Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and Response
Released: 2005-01-24T00:00:00

RS21293 -- Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and Response

Updated January 24, 2005

Background

Terrorists have tried to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) -- chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclearweapons. While it would probably be more difficult for terrorists to obtain or fabricate a nuclear weapon than otherWMD, an attack using a nuclear weapon merits consideration because it would have much higher consequence. U.S.seaports could be targets for terrorist attack. A terrorist Hiroshima-sized nuclear bomb (15 kilotons, the equivalentof15,000 tons of TNT) detonated in a port would destroy buildings out to a mile or two; start fires, especially in a portthat handled petroleum and chemicals; spread fallout over many square miles; disrupt commerce; and kill manypeople. Many ports are in major cities. By one estimate, a 10- to 20-kiloton weapon detonated in a major seaportwould kill 50,000 to 1 million people and would result in direct property damage of $50 to $500 billion, losses duetotrade disruption of $100 billion to $200 billion, and indirect costs of $300 billion to $1.2 trillion. (1)

Terrorists might try to smuggle a bomb into a U.S. port in many ways, but containers may offer an attractive route. Acontainer is a metal box, typically 8 ft wide by 8� ft high by 20 ft or 40 ft long, that can be used on and movedbetween a tractor-trailer, a rail car, or a ship. Much global cargo moves by container. Nearly 9 million containersayear enter the United States by ship. (2) Customs andBorder Protection (CBP) screens data for all containers, andreportedly inspects about 6 percent of them. (3) Containers could easily hold a nuclear weapon. Many believe thatports and containers are vulnerable. An FBI official stated, "The intelligence that we have certainly points to theportsas a key vulnerability of the United States and of a key interest to certain terrorist groups...." (4) CBP CommissionerRobert Bonner believes an attack using a nuclear bomb in a container would halt container shipments, leading to"devastating" consequences for the global economy. ..." (5) People can, however, find ways to minimize economicproblems.

Terrorist Nuclear Weapons: Routes to a Bomb. A terrorist group might obtain a bomb, perhaps with the yield of the Hiroshima bomb, by several plausible routes.

Russia. Strategic (long-range) nuclear weapons are reportedly well guarded on missiles or, thanks in part to U.S. assistance, in storage. In contrast, thousands of shorter-rangelower-yield weapons intended for use in combat are less well secured, and numbers and locations are uncertain. (See CRS Report RL32202 , Nuclear Weapons in Russia: Safety, Security, and Control Issues .) A fear is thatterroristsmight buy or steal one of these weapons along with information on how to bypass any use-control devices.

Pakistan. U.S., British, Chinese, French, and Israeli nuclear weapons are thought to be well guarded. Control is less certain for India and Pakistan. Reports indicate that Pakistanis aidednuclear programs in Iran, Libya, and North Korea, and there are concerns about the security of Pakistani nuclearweapons if President Musharraf were assassinated. (6)

Build a Bomb. The Hiroshima bomb was a "gun assembly" weapon. Its nuclear explosive was a gun barrel about 6 inches in diameter by 6 feet long. It was capped at each end, withstandard explosive at one end, a mass of uranium highly enriched in the isotope 235 (highly enriched uranium, orHEU) next to the explosive, and a second HEU mass at the other end. Detonating the explosive shot one mass ofHEU into the other, rapidly assembling a mass large enough to support a fission chain reaction. (Plutonium cannotbeused.) This is the simplest type of nuclear weapon. U.S. scientists had such high confidence in the design that theydid not test the Hiroshima bomb. Experts agree that terrorist groups could not make special nuclear material (SNM,i.e., fissile plutonium or HEU). Many believe that a terrorist group with access to HEU and key skills could buildacrude nuclear weapon. Five former Los Alamos nuclear weapons experts held that such a weapon "could beconstructed by a group not previously engaged in designing or building nuclear weapons, providing a number ofrequirements were adequately met." (7) A NationalResearch Council study stated: "The basic technical informationneeded to construct a workable nuclear device is readily available in the open literature. The primary impedimentthatprevents countries or technically competent terrorist groups from developing nuclear weapons is the availability ofSNM, especially HEU." (8) Many believe it would behard for a terrorist group to obtain enough HEU for a weapon;others fear that terrorists could do so. The National Research Council study rated the threat level from SNM fromRussia as "High -- large inventories of SNM are stored at many sites that apparently lack inventory controls andindigenous threats have increased." (9)

