Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern Command's Coordination with States and the National Guard Bureau, but Gaps Remain
Released: 2008-04-16T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOD realized the need for a more integrated civilian and military response capability for any future attack on the United States. In response, DOD established NORTHCOM in October 2002 to provide command and control in homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities within its area of responsibility (see fig. 1).

NORTHCOM’s mission consists of (1) homeland defense and (2) civil support. It is important to understand the relationships between NORTHCOM’s missions and homeland security. Homeland defense and homeland security are not synonymous. Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. The DHS is the primary federal agency for homeland security issues. DHS’s responsibilities extend beyond terrorism to preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a wide range of matter domestic disasters and other emergencies. DOD contributes to homeland security through its military missions overseas and homeland defense and civil support operations.

While the terrorism portion of homeland security is concerned with preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, DOD’s concerns include responding to conventional and unconventional attacks by any adversary as well as terrorists. When DOD is designated as the primary federal agency by the President or Secretary of Defense for conducting military missions to defend the people or territory of the homeland, it is considered to be homeland defense. Homeland defense is the protection of U.S territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression. DOD activity in support of a National Response Framework primary or coordinating agency is considered to be civil support. Civil support is DOD support to U.S. civilian authorities, such as DHS, for domestic emergencies, both natural and man-made, and includes the use of DOD personnel—federal military forces and DOD’s career civilian and contractor personnel—and DOD agency and component resources. Because these missions are complex and interrelated, they require significant interagency coordination.

NORTHCOM’s Homeland Defense Mission

To carry out its homeland defense mission, NORTHCOM is to conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States. According to Joint Publication 3-27, DOD is the primary federal agency for homeland defense operations, and NORTHCOM is the combatant command responsible for commanding and coordinating a response to a homeland defense incident. In this case, the chain of command is relatively straightforward: other DOD commands and federal agencies provide support to NORTHCOM for homeland defense operations (see fig. 2). Although NORTHCOM has few forces assigned to its command, during an incident it requests forces through the Joint Staff.

The Joint Staff will direct Joint Forces Command, which is DOD’s joint force provider, to assign appropriate and available forces to NORTHCOM. The President may decide to federalize National Guard units in order to provide these forces.

While the states do not have an operational role in homeland defense, NORTHCOM’s homeland defense mission includes protecting the territory or domestic population of the United States as well as the infrastructure or other assets determined by the Secretary of Defense to be critical to national security. In order to protect these critical assets, NORTHCOM must maintain awareness of the environment in which it may be operating, including critical infrastructure locations relevant to its operations.

NORTHCOM’s Civil Support Mission

NORTHCOM’s second mission is civil support or defense support of civil authorities. Civil support missions include domestic disaster relief operations for incidents such as fires, hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. Such support also includes counterdrug operations and management of the consequences of a terrorist incident employing a weapon of mass destruction. DOD is not the primary federal agency for such missions (unless so designated by the President) and thus provides defense support of civil authorities only when (1) state, local, and other federal resources are overwhelmed or unique military capabilities are required; (2) assistance is requested by the primary federal agency; and (3) NORTHCOM is directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

Civil support is based on a tiered response to an incident; that is, incidents must be managed at the lowest jurisdictional levels and supported by additional response capabilities when needed (see fig. 3). Local and county governments respond to emergencies daily using their own resources and rely on mutual aid agreements and other types of assistance agreements with neighboring governments when they need additional resources. For example, county and local authorities are likely to have the resources needed to adequately respond to a small-scale incident, such as a local flood, and therefore will not request additional resources. For larger-scale incidents, when resources are overwhelmed, local and county governments will request assistance from the state. States have capabilities, such as the National Guard, that can help communities respond and recover. If additional resources are required, the state may request assistance from other states through interstate mutual aid agreements, such as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). If an incident is beyond the community and state capabilities, the governor can seek federal assistance. The federal government has a wide array of capabilities and resources that can be made available to assist state and local agencies to respond to incidents.

Overall coordination of federal incident management activities, other than those conducted for homeland defense, is generally the responsibility of DHS. Within DHS and as an executive agent for the National Preparedness System, FEMA is responsible for coordinating and integrating the preparedness of federal, state, local, tribal, and nongovernmental entities.

In accordance with the National Response Framework and applicable laws including the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), various federal departments or agencies may play primary, coordinating, or supporting roles, based on their authorities and resources and the nature of the threat or incident. In some instances, national defense assets may be needed to assist FEMA or another agency in the national response to an incident. Defense resources are committed after approval by the Secretary of Defense or at the direction of the President. When deciding to commit defense resources, officials consider military readiness, appropriateness of the circumstances, and whether the response is in accordance with the law. For example, the Posse Comitatus Act allows military forces to provide civil support, but these forces generally cannot become directly involved in law enforcement.

