Military Training: Management Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Investment in the Joint National Training Capability
Released: 2006-08-11T00:00:00

Letter

Background

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall responsibility for the Training Transformation Program and, through the use of the Training Transformation Executive Steering Group and the Training Transformation Senior Advisory Group, oversees the execution of three capabilities or initiatives: JNTC, the Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability, and the Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability. According to the 2006 Training Transformation Implementation Plan, these 3 initiatives are designed to prepare individuals, units, and staff for the new strategic environment and to provide enabling tools and processes to carry out joint missions. Specifically: The JNTC, focusing on collective training, is expected to prepare forces by providing units and command staff with integrated live, virtual, and constructive training environments. This initiative would add enhanced service and combatant command training that emphasizes jointness and enables global training and mission rehearsal in support of combatant command operations.

The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability, which focuses on individual training, is intended to prepare future decision makers and leaders to better understand joint operations and the common operational picture, as well as to respond innovatively to adversaries. It develops and distributes joint knowledge via a dynamic, global-knowledge network that provides immediate access to joint education and training resources.

The Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability is expected to assist leaders in assessing the value of transformational training initiatives to individuals, organizations, and processes, and to link the impact of the Training Transformation Program to combatant commanders’ readiness requirements. This initiative is also supposed to provide the processes and tools to continuously improve joint training.

The JNTC initiative, the leading initiative for training transformation, is managed by a Joint Management Office within the Joint Forces Command’s Joint Trainer Directorate. This Joint Management Office, which was established in 2003, manages the operational, technical and program resources necessary to implement the initiative. The Joint Management Office coordinates its management efforts of the initiative with the Office of the Secretary of Defense through senior and executive advisory groups. The overall purpose of the JNTC initiative is to provide a persistent capability to combatant command and service training programs to create an appropriate, realistic joint operating environment within their existing training activities. To accomplish this, DOD plans to spend about $1.5 billion on the JNTC initiative through fiscal year 2011, or 84 percent of training transformation total funding. The JNTC initiative was deemed by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness to be operationally capable in October 2004—indicating that the initial infrastructure of networked sites and systems needed to enhance the joint environment of training exercises was in place. During fiscal year 2005, 16 combatant command and service training events were selected by the Joint Forces Command to enhance their joint training environment through the JNTC initiative.

The JNTC initiative includes several key efforts to enhance the joint training environment of combatant commands and services. These efforts include the following: Development of joint task articles. This is an effort to enhance the level of details associated with joint mission essential tasks that are identified by the combatant commands as critical to joint operations, and to provide joint trainers specific guidance for developing exercises and other joint training activities. These task articles are a set of processes, procedures, or actions that address critical horizontal (actions between services) and vertical (actions between a service and a higher joint force command) elements of interoperability for specific joint mission essential tasks. Currently, the JNTC initiative has developed 156 approved articles and has 88 under various stages of development.

Joint training and experimentation network. The joint network is intended to be a large-capacity communications network that will provide persistent support to joint training exercises, service stand- alone events, exercise preparation and rehearsal, experimentation, evaluation of advanced training technologies, and evaluation of new warfighting concepts. The network, when complete, will enable the Joint Forces Command to use live, virtual, and constructive simulations in concert to enhance the joint training environment for combatant commands and services. By the end of fiscal year 2005, the joint network had been expanded to 33 sites, including one in Hawaii and one in Germany.

Accreditation and certification programs. The JNTC accreditation program works toward ensuring that combatant command and service joint training programs include the appropriate joint environment for the joint tasks being trained. Accreditation is program-centric, whereby entire service and combatant command training programs are evaluated and accredited for training selected joint tasks in a joint environment that meets specific joint standards or conditions. The intent of this effort is to establish a process that ensures delivery of a recurring, consistent, realistic training environment for all units participating in joint training, regardless of the locations from which they are participating. The Joint Forces Command accredited 4 training programs during fiscal year 2005 and is expecting to accredit 23 more programs during 2006. JNTC’s certification effort concurrently ensures that the technical aspects of the training programs—the sites and the systems comprising the training infrastructure, networks, and ranges— support the accredited training program.

The JNTC initiative, now 1 year after being deemed initially operational capable, is expected to reach full operational capability in 2010 when it will provide a global joint training network that allows live, virtual, and constructive participation by services, combatant commands, and coalition and interagency partners in accredited training programs.

DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on Training Programs, but Our Analysis Found Indications of Improvements

The full extent to which the JNTC initiative has improved the ability of the services and combatant commands to train jointly is not clear because DOD has not yet assessed the full impact of the JNTC initiative efforts on joint training or developed a strategy for conducting such an assessment. Based on our examination of 5 of the 16 fiscal year 2005 exercises that the Joint Forces Command helped to fund and enhance through the JNTC initiative, we found indications that the JNTC initiative has begun to improve joint training. Examples we found include increases in the use of joint objectives and increases in participation by other services. Without a comprehensive assessment of the JNTC initiative’s enhancement of joint training programs, DOD has no assurance that its investment in the initiative will produce the desired results.

DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on Training Programs

DOD has not yet assessed the full impact of JNTC efforts on joint training; therefore both the overall impact the JNTC initiative is having on joint training programs and the extent to which it is achieving the program’s goals are unclear. The Training Transformation Implementation Plan does not include a requirement for the JNTC Joint Management Office to assess whether the JNTC initiative has improved the ability of the services and combatant commands to train jointly. The JNTC Joint Management Office receives feedback through working with the services and combatant commands, but no formal evaluation of JNTC efforts has been conducted. The individual services and combatant commanders are aware of JNTC enhancements to their specific training programs and resulting improvements and are documenting some of these enhancements in after action reports and lessons learned reports. For example, the Navy’s preliminary assessment of its Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint 05-2 exercise stated that the value added through rapid delivery and improved interoperability and repeatability of the Fleet Synthetic training capability and the joint network will save operating costs while providing quality joint and coalition training to the warfighter. Additionally, as a result of a lesson learned during Terminal Fury 05, JNTC funds were used to develop an analytical tool that enabled analysts to search through recorded exercise model data and replay selected training exercises, which helped explain to the exercise control group and the training audience how and why a particular event occurred. However, these types of reports do not provide an overall assessment of the collective impact JNTC efforts are having on joint training.

DOD’s most recent assessment of its training transformation efforts, conducted by the Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability in support of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, is known as the training transformation block assessment. This block assessment, conducted for the first time in 2005, is the primary mechanism for providing feedback to senior DOD leadership on how well DOD is meeting its training transformation goals. The block assessment is to provide an assessment every 2 years that measures, guides, and evaluates the progress of the training transformation initiatives, including the JNTC initiative. These evaluations are intended by DOD to be an innovative use of performance assessment tools, techniques, and policies, using well- defined metrics to provide a feedback capability to the leadership. Additionally, DOD recently announced its plans to conduct a Joint Training Program Review during mid-2006 to examine training transformation efforts and to realign these efforts with the recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report and program strategic guidance.

Our prior work, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and DOD’s Training Transformation Implementation Plan emphasize the importance of establishing performance metrics that set up time frames and measurable outcomes to gauge the success of a program implementation. GAO’s Human Capital: A Guide on Assessing Strategic Training Programs and Development Efforts in the Federal Government emphasizes the importance of using program performance information to assess the progress that training and development programs make toward achieving results. The guide states that agencies should keep in mind that they need to collect data corresponding to established training objectives throughout the implementation process to refine and continually improve, deliver, and enhance learning. Furthermore, the guide asserts that it is important for agencies to develop and use outcome-oriented performance measures to ensure accountability and to assess progress toward achieving results aligned with the agencies’ missions and goals. The Quadrennial Defense Review Report emphasizes that each initiative is accountable for measuring performance and delivering results that support the departmentwide strategy. DOD’s Training Transformation Implementation Plan requires periodic reviews to assess the success of its Training Transformation Program. According to the plan, every 2 years, a formal program assessment should be conducted to measure the impact of training transformation initiatives on joint force readiness. The results of those assessments are intended to help leaders decide strategy modifications and subsequent investments.

DOD’s initial 2005 training transformation block assessment did not evaluate the JNTC initiative’s collective impact on joint training. According to DOD officials, this assessment was not expected to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the JNTC initiative’s impact on joint training because the initiative is still early in its implementation. Instead, it served as a baseline or framework for identifying joint training measurements for future assessments, and provided a status of the JNTC initiative’s efforts implemented to date. However, the 2005 assessment did not address training efficiency measured by specific cost, schedule, and outcome- oriented performance metrics. Specifically, the 2005 assessment highlighted some progress: (1) the JNTC initiative is providing more joint training through accreditation and certification; (2) combatant command joint mission essential tasks are addressed in events and integrated into training objectives for each event; and (3) rapidly configurable, persistent training networks, such as the Joint Training and Experimentation Network, are a current reality and are being improved. However, the 2005 Training Transformation Assessment Report noted that because of a wide variation of joint training activities, the task of developing metrics that supported effective assessment and corresponding program status progress was unduly complicated.

The 2005 block assessment did identify 10 metrics DOD is considering for its future assessments, such as the 2007 block assessment. These metrics include the percentage of combatant command joint mission essential tasks trained in the joint exercise; the number of programs accredited and certified; and the number of participants using JNTC resources. However, many of these metrics are output oriented and not outcome performance measures, which are necessary to gauge the success of program implementation. Additionally, one of the block assessment’s recommendations is to institutionalize a process to develop metrics for training transformation exercises for use in future assessments. However, it has not finalized its plans for which metrics are to be assessed or identified the time frames and processes it will employ for obtaining data. Because DOD has not finalized its metrics or identified a process to collect the data, training transformation officials stated that it may be difficult to show the impact of JNTC efforts on joint training even in the 2007 block assessment. Without a comprehensive assessment of JNTC’s enhancement of joint training programs, DOD has no assurance that the money invested in the JNTC initiative will produce the desired results of providing combatant commanders with better prepared forces aligned with their joint operational needs or maximize the benefit for DOD’s investment.

Indications Are That the JNTC Initiative Has Begun to Improve Joint Training

Even though DOD has yet to assess the overall impact of the JNTC initiative on joint training, our analysis found indications of potential improvements, such as events that include more joint objectives and allow for more joint participation.

According to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, joint training is defined as “Military training based on joint doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures to prepare joint forces and/or joint staff to respond to strategic and operational requirements deemed necessary by combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. Joint training involves forces of two or more Military Departments interacting with a combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander; involves joint forces and/or joint staffs; and is conducted using joint doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.”

Based on this definition, we selected several attributes to evaluate the effect the JNTC initiative had on joint training. Specifically, we determined whether selected JNTC events conducted in 2005 reflected the following: persistent capabilities added to exercises funded by the JNTC increased use of joint training objectives, increased use of joint task articles, increased involvement of other services, increased use of virtual and constructive training capabilities, and initiative.

DOD officials reviewed the attributes listed above and agreed their use was appropriate in evaluating the effect of the JNTC initiative on joint training.

