Hazardous Materials: EPA May Need to Reassess Sites Receiving Asbestos-Contaminated Ore from Libby, Montana, and Should Improve Its Public Notification Process
Released: 2007-10-12T00:00:00

Letter

Background

The vermiculite ore mined at Libby, Montana, between 1923 and the early 1990s contained high concentrations of naturally occurring asbestos minerals, including tremolite, winchite, richterite, and others (see fig. 1). As the ore was mined and processed, dust containing asbestos fibers was released into the air, which workers then inhaled. By the early 1900s, asbestos was recognized as a cause of occupational disease. Initially, the disease associated with asbestos was asbestosis, a nonmalignant respiratory disease characterized by scarring of the lung tissue that may progress to significant impairment and death. During the 1930s and 1940s, the connection between asbestos exposure and lung cancer emerged. By 1960, the connection between asbestos and mesothelioma—a cancer of the mesothelial lining of the lungs—was established. Diseases stemming from exposure to asbestos may not be apparent for decades after the initial exposure. Thus, even though the Libby mine closed around 1990, many residents, former workers, and others who were exposed to the asbestos-contaminated ore, recently have been diagnosed with asbestos- related diseases and many more may become ill in the future.

EPA’s involvement with Libby’s asbestos-contaminated vermiculite ore dates back to the late 1970s and continued intermittently until 1999, when the agency initiated an investigation that led to ongoing cleanup activities in the Libby area. In 1978, EPA learned that workers at a vermiculite processing plant in Marysville, Ohio—one of hundreds of sites across the United States where Libby vermiculite ore was sent—were exhibiting symptoms of asbestos-related diseases. Between 1980 and 1982, EPA issued a series of reports related to asbestos-contaminated vermiculite. Most of these reports indicated that there was a lack of data on both exposure to asbestos-contaminated vermiculite and its adverse health effects. Further, the reports identified problems in sampling, analysis, and reproducibility of data regarding low levels of asbestos in vermiculite, which made it difficult to acquire data on exposure and health effects. One of the studies also noted that EPA needed to develop more information identifying, among other things, the vermiculite-mine sites, the processors of vermiculite, and the potential number of employees exposed to asbestos-contaminated vermiculite. In a February 1985 report, EPA estimated the levels and ranges of exposure to asbestos-contaminated vermiculite for workers and the general public and indicated that, with further study, this information could be used for regulatory decision making. This report contained a list of the locations of 52 exfoliation plants in the United States that had received vermiculite ore from the Libby mine. Even so, EPA did not initiate any action at the time and, until 1999, did little to address concerns about the health risks associated with exposure to asbestos-contaminated vermiculite ore.

In 1999—after a series of newspaper articles reporting that miners and their families in the area of Libby, Montana, had died or were ill from exposure to the asbestos-contaminated vermiculite ore—EPA began investigating the contamination in the Libby area and began cleaning up the contamination in 2000. Subsequently, concerns were raised about why EPA had not taken action much earlier in Libby, which resulted in investigations by both the EPA Office of Inspector General and GAO. The subsequent reports concluded that, due to various challenges, EPA missed past opportunities to take steps that might have protected the citizens of Libby. These challenges included (1) fragmented regulatory authority and jurisdiction with other federal agencies and within EPA, along with ineffective communication, which made it difficult for EPA to take action; (2) limitations of science, technology, and health-effects data that made it difficult for EPA to determine the degree of health risk at Libby; and (3) funding constraints and competing priorities, which led EPA to de- emphasize dealing with asbestos-contaminated vermiculite. Since these reports were issued, as part of an ongoing criminal case against W.R. Grace, the government has alleged that Grace engaged in a conspiracy to defraud EPA and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health by concealing and misrepresenting the nature of the asbestos-containing vermiculite produced at the mine. Grace has denied the allegations.

When EPA began cleaning up contamination in the Libby area in 2000, it also took steps to identify and evaluate sites that may have received shipments of Libby ore for asbestos contamination according to CERCLA. Under NCP regulations that implement CERCLA, a removal site evaluation involves, among other things, identifying the source and nature of any hazardous-substance release, analyzing the magnitude of the potential threat to human health and the environment, and evaluating factors necessary to make the determination of whether a removal is necessary.

According to NCP regulations, when EPA is the lead agency for a cleanup, an EPA region must take certain actions, as appropriate, to notify the public about a removal action. These actions include (1) designating a spokesperson to notify immediately affected citizens and state and local officials about the cleanup; (2) creating a record documenting the basis for the cleanup action and making the record publicly available; (3) publishing a notice that the record is available for review in a major local newspaper; and (4) providing an opportunity for the public to comment on the record. When EPA expects the cleanup action to last more than 120 days, the regional office must also conduct interviews with interested or affected parties, prepare a formal community response plan, and establish at least one local information repository at or near the cleanup location, such as at a public library.

EPA has also issued numerous policy directives and guidance documents over the years establishing additional public notification procedures that EPA regions should follow. For example, EPA guidance issued in July 1992 directed regions to interact closely with and reach out to communities. This guidance specifies that one of the goals of public participation is to inform the public about the risks associated with a site and any cleanup actions. The guidance also states that it is imperative for EPA to give the public prompt, accurate information about the nature of threats to public health and the environment, and the removal action necessary to mitigate the threats. In its April 2002 guidance, EPA stated that just complying with NCP provisions is often insufficient for informing the media, the public, and interested stakeholders. This guidance strongly suggested the regions use other options for meeting community needs, such as scheduling press briefings; establishing a local or toll-free telephone hotline; and canvassing neighborhoods to identify residents’ needs, fears, and concerns.

ATSDR has provided information to EPA to help assess the risks posed by potential asbestos contamination at selected sites that received Libby ore. Specifically, in 2002, ATSDR launched the first phase of its National Asbestos Exposure Review. Under this phase of the project, ATSDR evaluated human health effects that may be associated with past or current exposure to asbestos at 28 of the sites that had received and processed the vermiculite ore mined in Libby, Montana. These sites were selected because they received a high-volume of Libby ore (greater than 100,000 tons) or EPA identified them as needing further investigation. These 28 sites together received about 80 percent of the vermiculite ore shipped from the Libby mine between 1964 and 1980.

Federal Agencies Have Assessed Sites Thought to Have Received Asbestos- Contaminated Ore but Did So without Critical Information about Safe Exposure Levels

EPA, with assistance from other federal and state agencies, has assessed 271 sites that were thought to have received asbestos-contaminated ore from Libby, Montana, to determine if the sites are contaminated with asbestos and if they need cleanup. As a result of these investigations, 19 sites were identified as requiring cleanup. As a part of ATSDR’s effort to evaluate public-health risks posed by past and current exposures to asbestos contamination in the Libby area and at some of the sites that received the Libby ore, ATSDR has noted there is an absence of key information on the toxicity of the asbestos found in the Libby ore. ATSDR also noted that the methods EPA used to sample and analyze the air and soil at most of the 28 sites it reviewed have since been improved and now better quantify asbestos levels. After the EPA Office of Inspector General recommended in December 2006 that EPA perform a toxicity assessment to determine safe levels of exposure for humans, EPA agreed to do so.

EPA Has Evaluated Sites That May Have Received Libby Ore and Concluded Some Needed to be Cleaned Up

EPA has taken a number of actions to identify and evaluate sites that may have received Libby ore and, when needed, has conducted removal actions. In early 2000, EPA began compiling a list of facilities that might have received asbestos-contaminated vermiculite ore from the Libby mine. To compile the list, it used shipping records and other information obtained from W.R. Grace as well as historical information about vermiculite processing facilities from the Bureau of Mines and the U.S. Geological Survey. Initially, EPA identified over 500 sites, but after coordinating with the U.S. Geological Survey to update and revise the list of facilities and eliminate duplicate entries, EPA narrowed the list to less than 300 potential sites.

The data that EPA collected on the sites believed to have received Libby ore paint a picture of the distribution of Libby ore across the United States. Figure 2 illustrates the nationwide distribution based on 195 sites for which data on the amount of ore shipped were available. These 195 sites are believed to have received a combined total of at least 6 million tons of ore from the Libby, Montana, mine and ore processing operations. The 271 sites were located in 39 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. The most sites were in California (28) and Texas (26). EPA has continued to identify sites and will investigate them as it deems necessary. For example, in 2006, EPA identified additional sites (included in the 271) that it needed to assess for asbestos contamination.