When it is determined that defense assistance is appropriate and is requested by FEMA, NORTHCOM is responsible for leading DOD’s response. In the same manner as is applicable to homeland defense, NORTHCOM generally operates through established joint task forces that are subordinate to the command. In most cases, support will be localized, limited, and specific. When the scope of the disaster is reduced to the point where the primary federal agency can again assume full control and management without military assistance, NORTHCOM will exit.

NORTHCOM’s Planning for Homeland Defense and Support of Civil Authorities

In order to prepare for its homeland defense and civil support missions, NORTHCOM has developed plans based on various incident scenarios, including 14 of DHS’s 15 national planning scenarios. NORTHCOM develops contingency plans to outline its role in potential disaster situations. NORTHCOM currently develops strategic-level concept plans rather than more detailed operational plans, because the potential threats that it is planning for are varied and nonspecific, ranging from terrorist threats to hurricanes and wildfires. NORTHCOM uses the adaptive planning process for developing its plans—that is, the joint capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require. Interagency coordination is a key part of the plan development process in adaptive planning.

States’ and NGB’s Roles in Preparing for Homeland Defense and Civil Support

In each state, the National Guard plays a crucial role in preparing for both homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities, in its dual roles as a national reserve force for the Army and Air Force and as a state militia. As the only military force shared by the states and the federal government, the National Guard provides a natural and effective bridge to accomplish collaboration between NORTHCOM and key state partners. The National Guard’s federal mission is to provide trained units available for active duty in the armed forces, in the time of war or national emergency, and at such times as national security may require. NORTHCOM is responsible for the planning, exercising, and command and control of the National Guard for its federal missions conducted under the command and control of the President within its area of responsibility.

As a state militia, the National Guard of each state responds to state emergencies, including natural disasters, civil disturbances, and acts of terrorism, and provides support to law enforcement in the war on drugs under the command and control of the state governor. The governor commands the National Guard through the TAG, who heads the joint force headquarters of the state. According to NGB officials, the state’s joint force headquarters’ mission is to maintain trained and equipped National Guard forces and to provide expertise and situational awareness to facilitate the integration of federal and state activities.

NGB is a joint activity of DOD, with unique statutory, regulatory, and policy-based responsibilities and authorities, including serving as the official channel of communications between the Departments of the Army and the Air Force and the states on National Guard matters. NGB administers DOD, Department of the Army, and Department of the Air Force policies, programs, and plans pertaining to National Guard matters and facilitates the integration of federal and state activities, including facilitating mutual support among the states. Although NGB does not command or control forces, it assists the states in the organization, maintenance, and operation of their Army National Guard and Air National Guard units located in the states and coordinates the movement of nonfederalized National Guard forces. NGB also maintains and provides information on National Guard matters affecting homeland defense and civil support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the combatant commands, including NORTHCOM; and others. During civil support missions, NGB provides policy guidance and facilitates National Guard assistance to the TAGs. Because of their interrelated missions, coordination between NORTHCOM and NGB is critical in planning for homeland defense and civil support.

NORTHCOM Has Ongoing Efforts to Improve Coordination with the States and NGB in Planning for Its Missions

In analyzing the survey results as well as during meetings with NORTHCOM and NGB officials, we found that NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to improve coordination with the states and NGB in planning for its missions and responding to requests for civil support missions. As part of NORTHCOM’s strategic vision, its goal is to facilitate the synchronization of national, state, and local assets and capabilities to defend the nation and support civilian authorities. We found six areas in which NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to improve coordination with the states and NGB, ranging from including states in its exercises to a new state engagement strategy for reaching out directly to state leaders. Some of these efforts are intended to help NORTHCOM plan for both of its missions, while others are intended to improve how it responds to requests for civil support.

States’ Participation in NORTHCOM’s Exercises Enhances Coordination

NORTHCOM conducts or participates in training exercises to improve planning for its missions and responses to requests for civil support. The command conducts two large-scale exercises—Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Shield—and participates in over 30 smaller regional, state, and local exercises annually to help potential responders prepare for man-made and natural disasters. Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Shield alternate between emphasizing the homeland defense mission and the civil support mission. Each training event exercises one of the key missions while at the same time including elements of the other. Practicing and training for emergency responses together not only helps to identify problem areas or lessons learned, but also helps state responders to build relationships with NORTHCOM and improve coordination. One TAG told us that he did not have any communications with NORTHCOM prior to his state’s participation in Ardent Sentry, but has since developed a close working relationship with NORTHCOM officials. Table 1 shows the percentage of states participating in Ardent Sentry, Vigilant Shield, or other events, according to our survey of TAGs.