We analyzed 5 of 16 exercises conducted in fiscal year 2005 that the Joint Forces Command helped to fund and enhance through the JNTC initiative. Table 1 describes the exercises selected for our analysis.

Enhancements to the exercises brought about by the JNTC initiative were many and varied. Some of the improvements purchased with JNTC funds included radios, aircraft instrument pods, threat emitters that imitated ground base enemy radar, and cruise missile simulators. The Air Force used JNTC funds to help establish an Air Support Operations Center that improved the realism of the Air Warrior I exercise by including real-world joint operational organizations. The Joint Forces Command also used JNTC funds to make improvements in computer models used in the Terminal Fury exercise. Aircraft, including former Russian aircraft, were obtained with JNTC funds to act as opposing forces in the Weapons and Tactics Instructor course. JNTC funds were also used to hire personnel and place them at service and combatant command headquarters to assist in improving the joint environment of existing exercises. Finally, the joint network is supported and funded by JNTC funds, allowing a large number of simulators and constructive models from around the country to connect and interact in support of training programs.

To analyze the exercises, we developed a comparative analysis based on the attributes discussed above. This practice allowed us to determine the measure of change in attributes for each selected training exercise prior to fiscal year 2005 and afterwards. We obtained and reviewed exercise documentation, such as exercise planning documents and after action reports for selected exercises to determine the measure of change in the exercise based on our attributes. Our analysis revealed indications that some joint training improvements were made in each of the exercises we assessed. Table 2 summarizes the results of our analysis.

Our analysis of the five exercises and discussions held with exercise planners at two of these exercises revealed several key areas in which indications exist that the JNTC initiative has begun to improve joint training.

Increased use of joint training objectives. Our analysis found that for four of the five exercise events we reviewed, the services increased the number of joint training objectives to which they trained. For example, prior to being enhanced by the JNTC initiative, Air Warrior I’s exercise objectives were determined by the squadron commanders and were focused on achieving service-specific objectives. After JNTC, service-specific training objectives were modified to include some joint training objectives, such as conducting a joint, live-fire event within a realistic combat scenario and employing real-time joint and combined fires. In another exercise, according to the exercise planner, JNTC efforts enabled the Navy Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint exercise to include Army and Air Force units in its exercise. Through the participation of the Army and Air Force units, the Navy began including joint interoperability training objectives in exercise planning documents for both Navy Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint 05-2 and 06-1. The National Training Center’s primary focus, both before and after the JNTC initiative, has been on accomplishing service-specific training objectives. However, after the JNTC initiative’s involvement, the National Training Center has added some joint and interoperability tasks in its exercises, although these tasks are subordinate to the service-specific training objectives. Prior to the JNTC initiative, the Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor course trained to the six functions of Marine Corps aviation, which had some joint aspects. After JNTC designation, the Marine Corps continued to train to the six functions of Marine Corps aviation, but it began using several joint tactical tasks and joint training objectives in the exercise.

Increased use of joint task articles. The Air Force and the Navy used joint task articles in enhancing their Air Warrior I and Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint exercises. Joint task articles detail the integrated tasks and steps necessary to provide a specific warfighting capability to a joint force commander and are based on the joint mission essential tasks. Air Force officials compared the task article for close air support with current practices at Air Warrior I and identified deficiencies in the procedures used during these exercises prior to 2005. Steps were then taken to correct the deficiencies which included adding an Air Support Operations Center. Consequently, Air Warrior I exercises are now conducted more in line with close air support joint doctrine. The Navy also made extensive use of the task articles in preparing for its accreditation review.

Increased involvement of other services. Four of the five exercises we examined showed that participation had expanded to include more services when compared to years before the JNTC enhancements were included. The fifth exercise was a combatant command exercise that was already joint and did not show an increase in the participation of other services as a result of JNTC efforts. Joint training requires the involvement of two or more services; therefore the JNTC initiative used a variety of means, such as additional funding and the Joint Training and Experimentation Network, to increase the participation of other services in an exercise. As a result, Navy and Marine air units and the staff of the Commander, Third Fleet, participated in the National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercises in 2005. Army and Air Force units participated in the Navy’s Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint in 2005 and 2006. A NATO Airborne Warning and Control aircraft joined the Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor course exercise in 2005, and a similar unit from the United Kingdom plans to participate in 2006.

Increased use of virtual and constructive training capabilities. Our analysis showed that key virtual and constructive training capabilities made possible by the use of the Joint Training and Experimentation Network have had a positive impact on three of the five exercises we examined. The joint network is a persistent, rapidly reconfigurable communications network that connects multiple training sites. According to Navy training exercise planners, the joint network is what allowed the Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint exercises to include Army and Air Force simulators to participate in the exercise. For example, we observed during a recent Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint exercise, Army and Navy operators, using virtual and constructive capabilities, track an incoming missile attack and coordinate a joint response. Without the joint network, the Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint exercises would likely have remained solely a Navy exercise. According to Terminal Fury exercise planners, the joint network improved Terminal Fury by increasing the capacity to include a larger number of constructive models in the exercise. For example, Tactical Simulation is a very large intelligence model used to simulate the entire spectrum of intelligence operations. Prior to the joint network, the Tactical Simulation model was not included in the exercise because the model was too large to transport to Hawaii. The joint network provided the means to connect the Tactical Simulation model to the exercise from its home station in the continental United States. In addition, Terminal Fury participants are spread out over a wide area, including several sites in Hawaii and the continental United States. According to Terminal Fury exercise planners, two tools made possible by the joint network, Video Teleconferencing and Voice Over Internet Protocol, provided the means by which these geographically separated sites could coordinate the execution of the exercise. Finally, according to a Marine Corps official, the joint network has aided the Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course in developing exercise scenarios, executing the exercise, and connecting a virtual Unmanned Aerial Vehicle to the exercise.

