Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts
Released: 1995-03-08T00:00:00

Letter

Introduction

With the end of the Cold War, the number, scope, and size of operations other than war have increased dramatically, and the United States has become an active participant in some of these operations. Senior administration officials have testified that multilateral peace operations are an important part of this administration’s national security strategy,albeit not the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. These officials have stated that the United States must be willing to act to preserve peace and stability in order to advance and protect U.S. interests in the world. This in turn demands that the United States encourage the successful conduct of multilateral peace operations and, when it is in the United States’ interests, participate in these operations.

Demand Has Increased for U.S. Military Response to Peace Operations

U.S. military forces have been participating in peace operations for almost 50 years, with limited numbers of personnel. However, as the number, size, and scope of peace operations have increased dramatically in the past several years, the nature and extent of U.S. participation have changed markedly. Recently, the United States has used much larger numbers of combat and support forces to respond to events in a number of locations, including Somalia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Iraq. (See table 1.1) For example, while the United States has approximately 1,100 military personnel committed to the Multinational Force and Observers for the 12-year operation on the Sinai Peninsula, starting in December 1992 it deployed approximately 26,000 to Somalia and approximately 20,000 to Haiti beginning in September 1994.

While U.S. participation in peace operations has increased, the size of the armed forces has declined over the past 8 years. From a post-Vietnam War peak of 2.2 million in fiscal year 1987, the active armed forces have been reduced to an authorized level of 1.5 million in fiscal year 1995.

Peace Operations Require Extended Force Commitments

Peace operations tend to be sustained rather than short-term operations and sometimes have required extended force commitments from the U.S. military services. U.S. military forces continue to maintain a 12-year commitment to the Multinational Force and Observers on the Sinai Peninsula, a 3-year commitment to Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, and were committed to Operation Restore Hope in Somalia for almost 2 years. Numerous units provide forces during these operations and are rotated to ensure a ready presence. During Operation Restore Hope, the Army rotated forces to and from Somalia approximately every 4 months. The Air Force tends to rotate its aircrew more frequently. In peace operations such as Provide Comfort, Provide Promise, Deny Flight, and Southern Watch, it rotated forces every 3 months. In addition to the forces deployed, additional forces are preparing to deploy or have recently redeployed.

Force Drawdown Has Increased Challenge of Responding to Peace Operations

The continuing force drawdown has compounded challenges for the U.S. military in responding to extended peace operations. All four services have experienced reductions in personnel and equipment that have forced military planners to reevaluate how the services will respond to peace operations and major regional conflicts (MRC). For example, with the reduction in the number of overseas bases and forward-deployed forces in Europe, the Army and the Air Force have returned part of their Cold War-era European force structure to the United States and decommissioned some units. The forces that remained in the force structure, which once could have responded to peace operations from forward locations, now may have to be augmented by forces from the United States.

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The former Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services, asked us to review the suitability of the current U.S. force structure for peace operations. They wanted to know whether the U.S. military had the capabilities necessary to operate effectively in a peace operations environment, while maintaining the capability to respond to two nearly simultaneous MRCs. We did not assess whether the United States should participate in peace operations. We examined (1) the impact that peace operations have on U.S. military forces, (2) force structure limitations that may affect the military’s ability to respond to other national security requirements while engaged in peace operations, and (3) options for increasing force flexibility and response capability.

To determine the impact of peace operations on U.S. military forces, we held discussions with personnel who participated in recent peace operations. We also reviewed after-action reports and situation reports and conferred with service, unified command, and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials to identify the units involved, their level of participation, the types of capabilities provided, and the problems encountered in providing these capabilities. In addition, we reviewed the before- and after-deployment personnel and equipment readiness reports of some participating units and interviewed (1) officials responsible for the readiness of these forces and (2) some of the forces that participated in these operations.

To determine the effect on the Army of participating in peace operations, we reviewed the experiences of combat and support forces who participated in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and in a number of other smaller operations such as the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. However, we focused our efforts primarily on Operation Restore Hope, the largest Army peace operation deployment to date. We also reviewed the plans for employment of Army forces in Bosnia should a peace plan be implemented. The operations in Rwanda and Haiti took place after we completed the bulk of our work, so we were not able to fully address them.

As a means of determining the effects of peace operations on the Air Force, we selected four of the specialized U.S.-based platforms identified by the Air Force as most affected by participation in peace operations, reviewed data concerning their participation, and interviewed aircrew and maintenance personnel involved in the missions. Similarly, we analyzed data and met with military personnel concerning heavily tasked Air Force units based in Europe. We concentrated our efforts on peace operations involving relatively large numbers of Air Force units, such as Operations Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, Southern Watch in Southern Iraq, and Provide Promise and Deny Flight in Bosnia.

For the Navy, we compared pre-Desert Storm Sixth Fleet aircraft carrier deployments in the Mediterranean area with current Sixth Fleet deployments where the U.S. Navy is supporting Operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard. We also briefly reviewed Navy participation in Haiti and Cuban operations in the Caribbean. We focused on the Marine Corps’ participation in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia since it was the largest Marine Corps participation to date in a peace operation.

To determine whether there are force structure limitations that may affect the military’s ability to respond to other national security requirements while engaged in peace operations, we held discussions with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and unified command and service officials, including officials associated with MRC planning. Using the national security requirements in the bottom-up review as our criteria, we obtained data describing the capabilities necessary to respond to a MRC within the initial days of conflict. We then compared this with the capabilities that had recently been used in peace operations and the total number of the same capabilities available in the active force. We also discussed the actions that would be necessary to disengage from a peace operation in order to deploy to a MRC with officials from each of the military services.

To identify options for increasing force flexibility and response capability for peace operations, we reviewed pertinent documents and interviewed senior service, unified command, and other Department of Defense (DOD) officials to obtain information concerning proposed initiatives and options.

During the course of this review, we did not examine the adequacy of the funding for DOD’s participation in peace operations or the impact of participation on DOD’s planned spending. We are examining these issues as part of a separate request of the Subcommittee on Military Readiness, House Committee on National Security, and will report the results separately.

