Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Address Some Challenges Faced by State and Local Fusion Centers
Released: 2008-04-17T00:00:00

Letter

Most States and Several Local Jurisdictions Have or Are Planning Fusion Centers That Vary in Their Characteristics

Almost all states and several local governments have established or are in the process of establishing a fusion center. Specifically, officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted described their centers as operational, and officials in 15 centers considered their centers to be in the planning or early stages of development as of September 2007. Officials cited a variety of reasons why their state or local area established a fusion center. To improve information sharing—related to homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement—among federal, state, and local entities and to prevent terrorism or threats after the attacks of September 11 were the most frequently cited reasons for establishing a fusion center. Several officials cited the need to enhance information sharing within their own jurisdictions across disciplines as the reason why they established a center. While 9 centers opened in the couple of years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, 34 of the 43 operational centers have opened since January 2004 as shown in figure 1.

Consistent with the 9/11 Commission Act’s definition of a fusion center and the purpose of a fusion center, as defined in the Fusion Center Guidelines, officials in 41 of the 43 operational centers we contacted said that their scopes of operations focused on more than just counterterrorism. For instance, officials in 22 of these centers described their centers’ scope as all crimes or all crimes and counterterrorism, and officials in 19 operational centers said that their scopes of operations included all-hazards information (such as related to public health and safety or emergency response). Further, 23 of the 36 operational fusion centers that provided us mission statements had missions that involved collecting, analyzing, and disseminating criminal as well as terrorism- related information. Eleven other fusion centers had missions that involved enhancing, supporting, or coordinating information and intelligence dissemination to both law enforcement and homeland security agencies. Officials told us that adopting a broader focus helped provide information about all threats because of the link of many crimes to terrorist activity and also increased the centers’ sustainability, for instance, by including additional stakeholders. Indeed, the National Strategy highlights the importance of the centers fostering a culture that recognizes the importance of fusing “all crimes with national security implications” and “all hazards” information, which often involves identifying criminal activity and other information that might be a precursor to a terrorist plot.

Law enforcement entities, such as state police or state bureaus of investigation, were the lead or managing agencies in the majority of the operational centers we contacted. The centers varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies, ranging from fewer than 5 employees to over 80. In addition to a variety of state and local law enforcement agencies, some centers included personnel detailed from emergency management, fire, corrections, or transportation partners. As of September 2007, at least 34 of the 43 operational fusion centers we contacted reported that they had personnel from at least one federal agency assigned to their centers. For example, DHS had deployed full-time intelligence officers to 17 of the 43 operational fusion centers we contacted and was in the process of staffing 8 additional centers. About three quarters of the operational centers we contacted reported that the FBI had assigned personnel, including intelligence analysts and special agents, to their centers. Additionally, 12 of the operational centers we contacted were colocated in an FBI field office or with an FBI task force, such as a Joint Terrorism Task Force or a Field Intelligence Group. Further, 19 of the operational centers reported that they had other DHS or DOJ components represented in their centers, such as personnel from Customs and Border Protection; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Transportation Security Administration; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; or Drug Enforcement Administration.

Many fusion centers reported having access to DHS’s and DOJ’s unclassified networks or systems, such as the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and Law Enforcement Online (LEO), containing, among other things, terrorism-related information. For example, as of September 2007, 40 of the 43 operational centers reported they had access to HSIN, and 39 reported having access to LEO. In addition, 16 of the 43 centers said they had or were in the process of obtaining access to DHS’s classified network of secret-level homeland security data, and 23 reported they had or were in the process of obtaining access to the FBI’s classified systems containing, among other things, secret-level investigative case files.

Thus far, products disseminated and services provided also varied. Fusion centers reported that they issued a variety of products, such as daily and weekly bulletins on general criminal or intelligence information and assessments that, in general, provided in-depth reporting on an emerging threat, group, or crime.

Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help Address Some Reported Challenges

Fusion center officials identified challenges in establishing and operating their centers in several areas, such as accessing and managing multiple information systems, obtaining and using security clearances, finding sufficient guidance and training, obtaining and retaining personnel, and obtaining funding. DHS and DOJ, recognizing the importance of fusion centers in information sharing, have efforts under way that begin to address many of these challenges.