Responses

The main approach to reducing vulnerability to a terrorist nuclear attack is defense in depth -- using multiple methodsto detect and interdict a weapon. It would be harder to evade several methods than one: attempts to evade one maymake a bomb more visible to another or reduce the odds that the bomb would work. Defense in depth also seekstopush detection and interdiction far from U.S. shores. This section illustrates the scope of effort. (See CRS Report RL31733 , Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress, and CRS Report RS21283 , HomelandSecurity: Intelligence Support. )

Programs to Secure Nuclear Weapons and Materials. One report saw securing "existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials" as "the most critical and cost-effective steptoprevent nuclear terrorism." (10) To this end, theDepartment of Energy (DOE) operates the Materials Protection,Control, and Accounting Program (MCP&A) to secure fissile materials in former Soviet republics, and theDepartment of Defense operates the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to secure nuclear weapons there. InMay2004, DOE announced the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to secure fissile and other radioactive materialworldwide. (See CRS Report RL31957 , Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programsin theFormer Soviet Union. )

Other International Programs. (1) The International Atomic Energy Agency has safeguards to protect, among other things, HEU in nuclear reactors. (2) A joint effort by that agency,theUnited States, and Russia moved HEU from a shut-down nuclear reactor in Bulgaria to Russia for conversion to asafer form of uranium. (11) (3) On May 31, 2003,President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative, underwhich the United States and allies "have begun working on new agreements to search planes and ships carryingsuspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or missile technologies." Reports claim one such interdiction may haveinfluenced Libya's decision to end its WMD programs. (12) (4) CBP's Container Security Initiative started in January2002. CSI involves bilateral agreements with foreign ports that export to this nation. CBP teams work with hostgovernments to identify high-risk containers for screening for WMD before they are loaded onto ships. CSIoperatedin 34 ports in January 2005. (13) (5) Under theMegaports Initiative, MCP&A provides radiation detection equipmentand expertise to CBP for screening containers in foreign ports. (6) The U.N.'s International Maritime Organizationpromulgated the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, effective July 1, 2004, which requires portoperators, ship owners, and others to improve maritime security, such as by creating plans to respond to terroristattack.

U.S. Domestic Programs. Various programs seek to strengthen the security of U.S. ports. As of late 2004, DHS had reportedly distributed about $560 million in port security grantsinthe past few years. (14) The Maritime TransportationSecurity Act (MTSA) of 2002 ( P.L. 107-295 ) requires (Sec.102)assessments of the vulnerability of vessels and U.S. maritime facilities "that may be involved in a transportationsecurity incident," a plan for deterring and responding to such an incident, assessment of the effectiveness ofantiterrorism measures at certain foreign ports, etc. CBP is implementing the Automated Commercial Environment,an electronic system to gather and analyze data on goods entering the United States to help select containers forinspection. On December 21, 2004, President Bush reportedly issued "Maritime Security Policy," National SecurityPresidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13. While the text has apparently not beenreleased as of mid-January 2005, a report indicates that it requires DHS to set standards for maritime recoveryoperations in the event of a terrorist attack. It also requires creation of a Maritime Security Policy CoordinatingCommittee, development of a National Strategy for Maritime Security, integration of global maritime intelligence,coordination of domestic and international outreach, and creation of a comprehensive plan for maritime supply chainsecurity. (15)