NORTHCOM’s Training and Exercise Directorate continues to work with state and National Guard entities to plan and conduct exercises and to develop a robust Vigilant Guard regional exercise program.

Including NGB in the Development of NORTHCOM’s Plans Provides National Guard Perspective

NORTHCOM has been informally including NGB in reviewing its plans, in the early stages, during concept development workshops, and during final coordination. NGB officials told us that regularly scheduled conferences between the planning directorates at NORTHCOM and NGB have greatly enhanced coordination over the past few months. In addition, NGB officials confirmed that NORTHCOM has been routinely providing its draft plans to them for comment/review to get the National Guard’s perspectives. This review process will be formalized in the next few months, when NGB becomes an officially recognized member of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). JPEC coordinates DOD efforts and ensures unity in the planning and execution of joint operations, and includes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, the combatant commands and their component commands, sub-unified commands, joint task forces, and defense agencies.

Participation of TAGs and Their Staffs in Joint Force Orientation Program Provides Information on NORTHCOM’s Supporting Role to the States

NORTHCOM has also established a Joint Force Orientation Program to improve the states’ knowledge on NORTHCOM’s role in response to requests for civil support. Several TAGs reported that their and their staffs’ involvement in this program enhanced coordination with NORTHCOM. The primary objectives of this program are to facilitate a mutual understanding of joint operational concepts and information sharing between NORTHCOM and the states to help clarify NORTHCOM’s supporting role to the states and to improve overall coordination. At the time of our audit, the Joint Force Orientation Program was organized into three phases. The first phase included an overall command briefing and individual briefings from each NORTHCOM directorate, including discussions about NORTHCOM’s training and exercise programs. The second phase of the Joint Force Orientation Program discussed more in- depth information about NORTHCOM, NGB, and the Joint Forces Command. This phase generally covers warfighter doctrine and operational application, including joint concepts and terminology, joint operational environment, command relationships, joint planning, and joint logistics. The third phase of the program is designed to be state specific, where the process for requesting federal assistance is reviewed and issues—such as intelligence sharing and oversight, mobile communications, planning, and logistics—are discussed in more detail. NORTHCOM provided us with the most recent participation data, and we found that all of the states within NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility have received the first phase of Joint Force Orientation Program training, 46 states have received phase 2 training, and 19 states have received phase 3 training. NORTHCOM told us that it is working toward providing phase 3 training to the remaining states. The willingness of the TAGs to participate and send their staffs to this training shows how useful the information exchanged and relationships developed with NORTHCOM during the training are to them.

Hurricane and Wildfire Conferences Are Beginning to Build Effective Relationships between Participating Officials

Other ongoing efforts include NORTHCOM’s weekly teleconferences throughout the hurricane season to coordinate with local, state, and federal partners and discuss potential storms; available resources, including EMAC; and potential needs or unique capabilities that DOD may be asked to provide. For instance, if a hurricane is projected to affect the mid-Atlantic states, officials in those states may inquire about resources potentially needed—such as helicopters, trucks, or other equipment—in advance of the incident, thereby helping affected states to more effectively plan their responses. Similarly, NORTHCOM monitors wildfire activity and sets up teleconferences with the National Interagency Fire Center—which includes state emergency response officials—if it appears NORTHCOM may need to assist in fighting the fires. As a result of this frequent interaction, NORTHCOM has begun to build more productive and effective relationships with the participating states and agencies.

Locating Defense Coordinating Officers in the FEMA Regional Offices Improves NORTHCOM’s Relationship with State and Local Officials

As part of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, NORTHCOM has placed a defense coordinating officer (DCO) in each of FEMA’s 10 regional offices and placed greater emphasis on the DCOs’ mission (see fig. 4). DCOs are senior-level military officers with joint experience and training on the National Response Framework, defense support to civil authorities, and DHS’s National Incident Management System. They are responsible for assisting civil authorities when requested by FEMA, providing liaison support and requirements validation, and serving as single points of contact for state, local, and other federal authorities that need DOD support. DCOs work closely with federal, state, and local officials to determine what unique DOD capabilities can be used to assist in mitigating the effects of a natural or man-made disaster. According to TAGs, FEMA, and NORTHCOM officials, placing DCOs in all of the FEMA regional offices and emphasizing the DCOs’ mission has improved NORTHCOM’s relationships and coordination with state and local officials, as well as with FEMA in day-to-day planning and when an incident occurs. For example, in response to FEMA’s request during the California wildfires in October 2007, NORTHCOM’s subordinate command, Army Forces North, deployed the Region 9 DCO to support the Joint Field Office in Pasadena, California and assess and coordinate defense support of civil authorities with FEMA. Based on the requirements identified by state and federal officials in consultation with the DCO, DOD and the National Guard deployed six aircraft equipped with the Modular Air Firefighting System to California to assist in fighting wildfires.