According to the data that EPA collected, most (95 percent) of the vermiculite ore known to have been shipped from Libby between 1964 and 1990 went to facilities that converted it into commercial vermiculite through a process called “exfoliation” (expansion). Exfoliation plants heated the vermiculite ore to approximately 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit, which caused the ore to expand, or pop. This expanded vermiculite was then used in a variety of products, including loose-fill insulation in homes (see figs. 3 and 4 for photos of expanded vermiculite ore and vermiculite insulation). Because significant concentrations of asbestos fibers were likely released during the exfoliation process, of the facilities that received Libby ore, exfoliation plants were deemed the most likely to have caused environmental contamination and exposure.

In performing their preliminary assessment of sites, EPA regions generally tried to determine the facilities’ locations using a variety of methods, including title searches; reviews of town records; and interviews with people who might provide useful information, such as company representatives or people who formerly worked at the sites. Once they identified an accurate address for a site, a “windshield survey” was performed to determine current site conditions and gather additional information on past operations at the site. These surveys generally included viewing the suspected location and its surrounding area and, in some instances, interviewing business owners and residents in the immediate vicinity.

If these initial surveys indicated the need for further examination, the regions typically conducted a detailed investigation of the site. This investigation typically consisted of a site visit, which included a more thorough visual inspection of the property and surrounding area; additional interviews with people who might be knowledgeable about past operations, such as facility representatives; reviews of any relevant and available documentation from state and federal agencies; and, if deemed necessary, collection of soil and air samples.

As indicated in table 1, EPA conducted site visits to at least 241 of the sites. At least 19 sites were not visited because either initial efforts to determine site locations were unsuccessful or information gathered while pre-screening the sites indicated that a site visit was not necessary. For example, for a site located in Stanton, North Dakota, company officials indicated in a letter that the company purchased a relatively small amount of Libby ore in the early 1980s and had since obtained vermiculite ore from a mine in Virginia. The company officials provided EPA Region 8 with a lab analysis of the ore from the Virginia mine, which indicated no asbestos was present in the ore. As a result, EPA Region 8 concluded a site visit was not necessary.

For the sites where the regions decided sampling was warranted, samples of “bulk” materials—such as raw vermiculite ore, suspected waste vermiculite piles, and soils—were collected. Air samples were collected if there was concern that disturbing contaminated materials (in the soil or elsewhere) could result in asbestos fibers migrating into the air and being inhaled. Based on information obtained during the site visits, bulk and, in some cases, air samples were collected for at least 80 (30 percent) of the sites (as shown in table 1).

One of the most important factors EPA regional offices considered in determining whether a site needed to be cleaned up was the amount, if any, of asbestos present at the site. In general, a cleanup would be performed if sampling results indicated that asbestos was present in amounts greater than 1 percent (based on the percentage of the area of a microscopic field) in soils or debris or greater than 0.1 asbestos fibers per cubic centimeter of air. According to EPA, the “1 percent threshold” for asbestos in soils or debris is not a health-based standard, but is rather related to the limit of detection for the analytical methods available during the early years of EPA’s asbestos program (early 1970s), and to EPA’s desire to concentrate resources on materials containing higher percentages of asbestos. EPA has never determined that materials containing less than 1 percent asbestos are safe, and scientists have not been able to develop a safe level for exposure to airborne asbestos. Of the sites sampled, 22 had levels of asbestos that that exceeded the thresholds, 29 had detectable levels of asbestos that were below the thresholds (trace amounts), and 26 sites had no detectable levels of asbestos.

After reviewing the sampling results and other pertinent information collected about the sites, EPA—and in some instances states—identified 19 sites where contamination from the asbestos in Libby ore needed to be cleaned up. Figure 5 includes a map showing the location of the 19 sites that were identified for cleanup. With the exception of one site, all of the sites that needed to be cleaned up had levels of asbestos in soils that exceeded the 1 percent threshold. For the one exception, a site located in Salt Lake City, all of the soil samples contained trace amounts of asbestos (less than 1 percent). However, after raking the ground and using a leaf blower, EPA collected air samples which showed elevated levels of asbestos fibers that exceeded the threshold of 0.1 asbestos fibers per cubic centimeter of air. As a result, EPA determined this site needed to be cleaned up as well.

ATSDR Concluded Former Workers at Facilities That Processed Libby Ore Were Most at Risk for Asbestos Exposure and That Health- Effects Data Are Limited

In conjunction with EPA’s efforts to evaluate sites that received Libby ore, ATSDR is conducting a project—the National Asbestos Exposure Review—to investigate selected sites that received and processed ore from the Libby mine. These investigations—referred to as health consultations—involve evaluating information about toxic material at a site, determining whether people might be exposed to it, and reporting what harm exposure might cause. Health consultations may be performed by ATSDR staff or by state health department officials working under a cooperative agreement with ATSDR. The consultations may consider what levels (or concentrations) of hazardous substances are present; whether people might be exposed to contamination and how (through “exposure pathways” such as breathing air, drinking or coming into contact with water, eating or coming into contact with soil, or eating food); what harm the substances might cause people (or the contaminants’ “toxicity”); whether working or living nearby might affect people’s health; and other dangers to people, such as unsafe buildings or other physical hazards.

Every health consultation includes ATSDR’s conclusions about public- health hazards and recommendations for actions to protect public health. These can include recommended follow-up activities for EPA, state environmental and health agencies, and ATSDR. For example, the recommendations could be related to (1) cleaning up sites; (2) keeping people away from contamination and physical dangers—for example, by placing a fence around a site; (3) giving residents safe drinking water; (4) relocating exposed people; (5) providing health education for residents and health-care providers to inform them about site contaminants and harmful health effects; and (6) performing additional health studies.

ATSDR is conducting the National Asbestos Exposure Review in two phases. In Phase 1, it is conducting health investigations of 28 sites. These 28 sites together received about 80 percent of the vermiculite ore believed to have been shipped from the Libby mine between 1964 and 1980 (see fig. 6). As of June 2007, ATSDR had completed investigations at all 28 sites. For each site, ATSDR has issued a health-consultation report and a fact sheet summarizing the results of the site evaluation. Phase 1 will conclude with the completion of a report summarizing all 28 site investigations. This report will likely be released in late 2007 or early 2008. In Phase 2 of the National Asbestos Exposure Review, ATSDR will build on work from Phase 1 to determine the need for public-health activities at additional sites that received Libby ore. ATSDR’s role during Phase 2 will vary from providing technical support or advice to other agencies to possibly conducting additional public-health activities.

In selecting the 28 Phase 1 sites, ATSDR selected sites that would be more likely to pose public-health risks because the sites (1) had been designated by EPA as requiring further action based on current contamination, or (2) were exfoliation facilities that processed more than 100,000 tons of vermiculite ore from the Libby mine. ATSDR’s general conclusions about past and current exposures to asbestos from the contaminated Libby ore at the 28 sites included the following: Former employees at the facilities that processed the asbestos- contaminated vermiculite ore were most at risk for exposure.

Those who lived in the employees’ homes may have also been exposed because asbestos fibers could have been carried home on the employees’ clothing, skin, and hair.

People could have been exposed to asbestos if they handled or played in waste rock, a by-product of vermiculite exfoliation. At some of the vermiculite plants, workers or people in the community may have brought the waste rock from the plants to their homes to use in gardens and as fill or driveway surfacing material. If this waste rock is uncovered and stirred up, asbestos fibers may be released into the air. Determining the extent to which former and current residents were or could currently be exposed to waste rock on their properties was not possible at most sites given a lack of knowledge about whether or to what extent past community members may have taken waste material home.

People living around the plants could have been exposed to asbestos fibers in the air when vermiculite was being processed at the sites. Determining whether former residents were exposed to hazardous levels of asbestos was not possible at most of the sites given a general lack of data on past emissions from the facilities.

Since the plants no longer process Libby ore, current residents living around the sites are no longer being exposed through air emissions from processing activities at the plants.

As a part of its on-going work to assess public-health risks at the Phase 1 sites, ATSDR has also reported significant gaps in scientific data used to evaluate health risks associated with exposure to the type of asbestos fibers found in Libby ore. ATSDR has pointed out that evaluating health effects requires extensive knowledge of both the ways in which people were exposed and the level of asbestos that is harmful to humans (i.e., the toxicity of the asbestos). According to ATSDR, the public health implications of exposures to these fibers are difficult to determine in part because the toxicological information currently available for the asbestos fibers found in the Libby ore is very limited. Also, in a May 2003 Public Health Assessment of the Libby site, ATSDR recommended that “more research is needed, specifically: toxicological investigation of the risks associated with low-level exposure to asbestos, especially Libby asbestos; clinical research on treatment for mesothelioma and asbestosis; and epidemiology studies to better characterize the link between exposure to asbestos and disease.”

