Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Collection of Unmanned Aerial Systems and Aerostats Data
Released: 2017-02-16T00:00:00

Letter

Background

CBP’s Predator B UAS Program

CBP began operation of Predator B aircraft in fiscal year 2006, and as of fiscal year 2016, operates nine Predator B aircraft from four AMO National Air Security Operations Centers (NASOC) in Arizona, Florida, Texas, and North Dakota. Based on CBP data provided to us for fiscal year 2015, annual obligations for CBP’s Predator B program were approximately $42 million and the cost per flight hour was $5,878. AMO is responsible for operation of CBP’s Predator B aircraft and coordinates with other CBP components and government agencies to perform federal border security activities. CBP’s Predator B aircraft are equipped with video and radar sensors primarily to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. For more information on sensors equipped on Predator B aircraft, see figure 1. CBP’s Predator B aircraft are launched and recovered at its NASOCs in Sierra Vista, Arizona; Corpus Christi, Texas; and Grand Forks, North Dakota; while the NASOC in Jacksonville, Florida remotely operates Predator B aircraft launched from other NASOCs. Each NASOC where Predator B aircraft are launched and recovered is generally assigned a broad geographic area of responsibility (AOR); see figure 1 for more information.

CBP is responsible for operating Predator B aircraft in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) procedures for authorizing UAS operations in the national airspace system. Pursuant to FAA requirements, all Predator B flights must comply with procedures for obtaining Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA). The COA- designated airspace establishes operational corridors for Predator B activity both along and within 100 miles of the northern border, and along and within 25 to 60 miles of the southern border, exclusive of urban areas. COAs issued by FAA to CBP also include airspace for training missions which involve take offs and landings around a designated NASOC and transit missions to move Predator B aircraft between NASOCs. CBP reported 80 percent of Predator B aircraft flight hours were along border and coastal areas of the United States in COA- designated airspace (see fig. 2).

CBP’s Tactical Aerostat Program

CBP began operation of tactical aerostats in August 2012 in south Texas. As of the end of fiscal year 2016, it had deployed five tactical aerostats in Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley sector and one tactical aerostat in Laredo sector. For locations of CBP’s tactical aerostats, see figure 3.

Based on data CBP provided to us for fiscal year 2015, annual obligations for CBP’s tactical aerostat program were approximately $41 million and the cost per flight hour ranged between $424 to $677, depending on the type of aerostat.

CBP currently operates three types of tactical aerostats equipped with video surveillance cameras that vary in size and altitude of operation. CBP is responsible for operating its tactical aerostats in accordance with FAA regulations through the issuance of a COA authorizing use of moored balloons. CBP’s tactical aerostats were obtained through its Department of Defense ReUse program and are comprised of a mix of Department of Defense-loaned and CBP-owned equipment. CBP manages the technology and operation of each tactical aerostat site through contracts, and Border Patrol agents operate tactical aerostat video surveillance cameras and provide security at each site. See figure 4 for a photograph of a CBP tactical aerostat.

CBP’s TARS Program

The former U.S. Customs Service began the TARS program in 1978 with the establishment of its first site located in Florida followed by a second site in Arizona in 1983. From 1988 to 1991, the U.S. Customs Service established additional TARS sites at Yuma, Arizona, and three sites in Texas, including Marfa, Eagle Pass and Rio Grande City. In 1992, management of the TARS program was transferred to the Department of Defense, with the U.S. Air Force designated as the executive agent. During the Department of Defense’s management of the TARS program, sites were located in Florida, Texas, Arizona, Puerto Rico and the Bahamas.

In July 2013, the TARS program was transferred from the Department of Defense to DHS with a total of eight sites. At the time of transfer, two TARS sites were inoperable due to past system crashes and CBP restored operations at those sites in September 2014. Based on data CBP provided to us for fiscal year 2015, annual obligations for CBP’s TARS program were approximately $45 million and the cost per flight hour was about $950. CBP manages the technology and operation of each TARS site through contracts and CBP’s Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) has operational control over each asset. As of fiscal year 2016, there were a total of eight TARS sites along the southern U.S. border and in Puerto Rico. For a map of TARS sites, see figure 3 above.

CBP Uses UAS and Aerostats for a Variety of Border Security Activities, but Could Benefit from Documented Procedures for Coordinating Predator B Operations with Other Government Agencies

CBP Uses Predator B UAS to Support a Variety of Activities and Government Agencies, but Could Benefit from Documenting Coordination Procedures

CBP uses Predator B aircraft to conduct various border security activities and to support a range of government agencies. First, with regard to the types of activities for which Predator B aircraft are used, our analysis of CBP data showed that over 80 percent of Predator B missions were in support of law enforcement and extended border missions, as shown in table 1. In particular, about 67 percent of missions were for law enforcement activities, such as use of Predator B aircraft to locate individuals illegally crossing the border and provide aerial surveillance during investigations in joint operations with federal law enforcement agencies and during special security events like Pope Francis’s visit to Juarez, Mexico, in February 2016. About 16 percent of missions were in support of extended border operations, which are operations beyond U.S. territorial lands and seas in support of federal and international law enforcement partnerships. For example, CBP uses its Predator B aircraft for interdiction operations with Joint Interagency Task Force – South, including maritime patrol missions in the source and transit zones, which encompass the area from South America through the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean that is used to transport illicit drugs to the United States (transit zone) from drug producing countries in South America (source zone). In addition, about 14 percent of missions were for training, and about 1 percent was for non-enforcement activities, such as for natural disaster recovery efforts.

With regard to CBP’s use of Predator B aircraft in support of government agencies, based on our analysis of CBP data, we found that half of all Predator B flight hours from fiscal years 2013 through 2016 (51 percent) were in support of Border Patrol to help, among other things, in its efforts to detect the illegal entry of goods and people between U.S. ports of entry. We also found that 32 percent of Predator B flight hours from fiscal years 2013 through 2016 were in support of AMO, such as for missions to train AMO UAS pilots. CBP’s Predator B operations in support of other federal agencies accounted for 15 percent of Predator B flight hours from fiscal years 2013 through 2016, such as conducting aerial surveillance for investigations during controlled deliveries of illegal contraband by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. We found that 2 percent of Predator B flight hours from fiscal years 2013 through 2016 were attributed to support for state and local government agencies. For example, CBP’s Predator B operations in support of local law enforcement agencies have included performing aerial surveillance during officer safety incidents, such as an active shooting incident.