Enhanced Technology. The last line of defense against a terrorist nuclear attack is the ability to detect nuclear weapons or material entering the United States. A large effort isunderway by government agencies, industry, and universities to develop key technologies. By one estimate, theFY2005 appropriation provides $4.1 billion for homeland security R&D. (16) Operation Safe Commerce, a Departmentof Transportation-CBP "program to fund business initiatives designed to enhance security for container cargo ... willprovide a test-bed for new security techniques." (17) The Trade Act of 2002, P.L. 107-210 , sec. 343a, mandates theestablishment of a task force to "establish a program to evaluate and certify secure systems of internationalintermodaltransport." (18)

Terrorists can counter new technologies. If the United States deploys sensors at some ports, terrorists might detonatea weapon before it is inspected, or ship it to another port. If foreign ports screened containers before being loadedonto U.S.-bound ships, terrorists could infiltrate the ports. Securing the largest ports might lead terrorists to usesmaller ones. Securing every U.S.-bound container might lead terrorists to smuggle a weapon in a small boat orairplane. Detecting an HEU bomb is difficult because HEU emits very little radiation. R&D is underway toaddressthis key issue.

In 2002 and 2003, ABC News shipped shielded 15-pound cylinders of depleted uranium (DU, natural uranium minusmost uranium-235) into U.S. ports in containers. CBP did not detect these shipments. ABC claimed that DU is agood surrogate for HEU; CBP claimed the opposite. In September 2004, DHS issued a report on the topic. It concluded "[i]mprovements are needed in the inspection process to ensure that weapons of mass destruction ... donotgain access to the U.S. through oceangoing cargo containers" and recommended improving detection equipmentandsearch methods. (19)

Pending Legislation. Bills related to terrorist nuclear attacks on ports include H.R. 163 , Secure Domestic Container Partnership Act of 2005, and H.R. 173 ,Anti-Terrorism and Port Security Act of 2005.

Policy Issues

Securing Nuclear Materials. The possibility that a terrorist group could make a nuclear weapon given enough HEU, and the difficulty of preventing terrorists from smuggling aweaponinto a U.S. port, show the value of securing nuclear weapons and materials in Russia and elsewhere. Are currentefforts sufficient?

Forensics. Technology may enable identification of the origin of nuclear material used in a bomb. This forensic capability strengthens the value of controlling Russian nuclearweapons and materials: finding that material for a bomb detonated in the United States came from Russia, a likelysource, would in all probability lead to the conclusion that the material was stolen rather than that Russia conductedthe attack. At the same time, augmenting already-excellent forensic capability through technology and intelligencecould help deter other nations from giving nuclear materials to terrorists.

Ports in Major Cities. The terrorist weapons discussed earlier, while lower in yield than strategic weapons, might produce blast damage over a radius of 1 to 2 miles, and fire andfallout beyond that range. Accordingly, it might be argued that ports with the greatest number of people living orworking within a mile or two of cargo docks, such as Philadelphia and New York, should have highest priority inreceiving security resources.

Ameliorating Economic Consequences. Cold War civil defense studies examined how to ameliorate the destructive effects of a large nuclear attack. This effort, and more recentemergency preparedness efforts, provide a template for response and recovery following a terrorist attack using one15-kiloton weapon. This work does not, however, address possible global economic consequences and how topredictand mitigate them. These issues could benefit from further study and analyses.

What Priority Should Port Security Have? The 9/11 Commission wrote, "Opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation [compared tocommercial aviation]. Initiatives to secure shipping containers have just begun." Terrorists "may be deterred byasignificant chance of failure." (20) Improving theability to detect terrorist nuclear weapons in the maritimetransportation system may make a terrorist attack on a port less likely to succeed, and thus less probable. TheAmerican Association of Port Authorities, a trade association, welcomed federal grants for port security upgradestocomply with the MTSA, but called for "substantially greater resources." (21) Others agree that more resources areneeded to secure U.S. ports, such as to reduce overcrowding of cargo-handling facilities and to hire more workers. (22) A similar case could be made for gas pipelines, electric power plants, rail yards, or bridges. At issue for Congressishow to allocate security funds among ports and other potential targets.

Footnotes

1. (back) ABT Associates, "The Economic Impactof Nuclear Terrorist Attacks on Freight Transport Systems in an Age ofSeaport Vulnerability," executive summary, April 30, 2003, p. 7, http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/ES-Economic_Impact_of_Nuclear_Terrorist_Attacks.pdf .

