Border Security: DHS Has Made Progress in Planning for a Biometric Air Exit System and Reporting Overstays, but Challenges Remain
Released: 2017-02-27T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Biometric Exit System Development and Implementation

In 1996, federal law required the development of an automated entry and exit control system to match arrival and departure records for foreign nationals entering and leaving the United States, and to enable identification of overstays. Subsequently, the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 required implementation of an integrated entry and exit data system for foreign nationals. The system was to provide access to and integrate arrival and departure data that are authorized or required to be created or collected under law and are in an electronic format in certain databases, such as those used at POEs and U.S. consulates abroad, and assist in identifying nonimmigrant visa overstays. In 2003, DHS initiated the US- VISIT program to develop a comprehensive entry and exit system to collect biometric data from foreign nationals entering or exiting the country through POEs. In 2004, US-VISIT initiated the first step of this program by collecting biometric data on foreign nationals entering the United States at 115 airports and 14 seaports.

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a plan to accelerate full implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit data system that matches available information provided by foreign nationals upon their arrival in and departure from the United States. In fiscal year 2016, Congress reiterated its requirement for DHS to submit a plan to implement a biometric entry and exit capability and established a funding mechanism available to the Secretary of Homeland Security beginning in fiscal year 2017 to develop and implement a biometric entry and exit system. Specifically, fifty percent of amounts collected pursuant to temporary fee increases for L-1 and H-1B visas, which began in fiscal year 2016 and will expire at the end of fiscal year 2025, up to a total of $1 billion, shall be deposited into the 9-11 Response and Biometric Exit Account for DHS to implement the biometric entry and exit data system.

Since 2009, DHS has been exploring various biometric exit capabilities through laboratory and field testing. For instance, in 2009, the legacy US- VISIT program, in partnership with CBP and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), deployed two biometric exit pilot programs in U.S. airports. In 2014, CBP also collaborated with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to test possible biometric solutions in simulated operational conditions, using the results to inform subsequent CBP biometric efforts. Although this effort informed later biometric exit pilot programs, it did not test potential biometric capabilities in a real-world setting. Figure 1 demonstrates key actions taken by Congress and DHS to pursue biometric entry and exit capabilities from 1996 through 2016.

Overstay Reporting and Enforcement

Federal law also requires that DHS implement a program to collect data, for each fiscal year, regarding the total number of foreign visitors who overstayed their lawful admission period in the United States; and submit an annual report to Congress providing numerical estimates of the number of foreign nationals from each country in each nonimmigrant classification who remained in the country beyond their authorized period of stay. Two DHS components—CBP and ICE—are primarily responsible for collecting and maintaining overstay data, issuing reports on overstays, and addressing potential overstays, as shown in table 1. Further, the Office of Biometric Identity Management, which was created in March 2013 and replaced US-VISIT, is responsible for storing biometric data for the department. In addition, the State Department is responsible for ensuring that individuals who have previously overstayed and are ineligible for a visa do not receive one when applying for a visa to the United States at consular offices overseas.

CBP Has Made Progress Testing and Evaluating Biometric Exit Capabilities since 2013, but It is Too Early to Assess Whether Current Implementation Plans Address Long- Standing Challenges

CBP Has Conducted Biometric Pilot Programs to Inform Planning for a Biometric Exit System

Since our 2013 report on DHS’s efforts to develop a biometric exit capability, CBP has conducted four biometric pilot programs intended to inform the acquisition of a biometric exit system: (1) Biometric Exit Mobile Air Test (BE-Mobile) (mobile fingerprint reader); (2) 1 to 1 Facial Comparison Project (facial recognition upon entry); (3) Departure Information Systems Test (matching on-site facial scan to a gallery of photographs); and (4) the Southwest Border Pedestrian Exit Field Test (face and iris scanning at pedestrian exit from the United States). As of September 2016, CBP reported that it had obligated nearly $13 million developing, implementing, and evaluating these four pilot programs, as illustrated in table 2. This amount includes over $3.5 million to install secure Wi-Fi systems for supporting the BE-Mobile pilots in three of the test airports.

