DOD Information Technology: Software and Systems Process Improvement Programs Vary in Use of Best Practices
Released: 2001-03-30T00:00:00

Letter

Background

IDEALSM is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University and stands for initiating, diagnosing, establishing, acting, and leveraging. weapons systems, command and control systems, satellite systems, inventory management systems, financial systems, personnel systems, payment systems, and others. Many of these systems in turn are connected with systems operated by private contractors, other government agencies, and international organizations.

DOD’s ability to effectively manage information technology is critical to its ability to accomplish its mission. Its reliance on software-intensive systems to support operations related to intelligence, surveillance, security, and sophisticated weaponry—along with financial management and other business functions—will only increase as the department modernizes and responds to changes in traditional concepts of warfighting.

The scope of DOD’s information technology inventory is vast: over 1.5 million computers, 28,000 systems, and 10,000 computer networks. Further, many of DOD’s most important technology projects continue to cost more than projected, take longer to produce, and deliver less than promised. As a result, we have designated DOD systems development and modernization efforts as a high-risk area.

The quality of the processes involved in developing, acquiring, and engineering software and systems has a significant effect on the quality of the resulting products. Accordingly, process improvement programs can increase product quality and decrease product costs. Public and private organizations have reported significant returns on investment through such process improvement programs. SEI has published reports of benefits realized through process improvement programs. For example, SEI reported in 1995 that a major defense contractor implemented a process improvement program in 1988 and by 1995 had reduced its rework costs from about 40 percent of project cost to about 10 percent, increased staff productivity by about 170 percent, and reduced defects by about 75 percent. According to a 1999 SEI report, a software development contractor reduced its average deviation from estimated schedule time from 112 percent to 5 percent between 1988 and 1996. During the same period, SEI reported that this contractor reduced its average deviation from estimated cost from 87 percent to minus 4 percent.

To aid organizations attempting to initiate and manage SPI programs, SEI has published a best practices model called IDEAL,SM which defines a systematic, five-phase, continuous process improvement approach, with a concurrent sixth element addressing the program management tasks spanning the five phases (see figure 1).

Initiating: During this phase, an organization establishes the management structure of the process improvement program, defines and assigns roles and responsibilities, allocates initial resources, develops a plan to guide the organization through the first three phases of the program, and obtains management approval and funding. Two key organizational components of the program management structure established during this phase are a management steering group and a software engineering process group (SEPG). Responsibility for this phase rests with senior management.

Diagnosing: During this phase, the SEPG appraises the current level of process maturity to establish a baseline capability against which to measure progress and identifies any existing process improvement initiatives. The SEPG then uses the baseline to identify weaknesses and target process improvement activities. It also compares these targeted activities with any ongoing process improvement activities and reconciles any differences. Responsibility for this phase rests primarily with line managers and practitioners.

Establishing: During this phase, the SEPG prioritizes the process improvement activities and develops strategies for pursuing them. It then develops a process improvement action plan that details the activities and strategies and includes measurable goals for the activities and metrics for monitoring progress against goals. Also during this phase, the resources needed to implement the plan are committed and training is provided for technical working groups, who will be responsible for developing and testing new or improved processes. Responsibility for this phase resides primarily with line managers and practitioners.

Acting: During this phase, the technical working groups, formed under the establishing phase, create and evaluate new and improved processes. Evaluation of the processes is based on pilot tests that are formally planned and executed. If the tests are successful, the working groups develop plans for organization-wide adoption and institutionalization, and once approved, execute them. Responsibility for this phase resides primarily with line managers and practitioners.

Leveraging: During this phase, results and lessons learned from earlier phases are assessed and applied, as appropriate, to enhance the structures and plans of process improvement programs. Responsibility for this phase rests primarily with senior management.

The model’s sixth element, continuous program management, specifies management structures and tasks for planning, organizing, directing, staffing, and monitoring the program. Responsibility for this element rests with senior management.

Each phase of the IDEALSM model contains several recommended tasks. Appendix I, which describes our objectives, scope, and methodology, identifies all tasks for each phase.

Components’ SPI Program Alignment With SEI IDEALSM Model Varies

The Army and Air Force units that we reviewed, as well as DFAS and two of the four Navy units, have long-standing SPI programs that satisfy almost every task recommended in the IDEALSM model (see table 1 for a summary of how each component and its units, if applicable, compared to the model). For example, in 1996 the Secretary of the Army mandated that all software development, acquisition, and maintenance activities establish SPI programs. Further, the Army requires that its software activities continually improve their process maturity and has set maturity goals for all of its units. Army regulations also mandate that contractors be evaluated for software process maturity. Moreover, the two specific units within the Army that we reviewed have SPI management structures, plans, and dedicated resources. In addition, these units have continuously evolved in software and system process maturity through many years of assessing their baseline process capabilities, implementing new and improved process initiatives, reassessing process maturity, and implementing lessons learned. Both Army units satisfy all IDEALSM tasks.

