NATO Partnerships: DOD Needs to Assess U.S. Assistance in Response to Changes to the Partnership for Peace Program
Released: 2010-11-10T00:00:00

Letter

Background

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, by 12 European and North American countries to provide collective defense against the emerging threat that the Soviet Union posed to the democracies of Western Europe. Since its inception, NATO’s key objective has been to achieve a lasting peace in the North Atlantic area that is based on the common values of democracy, rule of law, and individual liberty.

Currently, 28 countries are members of NATO. Article 10 of the treaty permits accession of additional European states if they are in a position to further the treaty’s principles and contribute to North Atlantic security. Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, members of NATO agree that an armed attack against any member is considered to be an attack against them all.

The NATO PfP program was launched at the January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels as a way for the alliance to engage the former members of the Warsaw Pact and other former communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. Currently, 22 countries from Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia are in the PfP program. The objectives of the partnership are to (1) facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes; (2) ensure democratic control of defense forces; (3) maintain the capability and readiness to contribute to crisis response operations under the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations; (4) develop cooperative military relations with NATO for the purposes of joint planning, training, and exercises for peacekeeping; search and rescue; and humanitarian operations; and (5) develop forces that are better able to operate with NATO members. NATO also uses the PfP to support countries interested in NATO membership, although it does not promise eventual membership. NATO does not extend Article 5 protection to PfP countries or any country other than NATO members.

In addition to the PfP program, NATO has established partnerships with other groups of countries located beyond Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia to build security relationships and maintain dialogue with countries in other regions of the world. NATO established the MD partnership in 1994—the same year as the PfP. As of September 2010, it includes seven African and Middle Eastern countries. At the June 2004 NATO Summit in Istanbul, NATO established the ICI, and invited six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council to participate. NATO has also established formalized partnership relationships with additional countries, referring to them as “Partners across the Globe.”

Since the mid-1990s, NATO has initiated several military operations, most notably the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Initially, ISAF was a coalition of volunteering countries deployed under the authority of the UN Security Council. In August 2003, the Alliance assumed strategic command, control, and coordination of the mission and established a permanent ISAF headquarters in Kabul. Since then, the operation has grown to about 120,000 troops from 47 countries, including all NATO members, as of August 2010. NATO also intervened militarily in the aftermath of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia to halt conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, and Macedonia in 2001. Since December 2004, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) has been the only remaining large-scale Allied force deployment in the Balkans, although NATO maintains headquarters in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina; and Skopje, Macedonia; to assist the host governments in defense reform and NATO integration. In addition, NATO’s naval forces lead Operation Active Endeavour, a maritime surveillance operation, launched after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, to detect, deter, and protect against terrorist activity in the Mediterranean. NATO vessels started patrolling the Eastern Mediterranean in October 2001 and eventually expanded to the entire Mediterranean in March 2004. NATO also has a noncombat training mission in Iraq, begun in 2004; and a counterpiracy mission off the Horn of Africa, known as Operation Ocean Shield, begun in 2009.

DOD launched the WIF program in July 1994 to support countries that are members of the PfP program. DOD uses defense-wide Operation and Maintenance, and Research and Development funds for the WIF program according to the laws and policies governing these types of funds. The WIF program’s goals include: assisting PfP partners in building defense institutions that are transparent, accountable, and professional; improving U.S./NATO-PfP partner interoperability to enhance partner contributions to coalition operations; supporting PfP partner integration with NATO; and ensuring democratic control of the armed forces.

WIF funding supports the participation of PfP countries in bilateral and multilateral military exercises and military contact programs, including seminars, workshops, conferences, exchanges, and visits. Within DOD, different components are responsible for the implementation of the WIF program. Appendix II provides descriptions of these components and the level of WIF funding allocated to them in the fiscal year 2010 budget. WIF funding may also be used in conjunction with other security cooperation programs that support the goals of the WIF and PfP programs. Appendix III provides descriptions of these related programs and the level of funding they provided to PfP countries in fiscal year 2009. DOD relies on other funding, such as the Coalition Support Fund, to cover the cost of partner countries’ participation in NATO operations.

The PfP Has Evolved in Several Key Ways Due to Changing Political Circumstances and Security Threats

The PfP program has evolved in four key ways since July 2001, when we last reported on the program. First, several PfP countries from Central and Eastern Europe have become members of NATO, resulting in a decline in the total number of PfP countries and the number of PfP countries aspiring to NATO membership. Second, NATO has developed additional mechanisms for engaging with PfP countries, allowing partners additional opportunities to tailor their participation in the PfP based upon their individual objectives and capacities. Third, the growing size and significance of the NATO operation in Afghanistan has increased NATO’s emphasis on developing PfP countries’ capabilities for participating in NATO military operations and the strategic importance of the Caucasus and Central Asian PfP countries to NATO, given their proximity to Afghanistan. Fourth, as NATO has taken steps to wind down its peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans, it has increasingly used the PfP to build cooperative relationships with countries in the region, marking a shift in its role in stabilizing that part of Europe.

The Number of PfP Countries Aspiring to Membership Has Declined

Since 2001, several PfP countries from Central and Eastern Europe have become members of NATO, resulting in a decline in the total number of PfP countries and the number of PfP countries aspiring to NATO membership. While NATO has utilized the PfP for a variety of purposes, historically, NATO’s primary focus for the program has been to assist interested countries in preparing to become NATO members. However, the PfP’s function as a pathway to membership has diminished as the composition of countries in the program has changed. As figure 1 shows, 12 former PfP countries have joined NATO since the PfP’s establishment in 1994, including 9 countries since our previous report on the PfP in 2001.

While 9 countries have left the PfP since 2001, 5 new countries have also joined—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Malta, Montenegro, Serbia, and Tajikistan—bringing the total number of current PfP members to 22 (see fig. 2).

