Truck Safety: Share the Road Safely Pilot Initiative Showed Promise, but the Program's Future Success Is Uncertain
Released: 2006-09-08T00:00:00

Letter

Background

The occupants of other vehicles are several times more likely to die in crashes involving large commercial trucks than the occupants of the trucks. From 1995 through 2004, there were 51,791 people killed in large- truck crashes. Of this total, 40,438 were occupants of other vehicles, while 7,131 were the occupants of large trucks and 4,222 were nonmotorists, such as pedestrians. Figure 1 shows the number of passenger-vehicle and large-truck occupants killed in collisions involving large trucks from 1995 through 2004, according to NHTSA’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System.

In 2004, we presented information on traffic fatalities using data contained in NHTSA’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System database. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for reporting purposes. See GAO, Highway Safety: Federal and State Efforts to Address Rural Road Safety Challenges, GAO-04-663 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004).

During 2004 and 2005, the Share the Road Safely Program Funded a Reasonably Designed Education and Enforcement Pilot in Washington State

During 2004 and 2005, NHTSA funded the Share the Road Safely program and implemented an aggressive driving pilot initiative in Washington State. Known as Ticketing Aggressive Cars and Trucks (TACT), it combined education and law enforcement activities in an effort to reduce aggressive driving between passenger vehicles and trucks. Another objective of the pilot was for NHTSA to show FMCSA staff how to operate similar initiatives in the future. TACT generally conformed to the proven high- visibility law enforcement model, although it dealt with more complex issues than previous high-visibility law enforcement campaigns. TACT’s design and implementation linked to the STRS goal of changing driver behavior, whereas past STRS initiatives sometimes did not link to goals or were not designed to maximize the potential for success. In addition, Congress requested FMCSA to use a liaison to facilitate the transfer of knowledge about high-visibility law enforcement campaigns from NHTSA to FMCSA. Lastly, educational initiatives that were a part of STRS in 2003 were pursued by FMCSA, although not funded under NHTSA in 2004 and 2005.

DOT Helped Establish and Operate an Aggressive Driving Pilot Initiative in Washington State

According to DOT officials, Share the Road Safely program funding has supported an aggressive driving pilot initiative in Washington State starting in 2004. In 2004, DOT selected Washington State for the pilot initiative and signed a cooperative agreement with the Washington Traffic Safety Commission. The pilot, known as TACT, combined high-visibility law enforcement waves with education and outreach activities in an effort to reduce aggressive driving between passenger-vehicle and large-truck drivers. TACT focused on four interstate highway corridors, each covering a distance of approximately 25 miles. (See fig. 2.) Two intervention corridors in the western part of the state received media messages and 2 weeks of increased, high-visibility law enforcement waves in July and September, 2005, while two comparison corridors did not. During these waves, law enforcement officers patrolled the intervention corridors in marked and unmarked patrol cars, in state patrol aerial units when weather permitted, and from the cabs of semitrucks to target unsafe driving around large trucks.

The TACT pilot initiative used paid radio advertising and earned media, such as local news coverage, to inform the targeted audience of the dangers of aggressive driving related to trucks and to announce that law enforcement officers would issue tickets for such behavior. TACT’s radio advertisement was aired over 6,000 times during the course of the enforcement waves, and eight local television stations dedicated coverage to the pilot. Figure 3 shows an example of the earned media coverage.

DOT officials said they selected Washington State to participate in this pilot because of the state’s experience with other related safety initiatives, its accurate fatality and crash database, and its strong relationships with key stakeholders. TACT built upon a previous STEP model campaign, Step Up and R.I.D.E., which operated in Washington for several years. In the Step Up and R.I.D.E. program, Washington partnered with the local trucking industry to periodically place police officers in commercial vehicles to identify and issue citations to drivers observed committing offenses. DOT officials also stated that Washington has shown itself capable of successfully implementing and evaluating a high-visibility law enforcement campaign—specifically its Click It or Ticket campaign, which in 2002 increased safety belt use from about 80 percent to 95 percent. Additionally, DOT cited Washington as having good data on crashes and fatalities. In a 2005 report, we also recognized that Washington has very good cooperation among state agencies involved in crash data collection and reporting, and a strong relationship with its FMCSA division office. Finally, according to DOT officials, a particular strength of Washington is that the Washington Traffic Safety Commission, the lead organization in implementing the TACT initiative, comprises multiple state agencies, including all of the agencies that are participating in TACT, thus setting the stage for easy coordination and cooperation among participating agencies.