As part of using Predator B aircraft to support other government agencies, CBP has established various mechanisms to coordinate Predator B operations. For example, at NASOCs, personnel from other CBP components are assigned to support and coordinate mission activities involving Predator B operations. Border Patrol agents assigned to support NASOCs assist with directing agents and resources to support its law enforcement operations and collecting information on asset assists provided for by Predator B operations. Further, two of DHS’s joint task forces help coordinate Predator B operations. Specifically, Joint Task Force – West, Arizona and Joint Task Force – West, South Texas coordinate air asset tasking and operations, including Predator B operations and assist in the transmission of requests for Predator B support and communication with local field units during operations, such as Border Patrol stations and AMO air branches. Further, CBP uses a dedicated system—called BigPipe—to coordinate Predator B operations. BigPipe distributes operational mission data to supported federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. In particular, BigPipe distributes real-time and recorded mission information, including information from sensors on AMO assets, including Predator B aircraft. According to CBP officials, BigPipe allows for seamless and efficient secure communication between AMO, Joint Task Force – West, Arizona, and other locations.

In addition to these mechanisms, CBP has also documented procedures for coordinating Predator B operations among its supported or partner agencies in Arizona specifically by developing a standard operating procedure for coordination of Predator B operations through its NASOC in Arizona. These documented procedures include a description of the responsibilities of participating agencies; procedures for sharing mission information and collecting asset assist information from supported agencies related to seizures and apprehensions; and requirements for reviewing and tasking of air support requests for Predator B aircraft from non-CBP government agencies. Joint Task Force – West, Arizona also created an air integration strategy outlining the surveillance assets and associated capabilities available to support operations in its AOR, including a model to guide use of air and ground assets, including Predator B aircraft and towers equipped with video and radar surveillance technology. According to CBP officials we met with in Arizona, the integration strategy, in conjunction with information on surveillance technology deployment, were used to help plan and prioritize Predator B patrol missions in areas lacking existing surveillance technology; for example, along federal and tribal lands in Tucson Border Patrol sector’s AOR.

However, CBP has not documented procedures for coordination of Predator B operations among its supported agencies through its NASOCs in Texas and North Dakota. CBP has established national policies for its Predator B operations that include policies for prioritization of Predator B missions and processes for submission and review of Predator B mission or air support requests. However, these national policies do not include coordination procedures specific to Predator B operating locations or NASOCs, such as local tasking of air support requests to Predator B versus other aircraft, procedures for sharing mission information across multiple locations and agencies, and collection and reporting of asset assist information from supported agencies during and after Predator B missions. For example in Texas, Predator B operations are coordinated in part through DHS’s Joint Task Force – West, South Texas and air support requests for Predator B aircraft may be submitted by government agencies to the NASOC in Texas. Without documented coordination procedures for Predator B operations in Texas, it is not clear how requests submitted to the NASOC in Texas are reviewed, prioritized, and coordinated with Joint Task Force – West, South Texas, including how both entities reach agreement on requests that may involve competing priorities.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that significant events should appear in management directives, policies, or operating manuals to help ensure management’s directives are carried out as intended. The Trade Facilitation Act also requires that, as part of standard operating procedures regarding use of UAS, AMO is to develop a formal procedure to determine how UAS mission requests from non- CBP law enforcement agencies are prioritized and coordinated. Further, CBP’s strategic plan states that integrating surveillance capabilities into the planning and execution of law enforcement operations is enabled by sound standards, procedures, and processes that require interagency coordination. CBP’s Predator B aircraft are national assets used primarily for detection and surveillance during law enforcement operations, independently and in coordination with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies throughout the United States. AMO officials acknowledged that developing documented coordination procedures for Predator B operations in North Dakota and Texas could strengthen ongoing coordination efforts; however, CBP has not yet taken actions to develop documented coordination procedures in those operating locations due to differences across those locations. For example, AMO officials told us that the current coordination process in Texas, which relies on direct operator to operator coordination, may be inefficient at times. Further, AMO officials stated that a coordination process through Joint Task Force – West, South Texas is under development and that documented coordination procedures for Predator B operations could strengthen CBP’s coordination with other government agencies. Without documenting its procedures for coordination of Predator B operations with supported agencies, CBP does not have reasonable assurance that practices at NASOCs in Texas and North Dakota align with existing policies and procedures for joint operations with other government agencies.

CBP Uses Tactical Aerostats to Detect Cross- Border Illegal Activity in South Texas

Within CBP, Border Patrol uses tactical aerostats to identify cross-border illegal activity through video surveillance cameras attached to an aerostat during flight, and these aerostats are deployed in south Texas. Border Patrol agents operate video surveillance cameras on tactical aerostats in flight from a local command and control center to detect, identify, monitor, and track items of interest. For example, Border Patrol agents can position video surveillance cameras to observe an item of interest such as a person attempting to illegally enter the United States from Mexico by crossing the Rio Grande River using a raft. Once an item of interest has been identified, a Border Patrol agent operating a video surveillance camera can relay information to other agents through direct land-mobile radio communication or through a Border Patrol station Tactical Operations Center. For an example of Border Patrol’s use of tactical aerostat technology, see figure 5.

In its Aerostat Operational Need Statement, Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley sector stated that video surveillance cameras on tactical aerostats in flight can be used to detect items of interest across wide coverage areas. The Operational Need Statement further stated that video surveillance cameras on tactical aerostats in flight can enhance surveillance coverage by increasing the elevation and viewing angle to overcome obstructions from vegetation and bends in the Rio Grande River, which limit the use of tower-mounted camera systems. Further, CBP reported that video surveillance cameras on tactical aerostats can view items of interest from a distance between 10 to 24 kilometers based on the type aerostat and altitude of operation.

Border Patrol agents also use tactical aerostats in south Texas to support bi-national law enforcement efforts between Border Patrol and the government of Mexico. Border Patrol officials we met with in south Texas told us that information from video surveillance cameras on tactical aerostats shared with the government of Mexico has resulted in seizures of weapons and narcotics. For example in fiscal years 2014 through 2016, Border Patrol reported over 60,000 pounds of known marijuana seized by the government of Mexico through assistance provided by tactical aerostats.

Border Patrol agents use other surveillance technologies to aid in identifying items of interest with tactical aerostat video surveillance cameras. For example, Border Patrol agents may use tactical aerostat and relocatable tower video surveillance cameras concurrently within tactical aerostat command and control centers. According to CBP officials, video surveillance cameras on these towers help to enhance the coverage area and provide continued coverage when aerostats are not in flight. Border Patrol agents assigned to tactical aerostat sites are also able to access information from unattended sensors, which can provide cueing information to locate items of interest with tactical aerostat video surveillance cameras.

