Personnel Security Clearances: Opportunities Exist to Improve Quality Throughout the Process
Released: 2013-11-13T00:00:00

Letter

Agencies’ Roles and Responsibilities in the Personnel Security Clearance Process

Several agencies in the executive branch have key roles and responsibilities in the federal government’s personnel security clearance process. In a 2008 memorandum, the President called for a reform of the security clearance and suitability determination processes and subsequently issued Executive Order 13467, which designates the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as the Security Executive Agent. As such, the DNI is responsible for developing policies and procedures to help ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of background investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information and eligibility to hold a sensitive position. Positions designated as sensitive are any positions within a department or agency where the occupant could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse effect on national security.

Further, Executive Order 13467 established a Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council, commonly called the Performance Accountability Council, that is accountable to the President for achieving the goals of the reform effort, which include an efficient, practical, reciprocal, and aligned system for investigating and determining eligibility for access to classified information. Under the executive order, this council is responsible for driving implementation of the reform effort, including ensuring the alignment of security and suitability processes, holding agencies accountable for implementation, and establishing goals and metrics for progress. The order also appointed the Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as the chair of the council.heads shall assist the Performance Accountability Council and executive agents in carrying out any function under the order, as well as implementing any policies or procedures developed pursuant to the order.

In addition, the executive order states that agency Executive branch agencies that request background investigations use the information from investigative reports to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a personnel security clearance. Two of the agencies that grant the most security clearances are DOD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DOD accounts for the majority of all personnel security clearances, and spent $787 million on suitability and security clearance background investigations in fiscal year 2011. Investigators—often contractors—from Federal Investigative Services within the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conduct the investigations for most of the federal government. DOD is OPM’s largest customer, and its Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) is responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of DOD policy, programs, and guidance for personnel, physical, industrial, information, operations, chemical/biological, and DOD Special Access Program security. Additionally, the Defense Security Service, under the authority, direction, and control of USD(I), manages and administers the DOD portion of the National Industrial Security Program for the DOD components and other federal agencies by agreement, as well as providing security education and training, among other things.

DHS spent more than $57 million on suitability and security clearance background investigations in fiscal year 2011. Within DHS, the Chief Security Officer develops, implements, and oversees the department’s security policies, programs, and standards; delivers security training and education to DHS personnel; and provides security support to the DHS components. The Chief of DHS’s Personnel Security Division, under the direction of the Chief Security Officer, has responsibility for personnel security and suitability policies, programs, and standards, including procedures for granting, denying, and revoking access to classified information as well as initiating and adjudicating personnel security and suitability background investigations and periodic reinvestigations of applicants. Within the DHS components, the component Chief Security Officers implement established personnel security directives and policies within their respective components.

The personnel security clearance process has also been the subject of congressional oversight and statutory reporting requirements. Section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 prompted government-wide suitability and security clearance reform. The act required, among other matters, an annual report to Congress—in February of each year from 2006 through 2011—about progress and key measurements on the timeliness of granting security clearances. It specifically required those reports to include the periods of time required for conducting investigations and adjudicating or granting clearances. However, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act requirement for the executive branch to report annually on its timeliness expired in 2011. More recently, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010 established a new requirement that the President annually report to Congress the total amount of time required to process certain security clearance determinations for the previous fiscal year for each element of The Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010 the Intelligence Community.additionally requires that those annual reports include the total number of active security clearances throughout the United States government, to include both government employees and contractors. Unlike the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 reporting requirement, the requirement to submit these annual reports does not expire.

Phases of the Personnel Security Process

To help ensure the trustworthiness and reliability of personnel in positions with access to classified information, executive branch agencies rely on a personnel security clearance process that includes multiple phases: requirements determination, application, investigation, adjudication, appeals (if applicable, where a clearance has been denied), and reinvestigation (where applicable, for renewal or upgrade of an existing clearance). Figure 1 illustrates the steps in the personnel security clearance process, which is representative of the general process followed by most executive branch agencies and includes procedures for appeals and renewals. While different departments and agencies may have slightly different personnel security clearance processes, the phases that follow are illustrative of a typical process. Since 1997, federal agencies have followed a common set of personnel security investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines for determining whether federal civilian workers, military personnel, and others, such as private industry personnel contracted by the government, are eligible to hold a security clearance.