ATSDR has also noted that the 1 percent threshold used in determining when sites need to be cleaned up is not health based. Furthermore, the agency cited EPA studies showing that disturbing soils containing less than 1 percent asbestos can suspend fibers in the air at levels that cause a health concern. Therefore, ATSDR concluded it is unclear whether sites that were not cleaned up and with asbestos levels of less than 1 percent were safe.

In addition, ATSDR stated that the sampling and analysis methods used by EPA at some of the sites were limited in their ability to detect and measure asbestos fibers. In fact, recent health-consultation reports for two sites in Portland, Oregon, issued by the Oregon Department of Human Services in consultation with ATSDR, pointed out that sampling and analysis methods have been improved since samples were taken at those sites in 2000 and that new methods are better able to quantify levels of asbestos. As a result, the health-consultation reports for those sites recommended, among other things, that EPA conduct additional sampling at these sites to ensure people are not being exposed to residual fibers. After conducting additional sampling at one of these sites, EPA determined the site required further cleanup.

EPA Has Attempted to Clarify Its Asbestos Cleanup Goals and Agreed to Complete a Toxicity Assessment for the Asbestos in Libby Ore

“to ban the use of materials which contain significant quantities of asbestos, but to allow the use of materials which would: (1) contain trace amounts of asbestos which occur in numerous natural substances, and (2) include very small quantities of asbestos (less than 1 percent) added to enhance the material’s effectiveness.”

This memo acknowledged that the widespread use of the 1 percent threshold may have caused EPA managers at cleanup sites to assume that levels below that threshold did not pose an unreasonable risk to human health. The memo stated that it is important to note the 1 percent threshold was related to (1) the limit of detection for the analytical methods available in the early 1970s and (2) EPA’s decision to focus its resources on materials containing higher percentages of asbestos.

The memo further noted the threshold may not be protective of human health in all instances. It stressed that regions should not assume soil or debris containing less than 1 percent asbestos does not pose an unreasonable risk to human health and should instead develop risk-based, site-specific action levels to determine if response actions should be undertaken. However, the memo clearly stated that this information did not constitute a regulation nor did it impose legally-binding requirements on EPA.

In November 2005, EPA issued its Asbestos Project Plan. The plan provided a framework for a coordinated agency-wide approach to identify, evaluate, and reduce the risk to human health from asbestos exposure.

Among other things, the plan focused on improving the state of the science for asbestos through a number of steps, including activities to improve EPA’s (1) understanding of asbestos toxicology, (2) understanding of asbestos-related exposures, and (3) ability to perform meaningful environmental sample collection and analysis.

When asked about the status of these activities and funding provided to accomplish the Asbestos Project Plan, EPA responded that the plan was developed only to provide an overview of various ongoing and planned agency-wide activities to address risks from asbestos, and that it was never intended as an ongoing strategy with timelines for deliverables and budget tracking features. Nevertheless, according to EPA, by pursuing activities outlined in the plan the agency has made progress in improving the state of the science for asbestos. Among other things, it has undertaken work to (1) develop a methodology for estimating the risk of lung cancer and mesothelioma from inhalation exposure to different forms of asbestos; (2) update the asbestos health-effects information contained in the EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS); (3) develop methods for identifying the presence of asbestos in vermiculite attic insulation; and (4) test an alternative method for removing asbestos from buildings.

In December 2006, EPA’s Office of Inspector General reported that EPA had not completed a toxicity assessment of the type of asbestos found in the Libby ore and that this information was necessary to determine the safe level of exposure for humans. Furthermore, the Office of Inspector General reported without such information EPA cannot be sure that the cleanup actions taking place in Libby sufficiently reduce the risk that people may become ill from asbestos exposure or, if already ill, get worse. When asked by the EPA’s Office of Inspector General’s staff why a toxicity assessment had not been performed, officials from EPA’s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER) replied that an assessment was proposed but was not performed because it was not funded and because OSWER believed the information could be obtained through completed and ongoing epidemiological studies. According to the report, however, OSWER program staff, as distinguished from OSWER senior officials, said the epidemiological studies that were ongoing and planned would not be sufficient to determine the toxicity of the asbestos in the Libby ore. As a result, the EPA Office of Inspector General recommended that EPA fund and execute a comprehensive asbestos toxicity assessment to determine (1) the effectiveness of the Libby removal actions and (2) whether more actions are necessary.

Shortly after the Office of Inspector General’s December 2006 report was issued, EPA agreed to conduct additional toxicological and epidemiological studies for the type of asbestos found in the Libby ore. In January 2007, EPA convened a group of more than 30 scientists from EPA, ATSDR, and the National Toxicology Program to identify data gaps and recommend additional studies. According to EPA, a Libby Asbestos Action Plan initiated at this meeting includes recommendations for 12 additional studies. Detailed work plans for five of these studies have been completed with consultation from other agencies and external peer reviewers. Two other studies are continuations of ongoing efforts. Detailed work plans for the remaining five studies are currently being finalized. All studies are scheduled to be completed by the end of calendar year 2009. The milestone date for completing the baseline risk assessment, including the comprehensive toxicity assessment, is the end of fiscal year 2010.

EPA Regions Did Not Consistently Implement Public- Notification Provisions and Adhere to Guidance

At most of the 13 sites for which EPA had public-notification responsibilities, EPA regions did not implement key notification provisions of NCP. At five sites, EPA regions did not perform notification activities beyond those listed in NCP, even though EPA guidance strongly recommends the regions do so. State and local government officials had mixed views about how effective EPA was in notifying them about cleanups in their jurisdictions—some state and local officials reported a positive experience working hand-in-hand with EPA, while others said EPA had not notified them at all. Similarly, while community members participating in two of three focus groups were disappointed overall in EPA’s efforts to inform them about cleanups in their neighborhoods, the participants in the third group were very satisfied with EPA’s efforts.

EPA Regions Did Not Implement Key NCP Public-Notification Provisions at Most Sites

As the lead agency responsible for notifying the public of cleanup activities taking place at 13 of the cleanup sites, EPA was required by NCP regulations to take certain steps, as appropriate, to inform the public about the cleanup activities. All 13 sites were classified as time-critical removal actions, which means EPA must begin cleanup at the sites within 6 months of determining that a removal action is appropriate. Figure 7 shows the locations of the 13 sites.

For all 13 sites, EPA was required to take the following public-notification steps: Designate an agency spokesperson. This representative must inform the community of actions taken, respond to inquiries, and provide information concerning the release of hazardous substances.

Notify affected citizens. The spokesperson must, at a minimum, notify citizens immediately affected by the release of hazardous materials, as well as state and local officials, and when appropriate, civil defense or emergency management agencies.

Create an administrative record. EPA must establish an administrative record containing documents that form the basis for the cleanup action selected and make this record available for public review.

Notify the public about the administrative record. Within 60 days of initiating cleanup activities, EPA must publish an announcement in a major local newspaper indicating that the administrative record is available for review.

Hold a public-comment period, as appropriate, and respond to comments. From the time the administrative record is made available for review, EPA must provide the public no less than 30 days to provide comments about the cleanup. EPA must prepare a written response to significant comments.

When time-critical cleanup activities are expected to last more than 120 days, because there is more time for community involvement and outreach, NCP requires the following additional notification activities be performed, as appropriate: Establish an information repository. To provide the public easier access to site-related documents, EPA must establish at least one information repository at or near the location of the cleanup site. At least one repository must have the administrative record file available for public inspection.

Notify the public about the repository. EPA shall inform the public that it has established an information repository and provide notice that the administrative record is available for review. If EPA knows that cleanup activities will extend beyond 120 days, it can publish a single public notice announcing the availability of the repository and the administrative record.

Conduct community interviews. EPA must conduct interviews with local officials, community residents, public-interest groups, or other interested parties, as appropriate, to solicit their concerns, their information needs, and their views on how and when they would like to be involved in the cleanup.

Prepare a Community Relations Plan. Using information gathered from the community interviews and other sources, EPA must prepare a formal Community Relations Plan specifying the community-involvement activities the agency expects to conduct during the cleanup.

According to EPA regional officials, key public notification provisions of NCP were not implemented at 8 of the 13 cleanup sites. Specifically, regional officials told us the following: At the Great Falls, Montana site (Region 8), regional officials did not establish an administrative record, did not place a notice announcing the record was available for review, and did not hold a public-comment period. According to Region 8 officials, they did not create a formal administrative record because they made a mistake in processing the site’s file and did not discover the mistake until after the cleanup was completed. Before the cleanup, Region 8 did provide an information packet equivalent to an administrative record to the owner of the site where the cleanup occurred and to the state of Montana. Region 8 officials said they have since established a formal standard-operating procedure for completing such tasks, which includes assigning tasks to specific personnel and program offices within the region.