Border Patrol plans to use tactical aerostats until Remote Video Surveillance System technology is deployed in Rio Grande Valley and Laredo Border Patrol sectors, but is too soon to tell when such technology will be deployed. According to CBP officials, as of fiscal year 2016, there are no plans to deploy any additional tactical aerostats. In April 2016, DHS approved deployment of Remote Video Surveillance System technology in two Border Patrol station AORs in Rio Grande Valley sector. Specifically, CBP plans to deploy 18 Remote Video Surveillance System technology sites in Rio Grande City and 12 in McAllen stations’ AORs. According to CBP officials, as of November 2016, CBP had chosen its sites for Remote Video Surveillance System technology deployment in the two AORs and initiated survey studies to plan activities for its chosen sites. CBP has not finalized plans for deployment of Remote Video Surveillance System technology in other areas of Rio Grande Valley or Laredo Border Patrol sectors.

CBP Uses TARS to Support Domain Awareness along the Southern Border

CBP uses TARS to provide domain awareness along U.S. southern borders. TARS captures continuous radar information and detects moving objects passing through its radar coverage area that can include lawful and unlawful aircraft, vessels, or vehicles entering or approaching the United States. TARS provides radar coverage from an altitude of operation up to 15,000 feet and can detect objects within 200 nautical miles. The elevated radar sensor on the TARS aerostat mitigates curvature of the earth and terrain masking limitations of common ground based radar systems. According to CBP data provided to us for 2015, the eight TARS sites collectively detected approximately 4.73 billion moving objects such as aircraft and vessels. Data captured from TARS are disseminated to AMOC. Two TARS sites in Florida and Puerto Rico provide constant radar surveillance of vessel traffic to enable maritime domain awareness. One TARS site in Eagle Pass, Texas is also equipped with a video surveillance camera to assist Border Patrol Del Rio sector’s efforts to detect cross-border illegal activity in its Eagle Pass South Border Patrol station’s AOR.

Information from TARS is primarily used by CBP detection enforcement officers (DEO) at AMOC in combination with other information to detect and identify tracks of interest (TOI) or potential occurrences of illegal air, land, and maritime border incursions (see fig. 6 below). Specifically, radar information captured across all TARS sites is integrated through AMOC’s operational system—the Air and Marine Operations Surveillance System (AMOSS). AMOSS provides a single display showing multiple real-time radar images, including from TARS and FAA and Department of Defense radar systems, as a single fused output or track. AMOSS provides users with information from government databases, such as FAA databases for aircraft registration and flight plan information. CBP’s law enforcement databases are also integrated with AMOSS to provide users with enforcement and case-related information. AMOSS automatically populates information from other government databases which is available in real-time along with a single radar image including information from multiple radar systems and TARS. According to CBP officials, the ability of DEOs to detect border incursions through AMOSS is significantly diminished when a TARS site is not operational since there are limited radar systems near TARS sites and none that can provide similar radar coverage.

As of November 2016, CBP has a study underway to evaluate future use of TARS. As we reported in May 2016, CBP is conducting an analysis of alternatives for the TARS program to inform future decisions related to the legacy program. According to CBP, TARS are obsolete and no longer manufactured or supported and could be out of service by early 2020. CBP officials told us TARS sites face immediate risks of being out of service earlier than 2020 should a crash occur at a TARS site rendering the radar components inoperable because there are no spare radar systems available. CBP has no specific plans for replacement or modernization of TARS, but is currently undergoing an analysis of alternatives to determine whether the agency should modernize or replace them. According to CBP officials, the analysis of alternatives for TARS is expected to be completed during fiscal year 2017. The purpose of the analysis of alternatives is to identify the most appropriate capability that CBP should consider to fill the impending gap in persistent surveillance of the air domain provided by the eight current TARS sites.

CBP Has Taken Actions to Assess Effectiveness of Its UAS and Aerostats, but Could Improve Data Collection

CBP Has Studied and Collects Various Data to Assess the Effectiveness of Its Predator B Program, but Could Strengthen Its Efforts through More Consistent Data Collection

CBP has initiated various studies and evaluations to help assess the effectiveness of its Predator B program, and also collects and tracks various data related to Predator B operations. With regard to studies and evaluations, in October 2015 AMO initiated a capability gap assessment process to evaluate how specific AMO platforms, including Predator B aircraft, contribute to its border security mission. Further, in 2015 AMO also initiated a study to analyze the contributions of its assets and identify metrics for domain awareness along the southwestern U.S. border. AMO’s objectives for this study include (1) defining domain awareness as it pertains to border security; (2) characterizing and measuring AMO operations in terms of their contributions to domain awareness; and (3) developing candidate metrics for domain awareness. In June 2016, as part of this study, AMO released a report including analysis of Predator B aircraft Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER)—a radar system which collects radar images of moving objects—use along the U.S-Mexico border in Arizona and proposed performance metrics for missions involving domain and situational awareness. AMO officials told us it plans to analyze VADER use along the U.S.-Mexico border in Texas as part of this study starting in fiscal year 2017.

In addition, in August 2015 DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) initiated a study of CBP’s Predator B program through DHS’s Joint Requirements Council in partnership with AMO. The purpose of this study is to (1) identify a recommended number of Predator B aircraft assigned to operating locations or NASOCs and (2) determine whether expanding the use of Predator B aircraft is the best use of funds for border security. The study was initiated in response to the findings of a 2014 DHS Office of Inspector General report on CBP’s Predator B program and following a January 2015 Acquisition Decision Memorandum that called for CBP to provide the Joint Requirements Council with justification for the number of Predator B aircraft and their assignment to operating locations.

In September 2016, DHS released a report based on the S&T-led study that recommended CBP not expand its Predator B program beyond its current nine aircraft based on challenges identified in the report. Challenges identified in DHS’s report included, for example, the availability of UAS pilots and staff to operate, maintain, and repair Predator B aircraft. According to CBP officials, the agency plans to resolve the challenges identified by the S&T-led study and maintain the nine aircraft already in its Predator B program.

With regard to data on Predator B operations, CBP collects and tracks data that can help it monitor operational effectiveness, including (1) asset assists, (2) detections of cross-border illegal activity, (3) the launch rate of Predator B aircraft (i.e., the percentage of launched versus scheduled missions), and (4) annual flight hour goals.

Asset assists. CBP collects and maintains data on known assists for apprehensions and seizures attributed to support by Predator B aircraft. According to CBP data provided to us, Predator B aircraft assisted in the apprehension of 7,951 individuals from fiscal years 2013 through 2016 as shown in table 2. Further, CBP data shows Predator B aircraft support assisted with the seizure of 9,190 pounds of cocaine and 223,817 pounds of marijuana from fiscal years 2013 through 2016.