U.S.

NORTHCOM’s New State Engagement Strategy Is Intended to Build Relationships with States

While NORTHCOM relies on NGB as its channel of communications for National Guard matters, NORTHCOM’s commander believes that developing relationships directly with states will contribute to success in saving lives, protecting infrastructure, and promoting a resilient society. NORTHCOM is currently developing a state engagement strategy to build relationships with appropriate state leadership, including governors, TAGs, state homeland security advisors, and emergency managers of major metropolitan areas. As part of this strategy, NORTHCOM’s Commander has personally met with several state governors and TAGs to discuss NORTHCOM’s roles and missions and determine how they can coordinate when responding to an incident. For example, the Commander met with TAGs from the northeast region in November 2007 to discuss both military coordination and interagency coordination for regional domestic operations. The draft strategy also recognizes the importance of NORTHCOM working with the states in close coordination with the organizations such as NGB and DHS/FEMA, which are responsible for coordinating with the states regarding federal matters related to incident management. NGB officials told us that working with the states will provide NORTHCOM with a greater appreciation for the role and authority of the governor and sensitivity to the sovereignty and rights of states. While the strategy is designed to build the relationships needed for national planning and execution, it does not include established and thorough processes for involving states in the development of NORTHCOM’s plans, obtaining state emergency response plans, or facilitating integrated intergovernmental planning.

Gaps Remain in NORTHCOM’s Coordination with the States and NGB

We identified three areas in which there are gaps in coordination with the states and NGB. First, NORTHCOM officials involve the states minimally in the development of NORTHCOM’s major homeland defense and civil support plans, and they are not required to do so. Second, NORTHCOM generally was not familiar with state emergency response plans and capabilities and has no established and thorough process for gaining access to this information. Third, a 2005 memorandum of agreement, which is intended to provide the procedures by which NORTHCOM and NGB interact, does not clearly define each agency’s roles and responsibilities for planning for homeland defense and civil support. Improvements in these areas may help to effectively align NORTHCOM’s efforts with other national efforts, as required by the new annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 on national planning; help NORTHCOM to manage its overall risk; and better ensure that it will be able to fully respond when called upon to perform either of its missions.

NORTHCOM Only Minimally Involves States in Planning

Although the majority of TAGs are familiar to varying degrees with NORTHCOM’s homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities plans (see table 2), in our survey less than 25 percent reported that they were involved in developing and reviewing these plans (see table 3). NORTHCOM is not required by DOD specifically to involve states in the development and review of its homeland defense and support of civil authorities plans. However, its strategic vision set forth in its Concept of Operations and the recent annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 emphasize that plans and capabilities should be synchronized at the national, state, and local levels. According to several TAGs, NORTHCOM should coordinate more with state and local organizations, particularly with the National Guard, to develop a good planning and operational relationship and to enhance the ability of all organizations to plan and respond rapidly in a crisis. We previously reported on the need to include state and local jurisdictions in the development of response plans because they are key stakeholders and would be on the front lines if an incident occurs.

In the case of homeland defense, NORTHCOM planners told us that, as the official channel of communication for National Guard related matters, NGB provides the states’ perspectives when commenting on NORTHCOM’s plans. The planners also said that further state involvement in the development of NORTHCOM’s plan is not required because (1) this is a strategic-level concept plan that does not require such detail and (2) NORTHCOM is the lead during a homeland defense incident. NGB officials told us that as requested in NORTHCOM homeland defense plan, they have collected and reviewed states’ supporting homeland defense plans and, to the extent possible, have attempted to represent these perspectives when commenting on NORTHCOM’s homeland defense plan. However, an NGB planning official told us that the states have differing perspectives, and NORTHCOM could better learn about these differences by reviewing the individual state plans. In addition, while NGB provides information of National Guard capabilities, the states may have other capabilities and requirements that NORTHCOM should be aware of. By only relying on NGB, NORTHCOM may not be able to maintain awareness of the environment in which the command may be operating, including critical infrastructure locations relevant to its operations, which is important to fully carrying out its homeland defense mission.

In the case of civil support and as outlined in the National Response Framework, because NORTHCOM plays a supporting role to other federal agencies and subsequently to state and local governments, NORTHCOM officials told us that they are starting to reach out directly to states to obtain their perspectives and incorporate these into future revisions of NORTHCOM’s defense support of civil authorities plan. In order to effectively develop a civil support plan, NORTHCOM needs to know what its requirements may be. DOD recognizes that these requirements are driven both by the capabilities gaps of the primary federal agencies and those of the state and local governments. In either homeland defense or civil support, increasing the current level of state involvement in the development of NORTHCOM’s plans could help integrate intergovernmental planning for catastrophic incidents, enhance overall coordination, and help ensure that NORTHCOM’s plans for its missions and responses to incidents are as effective as possible.