While the PfP has always included some countries that did not aspire to join NATO, NATO and U.S. officials with whom we spoke noted that the number of PfP countries seeking NATO membership has declined as the majority of those countries interested in joining have already done so. Of the 22 countries currently in the PfP, only 4 are actively pursuing NATO membership: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Ukraine had previously pursued NATO membership, but is no longer doing so, given the outcome of the country’s February 2010 presidential elections.

Three of the countries aspiring to membership—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia—have been offered a MAP, the final step that countries complete before NATO offers membership. Nine of 26 PfP countries had MAPs at the time of our previous report in 2001. During the MAP process, countries are required to undertake an intensive set of reforms that extend beyond their defense institutions, in order to bring the countries in line with NATO standards. Macedonia has had a MAP since 1999, and NATO has committed to offering it membership as soon as it resolves its dispute with Greece over its constitutional name. NATO has offered the other two countries a MAP only within the last year. NATO’s Foreign Ministers offered Montenegro a MAP in December 2009. In April 2010, the NATO Foreign Ministers voted to offer Bosnia- Herzegovina a MAP; however, the Foreign Ministers decided that Bosnia- Herzegovina can only fully participate in MAP once it takes the necessary steps to transfer ownership of various immovable military assets (such as bases) from its two entity governments to the central government.

Most current PfP countries have not indicated an interest in joining NATO, or, in the case of the five Central Asian PfP countries, are not eligible for NATO membership because of their geographic location outside of Europe. According to NATO, U.S., and PfP country officials, these countries participate in the PfP for a variety of reasons including the opportunity for dialogue with NATO on security issues, the ability to access NATO training and technical assistance to support reform efforts and build interoperability with NATO, the opportunity to contribute to NATO operations, and the desire to counter external pressures from other countries.

NATO Has Created a Range of Partnership Mechanisms in which PfP Countries Can Participate Based upon Their Differing Needs

Since our report in 2001, NATO has created a variety of new partnership mechanisms and modified existing mechanisms to allow PfP countries to tailor their participation in the program based upon their unique capacities and objectives. With nine PfP countries having joined NATO since 2001, leaving fewer countries aspiring to membership, these mechanisms enable current PfP countries to structure their cooperation with NATO in ways other than the MAP process. The 22 countries currently in the PfP differ significantly in terms of geographic location, military capabilities, political systems, and economic development, ranging from developed Western European democracies, such as Switzerland, to developing, authoritarian states in Central Asia, such as Turkmenistan. These mechanisms allow this diverse group of PfP countries the flexibility to shape their participation in the PfP based upon their unique needs (see table 1). Three of the mechanisms in table 1, the Individual Partnership Programme, the Planning and Review Process, and the Operational Capabilities Concept focus primarily on PfP countries’ defense and military goals. The three other mechanisms in figure 3, the Individual Partnership Action Plan, the Annual National Programme, and the MAP, also allow PfP countries to establish defense and military goals. However, these mechanisms are broader in scope with countries also identifying political, legal, economic, security, and other goals they would like to work with NATO to achieve.

Individual Partnership Programme. Since NATO established the PfP program in 1994, all participating countries prepare, at a minimum, Individual Partnership Programme documents. Individual Partnership Programmes identify each country’s national policy for participating in the PfP, the forces and assets they are willing to make available for PfP activities, and the areas in which they would like to pursue cooperation with NATO. In developing Individual Partnership Programmes, countries select partnership activities and events in which they would like to participate. To improve this process, NATO developed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Work Plan (EAPWP) in 2004. The EAPWP, which is developed for a 2-year period, lists activities and events offered by NATO, as well as by individual NATO members and other PfP countries. In the 2010-2011 EAPWP, there are over 1,200 activities sorted into 34 areas of cooperation (for more details about these areas of cooperation, see app. IV).

Planning and Review Process. NATO established the Planning and Review Process in 1994, and modeled it on NATO’s own force planning system. The Planning and Review Process allows PfP countries to work more closely with NATO to enhance their interoperability with NATO forces and strengthen their defense institutions. The 18 countries participating in the Planning and Review Process work with NATO to assess their defense capabilities, identify potential contributions to NATO exercises and operations, and select specific goals for developing their defense capabilities and building interoperability (see app. V for further information on partnership goals participating countries have selected through the Planning and Review Process). NATO has made modifications to the Planning and Review Process over time. For instance, in 2004, NATO modified the Planning and Review Process’ goals to further support defense reform, defense institution building, and the fight against terrorism.

Operational Capabilities Concept. In 2004, NATO introduced the current version of the Operational Capabilities Concept to assist PfP countries in improving their ability to work effectively with NATO forces during military operations. Thirteen countries participate in the Operational Capabilities Concept. Through this process, countries identify specific military units that they want to develop to NATO standards. NATO then evaluates and certifies these units as ready to participate in NATO operations.

Individual Partnership Action Plan. NATO created the Individual Partnership Action Plan mechanism in 2002 to allow PfP countries to develop deeper and more individualized cooperation with NATO than the Individual Partnership Programme, without having to commit to pursuing NATO membership. The Individual Partnership Action Plan process is a 2- year cycle in which participating partners identify specific goals for cooperation with NATO related to political, economic, and other reforms in addition to their defense and military goals. As part of the Individual Partnership Action Plan process, NATO also conducts assessments of the progress participating partners are making toward meeting these goals. Of the five countries currently with Individual Partnership Action Plans, only Bosnia-Herzegovina aspires to become a NATO member.

