Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination
Released: 1997-12-03T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Under Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 (U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, June 1995), the National Security Council (NSC) is to coordinate interagency terrorism policy issues and review ongoing crisis operations and activities concerning foreign terrorism and domestic terrorism with significant foreign involvement. An NSC-chaired coordinating group is to ensure the PDD is implemented but does not have authority to direct agencies’ activities.

Among its general mission responsibilities, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is to evaluate the effectiveness of agency programs, policies, and procedures; assess competing funding demands among agencies; set funding priorities; and develop better performance measures and coordinating mechanisms. Further, according to PDD 39, OMB is to analyze the adequacy of funding for terrorism-related programs and ensure the adequacy of funding for research, development, and acquisition of counterterrorism-related technology and systems on an ongoing basis.

Under PDD 39, the State Department and the Department of Justice, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), have lead federal agency responsibility for dealing with terrorist incidents overseas and domestically, respectively. Numerous federal departments, agencies, bureaus, and offices also have terrorism-related programs and activities that are funded through annual and supplemental appropriations. (See app. I for a list of federal entities with terrorism-related programs and activities.) Terrorism-related funding requests include nearly $290 million provided under the 1995 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-19) in the aftermath of the domestic terrorist attack in Oklahoma City and $1.1 billion proposed for counterterrorism programs within a number of agencies in fiscal year 1996 supplemental appropriations and fiscal year 1997 budget amendments.

The Government Performance and Results Act (Results Act) of 1993 is intended to improve the management and accountability of federal agencies. The Results Act seeks to shift the focus of federal management and decision-making from activities that are undertaken to the results of activities as reflected in citizens’ lives. Specifically, it requires federal agencies to prepare multiyear strategic plans and annual performance plans, establish program performance measures and goals, and provide annual performance reports to the Congress. Agencies submitted the first strategic plans to OMB and the Congress by September 30, 1997; the first annual performance plans, covering fiscal year 1999, are to be submitted to the Congress after the President’s budget submission in 1998.

In recent years, several efforts have been undertaken to coordinate federal programs that cut across agencies to help ensure that national needs are being effectively targeted. These efforts have shown that coordinating crosscutting programs takes time and sustained attention and, because of the statutory bases of crosscutting programs, may require congressional involvement to integrate the federal response to national needs. With the large number of government entities involved, the federal effort to combat terrorism is one example of a crosscutting program to which Results Act principles and measures might be applied.

Total Terrorism-related Spending Is Uncertain

Federal agencies are not required to account separately for their terrorism-related programs and activities. Because most federal agencies do not isolate or account specifically for terrorism-related funding, it is difficult to determine how much the government budgets and spends to combat terrorism. Key agencies provided us their estimates of terrorism-related spending, using their own definitions. These estimates totaled nearly $7 billion for unclassified programs and activities for fiscal year 1997, and should be considered a minimum estimate of federal spending for unclassified terrorism-related programs and activities.

The amounts for governmentwide terrorism-related funding and spending are uncertain because (1) definitions of antiterrorism and counterterrorism vary from agency to agency; (2) in most cases agencies do not have separate budget line items for terrorism-related activities; (3) some agency functions serve more than one purpose, and it is difficult to allocate costs applicable to terrorism alone (e.g., U.S. embassy security measures protect not only against terrorism but also against theft, compromise of classified documents, and violent demonstrations); (4) some agencies, such as the Departments of Energy and Transportation, have decentralized budgeting and accounting functions and do not aggregate terrorism-related funding agencywide; (5) programs and activities may receive funding from more than one appropriation within a given agency, which makes it difficult to track collective totals; and (6) appropriations legislation often is not clear regarding which amounts are designated to combat terrorism.

At our request, the primary agencies leading or supporting operational crisis response and management activities under PDD 39 provided spending data for fiscal years 1994 to 1996 (not all agencies were able to provide historical data prior to fiscal year 1996) and estimates for fiscal year 1997 (see table 1).

Figure 1 indicates that DOD spent the largest share of estimated terrorism-related funds for fiscal year 1997, followed by the Department of Energy.