Detections of cross-border illegal activity. CBP tracks the number of detections made using VADER equipped on its Predator B aircraft. CBP began use of VADER at its NASOCs in Arizona in fiscal year 2012 and Texas in fiscal year 2015. In 2014, CBP began collecting data on the number of individuals detected by VADER in relation to cross-border illegal activity. Our analysis of CBP data showed that from fiscal years 2014 through 2016 about 98 percent of these detections (20,858 of 21,384 detections) were attributed to VADER used on Predator B aircraft operated from CBP’s NASOC in Arizona.

Launch rate. CBP tracks the launch rate of its Predator B aircraft.

Our analysis of Predator B aircraft launch rate data showed a 69 percent launch rate from fiscal years 2013 through 2016. CBP also tracks reasons for Predator B mission cancelations. Our analysis of Predator B mission cancellations found that 20 percent of all Predator B scheduled missions from fiscal years 2013 through 2016 were canceled due to weather. We also found that CBP’s NASOC in Texas had the highest percentage of weather-related mission cancelations (37 percent) among NASOCs, followed by North Dakota (28 percent) and Arizona (26 percent), for Predator B missions scheduled from fiscal years 2013 through 2016. Other reasons identified for cancellations of scheduled missions from fiscal year 2013 through 2016 include aircraft maintenance (5 percent of scheduled missions) and lack of available crew (4 percent of scheduled missions), among others. For more information on the limitations related to CBP’s use of Predator B aircraft, see appendix III.

Annual flight hour goals. CBP sets and tracks annual Predator B program flight hour goals as part of AMO’s annual operational flight hour planning process. Our analysis of CBP data showed that CBP met 93 percent of its set flight hour goals from fiscal years 2013 through 2016. For more information on CBP’s Predator B flight hour goals, see table 3.

These studies and data collection efforts provide CBP with useful information for assessing the effectiveness of its Predator B program. However, CBP could strengthen these efforts by more consistently recording data on Predator B missions across its operating locations. Our analysis of CBP data found that users recorded information about supported agencies and asset assists inconsistently across Predator B operating locations within its system for recording Predator B mission data. We found that for law enforcement missions in support of multiple agencies and part of operations through joint task forces, users did not consistently record the name of the joint task force supported. For example, some users listed the supported agency only as ”joint task force” without identifying the task force name, while others identified the name of the task forces supported.

Similarly, we found that some users listed one or multiple agencies that are members of the Joint Interagency Task Force – South (such as U.S. Coast Guard or AMO) rather than identifying the task force itself. Users also misidentified supported agencies for other types of missions. For example, users did not consistently record AMO as the supported agency for maintenance and training missions and at times recorded Border Patrol instead as the supported agency. We also found users did not consistently record information on asset assists for Predator B missions. For example, no asset assist information for seizures of narcotics were recorded for CBP’s NASOC in North Dakota from fiscal years 2013 through 2015 despite participation in law enforcement operations involving investigations related to the illegal production and distribution of narcotics. For example in fiscal year 2013, Predator B aircraft launched from its NASOC in North Dakota provided aerial support for investigations related to methamphetamine production and marijuana cultivation; however, as CBP does not consistently record information on asset assists, it is not known if those investigations resulted in the seizure of narcotics.

CBP’s written guidance for recording Predator B mission data has not been updated since 2014 to include new data variables and system functions added to its system for recording Predator B mission data. Further, it does not include definitions and instructions for collecting and recording information on missions with multiple supported agencies and asset assists for seizures and apprehensions. According to AMO officials, guidance for recording Predator B mission information has not been updated due to resource and time constraints.

AMO officials at NASOCs responsible for recording Predator B mission information told us that in the absence of updated guidance from CBP, they developed local guidance to address changes made to CBP’s system for recording Predator B mission data. However, according to AMO officials, not all data are collected and recorded consistently at NASOCs as a result of differing local guidance. For example, in Arizona, NASOC officials record multiple supported agencies while NASOC officials in North Dakota only record the agency submitting the air support request even if more than one agency is supported. Moreover, according to AMO officials, not all users across Predator B operating locations have received training to use its system for recording Predator B mission data. While AMO has provided training to users responsible for recording mission information for manned aircraft and vessels in the same system at its operating locations, such as air branches, according to AMO officials, no training has been provided at its NASOCs for Predator B operations. According to AMO officials, a working group of NASOC officials met in 2015 to discuss Predator B mission data collection across its NASOCs and identified the need to record data consistently across operating locations. AMO officials we spoke with told us that limited resources have affected its ability to develop and implement training across all Predator B operating locations. According to NASOC officials responsible for recording Predator B mission information, updated guidance and training could help ensure data is collected consistently across locations as its system for recording Predator B mission data is periodically updated with new features and requirements.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for pertinent information to be recorded and communicated to management in a form and within a time frame that enables them to carry out internal control and other responsibilities. This includes the accurate recording and reporting of data necessary to demonstrate agency operations. Additionally, internal control standards state that all transactions and other significant events need to be clearly documented, and the documentation should be readily available for examination. The documentation should appear in management directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals and may be in paper or electronic form. Without clear guidance and training, users may continue to record Predator B mission data inconsistently for certain mission variables such as supported agencies and outcomes for asset assists. As a result, CBP is not well positioned to capture complete and consistent data from which to assess the effectiveness of its Predator B program. Updated guidance and training for users for Predator B mission data collection would help CBP ensure consistent recording across all Predator B operating locations to support CBP’s efforts to assess the effectiveness of its Predator B program.

We also found that CBP collects additional information on its use of Predator B aircraft for non-CBP law enforcement agencies, but this information is not linked to data in its system for recording Predator B mission data. As mentioned previously, CBP uses Predator B aircraft to conduct missions in support of a variety of government agencies which are submitted to AMO as air support or mission requests. AMO Procedure 2014-07 includes procedures for submission and review of requests for Predator B aircraft from non-CBP law enforcement agencies and states that Predator B air support requests provide for oversight to ensure that mission requests are vetted and prioritized and requires an electronic archive be kept of all requests. CBP’s procedures require requests from non-CBP law enforcement agencies for Predator B aircraft support to be submitted through an air support request form which is reviewed and approved by CBP. Although CBP has a process for submission and review of air support requests for Predator B aircraft by non-CBP law enforcement agencies, these air support request forms are not recorded in its system for recording Predator B mission data. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government notes that internal controls are an integral part of each system that management uses to regulate and guide its operations, and that communication of information and control activities are an integral part of an entity’s planning, implementing, review, and accountability for stewardship of government resources and achieving effective results. Furthermore, the standards state that control activities, which include a wide range of diverse actions and maintenance of related records, need to be clearly documented and help to ensure that all transactions are completely and accurately recorded. CBP currently tracks air support request forms submitted from non-CBP law enforcement agencies for Predator B missions using a separate internal system. However, by not logging or recording these requests in its system for recording Predator B mission data, CBP does not document in a single system complete information about its use of Predator B aircraft for non-CBP law enforcement purposes, such as the names of the state and local government agencies supported, making it more difficult for CBP to analyze its Predator B mission data.