In contrast, DLA, the Marine Corps, and two of the Navy’s four units that we reviewed do not perform important IDEALSM model tasks. In particular, DLA currently does not satisfy any of the model’s recommended tasks. According to DLA officials, it had an SPI program prior to 1998, but at that time the program was terminated to reduce costs. During our review, DLA’s CIO stated that the agency plans to begin a new SPI program and has taken a first step by assigning organizational responsibility.

The Marine Corps has many SPI activities under way that could form the foundation of a program. However, it is not performing several key SPI tasks that are fundamental to SPI program success. For example, the Marine Corps has assigned responsibility for process improvement, and it has begun assessing its software process maturity to establish baseline capability. However, it is not using this baseline as a basis for implementing recommended improvements, nor does it have an SPI plan or dedicated resources for these activities. As such, the likelihood of the Marine Corps’ process improvement initiatives producing desired results is diminished.

Two of the four Navy software/systems units that we reviewed also do not have SPI programs that are aligned with the IDEALSM model. To their credit, however, one has recently taken the first step toward initiating a program and the other has activities under way that could form the beginnings of a program. (See appendix IV for more detailed results on each of the components that we reviewed.)

Components’ SPI Management Approaches Vary, Yet All Report Positive Program Results

The four components that have SPI programs—Army, Air Force, DFAS, and parts of the Navy—have different approaches for directing and controlling their respective programs, ranging from centralized to highly decentralized; each, however, reports positive results. For example, DFAS has a centralized approach, with its headquarters office directing and controlling all SPI activities. In contrast, the Army, Air Force, and Navy have decentralized approaches to SPI program management. The Army, which began its SPI program centrally, has since delegated SPI responsibility to its commands, which—in the case of the two commands we reviewed—have further delegated SPI program management to their respective software/systems units. Similarly, the Air Force units that we reviewed further delegated SPI management to their respective software/systems units. The Navy commands follow different approaches—one manages its program centrally and the other has delegated SPI management to its software/systems units.

Despite different approaches, each DOD component/unit with an SPI program reports positive effects on software/systems quality. DFAS, for example, reports that its SPI program has reduced its cost to deliver software to about one-third less than organizations of similar size. One Navy software activity reports reduced costs, improved product quality, and a 7:1 return on its SPI investment. An Army activity reports that it has almost doubled its productivity in writing software for new systems because of improvements made under its SPI program. (See appendix IV for more detailed information on the approaches and reported benefits of the components that we reviewed.)

DOD-Wide Efforts to Promote and Leverage SPI Programs Do Not Exist

Within OSD, the Assistant Secretary for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence is responsible for establishing and implementing DOD’s policies, processes, programs, and standards governing the development, acquisition, and operation of nonweapons systems software and information systems. Similarly, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is responsible for establishing DOD acquisition policies and procedures. Accordingly, OSD has an important leadership role to play in ensuring that DOD components reap the maximum possible benefits of effective SPI programs. Such leadership can include dissemination of policies and guidance promoting SPI programs and activities, knowledge of the nature and extent of components’ SPI programs and activities, associated lessons learned and best practices, and facilitation of SPI knowledge-sharing across DOD components.

Both OSD organizational units have efforts under way aimed at improving some aspects of DOD’s ability to develop and acquire software and systems. For example, they have established teams to conduct software acquisition maturity assessments and established a software collaborators group. They also are collecting software metrics and establishing training for managers.

However, OSD has no SPI actions under way or planned, such as issuing policy and guidance on SPI programs; determining where in DOD SPI programs do and do not exist; promoting the establishment of programs in component units, such as DLA, where they do not exist; and sharing knowledge across DOD about the experiences of reportedly successful SPI programs, such as those within the Army, Air Force, DFAS, and parts of the Navy. According to OSD officials, uncertainty about the costs versus benefits of SPI, resource constraints, and other priorities have precluded such a focus. However, as stated earlier in this report, various organizations, including some DOD components, report positive returns on investments from SPI programs that argue for SPI being treated as a funding priority.

Conclusions

Several DOD components have SPI programs that are aligned closely to the best practices embodied in the SEI IDEALSM model and thus provide excellent examples of SPI. However, such programs are lacking in other parts of the department. Where they exist, these programs are being credited with producing higher quality software and systems products faster and at less expense, whether managed in a centralized or decentralized fashion.

OSD has an important leadership role to play in expanding SPI across the department. In particular, it can seize opportunities to build upon and leverage the existing base of SPI programs within DOD’s components and help ensure that all of its components realize the strategic value (i.e., benefits that exceed costs) that both private and public-sector organizations, including some DOD components, attribute to these programs. While OSD is faced with making funding choices among competing leadership initiatives, such as its efforts to conduct software acquisition maturity assessments and collect software metrics, these are some of the very tasks that are embedded within an effective SPI program. Thus, by ensuring that DOD components have effective SPI programs, OSD can leverage programs to indirectly accomplish its other high-priority initiatives as well.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To strengthen DLA, Marine Corps, and Navy software and systems development, acquisition, and engineering processes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director of DLA, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Secretary of the Navy to establish SPI programs where this report shows none currently exist. In so doing, these officials should consider following the best practices embodied in the SEI IDEALSM model and drawing from the experiences of the Army, Air Force, DFAS, and some Navy units.