Federal, state, and local organizations participated in and contributed about $892,000 for the planning and operation of TACT. A steering committee led by the Washington Traffic Safety Commission planned and administered the pilot project. Other partners on the steering committee included the Washington DOT, the Washington State Patrol, the Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs, and the Washington Trucking Association. Officials on the steering committee believed having all of these groups involved in developing the pilot was important to the successful implementation of the pilot. The Washington Traffic Safety Commission also contributed $118,000 to the pilot for project management and communications. Local and state police made officers available for the enforcement waves, and the Washington Trucking Association worked with trucking companies to provide decoy trucks and drivers. NHTSA provided considerable assistance in developing and implementing the initiative and supplied the majority of TACT’s funding, awarding $497,000 in fiscal year 2004 and an additional $68,000 for evaluation activities in fiscal year 2005. Congress also provided NHTSA with an additional $99,000 for the TACT initiative in fiscal year 2005. FMCSA did TACT’s initial planning and provided ongoing assistance, including reviewing plans. It also provided $100,000 in fiscal year 2005 for TACT’s enforcement efforts through MCSAP.

FMCSA Sought to Learn How to Operate a High- Visibility Law Enforcement Campaign

DOT officials told us that a goal for FMCSA in the TACT initiative was to gain institutional knowledge on the operation of high-visibility law enforcement campaigns, such as Click It or Ticket. These campaigns combine education and outreach activities with high-visibility law enforcement to bring about a change in driver behavior. Our 2003 report stated that highway safety experts agree that attempts to modify behavior are more effective when educational and enforcement efforts are used together. However, the STRS initiatives we identified in our 2003 report were purely educational. The report added that FMCSA could improve STRS by drawing from NHTSA’s considerable experience with high- visibility law enforcement campaigns like Click It or Ticket, which has been widely considered effective in increasing the rate of safety belt use. Furthermore, a NHTSA evaluation report found that 10 states that used the Click It or Ticket model had significantly greater increases in safety belt use compared with states that attempted to increase safety belt use through other initiatives. TACT offered FMCSA an opportunity to learn from NHTSA’s experience with high-visibility law enforcement campaigns and learn how to develop similar aggressive driving initiatives in other states. To further ensure this transfer of knowledge as requested by conferees in the Conference Report accompanying its 2005 appropriations act, FMCSA hired and detailed a staff member to NHTSA to act as a communications liaison for STRS. The liaison was involved in some facets of TACT, including meeting with its steering committee and preparing briefings on the pilot. According to DOT officials, however, the liaison came aboard after the completion of the last enforcement wave—later in this report, we discuss this matter further in relation to the future of STRS initiatives.

Pilot Generally Conformed to the Proven High-Visibility Law Enforcement Campaign Model with Some Variation, but Dealt with More Complex Issues

Our analysis of TACT’s design and implementation shows that it generally conformed to the high-visibility law enforcement campaign model as intended, but varied in a few aspects. Specifically, TACT was modeled after NHTSA’s Click It or Ticket campaign. In modeling Click It or Ticket’s approach, officials in the TACT program collected data before and after its enforcement waves to identify behavior changes; it had highly visible enforcement on each day of its enforcement waves; and it had used both paid and earned media to publicize its enforcement.

TACT did deviate from the Click It or Ticket model in two ways. First, the pilot did not use paid television advertising. Washington State officials explained that this was because of the program’s limited budget. While evaluations of Click It or Ticket show that radio advertisements were effective in reaching the motoring public, radio is not as effective a medium as television. Second, the media for the TACT pilot described the enforcement campaign as zero tolerance as prescribed by the Click It or Ticket model, and enforcement was stepped up; however, law enforcement officers participating in TACT issued warnings instead of citations in 28 percent of the traffic stops. NHTSA officials explained that law enforcement officers always have discretion on whether to issue citations, and what is more important is that the public perceive an increase in law enforcement. Furthermore, they explained there is no research about the most effective level of citation tickets. See appendix II for a detailed comparison of TACT’s implementation of the Click It or Ticket model.