BE-Mobile. In summer of 2015, CBP began deploying the BE-Mobile pilot at the 10 highest international passenger volume airports in the United States. Under this pilot, CBP officers stationed at the passenger loading bridges of selected flights used a handheld mobile device to scan fingerprints and passports for certain foreign nationals at the time of departure from the United States at identified airports. The biometric and biographic data collected by the BE-Mobile device was matched against data such as departures and arrivals in the United States, criminal histories, and visa status. The goal of the BE-Mobile pilot was to evaluate the viability of using the technology to collect biometric exit data from a sample population on randomly selected flights, as well as to evaluate the viability of implementing biometric exit in conjunction with CBP’s outbound enforcement operations. See figure 2 for a representation of the BE-Mobile device.

During our observations, CBP officials noted that the BE-Mobile pilot demonstrated that while the technology can effectively capture biometric data and match that data against DHS databases, it requires too much time and manpower to be a solution for biometric exit capabilities on all flights departing the United States—a statement consistent with our own observations of BE-Mobile at two airports. According to CBP officials, the pilot program established that the manifest data provided by the carriers in the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) are accurate and reliable. However, using BE-Mobile to screen outgoing passengers is time consuming. For example, in May 2016, we observed CBP’s use of BE- Mobile at Los Angeles International Airport to capture biometric information on categories of passengers included in the pilot (approximately 75 individuals) on one flight departing for Mexico. We observed that the outbound process using BE-Mobile took six CBP officers—who constitute a CBP tactical operations team—approximately 45 minutes to complete. CBP officials noted that when those six officers are conducting outbound enforcement operations using BE-Mobile, they are not conducting inspections or operations on inbound cargo and passengers.

CBP officials also noted that the BE-Mobile system provided some benefits to the officers checking foreign nationals leaving the country. For instance, BE-Mobile allows officers to identify travelers who have suspicious travel histories or other derogatory information for further investigation by searching databases that detail individuals’ travel patterns, visa status, and criminal records. For instance, during our observation of the program at Los Angeles International Airport, one officer used BE-Mobile to identify an individual whose travel pattern may have indicated drug trafficking, so the individual was examined more closely before being allowed to board a plane to Mexico. Similarly, BE- Mobile can identify travelers exiting the country who do not have corresponding entry information, indicating that they potentially entered the country without inspection. Finally, BE-Mobile may identify individuals who have overstayed their period of admission, allowing CBP to collect more accurate overstay information. During our observation of BE-Mobile at John F. Kennedy International Airport, an officer identified one traveler as having overstayed a student visa, and noted the violation in the traveler’s Student and Exchange Visitor Information System record. According to CBP officials, CBP is currently maintaining the BE-Mobile program at the original 10 airports as an enforcement tool for use by CBP officers. These officials also said BE-Mobile may be a viable solution for smaller airports with relatively few outbound international flights at which officers could utilize BE-Mobile to obtain biometric information from exiting passengers at times when no international travelers are arriving. 1 to 1 Facial Comparison. Between March and May 2015, CBP tested the 1 to 1 Facial Comparison Project at Dulles International Airport. This pilot was intended to assist CBP officers in confirming the identity of U.S. citizens entering the United States against the travel document being presented. After the conclusion of the pilot program, the technology was deployed for use at both Dulles International Airport and John F. Kennedy International Airport. The technology compares a photograph taken of the U.S. citizen by a CBP officer to the photograph stored on the traveler’s passport chip to assess whether the individual applying for entry into the United States was the same person to whom the U.S. passport was legally issued. Although the capability was tested at entries to the United States, the information gathered through the pilot is intended to also inform the acquisition of a biometric exit capability, according to CBP officials. According to an evaluation conducted by CBP, the results of the pilot showed that biometric facial matching can increase the confidence with which CBP officers verify individuals’ identities without a negative impact to port of entry operations and traveler wait times. When we observed CBP officers at John F. Kennedy International Airport processing passengers using this technology in July 2016, they said that the facial recognition process added approximately 20 to 30 seconds to the processing time for each passenger. However, agency officials stated that the technology is not yet integrated with CBP systems, and will not impact wait times once it is fully integrated. See figure 3 for a representation of the 1 to 1 Facial Recognition use and equipment.