Our review was conducted primarily at Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine locations, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and component and unified command headquarters within the United States and Europe. We contacted by telephone any relevant organizations we did not visit, such as the 7th Transportation Group at Fort Eustis, Virginia; the Military Police Center and School at Fort McClellan, Alabama; the 57th Wing at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; the 27th Operations Group at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico; the 552nd Operations Group at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma; and the 7th Air Command and Control Squadron at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi.

Our review was performed from August 1993 to July 1994 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We obtained DOD comments on a draft of this report.

Recent Peace Operations Have Stressed Key Military Capabilities

Peace operations have affected each of the military services differently. These operations heavily stress some U.S. military capabilities, including certain Army support forces such as quartermaster and transportation units and specialized Air Force aircraft, while having less impact on other forces, such as Army armored combat divisions and general purpose Air Force combat aircraft outside Europe.

In the Army, a large percentage of certain support capabilities in the active component have been used for peace operations. Most of these support capabilities are in the reserves and, for the most part, the reserves have not been activated for use in peace operations. The adverse impact on these support forces has been further exacerbated because the Army frequently borrows people from one unit to supplement another that lacks sufficient personnel to deploy and assigns some personnel to the same operation more than once, or to consecutive operations, because of the high demand for their capability.

In the Air Force, peace operations have placed considerable stress on the relatively limited number of forces providing specialized capabilities and on forward-deployed units in the European theater. The increased flying hours necessary to support these operations have resulted in extended temporary duty in excess of established goals, increased aircraft maintenance, cannibalization of home station aircraft, and missed training.

Peace operations have not been as disruptive to the Navy and the Marine Corps. However, forward-deployed naval forces have experienced increased operating tempo and, in some cases, reduced time to prepare for deployments, both of which have limited the forces’ availability for training. Naval officials point out, however, that in many cases, peace operations have exposed the naval services to unique experiences in joint and coalition operations.

Certain Army Support Forces in the Active Component Bear Heavy Burden

Certain kinds of Army combat support and combat service support capabilities, including quartermaster and transportation companies, are critical in peace operations. The need to establish and provide continued infrastructure support for U.S. military forces, coalition forces, and the local population is the key reason support forces are needed in peace operations. The type and amount of support differs with each operation, depending on the mission and the nature of the operating environment. Peace operations often occur in austere locations where there is limited electric power, roads, water, port facilities, and air fields. As such, support forces have played an important role in establishing and sustaining a working infrastructure, not only for U.S. forces but also for coalition forces and the local population. In Somalia, for example, the Army encountered an environment completely devoid of any useful infrastructure and had to refurbish or build even the most basic of facilities. If nation building is part of the military mission, support forces are additionally burdened with tasks such as building schools, hospitals, and local housing and establishing police and other civil administration services.

Operational and environmental challenges further tax support forces. In Somalia, for example, the area of responsibility for U.S. and coalition forces consisted of approximately 21,000 square miles in the southern half of the country, with U.S. military and coalition forces dispersed over considerable distances throughout the country. As shown in figure 2.1, Mogadishu is more than 200 miles from Kismayo (a key Army location) and about 200 miles from the Marine base in Bardera, which in turn is about 200 miles from Kismayo. Support forces had to frequently move between these locations to deliver food, water, fuel, and other supplies. To the extent possible, decentralized support operations were established at various locations throughout the country to reduce the time spent moving between locations. In some cases, however, this posed even greater stress on support forces because they had to divide already limited support assets. For example, the 10th Mountain Division’s 710th Main Support Battalion divided some of its water teams so that they could provide water purification capabilities at additional locations.

Combat forces also have played a significant role in peace operations. However, because more of these forces are in the active component, a larger number of them have been available for peace operations. Armored combat divisions have had limited involvement.

Army Uses a Large Percentage of Some Support Capabilities to Meet Peace Operations Requirements

The Army’s capacity for providing unique support capabilities exceeds that of any other military service or nation. Yet, most of these support capabilities are in the reserves and, except for volunteers, the Army has been authorized to draw on reserves for peace operations only once—in September 1994 for the operation in Haiti. Without a presidential decision to call up reserve forces, the Army has had to draw upon the smaller number of active forces and reserve volunteers to meet support requirements. In some cases, nearly all the active units for a particular support capability deployed to a peace operation. For example, 75 percent of the petroleum supply companies in the active force structure deployed to Somalia. Similarly, 67 percent of the medium petroleum truck companies and 100 percent of the air terminal movement control teams deployed to Somalia. Table 2.1 provides a list of selected Army capabilities within quartermaster, transportation, engineering, and miscellaneous support units that experienced heavy deployments to Somalia.

Army’s Cross-Leveling and Multiple Rotation Practices Tax the Already Overextended Support Forces

To prioritize scarce resources, many of the Army’s active support units are assigned fewer people in peacetime than are required to perform their wartime missions. If the Army’s early-deploying support units were needed for war, the Army would supplement the units with people and equipment from other active and reserve units. After the Army restructured its forces in the mid-1980s, we reported that its goal was to authorize combat units, which are the chief means of deterrence, to be staffed at 100 percent of their wartime requirements and support units to be staffed at an average of 90 percent of their wartime requirements. In discussions with XVIIIth Airborne Corps officials, the most ready and resourced of all the Army corps, we were advised that units deploying to Somalia needed 100 percent or more of their authorized people and equipment in order to meet operational requirements. Most units did not have the people, and many did not have the equipment to satisfy this requirement. For example, almost half of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps’ First Corps Support Command units were authorized 90 percent or less of their authorized people, and several support units were authorized 80 percent or less of their authorized people. Other corps support commands, such as the Third Corps’, which provided initial corps support for operations in Somalia, are resourced at an even lower level than the XVIIIth Airborne Corps.

The Army supplemented the personnel-deficient units deploying to Somalia by borrowing from other units throughout the Army force structure. This practice is known as “cross-leveling.” Cross-leveling has occurred at both the division and corps level. For instance, the 210th Forward Support Battalion, an element of the 10th Mountain Division, took people and equipment from the Division’s 46th Forward Support Battalion and the 710th Main Support Battalion before deploying to Somalia. The 710th Main Support Battalion also supported the 46th Forward Support Battalion’s deployment, thereby creating a domino effect within the 10th Mountain Division. According to the 710th commander, the battalion deployed with fewer than all its people and equipment. Thus, the remaining people were burdened to make do with less.

