Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Developments and Implications
Released: 2005-04-14T00:00:00

Background

Kyrgyzstan is a small and poor country that gained independence in 1991 with the breakupof the Soviet Union. (1) Itwas long led by Askar Akayev, who initially was widely regarded as a reformer but in recent yearsappeared increasingly autocratic. Despite this, the country was still considered "the most open,progressive and cooperative in Central Asia," according to the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment. (2) TheUnited States has been interested in helping Kyrgyzstan to enhance its sovereignty and territorialintegrity, increase democratic participation and civil society, bolster economic reform anddevelopment, strengthen human rights, prevent weapons proliferation, and more effectively combattransnational terrorism and trafficking in persons and narcotics. The United States has pursued theseinterests throughout Central Asia, with special strategic attention to oil-rich Kazakhstan andregional-power Uzbekistan, and somewhat less to Kyrgyzstan. The significance of Kyrgyzstan tothe United States increased after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. TheU.S. military repaired and upgraded the air field at the Manas international airport for trans-shippingpersonnel, equipment, and supplies to support coalition operations in Afghanistan and the region. In early 2005, the base hosted about 800 U.S. and 100 Spanish troops. (3)

The Coup and Its Aftermath

Many people both inside and outside Kyrgyzstan were hopeful that the national legislativeelection on February 27, 2005 would strengthen political pluralism, easing the way for a peacefulhandover of executive power in late 2005 when President Akayev was expected to step down. Nearly 400 prominent politicians and businessmen and 40 parties (many united in blocs) ran for 75seats in the highly contentious race. Many in Kyrgyzstan thought it unseemly that the president'sand prime minister's children were running for seats, along with many other family members andfriends of high officials. Balloting resulted in the filling of less than half the seats, with run-offs heldon March 13 in districts where no one candidate received over 50% of the votes cast. On March 22,the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) announced that results for 71 districts were valid. Lessthan 10% of seats were won by opposition candidates, although there reportedly were many closeraces where they "lost" only by a few votes. These results incensed many in the opposition camp,who alleged massive vote fraud. An initial report by election observers from the Organization forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Parliament fueled this discontent bystating that serious irregularities had taken place, including the questionable exclusion of severalopposition candidates from running, biased state-controlled media and other heavy government useof administrative resources, and problematic voter lists. (4)

After opposition candidates won only two seats in the first round, opposition party-leddemonstrators called for a new election and for Akayev to resign. In southern Kyrgyzstan, protestorsstormed and occupied government facilities, including in the regional centers of Osh and Jalalabad. Many of these southerners (including a majority ethnic Uzbek community) viewed themselves asdiscriminated against both economically and politically by a central government dominated bynortherners. (5) Somecounter-demonstrations in support of the government also were reported. Protests widenedthroughout both the north and south in the wake of the March 13 run-off. Akayev hastily convenedthe new legislature immediately after the CEC announced voting results on March 22, and urged thepublic to focus on the upcoming planting season rather than a past election. He blamed foreignNGOs and religious extremists for the protests, and his spokesman warned that the unrest markedefforts by drug lords and terrorists to take power.

Akayev's Ouster

Kyrgyzstan's capital Bishkek remained relatively calm until an opposition rally on March 23was successfully dispersed by police and armed Akayev supporters. The next day, thousands ofangry demonstrators converged on government offices. According to one account, a violent attackon the protesters by some of Akayev's supporters enraged the demonstrators and they stormed andoccupied the presidential and other offices. Akayev fled the melee and he and his family soon flewto Moscow. Akayev's prime minister resigned. The protesters released opposition party leaderFeliks Kulov from prison, where he had been held on embezzlement charges that many observershad deemed politically motivated. Going to the occupied compound, he hailed the "revolution madeby the people." (6)

Indicative of the chaotic legal situation, the Kyrgyz Supreme Court on March 24 recognizedthe former legislature as still duly empowered. Deputies from the former legislature met that night. They were shocked by rampant looting in Bishkek, and appointed Kulov to oversee the Security,Interior (police), and Defense ministries. They also appointed opposition figure Kurmanbek Bakiyevacting prime minister, and the next morning named him acting president as well. Bakiyev quicklyproposed a provisional government composed of opposition politicians, most prominently RozaOtunbaeva as acting minister of foreign affairs; Adakhan Madumarov, acting deputy prime minister;and Azimbek Beknazarov, acting prosecutor-general (for further information on selected politicians,see the Appendix ). The old legislature wrangled with Bakiyev over the appointments, perhapsspurring him to decide to dispense with it and endorse the powers of the new legislature.