While CBP currently documents requests, recording air support request forms in its system for recording Predator B mission data could allow CBP to further facilitate implementation of provisions included in the Trade Facilitation Act by ensuring such requests are documented in the same system as mission data. Specifically, these provisions require CBP to develop a process and procedure for the submission, approval, prioritization and coordination of air support requests from non-CBP law enforcement agencies for command, control, communication, surveillance, and reconnaissance assistance through unmanned aerial systems. By documenting Predator B air support request forms in its system for recording Predator B mission data, CBP could also better oversee implementation of procedures related to Predator B air support requests along with mission information.

CBP Collects and Tracks Data to Assess Effectiveness of Its Use of Tactical Aerostats, but Could Strengthen its Data Collection Efforts

CBP has conducted two evaluations of tactical aerostats and collects and tracks data on its use of tactical aerostats. First, with regard to the two evaluations, CBP conducted these to inform its initial deployment in 2012 and continued use in 2014. In August 2012, CBP, in collaboration with the Department of Defense, conducted an initial evaluation of the operational utility of tactical aerostats in Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley sector. CBP completed a second evaluation of its use of tactical aerostats in July 2014 to further assess the operational utility and functionality of tactical aerostats within Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley sector. The purpose of the second evaluation was to support Border Patrol’s continued use of tactical aerostats by examining operational effectiveness and comparison of capabilities and performance of tactical aerostats compared to other existing surveillance technology—for example, towers equipped with video surveillance cameras and ground sensors. CBP concluded that tactical aerostats enhance Border Patrol’s situational awareness; are deployable over typical terrain with proper planning and site preparation; are operable and maintainable in the operational environment; and are a visual deterrent to transnational criminal organizations. CBP also concluded that tactical aerostats contributed to its operational effectiveness and that they provide greater cumulative surveillance coverage than towers or other ground-based systems.

Second, with regard to data, CBP collects and tracks data on its use of tactical aerostats to assess effectiveness, including data on (1) operational availability (i.e., percentage of time an aerostat is in flight providing surveillance data to CBP), (2) asset assists for apprehensions of individuals and seizures of narcotics, and (3) the number of detections of items of interest.

Operational availability. According to CBP data provided to us, tactical aerostat operational availability from May 2015 through fiscal year 2016 across all sites averaged 62 percent with a range of 51 to 81 percent. CBP set a performance goal of greater than 60 percent for tactical aerostat operational availability. A variety of factors can influence operational availability of a tactical aerostat, including equipment maintenance and weather as aerostat flight is subject to weather restrictions. See appendix III for more information about limitations on CBP’s use of tactical aerostats.

Asset assists. Border Patrol collects and maintains data on known assists for apprehensions and seizures attributed to support provided by tactical aerostats. Border Patrol collects data on asset assists for known seizures and apprehensions using DHS’s Enforcement Integrated Database (EID), which includes an asset assist data field in which Border Patrol agents can specify whether an asset, such as a tower or ground sensor, contributed to the apprehension of individuals and seizure of drugs and other contraband. In May 2014, CBP added an asset assist data field in EID to capture known asset assist data for “aerostats”. Our analysis of CBP data showed that a majority of asset assists attributed to aerostats for the apprehension of individuals and seizure of narcotics were in Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol sector from May 2014 through fiscal year 2016. Specifically, 98 and 99 percent of total asset assists for apprehensions of individuals and seizures of narcotics were recorded in Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol sector, respectively. For more information on asset assists attributed to aerostats for seizures of narcotics and apprehension of individuals, see appendix IV.

Detections of items of interest. Border Patrol also collects information on the number of detections of items of interest at each tactical aerostat site using video surveillance cameras on tactical aerostats through an internal system. Border Patrol developed a system for agents operating tactical aerostat surveillance cameras to record detections made at each site. According to Border Patrol officials, detections recorded by agents are detections of cross-border illegal activity and exclude other activities observed through tactical aerostat surveillance cameras such as recreational activities including fishing. Table 4 summarizes the number of detections recorded across all tactical aerostat sites from fiscal years 2014 through 2016.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that agencies should promptly and accurately record transactions to maintain their relevance and value for management decision making. In collecting and recording asset assist information, Border Patrol does not distinguish between tactical aerostats and TARS. Border Patrol issued guidance in May 2016 to users for recording tactical aerostat asset assist information in EID, which stated users were to include tactical aerostat and TARS under the same asset assist data field for aerostat. Without a separate mechanism to record tactical aerostat asset assists, users could potentially misidentify asset assist information related to tactical aerostats to TARS, limiting the completeness and usefulness of the data. For example, CBP has two tactical aerostats and one TARS deployed in Rio Grande City Border Patrol station’s AOR (see figure 3), and the two types of systems provide distinct types of support when assisting with, for example, seizures and apprehensions. By recording asset assist information in EID for TARS and tactical aerostats under the same data field, CBP is not able to determine the contribution of each separate program. According to Border Patrol officials, the agency has not yet taken actions to develop a mechanism to collect asset assist information that distinguishes between TARS and tactical aerostats, but such a mechanism would be useful and could be developed outside of EID. In addition, according to Border Patrol officials, asset assist data in conjunction with detection information has been used to evaluate tactical aerostat site deployment locations related to proximity to cross-border illegal activity. Specifically, CBP officials told us the data were used to inform the relocation of a tactical aerostat site due to changes in cross- border illegal activity in Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol sector. Due to the constant change in cross-border illegal activity, costs associated with re-deployment of tactical aerostat sites (between $60,000 to over $100,000 per site), and time needed to locate and obtain access for land use for re-deployment, better data collection practices to distinguish between asset assists associated with tactical aerostats and TARS would help CBP to better ensure its data are complete to help guide resource allocation decisions.