Executive branch agencies first determine which of their positions— military, civilian, or private-industry contractors—require access to classified information and, therefore, which people must apply for and undergo a personnel security clearance investigation. This involves assessing the risk and sensitivity level associated with that position, to determine whether it requires access to classified information and, if required, the level of access. Security clearances are generally categorized into three levels: top secret, secret, and confidential. The level of classification denotes the degree of protection required for information and the amount of damage that unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to national defense.

A sound requirements process is important because requests for clearances for positions that do not need a clearance or need a lower level of clearance increase investigative workloads and costs. A high volume of clearances continue to be processed and a sound requirements determination process is needed to effectively manage costs, since agencies spend significant amounts annually on national security and other background investigations. In addition to cost implications, limiting the access to classified information and reducing the associated risks to national security underscore the need for executive branch agencies to have a sound process to determine which positions require a security clearance.

Agency heads are responsible for designating positions within their respective agencies as sensitive if the occupant of that position could, by virtue of the nature of the position, bring about a material adverse effect on national security. In addition, Executive Order 12968, issued in 1995, makes the heads of agencies—including executive branch agencies and the military departments—responsible for establishing and maintaining an effective program to ensure that access to classified information by each employee is clearly consistent with the interests of national security. This order also states that, subject to certain exceptions, eligibility for access to classified information shall only be requested and granted on the basis of a demonstrated, foreseeable need for access. Further, part 732 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides requirements and procedures for the designation of national security positions, which include positions that (1) involve activities of the government that are concerned with the protection of the nation from foreign aggression or espionage, and (2) require regular use of or access to classified national security information.

Part 732 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations also states that most federal government positions that could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse effect on national security must be designated as a sensitive position and require a sensitivity level designation. The sensitivity level designation determines the type of background investigation required, with positions designated at a greater sensitivity level requiring a more extensive background investigation. Part 732 establishes three sensitivity levels—special-sensitive, critical- sensitive, and noncritical-sensitive—which are described in figure 2. According to OPM, positions that an agency designates as special- sensitive and critical-sensitive require a background investigation that typically results in a top secret clearance. Noncritical-sensitive positions typically require an investigation that supports a secret or confidential clearance. OPM also defines non-sensitive positions that do not have a national security element, and thus do not require a security clearance, but still require a designation of risk for suitability purposes. That risk level informs the type of investigation required for those positions. Those investigations include aspects of an individual’s character or conduct that may have an effect on the integrity or efficiency of the service.

Figure 2 illustrates the process used by both DOD and DHS to determine the need for a personnel security clearance for a federal civilian position generally used government-wide.

Once an applicant is selected for a position that requires a personnel security clearance, the applicant must obtain a security clearance in order to gain access to classified information. To determine whether an investigation would be required, the agency requesting a security clearance investigation conducts a check of existing personnel security databases to determine whether there is an existing security clearance investigation underway or whether the individual has already been favorably adjudicated for a clearance in accordance with current standards. If such a security clearance does not exist for that individual, a security officer from an executive branch agency (1) requests an investigation of an individual requiring a clearance; (2) forwards a personnel security questionnaire (Standard Form 86) to the individual to complete using OPM’s electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) system or a paper copy; (3) reviews the completed questionnaire; and (4) sends the questionnaire and supporting documentation, such as fingerprints and signed waivers, to OPM or its investigation service provider.