At the Denver, Colorado site (Region 8), although officials established an administrative record, they did not notify the public that the record was available for review and did not hold a public-comment period. The omissions occurred because the employee responsible for placing the notices had retired. During the time the position was vacant, the region did not place public notices for some other removal actions. Region 8 has since filled the position and, in December 2003, it established formal procedures for setting up repositories and publishing notices; the procedures include assigning these responsibilities to specific EPA program offices and staff.

For both the Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Dearborn, Michigan, sites (both in Region 5), the region established administrative records and placed notices about their availability, but it did not hold public-comment periods. EPA Region 5 officials explained that they do not believe that NCP requires EPA to hold a comment period for removal actions, rather, they said NCP allows EPA latitude to determine whether a comment period is appropriate for removal actions. Their general view is that a comment period is not appropriate for time-critical and emergency- removal actions because they need to proceed quickly and because there is typically not a range of options to be considered. In such cases, regional officials said it is more important to focus on other community-outreach and community-relations activities.

At the Wilder, Kentucky (Region 4), Minot, North Dakota (Region 8), and Phoenix, Arizona (Region 9) sites, regional officials posted notices of availability in local newspapers, but they did not place the notices within 60 days of the start of the cleanup as provided in NCP. At two sites, regional officials did not know why the notices were delayed. At the Minot site, the notice was placed 22 days after the deadline and 2 days after the cleanup was completed; and at the Wilder site, the notice was placed 6 days after the deadline. At the Phoenix site, regional officials said the staff person who was responsible for placing the notice had resigned and that position was still vacant at the time the notice should have been placed. The notice was placed 42 days after the deadline and 90 days after the cleanup was completed.

At one of the sites located in Salt Lake City (Region 8), regional officials did not prepare a formal community-relations plan, even though regional officials thought the cleanup could take more than 120 days to complete. Region 8 officials explained that, at the time the memorandum justifying the need for the cleanup was issued, it would have been reasonable to expect that the initial scope of the cleanup would be completed within 120 days. Unfortunately, additional contamination was discovered during a portion of the cleanup, which required the completion date to be extended. However, the memo justifying the cleanup indicated the cleanup might exceed 120 days. Specifically, the memo stated “total costs of the removal action are anticipated to exceed $2 million due to the size of the properties and the extensive amount of soil contamination; and the large amount of excavation and monitoring of landscape restoration may cause the removal to extend past 12 months.” Region 8 officials said that even though a plan was not prepared for this site, the region conducted all substantive community-relations activities that would have been documented in a formal community-relations plan.

EPA Regions’ Adherence to Public-Notification Guidance Varied

Since the 1980s, EPA has issued policy and guidance documents providing more direction to regional offices on how to ensure meaningful public involvement in the agency’s decision making processes, including decisions related to the cleanup of hazardous waste. The key guidance issued by EPA includes: January 1981. EPA issued its Public Participation Policy that provided overall guidance and direction about reasonable and effective means of involving the public in program decisions to public officials who manage EPA programs. This policy defined public participation as that part of EPA’s decision-making process that provides opportunity and encouragement for the public to express their views to the agency, and assures that the agency will give due consideration to public concerns, values, and preferences when decisions are made.

July 1992. EPA published public participation guidance for on-scene coordinators, who are responsible for directing cleanups. This guidance stressed the need to (1) inform the public of the degrees and types of risks associated with a site, planned or ongoing actions, and other issues; (2) provide the public with an opportunity to comment on decisions about the site; and (3) identify and respond to community concerns.

April 2000. The Director of EPA’s Office of Emergency and Remedial Response instructed all EPA regional offices to contact related state or tribal and agency officials to notify them of the potential evaluations of sites that received ore from Libby, Montana, and to gather relevant information from these officials and solicit their participation in site activities.

April 2001. The EPA Administrator issued a policy memorandum that endorsed “vigorous public outreach and involvement.”

October 2001. In an effort to encourage more substantive involvement of communities from the very outset of a cleanup, the Acting Director of EPA’s Office of Emergency and Remedial Response issued a policy memorandum supporting “early and meaningful community involvement.” This memo stressed that even if the cleanup is an emergency removal, community involvement should not be neglected or postponed. The memo stated that while initial calls should be to state and local authorities, soon thereafter, efforts should be made to reach out to the entire community, which may have a high level of anxiety and concern about health and safety.

April 2002. EPA issued the Superfund Community Involvement Handbook that contained detailed guidance on how to conduct public-notification activities. This guidance states that while it is up to EPA officials in charge of a site cleanup to decide what public-notification activities are needed based on a site’s circumstances, EPA’s experience has shown that, at most sites, just complying with NCP provisions is not sufficient to adequately meet community needs. This guidance recommends that regions use many other notification activities, such as distributing fact sheets to let residents know about EPA’s activities; hosting public meetings to deliver information to large groups of people; and, if community demographics indicate a need, translating documents into appropriate languages.

September 2002. EPA issued the Superfund Community Involvement Toolkit, which provided EPA community involvement staff with practical, comprehensive, easy to use guidance for designing and enhancing community involvement activities. The Toolkit includes guidance on how to conduct both required and recommended notification activities, such as how to place public notices and how to conduct public meetings. The Toolkit indicated an expectation that EPA staff should not just distribute information to the public; it should promote meaningful citizen participation in the decisions affecting sites.

As indicated in table 2, EPA regions varied greatly in the extent to which they followed the agency’s guidance for conducting public-notification activities—with 9 of the 13 sites employing at least some of the notification activities that went beyond NCP provisions. For the cleanup sites located in Dearborn and Minneapolis (Region 5), EPA engaged in many of the notification activities that are recommended by NCP provisions. For example, at the Dearborn site, EPA coordinated with the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services to determine the best approach for providing information about the cleanup to the Arab- American residents living near the site. EPA also distributed fact sheets, printed newspaper notices in both English and Arabic, went door-to-door to notify residents about the cleanup, and hosted two public meetings, and conducted two direct mailings. At the Minneapolis site, EPA went door-to- door to discuss the cleanup with residents, held several public meetings, and distributed fact sheets. However, for the sites located in Glendale, Newark, Phoenix, and Honolulu (Region 9), and for the first phase of the cleanup of the site in Hamilton Township (Region 2), EPA did not engage in notification activities beyond those required by NCP provisions. According to both Region 2 and Region 9 officials, even though residential areas were located near each of these sites, additional community- outreach activities were not performed because the site settings, limited scope of the removals, and the nature of the removal activities led them to conclude that it would not be necessary.

State and Local Officials’ Views Varied on the Effectiveness of EPA’s Public-Notification Efforts

State officials we spoke with were mostly satisfied with EPA’s efforts to inform them about site cleanups in their jurisdictions. That is, state officials from 7 of 12 sites were generally satisfied with EPA’s public- notification efforts (North Dakota officials did not respond to our request for their views about the Minot site).

At five of the seven sites (Glendale, Denver, Dearborn, and the two sites located in Salt Lake City), state officials explained that when EPA is the lead agency for a site, they typically expect EPA to inform them about cleanups but do not expect to be involved in the final decision-making process. For these sites, the state officials were pleased with EPA’s efforts to keep them informed about the site evaluations, sampling results, and cleanup activities.

At the other two sites (Minneapolis and Wilder), state officials reported they worked hand-in-hand with EPA officials and were extremely pleased with EPA’s efforts to keep them informed about site activities. For example, officials from the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) collected samples with EPA Region 5 at the Minneapolis site and officials from both agencies agreed the site needed to be cleaned up. EPA and MPCA held joint public meetings to inform residents about the contamination and went door-to-door in a wide area to determine if residents had taken contaminated waste materials from the site to their homes. Also, Minnesota Department of Health officials reported working closely with EPA and MPCA to review site cleanup plans, ensure that contractors were properly licensed, and obtain access to residential properties so they could be tested for the presence of asbestos. Similarly, for the Wilder site, officials from the Kentucky Department of Environmental Protection (KYDEP) reported that EPA Region 4 officials continually communicated through e-mails, telephone calls, written correspondence, and meetings. KYDEP officials worked closely with EPA at the site, providing general oversight on the cleanup, including removal and disposal of the asbestos-contaminated materials. They coordinated with EPA on all aspects of the planned removal and reported that EPA staff were very professional, knowledgeable, helpful, courteous, and visible.

For three sites (Honolulu, Great Falls, and Hamilton Township), state officials said they were not satisfied with EPA’s efforts to inform them about cleanup activities.

Honolulu. Officials from the Hawaii Department of Health (HDOH) said that an EPA Region 9 official stopped by their offices and mentioned that the Honolulu site had received vermiculite ore from Libby, Montana.