Although TACT is based on the high-visibility law enforcement campaign model, it deals with more complex issues than previous initiatives. In the case of Click It or Ticket, law enforcement is simply checking for safety belt use. With TACT, there are a number of behaviors that may constitute aggressive driving, including tailgating, speeding, and unsafe merging. These multiple factors also made it more difficult to develop a primary message for TACT to communicate to the public. TACT administrators, for example, determined that they had to choose a primary behavioral theme— leaving more space around trucks—to communicate to motorists, although obeying the speed limit and staying out of a truck’s blind spots also are important and were secondary themes. See figure 4 for a depiction of TACT’s selected message. This message was posted on 16 highway signs in the intervention corridors. Additionally, TACT was more difficult to institute from a legal standpoint. Washington has a primary safety belt law, meaning that officers can pull over drivers solely for not wearing their safety belts. In the case of TACT, however, Washington has no single aggressive driving law. Washington State officials told us they had to ensure that courts would be willing to enforce the tickets because police officers issued citations for violations under a number of laws.

Previous STRS Initiatives Were Not Funded under NHTSA

In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, STRS did not fund initiatives that were a part of the program in 2003. All STRS funds in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 were directed to the TACT pilot. According to FMCSA officials, however, they continued to disseminate education and outreach materials. For instance, the No-Zone campaign—a major initiative of STRS—was not funded during this period. FMCSA did, however, keep No-Zone information available on its Web site and responded to requests for educational material. For example, according to FMCSA officials, during this period they distributed over 200,000 copies of the No-Zone brochure through venues such as conferences and industry events. Also prior to TACT, FMCSA developed a curriculum for teaching students about sharing the road with trucks. FMCSA completed work on the curriculum and produced a video for the course, and it distributed the materials during fiscal years 2004 and 2005, including 1,500 copies of the video.

Evaluation of TACT Demonstrated Positive Results and Was Generally Well- Designed

DOT and Washington State officials conducted an evaluation of TACT that demonstrated the initiative’s success and was generally well-designed. Specifically, analysis of videotaped driver behavior showed reductions in aggressive driving, and targeted motorists reported significant exposure to the initiative’s message. Additionally, the evaluation followed accepted experimental design principles by comparing changes on two intervention highway corridors, which were exposed to the initiative’s message and enforcement, with changes on two comparison highway corridors, which were not exposed to the message. This experimental setup enabled program administrators to attribute positive changes in driver behavior to TACT initiatives. The evaluation did not assess changes in crashes, but increased driver awareness and improved driver behavior should logically lead to reduced crashes, injuries, and fatalities. Also, TACT’s design of combining education outreach with law enforcement better lent itself to reaching STRS goals than previous initiatives that were purely educational.

TACT Improved Driver Behavior and Public Awareness

The TACT evaluation demonstrated that the initiative was able to produce improvements in driver behavior. TACT evaluated changes in driver behavior by recording video footage of drivers in the four corridors and using three groups of reviewers—police officers, truck drivers, and Washington Traffic Safety Commission staff—to rate the seriousness of any unsafe driving acts. (See app. III for a more detailed explanation of how this video footage was analyzed.) This analysis found that the rate of unsafe driving acts per observation hour was nearly cut in half, from 5.80 to 3.05, for the intervention corridors, as compared with a slight decrease, from 4.03 to 3.92, for the comparison corridor. When controlled for the preenforcement rates, these data represent a 46 percent decrease in unsafe driving in the intervention corridors. The comparison corridors also had 1.85 times as many violations per hour than the intervention corridors when the data are controlled for the corridors’ respective violation rates prior to enforcement. (Fig. 5 shows the rate of violations per observation hour.) Also, analysis of driver behavior in the intervention corridors found that crash risk decreased and driver behavior was less illegal and less intimidating, among other things.