Departure Information Systems Test. From June to September 2016, CBP deployed the Departure Information Systems Test pilot at Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. The goal of the pilot was to evaluate the effectiveness of biometric facial recognition matching of a real-time photograph of an individual to a gallery of facial images stored in a database. Photographs of travelers taken during boarding were compared against photographs taken previously (U.S. passport, U.S. visa, and DHS encounters) that had been stored in the gallery based on names on the outbound flight manifest. The biometric capture device includes a camera, document reader and display tablet. The display tablet instructs travelers to present their boarding pass to the reader as they approach the unit. Once the boarding pass is scanned, an image of the traveler’s face is captured. The system matches the photograph to all images in the gallery of photographs, at which point a green light appears and the traveler is instructed to proceed to board the plane. After the flight has departed, the system compares the captured images to the images in the gallery to determine the system’s effectiveness at matching photographs taken to those in the gallery. CBP officials told us that the capability to match one photograph to a gallery of photographs will be critical in developing a biometric exit solution for deployment on a nationwide scale because the agency already has access to one or more photographs on record of each person exiting the country, if they entered legally. As of November 2016, CBP had not yet completed the formal evaluation of the test. They added that a second biometric indicator, such as fingerprints, would also be useful in cases where the facial recognition software cannot match the live image to the images in the gallery.

For this pilot test, CBP deployed the capability at one gate and used it to obtain biometric information from passengers on a daily nonstop flight from Atlanta to Tokyo. We observed this capability collecting biometric information from passengers in August 2016. CBP officials told us that this flight was selected because it departed from a gate with ample physical space every day, which allowed CBP to set up its equipment to collect photographs. In addition, the flight departed at a time when few international flights were arriving or departing, so CBP did not have to divert officers from inspecting departing or incoming travelers to operate the pilot. See figure 4 for a representation of the biometric capture device.

Southwest Border Pedestrian Exit Field Test. From February to May 2016, CBP initiated a pilot program to test facial and iris scanning technology at the Otay Mesa POE south of San Diego, California. The purpose of the test was to determine if biometric technology could be effectively used in an outdoor land environment without significant impact to operations and wait times, and to determine if collecting biometrics in conjunction with biographic data upon exit will assist CBP in identifying individuals who have overstayed their period of admission. Under this pilot program, CBP collected biographic data from all travelers departing the United States at the Otay Mesa POE and biometrics (facial images and/or iris scans) from certain foreign nationals entering and departing the Otay Mesa POE on foot. To exit the country, travelers scanned their passports at a radio frequency identification-enabled kiosk, as shown in the picture on the left in figure 5. One collection lane was equipped with facial and iris scanning equipment that required the traveler to pause for biometric data collection, as pictured in the middle picture shown in figure 5. Another lane was equipped with technology that collected facial and iris images while the traveler continued through the lane without pausing, as shown in the picture on the right in figure 5.

Although CBP had not completed its formal evaluation of the pedestrian exit field test as of November 2016, CBP officials told us the pilot provided information about the physical challenges to implementing face and iris scanning technology at land POEs. The officials noted that the conditions at Otay Mesa POE were “ideal” in terms of space availability and weather conditions compared with other land POEs. Specifically, the Otay Mesa POE had sufficient space to install and operate the kiosks and cameras to collect biometric data from departing pedestrians. In addition, the location generally had favorable weather and climate conditions that were less likely to affect the biometric collection machines stationed outside, though the officials told us that the technology did need to be under a roof or canopy, both to protect it from the rain and to prevent sun glare from affecting the quality of the images captured. However, the officials said that while rain and wind are not a significant issue at Otay Mesa’s location in southern California, other land POE locations, such as those in southern Texas, may experience challenges such as heavy storms or dust. They added that the pilot program had highlighted the need for biometric scanning equipment to be located inside for protection from the elements, but that some land POEs do not have sufficient space for such infrastructure.