Persistent capabilities added to exercises funded by the JNTC initiative. All five exercises reviewed received enhancements that will continue to benefit these exercises into the future. Each exercise received a persistent link to the joint network and embedded Support Element staff hired to assist service and combatant command headquarters in adding joint capabilities to their exercises. In addition, the Air Force received radios and aircraft instrument pods for Air Warrior I, computer model improvements were made for Terminal Fury, and the National Training Center received surrogate weapons for its opposing force. All these persistent capabilities were procured with JNTC funds.

In addition to the improvements noted above, we also found that the JNTC initiative has reduced some of the travel and transportation costs associated with one of the five exercises we examined. Specifically, a number of the constructive models used in the Terminal Fury exercise are based in the continental United States. In prior years, the hardware and supporting personnel would have to travel to Hawaii to participate in the exercise. Since the joint network connected these models to the exercise from their home stations, there was no need to move the hardware and support staff to Hawaii for the exercise.

Finally, there are a number of JNTC efforts under way to further improve joint training. For example, in future iterations of the National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercise, the Air Force would like to use the joint network to include a Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System aircraft simulator to create a realistic joint environment. Due to their limited number and the high demand for these aircraft, the planes are not always available to participate in the exercises. The joint network will allow the use of these aircraft simulators in the National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercise by having them participate virtually from their home stations. In addition to increasing the availability of these aircraft virtually in future exercises, the joint network will also reduce the travel, transportation, and fuel costs of deploying and using the actual aircraft in the National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercises.

Reserve Components Have Potentially Benefited from JNTC, but Joint Forces Command Has Not Fully Embraced the Reserves’ Unique Training Needs

Reserve component members have benefited from JNTC-enhanced training events, but the unique training needs of the reserve components have not been fully considered because the Joint Forces Command has not established an ongoing working relationship with them.

Reserve Units Have Participated in JNTC Training Events

Members of the reserve components have potentially benefited from JNTC-enhanced training when they participate in active service- and combatant command-sponsored combat training programs enhanced by the JNTC initiative, such as predeployment and mission rehearsal exercise programs. For example, based on our analysis of five training events enhanced by the JNTC initiative, reserve and guard units and individuals have participated to a limited extent in all but one of the five events. Specifically, Air National Guard personnel participated in a fiscal year 2005 Air Warrior I exercise, Army reservists participated in a fiscal year 2005 National Training Center exercise, Navy reservists participated in a fiscal year 2005 Fleet Synthetic Training—Joint exercise, and Marine Corps reservists participated in a fiscal year 2006 Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course exercise. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs officials stated that reserve participation in many of these events occurred, in part, because active duty units were unavailable to fully participate and reserve units were asked to fill in. According to JNTC and service officials, reserves participating in these events may benefit from many of the same JNTC enhancements to the joint training environment as do active forces. To date, Joint Forces Command officials said they have relied on active service components and combatant commands to involve the reserve components in JNTC-enhanced training.

Joint Forces Command Has Not Established a Working Relationship with the Reserve Components

In an effort to develop and manage active service and combatant command training programs, the Joint Forces Command has developed formal coordination mechanisms, including liaison officers, planning conferences, and process action teams that involve numerous participants from various organizations within the active service and combatant commands, but these coordination mechanisms do not include reserve personnel. For example, the Joint Forces Command has established on- site liaison officer positions to serve as the active service representative on a daily basis to communicate with the JNTC officials and aid in the development of the business and operational processes related to the JNTC initiative. Currently, all liaison officer positions include representatives from the active services with no representatives from the reserve components. According to Joint Forces Command officials and service liaison officers, these active service liaison officers primarily represent their respective active service components’ needs and issues and do not specifically communicate the needs of the reserve component to Joint Forces Command officials.

Active services and combatant command personnel also regularly attend planning conferences to organize upcoming training exercises. These meetings occur periodically throughout the initial, middle, and final planning stages of an exercise, and to date, the Joint Forces Command has not reached out specifically to the reserve components to include them in these planning conferences. The Joint Forces Command has also established nine process action teams organized by functional areas in operations, technical, and program management to discuss JNTC implementation and development. These process action teams perform a vast array of responsibilities, such as developing JNTC event requirements and timelines; defining required operational capabilities in order to fully coordinate live, virtual, and constructive opposition forces into joint training; defining technical goals for data systems that will enable joint selecting advanced training technologies to ensure integration of live, virtual, and constructive components into a seamless joint training environment; and developing all JNTC budget and program activities.

According to Joint Forces Command officials, the reserve components are not formally invited to participate in these process action teams.

DOD guidance regarding reserve components and joint training requires full integration of the reserve components into every aspect and each stage of the overall process in developing a joint training initiative. For example, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report specifically highlights the need for joint training to include the reserve components in ensuring the readiness of the total force. In addition, the Training Transformation Strategic Plan identifies that the reserve components face several unique training requirements and circumstances that must be considered at each step of this process, from strategic planning through implementation. Further, the 2005 training transformation block assessment calls for including the reserve components’ training in transformation training events. Specifically, the assessment states that the reserve components (1) should participate in training transformation events in order to integrate the reserve component with the active component and (2) may have special needs for training, and training events should be tailored to meet these needs.

During discussions with Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, officials, they noted the following unique reserve training circumstances that should be considered when developing the JNTC enhancements: Geography. Since members of the National Guard and reserves are often not physically located at their respective home duty stations, the scheduling of training is more complex.