While DOD and the Department of Energy estimated spending accounted for 76 percent of the unclassified fiscal year 1997 terrorism-related funds, other agencies’ resources dedicated to combating terrorism have significantly increased in recent years. For example, FAA resources tripled (in current dollars) during fiscal years 1994-97, and FBI resources increased five-fold. FAA increased equipment purchases and aviation security operations, and the FBI nearly tripled the authorized staffing level dedicated to combating terrorism, with the largest staff increase occurring in fiscal year 1997.

Key Interagency Management Functions Are Not Clearly Required or Performed

There is no interagency mechanism to centrally manage funding requirements and requests to ensure an efficient, focused governmentwide application of federal funds to numerous agencies’ programs designed to combat terrorism. Given the high national priority and magnitude of this nearly $7-billion federal effort, sound management principles dictate that (1) governmentwide requirements be prioritized to meet the objectives of national policy and strategy and (2) spending and program data be collected from the federal agencies involved to conduct annual, crosscutting evaluations of their funding requests based on the threat and risk of terrorist attack and to avoid duplicated efforts or serious funding gaps. Neither NSC nor OMB currently performs these functions for the governmentwide program to combat terrorism. Rather, each agency is responsible for identifying and seeking funding for its priorities within its own budget allocation, and OMB reviews the budget requests on an agency-by-agency basis. Because individual agencies continue to propose new programs, activities, and capabilities to combat terrorism, annual crosscutting evaluations of agency budget requests for such programs would be prudent to help avoid duplicated efforts.

Under PDD 39, NSC is to ensure the federal policy and strategy for combating terrorism is implemented. Although PDD 39 establishes interagency coordinating and working groups under the auspices of NSC to handle policy and operational issues related to combating terrorism, these groups operate on a consensus basis, do not have decision-making authority, and do not establish governmentwide resource priorities for combating terrorism. Moreover, PDD 39 does not assign responsibility to NSC to ensure that terrorism-related requirements and related funding proposals (1) are analyzed and reviewed to ensure they are based on a validated assessment of the terrorism threat and risks of terrorist attack, (2) provide a measured and appropriate level of effort across the federal government, (3) avoid duplicative efforts and capabilities, and (4) are prioritized governmentwide in a comprehensive strategy to combat the terrorist threat.

PDD 39 requires OMB to analyze the adequacy of funding for terrorism-related programs, technology, and systems. Further, OMB’s general mission responsibilities include evaluating the effectiveness of federal programs and policies, assessing competing funding demands, and setting funding priorities. However, PDD 39 does not specifically require OMB to prioritize terrorism-related requirements governmentwide or to gather funding data across agencies and perform the crosscutting analyses of agencies’ funding proposals necessary to ensure the efficient use of federal resources.

OMB examiners who review individual agencies’ terrorism-related funding requests explained that although they do not review activities and programs to combat terrorism on a crosscutting basis as such, they often discuss funding issues with each other during their reviews. Further, they bring issues they identify during their reviews to the attention of senior OMB officials. For example, OMB said it reviewed the FBI’s funding requests for a hazardous materials laboratory capability and for increased staffing to combat terrorism. However, because OMB did not provide evidence of its reviews, we could not verify the extent to which OMB considered the capabilities of other federal laboratories or analyzed the FBI’s request for increased staffing based on workload data and on the threat and risk of terrorism. Further, because terrorism-related funding requirements and proposals have not been prioritized across agencies, OMB could not have fully considered tradeoffs among competing demands. For this reason, it is unclear, for example, whether OMB’s denial of an FBI request for an aircraft that the FBI said was required for counterterrorism and other operations was based on an assessment of terrorism-related priorities across the government or of only the FBI’s funding requests.

OMB stated that in addition to its examination of agencies’ funding requests, it has met its responsibilities under PDD 39 by reviewing DOD’s counterterrorism program baseline funding and program submission, participating in interagency meetings designed to better identify terrorism-related budget functions that are imbedded in broader funding accounts, and reviewing specific technology proposals (such as FAA proposals for explosives detection technology). Also, consistent with its role, OMB prepared the President’s $1.1-billion request for terrorism-related programs and activities. We submitted a letter of inquiry to OMB to obtain information about OMB’s role in reviewing federal agencies’ budget requests and spending to combat terrorism. Our questions and OMB’s written response appear in appendixes II and III, respectively.