NORTHCOM Lacks Familiarity with State Emergency Response Plans and May Not Be Aware of Capabilities and Potential Gaps

We found that NORTHCOM generally was not familiar with state emergency response plans and has not obtained detailed information on states’ plans and capabilities to determine the specific challenges it may face in conducting homeland defense or civil support operations. According to our survey, 54 percent of the TAGs believe that NORTHCOM is not at all or only slightly familiar with their states’ plan (see table 4). In written comments in our survey, several TAGs reported that NORTHCOM should be more familiar with state emergency response plans, and should determine how best to support the states’ plans and, where appropriate, incorporate these plans to ensure a unified effort. Developing a synchronized and coordinated planning capability at all levels of government is important for a coordinated national response to domestic incidents. In part, NORTHCOM is not more familiar with these plans because it has no established and thorough process regarding coordination with the states or for gaining access to emergency response plans, and it is not specifically required by DOD to obtain information on state emergency response plans or determine state and local capabilities and potential resource gaps. NORTHCOM planners told us that they do not need access to state emergency response plans because they are doing strategic-level concept plans and this level of detail would be more appropriate for tactical level planning, such as planning done by NORTHCOM’s subordinate commands, like Army Forces North. However, NGB and FEMA officials told us that one of NORTHCOM’s biggest challenges is its current inability to anticipate the capabilities and requirements of state and local governments during a civil support incident because of the lack of advanced planning and coordination between NORTHCOM, states, and local governments. Furthermore, NORTHCOM officials told us that the complexity of the planning involved for a large-scale disaster is such that even if states can adequately plan for the resources they will need, they do not always have adequate multistate plans to integrate the state, local, federal, and nongovernmental responses. By not obtaining and using information on state plans and capabilities, NORTHCOM increases the risk that it will not be adequately prepared to respond to an incident with the needed resources, including the types, numbers, and timing of capabilities (trained personnel and equipment).

One of NORTHCOM’s subordinate commands, JTF-CS, has been collecting state emergency response plans so that if called upon to provide assistance in a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident, its Commander will have as much advance information as possible regarding state plans, resources, and potential areas where assistance may be required. JTF-CS found that some state and local governments are reluctant to share their plans because they fear that DOD will “grade” their plans or that potential capability gaps will be made public, with an accompanying political cost. A NORTHCOM official told us that there will always be some tension between the states and DOD and other federal agencies as a result of the nation’s constitutional structure. JTF-CS is therefore extremely careful about how it shares its emergency plan analyses and has made progress in gaining access to these plans through DHS.

DHS has collected and assessed state emergency response plans as part of a nationwide plan review to determine the status of catastrophic planning for states and 75 of the nation’s largest urban areas. Participation in the review was a prerequisite for receipt of fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant funds. The review concluded that no individual plan or resource base can fully absorb and respond to a catastrophe and that unsystematic planning and the absence of an integrated planning system is a national operational vulnerability. The annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, issued in December 2007, directs the establishment of a comprehensive approach to national planning through an integrated planning system. This system is to include, among other things, a description of the process that (1) links regional, state, local, and tribal plans, planning cycles, and processes and allows these plans to inform the development of federal plans and (2) fosters the integration of such plans and allows for state, local, and tribal capability assessments to feed into federal plans. DHS may, therefore, be one source from which NORTHCOM could obtain information on state emergency response plans and capabilities.

Given its relationship with the states, NGB could also be a conduit for NORTHCOM to share its plans with states and obtain information on states plans and capabilities. In addition, NGB officials suggested that emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLO) could be a potential conduit for NORTHCOM and states to share plans. EPLOs are senior reserve officers from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps who represent the federal military in each state and in each of the 10 FEMA regional offices. EPLOs coordinate the provision of military personnel, equipment, and supplies to support the emergency relief and cleanup efforts of civil authorities. According to NGB officials, expanding the EPLO program to include sharing plans with states would provide a closer link between NORTHCOM and the states without the sensitivity of state sovereignty issues. The DCOs who are also located in FEMA’s 10 regional offices could potentially serve as NORTHCOM’s points of contact for the EPLOs.

NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve the coordination of its homeland defense and civil support plans and operations with federal agencies. However, in its role either in support of other federal agencies or as the primary agency in homeland defense incidents, NORTHCOM does not have adequate information on states’ plans and capabilities. By minimally involving the states in its homeland defense and civil support plans and not becoming familiar with information on states’ emergency response plans and capabilities, NORTHCOM increases the risk that it may not be prepared with the needed resources to respond to an incident. These gaps may be attributable in part to the fact that NORTHCOM does not have an established and thorough process for cooperating and interacting with the states. One model of such a process is NORTHCOM’s security cooperation plans with Canada and Mexico, since the states are each separate governments within the federal system. For example, NORTHCOM’s cooperation plan with Canada and Mexico outlines a strategy for planning, assessing, and executing security objectives and other strategic priorities. These objectives include advancing common interests, reducing impediments to cooperation, encouraging improved capabilities and willingness to operate in coalition, and improving combined homeland defense capabilities. Without a similar kind of cooperation plan for the states within its area of responsibility, NORTHCOM cannot optimally involve the TAGs and other state or local officials in its planning activities and develop a process for obtaining and using information on state emergency plans and capabilities. Moreover, without such a cooperation plan, NORTHCOM is not likely to reduce confusion, facilitate effective planning, and facilitate effective and efficient responses to incidents.

NORTHCOM and NGB Responsibilities for Homeland Defense and Civil Support Are Not Clearly Defined

DHS’s National Response Framework and NORTHCOM’s Concept of Operations both emphasize that NORTHCOM should coordinate with federal, state, and local partners before, during, and after an incident. Coordination with NGB is particularly important, because NGB has experience working with state and local authorities during incidents and it functions as NORTHCOM’s formal link to the states. We previously reported that as with preparing for and responding to any type of disaster, leadership roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and effective decision making. Furthermore, we reported that without clearly defined roles and responsibilities, the potential remains for confusion and gaps or duplication by the combatant commands relative to other agencies. The National Strategy for Homeland Security also emphasizes that a lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities across all levels of government can lead to gaps in the national response and delay the ability to provide life-saving support when needed.

In July 2005, NORTHCOM and NGB signed a memorandum of agreement outlining their command and coordination relationship. This memorandum, which is intended to provide the procedures by which the two entities interact, broadly establishes that NORTHCOM and NGB “will coordinate on policy, program and planning actions related to missions and requirements affecting the National Guard.” The memorandum further provides for the location of a small NGB office at NORTHCOM to advise NORTHCOM’s Commander regarding National Guard-related issues. The mission of this office is to advise and assist NORTHCOM’s Commander on all matters involving the National Guard, provide a conduit to NGB leaders and staff, and promote integration of National Guard priorities and capabilities into NORTHCOM’s plans and operations. The staff members of this office provide input to numerous requests for information from NORTHCOM. This office is not intended to serve as the only point of coordination between NORTHCOM and NGB. Officials told us that there is no formal process in place for the NORTHCOM National Guard Office to coordinate with NGB headquarters. Such a process could improve coordination between the NGB liaison office and NGB headquarters.

Our analysis of the memorandum, NORTHCOM’s Concept of Operations, the regulation describing the organization and function of NGB, and other documents showed that there is no detailed guidance on NORTHCOM’s and NGB’s roles and responsibilities for homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities. Clearly defined responsibilities help to ensure unity of effort, prevent duplication, and enable efficient use of resources. As a result of the lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities between NORTHCOM and NGB, we found several instances in which there was confusion and duplicate or potentially wasted efforts. For example, some TAGs survey responses indicated that because responsibilities are not clearly defined, both NGB and NORTHCOM are requesting the same information during an incident. In addition, NORTHCOM’s homeland defense plan required NGB to collect state homeland defense plans and make them available to NORTHCOM. NGB compiled and reviewed these plans from the states and territories within NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility and made them available to NORTHCOM on its Web portal. However, NORTHCOM planning officials told us that they did not request that NGB compile these plans and that, in fact, they do not have a need for state supporting plans because such plans will not affect how NORTHCOM’s strategic-level homeland defense concept plan is written. Nevertheless, NGB spent resources collecting information that has not been used by NORTHCOM. As discussed above, we believe NORTHCOM officials should be reviewing these plans to ensure that they have sufficient awareness of the environment in which they may be operating to fully carry out the command’s homeland defense mission.

In addition, we found that NGB has developed a Joint Capabilities Database that includes all National Guard capabilities and has made this database available for NORTHCOM’s use. However, NORTHCOM officials told us that rather than use the database, they prefer to rely on NGB staff to provide them National Guard readiness and capabilities data. NGB officials also told us that they have not encouraged NORTHCOM to use the database thus far because they are still finalizing the procedure for maintaining and updating the database with information from all states and territories. The officials said that they expect to have these issues worked out within the next few months in advance of the hurricane season and to begin to encourage NORTHCOM to make use of the database. NGB’s goal with the database is to provide a national look at the National Guard’s capabilities.