Limited training time. Reservists are constrained to 39 training days per year. Only if a reservist is activated or volunteers can he/she exceed this limitation.

Competing requirements. Reservists must complete training requirements similar to the active core training requirements, such as general military training and physical training, as well as satisfying any other reserve requirements. Reservists must also consider and manage their civilian careers along with their military obligations.

Limited training assets. Resources, such as classrooms and computer simulation systems and networks for joint training (such as those that enable live, virtual, and constructive participation), are not readily available to National Guard members and reservists.

Lack of training predictability. Since reserve components are currently not included in the scheduling of joint training events, planning for joint training opportunities is much more difficult and erratic.

Along with these unique training requirements, National Guard Bureau officials stated that some of the National Guard’s missions, such as homeland defense and responding to natural disasters, should be included as a part of the JNTC initiative that currently are not.

As a result of the absence of formal reserve component representation in the development of the JNTC initiative, the unique characteristics of the reserve component have not been incorporated into the initiative’s development of joint training requirements. According to Joint Forces Command officials, the inclusion of unique reserve component training needs into the JNTC initiative is a long-term goal. To date, there has been no specific effort made by the Joint Forces Command to develop joint tasks or technical enhancements associated with the needs and missions of the reserve components.

The JNTC initiative’s priority remains on active services and combatant commands, as the development of joint tasks and technical enhancements has been primarily for existing active service and combatant command training programs. According to Joint Forces Command officials, the process for the development of joint articles has involved the active services and combatant commands and focused on developing tasks for combat missions, such as close air support, joint force targeting, and joint fires. Although reserve members deploying to overseas operations are expected to perform these combat tasks as appropriate, Joint Forces Command officials have stated that the development of joint articles has not significantly focused on tasks unique to the reserve components, such as disaster relief and homeland defense. Further, the reserve components were not included in the team responsible for the development of joint articles. Additionally, the development of the Joint Training and Experimentation Network has established permanent capability throughout the continental United States at active service and combatant command facilities. The joint network has been coordinated with existing active training networks, such as the Navy’s Continuous Training Environment, according to Navy officials, and the Air Force’s Distributed Mission Operations Center. According to Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs officials, interfaces with reserve and guard networks have not yet occurred. The continued lack of focus on the joint training needs of the reserve components will limit their ability to enhance their joint training skills.

JNTC Training Program Accreditation Process Does Not Give Priority to New and Emerging Missions, Ensure Consistent Use of JNTC Capabilities, or Include the National Guard

The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop a process of accrediting training programs and joint tasks to facilitate the JNTC goals. However, the command has not (1) placed priority on accrediting training programs related to new and emerging missions, as highlighted in the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report; (2) taken steps to ensure that accredited joint training will continue to occur after initial accreditation; and (3) accredited any National Guard-specific training programs.

Joint Forces Command Has Begun an Accreditation Process

In fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command began a process of accrediting active services’ and combatant commands’ training programs on specific joint tasks, in an effort to facilitate the goals of the JNTC initiative. The intent of the accreditation process is to validate that the training programs can provide the training audience, regardless of location, with a recurring, consistent, realistic environment for the joint tasks being trained. An accreditation review is not an inspection or a report card, but can be compared to accrediting a university, where individual courses of instruction are officially approved. Initially, the JNTC initiative used an event-centric approach that focused on enhancing single designated training events. Starting in fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command began employing a program-centric approach that focused on establishing permanent joint capabilities, which can be used for all rotations of active service and combatant command training programs. Previously, the event-centric approach only provided a limited number of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines with an opportunity to experience a JNTC-enhanced joint training event. Specifically, one rotation of the Navy’s Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint exercise would have been enhanced by the JNTC initiative, and the one event would have incorporated enhanced joint capabilities. However, in the program-centric approach, the number of training opportunities using JNTC enhancements significantly increases. Now, every rotation of the Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint exercise has the opportunity to include enhanced joint training.

The accreditation process involves several steps, beginning with the nomination process and ending with the Joint Forces Command’s recommendation. The key steps of the accreditation process are summarized below: The Joint Forces Command sends a message to the active services and combatant commands, requesting that they nominate training programs and joint tasks to be accredited.

Once the active services and combatant commands submit their training programs for nomination, the Joint Forces Command reviews and selects these programs, and consolidates and prioritizes a master schedule of those nominated programs to include joint tasks to be performed by each program.

To familiarize the active services and combatant commands with the accreditation process, the Joint Forces Command’s Accreditation Review Team develops a Web site for each training program and provides training for the services and combatant commands.

The Joint Forces Command schedules site visits with cognizant active service and combatant command officials to perform its accreditation review.

The Joint Forces Command team conducts the review and makes a recommendation to the Commander, who will grant the appropriate level of accreditation status to that training program on specific joint tasks, in the final accreditation report.

JNTC Nomination Guidance for Accreditation Does Not Emphasize Priorities Identified by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report

Although the Joint Forces Command has begun its accreditation process to facilitate the JNTC goals, it has not emphasized nominating training programs that place a priority on new and emerging missions as stressed in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. These new and emerging mission areas include irregular warfare, complex stabilization operations, combating weapons of mass destruction, and information operations, which may emphasize additional skill sets than offensive combat operations, such as cultural awareness training and coordination with other agencies. In the past nomination cycles, there has been no guidance that provides criteria for nominating training programs and joint tasks. In lieu of established nomination guidance, we found that the active services nominated training programs based on several reasons. For example, Army and Marine Corps officials told us they selected programs based on their need to enhance joint tasks for the maximum number of participants. The Navy nominated programs based on their ability to provide joint and coalition training. The Air Force nominated programs based on their perceived gains from adding jointness to the training environment. While there have been no specific nomination criteria, the Joint Forces Command has established criteria it uses for selecting programs once nominated. These criteria focus on (1) programs that address critical joint training issues that are affecting warfighting capabilities; (2) the mission of organizations that will receive joint training; (3) programs that provide predeployment training; and (4) joint throughput, or the number of multi-service and joint units that can be trained on required joint training. These criteria do not emphasize skill sets required for new and emerging mission areas.