DHS Continues to Face Long-Standing Challenges Implementing a Biometric Exit System but It is Too Early to Assess Current Implementation Plans

While DHS has made progress testing and evaluating biometric exit capabilities through the pilot programs described above, DHS continues to face challenges in developing and deploying a biometric exit system, many of which are longstanding. In particular, we and DHS have identified challenges in the areas of planning, infrastructure, and staffing that have affected DHS’s efforts to develop and implement a biometric exit capability. DHS has recognized these challenges and, according to CBP officials, is working to address them as part of its current planning process for a biometric exit system. Under this current process, as of November 2016, CBP plans to implement a biometric exit capability in at least one major airport by 2018, but has not yet finalized the approach it will take to deploy this capability in airports. As a result, it is too early to assess CBP’s current plans and how the department will address the challenges we and DHS have identified.

Planning process. We and DHS have identified challenges in CBP’s planning efforts to develop and implement a biometric exit capability. For example, in our July 2013 report we found that DHS had a high-level plan for a biometric air exit capability, but it did not clearly define the steps, time-frames, and milestones needed to develop and implement an evaluation framework, as is standard in project management. As a result, we recommended that DHS establish time-frames and milestones for developing and implementing an evaluation framework to be used in conducting the department’s assessment of biometric exit options. DHS concurred with this recommendation and finalized goals and implemented actions to address it. Specifically, in June 2016, CBP provided us with the evaluation framework as well as expected time-frames and milestones for implementing the biometric exit system.

CBP has also previously faced challenges in meeting the timeframes it has identified for deploying a biometric exit capability at airports. For instance, in July 2014, a DHS document stated that the department’s goal was to deploy a biometric exit capability to the top 20 airports—selected by international passenger departure volume—between 2015 and 2018. However, as of November 2016, CBP’s planned timeframe was to begin deployment of a biometric exit capability at one airport by the end of 2018, and additional airports in subsequent months. CBP officials told us this change in schedule was because funds from the appropriation funds established by Congress in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, to develop and implement the system were not available until October 2016.

In November 2016, CBP officials also told us the agency had changed its approach to the biometric exit capability and was working with airlines and airports on strategies for using public/private partnerships to both reduce the cost to taxpayers and give industry more control over how a biometric exit capability is implemented at airport gates. CBP’s previous planned approach had been for CBP to acquire and deploy biometric technology at airports, and to be responsible for collecting biometric information from passengers. Developing a biometric exit system in collaboration with airlines and airports, if implemented, would represent a change in CBP’s acquisition strategy because it would rely on airlines and airports to collect biometric information from passengers by acquiring biometric exit technology, such as cameras to collect facial images or equipment for fingerprinting. CBP would then be responsible for transmitting, storing, and analyzing this biometric information in order to pursue enforcement actions, such as the apprehension of individuals with warrants for their arrests, or recording the presence of individuals who entered the country illegally. Under this scenario, the airlines could integrate this biometric collection process into their existing boarding procedures, potentially resulting in minimal disruption to the flow of passengers during boarding, according to CBP officials. For instance, CBP officials suggested facial images or iris scans could be collected as travelers’ boarding passes are being scanned, and the biometrics could eventually be used in the place of boarding passes.

CBP officials said that this new approach did not change the timelines for initial implementation of a biometric exit capability, but officials noted that the approach or approaches selected will affect timelines and costs for future implementation. As of November 2016, CBP officials told us they had not finalized any partnership agreements with airports or airlines providing international service; and the agency cannot complete the planning process, including cost and schedule estimates, until these partnership agreements and key implementation decisions are finalized. Going forward, CBP intends to finalize its plans and approach for developing and implementing a biometric exit capability. Given these considerations, it is too early to assess CBP’s plan for including airlines and airports in the development and implementation of the biometric exit system or the cost to CBP of this system.

Infrastructure. We and CBP officials have also identified limitations in infrastructure as a significant challenge to implementing a biometric exit capability at airports as well as at land POEs. For example, CBP officials pointed out that U.S. airports generally do not have designated and secure exit areas for conducting outbound immigration inspections, nor are there checkpoints for travelers to pass through where their departure is recorded by a U.S. immigration officer and where biometric information could be captured. According to CBP officials, for a biometric exit program to be effective, the collection of biometric information must take place at the gate or on the jetway to ensure that the traveler actually departs the country. To address these challenges, CBP intends to use the information gained from the pilot programs to identify biometric exit technology and processes that are effective in the airport environment and minimize the impact on passenger flow and airport operations.