DHS, DOJ, and PM-ISE Have Some Actions Under Way to Address Fusion Center Challenges with Accessing and Managing Information Systems

Fusion center officials reported challenges accessing and managing multiple information systems. In October 2007, we reported that DHS and the FBI had provided many operational fusion centers access to their primary unclassified information systems (HSIN and LEO) and had outlined plans to provide access to their primary classified networks to state and local centers that had federal personnel at the center. However, officials at 31 of the 58 centers we contacted reported challenges obtaining access to federal information systems or networks. For instance, officials in some centers cited challenges with DHS and the FBI not providing fusion center personnel with direct access to their classified systems. Fusion center personnel in these centers had to rely on federal personnel who were assigned to the center or other state personnel assigned to FBI task forces to access these systems, obtain the relevant information, and share it with them. Further, officials in 12 fusion centers reported challenges meeting system security requirements or establishing the technical capabilities necessary to access information systems, and DHS and the FBI had taken some steps to address these challenges. For example, we reported that DHS reviews the fusion centers’ security status and assesses its adequacy in light of its intention to deploy personnel and information systems to the center. In March 2008, the DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis stated that DHS planned to deploy its secret-level homeland security data network to 41 fusion centers by the end of fiscal year 2008.

While officials in many fusion centers cited challenges obtaining access to systems, primarily classified ones, officials in 30 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted reported that the heavy volume of information or the existence of multiple systems with often redundant information was a challenge to manage. Officials in 18 fusion centers said that they had difficulty with what they perceived to be the high volume of information their center receives, variously describing the flow of information as “overwhelming,” “information overload,” and “excessive.” For example, officials described how center personnel must sort through the large amount of information, much of which is not relevant to the center, to find information that is useful or important to them. In addition, officials in 18 fusion centers found the lack of integration among these multiple, competing, or duplicative information systems challenging, or said they wanted a single mechanism or system through which to receive or send information.

In October 2007, we reported that officials from the PM-ISE’s office were collaborating with other agencies, including DHS and DOJ, to identify potential opportunities to streamline system access and improve the quality and flow of information. For example, PM-ISE officials reported that these entities had completed a review of the most commonly used systems, such as HSIN, LEO, and the Regional Information Sharing Systems, that included an examination of users’ needs to identify potential areas to streamline system access. In October 2007, we also reported that such a review was in accordance with recommendations that fusion centers made during the first annual national fusion center conference in March 2007 and with what several officials we contacted told us. Specifically, officials in 23 of the 58 fusion centers told us that DHS and DOJ, to facilitate implementation of a national network of fusion centers, should reduce the number of existing systems or develop a unified platform or mechanism for information sharing with fusion centers. In addition, the PM-ISE, along with DHS, DOJ, and other federal agencies, are taking steps to improve the quality and flow of information through the establishment of an Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG), which was made a statutorily mandated body by the 9/11 Commission Act. This group, which is to include state, local, and tribal representatives detailed to work with the National Counterterrorism Center, is to provide advice, counsel, and subject-matter expertise to the intelligence community about the types of terrorism- related information needed by state, local, and tribal governments and how these entities use that terrorism-related information to fulfill their counterterrorism responsibilities. In doing so, the PM-ISE reported that the ITACG is to enable the timely production by the National Counterterrorism Center of clear, relevant, and federally coordinated terrorism-related information products intended for dissemination to state, local, and tribal officials. In October 2007, we reported that PM-ISE officials indicated that the ITACG had achieved an initial operational capability. As of March 2008, four state and local law enforcement representatives had been detailed to the ITACG to provide a nonfederal perspective to the intelligence community in its situational and threat reporting and intelligence products, by, for example, requesting changes to report language to better address state and local needs. According to one of the representatives, these changes have involved requesting that specific tactical information be included in reports or that, where possible, the security classification of a report be lowered so that it could be disseminated more broadly to state and local officials. While these efforts to improve the quality and flow of information to state and local users are promising, it is too soon to determine the extent to which they will address the challenges in accessing and managing information reported to us by fusion center officials.

DHS and the FBI Provide Clearances to Fusion Center Officials, but Officials Cited Some Challenges with Obtaining and Using Clearances

Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for numerous state and local personnel in order to access classified information and have set goals to reduce the length of time it takes to obtain a security clearance. For example, DHS set a goal of 90 days to complete a Secret clearance, and the FBI set a goal of 45 to 60 days to complete a Secret clearance and 6 to 9 months to complete a Top Secret clearance. DHS and the FBI have also provided centers with information about the security clearance process and time frames, stating that processing time for individual security clearances can vary, depending on complexity. However, obtaining and using security clearances represented a challenge for many of the fusion centers (44 of 58) we contacted. For instance, officials at 32 of the centers cited difficulties with the length of time it takes to receive a security clearance from DHS or the FBI. However, some fusion center officials acknowledged that that the length of time to conduct the required background checks was necessary to ensure that clearances were only given to individuals who meet the requirements.