People from some units rotated more than once to the same peace operation or deployed to consecutive peace operations and/or participated in domestic relief operations because of the high demand for their particular capability. For example, almost all of the people from the XVIIIth Airborne Corps’ 364th Direct Support Supply Company that deployed to Hurricane Andrew also deployed to Somalia within the next year. Other units within the XVIIIth Airborne Corps had similar experiences. According to Army officials, support personnel from other Army units rotated more than once to Somalia. The 10th Mountain Division, which responded to the Hurricane Andrew relief operation and to Operation Provide Hope in Somalia, also deployed to Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in September 1994 to provide the predominant Army force in support of this peace operation. According to Army officials, approximately 40 percent of the participants in the Haiti operation also participated in the Somalia operation less than 1 year ago.

Cross-leveling and frequent deployments in turn affect the ability of a unit’s non-deployed elements to meet their operational responsibilities. A combat support group headquarters has considerable responsibility, particularly as part of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps. When the approximately 150 of 180 military personnel from the XVIIIth Airborne Corps’s 507th Combat Support Group Headquarters deployed to Somalia for several months, they left approximately 30 headquarters personnel at Fort Bragg, along with the group’s three battalions, without any additional augmentation. The headquarters was still responsible for (1) supporting the group’s three battalions, (2) supporting the Multinational Force and Observers rotation, (3) conducting logistics operations missions on the installation, and (4) preparing quarterly training briefs to XVIIIth Airborne Corps. In addition, several of the remaining personnel had to participate in two emergency deployment and redeployment exercises and conduct testing and a major briefing for the Army Chief of Staff. In order to cope with the absence of so many headquarter personnel, many operational requirements were decentralized to the battalion level. In some cases, remaining headquarter personnel (1) took on responsibilities typically assigned to more senior personnel, and (2) doubled and tripled workloads throughout the deployment period.

Reserve Forces Contain Key Support Capabilities, but They Have Not Often Been Activated for Peace Operations

Until recently, the President has elected not to activate reserve personnel for use in peace operations. Therefore, only reserve volunteers have participated in most peace operations. This policy has posed particular difficulties because, as shown in table 2.2, many of the support capabilities most heavily relied upon in recent operations reside predominantly in the reserves.

The Army relied on many reserve volunteers in the Somalia operation. While Army volunteers have been helpful, the volunteers available are not always the ones with the specific capabilities, equipment, and training required for the peace operation. Furthermore, individual volunteers do not meet the Army’s requirement for units, in which a group of individuals are trained and organized to perform a mission as a cohesive entity. For example, when Army planners needed a postal unit for operations in Somalia, they created a unit from available volunteers. This process proved to be time-consuming, taking 1 month to create a 49-person postal unit.

The recent initiative for using reserve volunteers for the peacekeeping operations in the Sinai has been time-consuming due to planning and procedural processes associated with activating approximately 420 reserve personnel. The reserve volunteers will be ready to deploy to the Sinai by January 1995 after completing 3 to 6 months of training. More senior personnel will train longer. While there has been no shortage of volunteers for the current deployment, Army officials are concerned that they will not be able to recruit enough volunteers to continue this on an annual basis. Therefore, the Army is considering the use of volunteers for every third rotation.

Future Operations Could Further Burden Support Capabilities in the Active Component

The Army’s experience in Somalia illustrates the challenges that could lie ahead if the United States chooses to deploy forces to Bosnia or to other peace operations throughout the world. The Army will likely send at least a division-size force to Bosnia if a peace plan is signed. This could have almost three times the impact on the Army as the Somalia operation, which generally required one-third the number of forces designated for Bosnia.

Military police units, in particular, have been kept extremely busy as a result of peace operations. In September 1994, 40 percent of the military police combat support companies stationed in the United States were deployed to Guantanamo Bay supporting the Cuban and Haitian refugee operation. Three other companies were deployed to Suriname, Honduras, and Panama, leaving just 13 companies to patrol nine installations in the United States. According to an Army official, this is a problem because many installations require more than one military police combat support company for patrol duties. Because the increase in military police deployments, mostly due to the refugee crisis, has exceeded the number available in the Army’s force structure, Army infantry units have been used to help meet military police deployment requirements. For example, upon completion of their rotation to Guantanamo Bay, military police companies will return home while rifle companies rotate to Cuba.

According to an Army official, while rifle companies will undergo 2 weeks of training to perform the military police function, the training will not provide them with the full breadth of skills that military police possess.

The Army will continue to face challenges in responding to sizable peace operations if reserve forces are not activated. The need for reserve activation depends on a variety of factors, such as the size of a peace operation and the number of such operations ongoing at one time. For example, Army officials stated that if the United States participates in enforcing a peace agreement in Bosnia, with an Army deployment of approximately 22,000 soldiers, access to the reserve component could be required for the second 6-month rotation because the large support requirement exceeds the number of active forces available in certain support capabilities. According to Army officials, reserve forces would also likely be required if a number of smaller size peace operations were ongoing at one time.

On September 15, 1994, the President authorized the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation to call to active duty about 1,900 Selected Reserve military personnel in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to support operational missions in Haiti. The call-up included reservists in specialties such as tactical airlift, aerial port operations, military police, medical support, and civil affairs. These specialties are those that maintain most of their capabilities in the reserve component. In regard to this activation, the Secretary of Defense stated that DOD “. . . cannot conduct operations involving significant numbers of personnel and amounts of equipment being moved without using the Reserves.”

Peace Operations Stress Certain Air Force Units

Since Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force has responded to numerous, and often simultaneous, peace operations throughout the world on a sustained basis. While these operations have provided valuable experience in joint and coalition operations, they also have taxed the Air Force’s specialized capabilities and the units that are forward deployed in the European theater, where most recent operations involving the Air Force have occurred. The Air Force’s participation in these operations has resulted in extended tours of duty, missed training, increased maintenance on aircraft, and cannibalization of aircraft. There are some reports that the stresses on personnel are affecting morale and families. The Air Force has used reserve force volunteers to relieve part of the operational burden on these forces.