At land POEs, there are also longstanding infrastructure and operational challenges to implementing a biometric exit capability to collect traveler information upon departure from the United States. In 2006 we reported that establishing a biometric exit capability at land POEs faced a number of challenges, including space constraints complicated by the logistics of processing high volumes of visitors and associated traffic congestion. For example, travelers may arrive at land POEs on foot or via a variety of vehicles—including cars, trucks, trains, buses, ferries, and bicycles—and many land POEs do not have sufficient space to deploy equipment and staff for obtaining biometric information from individuals leaving the country. Given the current capabilities of biometric capture devices, applying biometric capabilities to vehicle passengers would be more difficult than doing so for those crossing on foot, because, according to CBP officials, biometric capabilities currently available would require all passengers to stop and exit their vehicle to be photographed or scanned. In addition to the large amount of space this process would require, DHS officials stated that it would cause extensive delays at vehicle POEs. CBP officials said they intend to use the information from the pedestrian exit field test at Otay Mesa to inform any future solution. The officials also told us that they entered into an agreement with Oak Ridge National Laboratory beginning in June 2016 to explore options for applying biometric capabilities to vehicle passengers exiting the country. Given these challenges, CBP does not plan to implement a biometric exit capability at land POEs until 2020.

Staffing. In addition, CBP officials stated that implementing a biometric exit capability will likely require additional CBP officers at each POE. The biometric exit pilot programs we observed required CBP staff to assist travelers with using the biometric technology and also for any enforcement actions that may be needed. However, CBP officials noted that they are exploring biometric exit capabilities that minimize the involvement of CBP officials, either by having the collection of biometric information done automatically through facial recognition technology or using airline personnel to process passengers. In either case, the CBP officials said that any biometric exit capability will require additional officers to support increased enforcement operations involving individuals departing the country that result from a biometric exit system. For example, individuals with warrants for their arrest may be prevented from departing the country so they can be tried for a crime. CBP officials told us that they have developed staffing estimates for each of the 20 busiest airports in the United States and that the estimates will be reviewed by DHS management and the Office of Management and Budget. However, CBP officials also told us they are still developing enforcement policies and priorities for foreign visitors departing the United States, so it is difficult to determine the extent to which enforcement actions would increase or how many additional CBP officers may be needed at each airport or land port of entry.

DHS Included Some Required Information in Its First Overstay Report and Plans to Include More Information in Future Reports, and DHS Overstay Enforcement Priorities Have Not Changed Since 2013 DHS Overstay Report Includes Some Required Information, and DHS Officials Expect Future Reports to Include Additional Information

In January 2016, DHS issued its first report on estimated overstay rates that covered fiscal year 2015, which included some but not all information required by statute. DHS had not previously reported required overstay estimates to Congress on an annual basis, as required, because of DHS and legacy INS concerns about the reliability of the data available on overstays. In April 2011, we reported that DHS officials stated that the department had not reported overstay estimates because it did not have sufficient confidence in the quality of its overstay data. In our July 2013 report, we found that although DHS had taken action to strengthen its overstay data, DHS had not yet validated or tested the reliability of those actions and challenges to reporting reliable overstay data remained. We recommended that DHS assess and document the extent to which the reliability of the data used to develop any overstay estimates has improved and any remaining limitations in how the data can be used. DHS concurred, and in the 2015 overstay report, DHS noted which data were used to compile the overstay estimates in the report and identified limitations with other data sources, thus addressing our recommendation. To identify overstays, CBP matches arrival and departure data on foreign nationals in the Arrival and Departure Information System. These overstays are then checked against other DHS immigration databases to identify persons who have departed the United States or obtained an extension, or other valid immigration status or protection, and thus are not potential overstays.