About a year later, HDOH officials said they were copied on a letter from Region 9 stating that there had been a release of asbestos at the site. Subsequent to receiving this letter, an EPA Region 9 official stopped by the HDOH offices “as a courtesy” to let them know EPA would be conducting a removal action at the site. However, HDOH officials said they did not receive any more information from EPA about the site and that they would have preferred having more advance notice about the cleanup and information about the status of the cleanup as it was being conducted.

Great Falls. An official from the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) was very dissatisfied with EPA Region 8’s lack of notification about the cleanup. The site was a residence that was being cleaned up because a former owner of the property who had worked at a vermiculite processing facility in Great Falls had taken contaminated waste product home to use on his driveway. The MDEQ official first became aware of the site through an asbestos-abatement contractor who had heard about the cleanup. The MDEQ official said he went to investigate the site because EPA typically coordinates such matters with him. The MDEQ official said he was not sure why EPA did not inform him about the cleanup, but he considered this “slipshod” behavior.

Hamilton Township. Officials from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) said they first learned the site was contaminated with asbestos when they were copied on an EPA Region 2 memorandum stating that the site needed to be cleaned up. They said they received copies of two more EPA reports about the site before being invited to a stakeholder meeting in March 2005 (approximately 1 year after the completion of the first phase of the site cleanup) to discuss the site cleanup. The NJDEP officials said that EPA had improved its public- notification efforts during the second phase of the site cleanup. For example, since the beginning of the second phase, EPA has held several public meetings and issued numerous community updates. The NJDEP officials felt that EPA should have notified them and local government officials about the first phase of the cleanup in the same manner as was done for the second phase. In general, NJDEP officials said EPA could improve public-notification efforts by, among other things, providing additional public notices to state and local officials, keeping the site’s Web site up-to-date, and by asking for and obtaining feedback from community members about what their notification needs are, and then providing this information to state and local agencies.

For the remaining sites in Phoenix and Newark, state officials said they were neither entirely satisfied nor entirely dissatisfied about Region 9’s efforts to inform them about the site cleanups. Specifically, officials from the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality said they received a report from Region 9 indicating that EPA was assessing sites that had received Libby ore and that the Phoenix site was being assessed. A letter accompanying the report indicated the Phoenix site would be cleaned up, but did not indicate when the cleanup would occur. While Arizona officials found it helpful that EPA kept them informed about the assessments of sites that had received Libby ore, they said it would have been better if EPA had informed them ahead of time about when the Phoenix site would be cleaned up so they could have been better prepared to answer the public’s questions about the cleanup. For the Newark site, an official from the California Department of Health Services said EPA did not provide any information to them directly about the site. Instead, they received most of their information from ATSDR, who they understood was working closely with EPA. Since the California Department of Health officials’ view their role in such situations as providing support to ATSDR, the official said the Department would not necessarily expect EPA to notify it about site cleanups. However, as a part of its efforts to help ATSDR disseminate information to communities, in September 2003, the California Department of Health found that officials in the City of Newark and in the county government were not aware of the cleanup or the site’s history (the site cleanup began in April 2002).

Of the seven local governments that provided their views on EPA’s efforts to inform them about cleanups within their jurisdictions, three (Dearborn, Minneapolis, and Salt Lake City) said they were satisfied.

Dearborn. City officials said EPA Region 5 did everything that could have been done to inform the public about the cleanup. According to these officials, EPA informed the mayor’s office very early in the process and asked the city to appoint a liaison to work with EPA on the site cleanup. City officials also said EPA met with local government officials and the emergency-management coordinator to determine any concerns they might have. Overall, city officials thought EPA was professional, in control of the situation, and cognizant that they needed to maintain frequent contact with the residents.

Minneapolis. City officials said they already had a good working relationship with EPA Region 5 and were impressed with EPA’s efforts to be open and available to the community through, among other things, public meetings and door-to-door contacts. They said that EPA was very upfront with city officials, established good credibility with members of the community, and was respected by local activist groups.

Salt Lake City (two sites). Officials from the Salt Lake City government said EPA’s interaction with the local government was excellent and EPA staff were always accessible to discuss their concerns. EPA Region 8 staff first called them to explain that the sites had processed asbestos- contaminated ore from Libby and were likely contaminated. When the city public utility offices raised concerns about whether contamination under the streets near one of the sites was a threat to their employees, EPA met with them to address their concerns. Once EPA began the removal action, EPA kept the local government informed via weekly e-mails, three meetings, and a site visit.

There were four sites (Newark, Wilder, Great Falls, and Hamilton Township) where local government officials said they were somewhat to largely dissatisfied with EPA’s notification efforts.

Newark. A city official said a Newark Fire Department official first found out about the site cleanup from county health department officials and the California Department of Health. After hearing about the contamination and activities at the site, the fire department official informed the city manager and the city’s executive team. The city officials said that EPA Region 9 had very little contact with the local government as the cleanup proceeded.

Wilder. A city official said he first learned about the site from a local newspaper reporter and that EPA Region 4 notified the city after it decided to clean up the site. According to this official, if the city had known earlier, it could have cordoned off the area to prevent children from riding their bikes through the site. The city official was also concerned that EPA did not do enough to contact former workers and identify people who took asbestos-contaminated waste rock from the site to use in their yards.

Great Falls. A city official at the Great Falls site said EPA Region 8 did not notify the city about the cleanup. After finding out about the cleanup from an asbestos-abatement contractor, the city official decided to investigate the site. The city official discovered the EPA contractor performing the removal was not licensed to do work in the city. In the opinion of the city official, EPA should have notified the state government about cleanup activities and should have asked the local government to appoint a liaison to work with EPA on matters concerning the cleanup.

Hamilton Township. During Phase I of the cleanup, township officials said EPA Region 2 invited an official from the Hamilton Township Department of Health to attend a visit to the site. During this visit, township officials said the city health department official was told that EPA was going to clean up the site. Township officials said that other than EPA’s request for a permit to place a construction trailer on the site, they did not receive any further communication until after the first phase of the cleanup was completed. At that time, township officials said the New Jersey Department of Health asked the Hamilton Township Department of Health to help organize a public meeting about the second phase of the cleanup; the Hamilton Township Department of Health then informed the mayor’s office about the cleanup. According to township officials, while EPA did place an administrative record for the site in the local library, the agency did not notify local officials that it was available for review. Township officials said that since the second phase of the cleanup began, EPA has been doing a “great job” keeping local officials informed. According to township officials, the catalyst for change was getting the mayor’s office involved in the cleanup. In their opinions, because staffs in mayors’ offices can help ensure communities are informed and that all parties are working together, it is important for EPA to keep mayors’ offices informed about cleanup activities.

Many Community Members Believe EPA Should Have Done More to Notify Them about Cleanups

Ultimately, it is the affected community members who most need information about the health risks posed by the presence of asbestos contamination in their neighborhoods. Accordingly, to obtain detailed insights into the effectiveness of EPA’s efforts to reach these individuals, we conducted focus groups at three sites—Hamilton Township, New Jersey; Minot, North Dakota; and Dearborn, Michigan. We discussed five key issues at these locations: (1) how the community members first became aware of the cleanup; (2) the content, visibility, and usefulness of the public notices EPA placed to inform the community about the cleanups; (3) overall views of EPA’s efforts to notify the community about the cleanup; (4) information about site cleanups that community members need; and (5) the best methods to reach out and inform affected members of the community. Overall, participants in Dearborn were supportive of EPA’s efforts, but their counterparts at the other two sites generally characterized EPA’s notification efforts as ineffective.

How Community Members First Became Aware of Cleanups

According to the NCP provisions, EPA must at a minimum notify immediately affected citizens and others of cleanup activities. EPA notification guidance recommends that EPA perform outreach and other community-involvement activities as early as possible. For example, the guidance suggests EPA could meet with local officials, media, and residents during the initial site assessment to explain EPA’s removal program. At two of the three sites, however, most discussion group participants said EPA did not notify them about the cleanups before they began. At Minot, nearby residents said they did not know anything about the cleanup until they saw contractors in “space suits” working at the site. At Hamilton Township, most focus-group participants said they found out about the site cleanup through articles in local newspapers. In contrast, participants in the Dearborn focus group said they first heard about the cleanup when EPA officials canvassed the neighborhood delivering letters explaining what was happening at the site and through public meetings in the neighborhood.