The TACT initiative improved driver behavior by successfully reaching its intended audience. TACT evaluators demonstrated this by using a survey to measure the extent to which the initiative changed the awareness of the target audience. In each of the four communities selected for the project, TACT administrators distributed surveys to the public at driver licensing offices both before and after the enforcement waves. For example, the percentage of respondents on the intervention corridors that reported general exposure to media about giving trucks more space nearly quadrupled, from about 18 to 67 percent. These data contrast with data for the comparison corridors, where the percentage only increased from about 17 to 20 percent. (Fig. 6 shows the percentages of respondents that reported hearing or seeing TACT-related media outreach.) Additionally, the evaluation found significant increases in the percentages of respondents on the intervention corridors that specifically reported hearing the radio message and seeing the TACT road sign, television, and newspaper messages. Furthermore, surveys of drivers also showed a significant increase in drivers reporting that they leave more space when passing trucks (the intended behavioral change theme of the project) from about 16 to 24 percent for the intervention corridors as compared with a slight increase from about 15 to 16 percent for the comparison corridors.

The Evaluation of TACT Was Generally Well- Designed and Links Results to Its Intended Goal of Crash Reduction

We found that the evaluation of TACT was generally well-designed, since it appropriately used an experimental design to attribute outcomes to TACT’s initiatives. An experimental design permits researchers to attribute outcomes to the effects of the program and rule out other influences. Often with this kind of evaluation design, the participants in the intervention group are exposed to the initiative, while similar participants in the comparison group are unexposed. Aside from the initiative, participants experience the same influences. That is, they face conditions that are alike during the same period. More specifically, the evaluation of the TACT initiative exposed drivers in the intervention corridors to paid and earned media and high-visibility law enforcement waves, while simultaneously leaving unexposed comparable drivers in similar comparison corridors. Then the evaluation compared outcomes in the two groups. This procedure was repeated in two additional corridors to make sure that any detected differences in outcomes were not unique to the first two corridors. Our 2003 review of STRS recommended that DOT establish a systematic process for evaluating the effectiveness of the program. Therefore, the evaluation of TACT’s methodology represents a positive step toward meeting our 2003 recommendation.

The evaluation report concludes that the initiative was a success, but it did not report on TACT’s effect on the long-term results of the initiative, such as the impact on the number of crashes, despite earlier plans to do so. Both TACT implementation plans and a NHTSA official stated that the evaluation would assess the impact of the initiative on the number of crashes in the intervention corridors. However, as the evaluation report states, it is difficult to determine changes in crashes given the low number of crashes in Washington State; therefore, intermediate measures for evaluating the initiative had to be relied upon. NHTSA officials stated that although the evaluation was unable to report on long-term results, the program’s finding of improved driver behavior around trucks would logically indicate an expected decrease in truck-related crashes, injuries, and fatalities. Furthermore, NHTSA does not evaluate individual Click It or Ticket campaigns, which are considered to successfully modify behavior, for their effect on long-term results such as fatality reduction. Figure 7 shows how TACT linked short-term results (such as awareness and knowledge of the dangers of driving around trucks) and intermediate results (such as changed driver behavior around trucks) to the long-term results of fewer truck-related crashes, injuries, and fatalities.

TACT Is Better Designed to Successfully Reach Agency Goals Than Past STRS Initiatives

The design of TACT provided a better opportunity for successfully reaching desired results and goals than past STRS initiatives. Our 2003 report on STRS found that some of FMCSA’s education and outreach initiatives were not directly connected to agency goals and recommended that future initiatives be so connected. While program initiatives that exclusively rely on education and outreach, such as distributing informational pamphlets or advertising, can increase awareness and encourage the intended behaviors, thereby linking to a program’s goals, attempts to modify the behaviors of drivers are more effective when educational initiatives are combined with enforcement. This conclusion is supported by the evaluation of past initiatives to change driver behavior, particularly of efforts to increase safety belt use. For example, a 2002 study by NHTSA included data from Texas, which showed that while the baseline percentage of individuals wearing safety belts (80 percent) increased slightly with advertising alone, the combination of advertising and enforcement caused the number to increase another 6 percent. TACT’s use of media, road signs, and other educational outreach tools therefore directly linked to the STRS goal of decreasing unsafe driver behavior around commercial vehicles by truck drivers and passenger-vehicle drivers, and incorporating high-visibility law enforcement increased the initiative’s potential for successfully reaching that goal. In effect, TACT represents a positive step toward meeting our 2003 recommendation that STRS initiatives clearly link to STRS goals.