In October 2007, we also reported that while law and executive order provide that a security clearance granted by one government agency should generally be accepted by other agencies, officials in 19 of the centers we contacted encountered difficulties with federal agencies, particularly DHS and the FBI, accepting each others’ clearances. This reported lack of reciprocity could hinder the centers’ ability to access facilities, computer systems, and information from multiple agencies. DHS and DOJ officials said that they were not aware of fusion centers encountering recent challenges with reciprocity of security clearances. However, they said that there were complications in the clearance process because, for example, multiple federal agencies carry out their own processes and grant clearances without central coordination.

DHS and DOJ Continue to Provide Guidance, Technical Assistance, and Training to Fusion Centers

DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE continue to provide fusion centers with guidance, technical assistance, and training to help address their challenges in these areas. In October 2007, we reported that DHS and DOJ had, in August 2006, issued jointly developed Fusion Center Guidelines that outline 18 recommended elements for establishing and operating fusion centers. Intended to help ensure that fusion centers were set up and operated consistently, they cover elements such as ensuring appropriate security measures are in place for facility, data, and personnel. Officials in many (48 of 58) of the fusion centers we contacted said that they found the guidelines generally good and useful, however others said they were not specific enough to address their challenges. In addition, officials at 19 fusion centers said that they lacked guidance on specific information- sharing policies and procedures, such as privacy and civil liberties issues. Furthermore, officials at 21 of the centers we contacted said that the availability of adequate training for mission-related issues, such as training on intelligence analysis, was a challenge. Officials in 11 centers, most of which were operational centers that had been in existence for more than 2 years, expressed a need for the federal government to establish standards for training fusion center analysts. This could help ensure that analysts are trained in a similar way nationwide, thereby facilitating communication amongst fusion center analysts.

DHS and DOJ provide a technical assistance service program for fusion centers, which, among other services, includes assistance developing a comprehensive privacy and civil liberties policy, and have ongoing efforts to provide training to fusion centers. Additionally, along with the PM-ISE and others, DHS and DOJ have sponsored regional and national conferences, including the second annual national fusion center conference in March 2008, which was designed to support fusion centers in building capabilities and understanding their roles and responsibilities as described in the National Strategy. In addition, DHS and DOJ, in collaboration with others, disseminated in March 2008 a draft baseline capabilities document. Building on the Fusion Center Guidelines, the document outlines baseline capabilities and steps that fusion centers could take to ensure compliance in 12 topic areas, including management and governance, security, intelligence analysis and production, and intelligence and information dissemination. The document states that when a fusion center achieves all of these standards, it is considered to have the standards, structures, and tools in place to support the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement information. Such a baseline level of capability is critical to establishing a national, integrated network of fusion centers, according to the National Strategy. DHS and DOJ solicited the feedback of state and local officials on this document at the national fusion center conference— the results of which have yet to be compiled and released.

Fusion Center Officials Cited Challenges with Personnel and Funding; DHS and the FBI Are Helping to Address These Issues to Some Extent

Many fusion center officials we contacted reported challenges related to obtaining personnel (43 of 58) and obtaining and maintaining funding when establishing and operating their centers (54 of 58)—challenges that some of these officials also said affected their centers’ sustainability. For example, officials in 37 centers said they encountered challenges with federal, state, or local agencies not being able to detail personnel to their fusion center, particularly in the face of resource constraints. Fusion centers rely on such details as a means of staffing the centers and enhancing information sharing with other state and local agencies.

Furthermore, officials in 20 of the centers we contacted said that they faced challenges finding, attracting, and retaining qualified personnel. For instance, one official said that it was challenging to find personnel with the expertise to understand the concept behind the development of the center and to use the tools to build the center. While many of these reported challenges were attributed to difficulties at the state and local level, we reported that DHS and the FBI had ongoing efforts to assign personnel to support centers and facilitate information sharing. Both DHS and the FBI have continued to support fusion centers by deploying personnel, consistent with the 9/11 Commission Act. As of March 2008, DHS had deployed 23 officers to fusion centers and has plans to place officers in as many as 35 centers by the end of fiscal year 2008, and the FBI had assigned about 200 personnel to 44 fusion centers, according to DHS and FBI officials respectively.

In terms of funding, officials encountered challenges obtaining both federal and state funding. Specifically, officials in 35 of the 58 centers encountered challenges with the complexity of the federal grant process, uncertainty as to whether they would receive federal funds, or declining federal funding, and officials from 28 of the 58 centers reported having difficulty obtaining state or local funding. They said that these issues created confusion for their centers over the steps needed to secure federal funds, made it difficult to plan for the future, and created concerns about the fusion centers’ abilities to sustain their capabilities for the long term. Fusion center officials also identified challenges with restrictions on the use of federal grant funds, unclear and changing grant guidance, and a lack of understanding of how federal funding decisions are made. For example, officials in 21 fusion centers said that obtaining adequate funding for personnel was difficult, and officials in 17 fusion centers found federal time limits on the use of grant funds for personnel challenging.