While OMB said that it analyzes individual agencies’ funding requests—and some examiners say they share information during their examinations—OMB does not regularly perform crosscutting analyses of requirements, priorities, and funding for the overall federal effort to combat terrorism. Consequently, OMB cannot provide reasonable assurance that specific federal activities and programs to combat terrorism (1) are required based on a full assessment of the threat and risk involved, (2) avoid unnecessary duplication of effort or capability with other agencies, and (3) meet governmentwide priorities for effectively and efficiently implementing the national strategy on combating terrorism.

Section 1501 of the recently enacted National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires OMB to establish a reporting system for executive agencies on the budgeting and expenditure of funds for counterterrorism and antiterrorism programs and activities. The section also requires OMB, using the reporting system, to collect agency budget and expenditure information on these programs and activities. Further, the President is required to submit an annual report to the Congress containing agency budget and expenditure information on counterterrorism and antiterrorism programs and activities. The report is also to identify any priorities and any duplication of efforts with respect to such programs and activities.

Results Act Principles Provide Guidance for Crosscutting Programs to Combat Terrorism

The Results Act requires each executive branch agency to define its mission and desired outcomes, measure performance, and use performance information to ensure that programs meet intended goals. However, the national policy, strategy, programs, and activities to combat terrorism cut across agency lines. The act’s emphasis on results implies that federal programs contributing to the same or similar outcomes should be closely coordinated to ensure that goals are consistent and that program efforts are mutually reinforcing. Effective implementation of the act governmentwide should eventually help prevent uncoordinated crosscutting program efforts that can waste funds and limit the overall effectiveness of the federal effort.

The principles underlying the Results Act provide guidance that the many federal agencies responsible for combating terrorism can use to develop coordinated goals, objectives, and performance measures and to improve the management of individual agency and overall federal efforts to combat terrorism. For example, the act focuses on clarifying missions, setting program goals, and measuring performance toward achieving those goals. In our work examining implementation of the Results Act, we identified several critical issues that need to be addressed if the act is to succeed in improving management of crosscutting program efforts by ensuring that those programs are appropriately and substantively coordinated. As their implementation of the Results Act continues to evolve, agencies with terrorism-related responsibilities may become more aware of the potential for and desirability of coordinating performance plans, goals, and measures for their crosscutting activities and programs.

The next phase of implementation of the Results Act requires agencies to develop annual performance plans that are linked to their strategic plans.

These plans are to contain annual performance goals, performance measures to gauge progress toward achieving the goals, and the resources agencies will need to meet their goals. The development of annual plans may provide the many federal agencies responsible for combating terrorism the next opportunity to develop coordinated goals, objectives, and performance measures for programs and activities that combat terrorism and to articulate how they plan to manage this crosscutting program area.

Reimbursement for Agency Support Is a Matter of Concern Between the FBI and DOD

The Economy Act of 1932 (31 U.S.C. 1535, as amended) generally requires federal agencies to reimburse other federal agencies that provide them with support. However, PDD 39 states that federal agencies providing support to lead agencies’ counterterrorist operations or activities must bear the cost unless otherwise directed by the President. Because the Economy Act and PDD 39 differ in their treatment of reimbursement, DOD and the FBI have disagreed on whether the FBI must reimburse DOD for its support of counterterrorist operations. Primary examples of DOD support involve air transportation to return terrorists from overseas locations or other deployments of FBI personnel and equipment for special events or for the investigation of terrorist incidents. DOD officials stated that PDD 39 does not have the force of statutory authority regarding whether or not DOD’s support to another agency is reimbursable. These officials believe the Economy Act requires DOD to provide the requested support on a reimbursable basis unless another statute allows for nonreimbursable support. Every request for DOD support requires a legal determination of which statutes are applicable and whether the Economy Act applies. DOD believes that PDD 39 does not control the legal determination of reimbursement.