Content, Visibility, and Usefulness of Public Notices

The NCP public-notification provisions state that within 60 days of initiation of cleanup activities, EPA must publish an announcement in a major newspaper indicating the administrative record, which discusses EPA’s planned cleanup action, is available for public review. Furthermore, the provisions state that EPA must provide a public-comment period, as appropriate, of not less than 30 days from the time the administrative- record file is made available for public inspections. EPA guidance describes critical information that should appear in public notices and states that they should contain (1) background information about the site, which may include the location of the site and the contaminant involved; (2) the location of the information repository and the hours during which the repository is open; (3) the dates of the public comment period, if applicable; (4) the time, date, and location of the public meeting, if applicable; and (5) the name of the agency contact to whom written comments on the administrative record file should be addressed. The guidance also states that public notices should be placed in well-read sections of newspapers and specifically indicates that if a well-written notice is hidden in the classified section of a newspaper, it will not reach many people. The guidance also recommends using a simply-stated message in easily understood language. It even includes WordPerfect® templates of public notices with graphics to help regional staff easily modify the text to fit site-specific needs.

Based on this guidance, the notices EPA placed for all of the three focus- group sites were deficient in some respects. In particular, the notice for the Hamilton Township site did not give the address of the site, did not mention the contaminant of concern, and did not provide the dates of the public-comment period. This notice also appeared in the classified section of a local newspaper among many other classified advertisements. Figure 8 shows the content and placement of the Hamilton Township notice. Although the notice for the Minot site appeared in a well-read section of a local paper, it appeared in very small print, did not contain the contaminant of concern, or the dates of the public-comment period. In contrast, the notice for the Dearborn site appeared in well-read sections of multiple newspapers and contained all the critical information except the hours during which the repository would be open (see fig. 9).

We asked participants from the three focus groups to evaluate the usefulness of the public notices that EPA had placed for the sites in their neighborhoods. Focus group participants at two of the sites (Hamilton Township and Minot) said they did not see the notices when they were published. After examining the notices during the focus-group meetings, all the participants said the notices did not indicate a threat to their health, did not leave them with the impression that they were to seek out additional information, or that there was a site in their neighborhood contaminated with a hazardous material. For the Hamilton Township site, one participant said the notice gave the impression that all the studies had been completed and nothing more was to be done. For the Minot site, the participants said the notice was in such small print that it would be hard to find in a newspaper, especially if the notice ran for only one day. Another participant from Minot said they would probably ignore the notice because it does not convey useful information and is very bureaucratic and vague. After examining the Minot notice, one participant who owns a business in the city commented, “I run ads for a living, and if I ran ads like that, our company would’ve been broke a long time ago.”

All but one of the participants in the Dearborn focus group said they had seen the notice for the site when it was published, and all the participants commented that it was placed in a well-read section of a newspaper and conveyed useful information up front. This information included the address of the site, the contaminant involved, essential information about a public meeting, and contacts for further information. When the Dearborn group compared the notice for that site with the Hamilton Township notice, they commented that the Dearborn notice was much clearer and the Hamilton Township notice lacked key information, such as the location of the site and the contaminant of concern.

For two of the three focus groups (Hamilton Township and Minot), participants reported that EPA’s efforts to inform them about the cleanups were largely ineffective. For the Hamilton Township site, most of the participants said they did not receive any fliers or any other information from EPA about the cleanup. None of the participants in the Minot focus group said they had heard anything about the cleanup before it began, even though they all lived close to the site. None said they had received any fliers or saw EPA officials walking around the neighborhood. One participant, whose backyard borders the site, said he noticed workers in hazmat suits working at the site and asked them what they were doing. The participant said the engineer in charge of the cleanup provided him with information and agreed to set up air monitors to ensure that he and his neighbors were not exposed to elevated levels of asbestos during the cleanup. None said they had heard about the administrative record for the Minot site or about any opportunities for providing comments to EPA.

In contrast, participants in the Dearborn focus group said EPA effectively informed the community about the cleanup. They reported that EPA held several public meetings and even had a wrap-up meeting after the cleanup was completed. The participants said all the notices, fliers, and letters had contact information on them in case the residents had questions, and EPA had an information trailer at the cleanup site where residents were welcome to stop in with their questions. In addition, according to the participants, EPA officials were always readily available to respond to concerns. For example, when EPA became concerned that some residents might have taken the contaminated waste product home to use in their yards, the participants said EPA walked around the neighborhood and hand delivered letters asking permission to access people’s properties for inspection. Also, according to one participant, when some residents expressed concern about the spread of contamination during windy conditions, EPA set up monitors and stopped work at the site when the wind speed went above a certain level. Finally, because of the number of Arab-American residents in the community, participants said EPA provided notices and letters in both English and Arabic.

Information That Community Members Need about Site Cleanups

For those focus-group participants who did not have an opportunity to ask EPA questions about the site cleanups, we asked what information they would have wanted EPA to provide. While Dearborn participants said they had ample opportunities to ask EPA questions and received the information they needed, participants in the other two focus groups (Hamilton Township and Minot) said they would have asked questions about the following: Sampling, including what areas EPA sampled; whether there would be any off-site sampling; the results of the sampling; and how they could be sure their property was not contaminated.

Conduct of the cleanup, including what areas are being cleaned up; how the soil will be removed and what precautions will be taken to keep asbestos fibers from becoming airborne; how EPA will dispose of the contaminated dirt; whether there will be a follow-up information session after the cleanup is completed; and whether there will be continued monitoring for a designated period of time after the cleanup.

Health risks, including what health risks are associated with the site cleanup; what health risks are present before the site is cleaned up; who the contact is for questions about the risks and health effects associated with asbestos exposure.

Best Methods to Inform Affected Members of the Community

In the three focus groups, community members suggested several methods of notification that would have helped them understand the situation. In general, participants from all focus groups thought using multiple methods of communication would help ensure that more people are informed about cleanups. One participant pointed out, for example, if someone does not read a notice about a cleanup in a newspaper, they might find out about it instead by reading a flier that is placed on their door. Participants from all three groups agreed that fliers, letters, public meetings, and door-to-door contacts were effective. Some in the Hamilton Township focus group commented that since they received automated phone calls to remind them to vote, perhaps it would be possible for EPA to provide information about cleanups in a similar fashion. The importance of including contact numbers on all handouts, fliers, and letters was stressed by some participants in the Dearborn focus group. In addition, some of the Dearborn participants said that it was useful to have the trailer at the cleanup site.

Conclusions

To its credit, EPA has agreed to undertake a risk and toxicity assessment for the type of asbestos found in Libby ore. It expects to complete the assessment in 2010. Until then, EPA cannot be assured that of the 271 sites that it assessed, only 19—those generally exceeding thresholds for asbestos contamination—need to be cleaned up; nor can it be assured that the sites still having detectable levels of asbestos do not pose a risk to public health and the environment. As we noted, the thresholds EPA used are not health based. Furthermore, the methods EPA used to determine levels of asbestos contamination early in its assessment process are not as accurate as currently available methods. Resampling the sites that EPA initially sampled with these newly available and more reliable sampling and analytical techniques would be a major commitment for EPA; this step may nonetheless need to be taken for at least some of these sites to provide a more accurate assessment of the threats they pose. Hence, in addition to identifying a defensible health-based threshold, EPA will also need to determine the implications of the new sampling and analytical techniques to determine which sites may still need to be cleaned up.

Community members who live and work near sites where hazardous materials are being removed need to understand how cleanups are being conducted and have opportunities to voice any concerns they have. While EPA has recognized the need to obtain early and meaningful community involvement in cleanup decisions, and taken actions in recent years to strengthen its efforts to inform the public, we found that at the 13 sites where asbestos contamination from Libby ore was being cleaned up, several of the EPA regions did not fully implement NCP notification provisions and some did not adhere to the notification guidance. We believe this provides sufficient indication that similar problems may be occurring at other cleanup sites nationwide where EPA is responsible for conducting public-notification activities. Also, the feedback that we received during focus groups from community members living and working near cleanup sites indicates, among other things, that the notices EPA relies on to inform community members about cleanup activities were deficient in some respects.

Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the EPA Administrator direct the Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response to determine (1) the manner and extent to which newly available sampling and analysis techniques should be used to re-evaluate the threat that the sites receiving Libby ore may pose to human health, and (2) whether any additional sites that received the Libby ore need to be cleaned up when the results of the risk and toxicity assessment—now scheduled to be completed in 2010— are available.

We also recommend that the Administrator direct the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response to review regional offices’ implementation of the National Contingency Plan public-notification provisions and associated guidance and ensure that, in the future, (1) regional offices appropriately determine the extent of community outreach needed and (2) newspaper notifications are prominent and written in clear language that contains all critical information, such as the name of the contaminant, the location of the site, and the associated health risks.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to EPA and ATSDR for comment. EPA responded in a letter dated September 21, 2007, which indicated that it generally agreed with our recommendations and said that the agency is taking steps to address many of the issues identified in the report. Both EPA and ATSDR also provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix II includes EPA’s September 21, 2007 letter, along with our point-by-point response to their individual comments.