Further, to strengthen DOD-wide SPI, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, in collaboration with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to (1) issue a policy requiring DOD components that are responsible for systems/software development, acquisition, or engineering to implement SPI programs, and (2) develop and issue SPI guidance and, in doing so, consider basing this guidance on the SEI IDEALSM model and the positive examples of SPI within the Army, Air Force, DFAS, and some Navy units cited in this report.

We also recommend that the Secretary direct the Assistant Secretary for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence to (1) annually determine the components’ compliance with the SPI policy and (2) establish and promote a means for sharing SPI lessons learned and best practices knowledge throughout DOD.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, who is also the DOD Deputy Chief Information Officer (CIO), agreed with the report’s message that SPI practices should be used and encouraged, and that information about SPI practices should be shared among DOD components. To this end, and since receiving a draft of this report, the Deputy CIO stated that the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) has established a working group that is, among other things, to develop a plan for implementing SPI. According to the Deputy CIO, this plan will be ready for internal review in April 2001.

Further, the Deputy CIO stated that a January 2001 revision to DOD Regulation 5000.2-R represents a policy step toward addressing software improvement by including in the regulation a section on software management. According to the Deputy CIO, while this section does not specifically call for an SPI program, the regulation provides guidance for improving software by using, for example, SEI’s Capability Maturity Model level 3 or its equivalent for major acquisition programs with procurement costs in excess of $2.19 billion.

In light of the above, the Deputy CIO stated that DOD agreed with our recommendation to establish and promote a means for sharing SPI lessons learned and best practices knowledge throughout DOD, and added that a DOD steering group, which was chartered during the course of our review, has been assigned responsibility for this function. However, the Deputy CIO disagreed with our recommendation that DOD issue a policy to mandate SPI programs for all DOD components and their relevant activities. According to the Deputy CIO, establishing a policy requiring or otherwise directing DOD components that do not have SPI programs to implement them would be premature at this time because there are insufficient data to justify the sole use of the SEI IDEALSM model and that unless a specific model were used, compliance with such a policy or directive would be problematic. Therefore, the Deputy CIO stated a decision regarding the issuance of DOD-wide policy mandating the implementation of SPI programs would not be made until the work group reports its results and develops its plan for implementing SPI. At this point and without the work group’s findings, according to the Deputy CIO, issuance of SPI guidance (as opposed to “policy”) would be “a more beneficial approach.”

In our view, the Deputy CIO’s comments are not inconsistent with our recommendations, and our point of disagreement appears to center around simply the timing of actions rather than the recommended actions themselves. Specifically, while we continue to believe that sufficient bases currently exist for issuance of a DOD SPI policy requirement, especially in light of the evidence in our report that (1) without this requirement not all components are implementing SPI and (2) those components that are currently implementing SPI are reporting substantial benefits, it is reasonable for DOD to await its work group’s results before making a decision on how to proceed. Further, we agree with the Deputy CIO’s comment that there are insufficient data to justify citing in DOD policy the SEI IDEALSM model as the single model for SPI. Our report recognizes that not all of the DOD components that we cited as having effective SPI programs are using the same model. As a result, our recommendations did not prescribe a specific SPI model. Instead, we recommended that in developing SPI policy and associated guidance, DOD should consider basing this guidance on the SEI IDEALSM model as well as the positive examples of SPI within the Army, Air Force, DFAS, and some Navy units cited in the report.

Regarding the Deputy CIO’s comment that DOD has recently revised DOD Regulation 5000.2-R to include guidance for improving software management through the use of, for example, SEI’s Capability Maturity Model level 3, we note that level 3 requirements include performance of process improvement practices that are expanded upon by the SEI IDEALSM model. Additionally, we note that the regulation does not apply to all DOD software/system programs but, rather, only to acquisition programs that exceed a certain dollar threshold. Therefore, the revised regulation does not fulfill the intent of our recommendations.

DOD’s written comments, along with our responses, are reproduced in appendix II.

We are sending copies of this report to Senator John Warner, Senator Carl Levin, Senator Ted Stevens, Senator Daniel Inouye, and to Representative Bob Stump, Representative Ike Skelton, and Representative C.W. Bill Young, in their capacities as Chairmen, Ranking Members, or Ranking Minority Members of Senate and House Committees and Subcommittees. In addition, we are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Directors of DLA and DFAS; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be available at GAO’s web site, www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512- 3439 or by e-mail at hiter@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to (1) compare selected DOD components’ SPI programs against SEI’s IDEALSM model, which is a recognized best practices model; (2) determine how these components have approached management of their SPI programs and what program results they are reporting; and (3) determine what DOD-wide efforts are under way to promote and leverage the components’ SPI programs. The selected components include all four services—Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps—and two DOD agencies that have large, software-intensive system modernization programs under way—the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).