In October 2007, we reported that DHS had provided grant funding for fusion-related activities and had made some changes to ease the grant process and adjust some of the restrictions on the timing and use of grant funds. For example, DHS expanded grant funding in fiscal year 2006 in the area of allowable costs for information sharing and collaborative efforts. Funds could be used by states to develop and enhance fusion centers, particularly by hiring contract or government employees as intelligence analysts; purchasing information-technology equipment; or hiring consultants to develop and enhance fusion centers. However, we also reported that, despite this funding, fusion center officials were concerned about the extent of federal support they could expect over the long term, especially in relation to the role of their state or local jurisdictions. Given that at the time, federal plans or guidance did not articulate the long-term role the federal government expected to play in fusion centers, we recommended, and the PM-ISE and DHS concurred, that the federal government determine and articulate its long-term fusion center role and whether it expects to provide resources to help ensure their sustainability. Further, we stated that particular emphasis should be placed on how best to sustain those fusion center functions that support a national information-sharing capability as critical nodes of the ISE.

In promoting that fusion centers achieve a baseline level of capability, the National Strategy states that the federal government will support the establishment of fusion centers and help sustain them through grant funding, technical assistance, and training to achieve such a baseline level of capability. The strategy outlines specific roles and responsibilities for federal, state, local, and tribal authorities in five areas that are related to the establishment and continued operations of fusion centers and for establishing a national integrated network of centers. It notes that these roles and responsibilities were developed in partnership with state and local officials and represent a collective view. While the strategy acknowledges that fusion centers are owned and managed by state and local governments, it identifies the objective is to assist state and local governments in the establishment and sustained operation of these centers. However, some fusion center officials raised concerns at the national fusion center conference about how specifically the federal government was planning to assist state and local governments to sustain fusion centers. For example, whether federal funding for fusion centers would continue to be available through DHS’s homeland security grant program or whether in the future there would be fusion-center specific funding has yet to be determined. In addition, some officials raised questions about limits on federal funding for personnel. For example, according to the fiscal year 2008 homeland security grant program guidance, costs associated with hiring new intelligence analysts are still allowable for 2 years. After which, the states and urban areas will be responsible for supporting the sustainment costs of those intelligence analysts (as well as providing a budget plan for doing so) after the 2-year federal funding period is over. In our October 2007 report, we reported on challenges that officials found with federal time limits on the use of grant funds for personnel. In particular, some of these officials expressed concerns about maintaining their personnel levels, and one official told us that the 2-year limit on the use of DHS grant funds for personnel made retaining personnel challenging because state and local agencies may lack the resources to continue funding the position, which could hinder the center’s ability to continue to operate. In discussing the implementation of the National Strategy at the fusion center conference, a Homeland Security Council official stated that the question of federal versus state and local roles in sustaining fusion centers is a very difficult question and one that is not yet resolved but is ongoing.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, fusion centers are operating or are being established in almost all states and several local jurisdictions. Although fusion centers were primarily established to meet or enhance information sharing within a state or local area, they have become a critical component of the federal government’s plans as it works to improve information sharing in accordance with law and policy. Indeed, the National Strategy recognizes fusion centers as vital assets to information sharing and critical in the creation of an integrated national network to promote two-way sharing of terrorism-related information. Given the federal interest in fusion centers and the centers’ interest in supporting such a national network, it is important that the federal government continue to provide fusion centers with added value as an incentive to facilitate such a network. In October 2007 we reported that DHS’s and DOJ’s efforts to assist fusion centers, such as providing access to information systems, security clearances, guidance and technical assistance, personnel, and funding, had begun to address a number of the challenges fusion center directors identified to us. Several of those efforts are continuing and evolving, including the establishment of ITACG to improve the quality of information provided to state and local users and the release of baseline capabilities for the operation of fusion centers. These efforts are promising; however, it is too soon to determine the extent to which they will address all of the challenges reported to us by fusion center officials. It is also important for fusion center management to understand the federal government’s role with respect to these centers since this affects state and local governments’ support to centers. In this regard, we recommended in our October 2007 report that the federal government define and articulate its long-term fusion center role. The National Strategy clearly articulates a vision for the federal government’s role in supporting centers—that is by helping to sustain centers through grant funding, technical assistance, and training. However, fusion center officials raised some concerns about sustainability of funding and personnel as the federal government continues work to incorporate fusion centers into the information sharing environment and implement the National Strategy.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time.

Contact Information

For further information on this testimony, please contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at larencee@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Mary Catherine Hult, Tom Lombardi, and Jeffrey Niblack.

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