Increasing Number of Peace Operations Stress Specialized Forces in the Active Component

The Air Force’s specialized support aircraft provide reconnaissance, surveillance, command and control, and other capabilities that are often not available from other services or nations. This report focuses on four of these specialized aircraft, all of which (except two E-3B/C aircraft) are based in the United States—the EC-130E Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC), for command, control, and communications, and on-scene tactical battle management; the EF-111 Raven, for suppression of enemy air defenses; the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), for surveillance and command and control; and the F-4G Wild Weasel, for suppression and/or destruction of enemy radars.

The Air Force has relatively few of these specialty aircraft in the active component, and they are being used in an increasing number of peace operations, most of which require a sustained presence. For example, as shown in table 2.3, in June 1994 more than 40 percent of available E-3 AWACS, EC-130E ABCCC, and active component F-4G aircraft were being used in peace operations.

Participation in multiple peace operations by a limited number of specialized U.S.-based assets has resulted in increased flying hours for those aircraft involved. This has led to additional wear on the aircraft and more frequent intermediate and phase maintenance. For example, aircraft in the only F-4G squadron in the active component, the 561st fighter squadron, are undergoing major phase maintenance every 4 to 6 months versus every 7 to 8 months 1 year ago. Similarly, EF-111 maintenance officials noted that maintenance teams now must work longer to achieve desired results over a shorter time span than normally required.

In order to support increased peace operation flying hour requirements and maintain the operational effectiveness of forward-deployed forces, the home station has had to share key operational and support personnel with the deployed portion of the squadron. At times, the home station has gone without certain equipment and supplies to ensure that deployed forces can operate effectively. For example, the 7th Air Command and Control Squadron, the only EC-130E ABCCC squadron in the force structure, had to cannibalize home station aircraft and use their parts to support the squadron’s forward-deployed aircraft when parts were not available from other sources.

Aircraft Personnel Are Exceeding Recommended Time on Duty

Due to the extended nature of these operations, participating forces periodically rotate their aircrews, maintenance personnel, and aircraft in order to maintain a continuous ready presence in theater and reduce stress on aircraft and personnel. The Air Combat Command has established 120 days as the recommended maximum number of temporary duty days that Air Combat Command personnel should accrue in a year. However, because of the increasing number of peace operations, personnel associated with specialty aircraft have spent an increased number of days on temporary duty, away from their home bases. In 1994, personnel for the EF-111 and the F-4G approached the Air Combat Command’s recommended maximum number of temporary duty days in a year—120. According to one of their senior commanders, the F-4G’s deployment schedule for 1994 indicates that many individuals will be on temporary duty for about 180 days. According to squadron officials, the increased number of temporary duty days has affected the morale of Air Force personnel participating in peace operations and their families. Some Air Force personnel believe that this increase in temporary duty days is contributing to increased instances of divorce and decisions to leave the Air Force, although no direct link has yet been formally documented.

Aircraft Personnel Miss Training Necessary to Prepare for High-Threat Combat Environment

Aircrews flying extended hours in peace operations sometimes do not get the opportunity to train to the broad range of skills necessary for maintaining combat efficiency. For example, while deployed in support of Operation Provide Comfort, F-4G aircrews conducted lethal suppression of enemy defenses but were unable to remain proficient in formation take-off and landing events, night intercept operations, and advanced aircraft handling characteristics. In addition, according to squadron officials, aircrews maintained weapons qualifications at minimum proficiency while participating in peace operations. Without this training, aircrews do not meet the technical requirements needed to qualify for participation in a high-threat, combat environment.

On a selected basis, wing commanders can waive certain training requirements for aircrew participating in operations that prevent them from completing all required training. According to senior Air Force officials, the number of waivers granted recently has far exceeded those granted prior to Air Force involvement in these sustained operations. During the January through June 1994 training cycle, 30 of the 71 aircrew personnel of the only F-4G squadron in the active component required a waiver for at least one Graduated Combat Capability event. Similarly, 29 of the 61 aircrew in the only EF-111 squadron required one or more waivers for events to which they could not train. Squadron officials attribute most, if not all, of these waivers to extensive participation in peace operations. The Operations Group Commander, to whom the EF-111 squadron reports, considers the events waived to be critical mission areas. According to the commander, if a large number of aircrew personnel are not flying the required number of sorties required by the Air Combat Command, overall squadron and wing combat capability will suffer.

While there were no waivers received by E-3 AWACS aircrews for the training cycle ending June 30, 1994, squadron officials said that they still have training concerns. The AWACS Operations Group Commander noted that the quality of the training conducted from home station and/or at exercises is significantly greater than that logged on deployed sorties. However, in general, approximately 50 percent of the aircrews’ training requirements were accomplished on deployed sorties. While the training was completed, the commander believes that the aircrews did not receive the quality training they needed. As a means of ensuring quality training in the future, an Air Combat Command task force is reviewing Graduated Combat Capability training regulations. In addition, according to Air Force officials, the number of deployed E-3 AWACS aircraft will be reduced so that there will be more available at the home station for training. The reduction will be felt in the drug interdiction program.

European-Based Air Force Assets Carry Heavy Burden in Supporting Peace Operations

Since 1991, the end of Operation Desert Storm, three peace operations requiring substantial and sustained Air Force participation have occurred in the European theater of operations—Operations Provide Comfort, Provide Promise, and Deny Flight. These operations, combined with reductions in the U.S. Air Forces in Europe’s (USAFE) force structure—from 8.8 to 2.3 fighter wing equivalents—and corresponding squadron relocations, have resulted in many of the same conditions experienced by specialized U.S.-based assets participating in these operations, such as increased flying hours, high temporary duty rates, and missed training opportunities.

In addition, because recent peace operations have occurred in parts of the European theater where the Air Force has not maintained a permanent presence, a significant number of USAFE personnel have been required to build and maintain infrastructure from which to base forces. Weapons training deployment facilities in Aviano, Italy, and Incirlik, Turkey, had to be expanded greatly in order to accommodate the large numbers of military personnel supporting Operation Deny Flight and Operation Provide Comfort. The Air Force constructed tent cities in these two locations to provide additional housing and other services for deployed personnel.