Currently, the Joint Forces Command is in the process of developing guidance for future use that will provide criteria for nominating programs. These criteria ask active services and combatant commands to nominate programs that have the following traits: (1) primary training audience composed of units or staff; (2) established system for providing training feedback; (3) established training cadre and/or exercise control structure; and (4) realistic threat portrayal (i.e., opposing forces) within the training programs. Additionally, it provides nomination criteria for accrediting the joint tasks within the program. The criteria requires that the joint tasks (1) come from the Universal Joint Task List or the latest approved list of joint tasks, and (2) fall within the normal core competencies and normal training environment of the nominated training programs. Although the Joint Forces Command has proposed nomination guidance, its draft guidance still has not emphasized the need to accredit tasks within active service and combatant command training programs that will improve proficiency in new and emerging mission areas. Until DOD establishes such nomination guidance, new and emerging missions will not be given priority in the accreditation process and thus be able to incorporate the JNTC enhancements.

By the end of fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command had conditionally accredited joint tasks in 4 programs and plans to grant accreditation to joint tasks in as many as 23 additional programs by the end of 2006. Most of these training programs focus primarily on traditional combat missions. For example, the Navy’s Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint program has been conditionally accredited on seven joint tasks, including developing and sharing intelligence, conducting joint fires, conducting air and missile defense operations, and conducting defensive counter air operations. Additionally, the Joint Forces Command anticipates that the active services and combatant commands will nominate 3 or 4 additional programs for accreditation in 2007. Table 3 shows the total nominated programs, including the 4 programs conditionally accredited in fiscal year 2005 and the 23 programs planned to be accredited for 2006.

Accreditation Process Has No Mechanism to Ensure Recurring Use of JNTC Capabilities

The Joint Forces Command has not taken steps to ensure that accredited joint training will consistently reoccur in active service and combatant command training programs. As previously noted, the intent of the accreditation process is to ensure that all units participating in joint training, regardless of location, experience a recurring, consistent, realistic joint environment. In addition, DOD has directed the services to conduct joint training to the maximum extent possible in accredited exercises. As previously noted, in fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command began to transition its JNTC initiative from an event-centric approach to a broader program-centric approach, focusing on establishing permanent joint capabilities, which can be used for all rotations of training events, not just a single designated training event.

However, the Joint Forces Command has not taken steps to ensure that joint tasks previously accredited will consistently be incorporated in future service and combatant commander training events. According to DOD officials, the services and combatant commands should participate in the accreditation process in order to obtain JNTC funding for their nominated training programs. However, according to a Joint Forces Command official, the command cannot require the services and combatant commands to train to the joint tasks that have been accredited. Service officials we spoke with stated that currently there are no consequences for them not continuing to include accredited joint tasks in future training rotations. While service officials recognized the value of training to accredited joint tasks, they also recognized that there are competing demands for their time and resources that may preclude them from training to joint tasks. Situations that compete for their time and resources include service-specific unit training requirements, shortage of training funds, and the deployment of personnel and equipment to overseas operations. While the Joint Forces Command provides financial contributions to the services to help offset the costs associated with incorporating the JNTC enhancements, it is not clear if the JNTC initiative’s financial contributions are significant enough to function as leverage to encourage the repeated training of accredited joint tasks. For example, an Army official stated that the Army has budgeted $640 million to support its combat training centers in fiscal year 2006, and that the Joint Forces Command’s support for the Army’s combat training centers amounts to $11.6 million.

The Joint Forces Command is taking a proactive step to help support the active services and combatant commands in embedding JNTC enhancements in their training programs. It is hiring Support Elements— JNTC representatives placed permanently at service and combatant command training programs—to help ensure that the program officials implement the JNTC initiative by creating a supporting relationship between organizations. Additionally, the Support Elements are to assist program officials with joint training planning and executions at their locations and ensure that standards are maintained in accreditation reviews. However, according to JNTC officials, these individuals alone may not be able to ensure that accredited joint training will continue to occur. Furthermore, it is too early to determine if the services will continue to include joint tasks on a regular basis, since the Joint Forces Command only began the accreditation process in 2005 and only recently established positions to be filled by Support Element representatives.

The Joint Force Commander plans to reaccredit training programs every 3 years but has not established criteria for their reaccreditation process that would ensure that services and combatant commanders continue to incorporate and expand on previously accredited joint tasks. According to the JNTC Accreditation Concept of Operations, a reaccreditation process will be used to reaffirm accredited status upon expiration (following 3 years) or determine the status of a training program that has undergone such significant change that the existing program is considerably different from the program that last received accreditation status. However, this concept of operations does not address what standard of training needs to be accomplished or what level of accredited tasks should be trained to receive reaccreditation. Without providing adequate reaccreditation guidance, the Joint Forces Command may risk not accomplishing the intent of JNTC’s accreditation efforts. Moreover, until DOD establishes standards for reaccrediting training programs that ensure the consistent incorporation of JNTC enhancement in future training rotations, DOD risks not maximizing its investment in the JNTC initiative.

