NASA Supplier Base: Challenges Exist in Transitioning from the Space Shuttle Program to the Next Generation of Human Space Flight Systems
Released: 2007-07-25T00:00:00

Letter

Background

In January 2004, following the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster in 2003, the President announced a new exploration policy entitled A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President’s Vision for U.S. Space Exploration. The President’s vision calls for retiring the Space Shuttle upon completion of the International Space Station in 2010 and creating a new family of exploratory vehicles for human spaceflight that will allow a return to the moon and voyages to Mars and points beyond. To implement the President’s vision, NASA embarked on a major study and made recommendations for technologies and potential approaches for vehicle design. NASA incorporated these recommendations into the Constellation Program along with exploration activities called for in the President’s vision. NASA’s newly created Exploration Systems Mission Directorate manages the Constellation program, which will oversee three major projects—Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, and the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle. Figure 1 shows the general design of the Constellation vehicles and how they differ from the Shuttle.

The Space Operations Mission Directorate manages the Space Shuttle Program. In order to support the 5 major projects—orbiter, Space Shuttle main engine, solid rocket booster, reusable solid rocket motor, and external tank—that comprise the Space Shuttle Program, NASA has 654 facilities that utilize more than 980,000 line items of equipment and employs over 2,000 civil service and more than 15,000 contractor personnel. NASA has several space centers, but the three that hold the majority of this workforce are Johnson Space Center in Houston; Kennedy Space Center, in Cape Canaveral, Fla.; and Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Ala. The Space Operations Mission Directorate also manages the International Space Station.

NASA’s New Plans and Processes Establish a Foundation for Managing Transition, Retirement, and the Supplier Base

NASA has developed plans intended to help the agency sort through a myriad of decisions relating to transition and retirement, with some aspects focused on NASA’s transition management structure and others specifically addressing the supplier base. NASA has an overarching agency-level transition plan, a joint acquisition plan, and a Space Shuttle Program Transition Management Plan, which demonstrate an initial effort to establish a strategy for managing change. Monitoring risk at different levels of the agency is one of the issues addressed in the plans. Also addressed, in general, is the decision-making process related to transitioning the supplier based from the Space Shuttle Program to the Constellation Program.

New Plans Reflect NASA’s Overall Strategy to Manage Transition and Retirement

In response to a legislative mandate, NASA developed the Human Space Flight Transition Plan. This agencywide plan describes the overarching strategy for transition from the Shuttle to the Constellation Program’s new exploration activities and discusses desired outcomes, processes, roles, responsibilities, and certain program-level requirements. The plan also includes a range of issues that NASA will need to address to achieve a successful transition—budget, acquisition, human capital, and property and environmental management. NASA expects the Human Space Flight Transition Plan to serve as initial, top-level strategic guidance and a governance framework for the development of lower-level directorate, program, and project transition planning guidance documents. NASA officials say they are revising the plan to incorporate guidelines that the inspector general recommended with respect to program and project management.

The Space Operations and Exploration Systems Mission Directorates are developing a joint acquisition road map to avoid substantial duplication of acquisition costs. For example, the Constellation Program has begun work under a current NASA follow-on contract for Shuttle-related support to the Constellation Program and intends to begin work on the engine that will be used in the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle through an interagency agreement with the Air Force and National Reconnaissance Office.

NASA also recently approved the Space Shuttle Program Transition Management Plan, which defines how the Space Shuttle Program should organize and manage its retirement and transition activities to support the agency-level Human Space Flight Transition Plan and overall Vision. The plan describes the organizational structure, management approach, processes, products, and tools used to manage the transition and retirement of Space Shuttle Program capabilities. The shuttle program’s five project offices are developing separate transition plans, as are three of NASA’s space centers. Figure 2 shows the various plans and the NASA organizations affected by the plans.

In addition to the plans mentioned above, NASA has developed a communications strategy to keep the Shuttle workforce informed about the activities, intentions, and goals related to retirement of the Shuttle and transition to new exploration activities. Weekly teleconferences, monthly reports, quarterly newsletters and magazines, and Transition Quarterly Program Manager’s Reviews will strive to lessen confusion and frustration in this environment of change. NASA and the prime contractors are conducting supplier visits to better inform the subcontractor workforce about transition activities and the opportunities available for future work.