Investigation Phase

During the investigation phase, investigators—often contractors—from OPM’s Federal Investigative Services use federal investigative standards and OPM’s internal guidance to conduct and document the investigation of the applicant. The scope of information gathered in an investigation depends on the needs of the client agency and the personnel security clearance requirements of an applicant’s position, as well as whether the investigation is for an initial clearance or a reinvestigation to renew a clearance. For example, in an investigation for a top secret clearance, investigators gather additional information through more time-consuming efforts, such as traveling to conduct in-person interviews to corroborate information about an applicant’s employment and education. However, many background investigation types have similar components. For instance, for all investigations, information that applicants provide on electronic applications are checked against numerous databases. Both secret and top secret investigations contain credit and criminal history checks, while top secret investigations also contain citizenship, public record, and spouse checks as well as reference interviews and an Enhanced Subject Interview to gain insight into an applicant’s character.

Table 1 highlights the investigative components generally associated with the secret and top secret clearance levels. After OPM, or the designated provider, completes the background investigation, the resulting investigative report is provided to the requesting agencies for their internal adjudicators.

In December 2012, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and OPM jointly issued a revised version of the federal investigative standards for the conduct of background investigations for individuals that work for or on behalf of the federal government. According to October 31, 2013 testimony by an ODNI official, the revised standards will be implemented through a phased approach beginning in 2014 and continuing through 2017.

Adjudication and Appeals Phases

During the adjudication phase, adjudicators from the hiring agency use the information from the investigative report along with federal adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a security clearance.adjudicative guidelines specify that adjudicators consider 13 specific areas that elicit information about (1) conduct that could raise security concerns and (2) factors that could allay those security concerns and To make clearance eligibility decisions, the permit granting a clearance.weighing of a number of variables, to include disqualifying and mitigating factors, known as the “whole-person” concept. For example, when a person’s life history shows evidence of unreliability or untrustworthiness, questions can arise as to whether the person can be relied on and trusted to exercise the responsibility necessary for working in a secure environment where protecting national security is paramount. As part of the adjudication process, the adjudicative guidelines require agencies to determine whether a prospective individual meets the adjudicative criteria for determining eligibility, including personal conduct and financial considerations. If an individual has conditions that raise a security concern or may be disqualifying, the adjudicator evaluates whether there are other factors that mitigate such risks (such as a good-faith effort to repay a federal tax debt). On the basis of this assessment, the agency may make a risk-management decision to grant the security-clearance eligibility determination, possibly with a warning that future incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of access.

The adjudication process is a careful If a clearance is denied or revoked, appeals of the adjudication decision are generally possible. We have work underway to review the process for security clearance revocations. We expect to issue a report on this process in the spring of 2014.

Reinvestigation Phase

Once an individual has obtained a personnel security clearance and as long as they remain in a position that requires access to classified national security information, that individual is reinvestigated periodically at intervals that are dependent on the level of security clearance. For example, top secret clearance holders are reinvestigated every 5 years, and secret clearance holders are reinvestigated every 10 years. Some of the information gathered during a reinvestigation would focus specifically on the period of time since the last approved clearance, such as a check of local law enforcement agencies where an individual lived and worked since the last investigation.

Agencies Do Not Consistently Assess Quality Throughout the Personnel Security Clearance Process

Executive branch agencies do not consistently assess quality throughout the personnel security clearance process, in part because they have not fully developed and implemented metrics to measure quality in key aspects of the personnel security clearance process. To promote oversight and positive outcomes, such as maximizing the likelihood that individuals who are security risks will be scrutinized more closely, we have emphasized, since the late 1990s, the need to build and monitor quality throughout the personnel security clearance process. While our work historically was focused on DOD, particularly since we placed DOD’s personnel security clearance program on our high-risk list in 2005 because of delays in completing clearances, we have included DHS in our most recent reviews of personnel security clearance issues. Having assessment tools and performance metrics in place is a critical initial step toward instituting a program to monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of corrective measures.

