steps for the program’s implementation. OPM is not the sole recipient or target of our recommendations, but OPM and the Committee on National Security Personnel are both focal points because of their responsibilities.

OPM also stated that table 1 of our report oversimplifies the Committee’s delegation of responsibilities to the various departments and agencies. We find this table an appropriate portrayal of the roles and responsibilities specifically outlined in the Strategy as the table describes only the major roles and responsibilities, which was our intent. In addition, in its response to our draft report, OPM criticized our methodology for not including interviews with the Executive Office of the President in our review. As we stated in our report, we made multiple attempts to meet with the Executive Office of the President through the National Security Council, but they were unable to meet with us during the statutory timeframes required by our review. However, when provided the opportunity to comment on our draft report, the National Security Council responded that it did not have any comments on our report. As a result, we worked with OPM, as well as the other departments and agencies, to obtain necessary clarification on the roles and responsibilities, the distinction between the work carried out by the two committees, and the status of the program’s implementation, among other things.

Regarding our first recommendation to establish a clear leadership and oversight structure to guide future implementation efforts, OPM partially concurred. OPM stated that it agrees that a more formal system of reporting to the NSPD Executive Steering Committee and more frequent Executive Steering Committee review of performance metrics would improve the program’s accountability. However, OPM added that it cannot establish a charter or leadership structure for the program as a whole, because it would contravene section 1107(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which established the Committee as the policy lead on national security personnel rotations and specified OPM as only one of several participating agencies.

We agree that such steps may help improve the program’s accountability, but we disagree with OPM’s assessment of our recommendation— particularly the portion about a clear leadership structure. Specifically, we do not intend for OPM to act unilaterally, and we reiterate that our recommendation is directed at OPM in collaboration with the Committee. Further, as stated in our report, the Emergency Management Community of Practice charter—which was revised after the enactment of section 1107, approved by the NSPD Executive Steering Committee, and signed by the Chief Operating Officer of OPM—states that OPM will lead the Committee on National Security Personnel to implement an interagency rotation program that complies with the law. This statement clearly articulates OPM’s key role in the implementation of the system. Moreover, during the course of our review, officials we met with from the departments that comprise the Committee pointed to OPM as having a lead role in the program’s implementation and those officials continue to look to OPM for direction and guidance.

Regarding our second recommendation to identify and take action on necessary next steps to proceed with the program’s implementation, including developing and issuing required guidance for implementation within identified timeframes, OPM concurred. OPM agreed with our assessment that OPM has not issued two guidance documents required by the Strategy and has agreed to develop at least two guidance documents, including, for example, guidance specifically addressing performance appraisals for employees participating in interagency rotations.

We appreciate OPM’s acknowledgment of its responsibility to produce these guidance documents, but we believe that these statements miss the intent of our recommendation and will only address the recommendation in part. We continue to believe that OPM—in its capacity as both a member of the Committee and as the Chair of the NSPD Executive Steering Committee—needs to work with the Committee and the other departments and agencies to determine the steps needed to proceed with the implementation of the program. These steps may include OPM’s issuing additional guidance, but also may include, for example, identifying timeframes for next steps to help ensure implementation within the timeframes identified in section 1107. More specifically, the steps we identify here and in our report, including the aforementioned guidance documents, may not include all of the steps necessary to help ensure the implementation of the program. Thus, we continue to believe that OPM should work with the Committee and the departments and agencies to determine necessary next steps.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and other interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff has any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Timeline of Key Implementation Dates

The following timeline identifies key dates in the establishment and implementation of the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program and the National Security Professional Development (NSPD) Program. Section 1107 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 established the Committee on National Security Personnel and required the development and issuance of a National Security Human Capital Strategy that was to provide for the implementation of an interagency rotation program with the intent of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the federal government by fostering greater interagency experience among executive branch personnel on national security and homeland security matters. Prior to the establishment of the section 1107 program, in May 2007, Executive Order 13434 established the NSPD Executive Steering Committee to facilitate the implementation of a national strategy that set forth the framework for what would become the NSPD Program.

Appendix II: Prior GAO Work on Interagency Collaboration and Coordination

GAO has a large body of work highlighting interagency coordination and collaboration efforts across the federal government, as well as the need for such efforts to facilitate national security and homeland security operations, among other things. For example, in 2009, we highlighted past work that identified situations in which a lack of interagency coordination and collaboration hindered national security objectives. The following provides summary examples of how interagency coordination and collaboration could have been improved over the last decade and how interagency rotations among personnel could improve collaboration and coordination.

In the years after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, we found that multiple federal agencies took action to address challenges and strategies in fulfilling our national security objectives, such as instituting interagency collaboration through intelligence sharing; however, in 2004, we continued to identify further actions that could be taken to fully address these needs. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation established a National Joint Terrorism Taskforce to assist with information sharing between agencies. However, we noted that a comprehensive and coordinated national plan to facilitate information-sharing on critical infrastructure was needed.

Between 2005 and 2008, we found that multiple federal agencies— including the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development—participated in efforts to build the capacity of key Iraqi ministries to govern the country. Our work found that there was no overarching direction and coordination from a lead entity, which contributed to U.S efforts not meeting their goal of key Iraqi ministries having the capacity to govern reconstruction projects.