To measure progress on Shuttle retirement and transition, NASA has identified a collection of metrics that can be used at an agencywide or program level to assess cost, schedule, technical, and risks. NASA officials say they intend, on a quarterly basis, to analyze progress made and to look ahead for opportunities to, for example, save money, mitigate risks, and see what decisions need to be made about which suppliers. Key metrics at the agency level include cost avoidance, schedule variances, and government personnel time charges for work on single versus multiple programs. Various tools will be used to track risks related to transition and retirement activities. Such risks include loss of critical Shuttle personnel, transfer of facilities funding from the Space Shuttle Program to the Constellation Program, and cargo transportation shortfalls for the International Space Station after 2010.

NASA Has Developed New Decision-Making Process to Manage Supplier Base

NASA has developed a new decision-making process to manage supplier decisions related to the retirement of the Shuttle and transition to the Constellation Program. The new process defines key areas of authority and responsibility and lines of reporting. Control boards, comprising representatives from the Space Shuttle, Constellation, and International Space Station programs, are expected to provide guidance and facilitate decisions on important transition issues. Transition managers have been appointed at the directorate, program, and center levels. Table 1 provides an overview of the various processes.

To make better informed decisions, the boards obtain supplier assessments, known as Space Shuttle Management Resource Transition (SMRT) documents, usually completed by the project offices, which provide rationale and potential impact for recommended courses of action. Shuttle capabilities with potential use for the Constellation Program are usually elevated to Transition Control Board for coordination and review.

NASA is using the Critical Single Source Supplier List and the new Strategic Capabilities Assessment database to manage its supplier base through the retirement of the Shuttle and transition to the Constellation Program. The Critical Single Source Supplier List existed prior to the announcement of the Shuttle’s retirement and is used to monitor the unique capabilities provided by critical single source suppliers and note any supportability issues that could arise. NASA considers a supplier to be a critical single source supplier if it is the only known or only certified source of particular hardware or services and has received hardware or services from them in the past 5 years or expects to do business with them again in the future. The list contains over 230 suppliers identified by each of the five major Shuttle project offices (see app. II for a list of NASA’s critical single source suppliers). NASA can exercise various options to ensure that certain key capabilities and the critical suppliers associated with those capabilities are maintained until no longer needed. For example, a skills retention contract can be put in place by Shuttle program officials through the prime contractor to ensure that a subcontractor will maintain the minimum skills necessary to perform failure analysis until the end of the Shuttle Program.

The Strategic Capabilities Assessment database, created after the Shuttle’s retirement was announced, provides an initial review and categorization of Shuttle’s assets and is used for tracking, controlling, maintaining, and updating information associated with Shuttle capabilities. Each capability comes bundled with property, personnel, suppliers, contracts, and Shuttle last-need date, which together produce a product or service, and the database tracks risk associated with each capability. Using the information gathered in the database, NASA can generate a master schedule that provides the basis for transition plans and adds insight into the progress of transition and retirement activities. The Transition Program Requirements Control Board plans to use the master schedule to estimate how many decisions need to be made each quarter. The Shuttle Program has identified most of the last-need dates and release dates for the 300 or so capabilities that are contained in the Strategic Capabilities Assessment database, according to NASA officials. Constellation Program officials have completed in the spring of 2007 a preliminary assessment of which capabilities will be needed in the future, but acknowledged that further requirements refinement and definitions are needed.

Effectiveness of NASA’s Transition Plans and Processes Not Known until Constellation’s Supplier Base Needs Become Clearer and More Decisions Have Been Processed

Whether NASA’s transition plans and processes will be effective is unclear because NASA has not set requirements for Constellation’s supplier base needs and few decisions about suppliers have worked their way through the new processes.