Guidance Not Developed for Determining if Positions Require a Clearance or for Reviewing Existing Position Designations

In July 2012, we reported that the DNI, as the Security Executive Agent, had not provided agencies clearly defined policy and procedures to consistently determine if a position requires a personnel security clearance, or established guidance to require agencies to review and revise or validate existing federal civilian position designations. As a result, we concluded that DHS and DOD, along with other executive branch agencies, do not have reasonable assurance that security clearance position designations are correct, which could compromise national security if positions are underdesignated, or create unnecessary and costly investigative coverage if positions are overdesignated.

In the absence of clear guidance, agencies are using a position designation tool that OPM designed to determine the sensitivity and risk levels of civilian positions that, in turn, inform the type of investigation needed. This tool—namely, the Position Designation of National Security and Public Trust Positions—is intended to enable a user to evaluate a position’s national security and suitability requirements so as to determine a position’s sensitivity and risk levels, which in turn dictate the type of background investigation that will be required for the individual who will occupy that position. Both DOD and DHS components use the tool. In addition, DOD issued guidance in September 2011 and August 2012 requiring its personnel to use OPM’s tool to determine the proper position sensitivity designation. A DHS instruction requires personnel to designate all DHS positions—including positions in the DHS components—by using OPM’s position sensitivity designation guidance, which is the basis of the tool.

OPM audits, however, have found inconsistency in these position designations, and some agencies described problems implementing OPM’s tool. For example, during the course of our 2012 review, DOD and DHS officials raised concerns regarding the guidance provided through the tool and expressed that they had difficulty implementing it. Specifically, officials from DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement stated that the use of the tool occasionally resulted in inconsistency, such as over- or underdesignating a position, and expressed a need for additional clear, easily interpreted guidance on designating national security positions. DOD officials stated that they have had difficulty implementing the tool because it focuses more on suitability than security, and the national security aspects of DOD’s positions are of more concern to them than the suitability aspects. Further, although the DNI was designated as the Security Executive Agent in 2008, ODNI officials noted that the DNI did not have input into recent revisions of OPM’s position designation tool.

As a result, we recommended that the DNI, in coordination with the Director of OPM and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue clearly defined policy and procedures for federal agencies to follow when determining if federal civilian positions require a personnel security clearance. In written comments on our July 2012 report, the ODNI concurred with this recommendation. In May 2013, ODNI and OPM jointly drafted a proposed revision to the federal regulations on position designation which, if finalized in its current form, would provide additional requirements and examples of position duties at each sensitivity level. We also recommended that once those policies and procedures are in place, the DNI and the Director of OPM, in their roles as executive agents, collaborate to revise the position designation tool to reflect the new guidance. ODNI and OPM concurred with this recommendation and recently told us that they are in the process of revising the tool.

In July 2012, we also reported that the executive branch did not have a consistent process for reviewing and validating existing security clearance requirements for federal civilian positions. According to Executive Order 12968, the number of employees that each agency determines is eligible for access to classified information shall be kept to the minimum required, and, subject to certain exceptions, eligibility shall be requested or granted only on the basis of a demonstrated, foreseeable need for access. During our 2012 review of several DOD and DHS components, we found that officials were aware of the need to keep the number of security clearances to a minimum but were not always subject to a standard requirement to review and validate the security clearance needs of existing positions on a periodic basis. We found, instead, that agencies’ policies provided for a variety of practices for reviewing the clearance needs of federal civilian positions. In addition, agency officials told us that their policies were implemented inconsistently.

DOD 5200.2-R, Department of Defense Personnel Security Program (January 1987, reissued incorporating changes Feb. 23, 1996), as modified by Under Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Implementation of the Position Designation Automated Tool (May 10, 2011). annually during the performance review process to ensure that the duties and responsibilities on the position description are up-to-date and accurate. However, officials stated that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement does not have policies or requirements in place to ensure any particular level of detail in that review.