Over the weekend, the Constitutional Court, Bakiyev, Kulov, and a newly appointed headof the CEC proclaimed that the new legislature was constitutionally legitimate and should beempowered, although granting that twenty or more district races might need to be held again. Thenew legislature met on March 28 and elected Omurbek Tekebayev as speaker and reaffirmedBakiyev as prime minister and acting president. The interim government has announced that apresidential election will take place on July 10, 2005.

Akayev's formal resignation as president on April 4, 2005, was a major boost to thelegitimacy of the interim government. The resignation agreement called for Akayev to foreswearrunning for president again and for the new Kyrgyz authorities to respect existing law that grantsretired presidents immunity from prosecution. Russia pledged to assist the parties in honoring theircommitments. The Kyrgyz legislature accepted Akayev's resignation on April 11.

Among early policy decisions, Bakiyev on March 29 stated that he would combat corruptionthat siphons away investment capital and compromises the educational and legal systems. He alsoannounced that personnel in the former government responsible for electoral fraud and attacks ondemonstrators would be prosecuted, and that some property belonging to the Akayev family mightbe confiscated. Both Bakiyev and Otunbayeva stressed that Kyrgyzstan's foreign policy would notchange, including its close relations with Russia and the United States and the presence of theirmilitary bases in the country.

Implications for Kyrgyzstan and the Region

Observers remain divided on prospects for Kyrgyzstan, with some suggesting that it willcontinue to democratize because it has a relatively vibrant civil society, compared to the rest ofCentral Asia. Others are less optimistic, pointing to the economic development challenges facingKyrgyzstan and the high level of disaffection among its population. They also point to the socialfragility of a country where the north and south have differing interests and where even groundtransport back and forth is difficult during the winter because of mountainous terrain.

The main division among the groups vying for power and influence during the late Marchevents appeared to be between pro-Akayev regional, clan, and family groups -- which togetherconstituted the political and economic elite -- and other regional, clan, and family groups that feltdeprived of their share of political and economic power. Ethnic issues appeared at least initially lesssignificant, since many ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan joined other southerners in topplingthe regime. However, ethnic tensions remain of concern. Beyond their anti-Akayev stance anddemands for redistributing political and economic power, the opposition parties mostly lackwell-developed policies and strategic plans for the future of Kyrgyzstan. Some observers have raisedconcerns that interim government leaders are engaging in nepotism and other corrupt practicesrather than combating them.

Several commentators view the coup as involving two anti-regime groups, the dispossessedand the political opposition. To some degree, the former are younger and the latter are older. Theformer were the active agents in taking over government offices, and reportedly were motivatedmore by poverty and unemployment than by opposition politics. Otunbayeva stressed that "mainlypoor people" rather than party stalwarts stormed the government complex on March 24. Thesecommentators warn that if a new government fails to remedy economic distress, more violence couldoccur. (7) Other analystshave placed less credence on the "poor people" theory, suggesting that at least some of the politicalopposition may have planned to forcibly oust Akayev on March 24. (8)

No one opposition leader appears to enjoy overwhelming public and elite support, althoughBakiyev's influence appears to have grown in recent months. (9) As was the case in Georgia,some of the most influential opposition leaders appear at least initially to be cooperating in runningthe government. However, the planned July presidential election appears to be accentuating tensionswithin the opposition camp, in particular between Bakiyev and Kulov. (10) Bakiyev, representingsouthern interests, seeks to enlarge his power base by wooing northern politicians (such asOtunbayeva and many of those elected to the new legislature). Such actions could reduce Kulov'sstrong appeal in the north. On the other hand, many of the oppositionists remain outside the Bakiyevgovernment, and at least some may unify to support Kulov in a prospective presidential race. Kulovalso is trying to woo former Akayev supporters by endorsing Akayev's immunity from prosecution. However, some pro-Akayev and northern interests have created the Akyykat (Justice) politicalmovement to challenge opposition candidates in the election.