With the reduction of forward-deployed squadrons in the European theater, considerable portions of some USAFE capabilities have been dedicated to peace operations. For example, USAFE has two F-15E squadrons designed for delivering precision-guided munitions at night in a high-threat environment. For more than a year, about 14 aircraft from both squadrons, which have a combined total of about 48 aircraft, have been participating in Operations Provide Comfort and Deny Flight. The F-15E’s night navigational and targeting system and high resolution radar have been valuable in identifying ground targets during these operations. Similarly, USAFE has one A-10 squadron, which provides close air support and forward air control. Twelve of its 21 aircraft have been participating in Operation Deny Flight for more than a year. According to Air Force officials, although all the squadrons’ aircraft were not involved in the operation at any one time, peace operations affect entire squadrons because they are structured to fight in place or deploy as a whole unit rather than in smaller packages.

Recent peace operations in the European theater have also placed a heavy demand on USAFE’s C-130 Hercules, which provides intra-theater airlift capabilities. The Air Force has only one active C-130 squadron in the European force structure, and almost the entire squadron—17 of 19 aircraft—has been participating in peace operations in the European theater. Operation Provide Promise’s missions into Bosnia have required the heaviest use of C-130 assets. The squadron’s capabilities were supplemented by reserve aircraft from the United States; nevertheless, the squadron had to curtail training in certain skill areas in order to fly scheduled airlift missions between bases to deliver supplies and participate in Operation Provide Promise.

USAFE, which had primary responsibility for responding to these operations since they have occurred within its area of responsibility, met operational requirements with its own forces as much as possible. This is traditional Air Force practice. Where USAFE did not have the necessary assets (such as the E-3 AWACS) or had shortfalls (such as in C-130s), it sought augmentation from outside Europe. To the extent other USAFE assets could have been augmented with active-duty units from the United States, such as in the case of the F-15E aircraft, some of the adverse impact of participation in these peace operations might have been mitigated. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD noted that the Air Force has recognized these challenges and is addressing them by relying more on active, reserve, and Guard units based in the continental United States, which have deployed to Operations Provide Comfort and Deny Flight to relieve some of the operational burden.

Split Operations Create Logistics and Personnel Challenges for Squadrons Supporting Peace Operations

Deploying to peace operations from bases in Europe or the United States has created planning and logistics challenges for the Air Force because essential unit equipment and personnel have to be shared by the forces at the home base and in the deployed location. These split operations have had a significant impact on home bases, which sometimes have had to make due with a reduced number of maintenance and operational personnel and essential unit equipment to ensure that the deployed forces maintain a high state of readiness. Even if a squadron deploys less than half of its aircraft, the effect on the home base is still significant because key operations and maintenance personnel and equipment must deploy to support the aircraft. According to Air Force officials, split operations challenges exist because Air Force squadrons are still structured to fight in place or deploy as a whole unit rather than in smaller packages as they are doing for peace operations. According to squadron personnel, split operations impede squadron-wide communication processes and long-term squadron planning, and tax senior squadron leaders who often have to perform the jobs of their absent colleagues in addition to their own. According to one squadron commander, it is difficult to plan the future vision for the squadron because the squadron’s senior leaders are geographically separated.

Split operations create other personnel challenges as well. Operations and maintenance personnel rotate between the home station and the peace operation. For example, according to USAFE officials, aircrews from USAFE’s A-10 squadron deploy to Operation Deny Flight for an average of 6 to 9 weeks and remain at the home station for varying periods of 2, 5, or 7 weeks. Maintenance personnel remain deployed for 90 days. While at home station, personnel must train and attend to squadron administrative responsibilities. According to the squadron commander, this allows personnel minimal time for leave and attending to family responsibilities before rotating again to the peace operation.

Aircraft Squadrons Often Have to Forego Necessary Training Because of Peace Operation Demands

Many USAFE squadrons participating in peace operations on a sustained basis have found it difficult to attend major training exercises at the same time they are participating in a peace operation. According to squadron and wing officials we talked with, the squadrons do not have enough people or equipment to support the peace operation, home station requirements, and the training exercise concurrently. Because of their participation in peace operations, both of USAFE’s F-15E squadrons have had to reduce their level of involvement or cancel their participation altogether in training exercises. For example, the squadrons were not able to participate in major tactical air combat exercises, such as Maple Flag, a Canadian exercise similar to Red Flag, which would have provided them with realistic combat training. This type of training is particularly important for these F-15E squadrons since they were established in 1993 and have not had the opportunity to participate in a major tactical air combat exercise.

While USAFE squadrons have not deployed all their forces to peace operations, the forces remaining at the home station often find it difficult to maintain enough aircraft to conduct home station training. For example, beginning with its initial deployment in July 1993, USAFE’s only A-10 squadron provided 12 of its 21 aircraft on hand to support Operation Deny Flight. Of the remaining nine, two were undergoing phase maintenance inspections at the home station; one was undergoing depot repair; and one was used for spare parts in support of forward-deployed aircraft. Thus, only five of the remaining aircraft were available for pilot training sorties at the home station. Because of the limited number of available aircraft, the remaining aircrews were only able to fly the minimum number of hours needed to maintain mission-ready status. On the occasions when an additional aircraft had to be dedicated to Operation Deny Flight, the squadron did not have enough aircraft available to meet training needs. According to squadron officials, this was also true for USAFE F-15E, F-15C, F-16, and C-130 aircrews.

The Commander of USAFE’s A-10 squadron identified four training events that could not be accomplished at Operation Deny Flight because of various restrictions in the operating theater. These events also were difficult to accomplish at home station because of environmental and other restrictions on low-level flight (below 500 feet), target marking, full scale-weapons delivery, and certain types of approaches. Had the squadron not been participating continuously in Operation Deny Flight, it would have had the opportunity to deploy elsewhere for this training.