During our 2012 review, DOD and DHS officials acknowledged that overdesignating a position can result in expenses for unnecessary investigations. When a position is overdesignated, additional resources are unnecessarily spent conducting the investigation and adjudication of a background investigation that exceeds agency requirements. Without a requirement to consistently review, revise, or validate existing security clearance position designations, we concluded that executive branch agencies—such as DOD and DHS—may be hiring and budgeting for both initial and periodic security clearance investigations using position descriptions and security clearance requirements that do not reflect national security needs. Moreover, since reviews were not being done consistently, DOD, DHS, and other executive branch agencies did not have reasonable assurance that they were keeping to a minimum the number of positions that require security clearances on the basis of a demonstrated and foreseeable need for access.

Therefore, we recommended in July 2012 that the DNI, in coordination with the Director of OPM and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue guidance to require executive branch agencies to periodically review and revise or validate the designation of all federal civilian positions. In written comments on that report, the ODNI concurred with this recommendation and stated that as duties and responsibilities of federal positions may be subject to change, it planned to work with OPM and other executive branch agencies to ensure that position designation policies and procedures include a provision for periodic reviews. OPM stated in its written comments to our report that it would work with the DNI on guidance concerning periodic reviews of existing designations.

ODNI and OPM are currently in the process of finalizing revisions to the position designation federal regulation. As part of our ongoing processes to routinely monitor the status of agency actions to address our prior recommendations, we note that the proposed regulation would newly require agencies to conduct a one-time reassessment of position designations within 24 months of the final regulation’s effective date, which is an important step towards ensuring that the current designations of national security positions are accurate. However, the national security environment and the duties and descriptions of positions may change over time, thus the importance of periodic review or validation. The proposed regulation, if finalized in its current form, would not require a periodic reassessment of positions’ need for access to classified information as we recommended. We believe this needs to be done and, as part of monitoring the status of our recommendation, we will continue to review the finalized federal regulation and any related guidance that directs position designation to determine whether periodic review or validation is required.

Quality of OPM Investigative Reports Not Measured

As of August 2013, OPM had not yet implemented metrics to measure the completeness of its investigative reports—results from background investigations—although we have previously identified deficiencies in these reports. OPM supplies about 90 percent of all federal clearance investigations, including those for DOD. For example, in May 2009 we reported that, with respect to DOD initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports. We independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance decisions were missing at least one type of documentation The type of documentation required by federal investigative standards.most often missing from investigative reports was verification of all of the applicant’s employment, followed by information from the required number of social references for the applicant and complete security forms. We also estimated that 12 percent of the 3,500 investigative reports did not contain a required personal subject interview. Officials within various executive branch agencies have noted to us that the information gathered during the interview and investigative portion of the process is essential for making adjudicative decisions.

At the time of our 2009 review, OPM did not measure the completeness of its investigative reports, which limited the agency’s ability to explain the extent or the reasons why some reports were incomplete. As a result of the incompleteness of OPM’s investigative reports on DOD personnel, we recommended in May 2009 that OPM measure the frequency with which its investigative reports meet federal investigative standards, so that the executive branch can identify the factors leading to incomplete reports and take corrective actions.recommendation.

OPM did not agree or disagree with our In a subsequent February 2011 report, we noted that OMB, ODNI, DOD, and OPM leaders had provided congressional members with metrics to assess the quality of the security clearance process, including investigative reports and other aspects of the process. Rapid Assessment of Incomplete Security Evaluations was one tool the executive branch agencies planned to use for measuring quality, or completeness, of OPM’s background investigations.according to an OPM official in June 2012, OPM chose not to use this tool. Instead, OPM stated that it opted to develop another tool. In following up on our 2009 recommendations, as of August 2013, OPM had not provided enough details on its tool for us to determine if the tool had met the intent of our 2009 recommendation, and included the attributes of successful performance measures identified in best practices, nor could we determine the extent to which the tool was being used.

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2011). not reflect the quality of OPM’s total investigation workload. We are beginning work to further review OPM’s actions to improve the quality of investigations.