The issue of reimbursement has caused two concerns within the FBI: (1) the potential impairment of its operations under PDD 39 or other authorities and (2) the availability of funding for operations under PDD 39 if DOD does not provide nonreimbursable support. According to the FBI, DOD ultimately provides nonreimbursable support in most cases, but delays and uncertainties involved in DOD’s decision process on reimbursement frequently threaten timely FBI deployments.

DOD officials cited an example of the process it follows when the FBI, through the Attorney General, requests support under PDD 39. In response to an Attorney General request that DOD provide air transportation for FBI personnel and equipment to prepare for the June 1997 Summit of the Eight in Denver, Colorado, DOD identified a statute that allowed nonreimbursable support regarding the provision of security to foreign dignitaries. Otherwise, the Economy Act would have required the FBI to reimburse DOD for the transportation costs.

In an attempt to alleviate concern and confusion over reimbursement of support activities, NSC tasked a special working group on interagency operations to explore solutions. According to NSC, possible solutions include legislation to provide DOD with special authority to provide nonreimbursable support or to set aside contingency funds for domestic emergency support team activities. The Department of Justice commented that DOD-provided transportation services and assistance provided in response to terrorist activities involving a weapon of mass destruction should be exempt from the requirements of the Economy Act. DOD commented that it is also considering various legislative options to permit nonreimbursable support for counterterrorism operations. At the time of our review, the issue remained unresolved.

Conclusions

Billions of dollars are being spent by numerous agencies with roles or potential roles in combating terrorism, but because no federal entity has been tasked to collect such information across the government, the specific amount is unknown. Further, no governmentwide spending priorities for the various aspects of combating terrorism have been set, and no federal entity manages the crosscutting program to channel resources where they are most needed in consideration of the threat and the risk of terrorist attack and to prevent wasteful spending that might occur from unnecessary duplication of effort. Recent legislation requires that OMB establish a reporting system for executive agencies on the budgeting and expenditure of funds for counterterrorism and antiterrorism programs and activities and that the President report this information annually to the Congress, along with program priorities and any duplication of effort.

Recommendations

We recommend that consistent with the responsibility for coordinating efforts to combat terrorism, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC, in consultation with the Director, OMB, and the heads of other executive branch agencies, take steps to ensure that (1) governmentwide priorities to implement the national counterterrorism policy and strategy are established; (2) agencies’ programs, projects, activities, and requirements for combating terrorism are analyzed in relation to established governmentwide priorities; and (3) resources are allocated based on the established priorities and assessments of the threat and risk of terrorist attack.

To ensure that federal expenditures for terrorism-related activities are well-coordinated and focused on efficiently meeting the goals of U.S. policy under PDD 39, we recommend that the Director, OMB, use data on funds budgeted and spent by executive departments and agencies to evaluate and coordinate projects and recommend resource allocation annually on a crosscutting basis to ensure that governmentwide priorities for combating terrorism are met and programs are based on analytically sound threat and risk assessments and avoid unnecessary duplication.

In a draft of this report we also recommended that the Director, OMB, establish a governmentwide mechanism for reporting expenditures to combat terrorism. We deleted that recommendation in view of the requirements of the recently enacted legislation. Our remaining recommendations are consistent with and complement this legislation.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense concurred with our findings. DOD noted that we identified a significant issue involving reimbursement for and providing DOD support to other federal agencies under PDD 39. DOD commented that although PDD 39 states that support provided by a federal agency to the lead federal agency in support of counterterrorist operations is borne by the providing agency, PDD 39 is not a statute, and does not provide authority to waive reimbursement that is required by the Economy Act. DOD also discussed in its comments specific legislative options it is considering to resolve the issue. (DOD’s comments and our response are in app. IV.)