In 2010, we found that coordination with federal partners is essential to DOD’s homeland security mission—including homeland defense and civil support. To improve coordination, we recommended that the department (1) establish a timeline and update and ensure the integration and comprehensiveness of DOD policy and guidance that delineates the roles and responsibilities of and relationships between DOD entities; (2) establish a timeline to develop and issue a partner guide that identifies the roles and responsibilities of DOD entities, processes, and agreed-upon approaches for interagency coordination for homeland defense and civil support efforts; (3) ensure implementation of DOD’s current instruction on the tracking of DOD liaisons’ assignments to other federal agencies, as well as the establishment of position descriptions for uniformed military and DOD civilian personnel; and (4) develop and issue additional workforce management policy and guidance regarding DOD liaisons to other federal agencies, as well as other federal agencies’ liaisons to DOD, to include routine staffing needs-assessments and position descriptions, among other things. DOD concurred with all four recommendations we made and has taken action to address those recommendations.

In 2010, we found that the activities of U.S. Southern Command demonstrated a number of key practices that enhance interagency coordination and collaboration to achieve their mission objectives. However, the military relief efforts in response to the 2008 earthquake in Haiti challenged the organizational collaborative structure of U.S. Southern Command. Specifically, we found that initial relief efforts were hindered by weaknesses in the command’s organizational structure and a lack of augmentation planning. We concluded that the U.S. Southern Command must have a structure that is not only prepared for military activities, but that can also be effective in supporting other stakeholders or interagency groups in meetings challenges like corruption, crime, and poverty in the region.

In 2012, we found that Department of State and Department of Defense’s rotational assignment programs, which include State’s Foreign Policy Advisor Program and the Army Command and General Staff College Interagency Fellowship program, help achieve collaboration-related results, as reported by program participants in a survey. Effective interagency rotation programs can achieve interagency collaboration results, by developing program participants’ collaboration skills and building interagency networks. To build on the success of these programs, we made seven recommendations to the Department of State, which included (1) expand the scope of current efforts by routinely evaluating the Foreign Policy Advisor Program’s effectiveness to determine if desired results are being achieved; (2) clarify how assignments will achieve shared national security goals; (3) work with host agency counterparts to develop orientation materials to maximize the benefit of the rotation; (4) routinely evaluate the effectiveness of State’s interagency rotations to other government agencies to determine if desired results are being achieved for participating individuals and agencies; (5) improve incentives for civil service personnel to participate in interagency rotations by providing guidance to supervisors on how to consider interagency experience for, among other things, ratings and awards; (6) improve incentives for supervisors to support civil service personnel’s participation in interagency rotations by establishing performance expectations that supervisors share human resources; and (7) develop guidance on how to ensure that the knowledge, skills, and networks gained during rotation can be used upon the personnel’s return. Additionally, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense (1) work with host agency counterparts to develop orientation materials to maximize the benefits of the rotational assignment and (2) routinely evaluate the effectiveness of the program to determine if desired results are being achieved.

More recently, in 2014, we found that interagency collaboration is necessary for assessing and closing capability gaps in federal agencies’ emergency support functions for unexpected catastrophic disasters—such as an earthquake or improvised nuclear device.

Lessons learned from the federal response to Hurricane Sandy underscored the importance of assessing gaps in interagency emergency response preparedness. The National Security Council’s after action report identified challenges that delayed the federal government’s response to the disaster. One such challenge was that some response efforts were conducted through intra-department approaches, rather than as part of a coordinated, integrated approach.

Appendix III: GAO’s Compliance Assessment of the Section 1107 Requirements

On March 29, 2014, the Committee on National Security Personnel issued the required National Security Human Capital Strategy—entitled The Human Capital Strategy for Interagency Personnel Rotations (Strategy)—in response to requirements set forth in section 1107 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. The statute included 19 requirements related to the development and issuance of the Strategy and the subsequent implementation and monitoring of the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program; however, for 2 of these requirements we had no basis to judge because these requirements are contingent on actions that had not yet occurred. Therefore, we did not assess these requirements. Table 2 provides our assessment of the extent to which the Committee, through its actions and issued Strategy, complied with each of the 17 section 1107 requirements we could assess.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Office of Personnel Management

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the above named contact, Vincent Balloon, Assistant Director; Jason Bair; Clifton Douglas, Jr; Rebecca Gambler; Terry Richardson; Justin Riordan; John Van Schaik; Jennifer Weber; Erik Wilkins-McKee; and Michael Willems made key contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products

Critical Technologies: Agency Initiatives Address Some Weaknesses, but Additional Interagency Collaboration Is Needed. GAO-15-288. Washington D.C.: February 10, 2015.

Managing for Results: Implementation Approaches Used to Enhance Collaboration in Interagency Groups. GAO-14-220. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2014.

Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms. GAO-12-1022. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2012.

Interagency Collaboration: State and Army Personnel Rotation Programs Can Build on Positive Results with Additional Preparation and Evaluation. GAO-12-386. Washington D.C.: March 9, 2012.

National Security: An Overview of Professional Development Activities Intended to Improve Interagency Collaboration. GAO-11-108. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2010.

National Security: Interagency Collaboration Practices and Challenges at DOD’s Southern and Africa Commands. GAO-10-962T. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.

Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation. GAO-10-801. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions. GAO-10-364. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.

Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing. GAO-09-904SP. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2009.

Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. GAO-06-15. Washington, D.C.: October 21, 2005.