DHS’s fiscal year 2015 overstay report describes expected overstays rates by country for foreign nationals lawfully admitted into the United States for business or pleasure through air and sea POEs and who were supposed to depart the United States in fiscal year 2015, as required. According to the overstay report, 527,127 of the nearly 45 million foreign nationals admitted for business or pleasure through air and sea POEs that were expected to depart the United States in fiscal year 2015 overstayed their period of admission, for a total overstay rate of 1.17 percent (see table 3). This number represents 85 percent of all the foreign visitors who arrived through air and sea POEs and who were expected to depart the country in fiscal year 2015, according to the report. DHS classifies individuals as overstays by matching departure and status change records to arrival records collected during the admission process.

DHS distinguishes two groups of foreign visitors who overstayed their period of admission: (1) foreign nationals who are “out of country overstays” because their departure records show they departed the United States after their lawful admission period expired, and (2) foreign nationals who are “suspected in-country overstays” because they have no departure records nor did they obtain an extension, or other valid immigration status or protection, prior to the end of their authorized admission period. For example, 482,781 of the 527,127 foreign visitors who overstayed their period of admission in fiscal year 2015 were suspected in-country overstays because CBP did not have a departure record for them so they appeared to have remained in the country, a suspected in-country overstay rate of 1.07 percent, as illustrated in table 3.

However, the DHS overstay report does not include all required information. Specifically, because of data reliability concerns, the overstay report does not include required information on expected departures, overstays, and overstay rates for foreign nationals who entered the country under nonimmigrant visa categories other than for business and pleasure, such as those covering, for example, foreign students and their families (F, M, and J visas). DHS officials noted that the department is working to improve the reliability of the overstay information on foreign nationals who entered the country under student visa categories by, among other things, adding data on each visa holder’s last date of compliance and modernizing the database that contains data on individuals holding student visas. DHS officials stated that the fiscal year 2016 overstay report—which they expect to be issued in early 2017— will include reliable overstays estimates for these foreign student visa categories.

The fiscal year 2015 overstay report also did not include information on foreign visitors who entered the United States from Canada and Mexico using land POEs because of unreliable collection of departure data at these POEs. The collection of departure information at land POEs is more difficult than at air and sea POEs because of the lack of electronically captured biographic information of foreign nationals departing the country using land POEs. Specifically, land POEs do not receive information on anticipated arrivals or departures, because travel across these POEs is often on foot or in private vehicles rather than through a transportation company that provides CBP with advance passenger manifests, such as an airline or passenger ship operator.

To address this limitation for the land POEs at the northern border specifically, DHS and Canada’s Border Service Agency implemented the Beyond the Border agreement in October 2012 under which they exchange entry records for land crossings between the two countries so that an entry into one is recorded as an exit from the other. However, according to DHS, the southwest border with Mexico does not present the same opportunities as the border with Canada because Mexico’s border infrastructure and data collection capabilities are more limited. As a result, DHS officials noted that they have started discussions with Mexican government officials to set up a land pilot on the Mexican side of the border to capture information from travelers entering Mexico, similar to the information captured and exchanged under the Beyond the Border initiative with Canada. DHS has also been exploring other methods and technologies for obtaining biographic and biometric data from travelers departing the country through land POEs on the border with Mexico, such as the pedestrian biometric exit field test at the Otay Mesa border crossing near San Diego discussed earlier. DHS expects to start reporting overstay rates for foreign visitors who entered the country through land POEs in the fiscal year 2017 report.

DHS’s Overstay Enforcement Priorities Have Remained the Same Since 2013

Since our July 2013 report, DHS has not changed its enforcement priorities with respect to potential overstays, focusing its enforcement actions on individuals that may pose a national security or public safety risk. Within ICE, the Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) oversees the program for investigating nonimmigrant visa violators who may pose a national security risk. CTCEU receives system-generated lists of overstay leads from the Arrival and Departure Information System, which is produced by matching arrival and departure data on foreign nationals. On a weekly basis, CTCEU also receives information on overstay leads from the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System on foreign students who have remained in the United States beyond their authorized periods of admission. Once these leads are received, CTCEU analysts then determine whether the individuals from these lists meet DHS’s overstay enforcement priorities based on national security and public safety criteria.