FMCSA Plans Expanded Development of High- Visibility Law Enforcement Campaigns Similar to TACT, but Lacks a Clear Strategy and Expertise

Following the success of TACT in Washington State, FMCSA is developing plans encouraging states to adopt similar initiatives in other states; however, its strategy for expanding TACT and its ability to manage these initiatives remain unknown. FMCSA officials stated that they plan a nationwide rollout of initiatives similar to TACT by 2009, and that in the interim, they are currently developing another TACT pilot in Pennsylvania. FMCSA, however, has yet to articulate a strategy for expanding TACT into a nationwide program or to identify funding. Additionally, FMCSA’s ability to administer future TACT initiatives is uncertain, since FMCSA has limited experience with high-visibility law enforcement campaigns. Finally, FMCSA plans to spend the majority of its STRS funds on initiatives that are purely educational, even though little information is available to show that these activities will improve driver behavior and contribute to reducing fatalities.

FMCSA Plans to Implement More TACT-Like Initiatives but Has Yet to Articulate Its Strategy

FMCSA plans to expand initiatives similar to TACT to new states and, eventually, nationwide. FMCSA officials stated that they plan to issue a Federal Register notice in fiscal year 2008 before rolling out TACT on a nationwide basis in 2009. In the interim, FMCSA is currently developing plans to implement another TACT pilot in Pennsylvania, using primarily MCSAP grants and state funds. There, FMCSA will contract with the Pennsylvania State Police to develop and operate a high-visibility law enforcement campaign in at least two intervention corridors and two comparison corridors in an area with a high concentration of commercial- vehicle fatalities and crashes. Pennsylvania will also be responsible for evaluating its pilot. Agency officials anticipate this pilot taking 18 months to complete. FMCSA also plans to conduct two additional pilots in fiscal year 2007, but has not yet identified states. Additionally, FMCSA issued a Federal Register notice in March 2006 stating that states could use MCSAP High Priority grants to comply with provisions of SAFETEA-LU that require states to conduct comprehensive and highly visible traffic enforcement and commercial-vehicle safety inspection programs in high- risk locations and areas. FMCSA added that these initiatives could be similar to TACT.

FMCSA officials stated that they will develop guidance for states to follow, but gaps remain in their strategy for expanding TACT nationwide. Agency documents state that the Washington State TACT pilot and the future Pennsylvania initiative will form the foundation of a best practices guide to share with states. However, FMCSA has yet to articulate how it will expand TACT from several planned pilot initiatives in 2007 to a nationwide program 2 years later, or how this expansion will be funded. Additionally, although FMCSA enabled states to apply for MCSAP High Priority grants to develop initiatives similar to TACT, FMCSA did not provide states with the guidance to do so. Applications for these funds were due before the Washington TACT evaluation report was published; therefore, states seeking to begin similar initiatives needed to design their own initiatives without the benefit of Washington’s experience. Finally, FMCSA officials stated that no state applied for a fiscal year 2006 grant before the application deadline in the Federal Register; however, FMCSA will accept applications until the end of fiscal year 2006 or until the available funds are awarded.

Although FMCSA has plans for a nationwide expansion of TACT, the majority of FMCSA’s STRS funds will be spent on other activities. Program planning documents state that FMCSA has decided to transition STRS to focus on developing initiatives similar to TACT in other states, but FMCSA plans to invest just $150,000 of its $500,000 fiscal year 2006 STRS budget to do this. FMCSA officials told us that STRS funds would pay for the evaluation component of this initiative, and FMCSA will supplement activities with MCSAP funds. The $150,000 fiscal year 2006 STRS investment in these future initiatives is significantly less than the approximately $664,000 in STRS funds provided solely to TACT in fiscal years 2004 and 2005.

FMCSA’s Ability to Manage Future Initiatives Is Unclear and NHTSA’s Role Is Still Evolving

FMCSA’s ability to administer future high-visibility law enforcement campaigns and NHTSA’s role in future STRS initiatives are unclear. As we previously mentioned, a goal of the TACT pilot was for FMCSA to learn about the operation of high-visibility enforcement programs from NHTSA, and to support this goal, FMCSA detailed a liaison to NHTSA following congressional direction. FMCSA, however, missed valuable opportunities for learning because of the time it took to fill the position, since the liaison came aboard late in the TACT program and returned to FMCSA before NHTSA conducted its annual Click It or Ticket enforcement campaign. After discussing our findings with FMCSA officials, they clarified that other FMCSA staff participated in TACT and knowledge transfer was not limited to the liaison.