We have also reported that deficiencies in investigative reports affect the quality and timeliness of the adjudicative process. Specifically, in November 2010, we reported that agency officials who utilize OPM as their investigative service provider cited challenges related to deficient investigative reports as a factor that slows agencies’ abilities to make adjudicative decisions. The quality and completeness of investigative reports directly affects adjudicator workloads, including whether additional steps are required before adjudications can be made, as well as agency costs. For example, some agency officials noted that OPM investigative reports do not include complete copies of associated police reports and criminal record checks. Several agency officials stated that in order to avoid further costs or delays that would result from working with OPM, they often choose to perform additional steps internally to obtain missing information. According to ODNI and OPM officials, OPM investigators provide a summary of police and criminal reports and assert that there is no policy requiring inclusion of copies of the original records. However, ODNI officials also stated that adjudicators may want or need entire records as critical elements may be left out of the investigator’s summary. For example, according to Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals officials, in one case, an investigator’s summary of a police report incorrectly identified the subject as a thief when the subject was actually the victim.

Some Steps Taken to Determine Completeness of Adjudicative Files

To address issues identified in our 2009 report regarding the quality of DOD adjudications, DOD has taken some intermittent steps to implement measures to determine the completeness of its adjudicative files. In 2009, we reported that some clearances were granted by DOD adjudicators even though some required data were missing from the OPM investigative reports used to make such determinations. For example, we estimated that 22 percent of the adjudicative files for about 3,500 initial top secret clearances that were adjudicated favorably did not contain all the required documentation, even though DOD regulations require that adjudicators maintain a record of each favorable and unfavorable adjudication decision and document the rationale for granting clearance eligibility to applicants with security concerns revealed during the investigation. Documentation most frequently missing from adjudicative files was the rationale for granting security clearances to applicants with security concerns related to foreign influence, financial considerations, and criminal conduct. At the time of our 2009 review, DOD did not measure the completeness of its adjudicative files, which limited the agency’s ability to explain the extent or the reasons why some files are incomplete.

In 2009, we made two recommendations to improve the quality of adjudicative files. First, we recommended that DOD measure the frequency with which adjudicative files meet requirements, so that the executive branch can identify the factors leading to incomplete files and include the results of such measurement in annual reports to Congress on clearances. In November 2009, DOD subsequently issued a memorandum that established a tool to measure the frequency with which adjudicative files meet the requirements of DOD regulation. Specifically, the DOD memorandum stated that it would use a tool called the Review of Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and Rationales, or RADAR, to gather specific information about adjudication processes at the adjudication facilities and assess the quality of adjudicative documentation. In following up on our 2009 recommendations, as of 2012, a DOD official stated that RADAR had been used in fiscal year 2010 to evaluate some adjudications, but was not used in fiscal year 2011 due to funding shortfalls. DOD stated that it restarted the use of RADAR in fiscal year 2012.

Second, we recommended that DOD issue guidance to clarify when adjudicators may use incomplete investigative reports as the basis for granting clearances. In response to our recommendation, DOD’s November 2009 guidance that established RADAR also outlines the minimum documentation requirements adjudicators must adhere to when documenting personnel security clearance determinations for cases with potentially damaging information. In addition, DOD issued guidance in March 2010 that clarifies when adjudicators may use incomplete investigative reports as the basis for granting clearances. This guidance provides standards that can be used for the sufficient explanation of incomplete investigative reports.

Extent of Clearance Reciprocity Not Measured

Executive branch agencies have not yet developed and implemented metrics to track the reciprocity of personnel security clearances, which is an agency’s acceptance of a background investigation or clearance determination completed by any authorized investigative or adjudicative agency, although some efforts have been made to develop quality metrics. Executive branch agency officials have stated that reciprocity is regularly granted, as it is an opportunity to save time as well as reduce costs and investigative workloads; however, we reported in 2010 that agencies do not consistently and comprehensively track the extent to which reciprocity is granted government-wide. ODNI guidance requires, except in limited circumstances, that all Intelligence Community elements “accept all in-scope security clearance or access determinations.” Additionally, OMB guidance requires agencies to honor a clearance when (1) the prior clearance was not granted on an interim or temporary basis; (2) the prior clearance investigation is current and in-scope; (3) there is no new adverse information already in the possession of the gaining agency; and (4) there are no conditions, deviations, waivers, or unsatisfied additional requirements (such as polygraphs) if the individual is being considered for access to highly sensitive programs.