Annual National Programme and MAP. Annual National Programmes are associated with countries aspiring to become NATO members. The Annual National Programme process is similar to that for the Individual Partnership Action Plan and they address similar types of issues; however, Annual National Programmes are updated every year and NATO expects participating countries to establish more ambitious reform objectives that will bring their institutions in line with NATO standards. Additionally, NATO assesses participating countries’ progress in achieving reform objectives annually instead of biennially and places greater scrutiny on the extent and pace of progress. In the past, only countries in the MAP process completed Annual National Programmes. However, in 2008, NATO offered Georgia and Ukraine Annual National Programmes, but not MAPs, to acknowledge their membership aspirations, reward them for the progress they had already demonstrated in undertaking reforms, and encourage them to set goals and undertake additional reforms consistent with NATO standards. When NATO’s Foreign Ministers voted to offer Bosnia-Herzegovina a MAP in April 2010, they decided that NATO would not accept Bosnia-Herzegovina’s first Annual National Programme until it had taken the necessary steps to transfer ownership of its immovable military assets from its two entity governments to the central government.

NATO Has Placed an Increased Emphasis on Obtaining Support from PfP Countries for Its Operation in Afghanistan

The growing size and significance of the NATO operation in Afghanistan has increased both NATO’s emphasis on developing PfP countries’ capabilities for participating in NATO military operations and the strategic importance of the Caucasus and Central Asian PfP countries to NATO, given their proximity to Afghanistan. In recent years, NATO has made the operation in Afghanistan its top priority and ISAF has grown from 5,000 to approximately 120,000 troops since NATO assumed command of the force in August 2003. Consequently, NATO has placed an increased emphasis on obtaining support from PfP countries for this operation. This focus has been highlighted in NATO summit statements. For instance, at their 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO Heads of State declared their intention to provide partners with increased opportunities to enhance their contributions to NATO-led operations, and to help transform their defenses in keeping with NATO’s own evolving operational roles and capabilities. At their 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO Heads of State affirmed the high value they place on partners’ contributions to NATO operations and stated they would continue to strive to increase interoperability between NATO and partner forces. The importance of PfP countries to NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan has also been emphasized by various NATO and NATO member country officials. For instance, during a 2010 speech on NATO’s partnerships, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO stated that partner assistance to NATO’s operation in Afghanistan is the best example of what partnerships can accomplish.

As shown in figure 3, a range of PfP countries have contributed troops for ISAF. NATO reports that 11 PfP countries had almost 2,000 troops deployed in Afghanistan, as of August 2010. None of the Central Asian countries, or Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and Malta contribute troops to ISAF. Eight additional NATO partner countries that are not in the PfP program also contribute troops to ISAF, including Australia, which contributes approximately 1,450 troops.

Some PfP countries that do not provide troop contributions to NATO operations offer other types of support, such as overflight access, land access, or basing rights. Four of the five Central Asian PfP countries provide logistic and/or host nation support to ISAF. For instance, in May 2009, Uzbekistan signed an agreement with NATO that allowed for the rail transit of nonmilitary goods through its territory to Afghanistan to support NATO operations. Turkmenistan is the only Central Asian country that has not provided such support. In addition to contributing troops to ISAF, two Caucasus countries, Georgia and Azerbaijan, also provide logistic support, including allowing overflight rights and the rail transit of nonmilitary goods. NATO and U.S. officials with whom we met stated that this type of assistance from the Caucasus and Central Asian PfP countries is critical to NATO’s execution of the war in Afghanistan. Additionally, NATO has noted that the relationships developed through the PfP have laid the basis for many of these agreements.

In addition to ISAF, NATO has looked to partners to provide troop contributions to KFOR. As figure 4 shows, six PfP countries contributed troops to NATO’s operation in Kosovo, as of February 2010. These six countries include five Western European partners and Ukraine. Morocco, an MD partner, also contributed 213 troops to KFOR, as of February 2010. 82.2% NATO has noted that partners’ contributions to ISAF and KFOR have helped ease the burden on its members from conducting multiple operations.

NATO Has Utilized the PfP to Increase Stability in the Balkans as NATO Forces Have Drawn Down

A fourth key way the PfP has evolved since our previous report on the PfP centers on NATO’s efforts in the Balkans. As figure 5 shows, NATO has established several peacekeeping missions in the Balkans since the mid-1990s. However, as NATO has taken steps to wind down its peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans, it has increasingly used the PfP to build cooperative relationships with countries in the region, marking a shift in its role in stabilizing that part of Europe. NATO has relied on the promise of these cooperative relationships and eventual NATO membership to encourage reforms in the Balkan countries designed to reduce the risk of future violence.

Since our report in 2001, NATO has continued to invite additional countries in the Balkans to participate in the PfP. As of 2010, NATO has invited all the Balkan countries to participate in the PfP, with the exception of the newly independent Kosovo. Before inviting Bosnia- Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia to join the PfP in 2006, NATO placed various requirements on the three countries. For instance, NATO required the countries to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Additionally, NATO required that Bosnia-Herzegovina eliminate its two entities’ parallel defense structures and develop a unified command and control structure.

Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina have progressed in their membership aspirations since joining the PfP in 2006. Montenegro joined the MAP process in December 2009 and NATO invited Bosnia- Herzegovina to do so in April 2010; however, it must resolve the issue of transferring its immovable defense property, such as military bases, to state control before it can fully participate. The two countries have also cooperated with NATO on various reforms. For instance, a representative from Montenegro’s delegation to NATO noted that his country has worked closely with NATO to complete a Strategic Defense Review and has made significant progress in tailoring the size and composition of its military to its actual needs. A representative from Bosnia-Herzegovina’s delegation to NATO stated that his country has made strides in ensuring civilian control over the military through Bosnia-Herzegovina’s participation in the PfP. A NATO official based in Sarajevo also noted that Bosnia-Herzegovina has almost completed the process of unifying its military under state control. While Serbia has not engaged with NATO to the same extent as Bosnia-Herzegovina or Montenegro, it has also taken steps to further its participation in the PfP. For instance, it joined the Planning and Review Process in 2007. Additionally, NATO and Serbia created a Serbia-NATO Defense Reform Group in 2006 to support Serbia’s efforts to reform and modernize its military.