Furthermore, NHTSA’s participation in future STRS activities is still evolving. As we previously mentioned, SAFETEA-LU authorized $3 million to NHTSA and $1 million annually to FMCSA for administering education and outreach activities associated with commercial-vehicle safety for the 4- year period from 2006 through 2009. However, the Conference Report accompanying the DOT appropriations act for fiscal year 2006 indicates that the conferees did not fund the amounts authorized. Instead, they funded $4 million to FMCSA alone for these purposes. Given its limited experiences with programs designed to modify driver behavior, however, FMCSA’s plans call for continuing cooperation with NHTSA in future aggressive driving programs. For example, staff in FMCSA’s Washington Divisional Office told us that their agency lacks NHTSA’s experience with initiatives that change driver behavior and does not have staff with a background in the area, especially at the division office level. This is important because TACT’s evaluation report states that having an experienced evaluation team that can develop and implement a comprehensive evaluation design was critical to the success of the project. As we previously mentioned, NHTSA has experience in operating successful campaigns to increase safe behavior by motorists. Additionally, FMCSA has only a small number of staff dedicated to its education and outreach programs. NHTSA staff with whom we spoke initially stated that the agency’s involvement will end with the issuance of the TACT program evaluation report. Currently, however, NHTSA staff said they will provide FMCSA with general assistance, and FMCSA has formed a transition team to help ensure that the necessary expertise will be available to future initiatives. NHTSA officials added that specific experience with behavioral issues is not required to replicate the TACT initiative. They said that a program plan, a media plan, an enforcement plan, and an evaluation plan are required.

FMCSA’s Short-term Plans Focus on Initiatives That Do Not Include Enforcement and That Have Not Been Shown to Be Effective

FMCSA plans to spend the majority of its 2006 STRS funds on updating the STRS Web site and producing outreach materials. These funds will be spent on initiatives that have limited potential for reducing fatalities and provide limited opportunities for evaluation, representing a return to an earlier era of STRS. FMCSA will spend $200,000 in updating its Web site, $100,000 on education and outreach materials promoting sharing the road, and $50,000 on printing. FMCSA plans to update its Web site with information on preventing aggressive driving, which will include Spanish-language content. The Web site also will include a user survey to gauge satisfaction and will be able to ask up to five questions about a user’s knowledge of STRS initiatives. Currently, FMCSA can only collect information on the number of visits to the Web site. In addition, FMCSA plans to distribute education and outreach materials promoting sharing the road. These initiatives were not financially supported during fiscal years 2004 and 2005, when NHTSA had responsibility for STRS. As we previously stated, purely educational initiatives may conceptually link to FMCSA’s goal of reducing accidents and fatalities, but initiatives such as TACT have a better potential to improve driver behavior by incorporating local enforcement efforts with educational outreach. Figure 8 shows four categories of FMCSA’s planned STRS spending in fiscal year 2006. Table 1 lists FMCSA’s planned outreach activities within two of these categories.

It is unclear if evaluations of these planned STRS education and outreach activities will provide meaningful insight into their effectiveness. FMCSA officials told us that they hired a contractor to develop evaluations of STRS education and outreach activities, but plans to evaluate the impact of these activities on fatality and injury rates have yet to be developed. This contractor will be required to (1) develop an evaluation study that gathers baseline data and (2) assess whether the education and outreach materials and activities reached the intended audience, changed attitudes and behaviors, and helped the program meet its safety goals. However, in discussing these plans, a NHTSA official told us that it will be difficult to measure the impact of educational materials on driver behavior. Furthermore, in our 2003 report, we stated that previous evaluations of STRS activities shed little light on their short-term, intermediate, and long- term outcomes. This was due, in part, to FMCSA’s heavy reliance on self- reported data and to FMCSA’s not establishing a baseline of driver behavior and knowledge before the program started. By contrast, TACT’s evaluation visually assessed driver behavior before and after motorists received education and enforcement. If FMCSA cannot evaluate the effect of these activities on driver behavior, then the planned activities may represent a return to the practices that we questioned in our 2003 report.