To address the first objective, we reviewed the components’ respective information technology strategic plans as well as available SPI policies, guidance, and program documentation, and interviewed headquarters officials from each component. Using this information, we first ascertained whether SPI programs or activities existed for a component, and if so, how they were organized and structured. For the components in which we found SPI programs or activities, we then identified the units within the components responsible for implementing those programs and activities. In instances in which these responsibilities were decentralized (Army, Air Force, and Navy), we worked with component headquarters and command officials to select at least two units in each component that collectively (1) had missions involving both software-intensive weapons and business systems and (2) were responsible for the largest percentages of software and systems development, acquisition, and engineering activities within each component. Table 2 shows the DOD components and software/systems units where we reviewed SPI programs and activities. Where “not applicable” is indicated in the table, SPI responsibility resided at the “Command/major organizational unit,” and therefore our work did not extend to a “Software/systems unit.”

For each unit that we identified as being responsible for implementing an SPI program or activities, we analyzed relevant SPI program documentation, including program descriptions, plans, budgets, and progress and performance measures and reports, and interviewed program officials. We then compared this information with the SPI tasks specified and described in SEI’s IDEALSM model to determine whether the program satisfied the model.

Designed to assist organizations in implementing and managing effective SPI programs, the SEI-developed IDEALSM model comprises five specific phases; a sixth element addresses overall management of the five phases. Table 3 provides more information about the tasks involved in each phase. Table 4 lists every task included under each phase.

To address the second objective, we analyzed the aforementioned information, conducted additional interviews, and reviewed additional program information from the component units to which SPI management responsibility had been delegated. As part of this objective, we also reviewed program progress and performance reports and discussed program accomplishments with responsible officials to identify examples of SPI benefits. We then analyzed each component’s SPI program results in relation to its program management approach to determine whether any patterns were evident. We did not independently validate components’ reported accomplishments and benefits.

To address the third objective, we interviewed responsible component officials, reviewed supporting records and documentation, and visited Internet sites to identify SPI program best practices and lessons learned, along with what efforts are being made to share these with other activities and components throughout the department. We also identified two offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that have responsibility and activities underway relating to the advancement of software and system management practices in the departmentthe Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. For each office, we analyzed documentation describing their respective ongoing and planned activities and interviewed officials. In doing so, we focused on identifying any activities that specifically promoted and leveraged SPI programs and activities under way throughout DOD. We also discussed with SPI program officials in each component their awareness of the OSD efforts.

We performed our work at Army headquarters, the Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia; and interviewed officials and reviewed documentation from the Communications-Electronics Command Software Engineering Center at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and the Aviation and Missile Command Software Engineering Directorate at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. We also performed our work at Navy headquarters in Arlington, Virginia; and interviewed officials and reviewed documentation from the Naval Aviation Systems Command at Patuxent River, Maryland; and the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command Centers at San Diego, California; Chesapeake, Virginia; and Charleston, South Carolina. We also interviewed officials and reviewed documentation from the Air Force’s Electronic Systems Center Standard Systems Group at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; the Materiel Systems Group at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; and the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado. We also performed our work at Marine Corps headquarters in Arlington, Virginia; and interviewed officials and reviewed documentation from the Marine Corps Systems Command in Quantico, Virginia; and the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity at Camp Pendleton, California. We also performed work at DFAS headquarters in Arlington, Virginia; and DLA headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. We conducted our work from March through December 2000, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter dated March 2, 2001.

GAO Comments

1. We disagree. Sufficient bases currently exist for issuance of a DOD SPI policy requirement, especially in light of the evidence in our report that (1) without this requirement not all components are implementing SPI and (2) those components that are currently implementing SPI are reporting substantial benefits. Nevertheless, DOD's decision to await an OSD work group's results before making a decision on how to proceed is not unreasonable or inconsistent with our position. 2. See response to comment 1. 3. We disagree. Oversight is an important part of policy implementation, and without such oversight, DOD would incur significant risk that the policy would not be implemented. Further, establishing a baseline measure to determine compliance does not require the implementation of a specific model. The intent of our recommendations is to establish a policy requiring SPI that recognizes, as our report recognizes, that there is more than one model for doing so effectively.

Description of SEI Capability Maturity Models

Since 1984, the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) has worked to improve management of software/systems productivity and quality primarily by addressing problems in acquiring, developing, engineering, or enhancing software/systems through a series of capability maturity models. According to SEI, an organization’s process capability provides a means of predicting the most likely outcome of the next software/systems project undertaken; process maturity implies that the productivity and quality resulting from an organization’s software/systems processes can be improved as maturity of the processes increases. The IDEALSM model is based on lessons learned from SEI experiences as well as from SEI projects relating to software process capability and maturity. For example, during the initiating phase of the IDEALSM model, general SPI program goals are defined, and this definition could be in terms of capability maturity model levels. In the diagnosing phase, IDEALSM recommends developing an organization process maturity baseline; SEI’s capability maturity model− based appraisal is one way of establishing this baseline.