Two Balkan countries—Albania and Croatia—became NATO members in April 2009. A year earlier at NATO’s Bucharest summit, the heads of state from NATO countries noted that the two countries had demonstrated their commitment to the promotion of collective security among the NATO countries and had embraced NATO’s shared values. The President’s Report to Congress on the Future of NATO Enlargement in 2009 highlighted the role the PfP had played in preparing the two countries to assume the responsibilities of membership. For instance, the report noted that the PfP had assisted the two countries in making significant progress in reforming their militaries and developing forces that were interoperable with NATO. In addition, NATO has determined that Macedonia has also successfully met the requirements for membership and will be admitted into NATO once it has resolved its dispute with Greece over its name.

NATO Is Considering Ways to Strengthen Its Partnerships as Part of the Development of Its New Strategic Concept

NATO’s new Strategic Concept is expected to highlight the importance of the PfP and other NATO partnerships and discuss ways to strengthen these partnerships further. Specifically, NATO is debating how to (1) strengthen its partnerships with countries outside of the PfP, (2) enhance routine and crisis consultations with PfP countries on security issues, (3) more effectively engage with PfP countries, such as those in Central Asia, that are not seeking membership, and (4) balance PfP countries’ aspirations for membership with Russian concerns about NATO expansion.

NATO Is Considering How to Strengthen Partnerships with Countries outside the PfP

NATO’s new Strategic Concept is expected to highlight the importance of the PfP and NATO’s other partnerships, given the widespread acknowledgment among NATO members that partnerships are critical to NATO’s ability to address many of the security challenges it faces, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Group of Experts’ May 2010 report to NATO’s Secretary General highlighted the importance of partnerships, citing the strengthening of partnerships as one of NATO’s four core tasks for the next 10 years. As figure 6 shows, NATO’s partnerships extend beyond the PfP and include countries from around the world that fall into various partnership groupings including the MD, the ICI, and Partners across the Globe.

Some NATO members, including the United States, have advocated for NATO to pursue a more global partnership agenda. According to a U.S. mission to NATO official, the United States had previously proposed eliminating the distinctions between NATO’s various partnership programs and creating one consolidated, global partnership program. Some NATO stakeholders have argued that NATO is an organization facing global security threats and that by strengthening partnerships with key countries around the world, it will allow NATO to better draw upon these partnerships as such threats arise. However, some NATO members, such as France and Germany, have been reluctant to make these partnerships a key focus for NATO, believing that it pushes NATO away from its traditional focus on Europe. These NATO members believe that NATO should continue to place the PfP above its other partnership efforts, given the PfP countries’ geographic proximity to NATO territory. Various NATO stakeholders have also raised concerns that if NATO increases its engagement with partners outside of the PfP it will result in declining NATO resources for PfP countries, given NATO’s expected budget shortfalls in upcoming years.

As the scope of NATO’s partnerships is debated, NATO is also considering steps to work more effectively with its partners in the MD and the ICI. The Group of Experts noted in its report that the accomplishments of the MD and ICI programs have been relatively modest to date. Accordingly, various NATO stakeholders have recommended that NATO focus its efforts on areas of mutual concern such as nonproliferation, terrorism, missile defense, and Iran. To this end, the Group of Experts recommends that NATO develop a statement of shared interests with the two partnerships to further cooperation in such areas. Additionally, NATO’s Allied Command Transformation recommends that NATO should seek to review and reenergize its relationships with partners in the two programs in order to increase the scope and frequency of both its formal and informal engagements with these partners. One option NATO is considering is to increase MD and ICI countries’ access to partnership mechanisms that are currently only available to PfP countries. For example, these countries do not have access to all of the activities in the EAPWP. They are also not entitled to participate in the Planning and Review Process or develop Individual Partnership Action Plans.

Unlike the MD and ICI, NATO has not developed a formal partnership structure for cooperation and dialogue with its Partners across the Globe; however, it is assessing ways to deepen its partnership with these countries. Several of these partners are key contributors to NATO’s operation in Afghanistan. For example, Australia has contributed more troops than many NATO members. Japan, while not contributing troops, has funded billions of dollars in reconstruction projects. Both NATO’s Allied Command Transformation and the Group of Experts have recommended that NATO provide mechanisms to enable global partners to have a meaningful role in shaping strategy and decisions on missions to which they contribute. U.S. officials with whom we spoke noted that these countries are not seeking formalized partnerships with NATO, but are seeking such mechanisms to allow for better coordination with NATO on joint efforts.

NATO Is Seeking to Strengthen Routine and Crisis Consultations with PfP Countries

NATO stakeholders have cited the need for NATO to strengthen its existing commitments to PfP countries to hold consultations with those countries facing security threats. The PfP Framework Document states that, “NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.” Some NATO stakeholders view NATO’s failure to hold such consultations with Georgia during the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war as evidence that NATO’s current commitments to hold consultations with PfP countries in such situations are insufficient. In recognition of such concerns, the Group of Experts recommended that NATO strengthen crisis consultations, as provided for in the PfP Framework Document. However, a U.S. official with whom we spoke noted that some NATO members are reluctant to strengthen such commitments due to concerns that it may involve NATO in conflicts that are not in NATO’s best interests or create unrealistic expectations among PfP countries regarding potential NATO assistance.