Constellation Lacks Detailed Supplier Base Needs Requirements

While the Shuttle is, in some cases, ready to release or transfer certain suppliers, its ability to do so has been impacted by the lack of detailed requirements from the Constellation Program. According to NASA officials, because the Constellation Program is early in its design cycle, it is not able to “pull” suppliers to Constellation as a counter to the “push” from the Shuttle Program to release or transfer suppliers. For instance, according to the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) project manager, even though his office has identified, to the best of its abilities, the suppliers that could be needed for the J-2X engine (which will be used on the Crew Launch Vehicle), the Constellation Program is still working on the requirements for the J-2X and has not made any determinations about which Shuttle suppliers will be needed. The SSME project office was able to identify suppliers that could be used for new exploration activities because the same prime contractor that produces the Shuttle main engines will produce the J-2X engine. There is a risk that the SSME project will have to make decisions prior to the establishment of defined requirements at a risk of losing some key capabilities. When NASA makes decisions as whether to maintain an existing supplier that might not be needed in the future, NASA is attempting to balance the risk associated with losing that supplier and unnecessarily spending funds that could be used for other priorities. As a result of Constellation’s lack of detailed requirements, there are cases where NASA has provided funding for certain Shuttle suppliers’ work through its prime contractor’s subcontracts because of a possible future need for the suppliers with the Constellation Program and the need to maintain the critical skills. Following are examples of such cases.

One subcontractor is a critical single source supplier that makes tubes for nozzles and heat exchange coils. At the time of our review, the last delivery from the subcontractor is scheduled for summer of 2007, after which the prime contractor could end its relationship with the subcontractor. However, the SSME project office will seek gap funding for work that would maintain the subcontractor’s capability/skills because SSME project office officials believe that Constellation Program will likely have a future, but not an immediate need for the subcontractor’s services. SSME project office officials pointed out that the subcontractor may go out of business without NASA funding.

Another subcontractor is a critical single source supplier certified to refurbish and re-certify the post-flight Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) actuators. The SRB project currently has inventories that can support the remaining Shuttle flights plus eight spares. Therefore, the SRB project office could have informed the prime contractor that it no longer needed the subcontractor’s services as of January 2007. However, because the subcontractor’s refurbishment capability may be needed for the Ares 1 Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV), the SRB project office sought and obtained $1.8 million in gap funding from the Transition Program Requirements Control Board for work that would preserve the subcontractor’s capability/skills for the CLV through the end of fiscal year 2007. Otherwise, according to analysis completed by NASA, if the Constellation Program needed to restart the subcontractor’s refurbishment capability in the future through a new subcontract with the CLV’s prime, it would cost $15 million. At the time of our review, the Space Shuttle Program Transition Manager stated that the Constellation Program should decide by summer of 2007 whether it needs the subcontractor as its supplier.

The lack of a “pull” from the Constellation Program—that would identify current Shuttle suppliers that will be used in the new exploration program—may result in additional gap funding for some critical suppliers, costly production restarts in the event that some suppliers are let go but found to be needed later, or the capability could be lost altogether.

Increasing Number of Supplier and Capability Decisions to Be Made in Coming Years Could Overwhelm NASA’s Processes

The lack of requirements for the Constellation Program is not the only factor impacting NASA’s transition plans and decision-making processes. NASA’s plans and decision-making processes are relatively untested because only a small number of supplier decisions have been vetted through the decision-making process thus far. The Strategic Capability Assessment database, as described earlier, was created to efficiently and effectively manage the transition and retirement of Shuttle capabilities. The database divides each Shuttle project element into a list of capabilities that comprise the entire project. Each capability covers property, personnel, suppliers, and contracts data. A key decision date, last-need date, and estimated release date are determined for each capability.

Documenting decisions is an important part of the decision-making process. Each transition-ready capability in the Strategic Capabilities Assessment database should be paired with a corresponding SMRT document that will wind its way through the decision-making process and then be approved by the program-level Transition Program Requirements Control Board and/or the Transition Control Board at the directorate level. The document provides a body of relevant information from which decisions can be rendered, communicated, documented, and tracked. This paperwork is needed for any Shuttle capability that is being partially or fully terminated before the Shuttle Program ends—including those to be transferred to the Constellation Program.

As of January 2007, Shuttle program officials predicted they would need to set 42 key decision dates for fiscal year 2007; in May 2007, after realizing that this target was too optimistic, officials reduced the number to 21 and rescheduled a number of key decision dates to later years. Future dates also were adjusted. Figure 3 shows the number of dates set in January 2007 and then revised in May 2007.