The first of these capability maturity models, the Software Capability Maturity Model® (SW-CMM®), was designed to assist organizations in improving software development and maintenance processes. In this model, software process maturity—ranked from a low of level 1 to a high of level 5—serves as an indicator of the likely range of software cost, schedule, and quality that can be expected to be achieved by projects developed within an organization. (See figure 2.)

Continuous process improvement is enabled by quantitative feedback from the process and from piloting innovative ideas and technologies.

Predictable process

Detailed measures of the software process and product quality are collected. Both the software process and products are quantitatively understood and controlled.

Standard, consistent process

The software process for both management and engineering activities is documented, standardized, and integrated into a standard software process for the organization. All projects use an approved, tailored version of the organization’s standard software process for developing and maintaining software.

Disciplined process

Basic project management processes are established to track cost, schedule, and functionality. The necessary process discipline is in place to repeat earlier successes on projects with similar applications.

The software process is characterized as ad hoc, and occasionally even chaotic. Few processes are defined, and success depends on individual effort.

Since the SW-CMM® was published, SEI has developed additional models in the capability maturity series: The Software Acquisition CMM® is a model for improving the software acquisition process. It follows the same five-level architecture as the SW-CMM® but emphasizes acquisition issues and the needs of individuals and groups planning and managing software acquisition activities.

The Systems Engineering CMM® describes the essential elements of an organization’s systems engineering process and provides a reference for comparing actual systems engineering practices against these elements. The model addresses the process aspects of systems engineering and the product development portion of the life cycle. This model was a collaboration of several organizations, including SEI.

In 1997 a team led by DOD, in conjunction with SEI, government, and industry, concentrated on developing an integrated framework for maturity models and associated products. The result was the CMM IntegrationSM (CMMISM), which is intended to provide guidance for improving an organization’s processes and the ability to manage the development, acquisition, and maintenance of products and services, while reducing the redundancy and inconsistency caused by using stand-alone models.

The CMMISM combines earlier models from SEI and the Electronic Industries Alliance into a single model for use by organizations pursuing enterprise-wide process improvement. However, the prototype CMMISM does not include the acquisition features of the SA-CMM® because the team wanted to focus first on the development process. A CMMISM that includes coverage for acquiring software-intensive systems is currently being developed. Additional disciplines may also be covered. Ultimately, the CMMISM is to replace the models that have been its starting point.

Detailed Results of Review of DOD Components’ SPI Programs

Army SPI Program

Background

The Army depends on software-intensive systems to support each of its major commands and every facet of its mission, from weapons to financial management systems. The Army budgeted about $3.3 billion on information technology during fiscal year 2000.

The Army has assigned responsibility for information systems to the Army Materiel Command (AMC). Several major subcommands function under AMC. Three of these major subcommands—the Communications- Electronics Command (CECOM), the Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM), and the Tank-Automotive Command—are responsible for the acquisition, development, engineering, and maintenance of information technology for the Army. We reviewed the Army’s SPI activities at CECOM and AMCOM.

CECOM has assigned responsibility for information systems to its Software Engineering Center (SEC). The center, located at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, is supported by several software/systems activities located across the United States. The center is responsible for overseeing about 85 percent of the Army’s systems, including (1) command, control, communications, and computers; (2) intelligence, electronic warfare, and sensors; (3) sustaining base/power projection; and (4) AMC business systems.

AMCOM has assigned responsibility for its information systems to its Software Engineering Directorate (SED). This directorate, located at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, oversees and provides life-cycle support to both aviation and missile weapons systems. (See figure 3.)

Army’s SPI program activities began in the early 1990s; in mid-1996 the Secretary mandated that all Army software acquisition, development, and maintenance activities establish SPI programs. At the same time, the Army published an SPI policy that specified two requirements: First, a contractor’s capability to produce quality software will be part of the Army’s source-selection evaluation process. The Army has implemented this requirement by evaluating potential contractors against SW-CMM® level 3 maturity requirements and requiring contractors that do not meet these requirements to propose a strategy for mitigating the risks associated with not meeting them. This requirement is further enforced during milestone reviews of major systems, when the program manager must show that the contractor meets these requirements.

Second, Army software activities will continually improve their software and systems process maturity, including self-assessments of existing processes, and achieve SW-CMM® level 3 within 6 years of initial assessment.

Army’s SPI Program Is Aligned With SEI’s IDEALSM Model

Both the CECOM SEC and the AMCOM SED SPI programs are fully consistent with the IDEALSM model. Table 5 shows examples of program elements that reflect some of the recommended tasks in the IDEALSM model; table 6 provides a detailed comparison of CECOM and AMCOM’s SPI programs against each of the IDEALSM model recommended tasks.

Army Reports That Its Decentralized Approach to SPI Program Management Has Produced Results

When the Army first launched its SPI activities, it managed initiation and diagnosis centrally, with both CECOM and AMCOM being involved in these early actions. Subsequently, as many groups throughout the Army were trained in using the SEI process maturity measurements, responsibility for implementing SPI programs was delegated to the commands. The Army has since expanded this decentralized approach, giving each command the SPI requirements through Army policy and allowing each to implement the policy as it determines best supports its mission.