Revitalizing existing NATO-PfP councils may also be needed to improve ongoing dialogue between NATO and the PfP countries. The Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is the forum in which all NATO members and PfP countries come together to discuss relevant political and security issues. NATO and the PfP countries are currently considering various proposals to make the EAPC more dynamic and relevant, including linking the agenda more closely with that of the North Atlantic Council and focusing more on practical issues, such as energy security, where there is opportunity for mutual cooperation. Some NATO stakeholders with whom we met noted that the diversity of countries in the PfP has made substantive and frank discussion at the EAPC challenging, because some PfP countries are reluctant to discuss their security concerns, given other countries that attend. Additionally, stakeholders noted that because the EAPC is not a decision-making body, its meetings seldom result in specific outcomes.

Some NATO stakeholders have also cited the need for NATO to revitalize its commitment to conduct routine and crisis consultations with the priority countries of Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia through existing bilateral councils or commissions. For instance, NATO leaders noted at their 2009 summit that the NATO-Russia Council has not always been adequately utilized and recommended that NATO use the Council to focus on areas where there are opportunities for cooperation, such as nonproliferation, arms control, and counterterrorism. The Group of Experts recommended that NATO regularly make use of the NATO- Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions to discuss mutual security concerns and foster practical cooperation in areas such as defense reform. Other NATO stakeholders have called for NATO to ensure that it honors its commitments to Ukraine and Georgia to, through the two commissions, provide the countries with additional assistance in implementing political and defense reforms.

NATO Is Seeking More Effective Engagement with PfP Countries Not Aspiring to NATO Membership

NATO is also considering how it might increase the effectiveness of its efforts to encourage reforms in PfP countries that are not aspiring to NATO membership. In particular, NATO has cited Central Asia, which has no PfP countries aspiring to membership, as a key area of focus for the PfP since 2004; however, it has struggled to effectively engage with the five countries in the region. For instance, only one of the five countries in the region, Kazakhstan, has elected to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan. NATO has identified various challenges in engaging these partners, including their reluctance to have their defense ministries scrutinized, their limited financial resources and personnel available for participation in NATO activities, their close relationship with Russia, and their distance from Europe.

To enhance engagement with Central Asian countries, NATO is seeking better coordination among members’ bilateral assistance programs. One initiative centers on NATO’s clearinghouse mechanisms. These clearinghouses are designed to bring together PfP country representatives and security cooperation officials from NATO countries. Through the clearinghouses, partners can discuss their needs and then NATO members are able to volunteer to provide assistance to meet those needs. NATO has already established such clearinghouses for some PfP countries, such as those in the Caucasus, and is considering establishing one for Central Asia. A NATO official noted that NATO should do a better job of leveraging the types of assistance that individual members can provide that NATO itself cannot, such as the provision of equipment. As an example, the official noted that a Central Asian country has requested radar equipment to support border security requirements. The official noted that if a NATO member would commit to providing this equipment, NATO could use this as an opportunity to encourage the country to take certain actions, including providing additional support for its operation in Afghanistan. As part of its strategy, NATO intends to place a liaison officer in Central Asia to assist in the coordination of NATO members’ bilateral assistance and to increase communication between NATO and Central Asian government officials.

NATO Is Debating How to Support PfP Countries’ Membership Aspirations, while Not Escalating Tensions with Russia

Various NATO stakeholders have stated that NATO needs to maintain a credible “Open Door Policy” that supports the aspirations of those PfP countries that are seeking NATO membership. Some NATO members and PfP countries have expressed concern that NATO has allowed Russia undue influence in enlargement decisions, particularly for Georgia. In February 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that NATO membership should be a process between the country and NATO, with no outside party being able to adversely influence the outcome. In addition, the Group of Experts report emphasized the need for a strong Open Door policy stating that NATO should ensure consistency with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and its principles for enlargement by allowing states interested in joining NATO to move forward as they fulfill their requirements for membership. Certain NATO members have advocated for a slower approach to the prospective membership of some PfP countries to avoid antagonizing Russia. At NATO’s January 2010 Strategic Concept seminar, some participants stated that Russian concerns about enlargement should be taken into account. Additionally, some stakeholders have noted that, while NATO should reaffirm its commitment to maintain an open door policy, a slow path to membership for Georgia, would help ease tensions with Russia and provide greater possibilities for NATO-Russia cooperation.

Although Eligible Countries and the Focus of the WIF Program Have Changed, DOD Has Not Evaluated the Program since 2001

As a result of the changing composition of countries in the PfP program, total WIF funding dropped significantly in 2006, and the majority of funds are no longer distributed to countries aspiring to join NATO. DOD also established the DIB program in 2006 as a key focus of the WIF program; however, this relatively new program has faced challenges with its implementation. DOD last formally evaluated the WIF program in 2001 before key changes to both the WIF and PfP programs were implemented.

Amount and Distribution of WIF Funding Reflect Changing Composition of Countries in PfP Program

Since 1999, 12 PfP countries have become NATO members. As a result, fewer PfP countries remain eligible for WIF funding. In 2001, when we last reported on the WIF program, 21 countries were eligible for WIF funding; in 2010, 16 are eligible. According to DOD officials, the decline in the number of WIF-eligible countries contributed to the decreases in WIF budgets. From fiscal years 1996 through 2005, total annual WIF funding averaged about $43 million. From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, annual WIF funding has averaged about $29 million.

The distribution of WIF funding among eligible PfP countries also has changed since the initial years of the program. In our 2001 report on the WIF program, we found that WIF funding was primarily targeted to countries aspiring to become members of NATO. From 1994 through 2000, about 70 percent of WIF funding was distributed to 12 aspiring countries, according to the 2001 report. With the exception of Macedonia, these countries became NATO members and lost WIF funding. As of September 2010, only four countries aspire to join NATO. As a result, as table 2 shows, the fiscal year 2010 WIF budget only distributes about 20 percent of its funding to aspiring countries.