CBP Collects and Tracks Data on its Use of TARS To Assess Effectiveness

CBP collects and tracks data on its use of TARS to assess effectiveness, including (1) operational availability or percentage of time an aerostat is in flight providing surveillance data to CBP, (2) tracks of interest (TOI) identified using TARS, and (3) assets assists associated with TOIs from TARS. Specifically:

Operational availability. CBP collects performance information on TARS at each site by tracking operational availability. CBP established a performance goal of greater than 64 percent operational availability across all eight TARS sites. According to CBP data provided to us, operational availability across all TARS sites for fiscal years 2013 through 2016 ranged between 59 to 61 percent, with a range across each site of 34 to 85 percent. Table 5 shows operational availability of TARS sites from fiscal years 2013 through 2016. According to CBP data provided to us, weather-related TARS downtime resulted in an average 30 percent reduction in operational availability across all TARS sites from fiscal year 2013 through 2016. Other factors that affect operational availability include, for example, maintenance or incursion of an aircraft into the restricted airspace encompassing a TARS site.

TOIs. CBP collects and tracks information on TOIs identified by DEOs at AMOC using information from TARS. According to CBP data, DEOs identified 1,989 TOIs from TARS from fiscal years 2013 and 2016 as shown in table 6. Further, CBP data shows that TARS were used to identify 50 to 63 percent of total TOIs detected by AMOC along the southwest border between fiscal years 2013 through 2016. From fiscal years 2013 through 2016, over 90 percent of TOIs detected were short landings in Mexico and aircraft border incursions. Specifically, we found 73 percent (range of 55 to 80 percent) of TOIs were short landings and 20 percent (range of 15 to 30 percent) were aircraft border incursions. See table 6 for more information on TOIs identified by DEOs at AMOC.

Asset assists. CBP collects known asset assist information on TOIs identified by DEOs using TARS by coordinating with mission partners. The majority of asset assists were violations issued related to federal regulations for operation of aircraft entering, exiting, and flying in U.S. airspace. From fiscal years 2013 through 2016, CBP identified 377 violations issued related to federal regulations attributed to TOIs detected by DEOs through information from TARS; for example, pilot deviations related to penetration of restricted airspace without permission. CBP also reported 14 arrests and 40 seizures attributed to TOIs identified through TARS. See table 7 for more information on known asset assists associated with TOIs identified using TARS from fiscal years 2013 through 2016.

Conclusions

CBP uses a variety of technologies and assets to secure the border, including Predator B UAS. CBP’s Predator B aircraft are used as national assets and support numerous federal and non-federal government agencies. CBP established and implemented collaborative efforts to coordinate its Predator B operations among the government agencies it supports. By documenting its procedures in all operating locations, CBP could better oversee coordination procedures as use changes based on needs and cross-border illegal activity.

CBP currently has ongoing efforts to assess the effectiveness of its Predator B program. However, improving its collection of Predator B mission data by updating guidance and implementing training would help to ensure information is collected and recorded in a standardized and consistent way across all operating locations and could also further its efforts to assess the effectiveness of its Predator B program. CBP uses tactical aerostats in south Texas to support Border Patrol’s ability to detect and interdict cross-border illegal activity. CBP’s tactical aerostats may be relocated as cross-border illegal activity changes, and collecting data on effectiveness of these assets could help better guide CBP’s use and deployment of these assets. Border Patrol currently collects information on asset assists for its tactical aerostat program for apprehensions and seizures, but this information does not distinguish asset assists from CBP’s other aerostat program—TARS. Revising its collection of asset assist data to distinguish between tactical aerostats and TARS would help better position CBP to support its use and deployment of tactical aerostats.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve its efforts to coordinate Predator B operations among supported agencies and assess the effectiveness of its Predator B and tactical aerostat programs, we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP take the following five actions:

Develop and document procedures for Predator B coordination among supported agencies in all operating locations.

Update and maintain guidance for recording Predator B mission information in its data collection system.

Provide training to users of CBP’s data collection system for Predator B missions.

Record air support forms for Predator B mission requests from non- CBP law enforcement agencies in its data collection system for Predator B missions.

Update Border Patrol’s data collection practices to include a mechanism to distinguish and track asset assists associated with TARS from tactical aerostats.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS provided written comments, which are noted below and reproduced in full in appendix V, and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS concurred with the five recommendations in the report and described actions to address them as noted below.

With regard to the first recommendation related to developing and documenting procedures for Predator B coordination among supported agencies in all operating locations, DHS concurred. DHS stated that CBP plans to develop and implement an operations coordination structure and document its coordination procedures for Predator B operations through Joint Task Force – West, South Texas by September 30, 2018. DHS also stated that CBP plans to document its coordination procedures for Predator B operations through its NASOC in Grand Forks, North Dakota by September 2017.

With regard to the second recommendation related to updating and maintaining guidance for recording Predator B mission information in its data collection system, DHS concurred and stated that CBP will take actions to update and maintain guidance for recording Predator B mission information, including incorporating a new functionality in its data collection system to include tips and guidance for recording Predator B mission information and updating its user manual for its data collection system by September 2019.

With regard to the third recommendation related to providing training to users of CBP’s data collection system for Predator B missions, DHS concurred and stated that CBP is developing a schedule to train users of its data collection system for Predator B mission information. DHS provided an estimated completion date for the training of September 2018.

With regard to the fourth recommendation, related to recording air support request forms for Predator B mission requests from non-CBP law enforcement agencies in its data collection system for Predator missions, DHS concurred and stated that AMO plans to develop a process and disseminate guidance to users explaining how to maintain Predator B air support request forms in its data collection system for Predator B missions. DHS provided an estimated completion date of September 2017.

With regard to the fifth recommendation related to updating Border Patrol’s data collection practices to include a mechanism to distinguish and track asset assists associated with TARS from tactical aerostats, DHS concurred and stated that Border Patrol is making improvements to capture data to ensure asset assists are properly reported and attributed to TARS and tactical aerostats. DHS provided an estimated completion date of September 2017. DHS’s planned actions, if implemented effectively, should address the intent of our recommendations.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.

Appendix I: U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Recent Efforts to Implement a Small Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Program

CBP has taken steps to implement a small UAS program to support the U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol). Specifically:

CBP collaborated with the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) to demonstrate and analyze the potential benefits, limitations and risks of operating existing commercial off-the-shelf small UAS technology. Starting in June 2014, through its Robotic Aircraft for Public Safety (RAPS) project, S&T evaluated more than 22 small UAS platforms to assess the extent to which they could provide situational awareness in support of Border Patrol. In July 2016, S&T’s Silicon Valley Office released a solicitation for small UAS capabilities and technologies to augment CBP and Border Patrol mission capabilities. In fiscal year 2017, S&T initiated a project to perform assessments of small UAS sensors, similar to RAPS, to fill or mitigate identified Border Patrol operational capability gaps. Border Patrol officials told us it plans to continue collaboration with S&T to leverage results from past and ongoing work for asset selection, training, and concepts of operation in fiscal year 2017.