As the number of key decision dates and the corresponding SMRT documents to be processed increase in the coming years, the ability of the transition process to function effectively will be tested. NASA officials acknowledge that the increasing number of SMRT documents scheduled for upcoming years has the potential to overwhelm the transition decision- making process.

Obsolescence, Workforce Issues, and Transition Cost Estimates Pose Other Challenges to NASA’s Transition Efforts

NASA is likely to encounter other issues as it transitions to new exploration activities, including: obsolescence, particularly with regard to outdated materials for which no replacements have yet been developed; supplier viability; potential loss of NASA personnel with science and engineering safe disposal and cleanup of Shuttle facilities and equipment; and developing estimates of transition costs.

Obsolescence

To lower development costs for the Constellation Program, NASA plans to leverage some of the Space Shuttle Program’s existing technologies. In doing so, the Constellation Program stands to inherit problems, such as the continued use of obsolete materials for which replacements have yet to be found. Some long-used Shuttle materials are now known to pose environmental or health hazards. Examples include chrysotile fiber (asbestos), a component in rubber insulation; hydrazine, a type of fuel; methyl chloroform, a cleaning solvent and degreaser; and HCFC-141b, a foam-blowing agent. The Environmental Protection Agency classifies asbestos as a known carcinogen and hydrazine as a probable carcinogen, while both methyl chloroform and the foam-blowing agent are classified as ozone-depleting substances. If the Constellation Program continues to use these materials, health and environmental concerns will persist and administrative and technical burdens will likely increase.

Supplier Viability

Supplier viability presents another challenge. Over the years, the Shuttle Program has experienced many instances of suppliers dropping off unpredictably, making supply chain management more difficult and costly. The Integrated Space Operations Summit, attended by representatives from NASA, industry, and academia, issued a report in April of 2005 that stated the following: “the average mitigation cost from a loss of supplier, based on over 100 industry case studies, is between $200,000 and $700,000. Inventory, tooling, design, freight, people time, rush premiums, and extraordinary costs add to this figure.” NASA created the Critical Single Source Supplier List as a way to monitor critical suppliers that were the only known source or only certified source of a certain component or material. In addition, the statement of work in Shuttle’s Space Program Operations contract specifies that the prime contractors need to identify and resolve issues pertaining to loss of repair capabilities, failure analysis, or production capabilities. This information allows Space Shuttle Program officials to proactively monitor the supplier base and formulate appropriate risk mitigation plans, if needed. Given that the Constellation Program is the Shuttle’s replacement and will likely span decades, supplier viability issues could arise as they did during the Shuttle Program. Appropriately monitoring the supplier base early on, especially during the production and sustainment phases of the Constellation Program, could help to mitigate potential supplier viability issues.

Potential Loss of NASA Expertise

NASA acknowledges that it must realign employee resources and plan for a smaller workforce. NASA projects fewer resources will be required for operating and sustaining hardware, especially during vehicle processing and launch operations. By fiscal year 2012, the total number of personnel needed to meet NASA’s strategic goals is likely to drop from 18,100 to 17,000. As new space systems are designed, emphasis will shift to personnel with skills in systems development and engineering, program management, and systems integration. NASA made the decision to maintain program management and systems engineering competencies within the civil service workforce to ensure that it has the capabilities it needs to develop programs and projects for its missions. NASA acknowledges that, in coming years, these very skills will be in high demand across the federal government and in the private sector. NASA’s senior leaders recognize the need for an effective workforce in achieving mission success and to ensure the agency has the scientific and technical expertise necessary to preserve the nation’s role as a leader in aeronautics, earth and space science, and technology. NASA has a strategic human capital plan and Shuttle strategic human capital plan, but more work is needed in workforce planning and deployment. In a separate review requested by Congress, GAO is assessing the extent to which NASA’s human framework is aligned with its strategic mission and programmatic goals; whether NASA is effectively recruiting, developing, and retaining critically skilled staff; and what internal or external challenges NASA faces in achieving its workforce needs.