In addition, a significant share of the fiscal year 2010 WIF budget—about 35 percent—was devoted to supporting the participation of eligible PfP countries in bilateral or multilateral military exercises. WIF funding was budgeted to support the participation of PfP countries in a number of exercises in fiscal year 2010 ranging from 10 for Georgia to 2 for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. DOD views these exercises, which are sponsored by the United States, NATO, or other countries, as a key means of building participating countries’ military capability and interoperability with U.S. and NATO forces. According to DOD officials, WIF provides a key source of funding to enable PfP developing countries to participate in these exercises.

According to DOD officials, exercises are occasionally cancelled due to political factors in host countries. In fiscal year 2009, four exercises were cancelled, according to DOD. For example, a U.S.-sponsored multilateral exercise, known as Sea Breeze, hosted by Ukraine was cancelled in 2009 when the Ukrainian Parliament failed to authorize foreign troops to enter the country to participate. Consequently, the actual number of exercises WIF supports and amount of WIF funding devoted to exercises are likely to be lower than the budget reflects.

DIB Program is Key Focus of WIF Program, but Has Faced Implementation Challenges

DOD established the DIB program in 2006 as a key focus of the WIF program. The DIB program, which received about 20 percent of the fiscal year 2010 WIF budget, is designed to help eligible PfP countries develop accountable, professional, and transparent defense establishments. The DIB program is also intended to complement NATO’s Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building, which NATO established with similar objectives in 2004.

Approved activities in the fiscal year 2010 budget for the DIB program included assisting with strategic defense reviews; developing defense planning, budgeting, and resource management systems; developing professional military education programs; improving human resource management systems; and preparing countries to contribute to peacekeeping operations. In its initial years, the DIB program conducted surveys of PfP countries’ defense institutions and developed “roadmaps” to outline key steps the countries needed to take to achieve required reforms. According to DOD, the program has surveyed 11 PfP countries.

The DIB program has faced a variety of challenges in its first few years, which have contributed to frequent cancellations of DIB-sponsored activities. In fiscal year 2009, the DIB program executed only about $650,000 in originally approved activities in its $6.4 million budget. We also found that the DIB program did not execute any of its five originally approved activities in the fiscal year 2010 budget for Georgia and only one of seven for Bosnia-Herzegovina. DOD officials attributed the lack of execution to the existence of similar assistance provided through FMF- funded contracts in some countries and limited interest in DIB program activities in others.

First, DOD officials told us that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Georgia were already receiving similar assistance funded through the FMF program. For example, the DIB program included activities in its fiscal year 2010 budget to help Bosnia-Herzegovina implement its strategic defense review and create a human resource management system. However, FMF- funded advisors were already embedded in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Ministry of Defense and Joint Staff assisting with these efforts. In Georgia, both FMF and DIB funding were directed to help Georgia with its “defense transformation,” according to DOD documents. FMF funding provided $3.8 million in fiscal year 2009 and $2.5 million in fiscal year 2010 for a contract that provides advice and assistance to Georgia’s Ministry of Defense and Air Force for defense sector transformation, according to DOD. This included the building of institutions and systems, the development of doctrine and curricula, the conduct of a National Security Review, and the training of Ministry of Defense and Air Force personnel to improve professionalism and NATO interoperability. At the same time, the DIB program included $750,000 for defense transformation in its fiscal year 2010 budget for Georgia. According to a DOD official, the DIB program did not implement this assistance, primarily because of Georgia’s preference to work through the FMF-funded advisors, who were available to provide full-time assistance, rather than intermittent guidance visits offered through the DIB program.

Second, DOD officials noted that some PfP countries have been unwilling to participate in the DIB program’s surveys of their defense institutions or have lost interest in participating in follow-up activities after the surveys were completed. For example, according to a DOD official at the U.S. post in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Ministry of Defense and Joint Staff were not receptive to findings from a DIB assessment, which contributed to their decision to pursue reforms through FMF-funded advisors instead. DOD officials also noted that the PfP countries from Central Asia resist outside assessments of their defense institutions or undertaking reforms to increase transparency and accountability of these institutions. As shown in figure 7, the fiscal year 2010 WIF budget indicates that the DIB program planned limited assistance for Central Asian countries compared to countries in other regions.

DOD officials noted that the DIB program is still relatively new, although it was first developed in 2006. The Office of the Secretary of Defense only recently transferred management responsibility for the DIB program to the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The Center established a management team in January 2010 and intends to develop a plan for evaluating the DIB program, according to an official there.

DOD Last Evaluated the WIF Program in 2001

Two DOD-commissioned assessments of the WIF program were completed in 2000 and 2001. These assessments sought to analyze the objectives, activities, and accomplishments of Warsaw Initiative programs and identify the lessons learned from program implementation and results. The assessments found that the majority of WIF activities were successful in enhancing the ability of recipient countries’ militaries to contribute to NATO operations and to operate with NATO forces. The assessments also found that the WIF program should do a better job of taking into account the recipient countries’ capacities to absorb or apply the assistance provided. According to DOD officials, no formal evaluations specifically of the WIF program have taken place since these two assessments were conducted in 2000 and 2001. Federal standards for internal controls indicate that U.S. agencies should monitor and assess the quality of performance over time. Moreover, GAO’s Internal Control Tool states that separate evaluations are often prompted by events such as major changes in management plans or strategies. In commenting on our draft of this report, DOD noted that the Department has conducted periodic reviews of the WIF program and as a result, the program has evolved over time to keep pace with changes in NATO.