2. (back) U.S. Department of Homeland Security,Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, "Remarks by CommissionerRobert C. Bonner, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, New York," January 11, 2005.

3. (back) Caitlin Harrington, "Post-ElectionAnalysis: Millions of Dollars Ride on a Simple Definition of 'Inspection,'" CQHomeland Security, January 7, 2005.

4. (back) U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary,Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, Hearing: "Covering the Waterfront -- A Review of Seaport Security since September 11, 2001," January 27, 2004;Statement of Gary M. Bald, Acting Assistant Director Counterterrorism Division, FBI. Transcript by FederalDocument Clearing House, Inc.

5. (back) U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, U.S. CustomsCommissioner Robert Bonner, Speech Before the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, Washington, D.C., January 17, 2002, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/speeches_statements/archives/jan172002.xml .

6. (back) David Sanger and William Broad, "FromRogue Nuclear Programs, Web of Trails Leads to Pakistan," New YorkTimes, Jan. 4, 2004, p. 1 and "One Man's Fortune," Washington Post, Dec. 27, 2003, p. 24.

7. (back) J. Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, EugeneEyster, William Maraman, and Jacob Wechsler, "Can Terrorists BuildNuclear Weapons?" Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, http://www.nci.org/k-m/makeab.htm . Requirementsinclude detailed design drawings; individuals with a wide range of weapons skills; equipment; and preparations tocreate a bomb quickly after obtaining HEU to reduce the risk of detection.

8. (back) National Research Council, Committeeon Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, Making the NationSafer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism, Washington, National Academy Press,2002, p.40. http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10415.html .

9. (back) Ibid., p. 44.

10. (back) Matthew Bunn, "Preventing NuclearTerrorism: A Progress Update," Project on Managing the Atom, HarvardUniversity, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, October 22, 2003, p. 4.

11. (back) "IAEA, USA, Russia Assist Bulgariain Removal of HEU Fuel," staff report, International Atomic Energy Agency,December 24, 2003, at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2003/bulgaria20031224.html .

12. (back) Robin Wright, "Ship Incident MayHave Swayed Libya," Washington Post, Jan.1, 2004: 19.

13. (back) "Remarks by Commissioner RobertC. Bonner," January 11, 2005.

14. (back) Sam Hananel, "Report Criticizes Useof Port Security Grants," Washington Post, December 29, 2004: 17.

15. (back) Martin Edwin Andersen, "New BushNational Security Directive on Maritime Issues Charts AdministrationCourse During His Second Term," Port Security News, January 18, 2005.

16. (back) American Association for theAdvancement of Science, "Defense and Homeland Security R&D Hit New Highs in2005; Growth Slows for Other Agencies," November 29, 2004.

17. (back) U.S. Department of HomelandSecurity, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. "Customs and DOT Launch'Operation Safe Commerce' Program," November 20, 2002, p. 1.

18. (back) The MTSA Senior Policy Group wasestablished in early 2004 to address mandates in MTSA and the Trade Actthat DHS take steps to secure international intermodal cargo shipments. The group is led by the DHS DirectorateofBorder and Transportation Security and has representatives from the Department of Transportation, theTransportationSecurity Administration, the Coast Guard, and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. Information providedby Department of Homeland Security, August 17, 2004.

19. (back) U.S. Department of HomelandSecurity. Office of Inspector General. Effectiveness of Customs and BorderProtection's Procedures to Detect Uranium in Two Smuggling Incidents. OIG-04-40, September 2004, 4 p.

20. (back) U.S. National Commission on TerroristAttacks upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. (NewYork: Norton, 2004), p. 391.

21. (back) American Association of PortAuthorities, "U.S. Ports Laud Additional Federal Security Grants; Caution MoreAssistance Is Needed," news release, December 10, 2003, p. 1.

22. (back) John Broder, "At Nation's Ports, CargoBacklog Raises Question of Security," New York Times, July 27, 2004: 12.