Environmental Disposal and Cleanup

While executing the remaining Shuttle missions, NASA will simultaneously begin the process of disposing Shuttle facilities that are no longer needed and transitioning facilities that can be used by other NASA programs. NASA officials say that a much smaller number of facilities than the current 654 Shuttle facilities will probably be required to support the development or operation of future exploration systems. Environmental management encompasses a wide range of activities, including identifying and mitigating the environmental consequences of program and project activities, informing systems engineering decisions to enhance safety, preventing pollution, correcting environmental damage from past operations, and maintaining compliance with federal, state, and local environmental laws and regulations. Although NASA has an approach for identifying environmental risks, the agency does not have a comprehensive estimate of the environmental cleanup costs associated with the transition and disposal of the Shuttle Program’s facilities and equipment. In our report on major challenges facing the nation in the 21st century, we pointed out that frequently the costs associated with environmental cleanup dramatically exceed available funding levels. For example, it cost the Titan IV Program approximately $300 million over 6 years on cleaning facilities, equipment, and tools. Paying for environmental cleanup may require a significant future outflow of funds at the same time that NASA will be facing many other competing demands for its limited dollars, such as development of Orion, Ares I, and other exploration projects.

Transition Cost Estimates

Developing cost estimates is a complex task for a transition of this magnitude. Although NASA has identified its funding needs through fiscal year 2010 for transition activities—such as planning and initial asset/facilities screening and disposition—the total cost of retiring the Shuttle and transitioning to new exploration activities is currently being developed. The last Shuttle flight is scheduled to be flown in 2010, but many transition and retirement activities will occur after that date. Disposal of program facilities, contract closeouts, and transition and/or severance of the remaining workforce are among the tasks ahead. According to NASA officials, such efforts could last through 2020. At this time, NASA does not know the extent of the Shuttle Program’s environmental liabilities. Paying for such liabilities later may complicate NASA’s future fiscal landscape, especially when there will be other competing demands, such as Constellation’s crew exploration vehicle, the crew launch vehicle, and other new exploration activities.

In 2006, NASA developed a cost estimate of $2.8 billion for transition and retirement activities through fiscal year 2020. NASA officials say the estimate was based on a preliminary set of assumptions that were not properly validated and was calculated without the involvement of the NASA’s space centers and other institutions. Thus, NASA officials consider the estimate immature and, in its fiscal year 2008 budget submission to Congress identifying funding needs for fiscal year 2008 plus the required 4 out-years through fiscal year 2012, NASA elected not to include any funds for transition and retirement activities for fiscal years 2011 and 2012. Without cost estimates, NASA does not have the information needed to support the budget preparation process or assess the costs of addressing its supplier challenges. The Shuttle Program’s risk assessment states that not having secured funds for transition and retirement activities for fiscal year 2011 and 2012 is a risk to follow-on programs and institutions and to the agency as a whole.

As stated in NASA’s Inspector General report issued in January 2007, NASA’s own program and project management guidelines, the Integrated Space Operations Summit Transition Panel Report, and one of the Shuttle’s benchmarking studies (the Titan IV Program) all call for the establishment of a detailed cost estimate for the Shuttle’s retirement and transition. NASA officials say they are in the process of recalculating the total cost estimate through fiscal year 2020 and are deciding how to budget for transition and retirement activities beyond 2010. NASA officials told us that transition and retirement costs past 2010 will likely be absorbed by the other NASA programs—including the Constellation Program—and the space centers when the Shuttle Program ceases to exist. This will likely affect the scope of those activities as well.

Conclusions

NASA’s transition plans and processes increase the chances that key decisions about the supplier base will be made with sufficient input from the right people with the right expertise. The lack of defined requirements for the Constellation Program is having an impact on supplier transition decisions. Even if all of Constellation’s requirements were known today, NASA still may not be prepared to process the myriad of decisions ahead. Only after NASA funnels more supplier decisions through its new processes will the agency be able to declare success or failure. The sheer volume of decisions could create bottlenecks, with some critical suppliers getting lost in the mix, dropping out altogether before NASA makes up its mind, and adding risk that NASA will have nowhere to turn for certain capabilities. Lastly, the costs of transition and managing suppliers will be affected by many decisions yet to be made, including gap funding requirements and environmental remediation efforts. As a result, it is important that NASA begin estimating its transition and retirement costs and continually revisit these estimates to reflect final decisions on requirements and additional knowledge gained on technology development and supplier needs. Such cost estimates also need to be part of NASA’s budget submission to ensure Congress and NASA can balance investments and negotiate between competing priorities.