Without clearly defined lines of coordination and roles and responsibility, federal efforts may not be used in the most effective and efficient manner. This is increasingly important as DOD is currently developing a database of federal emergency response capabilities, including those for active and reserve DOD units and National Guard capabilities in each state, and FEMA is currently developing a list of organizations and functions within DOD that may be used to provide support to civil authorities during natural or man-made disasters. Coordinating all of these efforts will be critical to ensuring the efficient use of federal resources as well as to reduce the risk of potential capabilities gaps.

An NGB official told us that NORTHCOM and NGB have not revised the 2005 memorandum of agreement to more clearly define their responsibilities because they were waiting for the National Guard Empowerment Act, which was partially incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act for 2008, to be signed into law and, subsequently, for a new NGB charter to be developed and issued by the Secretary of Defense. The National Guard Empowerment Act includes provisions that may enhance the level of coordination between NORTHCOM and NGB. For example, the Secretary of Defense is required to prepare a plan coordinating the use of the National Guard and members of the armed forces on active duty when responding to an incident and include protocols for DOD, NGB, and the governors of the states to carry out operations in coordination with one another. An NGB official told us that the process of preparing this plan will require more coordination between NORTHCOM and NGB. More important, NGB’s charter, which is currently undergoing revision based on the new act, potentially could resolve a number of ambiguities by more clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of NGB and its relationships with other agencies, such as NORTHCOM. Further, the NGB official told us that the revised charter will greatly simplify negotiations of a revised memorandum between the two agencies. Without clearly defined responsibilities for NORTHCOM and NGB, there is the potential for a lack of effective coordination between the two agencies and duplicative or wasted efforts. Clearly identifying roles and responsibilities is increasingly important because responding to a major disaster in the United States—natural or man-made—is a shared responsibility of many agencies across all levels of government and cannot be effectively accomplished by one agency. Without effective interagency coordination and planning and clearly defined roles and responsibilities, there is a risk that NORTHCOM’s, NGB’s, and other nationwide efforts to respond to an incident may be fragmented and uncoordinated, such as in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.

Conclusions

Within the federal government, there is an increasing realization that the nation needs to integrate not just the response to an incident, but also the plans of many entities at all the levels involved in responding to such incidents. This planning integration will help ensure that when the federal government responds, its response will be as effective as possible. NORTHCOM’s recent efforts to coordinate with states and NGB have helped address some of the uncertainty in the homeland defense and civil support planning process and have improved NORTHCOM’s ability to coordinate in the event of an actual incident. However, without an established and thorough process for requesting, obtaining, and using information on state emergency plans and capabilities—whether from coordination with DHS or NGB or from direct interaction with states— NORTHCOM may be missing opportunities to better plan its missions and manage its risk in a more informed manner. Moreover, NORTHCOM may not be fully prepared to support states, resulting in ineffective planning and fragmented, uncoordinated responses to incidents.

Given that NORTHCOM and NGB both have increasingly important responsibilities for homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities, it is imperative that these entities work together to effectively prepare for DOD’s response to an incident. Without fully and clearly defined responsibilities for NORTHCOM and NGB, confusion and duplicative or potentially wasted efforts may result, causing an inefficient use of DOD resources during a time of increased military operations and a growing fiscal imbalance. Further, without clear guidance on their responsibilities, the risk is increased that these agencies’ responses to an incident may be ineffective and inefficient, potentially increasing response time and risking the safety of the U.S. population and infrastructure.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve NORTHCOM’s coordination with the states, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct NORTHCOM to develop an established and thorough process to guide its coordination with the states, including provisions for involving the states in NORTHCOM’s planning processes, obtaining information on state emergency response plans and capabilities, using such information to improve the development and execution of its concept plans.

To improve NORTHCOM’s coordination with NGB, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct NORTHCOM and NGB to revise the memorandum of agreement or develop an alternate document to include fully and clearly defined roles and responsibilities for NORTHCOM, NGB, and the NORTHCOM National Guard Office.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with the intent of our recommendations and discussed steps it is taking and planning to take to address the recommendations. DOD and FEMA also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report where appropriate.

In response to our recommendation that NORTHCOM develop an established and thorough process to guide its coordination with the states, DOD agreed that such a process should be developed to guide the coordination between local, state, and federal governments. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1 requires that DHS develop an integrated planning system consisting of a synchronized system of plans that integrates federal, state, and local operational capabilities to affect a coordinated national response. DOD told us that the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, the Joint Staff, NORTHCOM, and NGB are currently in coordination with DHS in developing the integrated planning system. We believe that developing this system would meet the intent of our recommendation if it provides NORTHCOM with an established and thorough process for requesting, obtaining, and using information on state emergency plans and capabilities and improves the development and execution of their concept plans, thereby helping NORTHCOM to manage its risk in a more informed manner.