CBP established a memorandum of agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration for small UAS operations in September 2016. The memorandum of agreement specifies provisions for operation of small UAS by CBP in the national airspace system, including advance notification requirements prior to each launch and operations at an altitude of operation at or below 1,200 feet.

In September 2016, CBP conducted a small UAS feasibility assessment in El Paso Border Patrol sector. The purpose of the assessment was to assess the capability of small UAS technology to provide situational awareness to support Border Patrol’s mission along the southwest U.S.-Mexico border and the ability of Border Patrol agents to employ small UAS. The assessment was a joint effort between CBP’s Border Patrol and Air and Marine Operations and included two small UAS platforms provided by the U.S. Army.

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report addresses the following questions:

How does U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) use unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and aerostats for border security activities, and to what extent has CBP developed and documented procedures for UAS coordination?

To what extent has CBP taken actions to assess the effectiveness of its UAS and aerostats for border security activities?

For the purposes of our report, UAS includes Predator B UAS and aerostats include tactical aerostats and the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) program. As of November 2016, CBP is currently developing a small UAS program to support the U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol), see appendix I.

To address both questions, we reviewed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and CBP strategic plans, such as DHS’s fiscal years 2014 to 2018 strategic plan, CBP’s fiscal years 2015 to 2020 strategic plan, Border Patrol’s fiscal years 2012 through 2016 strategic plan, and Air and Marine Operation’s (AMO) strategic plan. We also reviewed DHS strategies for border security, such as its Campaign Plan for Securing the U.S. Southern Border and Approaches 2015 to 2018 and Northern Border Strategy. In addition, we reviewed DHS and CBP documents related to UAS, aerostats, and surveillance technology, for example: plans, reports, concepts of operation, operational requirements, and standard operating procedures. We also reviewed relevant laws; Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) procedures, requirements and regulations for operation of UAS and aerostats in the national airspace system; and past GAO work related to UAS, aerostats, and surveillance technologies used for border security activities. We also conducted site visits to observe CBP’s use of Predator B UAS and aerostats in Arizona, Texas, North Dakota, and California and interviewed CBP officials responsible for their operation. Specifically:

Arizona: We visited AMO’s National Air Security Operations Center (NASOC) in Sierra Vista, Arizona to observe Predator B operations; TARS site at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; and met with CBP officials responsible for their operation.

Texas: We visited AMO’s NASOC in Corpus Christi, Texas to observe Predator B operations; three, of six total, tactical aerostat sites in south Texas to observe their use; and met with CBP officials responsible for their operations. The three tactical aerostat sites we visited included one of each type of tactical aerostat used by CBP.

North Dakota: We visited AMO’s NASOC in Grand Forks, North Dakota to observe Predator B operations and met with responsible CBP officials.

California: We visited CBP’s Air and Marine Operations Center in Riverside, California to observe use of the Air and Marine Operations Surveillance System which includes radar information from TARS sites used to detect border incursions and met with responsible CBP officials.

Findings from our observations and interviews during our site visits cannot be generalized to all occurrences of CBP’s use of Predator B UAS and aerostats, but provided useful insights about the operations of these assets.

To determine how CBP uses Predator B UAS and aerostats, we reviewed and analyzed CBP data and information and interviewed responsible CBP program officials. Specifically:

For Predator B UAS, we reviewed and analyzed CBP data on Predator B aircraft flight hours and types of mission activities from fiscal years 2013 through 2016, a time period for which data was available in CBP’s current system for recording Predator B mission data—Tasking, Operations, and Management Information System. We compared CBP’s available documentation of its procedures for coordination of its use of Predator B UAS with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. In addition, we reviewed provisions included in the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 requiring the establishment of standard operating procedures for CBP’s UAS program to address coordination of mission requests, among other things.

For tactical aerostats, we reviewed CBP documents, such as Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol sector’s Fiscal Year 2015 Aerostat Operational Need Statement, and information on bi-national law enforcement efforts between Border Patrol and the government of Mexico from fiscal years 2014 through 2016, a time period for which information was available.

For TARS, we reviewed information on CBP’s Air and Marine Operations Surveillance System and ongoing analysis of alternatives for the TARS program.

To determine how CBP assesses the effectiveness of its Predator B UAS and aerostats for border security activities, we analyzed CBP performance assessment documentation, such as reports and concepts of operation, related to use of Predator B UAS and aerostats and interviewed CBP officials responsible for performance measurement activities. We also analyzed and reviewed CBP data on Predator B UAS and aerostat performance for assists provided for apprehensions of individuals, seizures of narcotics, and other events (asset assists). Specifically:

For Predator B UAS, we analyzed asset assist, launch rate, and flight hour goal data from fiscal years 2013 through 2016, a time period for which data was available in CBP’s current system of record for Predator B mission data—Tasking, Operations, and Management Information System.

For TARS, we reviewed summary data on asset assists and operational availability from fiscal years 2013 through 2016, the time period starting when CBP assumed control of the program from the Department of Defense.

For tactical aerostats, we analyzed asset assist data beginning in May 2014 through fiscal year 2016, a time period starting when CBP began collecting information in Border Patrol’s system of record for assist information—e3 within DHS’s Enforcement Integrated Database. We also reviewed summary data on tactical aerostat operational availability from May 2015 through fiscal year 2016, a time period for which data was available.

To determine reliability of Predator B and aerostat data, we examined data for any anomalies, reviewed CBP guidance and documents, and interviewed CBP officials to understand their methods for collecting, reporting, and validating the data. We found these data were reliable for our purposes of reporting summary data across fiscal years 2013 through 2016. We assessed CBP’s data collection and management practices for Predator B UAS and tactical aerostats for usage and performance data against the management standards and practices contained in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.