Recommendation

Given the fact that many of NASA’s transition and retirement activities will continue to occur following the Shuttle retirement in 2010, it is important that NASA identify and estimate the costs associated with these activities in an accountable and transparent manner. Therefore, we are recommending that the NASA Administrator direct the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate and Space Operations Mission Directorate to jointly develop cost estimates for transition and retirement activities beyond fiscal year 2010 so that, in NASA’s fiscal year 2009 budget submission, NASA can include transition and retirement funding needs for the required out-years through fiscal year 2013. We would expect these estimates to be adjusted every year and have more fidelity as NASA gains more knowledge and makes more decisions.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report (see app. IV), NASA concurred with our recommendation, but stated that NASA management will work with the Office of Management and Budget to determine the appropriate timing for including transition and retirement costs in the President’s Budget Proposal. We also received technical comments from NASA, which have been addressed in the report, as appropriate.

We are sending copies of the report to NASA’s Administrator and interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or at ChaplainC@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

(1) To determine what plans and processes the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has established to effectively manage its supplier base to ensure both sustainment of the Shuttle Program and successful transition to planned exploration activities, we performed the following: Obtained and reviewed documents from NASA describing plans and processes for managing retirement and transition activities, including the Human Space Flight Transition Plan, Space Shuttle Program Transition Management Plan, Space Shuttle Program Transition and Retirement Requirements, and the Space Shuttle Program Risk Management Plan.

Reviewed various NASA reports and studies on similar retirement and transition efforts elsewhere in the federal government.

Examined databases relevant to NASA’s transition, specifically the Strategic Capabilities Assessment database and the Shuttle Integrated Risk Management Application.

Reviewed Space Shuttle Management Resource Transition documents and meeting minutes. Interviewed NASA’s transition management officials at NASA Headquarters and the NASA Centers.

Compared NASA’s plans and processes to GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. (2) To describe factors that could impact the effectiveness of such plans and processes for managing NASA’s supplier base and to (3) identify any other issues that NASA will likely encounter as the agency transitions to and implements its planned exploration activities, we performed the following: Reviewed NASA’s 2008 Budget Request along with Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Guidance for 2008 and 2009.

Collected and analyzed information derived from the Strategic Capabilities Assessment Database, including last need dates and key decision dates. Interviewed NASA Constellation, Space Shuttle, and International Space Station Program officials for information on coordination between programs.

Discussed transition challenges with NASA officials at the agency, program, and project level, with prime contractors for the Space Shuttle and Exploration programs, and with representatives of the Aerospace Industries Association.

Reviewed past GAO testimonies and reports.

Identified obsolescence and supplier viability issues noted in NASA and contractor reports and briefing charts that might impact new exploration activities.

To accomplish our work, we interviewed NASA and prime contractor officials for the Orbiter project at Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral, Florida; NASA and prime contractor officials for the External Tank, Solid Rocket Booster, Reusable Solid Rocket Motor and Space Shuttle Main Engine projects at Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama; and NASA officials for the Constellation, Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs at Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. We also attended the January 2007 Transition Quarterly Program Manager’s Review to garner information on the status of transition. At NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C., we met with the SOMD and ESMD Transition Managers, the Deputy Associate Administrator for Program Integration, the ESMD Special Procurement Advisor, and representatives from the SOMD and ESMD Resources Management Offices.