In its written comments, the State Department pointed out that, although interagency funding requirements for combating terrorism are not managed by any single mechanism, overall counterterrorism and antiterrorism spending is discussed by NSC’s Coordinating Sub-Group and interagency coordination occurs in other contexts. We agree that interagency coordination occurs at various forums in the counterterrorism community but such coordination mechanisms do not perform the functions we are recommending to NSC and OMB. State also highlighted the difficulties of determining the amount of funds spent to combat terrorism with a certain level of precision. We agree that it would be difficult and possibly not cost-effective to account for programs and activities that combat terrorism with a high degree of precision. Nevertheless, at the time of our review, information on federal spending to combat terrorism had not been gathered in any form or at any level of specificity, and we believe that a reasonable methodology could be devised to allow OMB to capture this data governmentwide. State also noted that efforts to coordinate programs and activities and prevent duplication are further complicated by the authorization and appropriations process in the Congress, because various committees have jurisdiction over the federal agencies involved in combating terrorism. State finally noted that it is important to have good working relations with other countries to effectively counter international terrorism. (State’s comments and our response are in app. V.)

OMB noted in its written comments that although our recommendations are consistent with policies and responsibilities established by statute and the President, the budget process would not be improved by mandating annual, formal crosscutting reviews of budget requests and spending for federal programs that combat terrorism. OMB also stated that, because of the significant investment in combating terrorism over the past few years, it will include a crosscutting review of these programs in the formulation of the fiscal year 1999 budget. We are encouraged by OMB’s crosscutting evaluation of programs to combat terrorism for the fiscal year 1999 budget submission. Because of the high national priority, the significant federal resources allocated, and the numerous federal agencies, bureaus, and programs involved, we continue to believe that annual crosscutting reviews would provide a mechanism for OMB to better assure that federal resources are aligned with governmentwide program priorities and that funds are not allocated to duplicative activities and functions to combat terrorism. Annual reviews would be particularly important because federal agencies continue to propose funding of new programs, activities, and capabilities to combat terrorism.

OMB expressed concern that our report suggests that there currently is no effective process to review spending for combating terrorism. We acknowledge OMB’s reviews of individual agencies’ funding requests, but as noted in our report, OMB did not provide evidence of its reviews, in particular of the $1.1-billion fiscal year 1997 amended budget request for combating terrorism. OMB also commented that it carefully considers funding levels for activities to combat terrorism. During the course of our review, OMB could not provide data on funding levels across the federal government for combating terrorism. During the agency comment period on a draft of this report, officials from the Treasury and Justice Departments noted that OMB recently issued a budget data request to gather budgetary and expenditure data from executive agencies for fiscal years 1996-99, which in part satisfies our recommendation to OMB. OMB would not provide a copy of the budget data request because we are not part of the executive branch and it was in the process of being implemented. As a result, we could not verify that the request was issued or determine its content. (OMB’s written comments are in app. VI.)

The Departments of Treasury; Justice, including the FBI; and Transportation provided technical comments, which we have reflected in our report, as appropriate. NSC and the Departments of Energy and Health and Human Services did not comment on the draft report.

Scope and Methodology

We reviewed PDD 39 to determine agencies’ roles and responsibilities in managing and coordinating resources for combating terrorism. Because data on agencies’ spending for U.S. efforts to combat terrorism are not available from a central source, we obtained from the Departments of Defense; Energy; Justice, including the FBI; State; Transportation (FAA); Treasury; and Health and Human Services data on spending that the agencies categorized as related to their unclassified efforts to combat terrorism. We did not verify the data for accuracy, completeness, or consistency. We discussed with NSC and OMB their respective roles in managing the crosscutting federal effort to combat terrorism, and we also submitted questions to the Director, OMB, on OMB’s role under PDD 39. We discussed reimbursement issues with the FBI and DOD.

We conducted our work from November 1996 to October 1997 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

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Federal Entities With Terrorism-related Programs and Activities

Letter of Inquiry From GAO to the Office of Management and Budget

OMB Response to GAO Letter of Inquiry

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following is GAO’s comment on DOD’s letter dated November 7, 1997.

GAO Comment

1. We did not evaluate DOD’s options for proposed legislative changes that would permit nonreimbursable support to law enforcement agencies.

Comments From the Department of State

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter dated November 3, 1997.