To identify costs associated with UAS and aerostats, we obtained and reviewed financial summary data and cost per flight hour information for Predator B UAS, TARS, and tactical aerostats. These data include summary information on end-of-year obligations and expenditures by cost category compiled by CBP for fiscal year 2015, the most recent fiscal year for which complete data was available. We also reviewed Aviation Governance Board Bulletin 2015-001: DHS Standard Aviation Comparable Cost per Flight Hour Reporting Methodology and supporting documentation to determine how CBP applied that methodology to develop its fiscal year 2015 cost per flight hour for Predator B UAS, TARS, and tactical aerostats. We determined that CBP’s summary financial and obligation data and cost per flight hour information for its Predator B, tactical aerostat, and TARS programs were sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2015 to February 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix III: Limitations Related to U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Use of Predator B Unmanned Aerial Systems and Tactical Aerostats for Border Security

Predator B Aircraft

Based on our review of data and interviews with CBP officials, CBP’s use of Predator B aircraft is limited, in part, due to weather and airspace access. For example:

Weather. Hazardous weather can directly impact take off and landing of Predator B aircraft at Air and Marine Operations (AMO) National Air Security Operations Centers (NASOC), including storms and cloud cover. As previously mentioned, weather accounted for 20 percent of Predator B mission cancelations from fiscal years 2013 through 2016. Hazardous weather can also limit where Predator B aircraft operate away from its NASOC launch site. According to CBP officials we spoke with in North Dakota, weather in locations distant from where a Predator B aircraft is launched can also limit operating locations as there are no diversion airports along the U.S.-Canadian border for CBP’s Predator B aircraft to land. CBP took steps to mitigate the impact of hazardous weather in January and February 2016 by deploying Predator B aircraft from Corpus Christi, Texas, to San Angelo, Texas, at San Angelo Regional Airport which had favorable weather conditions. CBP’s deployment of Predator B aircraft at San Angelo Regional Airport was in accordance with a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-issued Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) to conduct its border security mission in Texas, lasted approximately 3 weeks, and was supported by an existing AMO Air Unit co-located at San Angelo Regional Airport. According to AMO officials, three Predator B aircraft are scheduled to be deployed to San Angelo Regional Airport from January 2017 through April 2017.

National airspace access. CBP’s Predator B aircraft operations are limited to COA-designated and restricted airspace. To fly outside of COA-designated airspace, CBP must request and receive an addendum to an existing COA or submit a new COA to FAA. CBP’s Predator B operations in special use or restricted airspace are subject to agreements established between CBP and the Department of Defense which may limit airspace access to certain time periods. According to CBP officials we spoke with in Arizona, Predator B flights are often excluded from restricted airspace managed by the Department of Defense along border areas which can affect the ability of Predator B aircraft to support U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol). For example, CBP officials told us Predator B aircraft infrequently support Yuma Border Patrol sector as portions of its area of responsibility (AOR) along the border are covered by an area of restricted airspace managed by the U.S. Marine Corps who typically limit Predator B aircraft access to one hour or less per day. In addition, CBP officials also told us it infrequently flies Predator B aircraft in southern California due to airspace restrictions related to the volume of commercial air traffic in and around Los Angeles, California and San Diego, California.

Tactical Aerostats

Based on our review of documents and interviews with CBP officials, CBP’s use of tactical aerostats is limited, in part, due to weather, access to airspace, and real estate. For example:

Weather. According to CBP officials, weather has the greatest impact on CBP’s ability to use tactical aerostats, including storms which require CBP to cease flight operations. For example in May 2015, a tactical aerostat broke free from its tether as of the result of severe winds during a thunderstorm.

Access to airspace. We also found that airspace access can impact CBP’s ability to deploy and use tactical aerostats in south Texas as aerostat site placement is subject to FAA approval to ensure the aerostat does not converge on dedicated flight paths. According to CBP, airspace access is limited in Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley sector’s Weslaco and Rio Grande City stations’ AOR.

Real estate. Aerostat sites used by CBP may involve access to private property, and according to CBP, it would generally seek land owner approval prior to placement. According to CBP, tactical aerostat sites are used by CBP at no cost to the government and challenges may arise with respect to processes for landowners to request compensation for use of their property or restoration of land back to its original condition. In addition, according to CBP officials, it must take into consideration any relevant environmental and wildlife impacts prior to deployment of a tactical aerostat, such as flood zones, endangered species, and migratory animals, among others.

Appendix IV: Summary Statistics on the Reporting of Asset Assist Data for Apprehensions and Seizures for Aerostats, May 2014 through Fiscal Year 2016

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Enforcement Integrated Database includes a field that enables U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) agents to identify whether a technological or nontechnological asset assisted in the apprehension of illegal entrants or the seizure of drugs or other contraband. This appendix provides summary statistics on the reporting of asset assists by Border Patrol agents for the data field “aerostat” across all Border Patrol sectors from May 2014 through fiscal year 2016.

As mentioned earlier, the asset assist data field “aerostat” does not distinguish asset assists identified by Border Patrol agents from U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) tactical aerostats and Tethered Aerostat Radar System program. As of fiscal year 2016, CBP deployed one tactical aerostat in Laredo and five tactical aerostats in Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol sectors. CBP’s Tethered Aerostat Radar System Program includes sites in Yuma, Arizona; Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Deming, New Mexico; Marfa, Texas; Eagle Pass, Texas; Rio Grande City, Texas; Cudjoe Key, Florida; and Lajas, Puerto Rico.

As shown in table 8, the majority of apprehension and seizure events with asset assists attributed to aerostats occurred in the Rio Grande Valley sector from May 2014 through fiscal year 2016 (98 and 99 percent, respectively).

As shown in table 9, the majority of seizure events and largest quantity of narcotics seized occurred in the Rio Grande Valley sector from May 2014 through fiscal year 2016. Specifically, asset assists attributed to aerostats in Rio Grande Valley sector accounted for 674 seizure events, including 257,692 and 129 pounds of marijuana and cocaine, respectively.

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Kirk Kiester (Assistant Director), Chuck Bausell, Eric Hauswirth, Daniel McKenna, Amanda Miller, Sasan J. (Jon) Najmi, and Carl Potenzieri made key contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products

Border Security: DHS Surveillance Technology Unmanned Aerial Systems and Other Assets. GAO-16-671T. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2016.

Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Has Strengthened Management, but Execution and Affordability Concerns Endure. GAO-16-338SP. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2016.

Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Assess Resource Deployment and Progress. GAO-16-465T. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2016.

Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Implement and Assess Infrastructure and Technology. GAO-15-595T. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2015.

Unmanned Aerial Systems: Department of Homeland Security’s Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Use and Compliance with Privacy and Civil Liberty Laws and Standards. GAO-14-849R. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2014.

Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Collaborative Mechanisms along the Southwest Border. GAO-14-494: Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2014.

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-411T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2014.

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-368. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2014.

Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS Implementation and Assessment Efforts. GAO-13-653T. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2013.

Border Security: DHS’s Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S. Borders. GAO-13-414T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2013.

Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of DHS’s Air and Marine Assets. GAO-12-518. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2012.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan. GAO-12-106R. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2011.