No National Guard Training Programs Have Been Considered for JNTC Accreditation

DOD encourages the integration of the reserve components into joint training. Specifically, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report reinforces the need for joint training to include the reserve components in ensuring the readiness of the total force, and a DOD directive on military training says that to the maximum extent possible, all components shall conduct joint training in accredited events. Our analysis found that the National Guard has developed joint training exercise programs dealing with missions involving homeland defense and security. However, no National Guard training programs have currently been considered for JNTC accreditation. Joint Forces Command officials stated they have not placed a priority on involving the National Guard in the JNTC accreditation process, and incorporating the National Guard into the JNTC initiative is still a long-term goal for the Joint Forces Command. The Joint Forces Command has not sent request messages seeking nominations for joint training accreditation to the National Guard as it has done for the active services and combatant commands. In addition, we found that the Joint Forces Command has not established a process for nominating and accrediting National Guard-specific training programs.

The National Guard Bureau has approached the Joint Forces Command about considering the Vigilant Guard training program—a series of training exercises that will further enhance the preparedness of the National Guard to perform roles and responsibilities related to homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities—for the JNTC accreditation process. The training program involves 4 to 6 states per event with a focus on the training and coordination of the newly established state joint force headquarters and state joint task forces. Vigilant Guard provides the National Guard the opportunity to execute core joint tasks, such as (1) acquire and communicate operational-level information and maintain status; (2) establish, organize, and operate a joint force headquarters; and (3) provide theater support to other DOD and government agencies. However, National Guard officials stated that Vigilant Guard has not yet been considered for accreditation by the Joint Forces Command.

National Guard Bureau officials have also recently discussed with the Joint Forces Command officials the potential for linking the National Guard’s GuardNet network to JNTC’s joint network. GuardNet is a network for delivering telecommunications services to National Guard users in 54 U.S. states and territories, providing persistent connectivity. It consolidates video and data functions to support simulation, training, mobilization command and control, and computer emergency response, in addition to operational missions assigned to the National Guard. These telecommunications capabilities have helped to reduce stress on the National Guard force by decreasing personnel travel and increasing home station time available for training. To date, National Guard officials stated that GuardNet has not been integrated into JNTC’s joint network design. Although Joint Forces Command and National Guard officials have had meetings regarding the inclusion of both Vigilant Guard and GuardNet into the JNTC joint network, National Guard Bureau officials stated that no action has yet been taken. Without specific JNTC-accredited training programs and linkages with JNTC’s joint network, National Guard training programs may not be able to take full advantage of JNTC resources, such as participation from other components, access to new technologies and modeling, and training environments that realistically portray overseas and domestic joint operations.

Conclusions

In the new security environment, U.S. forces are conducting significantly more complex operations requiring increased joint interoperability among participants in the theater and on the battlefield. DOD’s JNTC initiative is designed to help the services and combatant commands meet these challenges. Without thoroughly assessing the progress of the Joint Forces Command’s training transformation efforts, DOD does not know the value added to the readiness of services and combatant commands resulting from the significant investment of resources devoted to the JNTC initiative. Furthermore, recent domestic events and ongoing overseas operations have placed extremely high demands on the reserve components, which play a critical role in executing our national defense strategy. Once mobilized, reservists and National Guard members operate in the same joint environment as active service members. Unless the reserve components receive the training necessary to allow them to operate seamlessly in this environment, reservists may be unprepared to face the full range of responsibilities they are called upon to perform both at home and abroad. Until the Joint Forces Command embraces the reserve components, incorporating their unique training needs into the development of the JNTC initiative’s joint training enhancements, the reserve and the National Guard forces will not be able to take full advantage of the enhanced joint training offered through this initiative. Additionally, without clear criteria to guide the accreditation and reaccreditation process, DOD will have no assurance that the joint training initiative reflects DOD’s training priorities on new and emerging threats or that the services and combatant commands will continually take advantage of the resources and capabilities provided by the JNTC initiative. Without consistently training its forces in a recurring, realistic, joint operating environment, DOD will lack assurance that forces deployed to its theaters will have the necessary skills to operate effectively in today’s complex, multinational, interagency operations. Also, without incorporating the National Guard into the accreditation process, DOD has no assurance that the National Guard will experience realistic overseas and domestic joint operational training environments portrayed by JNTC enhancements. Furthermore, DOD needs to address the issues highlighted above in order to ensure that the joint training benefits from its $1.5 billion investment in the JNTC initiative are being optimized.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To further enhance the quality of joint training and to increase the benefits of the JNTC initiative for the reserve components, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions: direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to fully develop a strategy for the next training transformation assessment to evaluate the overall impact of the JNTC initiative’s implementation on joint training, including time frames, outcome-oriented performance metrics, roles and responsibilities, and outcomes; direct the Joint Forces Command to establish liaison officers for the reserve components and include representatives from the reserve components as active participants in JNTC working groups and planning sessions; direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to establish guidelines for the services and combatant commands to follow when nominating programs for future accreditation that reflect the importance of new and emerging missions, as emphasized by DOD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report; direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to establish reaccreditation standards and criteria that will ensure that a recurring, consistent, realistic joint training environment exists for all units participating in accredited joint training programs; and direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to expand the accreditation process to include National Guard training programs.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with four recommendations and partially concurred with one recommendation to establish reserve liaisons. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. Specifically, DOD agreed with our recommendation that the department develop a strategy for evaluating the overall impact of the JNTC initiative as part of its 2007 training transformation assessment. DOD stated that it is in the process of developing a plan for its 2007 assessment that will include detailed metrics and roles and responsibilities and will address the impact of transformation initiatives on DOD-wide training.