DOD agreed with our recommendation that NORTHCOM and NGB revise their memorandum of agreement or develop an alternate document to include fully and clearly defined roles and responsibilities for NORTHCOM, NGB, and the NORTHCOM National Guard Office and stated that a revision to the memorandum is currently being coordinated. We believe that providing clear guidance on roles and responsibilities will help to ensure that these agencies’ responses to an incident will be effective and efficient, potentially reducing response time and enhancing the safety of the U.S. population and infrastructure.

DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix III.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Questionnaire and Survey Results

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

In conducting this review, we focused our scope on U.S. Northern Command’s (NORTHCOM) coordination with the states and the National Guard Bureau (NGB). We excluded NORTHCOM’s coordination with other federal agencies and organizations and nongovernmental organizations because this is addressed in a companion report. Our review focused on NORTHCOM’s coordination efforts occurring since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In addressing our objectives, we interviewed and obtained information and related documents from officials at the following locations: NORTHCOM Headquarters, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.

Joint Task Force-Civil Support, Fort Monroe, Virginia U.S. Army North, Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol Region, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

NGB, Arlington, Virginia Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Washington, D.C.

U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, D.C.

We also conducted semistructured telephone interviews with the state adjutants general, also known as TAGs, from Florida, Indiana, Nebraska, and Washington.

To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM is coordinating with the states, we surveyed the TAGs who are within NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility. We asked respondents about their familiarity and involvement in NORTHCOM’s homeland defense plan and the defense support of civil authorities plan. We also asked about their experiences in working and communicating with NORTHCOM, including their participation in NORTHCOM exercises and involvement of NORTHCOM in their state exercises. The questionnaire and survey responses can be found in appendix I. We sent a questionnaire to TAGs of all 49 states in NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility and the District of Columbia.

The self-administered electronic survey was sent via electronic mail to the TAGs and their chiefs of staff. More specifically, we sent the questionnaire by e-mail in an attached Microsoft Word form that respondents could return electronically after marking checkboxes or entering narrative responses into open answer boxes. Alternatively, respondents could return it by mail after printing the form and completing it by hand. We sent the original electronic questionnaire on April 4, 2007. We sent out reminder e-mail messages, with replacement surveys, at different time intervals to all nonrespondents in order to encourage a higher response rate. In addition, we made several courtesy telephone calls to nonrespondents to encourage their completion. All questionnaires were returned by September 19, 2007. We achieved a 100 percent response rate.

The survey used was not a sample survey because it included the universe of respondents. Therefore, the survey has no sampling errors. However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in interpreting a particular question, sources of information available to respondents, or entering data into a database or analyzing them can introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We took steps in developing the questionnaire, collecting the data, and analyzing them to minimize such nonsampling errors. For example, social science survey specialists designed the questionnaire in collaboration with GAO staff who had subject matter expertise. In addition to an internal expert technical review by GAO’s Survey Coordination Group, we pretested the survey with two TAGs by telephone to ensure that the questions were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to understand. Since there were relatively few changes based on the pretests and we were conducting surveys with the universe of respondents, we did not find it necessary to conduct additional pretests. Instead, changes to the content and format of the questionnaire were made after the pretests based on the feedback we received. When we analyzed the data, an independent analyst checked all computer programs. All data were double keyed during the data-entry process, and GAO staff verified a sample of the resulting data to ensure accuracy.

In addition to analyzing the frequency and distribution of marked checkbox survey responses, we also analyzed the open-ended narrative survey responses for trends and recurring themes. For instance, although we did not directly ask a question about the defense coordinating officers (DCO) now located in each FEMA region, the DCOs were cited several times by TAGs as improving their communications with NORTHCOM. When the TAGs were not in agreement or had different perspectives on issues, we also summarized conflicting responses to illustrate the complexity of NORTHCOM’s unique relationship with the states and any ongoing efforts to resolve these issues. For example, some TAGs believed that NGB should be the state’s primary channel of communication with NORTHCOM, but others disagreed.

To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM is coordinating with the states and NGB, we reviewed plans, guidance, and other documents, including the memorandum of agreement between NORTHCOM and NGB. In addition, we conducted semistructured interviews with officials from NORTHCOM and several of its subordinate commands, including the Joint Task Force-Civil Support, Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol Region, and Army Forces North, as well as officials from NGB headquarters and the NORTHCOM National Guard Office. We also conducted interviews with the officials from FEMA and DHS’s interagency Incident Management Planning Team. Additionally, we observed a major exercise (Ardent Sentry/Northern Edge) in the Indianapolis area in May 2007.

We conducted our review from April 2007 to April 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Lorelei St. James, Assistant Director; Yecenia Camarillo; Joanna Chan; Angela Jacobs; David Keefer; Joseph Kirschbaum; Joanne Landesman; Erin Noel; Terry Richardson; and Jena Whitley made key contributions to this report.

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