Conclusions

The TACT initiative represented a significant departure from previous STRS initiatives and, by following the high-visibility law enforcement campaign model, incorporated program elements that experts believe are most effective in changing driver behavior. Its systematic evaluation and clear link to agency goals were important steps toward addressing concerns with STRS that we raised in the past. Furthermore, the positive results shown by the TACT evaluation and the ongoing problem of crashes between trucks and passenger vehicles demonstrate that there is merit in further developing and implementing high-visibility law enforcement campaigns similar to TACT. FMCSA’s plans for future aggressive driving initiatives are still evolving, but the agency is currently developing a second pilot in Pennsylvania and has a goal of rolling out TACT-like initiatives nationwide in 2009. However, FMCSA has yet to develop a clear strategy describing how it will expand initiatives similar to TACT from a series of pilots into a nationwide program or to describe how these programs will be funded.

Furthermore, some of FMCSA’s plans for addressing unsafe driving do not focus on expanding education and enforcement initiatives such as TACT. Instead, FMCSA has chosen to spend the majority of its fiscal year 2006 STRS funds on initiatives that are purely educational, which safety experts agree are less effective than when educational outreach is combined with enforcement. Because FMCSA has not identified a cohesive strategy to expand TACT and not focused on proven approaches such as high-visibility law enforcement campaigns, it is unclear how FMCSA’s STRS initiatives will contribute to FMCSA’s goal of expanding TACT and reducing crashes and fatalities.

Finally, there are doubts about FMCSA’s ability to ensure the success of STRS in the future. Although funding responsibility for STRS returned to FMCSA in 2006 and FMCSA participated in the initial planning for TACT, NHTSA and the Washington Traffic Safety Commission significantly supported TACT’s implementation and evaluation. Additionally, FMCSA may have missed valuable opportunities to learn about the operation of TACT and other similar programs because its involvement was limited by not being able to use its legislatively mandated liaison to the fullest extent possible. DOT, through staff from both NHTSA and FMCSA, demonstrated that it has the ability to develop state initiatives that change driver behavior around trucks by successfully implementing TACT. Even so, it is uncertain that DOT will effectively use these resources in the future, given that the relationship between NHTSA and FMCSA is still evolving and that FMCSA has limited staff and experience in administering high-visibility law enforcement campaigns.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To ensure that the Share the Road Safely program continues to improve driver behavior around commercial vehicles, thereby potentially reducing fatalities, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrators of the appropriate agencies to take the following three steps: develop a comprehensive strategy describing how FMCSA will implement and fund an expansion of TACT-like initiatives from several pilots into a nationwide program and detail how STRS initiatives contribute to this goal; complete and execute plans to evaluate STRS outreach activities that are purely educational and discontinue activities with no demonstrable impact on behavior; and monitor whether FMCSA has sufficient staff and expertise to successfully develop and administer future high-visibility law enforcement campaigns, and, if it does not, determine the best methods for DOT to use its resources and expertise to modify driver behavior and address the problem of aggressive driving around trucks.

Agency Comments

We provided DOT with a draft of this report for review and comment. DOT officials, including FMCSA's Outreach Division Chief and NHTSA's Behavioral Technology Research Chief, provided oral and written comments and generally agreed with our recommendations. These FMCSA and NHTSA officials clarified FMCSA’s role in developing initial plans for an education and enforcement project after we issued our 2003 report and before Congress provided NHTSA with Share the Road Safely funding. FMCSA officials also provided additional information on, and documentation of, a contract to develop an evaluation of FMCSA’s education and outreach programs, including Share the Road Safely educational initiatives. Finally, the officials provided information on a team of FMCSA and NHTSA staff established in May 2006 to assist FMCSA with the expansion of TACT as fiscal responsibility for STRS transitions from NHTSA to FMCSA. We incorporated this information as well as technical comments throughout the report as appropriate.

We will send copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Scope And Methodology

To address our first objective and describe what the Department of Transportation (DOT) has done with the Share the Road Safely (STRS) program since 2003, we interviewed DOT officials to determine the changes made in the program since May 2003. Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and the Washington State Traffic Safety Commission to report on the implementation and administration of Washington State’s Ticketing Aggressive Cars and Trucks (TACT) pilot project. To determine whether the design of TACT was reasonable, we reviewed TACT programming documentation to determine if the design of the program links program initiatives to goals and if the design follows the high-visibility law enforcement campaign model for behavior change. We did not assess the design of other STRS initiatives because they were not actively funded in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, and because we reported on these activities in our 2003 report.