WIF program managers conduct midyear budget reviews and program management reviews each year. The budget review is designed primarily to assess the execution of WIF funds for the first half of the year and determine if any funds should be reallocated; however, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) did not have data readily available on how funds were reprogrammed when events were cancelled. According to DOD officials, the program management review is a forum for program managers and stakeholders to discuss ways the program can be improved and any lessons learned. Program implementers also prepare after action reports on individual events supported by WIF funding that include evaluations of results, according to DSCA officials. In addition, DOD officials also noted that while the department does not assess results of the WIF program specifically, it monitors progress countries make in achieving broader U.S security cooperation goals, which are supported by a variety of programs and funding streams, including WIF.

Conclusion

The WIF program provides a key source of DOD funding to support eligible countries’ participation in NATO’s PfP program. NATO’s new Strategic Concept, due at the end of 2010, will likely lead to further changes to the PfP program and other partnerships that could have implications for the WIF program. For example, DOD may need to reconsider how it defines eligibility for WIF funding to complement efforts by NATO to increase the level of cooperation activities with partner countries outside of the PfP program. DOD’s current policy is that WIF funding is only available to NATO partner countries in the PfP program. While DOD officials noted that they have undertaken efforts to periodically review and adapt the WIF program to changes in the PfP program, the last formal evaluation of the WIF program took place in 2001. This was before the focus of the PfP and WIF programs changed in response to the changing composition of participating countries and the critical need for partner contributions to the NATO-led war in Afghanistan. In addition, the challenges DOD has faced in implementing the WIF-funded DIB program, including potential duplication of other U.S.-funded assistance, heighten the need to assess whether the WIF program is effectively supporting PfP countries’ goals for cooperation with NATO and NATO’s efforts to deepen its relationships with partner countries.

Recommendation for Executive Action

We recommend that, following the establishment of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which could result in changes to NATO’s PfP program, the Secretary of Defense conduct an evaluation of the U.S. WIF program to ensure that it effectively supports the goals of NATO’s PfP program.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and State for their review and comment. DOD provided oral comments stating that the Department concurs with our recommendation. In commenting on our draft, DOD noted that the Department has conducted periodic reviews of the WIF program and, as a result, the program has evolved over time to keep pace with changes in NATO. DOD and State also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate.

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If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Our objectives were to (1) describe how the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program has evolved since GAO last reported on it; (2) describe options the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is considering for the future of the PfP and other partnership programs under the new Strategic Concept; and (3) analyze support to PfP countries through the U.S. Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF) program. To address these objectives, we analyzed NATO, Department of Defense (DOD), and Department of State (State) documents; academic literature related to PfP and WIF programs; and WIF funding data for fiscal years 2006 through 2010. We met with DOD and State officials in Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels, Belgium. We also met with NATO officials at both NATO Headquarters in Brussels and at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium, as well as with representatives from five PfP countries and one NATO member country. In addition, we conducted phone interviews with geographic U.S. combatant command officials who have PfP countries in their areas of responsibility—European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany, and Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida. We also reviewed relevant GAO and Congressional Research Service reports to obtain additional background information on NATO, the PfP, and NATO and the United States’ security cooperation relationships with PfP countries.

In addition, we selected three countries—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, and Kazakhstan—to examine NATO’s bilateral relationship with PfP partners and U.S. support through the WIF program in greater depth. We sought to pick countries that differed, among other things, in terms of their geographic location, level of participation in the PfP, interest in NATO membership, and contributions to NATO operations. We met with State and DOD officials at the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi, Georgia; Government of Georgia officials; and NATO officials based in Tbilisi. We also conducted telephone interviews with U.S. officials in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina; and Astana, Kazakhstan; and with an official from NATO Headquarters, Sarajevo. This sample of three countries is not intended to be representative of all countries participating in the PfP program or receiving WIF funding.

To describe how the PfP program has evolved since 2001 when GAO last reported on it, we reviewed a variety of relevant NATO documents that provided information on the PfP and analyzed how it has evolved over time. These documents included background materials that NATO has produced on the PfP generally and on specific PfP mechanisms. We also reviewed materials NATO has produced describing NATO enlargement since the PfP was created in 1994 and materials describing the organization’s cooperative efforts with specific PfP countries. Additionally, we assessed the results of NATO reviews of the PfP conducted in 2002 and 2004 and reviewed NATO summit statements from 1999 through 2009 to identify decisions NATO leaders have made about the PfP. We also reviewed NATO guidance on the PfP, such as NATO’s Handbook, the 2009 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Work Plan (EAPWP) Overarching Guidance, and the 2009 Planning and Review Process (PARP) Ministerial Guidance. In order to assess PfP countries’ level of engagement with NATO and their use of key mechanisms, we also reviewed examples of Individual Partnership Action Plans, Annual National Programmes, and PARP documents. We also reviewed corresponding assessments for these documents that describe NATO’s findings about partners’ progress in achieving these goals. To identify troop contributions to NATO’s operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, we analyzed publicly available NATO data that provided approximate figures of troop contributions by participating countries. We found these data to be sufficiently reliable for presenting the extent to which countries are contributing troops to these operations. To gather further information on how the PfP has changed since 2001, we also assessed findings in State’s annual reports to Congress on PfP developments for years 2007 through 2009. We also used information gathered in our interviews with U.S., NATO, and PfP country officials to further identify ways that the PfP program has changed since 2001.

To describe options NATO is considering for the future of the PfP and other partnership programs under the new Strategic Concept, we reviewed and synthesized findings from several NATO analyses, conducted in 2009 and 2010, including the Group of Experts’ final report, NATO’s Multiple Futures Project Final Report, NATO Allied Command Transformation’s report, “Building the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s recommendations regarding the new Strategic Concept. We also reviewed summary reports from two NATO conferences held in 2010 discussing the future of NATO’s partnership efforts. Additionally, we reviewed proposals by some PfP countries regarding how the Strategic Concept should address the issue of partnerships. To gain further information on considerations about NATO’s Strategic Concept and options for NATO’s partnerships, we reviewed academic articles, Congressional testimonies by NATO experts, speeches by key U.S. and NATO officials, and interviewed U.S., NATO, and PfP country officials during our visit to NATO Headquarters.