Some observers raise the specter of a highly contentious and problematic presidential electionthat may deepen civil disorder. Another source of likely disorder may then come to the fore later inthe year if the 15-20 or more disputed legislative seats are re-contested, or if a new election of thewhole legislature is carried out. Unless these elections take place, however, the legislature willremain illegitimate in the eyes of many Kyrgyzstanis. Calls by some in Kyrgyzstan for rewriting theconstitution to remove what are viewed as illegitimate changes made during Akayev-orchestratedreferenda create still more uncertainties about Kyrgyzstan's stability during the next few months. Some optimistic observers suggest that the relatively bloodless March coup (3 deaths were reported)and reduced public passions after Akayev's ouster may bode well for the avoidance of violence orpolitical instability in the near term. (11)

Other observers who caution that political disorder may deepen suggest that Islamicextremists could bid to take power. They maintain that Hizb ut-Tahrir and other Islamic extremistgroups have gained members in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, and warn that such groups areanti-American and anti-Russian. (12)

Before the coup, there appeared to be some cooperation among ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeksin protests in Kyrgyzstan's south, in contrast to inter-communal violence there in the early 1990s. Many ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz joined in supporting ethnic Uzbek opposition leader Anvar Artykovin Osh. The emergence of such cooperation appeared buttressed by region-wide parades and othercelebrations to mark Akayev's overthrow. However, while some ethnic Uzbeks have supportedBakiyev, others have criticized him for appointing people to leading government posts whom theyregard as Kyrgyz nationalists and for not appointing enough ethnic Uzbeks. (13)

Regional Implications

The coup in Kyrgyzstan appears to have belied the views of some who asserted that therelatively authoritarian regimes in Central Asia would endure for the foreseeable future. The couphas galvanized opposition throughout the region and caused palpable unease among regional elites,who unanimously condemned it as a bloody putsch. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, forexample, told his citizenry that the coup was the work of 5,000 convicts who had escaped from jailand were looting Kyrgyzstan.

Some observers suggest that Kazakhstan might be the most likely candidate among theremaining Central Asian states where the opposition could influence political change, becauseNazarbayev has not completely crushed civil society. However, he appears to be taking measuresto head off a Kyrgyz-type coup. He has, for example, raised salaries and pensions. Among securitymeasures perhaps inspired by the Kyrgyz coup, the legislature quickly approved electoral lawchanges banning political rallies immediately after an election. Zamanbek Nurkadilov, a leader ofa newly formed opposition bloc, called in late March for Nazarbayev to step down when his termexpires in 2006, so that a democratic and non-violent leadership transition may occur. (14)

In late 2005, Tajikistan faces a planned presidential election which the incumbentauthoritarian leader Emomali Rakhmanov is expected to win. Although some political oppositionparties were legalized as part of the 1997 settlement of Tajikistan's civil war, they have facedincreasing harassment. The OSCE and the Tajik opposition have criticized the Rakhmanovgovernment for gross interference in past elections, including the February 2005 legislative race, butthe opposition has not reopened the civil war. Following the events in Kyrgyzstan, however, theTajik opposition may consider the conduct of the 2005 presidential race as a decision point for itsfuture cooperation with the government. (15)

In Uzbekistan, the government strictly censored news about the Kyrgyz coup, restrictedpublic gatherings in regions near Kyrgyzstan, and closed the border. President Islam Karimovharshly condemned the coup as an illegal act. Some Uzbek opposition leaders hailed events inKyrgyzstan as a call to arms in Uzbekistan, but most of the major opposition leaders are in exile andlittle political expression is allowed within the country.

The coup in Kyrgyzstan at least temporarily set back the already limited cooperation amongthe Central Asian states, with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan putting restrictions on cross-border tradeand travel, some of which remain in place. The regional presidents have contacted the interimleaders of Kyrgyzstan to establish working relations to replace initial strains. These strains at timesappeared to be exacerbated by statements made by the interim Kyrgyz leadership. While Otunbayevaat the end of March assured the regional leaders that "the guidelines of our diplomacy will notchange," it appeared that she may have been advocating the export of revolution when she added that"I hope that our neighbors will experience the same thing ... that the other countries in central Asiawill follow our path." (16)

While opposition forces in the region include those espousing democratic principles, theyalso include Islamic extremists and ultra-nationalists. It appears unlikely that Islamic extremistssoon could come to power, many observers argue. More likely, Islamic extremists could use aweakened Kyrgyzstan as a base to support affiliated groups throughout the Fergana Valley (whichis shared by Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan), thereby enhancing threats to the regimes ofthese countries. (17) Another possibility could be the rise to power of an ultra-nationalist regime. It such a regime cameto power, many observers suggest, there might well be increased discrimination against ethnicUzbeks, Russians, and other minorities that could lead to violence. Kyrgyzstan's foreign relationswith neighboring countries could also suffer if it pressed sensitive border claims or stoppedcooperating as a critical source of water supply for the downstream countries of Kazakhstan,Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.