To address our second objective—to determine what DOT evaluations have shown and whether the methods were acceptable—we reviewed evaluation results and analyzed evaluation plans to determine if short-term, intermediate, and long-term outcomes were measured and if external factors were considered and controlled for in the assessment. We reviewed and summarized the results of the Washington State pilot evaluation and determined if program initiatives linked to agency goals. In addition, we reviewed the evaluation results to determine if the evaluation illustrates that the pilot met its criteria for success. Due to the nature of the TACT program, we could not determine in this report whether the Share the Road Safely program achieved reductions in the number of deaths and severity of injuries as requested by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). Specifically, SAFETEA-LU asked us to update our prior evaluation of STRS to determine if the program has achieved reductions in the number and severity of commercial-vehicle crashes, including reductions in the number of deaths and the severity of injuries sustained in these crashes. NHTSA officials, however, told us that the evaluation did not assess these long-term results because the numbers of injuries and fatalities on the pilot’s intervention corridors were too low to reliably measure any appreciable change.

Therefore, we did not discuss in this report the program’s impact on specific numbers of fatalities and injuries.

To assess DOT’s plans for the future of STRS, we interviewed program administrators at DOT and reviewed relevant budget and planning documents to determine DOT’s direction for STRS. We interviewed the FMCSA staff member assigned to transfer knowledge about administering high-visibility law enforcement campaigns from NHTSA to FMCSA to assess the staff member’s ability to accomplish this task. We also compared the design of future FMCSA initiatives with findings we listed in previous reports on programs designed to modify driver behavior and increase a program’s effectiveness at reducing crashes, injuries, and fatalities associated with commercial vehicles.

We conducted our review from October 2005 through July 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

TACT’s Implementation of the Click It or Ticket Model

Click It or Ticket criteria Data collection, before, during, and immediately after media and enforcement phases.

Earned and paid publicity announcing strict enforcement.

Highly visible enforcement each day of enforcement period.

Analysis of crash locations in determining the need for improvement and for targeting efforts.

Areas should be defined so that residents have a sense of belonging to a community.

Enforcement agencies should partner with local government, public service organizations, the media, and businesses to generate overwhelming program intensity.

Maximum involvement among the state, county, and local enforcement agencies serving the community.

Areas should try to include as large a percentage of the population as resources permit.

Up-front commitment to the program is needed from top management in each participating enforcement agency.

Officer training should be conducted.

A high-level enforcement official should take the lead in carrying the message to the public.

Organizers must have the full support of elected officials.

The program should be coordinated with the courts, since their caseloads will be affected directly by the number of citations issued.

Enforcement messages repeated over and over during the publicity period.

Continual use of earned media.

Paid advertisement campaigns.

Radio advertisements timed to run during drive times. Television advertisements are run at times when most viewers are present.

Enforcement campaigns usually last 2 weeks. During this period, zero-tolerance enforcement is carried out.

Enforcement visible for entire enforcement period.

Description of TACT Methodology for Analyzing Video Footage of Driver Behavior

To determine whether driver behavior changed, TACT administrators measured the incidence and rates of unsafe driver behavior in the vicinity of commercial vehicles. Washington State Police troopers collected these data by videotaping traffic from unmarked cars. Troopers drove behind commercial vehicles and provided narration indicating the type of behavior observed each time an unsafe act was seen. Unsafe behaviors included making unsafe lane changes, cutting in front of a truck, following another vehicle too closely, engaging in unsafe merging, and speeding. Troopers also provided narration detailing whether they would issue citations for driving violations. Later, 99 video clips were randomly selected and shown to three sets of reviewers consisting of police officers, truck drivers, and Washington Traffic Safety Commission employees. Reviewers filled out a score sheet for each video clip indicating how dangerous they believed the driver behavior was and whether it deserved a citation. Evaluators quantified these responses to generate a score indicating the seriousness of the unsafe driving act.

Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

Catherine Colwell, Assistant Director, and Samer Abbas, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment and made significant contributions to all aspects of the work. Daniel Concepcion also made significant contributions to all aspects of this report. In addition, Joel Grossman assisted in our assessment of the TACT initiative’s design and evaluation. Tamera Dorland provided writing assistance, Bert Japikse provided legal support, and Joshua Ormond and Theresa Perkins assisted with graphics.