GAO Comments

1. While we acknowledge the existence of various interagency coordinating mechanisms within the NSC structure, these mechanisms do not perform the functions we are recommending to NSC and OMB. For example, the interagency Technical Support Working Group coordinates only certain terrorism-related research and development projects, and it does not function to eliminate duplicative or redundant terrorism-related research and development across government agencies. 2. We modified the text to reflect the Department’s point that embassy guards help protect against a variety of threats. 3. We agree that it would be difficult and possibly not cost-effective to account for spending to combat terrorism with a high degree of precision. Our report discusses this matter on p. 14. 4. The Department’s concern about reimbursement for the cost of facilities security in U.S. missions abroad was not brought to our attention during our review of funding issues for combating terrorism. As a result, we are not in a position to comment on this matter. 5. The report discusses the State Department position on p. 14.

Comments From the Office of Management and Budget

The following are GAO’s comments on OMB’s letter dated November 18, 1997.

GAO Comments

1. The report acknowledges that OMB reviews agencies’ individual budget requests, and suggests that this process would be enhanced if federal funding proposals were reviewed on a crosscutting, governmentwide basis. The report also points out that additional steps could be taken to prioritize federal programs and activities to combat terrorism at a strategic level to better ensure priority programs are funded and avoid duplicative and overlapping activities. 2. As discussed on p. 14 of the final report, we are encouraged by OMB’s crosscutting review of programs to combat terrorism as part of the fiscal year 1999 budget process. 3. As discussed on pp. 14-15, in view of the national importance and priority, the significant federal resources allocated, and the numerous federal agencies, bureaus, and programs involved, we continue to believe that governmentwide priorities should be set and annual crosscutting reviews be performed on programs to combat terrorism. As agencies continue to propose new programs, activities, and capabilities, priorities and annual crosscutting reviews are particularly important to better assure that funds are not allocated to duplicative activities and functions to combat terrorism.

Related GAO Products

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997).

Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management Structure of Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-91, June 11, 1997).

State Department: Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-167, May 20, 1997).

Aviation Security: FAA’s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices (GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997).

Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection Devices (GAO/RCED-97-119R, Apr. 24, 1997).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies (GAO/NSIAD-97-95, Apr. 15, 1997).

Federal Law Enforcement: Investigative Authority and Personnel at 13 Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-154, Sept. 30, 1996).

Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-151, Sept. 11, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).

Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996).

Passports and Visas: Status of Efforts to Reduce Fraud (GAO/NSIAD-96-99, May 9, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27, 1996).

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89, Mar. 8, 1996).

Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and International Challenges (GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994).

Nuclear Security: Improving Correction of Security Deficiencies at DOE’s Weapons Facilities (GAO/RCED-93-10, Nov. 16, 1992).

Nuclear Security: Weak Internal Controls Hamper Oversight of DOE’s Security Program (GAO/RCED-92-146, June 29, 1992).

Electricity Supply: Efforts Underway to Improve Federal Electrical Disruption Preparedness (GAO/RCED-92-125, Apr. 20, 1992).

Economic Sanctions: Effectiveness as Tools of Foreign Policy (GAO/NSIAD-92-106, Feb. 19, 1992).

State Department: Management Weaknesses in the Security Construction Program (GAO/NSIAD-92-2, Nov. 29, 1991).

Chemical Weapons: Physical Security for the U.S. Chemical Stockpile (GAO/NSIAD-91-200, May 15, 1991).

State Department: Status of the Diplomatic Security Construction Program (GAO/NSIAD-91-143BR, Feb. 20, 1991).

International Terrorism: FBI Investigates Domestic Activities to Identify Terrorists (GAO/GGD-90-112, Sept. 9, l990).

International Terrorism: Status of GAO’s Review of the FBI’s International Terrorism Program (GAO/T-GGD-89-31, June 22, 1989).

Embassy Security: Background Investigations of Foreign Employees (GAO/NSIAD-89-76, Jan. 5, 1989).

Aviation Security: FAA’s Assessments of Foreign Airports (GAO/RCED-89-45, Dec. 7, 1988).

Domestic Terrorism: Prevention Efforts in Selected Federal Courts and Mass Transit Systems (GAO/PEMD-88-22, June 23, 1988).

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