Implications for Afghanistan

The coup does not appear to have affected the operations of the U.S. base in Kyrgyzstan insupport of coalition actions in Afghanistan. A more democratic and stable Kyrgyzstan might beconsidered for longer term pre-positioning of military supplies or other enhanced use. The changeof government in Kyrgyzstan could result in greater efforts to combat cross-border criminal, terrorist,and drug smuggling activities that conceivably could have a positive effect on Afghanistan. Drugtraffickers, however, could switch to other routes out of Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistanmight also cooperate in bolstering democracy in each other's countries and throughout the region.

Implications for Russia and Other Eurasian States

Some analysts view the coup in Kyrgyzstan as a harbinger of political transformations inother Soviet successor (Eurasian) states. Others view it as prompting tougher repression byauthoritarian leaders intent on retaining power. Russia quickly shifted in late March from harshcriticism of the Kyrgyz opposition to offers of aid to the interim government. This volte face wasmade easier after Bakiyev and others pledged that Kyrgyzstan would remain Russia's "strategicpartner." Some observers suggested that Russia had realized that its heavy-handed approach topolitical liberalization in Ukraine and Georgia was only making these countries more determined togravitate toward the West. Putin reflected this stance when he allowed that while "it is regretful thatonce more in a country in the post-Soviet area, political issues are decided by unlawful means," hehoped that he could work with the new leaders, many of whom he had amicably worked with in thepast. (18)

Although Putin appeared to be putting the best face on the impact of the coup on Russia'sregional influence, others in Russia raised concerns that the coup marked a further decline in Russianinfluence in other former Soviet successor states. Nikolai Bordyuzha, General Secretary of theCollective Security Treaty Organization of the Commonwealth of Independent States, (19) raised concerns that theCSTO had proved impotent, since Akayev had refused an offer of help from the CSTO in the daysbefore the coup, and the interim leaders of Kyrgyzstan also were ignoring it. Perhaps portendinggreater tension in U.S.-Russia relations, some state-owned television commentators in Russia allegedthat the coup was simply another example, after similar coups in Georgia and Ukraine, of U.S.meddling in Eurasia. Reflecting an ultranationalist perspective, one private Russian newspaper evendarkly warned that the U.S. goal was "direct control over Eurasia," including Russia, and that Russiaappeared to lack the political will to resist. (20)

Other authoritarian states in Eurasia have followed Uzbekistan's example and cracked downon civil society rather than liberalizing. In Belarus, President Aleksandr Lukashenka orderedmilitary exercises on March 28 that he stated would "make sure [that people] are afraid of replacingthe authorities" by attempted force. (21) In Azerbaijan, the government moved even before the Kyrgyzcoup (perhaps in response to democratization events in Ukraine) to restrict youth participation infuture electoral campaigns. Azerbaijan's opposition Musavat Party head Isa Gambar hailed theKyrgyz coup as proving that Muslim countries could roll back dictatorship, and called on oppositionparties to unite in bringing a "democratic revolution" to Azerbaijan by winning legislative electionsscheduled for November 2005. (22) Leaders of Moldova's Transnistria and Georgia's Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia regions in April appeared concerned about Russia's seeming impotence in influencingevents in Kyrgyzstan. Perhaps uncertain about Russia's continued de facto support for theirseparatism, they pledged to help one another militarily if they were attacked. (23)

In contrast to these leaders, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Georgian PresidentMikheil Saakashvili hailed the Kyrgyz coup and dispatched their foreign ministers to Bishkek at theend of March to offer advice and support to the interim leadership. The ministers proposed thatKyrgyzstan join a "Democratic Choice Coalition" just formed by the two presidents to cooperate ondemocratic reforms. Reportedly, democratic activists from both countries had traveled to Kyrgyzstanbefore the coup to give advice to activists there. (24)

Implications for China

China is concerned that the coup could lead to a more democratic Kyrgyzstan that wouldinspire Chinese democrats and embolden some ethnic Uighurs (a Turkic people) who advocateseparatism in China's Xinjiang region bordering Kyrgyzstan. Groups such as the East TurkestanIndependence Movement (ETIM; designated by the United States as a terrorist group) have basesin Central Asia. Akayev had reached agreement with China in 2003 to step up cooperation incombating these groups, and China is anxious that such cooperation continue. China may also beconcerned that peaceful Uighurs within a democratic Kyrgyzstan might become more politicallyactive in advocating for their kin in Xinjiang. (25) Apparently, there were some attacks on Chinese businessmenin Kyrgyzstan during the coup that might be classified as hate crimes. China is also concerned thatinstability in Kyrgyzstan could result in increased cross-border smuggling and other crime.