DOD also agreed with our recommendations to (1) establish guidelines that emphasize the need for the services and combatant commands to consider new and emerging issues when nominating programs for accreditation, (2) establish reaccreditation standards and criteria, and (3) expand the accreditation process to include National Guard training programs. DOD stated that its accreditation guidance will be refined to include consideration of new and emerging missions during the next phase of accreditation reviews. Additionally, DOD stated that the Joint Forces Command will ensure that the accreditation concept of operations is strengthened to include specific reaccreditation standards. Further, DOD stated it will add National Guard training programs with the appropriate joint environment to the accreditation nomination list. Moreover, it noted that the JNTC Joint Management Office is actively discussing this action with National Guard leadership to develop a plan for inclusion of National Guard joint training programs.

Finally, DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Joint Forces Command establish liaison officers for the reserve components and include reserve component representatives as participants in JNTC working groups and planning sessions. The department agreed it should establish liaison officers for the National Guard and include Guard representatives as participants in JNTC working groups and planning sessions. However, DOD stated that the joint training requirements of the other reserve components are adequately addressed through the current service liaison officer structure within JNTC and the assigned reserve Joint Warfighting Center. DOD’s approach would require that the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corp reserves continue to voice their training needs indirectly through their respective service headquarters rather than through direct participation. However, as discussed in this report, Training Transformation documents and officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense’s Office of Reserve Affairs have recognized that the reserve components have some unique training requirements and that these requirements have yet to receive priority in the Joint Forces Command’s JNTC initiative. We continue to believe that all reserve components would benefit if the Joint Forces Command would establish liaison officers for both the National Guard and the service reserve components and include them as active participants in JNTC working groups and planning sessions to allow them to voice their unique training needs and enhance their awareness of new developments and opportunities in joint training.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) initiative has improved the ability of the services and combatant commands to train jointly, we analyzed 5 of the 16 training exercises selected by the Joint Forces Command to incorporate JNTC enhancements in fiscal year 2005. We reviewed relevant exercise planning documents pertaining to the exercises and JNTC enhancements. We also discussed the impact of the JNTC initiative with a variety of officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, service headquarters, combatant commands, and Joint Chiefs of Staff who were involved in this effort. Additionally, we discussed our methods, the attributes to be assessed, and the information collected with agency officials and determined that they were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a population, because some elements of the population have no chance of being selected. Specifically, we did the following: To select the five exercises, we reviewed the descriptions and training profiles provided by JNTC initiative officials, and in consultation with these officials, we identified one event selected by the Joint Forces Command to be enhanced by the JNTC initiative from each of the military services and one sponsored by a combatant command.

To analyze the exercises, we identified attributes that would allow us to quantitatively discern the differences in selected exercises prior to their JNTC designation and afterwards. We then developed a detailed data collection instrument to precisely and consistently gather attribute information for comparative analysis. Our analysis of these attributes allowed us to determine the measure of change in a selected fiscal year 2005 training exercise prior to fiscal year 2005 and afterwards. We obtained and reviewed exercise documentation, such as exercise planning documents, and after action reports for selected exercises to determine the measure of change in the exercises based on our attributes.

To augment our documentation review of the JNTC initiative’s impact on existing service and combatant exercises, we met with service, combatant command, and JNTC officials to discuss their perspectives on the overall value added to joint training by the JNTC initiative. We then visited and observed 2 of the 5 exercises to obtain a real-time assessment of the past and planned evolution of the exercises and feedback from exercise participants, including the planners.

To determine whether the Department of Defense (DOD) had assessed the full impact of the JNTC effort on joint training through its first training transformation assessment, we reviewed and analyzed key DOD and JNTC documents, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2006 revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2005 Training Transformation Assessment Report, and the JNTC initiative’s strategic plan. Additionally, we met with Office of the Secretary of Defense officials directly involved in conducting the training transformation assessment to discuss the methodology for the current assessment and plans for future assessments.

To determine the extent to which the reserve components are benefiting from the JNTC initiative, we obtained and analyzed key DOD and JNTC documentation, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2006 revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and the JNTC strategic and implementation plans, to identify program guidance on the inclusion of the reserve components in training transformation initiatives and assess the level of coordination established between the JNTC initiative and the reserve components. We also examined the extent to which the reserve components participated in JNTC current events and formal collaboration mechanisms to further evaluate the effectiveness of the program to benefit the reserve components. Additionally, we conducted interviews with key reserve, National Guard, Office of the Secretary of Defense, service, and JNTC representatives to discuss the overall impact of the JNTC initiative on the reserve components.

To determine the extent to which the Joint Forces Command has developed an accreditation process that facilitates program goals, we obtained and reviewed key accreditation documentation, such as the Accreditation Concept of Operations, JNTC accreditation program briefing slides, the draft accreditation handbook and DOD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. We also reviewed and analyzed key DOD and JNTC documents, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2006 revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan and the JNTC strategic plan, to identify program guidance and critical milestones. Additionally, we reviewed selected training programs’ JNTC accreditation reports. To augment our documentation review, we met with service, combatant command, and JNTC officials to discuss the status and intent of the accreditation process. Specifically, we inquired about the status of the accreditation effort, the nomination process, and the reaccreditation process. We also examined to what extent the reserve components participated in the JNTC initiative’s accreditation process. Table 4 lists the organizations and locations we visited during the course of this review.

We performed this review from August 2005 through May 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland, Assistant Director; Fred Harrison; Joe Faley; Bonita Anderson; Angela Watson; Yong Song; Kevin Keith; Susan Ditto; and Rebecca Shea also made major contributions to this report.

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