As is the case with certain U.S.-based squadrons, aircrews from Europe-based squadrons participating in peace operations have also had to obtain waivers for training requirements they were not able to satisfy during the last training cycle. According to the squadron and wing officials we interviewed at home stations and deployed locations, pilot proficiency in a low-threat environment is at an all-time high due to the nature of the missions over Bosnia and Northern Iraq. However, proficiency in high-threat, low-altitude mission profiles has suffered and will continue to suffer as long as training opportunities and peace operation mission taskings remain at their present levels. As shown in table 2.4, for example, all of the aircrews in USAFE’s two F-15E squadrons obtained waivers for one or more training events they were not able to accomplish during the 6-month training cycle ending June 30, 1994. Aircrews received waivers in areas such as Night Weapons Delivery, Air Combat Maneuvers, Air Combat Tactics, and Basic Fighter Maneuvers.

As mentioned earlier, USAFE’s only C-130 squadron had to curtail training in order to meet its peace operation and normal operational requirements. However, after March 1994, its operational requirements for Operation Provide Promise declined significantly. As a result, C-130 aircrew did not require training waivers for the training cycle ending June 30, 1994. At the height of Operation Provide Promise, squadron aircrew required training waivers for two consecutive periods ending June 30 and December 31, 1993. For these training cycles, 42 and 52 percent of squadron cockpit crew required 102 and 127 training waivers, respectively. Squadron aircrew received training waivers in critical areas such as night vision profiles and assault approaches.

In September 1994, the newly appointed USAFE Commander acknowledged that USAFE units were having difficulty accomplishing their training tasks because they are supporting peace operations. He noted that operations such as Deny Flight and Provide Comfort are competing for combat training time and causing combat skills to atrophy. According to the Commander, fighter pilots need to practice intercepts, bomb dropping, and air-to-air combat, yet they do not typically get this experience during the course of a peace operation. He stressed that USAFE can no longer continue to accept degraded levels of training. As noted earlier in this chapter, the Air Force is now relying more on active, reserve, and Guard units based in the continental United States to relieve some of the operational burden.

Reserves Provide Operational Relief to Certain Forces in the Active Component

Air Force reserve volunteer participation in peace operations has more than doubled since fiscal year 1991. Reserve forces have participated in such major operations as Restore Hope, Provide Comfort, Provide Hope, and Southern Watch, as well as other smaller international peace operations and domestic disaster relief operations. In some cases, reserves have been needed to meet mission requirements that active forces were unable to fulfill. For example, since there is only one F-4G squadron in the active component and it is participating in Operation Provide Comfort and Southern Watch, reserve F-4Gs have had to provide augmentation to Operation Southern Watch. In particular, the 190th Air National Guard Fighter Squadron deployed to Southwest Asia in support of Operation Southern Watch in December 1993, within a year of returning from another Southern Watch deployment. According to squadron officials, the 190th Fighter Squadron was deployed 12 out of 18 months during this time period.

In other cases, reserve volunteers have provided operational relief to active forces. For example, from November 15, 1993, to January 15, 1994, and again during the summer of 1994, reserve A-10 personnel and aircraft from the United States relieved USAFE’s A-10 squadron so that its personnel could attend scheduled training at Nellis Air Force Base. Operational relief for other USAFE aircraft was provided by F-16, KC-135, C-141, and C-5 reserve aircraft from the United States. In addition to providing this operational relief, reserve forces still have had to meet most of their individual and unit training; attend exercises; and satisfy other operational responsibilities for local, state, and federal agencies, such as providing assistance in weather reconnaissance, disaster relief, aeromedical evacuations, and counternarcotics.

The majority of C-130s are in the reserves. Given Operation Provide Promise’s extensive C-130 requirements and USAFE’s relatively small number of C-130s, reserve aircraft and personnel were looked to for meeting mission requirements. Initially, reserve aircraft and personnel augmented USAFE’s only C-130 squadron. However, in January 1994, because an increasing number of U.S.-based aircraft and personnel were needed, the Air Force formed another squadron, known as the Delta squadron. This squadron consisted of reserve and active C-130 aircraft and personnel that operated out of Germany. Aircrew and maintenance personnel rotated every 2 to 3 weeks. The reserve deployments allowed the active component C-130 squadron in Europe to reduce its flying hours and subsequently increase its mission capable rates. As of May 1994, volunteer Air Force reservists flew approximately 62 percent of the airlift sorties in support of Operation Provide Promise. However, while reservists generally are willing to participate in these operations, Air Force Reserve and National Guard officials noted that this level of reserve participation in peace operations is affecting the willingness of reserves to volunteer for exercises. As of May 1994, however, the need for reservists to support Provide Promise dropped as operational demands diminished.

Naval Forces Have Not Been as Taxed by Peace Operations as Other Services, but Operational Stress Is Increasing

Certain Navy and Marine Corps units have experienced increased operating tempo and reduced time to prepare for deployments due to their participation in peace operations. The ability to obtain necessary training while participating in these operations is also becoming an increasing concern. However, peace operations have provided the naval services with unique experiences in joint and coalition operations that in many cases may be more valuable than training exercises.

Naval Services Experience High Operating Tempo in Providing Forces for Peace Operations

The Navy and Marine Corps in peacetime are inherently crisis- and contingency-oriented forces and have conducted peace operations in littoral areas since their creation. Navy and Marine Corps force structure is designed so that the naval services can maintain a forward presence and rapidly respond to crises, as well as the war-fighting requirements of MRCs. The peacetime role of forward-deployed carrier battle groups and amphibious task forces covers the spectrum of military involvement—from single-ship port visits, maritime interdiction and blockades, humanitarian relief missions, and emergency evacuation of U.S. nationals, to major amphibious operations.

According to naval officials, in attempting to meet both the requirements of peace operations and normal peacetime presence commitments, naval forces have exceeded established operating tempo standards for forward-deployed forces in the Central Command, European Command, and Pacific Command areas of operation. The officials indicated that this was due in part to participation in peace operations involving Bosnia, Iraq, and Somalia and in part to the reduction in force structure and forward-deployed forces available to respond to the same or greater number of operational commitments. While the Navy and Marine Corps have tried not to extend deployments beyond 6 months, the operating tempo has increased during deployments. This is reflected, for example, by an increased number of steaming days incurred by Navy aircraft carriers operating in the Mediterranean and adjoining seas in 1993 versus 1989 (the year before Operation Desert Shield).