According to information that these two subcommands provided, their SPI programs have produced positive results. One of AMCOM’s measures of software quality is development productivity, which is the number of lines of software code produced as a function of resources invested. According to AMCOM, SED’s productivity ratio for new development products increased from 1.30 to 2.48 as a result of moving from SW-CMM® level 2 to level 3. SED reports that it has recently achieved level 4.

Air Force SPI Program

Background

Software-intensive systems are vital to the Air Force’s overall mission. They are used to sustain weapons systems, airborne electronics, electronic warfare, space communications, and support equipment. The Air Force has about 1,600 systems and budgeted about $4.6 billion in fiscal year 2000 for information technology.

The Air Force has nine major commands, but its largest software/systems units are under the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC). Within AFMC, we reviewed SPI efforts at two units within the Electronic Systems Center, which provides command and control and information systems for the Air Force as well as for other DOD units, using a budget of over $3 billion in fiscal year 2000. The two units that we reviewed were the Standard Systems Group (SSG) at Montgomery, Alabama, and the Materiel Systems Group (MSG) at Dayton, Ohio. In addition, we reviewed SPI activities at the Air Force Academy (AFA), which has one of the remaining software/systems units outside AFMC. (See figure 4.)

SSG is the largest software/systems unit within the Air Force in terms of money invested and amount of software delivered. Its mission is to develop and maintain combat support information systems for the Air Force and other DOD components. Additionally, SSG manages information technology contracts and standard information systems programs commonly used at all active and reserve Air Force bases and some DOD agencies worldwide.

Next to SSG, MSG is the largest Air Force central software/systems unit. MSG’s mission is to support the Air Force goal of information dominance through acquiring, developing, maintaining, reengineering, and providing technical services for information systems.

AFA has a software/systems unit that is primarily responsible for maintaining and developing the Cadet Administrative Management Information System, a mission-critical database system that tracks the progress of cadets from precandidacy through academic, physical, ethical/moral, and military training programs and, after graduation, throughout their Air Force careers.

In 1991, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force initiated the service’s SPI program. In particular, Air Force software/systems units were directed to complete SW-CMM® assessments by October 1, 1994, perform follow-up assessments every 2 years, and achieve SW-CMM® level 3 by 1998. Air Force’s 1994 SPI policy was revised this year. This revised policy requires all units that develop or maintain software/systems to have an SPI program and a documented SPI plan that includes, at least, a baseline measure of their current capabilities, goals and milestones they intend to reach, and metrics with which to measure their progress toward goals and milestones.

Air Force SPI Program Is Aligned With SEI’s IDEALSM Model

The IDEALSM model is the framework the Air Force recommends to its software/systems units, and our comparison of the activities at SSG, MSG, and AFA to the IDEALSM model found that their respective SPI programs are almost all aligned with the model. Specifically, each of the programs satisfied all but five of the IDEALSM model recommended tasks, and none of those five is significant enough to preclude having effective SPI programs. Table 7 shows examples of the programs’ elements that reflect some of the recommended tasks in the IDEALSM model; table 8 shows a detailed comparison of SSG, MSG, and AFA SPI programs against each of the IDEALSM model recommended tasks.

Air Force Reports That Its Decentralized Approach to SPI Program Management Has Produced Results

Air Force headquarters has delegated SPI responsibility to its software/systems units. When the Air Force began its SPI activities in 1991, its goal was to initiate SPI by performing assessments that would indicate the current level of maturity at Air Force units. Management of this effort was centralized in the Air Force Communications Agency (AFCA). AFCA staff visited all 41 Air Force units, some more than once, to perform assessments. Once software/systems units became capable of conducting their own process maturity measurements, Air Force began decentralizing management of the SPI program to the units. The last year in which the Air Force exercised any centralized management of SPI was 1998.

The Air Force’s SPI efforts have been, in its view, beneficial. For example, one Air Force center reported a 7.5-to-1 return on its SPI investment, which was independently verified. An official at another center stated that SPI had allowed its organization to achieve higher process maturity levels and made significant improvements in the quality of its software products and its productivity measures.

Navy SPI Program

Background

The Navy depends on software-intensive systems to support many functions throughout its nine operating forces—including the Marine Corps—and its 15 support units—including four major systems commands. These systems support some aspect of every operation, including strategic and tactical operations; sophisticated weaponry; intelligence, surveillance, and security; strategic sealift and fleet mobilization and readiness; and routine business functions such as finance, personnel, logistics, and contract management. In fiscal year 2000, the Navy budgeted about $3.1 billion for information technology.