CTCEU prioritizes investigation of overstay leads based on the perceived risk each lead is likely to pose to national security and public safety as determined by threat analysis. To prioritize investigation of overstay leads, CTCEU uses an automated system to assign each overstay lead a priority ranking based on threat intelligence information. For the records that meet DHS’s overstay enforcement priorities, CTCEU analysts then conduct manual searches of other databases to determine, for example, if the individual obtained an extension, or other valid immigration status or protection and is therefore not an overstay. For their priority records, if CTCEU analysts are unable to identify evidence of a change in status or a departure, they search for the nonimmigrant’s current U.S. address, and if they are able to identify an address, they send the lead to the relevant HSI field office for investigation. In addition, starting in 2014, CTCEU has been using social media and open source information to locate and track individuals. HSI field offices only investigate a case if they have derogatory information on an individual or if they have viable location information, according to ICE officials. CTCEU sends overstay leads who do not meet DHS’s enforcement priorities to ICE’s ERO for potential enforcement action.

According to ICE data, between fiscal years 2013 and 2015, CTCEU reviewed approximately 2.7 million overstay leads, and closed 871,463 leads (about 32 percent) through their vetting process (see table 4). The most common reasons for closure were subsequent departure from the United States or pending immigration benefits. CTCEU had 155,182 overstays leads (about 6 percent) open under continuous monitoring. CTCEU sent 26,982 overstay leads (about 1 percent) to HSI field offices for further investigation because they represented national security or public safety threats. The majority of overstay leads CTCEU reviewed during this time period did not meet DHS’s priorities and were referred to ERO for potential enforcement action (over 60 percent).

According to ICE data, CTCEU’s overstay enforcement efforts resulted in about 5,000 administrative arrests, 369 criminal arrests, 333 indictments, and 300 convictions from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2015, as shown in table 5.

Of the more than 1.6 million overstay lead referrals sent by CTCEU to ERO between fiscal years 2013 and 2015, ERO did not send any leads to field offices for further investigation or enforcement action. ERO conducts reviews of the CTCEU overstay leads referrals to determine whether they meet DHS’s priorities and maintains the records of these referrals for reference and periodic reviews. ERO did not send any of the CTCEU’s referrals to ICE field offices for enforcement action because the overstay lead referrals did not meet DHS’s enforcement priorities. Specifically, ERO officials said that in most cases, overstay lead referrals do not have criminal convictions required to classify the referrals as DHS’s enforcement priority. As a result, based on current DHS’s priorities, ICE’s overstay enforcement efforts are limited to potential overstays involving national security and public safety threats.

Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS provided written comments, which are noted below and reproduced in full in appendix II, and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

In its comments, DHS stated that CBP has made progress testing and evaluating biometric exit capabilities since our work was completed. DHS noted that it plans to develop a biometric exit system at airports based on the facial recognition pilot program conducted at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. In December 2016, this system became the Biometric Verification System, which is biometrically confirming selected travelers departing the United States at the airport. DHS further noted that CBP will continue to test different facial image capture devices and work with airlines to more fully integrate the Biometric Verification System into the airline boarding process at additional airport locations. To support this effort, DHS reported that CBP has made progress in developing the documentation needed to designate Biometric Exit as a "program of record," indicating that it has met certain thresholds to allow for procurements and execution of funds. DHS also reported that CBP is developing a spend plan describing the execution of up to $1 billion that will accrue pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, for implementation of a biometric entry and exit system.

In addition, DHS reported that CBP drafted an overstay report for fiscal year 2016, which it expects to release by the end of February 2017. DHS stated that the report addresses over 95 percent of all nonimmigrants admitted by air to the United States, and will include student visa categories. DHS stated that it plans to report these numbers annually, as required.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, appropriate congressional committees and members, and other interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Previous GAO Reports and Recommendations Related to Biometric Exit Development

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Adam Hoffman (Assistant Director), Juan Tapia-Videla (Analyst-In-Charge), Miriam Hill, Megan Erwin, Sasan J. “Jon” Najmi, Amanda Miller, Adam Vogt, Eric Hauswirth, Richard Hung, and Nathan Tranquilli made significant contributions to this report.