Participation in Peace Operations Affects Training of Naval Forces

Sustained commitments to particular peace operations, such as Operations Sharp Guard and Deny Flight in Europe and Operation Southern Watch in Southwest Asia, require a sustained presence of surface ships and an aircraft carrier in the Adriatic Sea and Arabian Gulf. This often reduces U.S. naval participation in certain exercises and training. For example, in written responses to our questions the Navy stated that several exercises have been canceled in the European and Central Commands’ areas of operation, severely limiting training in anti-submarine warfare, amphibious operations, and command and control. These capabilities would be needed in a major regional conflict. Table 2.5 compares Sixth Fleet aircraft carrier deployments in 1989 and 1993 and shows a decrease in the number of days devoted to training exercises and an increase in the number of days devoted to all other operations.

Postponed or canceled training has not always had a negative effect on naval forces, however. Naval officials stress that peace operations provide unique opportunities for realistic joint and coalition experience and in many cases may be better than exercises. For example, naval forces may receive better training by participating in a multilateral peace operation involving maritime and air interdiction, such as Operations Sharp Guard and Deny Flight in Europe, than by participating in a scheduled exercise with one or two other nations. Similarly, Marine support forces in Somalia obtained valuable experience building infrastructure and providing other logistical support to U.S. and coalition forces.

If naval forces are pulled out of training required before a major deployment, they have to compress their training period and then work longer hours to catch up when they return to port. Some of the ships that have participated in the Haiti operation were taken out of single-ship basic training, such as damage control drills. The Navy considers interrupting this training less damaging to overall mission effectiveness than taking ships out of intermediate or advanced training that requires operating with more than one unit. Much of the basic training can be done at sea, even while a ship is participating in an operation. As more ships were dedicated to support Cuban migrant interdiction, however, training opportunities decreased because more of a ship’s crew was involved in migrant sighting, recovery, screening, care, and feeding. When the ships return to port, therefore, they have to perform in-port maintenance, training, and many administrative and operational inspections simultaneously to remain on schedule for their next major 6-month deployment. This has resulted in crewmen working longer hours and has left less time for them to spend with their families prior to a major deployment.

Naval officials also told us that peace operations are resulting in reduced intermediate training, such as that at instrumented ranges for missile and gun shoots. U.S. European Command officials noted that naval aviators participating in these operations are experiencing many of the same challenges as the Air Force in terms of training and operational tempo.

Participation in sustained peace operations and a reduction in forward-deployed forces has also contributed to reduced U.S. naval presence in certain geographic areas where U.S. forces had been able to visit on past deployments. Among the results has been a reduced level of participation in bilateral exercises and training with countries that may not be participating in peace operations and fewer port visits and military-to-military exchanges. Quantifying the effects of this reduction in presence is difficult since the political and diplomatic factors at issue are somewhat intangible. Naval officials have noted, however, that some nations dedicate considerable resources preparing for the opportunity to participate in an exercise with the U.S. Navy. When exercises are canceled, countries do not get the experience operating with technologically superior U.S. systems and therefore may not be capable of doing so in the future should the need arise.

Table 2.5 also shows the decrease in the number of days aircraft carriers spent in port during Sixth Fleet Mediterranean deployments in 1989 and 1993. The reduced number of days in port has affected the Navy’s ability to conduct intermediate maintenance on its ships and equipment. According to U.S. Navy officials in Europe, there has been a 20-percent reduction in the Navy’s ability to conduct intermediate maintenance in this theater, which requires time in port. They are concerned that continued delays in conducting intermediate maintenance may degrade equipment readiness and service life, particularly since peace operations tend to expose equipment to more wear and tear than would be expected during normal peacetime operations.

According to the Navy, its participation in peace operations has not, thus far, had a harmful impact on its ability to perform other more traditional missions. Thus, naval units have been able to meet a variety of demands by moving within or across command boundaries—such as between the European and Central Commands—in response to emerging crises. The Navy has generally been able to maintain its policy mandating that deployments not exceed 6 months and that the period between deployments be twice as long as the last deployment. The Navy had to break this policy in some cases, however, so that ships could be made available to support Somalia operations. While in 1993 there were 5 of these cases, through September 1994 the Navy had 15 cases in which it had to break this policy. According to the Navy, the 1994 cases were due chiefly to operational requirements regarding Somalia, Haiti, Cuba, and counter-drug missions. The Marine Corps faces similar challenges. For example, a Marine Expeditionary Unit that returned on June 23, 1994, from a 6-month deployment, including 3 months off the coast of Somalia, was sent back to sea in less than 3 weeks to support U.S. operations off the coast of Haiti.

According to service officials, the Navy and Marine Corps have not found it necessary to rely upon volunteer reserve forces in peace operations to the same degree as the Army and Air Force. Naval forces are structured for daily peacetime forward presence operations that require a complete range of combat forces and capabilities be readily available for immediate response. As a result, the majority of these forces and capabilities are in the active component. The function of the Navy and Marine Corps reserve is to augment the active component forces. Nevertheless, there are certain capabilities that reside exclusively, or nearly so, in the Naval Reserve and are essential to many peace operations. These capabilities include units and individuals involved in cargo handling, Navy air logistics, medical fleet hospitals, and mobil construction battalions. Recent Navy support to peace operations has included the Naval Reserve in search and rescue and maritime patrol support for Operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard, as well as construction support for operations in Somalia. According to naval officials, reliance on these limited, yet important, combat support and combat service support capabilities may increase as the Navy’s commitment to future peace operations continues to expand.

Short Duration of Marine Corps Participation in Somalia Operation Had Limited Impact

Marine Corps forces, chiefly from the First Marine Expeditionary Force, supported operations in Somalia from December 1992 through early May 1993. Later, other Marine forces provided offshore support. While Marine Corps forces have participated in a variety of peace operations, their participation in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia represented their largest peace operation commitment. Early in the operation, the Marine Corps provided the predominant number of forces, including initial entry and sustainment forces. At its peak in January 1993, there were over 11,000 U.S. Marine forces in Somalia. However, by February 1993, the U.S. Army gradually assumed the majority of the support responsibilities for U.S. and coalition forces, and the Marine Corps began to redeploy.