Within the Navy, acquisition, development, and maintenance of these systems is delegated to its major systems commands: the Naval Aviation Systems Command (NAVAIR), Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), Naval Sea Systems Command, and Naval Supply Systems Command. We reviewed SPI activities at NAVAIR and SPAWAR. Both commands have several subordinate units involved in acquiring, developing, and maintaining systems. (See figure 5.) and Acquisition)

NAVAIR provides full life-cycle support to 148 programs, such as aircraft, avionics, air-launched weapons, electronic warfare, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. NAVAIR has two divisions (weapons and aircraft). The weapons division has two California product centers, and the aircraft division has three centers, located in New Jersey, Maryland, and Florida.

SPAWAR develops, acquires, and maintains systems through three SPAWAR Systems Centers (SSC). These centers are at San Diego, California; Chesapeake, Virginia; and Charleston, South Carolina. We reviewed SPAWAR’s SPI efforts at all three centers. SSC San Diego develops, acquires, and supports command, control, communications, and ocean surveillance systems. SSC Chesapeake develops, acquires, and supports supply, inventory, finance, food service, and other information systems. SSC Charleston develops, acquires, and supports command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.

To guide and direct their respective SPI programs, these commands follow DOD and other models and standards. Commands have also established local policy. For instance, SPAWAR policy requires all managers with software-related responsibilities at San Diego to incorporate process improvement in the areas of new development, modification, reuse, reengineering, maintenance, integration, and all other activities resulting in software products. In 2000, NAVAIR published an interim policy that requires prospective contractors to be evaluated at SEI SW-CMM® level 3 for all acquisitions.

Navy’s SPI Program Is Partly Aligned With the IDEALSM Model

Navy’s experience with SPI to date has been mixed. Both SSC San Diego and NAVAIR have SPI programs that are consistent with the IDEALSM model. However, SSC Chesapeake’s and SSC Charleston’s programs are not. Specifically, SSC Chesapeake has only recently initiated an SPI program and, while efforts to date are aligned with the IDEALSM model, many important SPI program tasks have yet to be executed. For example, in July 2000 it completed some initiating-phase tasks, such as creating a management steering group and an SEPG. However, it has yet, for example, to (1) conduct baselines to identify process strengths and weaknesses in the diagnosing phase, (2) develop an SPI plan with measurable goals and committed resources in the establishing phase, (3) pilot-test potential solutions or transition the solutions to long-term support in the acting phase, or (4) gather or analyze lessons learned in the leveraging phase.

In the case of SSC Charleston, no SPI program exists, although the center has undertaken one task that is intended to begin the initiating phase of a program. Table 9 shows examples of Navy SPI programs’ elements that reflect some of the recommended tasks in the IDEALSM model; table 10 shows a detailed comparison of NAVAIR and SPAWAR SPI programs against each of the IDEALSM model recommended tasks.

Navy Reports That Its Decentralized Approach to SPI Program Management Has Produced Results

The Navy has delegated SPI responsibility to its commands, which in some cases have further decentralized SPI program management within the command structure. For example, NAVAIR manages its SPI program centrally through its Software Process Improvement Office. Established in 1999, this office, in combination with two NAVAIR executive groups, establishes NAVAIR software improvement policies, monitors performance, and provides support for process training and baselining. In contrast to NAVAIR, SPAWAR decentralized SPI program management to its SSCs.

Navy reports several SPI program benefits. For example, officials at NAVAIR’s F/A-18 software program report reaching SW-CMM® level 3 with benefits including cost savings, improved product quality, and a 7:1 return on their SPI investment. In addition, SSC San Diego officials report that their SPI program significantly reduced both the number of software defects and the time expended in testing their air traffic control program system. In particular, staff months spent addressing trouble reports were reduced by 70 percent. These officials also state that benefits from SPI include better management control, improved overall software performance, higher customer satisfaction, and increased competitive advantage and repeat business.

Marine Corps SPI Program

Background

The Marine Corps depends on software-intensive systems to support every facet of its mission—from weapons to tactical communications systems. In fiscal year 2000, the Marine Corps budgeted about $525 million for information technology.

The Marine Corps has assigned responsibility for acquisition, development, engineering, and maintenance of information technology to the Marine Corps Systems Command. The Command is the sole procurement activity for the Marine Corps, purchasing everything from business systems to software-intensive weaponry such as tanks and command, control, communications, and computer equipment. The Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA), located at Camp Pendleton, California, is a subordinate command. MCTSSA is responsible for software life-cycle support of designated Marine Corps and joint-service tactical data systems and software. (See figure 6.)

According to MCTSSA officials, the Marine Corps does not have a formal SPI program, although it has performed SPI activities since the early 1990s. MCTSSA uses both DOD and Marine Corps guidance to manage its SPI activities. At one time, however, MCTSSA appeared to be on its way to a formal SPI program. It started SPI activities in the early 1990s, and by 1995 was using SEI to support them. For example, during 1995 and 1996 SEI assisted the Marine Corps in identifying program weaknesses and in developing solutions to improve them. However, MCTSSA officials stated that they did not renew the SEI contract because of a lack of funds.