To analyze support to PfP countries through the U.S. WIF program, we discussed WIF-funded activities and program monitoring with DOD officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), EUCOM, and CENTCOM. We also discussed the WIF program with security assistance officers at U.S. embassies in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. In addition, we discussed the WIF program with an official from the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, which is responsible for managing the WIF-funded Defense Institution Building (DIB) program. We also reviewed DSCA guidance on the WIF program, and annual budget submissions and memos. In addition, to assess the extent of DOD’s past evaluations of the WIF program, we reviewed the findings of two independent assessments of the WIF program completed in 2000 and 2001, a July 2005 audit of the WIF program by the DOD Inspector General, and our July 2001 report on the NATO PfP and WIF programs.

To present information on WIF funding priorities and the distribution of funding among eligible countries, we analyzed WIF summary budget data for fiscal years 2006 through 2010 from DSCA. According to DOD, no reliable data showing the distribution of WIF budgets among eligible countries were available before fiscal year 2006. We also analyzed all approved activities in the fiscal year 2010 WIF budget to determine how WIF funding was distributed among eligible PfP countries and by type of activity. We focused on fiscal year 2010 budget data because, for fiscal years 2006 through 2009, DOD grouped a significant share of the WIF budget into a multiple country category. For example, in fiscal year 2009, the WIF budget allocated about $11 million out of a total of about $30 million in WIF funding to the multiple country category. The fiscal year 2010 WIF budget attributed more of the funding to specific countries and allocated only about $2 million to the multiple country category. Consequently, country breakouts in the fiscal year 2010 budget are more meaningful than in previous years. We also analyzed data on canceled activities approved in the WIF budgets for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 from DSCA and corroborated this information through interviews or emails with officials from DSCA; combatant commands; and the U.S. posts in Bosnia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.

To assess the reliability of DOD’s WIF budget data, we interviewed DSCA officials about the data and reviewed all the approved activities in the WIF budgets for fiscal years 2009 and 2010. We also discussed WIF funding with security assistance officers at U.S. posts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, and Kazakhstan to help verify the accuracy of DSCA budget data in these countries. We found the WIF budget data used in this report to be sufficiently reliable to present the distribution of the fiscal year 2010 WIF budget among eligible countries and specific types of activities, such as support for PfP countries’ participation in military exercises and the DIB program.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2009 to September 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Description of DOD Components Responsible for Executing the WIF Program

Within DOD, multiple components implement the WIF program. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for the development, coordination, and oversight of policy and other activities related to the WIF program. DSCA manages the program and provides the funding to different implementing components that are responsible for executing the program. Table 3 describes these implementing components. The portion of WIF funding that supports PfP countries’ participation in military exercises comes from WIF budget allocations to the relevant combatant commands. The combatant commands also use some of their WIF funding for military contact programs.

Appendix III: Other U.S. Security Cooperation Programs Supporting WIF and PfP Goals

Table 4 describes U.S. security cooperation programs that provide assistance related to the goals of the WIF program and NATO’s PfP program. The relevant geographic combatant commands (COCOM) and security assistance officers based at U.S. posts in recipient countries play a key role in ensuring that the WIF program complements the other available sources of funding in support of U.S. security cooperation goals.

Figure 8 shows the level of funding of these programs and the WIF program to eligible PfP countries in fiscal year 2009.

Appendix IV: NATO Areas of Cooperation

PfP countries are able to select partnership activities and events in which they would like to participate from the EAPWP. The EAPWP lists activities and events offered by NATO, as well as by individual NATO members and other PfP countries. It is revised every 2 years. In the 2010-2011 EAPWP, there are over 1,200 activities sorted into 34 areas of cooperation. PfP countries determine the areas of cooperation on which they wish to focus and select relevant activities in each area. Table 5 lists these areas of cooperation.

Appendix V: PfP Countries’ PARP Partnership Goals

Eighteen PfP countries participate in PARP. Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Malta are the only four PfP countries that do not currently participate in the PARP process. PARP is modeled on NATO’s own force planning system and allows interested PfP countries to work more closely with NATO to develop the interoperability of their forces and strengthen their defense institutions. Countries participating in PARP work with NATO to assess their defense capabilities, identify potential contributions to NATO exercises and operations, and select specific partnership goals for developing their defense capabilities and building interoperability. There are over 150 partnership goals that partners can choose from. There are general goals related to defense-wide issues, such as defense planning and budgeting, as well as goals specific to countries’ land, maritime, and air forces. Table 6 shows the 14 partnership goals most commonly selected by partners in 2008.

The 18 countries selected an average of 37 partnership goals in 2008. Ukraine selected the most goals with 96, while Kyrgyz Republic selected the least with 15. The types of goals selected by countries varied. For instance, Western European partners’ goals for participation in the PfP program focused primarily on improving military capabilities and interoperability with NATO. The European Union (EU) and NATO have committed to adhere to common standards in the development of their armed forces, so PfP countries that are also EU members are fulfilling EU requirements by developing interoperability with NATO. The Western European PfP countries already have developed civilian-run defense institutions and, therefore, do not generally pursue goals related to those issues. Countries from the Balkans and the former Soviet Union selected goals related to improving their military capabilities and interoperability with NATO as well. However, many of these countries also identified additional objectives related to defense institution building, including goals focusing on civilian control of the military, defense budgeting and planning, and effective personnel and resource management.

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Staff Acknowledgments

Key contributors to this report include Judith McCloskey, Assistant Director; Ashley Alley; Debbie Chung; Howard Cott; David Dayton; David Dornisch; Etana Finkler; and Ryan Vaughan.