We are sending copies of this report to the congressional requesters and other interested parties. In addition, we will send copies to the EPA Administrator, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of Labor. We will also make copies available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

We were asked to (1) describe how the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other federal agencies assessed and addressed potential risks at the facilities that received asbestos-contaminated vermiculite ore from a mine in Libby, Montana, and the results of these efforts; and (2) determine the extent and effectiveness of the EPA regions’ efforts to notify the public about the cleanup of facilities that received the contaminated ore.

Due to concerns of the Department of Justice and EPA that our work could impact an ongoing federal criminal case against W.R. Grace—the company that owned the vermiculite mine in Libby, Montana, and some of the processing facilities that received ore from Libby—and the need to avoid undue influence in the case, we designed our methodology to minimize direct contact with EPA staff. Accordingly, we obtained most of the information we needed about EPA’s assessments of the sites that received Libby ore and the agency’s public-notification activities at the sites that were cleaned up by submitting questions to EPA in writing; the agency provided written responses. We did not further pursue access to this information because we had sufficient data to respond to our objectives.

EPA’s Assessment of Sites

To address the first objective, we obtained from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) a table of sites that had potentially received contaminated ore from Libby, Montana. This table was largely based on data that ATSDR received from EPA about each of the sites identified as receiving ore from the Libby mine. The table included, for each site, the location, type of facility, and limited information on the status of EPA’s assessments of the sites as of April 2003. The table also included information on the amount of ore received by each site as of April 2001. After revising the table to include only the information needed to address our objectives, we sent the revised table to EPA and requested that EPA verify, update, and complete the information in the table. We also submitted in writing a set of questions to clarify the data in the table and a set of questions to assess the reliability of the information in the table for the purposes of our report, focusing mainly on the data about the amount of ore received by each site.

From March 2006 to May 2007, through a series of correspondences, we obtained EPA’s responses to our written questions and information about the site data, which are reflected in this report. Based on EPA’s responses regarding the accuracy and completeness of the information in the table of sites, we determined the data are adequate to provide conservative estimates of the amount of ore received by each site.

We also collected and analyzed relevant documentation about sites from EPA’s Superfund record centers, which are public repositories. In addition, we collected and analyzed ATSDR’s health consultations prepared for selected sites that received ore from Libby, Montana.

We also obtained and analyzed several documents that relate to EPA’s actions to clean up sites in Libby, Montana, and the sites that received Libby ore. These documents included: the National Contingency Plan (NCP) regulations that implement the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA); February and April 2000 memoranda from EPA’s Director of the Office of Emergency and Remedial Response to all EPA regions regarding assessment of sites that received Libby ore; 2001 EPA Office of Inspector General’s report entitled “EPA’s Actions Concerning Asbestos- Contaminated Vermiculite in Libby, Montana”; GAO’s 2003 report entitled “Hazardous Materials: EPA’s Cleanup of Asbestos in Libby, Montana and Related Actions to Address Asbestos-Contaminated Materials”; and an August 2004 memorandum from the Director of EPA’s Office of Superfund Remediation and Technology Innovation to EPA regions regarding clarification of asbestos cleanup goals.

EPA’s Public-Notification Efforts

To address the second objective, we limited our review to the 13 sites that were being cleaned up and for which EPA had public-notification responsibility. These sites were located in Phoenix, Arizona; Glendale and Newark, California; Denver, Colorado; Honolulu, Hawaii; Wilder, Kentucky; Dearborn, Michigan; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Great Falls, Montana; Minot, North Dakota; Hamilton Township, New Jersey; and two sites located in Salt Lake City, Utah. We interviewed officials from EPA’s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response to obtain general information about public-notification provisions to which EPA is subject and any guidance that EPA has issued instructing regional offices about their responsibilities for complying with these provisions. In April 2006, we submitted structured questions in writing to EPA’s headquarters and 10 regional offices to determine compliance with public-notification provisions and any additional community-notification efforts that took place at the 13 sites. From April 2006 to May 2007, through a series of correspondences, EPA provided responses to these questions and various follow-up questions in writing.

We developed sets of structured questions to assist in obtaining state and local government officials’ perspectives on the public notification that took place in communities where cleanups occurred. To identify the state and local government agencies involved in the cleanups and officials in those agencies most knowledgeable about the notification that took place at each site, we obtained some names from the administrative records for the sites being cleaned up. In some cases, we asked EPA to provide the names of state and local agencies or officials they worked with during the cleanups. For sites where we only had the name of an agency, we called the agency and asked for the person who would be most knowledgeable about the site. We conducted these interviews in person and by telephone. We interviewed officials in the following state offices: Arizona Department of Environmental Quality, California Department of Toxic Substances Control and California Department of Health Services, Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, Hawaii Department of Health, Kentucky Department for Environmental Protection, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, Minnesota Department of Health and Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Montana Department of Environmental Quality, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, and the Utah Department of Environmental Quality. We also interviewed officials from the following local governments: Newark, California; Alameda County, California; Wilder, Kentucky; Dearborn, Michigan; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Great Falls, Montana; Hamilton Township, New Jersey; Minot, North Dakota; and Salt Lake City, Utah.

To obtain community members’ perspectives on the extent and effectiveness of EPA’s public-notification efforts, we conducted focus groups to gather qualitative information about their attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions. Four focus groups were conducted in Wilder, Kentucky; Dearborn, Michigan; Minot, North Dakota; and Hamilton Township, New Jersey to ensure geographic diversity. In order to help compare notification practices across EPA regional offices, we selected sites that were located in different EPA regions. Other criteria for selection included the amount of ore received and whether the cleanup action had been completed or was ongoing.

We contracted with a marketing research firm, Marketing Systems Group, to obtain randomly selected names, addresses, and telephone numbers of 100 community members who lived or worked within a half-mile radius of each of the sites. We mailed a letter and brief questionnaire to each randomly selected community member to provide them some background information about our study, obtain information about the number of years they had lived in the communities, and determine whether they would be willing to participate in a focus group. We contacted the community members who returned questionnaires indicating they would be willing to participate. To increase the number of focus-group participants, we called the community members who did not return questionnaires, to determine if they could participate. We also contacted former workers and their family members who lived in each community to determine if they would be willing to participate in focus groups. The focus groups had between 4 and 14 participants.

In conducting the focus groups, the focus-group moderator encouraged the participants to speak freely. Following a GAO-developed discussion guide, the moderator asked the participants to give their perspectives on (1) how they first became aware of the cleanups, (2) the content and usefulness of public notices about the cleanups, (3) EPA’s overall efforts to notify their communities about the cleanups, (4) information that the community members need about site cleanups, and (5) best methods for informing them about the cleanups.

While generating mailing lists for the focus-group sites, the contracting firm inadvertently provided contact information for residences that lived over one-half mile from the Wilder site. After the error was discovered, the contractor provided corrected contact information for residences within a half-mile of the site. However, because the people who attended the Wilder focus group were either former workers or residents who lived more than one-half mile from the site, we decided not to include the results of that focus group in this report.

We also obtained and analyzed several documents that related to EPA’s responsibilities for notifying the public about cleanups at sites that received Libby ore. These documents included: the public-notification provisions of the NCP regulations that implement CERCLA as amended; EPA’s 1981 Public Participation Policy; EPA’s 1992 Public Participation Guidance for On-Scene Coordinators; EPA’s 1997 guidance on Publishing Effective Public Notices; EPA’s 2002 Superfund Community Involvement Toolkit; EPA’s 2002 Superfund Community Involvement Handbook; and EPA’s FY 2006/2007 Superfund Program Implementation Manual.

We performed our work from August 2005 to October 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency

The following are GAO’s comments on the Environmental Protection Agency’s letter dated September 21, 2007.

GAO Comments

1. GAO does note in the report that the Great Falls site in Region 8 involved a single residence where a former worker at a facility that processed Libby ore had taken contaminated waste product from the plant to his residence to resurface his driveway. While GAO acknowledges that the privacy of the homeowner should be considered, providing the public with information about such contamination could alert others who also used the waste ore for similar purposes on their properties. Our review of information on EPA’s evaluations of sites that received Libby ore revealed that one of the primary concerns was whether former employees or the general public took asbestos-contaminated waste ore from the sites to use in their gardens or to landscape their properties. Indeed a review of EPA documentation related to the plant in Great Falls where the homeowner worked indicates that another former employee interviewed by EPA stated that some people requested and were allowed to take dust left over from the processing of the ore to use in their gardens.