Marine Corps SPI Activities Are Partly Aligned With SEI’s IDEALSM Model

MCTSSA is performing many of the tasks recommended by the IDEALSM model. Table 11 shows examples of activities that reflect some of the recommended tasks in the IDEALSM model; however, in all but the diagnosing phase, MCTSSA is not executing some key recommended tasks. For example, (1) in the initiating phase, it has not defined general SPI goals or guiding principles; (2) in the establishing phase, it has not developed an SPI plan with measurable goals and committed resources; (3) in the acting phase, it developed solutions but never pilot-tested potential solutions or transitioned the solutions to long-term support; and (4) in the leveraging phase, it gathered lessons learned but did not analyze them or use them to revise its organizational approach. Further, it has not reviewed its sponsorship and commitment, established high-level goals, or decided to continue with the SPI process. Without performing these steps, it is unlikely that SPI activities will produce the kind of meaningful advances in product quality and cost savings that other DOD components have realized. Table 12 shows a detailed comparison of MCTSSA SPI activities against each of the IDEALSM model recommended tasks.

Marine Corps Uses a Decentralized Approach to Manage SPI Program Activities

The Marine Corps has adopted a decentralized management approach for SPI by delegating responsibility to the Command, which in turn has delegated most of the responsibility to MCTSSA. Specifically, the Command retained overall responsibility for SPI but assigned other activities, such as defining standard processes or metrics, to MCTSSA.

DFAS’ SPI Program

Background

DFAS provides finance and accounting services to DOD components. Created in 1991, it replaced more than 300 service and agency finance and accounting offices that operated more than 300 systems. DFAS consists of five centers and 20 field offices; it operates 83 finance and accounting systems but plans to reduce this number to about 30 or fewer by the end of 2005. The systems are acquired and maintained by seven software/systems units called systems engineering organizations (SEOs). (See figure 7.) In fiscal year 2000, DFAS budgeted about $225 million for information services.

DFAS began its SPI program in 1993 when responsibility for SPI was assigned to the Financial Systems Organization (FSO) and a corporate SEPG was established to manage the program and coordinate SPI among FSO field locations. FSO established an SPI policy in its 1995 SPI strategic action plan. That policy is currently under revision. The latest draft revision has continuous SPI as an objective for all DFAS SEOs. The policy also requires that best practices be shared across all DFAS SEOs and that process metrics be collected, maintained, analyzed, used, and reported to support the SPI process.

DFAS SPI Program Is Aligned With SEI’s IDEALSM Model

DFAS’ SPI program is fully consistent with the IDEALSM model. Table 13 shows examples of DFAS activities that reflect some of the recommended IDEALSM tasks; table 14 shows a detailed comparison of DFAS SPI activities with each of the IDEALSM model recommended tasks.

DFAS Reports That Its Centralized Approach to SPI Program Management Has Produced Results

DFAS centralized SPI program management when it started its program under FSO in 1993. When reorganized in 1998, DFAS retained centralized SPI management by assigning it to the Infrastructure Services Organization (ISO). Under the draft SPI policy revision, management of the program will still be centralized in headquarters, but responsibilities will be split between ISO and its parent unit, the Information and Technology Directorate (ITD). Specifically, the draft revision assigns the ITD responsibility for approving SPI policies, maintaining metrics, and analyzing metrics for the purpose of recommending changes in priorities, resources, and processes. The draft revision assigns the ISO responsibility for publishing SPI policies, maintaining the agency process assets library, and coordinating DFAS-wide SPI activities.

ITD reports that its SPI program has improved DFAS staff productivity. A DFAS contractor has conducted benchmarking measurements on DFAS software/systems development efforts. Results from 1996 and 1997 measurements show that DFAS develops and maintains software (measured in terms of function points) for $0.67 that costs an average organization $1.00, a comparable government organization $1.06, and a comparable large commercial organization $1.37. The contractor cited “strong processes” as one factor that contributed to DFAS’ productivity.

DLA’s SPI Program

Background

DLA is a combat support agency whose primary role is to provide supply management, logistics services, and distribution support to America’s military forces worldwide. It relies on software-intensive systems to administer over $900 billion in DOD and other agency contracts. DLA budgeted about $784 million for information technology in fiscal year 2000.

In 1998, DLA’s systems design center operated nine systems development and maintenance units across the country. After closing this center in December 1998 in order to streamline operations and reduce costs, DLA created three systems integration offices to oversee the development and maintenance units, which have been cut from nine to seven. (See figure 8.) Each of the three offices supports software development and maintenance for a separate DLA business function—materiel management, logistics, and base support and distribution.

DLA does not have an SPI program, having eliminated the program in 1998 when its system design center was closed in 1998. However, as part of its ongoing reorganization, DLA rewrote the policy and duties of its CIO and moved that function to the new Information Operations unit. The CIO told us that the SPI program is to be reestablished. However, specific plans and milestones for doing so were not available.

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, key contributors to this report were Tonia Brown, Suzanne Burns, Michael Fruitman, John Ortiz, Madhav Panwar, and Teresa Tucker.

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