While the Performance Accountability Council has identified reciprocity as a government-wide strategic goal, we have found that agencies do not consistently and comprehensively track when reciprocity is granted, and lack a standard metric for tracking reciprocity. Further, while OPM and the Performance Accountability Council have developed quality metrics for reciprocity, the metrics do not measure the extent to which reciprocity is being granted. For example, OPM created a metric in early 2009 to track reciprocity, but this metric only measures the number of investigations requested from OPM that are rejected based on the existence of a previous investigation and does not track the number of cases in which an existing security clearance was or was not successfully honored by the agency. Without comprehensive, standardized metrics to track reciprocity and consistent documentation of the findings, decision makers will not have a complete picture of the extent to which reciprocity is granted or the challenges that agencies face when attempting to honor previously granted security clearances.

In 2010, we reported that executive branch officials routinely honor other agencies’ security clearances, and personnel security clearance information is shared between OPM, DOD, and, to some extent, Intelligence Community databases. agencies find it necessary to take additional steps to address limitations with available information on prior investigations, such as insufficient information in the databases or variances in the scope of investigations, before granting reciprocity. For instance, OPM has taken steps to ensure certain clearance data necessary for reciprocity are available to adjudicators, such as holding interagency meetings to determine new data fields to include in shared data. However, we also found that the shared information available to adjudicators contains summary-level detail that may not be complete. As a result, agencies may take steps to obtain additional information, which creates challenges to immediately granting reciprocity.

GAO-11-65. adjudicators, according to agency officials, a subject’s prior clearance investigation and adjudication may not meet the standards of the inquiring agency. Although OPM has developed some training, security clearance investigators and adjudicators are not required to complete a certain type or number of classes. As a result, the extent to which investigators and adjudicators receive training varies by agency. Consequently, as we have previously reported, agencies are reluctant to be accountable for investigations and/or adjudications conducted by other agencies or organizations. To achieve fuller reciprocity, clearance-granting agencies seek to have confidence in the quality of prior investigations and adjudications.

Consequently, we recommended in 2010 that the Deputy Director of Management, OMB, in the capacity as Chair of the Performance Accountability Council, should develop comprehensive metrics to track reciprocity and then report the findings from the expanded tracking to Congress. Although OMB agreed with our recommendation, a 2011 ODNI report found that Intelligence Community agencies experienced difficulty reporting on reciprocity. The agencies are required to report on a quarterly basis the number of security clearance determinations granted based on a prior existing clearance as well as the number not granted when a clearance existed. The numbers of reciprocal determinations made and denied are categorized by the individual’s originating and receiving organizational type: (1) government to government, (2) government to contractor, (3) contractor to government, and (4) contractor to contractor. The report stated that data fields necessary to collect the information described above do not currently reside in any of the datasets available and the process was completed in an agency specific, semi-manual method. Further, the Deputy Assistant Director for Special Security of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence noted in testimony in June 2012 that measuring reciprocity is difficult, and despite an abundance of anecdotes, real data is hard to come by. To address this problem, ODNI is developing a web-based form for individuals to submit their experience with reciprocity issues to the ODNI. According to ODNI, this will allow them to collect empirical data, perform systemic trend analysis, and assist agencies with achieving workable solutions.