While GAO acknowledges that it is important to consider community concerns in deciding the extent of public notification needed during site cleanup, for the sites that received Libby ore, widely disseminating information about these sites to the general public could help identify former workers and others that could have been exposed in the past to the asbestos in the ore. These people, in turn, could provide valuable information that could help EPA in identifying contaminated areas that need to be cleaned up, such as where waste rock was dumped. 2. We did not make the suggested change. The statement is factually accurate and we already note the discretionary nature of the relevant NCP provisions in the report. Region 5’s reasoning for not holding public comment periods for these sites is also reflected in the report. 3. We changed the text to read, “Thus, even though the Libby mine closed around 1990, many residents, former workers, and others who were exposed to the asbestos-contaminated ore recently have been diagnosed with asbestos-related diseases and many more may become ill in the future.” 4. We changed text to read, “Between 1980 and 1982, EPA issued a series of reports related to asbestos-contaminated vermiculite. Most of these reports indicated that there was a lack of data on both exposure to asbestos-contaminated vermiculite and its adverse health effects. Further, the reports identified problems in sampling, analysis, and reproducibility of data regarding low levels of asbestos in vermiculite, which made it difficult to acquire data on exposure and health effects.” 5. We added a footnote stating that EPA cited and fined W.R. Grace in the early 1990s for failure to submit relevant information under the Toxic Substances Control Act. 6. We changed the text throughout the report as appropriate to clarify that EPA is cleaning up properties in the Libby area. 7. We revised the report to include the following statements: “As part of an ongoing criminal case against W.R. Grace, the government has alleged that Grace engaged in a conspiracy to defraud EPA and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health by concealing and misrepresenting the nature of the asbestos-containing vermiculite produced at the mine. Grace has denied the allegations.” 8. Under the NCP, a removal site evaluation includes a removal preliminary assessment and, if warranted, a removal site inspection. 40 C.F.R. § 300.410(a). A preliminary assessment includes, among other things, an “evaluation of factors necessary to make the determination of whether a removal is necessary.” 40 C.F.R. § 300.410(c)(1)(iv). We now use this language in the report. 9. We changed the language to read, “These 195 sites are believed to have received a combined total of at least 6 million tons of ore from the Libby, Montana mine and ore processing operations.” 10. We changed the text throughout the report as appropriate to clarify that the 1 percent asbestos standard is based on the percentage of the area of a microscopic field. 11. We did not make any changes as a result of this comment because the report already includes a discussion of this memorandum. 12. EPA had previously indicated to us that that the Removal Evaluation Report was pending for this site. We interpreted this as meaning that the final decision had not been made. The report has been updated to indicate that a final assessment decision has been made for the site in Brutus, New York, and the Region is drafting the report to document this decision. 13. We made the change suggested by EPA. 14. We clarified the language to read, “Since the plants no longer process Libby ore, current residents living around the sites are no longer being exposed through air emissions from processing activities at the plants.” 15. We did not make any changes based on this comment because it was for additional information and clarification and was not intended to suggest a specific change to the report. 16. The sentence is now complete. It reads “After conducting additional sampling at one of these sites, EPA determined the site required further cleanup.” 17. We did not make any changes based on this comment because the text is part of a footnote. 18. We changed the text to read, “Detailed work plans for five of these studies have been completed with consultation from other agencies and external peer reviewers. Two other studies are continuations of ongoing efforts. Detailed work plans for the remaining five studies are currently being finalized. All studies are scheduled to be completed by the end of calendar year 2009. The milestone date for completing the baseline risk assessment, including the comprehensive toxicity assessment, is the end of fiscal year 2010.” 19. No change was made; the text in the bullet already contains the phrase “as appropriate”. 20. We did not make the suggested change. The statement is factually accurate and we already note the discretionary nature of the relevant NCP provisions in the report. 21. We made the change suggested by EPA. 22. We did not make the suggested change. We already noted the discretionary nature of the relevant NCP provisions in the report. 23. We revised the text to read, “and at the Wilder site, the notice was placed 6 days after the deadline.” 24. We made the changes suggested by EPA. 25. We did not make the suggested change. In our correspondence with EPA about the Honolulu site, EPA indicated that the Hawaii Department of Health was involved in the cleanup. We contacted the Hawaii Department of Health and were directed to officials identified as being knowledgeable about the cleanup. The views expressed in the report are those of the officials we were directed to. During our interview with these officials, they stated the state OSC did do a drive by of the site before the cleanup began, but said the state was not involved around the time of the removal. 26. We did not make the suggested change. In the case of the Great Falls site, we called the Montana Department of Environmental Quality and asked to speak to the state staff EPA said were involved with this site. We were directed to another person identified as being knowledgeable about the cleanup. The views expressed in the report are those of the official we were directed to. In response to EPA’s comment, we tried to contact the two staff named by EPA again. One person was no longer working for the Montana Department of Environmental Quality and the other person said the official that we spoke to originally was the main contact for that site and that he had nothing to add to the information we already had about the site. 27. We sent a copy of EPA’s comments to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) for their review. These officials responded that they agree with GAO’s summary of NJDEP’s comments as presented in the report. They further stated that concerning the Phase I removal action at the Hamilton Township site, NJDEP continues to maintain that EPA’s notice to NJDEP of the Phase I removal action at the site could have been better. The officials said the March 24, 2000, meeting referred to in EPA’s comments was a regularly scheduled, biannual meeting between NJDEP’s Emergency Response Bureau and EPA’s response unit to discuss general removal activities and to coordinate the activities of the Region 2 states (New York and New Jersey) with those of the EPA. NJDEP officials said the attendees at this meeting remember a short discussion about the probability that the vermiculite ore from Libby, Montana, contained asbestos and that this ore was shipped throughout the United States, but none of the attendees construed this as official notification to NJDEP of asbestos contamination at the Hamilton Township site. NJDEP added that the “inventory of sites” and the “Agency Statement on Vermiculite Facility List” sent by EPA to NJDEP following the March 2000 meeting specifically stated that the “list is evolving and is subject to change as more information becomes available; therefore, EPA cannot verify the accuracy of this list.” NJDEP did not view these documents as any kind of official notification of a clean up action to be undertaken at the Hamilton Township site.

NJDEP reiterated that it first learned of the proposed removal action at the Hamilton Township site not in 2000, but rather only when it was copied on a November 6, 2002 Action Memorandum. It subsequently was copied on two Pollution Reports, dated January 30, 2004, and February 27, 2004, but did not learn that the removal action was completed until March 2005, when NJDEP attended a stakeholder meeting.

During the time of the Phase I removal action, NJDEP said that it does not dispute that EPA communicated with Janet Smolenski of NJDEP by copying her on the two Pollution Reports referenced above and by general telephone conversation(s) with Jim Daloia of EPA. The officials said there are no other records in NJDEP’s files to indicate that EPA sent any additional Pollution Reports to NJDEP, nor are there records of the specific telephone conversations held. 28. We did not make the change suggested by EPA. In the case of the Wilder site, we called the city of Wilder and asked to speak to the staff with the most knowledge about the cleanup. This person was also listed as a city contact in EPA’s community-relations plan for the Wilder site. The views expressed in the report are those of that official. 29. We did not make the first change suggested by EPA. In the case of the Great Falls site, we called the city of Great Falls and were directed to a person identified as being knowledgeable about the cleanup. The views expressed in the report are those of the official to whom we were directed. Regarding the contractor licensing issue raised by a city official, we noted the information that EPA provided in a footnote. 30. Table 2 of the draft report already indicates that, for the Minot site, EPA distributed fact sheets, held a public meeting, and went door-to- door to discuss the removal action. The views presented in the report are those of residents who lived within a half-mile of the Minot site. In fact, as pointed out in the report, one focus group participant’s backyard bordered the cleanup site. GAO cannot explain why EPA’s public-notification efforts apparently failed to reach the participants in the focus group. 31. Focus-group participants were asked if they had heard that EPA was cleaning up the sites before the cleanup started, including receiving any fliers from EPA, hearing about any public meetings sponsored by EPA, or seeing any EPA officials walking around their neighborhoods.

For the Minot site, the views presented in this report are those of residents who lived within a half-mile of the site. In fact, as pointed out in the report, one focus group participant’s backyard bordered the cleanup site. GAO cannot explain why EPA’s public notification efforts apparently failed to reach the participants in the focus group. 32. We clarified the language to avoid any inference that sites that were cleaned up to non-detectable levels still pose a risk.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Steve Elstein, Erin Lansburgh, David Stikkers, and Lisa Turner made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to the report were Richard Johnson, Jeremy Manion, Stuart Ryba, Stephanie Sand, Carol Shulman, and Monica Wolford.