China's Foreign Ministry spokeman on March 29 stressed China's paramount concern thatlaw and order be re-established with Kyrgyzstan and that "good neighborly relations" continue,including cooperation in combating terrorists. (26) The latter includes work within the Shanghai CooperationOrganization (SCO; formed in by China, Russia, and most of the Central Asian states),headquartered in Bishkek. Matching in some respects Russian concerns about the CSTO, the coupreportedly raised questions in China about the effectiveness of the SCO's emergency consultationprovisions.

Implications for U.S. Interests

The U.S. Administration has considered Akayev's government as less objectionable thanothers in Central Asian, and hoped that a planned late 2005 presidential race would become "a modelfor peaceful, democratic transfer of executive power in the region." (27) In line with these hopes,the Administration and others were focusing on civil society aid to facilitate a free and fairpresidential election late in the year, so Akayev's ouster caught the United States and virtually allobservers by surprise.

Cumulative U.S. budgeted assistance to Kyrgyzstan for FY1992-FY2004 was $749.0 million(FREEDOM Support Act and other agency funds). Kyrgyzstan ranks third in such aid per capitaamong the Eurasian states, indicative of U.S. government and Congressional support in the early1990s for its apparent progress in making reforms and more recently for anti-terrorism and borderprotection. Of this cumulative aid, 14.6% supported democratization programs, including legal andjudicial training, legal support for NGOs, advice on party and electoral legislation, training forpolitical parties, support for independent media, and the dissemination of civics textbooks. (28) Estimated aid for FY2005(FREEDOM Support Act and other foreign aid, excluding Defense and Energy Department aid) was$36.4 million. The Administration requested $35.7 million for FY2006, and on March 24 stated thatit would "continue to support economic and democratic reform in Kyrgyzstan, including elections,humanitarian assistance, law enforcement, and security, and will carefully watch for emerging needs"as political developments there unfold. (29)

Reportedly, opposition leaders Tekebayev and Otunbayeva have stated that U.S. democracyassistance was helpful to their endeavors. For example, both were participants in the InternationalVisitors Program to observe the 2004 U.S. presidential election. Other aid included a printing pressoperating since November 2003 that prints all opposition newspapers, which earlier had facedobstacles in obtaining services at state-controlled facilities. In the run-up to the legislative race, oneopposition newspaper did an expose on the alleged wealth of the Akayev family. Akayev denouncedthe article as libelous. A few days later, electricity mysteriously was shut off to the press. The U.S.Embassy strongly protested and lent generators to continue operations until power returned a weeklater. (30)

Although accepting some credit for the role U.S. democratization aid has played infacilitating the development of civil society in Kyrgyzstan, the Administration has been careful tostress that it did not "mastermind" the coup. Secretary Rice also has tried to reassure Russia that theUnited States and the West are not attempting to "encircle" Russia by instigating democratic"revolutions" throughout Eurasia, but that these are indigenous developments that will benefit Russiaas these countries become more stable and prosperous. (31)

The Administration at least initially appeared to follow the European Union and otherinternational institutions and governments in cautiously assessing developments in Kyrgyzstanduring the chaotic period leading up to the coup. Concerns that disorder and violence might increasewere foremost and the Administration urged peaceful negotiations between the Akayev governmentand opposition forces. Reportedly, U.S. Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Stephen Young soon after thecoup told Bakiyev that the United States would provide added aid to bolster a democratic transition. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick on March 29 endorsed a significant role for the OSCE infacilitating talks among pro-Akayev and opposition leaders to ease the transition of power and infacilitating support for the transition among regional OSCE members, including Russia. (32)

Some in the Administration have suggested that the Kyrgyz coup is part of a worldwide trendof democratization, following in the footsteps of those in Georgia, Ukraine, and elsewhere. Secretary of State Rice stated on March 24 that "the Kyrgyz people have a desire and an aspirationfor freedom and democracy, as do people around the world. The responsibility of the internationalsystem â¦ is to help people when they express this to channel this into a set of processes that thenlead to stable institutions." Deputy Secretary Zoellick similarly asserted that the Kyrgyz, like"people in very diverse parts of the world, whether it is Ukraine, Georgia, Iraq, Afghanistan or thePalestinian elections ... desire to be free...." (33)