Recent Efforts and Sustained Leadership Could Facilitate Progress in Assessing Quality

Several efforts are underway to review the security clearance process, and those efforts, combined with sustained leadership attention, could help facilitate progress in assessing and improving the quality of the security clearance process. After the September 16, 2013 shooting at the Washington Navy Yard, the President directed the Office of Management and Budget, in coordination with ODNI and OPM, to conduct a government-wide review into the oversight, nature, and implementation of security and suitability standards for federal employees and contractors. In addition, in September 2013, the Secretary of Defense directed an independent review to identify and recommend actions that address gaps or deficiencies in DOD programs, policies, and procedures regarding security at DOD installations and the granting and renewal of security clearances for DOD employees and contractor personnel. The primary objective of this review is to determine whether there are weaknesses in DOD programs, policies, or procedures regarding physical security at DOD installations and the security clearance and reinvestigation process that can be strengthened to prevent a similar tragedy.

As previously discussed, DOD and DHS account for the majority of security clearances within the federal government. We initially placed DOD’s personnel security clearance program on our high-risk list in 2005 because of delays in completing clearances. It remained on our list until 2011 because of ongoing concerns about delays in processing clearances and problems with the quality of investigations and adjudications. In February 2011, we removed DOD’s personnel security clearance program from our high-risk list largely because of the department’s demonstrated progress in expediting the amount of time We also noted DOD’s efforts to develop and processing clearances.implement tools to evaluate the quality of investigations and adjudications.

Even with the significant progress leading to removal of DOD’s program from our high-risk list, the Comptroller General noted in June 2012 that sustained leadership would be necessary to continue to implement, monitor, and update outcome-focused performance measures.initial development of some tools and metrics to monitor and track quality not only for DOD but government-wide were positive steps; however, full implementation of these tools and measures government-wide have not yet been realized. While progress in DOD’s personnel security clearance program resulted in the removal of this area from our high-risk list, significant government-wide challenges remain in ensuring that personnel security clearance investigations and adjudications are high-quality. However, if the oversight and leadership that helped address the timeliness issues focuses now on the current problems associated with quality, we believe that progress in helping executive branch agencies to assess the quality of the security clearance process could be made.

In conclusion, to avoid the risk of damaging, unauthorized disclosures of classified information, oversight of the reform efforts to measure and improve the quality of the security clearance process are imperative next steps. The progress that was made with respect to expediting the amount of time processing clearances would not have been possible without committed and sustained congressional oversight and the leadership of the Performance Accountability Council. Further actions are needed now to fully develop and implement metrics to oversee quality at every step in the process. We will continue to monitor the outcome of the agency actions discussed above to address our outstanding recommendations.

Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.

GAO Contacts and Acknowledgment

For further information on this testimony, please contact Brenda S. Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, who may be reached at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony include David E. Moser (Assistant Director), Jim Ashley, Renee S. Brown, Ryan D’Amore, and Michael Willems.

Related GAO Products

Personnel Security Clearances: Full Development and Implementation of Metrics Needed to Measure Quality of Process. GAO-14-157T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2013.

Personnel Security Clearances: Further Actions Needed to Improve the Process and Realize Efficiencies. GAO-13-728T. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2013.

Managing for Results: Agencies Should More Fully Develop Priority Goals under the GPRA Modernization Act. GAO-13-174. Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2013.

Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for Determining Civilian Position Requirements. GAO-12-800. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2012.

Personnel Security Clearances: Continuing Leadership and Attention Can Enhance Momentum Gained from Reform Effort. GAO-12-815T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2012. 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue. GAO-12-342SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

Background Investigations: Office of Personnel Management Needs to Improve Transparency of Its Pricing and Seek Cost Savings. GAO-12-197. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington, D.C.: February 17, 2011.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2011.

Personnel Security Clearances: Overall Progress Has Been Made to Reform the Governmentwide Security Clearance Process. GAO-11-232T. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 2010.

Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Improve Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum. GAO-11-65. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2010.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s Progress on Addressing Timeliness and Quality Issues. GAO-11-185T. Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2010.

Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process. GAO-10-117T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce Delays but Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain Reform Efforts. GAO-09-684T. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process. GAO-09-488. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting, Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January 2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008.

Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.

Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement. GAO-08-551T. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008.

Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. GAO-08-470T. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found for Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January 2007.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to Improve the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain. GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January 2005.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.

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