We conducted our work from September 2006 to June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Space Shuttle Program Critical Single Source Suppliers

MADS Recorder Thermal Protection System - Reusable Surface Insulation Auxiliary Power Units, Flight Control Hardware Emergency Egress Slide, Thruster Assembly, Window Pyrotechnic Devices O2/N2 Sensors, PPO2 Sensors, Valves ECLSS Waste and Potable Water Tank, Bellows Assembly (Lines, Tanks)

Shell Assembly (Salad Bowl)

MPS Feed Lines/Gimble Joints/ Re-circulation Manifold, GN2 Isolation Valve Bellows Assembly for Class I GSE RTVs (Room Temperature Vulcanization Adhesives), Adhesives Sensor, Heater (Thermocouple)

RCC, LESS, RFCA (Used in the Thermal Protection System)

Hydraulic 3-Way Valves, Hydraulic Control Valve & Bootstrap Reservoir MLG-NLG Landing Gear Production and Storage for Special Tooling/Special Test Equipment Honeywell International, Inc. - Glendale, AZ Enhanced Multiplexer/De-multiplexer, Multifunction Electronic Display System Honeywell International, Inc. - Tucson, AZ Air Data Transducer Assembly, Annunciator Control Unit Kearfott Guidance and Navigation Corp.

Inertial Measurement Units (IMU)

Frequency Division Multiplexer (FDM)

TACAN, GPS, DDU, HIS (Used for Guidance, Navigation and/or Control)

Microwave Scan Beam Landing System Decoders, Transmitters, Antenna, RF Assemblies Advanced Master Events Controller, Enhanced Master Events Controller Filters, Valves, Regulators, Disconnects Device Drive Unit (DDU)

Hypergolic & Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Bellow Assembly for Quick Disconnects Dimethylethoxysilane (DMES)

Permabond, Sealing Compound, & Molykote 321 Cork (External)

Railcar, End Grain, and Nozzle Shipping Covers MAPO (Inhibitor Curative)

Glass, Carbon, Silica Cloth Glass, Carbon, Silica Cloth Rayon Fabric Weaver (Nozzle)

Phenolic Resin (Nozzle)

Aerojet General Corp. - Propulsion Division Gas Generator Pacific Scientific Energetic Materials Co.

Frangible Nut, Separation Nuts, Separation Bolts Linear Shaped Charges (LSC), Nose Cap Thrusters, Pressure Cartridges, Confined Detonating Fuse Manifold, Range Safety System LSC, Frustum LSC ET Bolt Catchers, Struts, ETA Rings, Spherical Washers ET Strut Cover & Fairing Assembly, Zinc Anodes Forward Skirt Door Seal, Gaskets PR 855, Sealant 1422 Epoxy Resin (2216)

Cab-o-Sil, Fumed Silicon Dioxide Sea Water Activated Release (SWAR) (parachute line cutting system), SWAR batteries Hysol EA 934 NA (Epoxy Paste Adhesive), Thixotropic Epoxy Adhesive RCAS 2400 (Anti-static Packaging Material) 6077 Foam, RTV, DC 1200 Adhesive (RTV 133)

Epoxy Primer Auxiliary Power Unit Flush & Purge Filter Liner - Main Combustion Chamber (MCC), Forging Inlet Manifold Splitter Heat Exchange Coil Assembly, Nozzle Coolant Tubes, Nozzle Steerhorn Tubes Nickel Plating of Nozzle Tubes Forging Jacket MCC, Forging Inducer Low Pressure Fuel Turbopump (LPFTP)

Industrial Tectonics Bearing (ITB) Corp. - (Subsidiary of Roller Bearing Co.)

MCC AFT Manifold; FWD Manifold Balls for Bearings (Metal & SiN3)

Precious Metal and Nickel Plating Complex Machine Parts, Housings Protective Covers, Closers, Caps Hard Anodize of Low Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (LPOTP) Housing Seals, HPTP Turbine Inlet Bellows Turbine Blade and Vane Fabrication Howmet Corp. - Hampton Casting Division Large Castings for Turbopumps Bellows Assembly (Lines, Tanks)

Fluorinated Ethylene-Propylene Coating for Bearing Cages Propellant Valve/Hydraulic Actuator Main Oxidizer Valve Actuator (MOVA), Main Fuel Valve Actuator (MFVA), Preburner Fuel Oxidizer Valve Actuator (FPOVA), Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer Valve Actuator(OPOVA), Chamber Coolant Valve Actuator( CCVA)

HPOTP, HPFTP (High Pressure Oxidizer and Fuel Turbopumps)

Appendix III: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, James L. Morrison, Assistant Director; Lily Chin; Hillary Loeffler; Jeffrey Niblack; Shelby S. Oakley; Sylvia Schatz; and John P.K. Ting made key contributions to this report.