Indicating support for democratization and continued security ties, Defense Secretary DonaldRumsfeld briefly visited Kyrgyzstan on April 14. He thanked the interim leadership for Kyrgyzstan'ssupport for the Global War on Terror and stated that he told them that "the United States is wishingthem well in the important work that they're engaged in building a stable and modern and prosperousdemocracy." Bakiyev assured Rumsfeld that U.S. basing rights would be upheld. (34)

While the Kyrgyz interim government has pledged to continue Akayev's foreign policy ofgood relations with both the United States and Russia, it is uncertain whether this might change inthe future. The interim leadership appears to support important U.S. interests in the region. Kulovseems to be strongly pro-U.S., but he also has argued that up to one million Kyrgyz (20% of thepopulation) may be working in Russia, that their repatriated earnings constitute a major portion ofthe Kyrgyz budget, and that Russia provides oil, so "we cannot quarrel with Moscow." (35) Some observers suggestthat even if Kyrgyzstan endeavors to maintain close relations with China, Russia, and the UnitedStates, a strong Kyrgyz state would serve U.S. interests in the region by more effectively combatingterrorism and drug and human trafficking emanating from Afghanistan.

The United States has been building twenty troop barracks at the U.S. airbase at Manas toreplace tents, anticipating that the base will continue to be a major transhipment point for personneland equipment for operations in Afghanistan. According to a March 2005 report by Kyrgyzstan'sForeign Ministry (later denied by both U.S. and Kyrgyz authorities), the government had receivedrequests from the United States and NATO regarding the possibility of deploying airborne warningand control systems planes (AWACS) at Ganci. The government denied the requests, however,ostensibly because of its commitments to the CSTO and the SCO. Although the interim governmenthas stated that it will uphold the existing balance of security ties with Russia, China, and the UnitedStates, a more Western-oriented government might eventually reassess such ties.

As Congress and the Administration consider how to assist democratic and economictransformation in Kyrgyzstan, several possible programs have been suggested by observers inKyrgyzstan, the United States, and elsewhere. At the same time, these observers have cautioned thatdevelopments in Kyrgyzstan remain fluid and that a democratic transformation is not assured. Theseobservers suggest that one sign that the new leaders are committed to democratization would be afree and fair presidential election. Among possible programs, former Kyrgyz foreign ministerMuratbek Imanaliyev has called for the creation of an advisory group of international experts toexamine how Kyrgyz politics might become more inclusive of both northern and southern interestsand how Kyrgyzstan might step up its pace of private sector economic transformation. In Congress,the newly established House Democracy Assistance Committee is examining possibleinter-parliamentary technical assistance to Kyrgyzstan. Other observers have called for Kyrgyzstanto soon be designated a country eligible for aid from the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation. The International Monetary Fund views Kyrgyzstan as making important recent progress in fiscalreforms, GDP growth, and poverty reduction, and calls for international financial institutions tocontinue to support the country in coming years. (36)

Appendix

Opposition Leaders in the New Government

Kurmanbek Bakiyev , prime minister 2000-2002. Then-President Askar Akayev blamed him for agovernment crackdown on a protest in the south that led to several deaths, and he was forced toresign. He became head of the opposition People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan (PMK) bloc in late2004. He lost his bid for a legislative seat in the March 2005 run-off.

Azimbek Beknazarov , head of the nationalist Asaba Party. In 2001 he harshly criticized PresidentAkayev for agreeing to border adjustments deemed favorable to China and Kazakhstan, allegedlycontributing to his arrest in 2002. In late 2004, he became deputy head of PMK. He won alegislative seat in the March 2005 run-off.

Murtabek Imanaliyev , foreign minister 1997-2002. He heads the Jany Bagyt (New Direction) Socialand Political Movement.

Feliks Kulov , head of the Ar-Namys (Dignity) Party. He was imprisoned in 2001 on corruptioncharges that some observers viewed as politically motivated. His party is prominent in the north buthas members all over the country. He was released from prison during the demonstrations on March24, 2005, and the Supreme Court threw out all charges against him on April 11.

Adakhan Madumarov , co-head of the Ata Jurt party bloc and For Fair Elections Movement. Hecontested his "loss" in the March 2005 run-off and was declared the winner by the CEC.

Roza Otunbayeva , former deputy prime minister, foreign minister, ambassador to the UnitedKingdom and the United States, and U.N. emissary. In late 2004, she became co-chair of theAta-Jurt party bloc. The CEC refused to register her as a candidate in the recent legislative election.

Omurbek Tekebayev , heads the Ata Meken Party. He won a legislative seat in the March 2005run-off.

Figure 1. Map of Kyrgyzstan