The deployment of Marine forces to Somalia resulted in certain support units’ devoting a significant percentage of their capability to the operation, leaving minimal support available at the home base for use in other operations. For example, approximately 95 percent of the 1st Marine Division’s Combat Engineer Battalion and half of the Division’s Headquarters Battalion deployed to Somalia. The absence of the Headquarters Battalion required a secondary planning staff, the 11th Marines, to handle division operations until the main battalion returned. While the 11th Marines, which functions normally as an artillery unit, could have handled a contingency similar in size and scope to the riots in Los Angeles or the Northridge Earthquake, it did not have the capacity to orchestrate a response to a MRC, according to Marine officials. Had another conflict occurred while these forces were in Somalia, the Marines would have to have looked to one of the other two Marine Expeditionary Forces to respond. However, since the Marine Corps’ major ground participation was limited to several months and other forces were available for crisis response elsewhere, the operation had a limited impact.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

DOD generally agrees that recent peace operations have stressed key military capabilities and states that it is already examining various means to reduce lengthy deployments in support of peace operations and operations other than war. DOD further states that high temporary duty rates and heavy use of specialized aircraft are force management issues that have been addressed by better use of worldwide assets, heavier involvement of the reserves, and the purchase of additional and replacement aircraft. We describe DOD efforts to address the stress peace operations have placed on key military capabilities at several points in the report and modified the report based on DOD’s comments and further discussion with DOD officials.

DOD disagrees with our characterization of the demand peace operations have placed on specialized Air Force aircraft. It believes that we have painted an inaccurate and misleading picture about the degree to which such Air Force capabilities are devoted to peace operations. Our report clearly states that the aircraft we cite (see table 2.3) were the average number of aircraft available for mission ready training or deployment to a contingency in June 1994 and that the number excluded test aircraft and/or aircraft undergoing depot, phase, or intermediate phase maintenance. We recognize that the Air Force has more aircraft in its inventory than those available at any one time. However, we believe that in evaluating how peace operations affect military capabilities the appropriate focus is the number of aircraft available for use at any one time.

Participation in Peace Operations May Delay Services’ Response to Major Regional Conflicts

As a result of the bottom-up review, DOD concluded that military forces needed for peace operations will come from the same pool of forces identified for use in the event of one or more MRCs. Some of the Army and Air Force forces used in recent peace operations, including certain Army support units such as port and terminal services units and petroleum handling units that exist in small numbers in the active Army and specialized Air Force aircraft, such as the E-3 AWACS, are also needed in the early stages of a MRC. Disengaging these forces from a peace operation and redeploying them to the MRC quickly may be difficult. Also difficult would be obtaining sufficient airlift to redeploy the forces, retraining forces to restore their war-fighting skills, and reconstituting equipment. These difficulties are significant because in the event of a short-warning attack, forces are needed to deploy and enter battle as quickly as possible to halt the invasion and minimize U.S. casualties.

Bottom-Up Review Envisions Peace Operations as Secondary Mission

In 1993, the Secretary of Defense conducted the bottom-up review, a reassessment of U.S. defense requirements. This review, completed in October 1993, examined the nation’s defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, foundations, and resources needed for the post-Cold War era. The Secretary’s report on the bottom-up review outlined the new dangers facing the U.S. interests, chief among them being regional aggression. To deal with regional aggression and other regional dangers, DOD’s strategy is to (1) defeat aggressors in MRCs; (2) maintain overseas presence to deter conflicts and provide regional stability; and (3) conduct smaller scale intervention operations, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. To deal with the threat of regional aggression, DOD concluded that it is prudent for the United States to maintain sufficient military power to fight and win two MRCs that occur nearly simultaneously. According to the report on the bottom-up review, while deterring and defeating major regional aggression will be the most demanding requirement of the new defense strategy, U.S. military forces are more likely to be involved in operations short of declared or intense warfare. The forces responding to these other operations will be provided largely by the same collection of general purpose forces needed for MRCs and overseas presence.

DOD’s report on the bottom-up review states that if a MRC occurs, DOD will deploy a substantial portion of its forces stationed in the United States and draw on forces assigned to overseas presence missions. Unless needed for the conflict, other forces that are engaged in smaller scale operations like peacekeeping will remain so engaged. If a second conflict breaks out, the bottom-up review envisioned that DOD would need to deploy another block of forces, requiring a further reallocation of overseas presence forces, any forces still engaged in smaller scale operations, and most of the remaining U.S.-based forces. In determining force requirements for the two-conflict strategy, DOD assumed that forces already engaged in peace operations could rapidly redeploy to a regional conflict.

Congress Directs Review of Bottom-Up Review

In the Fiscal Year 1995 Defense Authorization Act, Congress expressed concern about the bottom-up review and the defense budget. Regarding peace operations, Congress found that U.S. forces are involved in a number of peace operations, there was a possibility of even larger future involvement, and many of the forces participating in peace operations would be required early on in the event of one or more MRCs. Consequently, Congress directed that DOD review the assumptions and conclusions of the President’s budget, the bottom-up review, and the Future Years Defense Program. The review is to consider the various other-than-war or nontraditional operations in which U.S. forces are or may be participating and directs among other things that the report describe in detail the force structure required to fight and win two MRCs nearly simultaneously in light of other ongoing or potential operations. Congress also stated that the President should be willing to increase defense spending if needed to meet new or existing threats.

Key Force Capabilities Relied on for Both Peace Operations and MRCs

We found that certain Army support forces as well as specialized Air Force aircraft and Marine Corps prepositioned equipment and stocks that would be needed early in a first MRC have been engaged in peace operations.

Army Support Forces Designated for Early Use in a MRC Are Used in Peace Operations

The Army identified 5-1/3 active combat divisions and associated support forces that are needed in the early stages of a MRC. An additional 3-1/3 active combat divisions and associated support forces—follow-on forces—would either be deployed later in a MRC or could provide part of the response for a second MRC.

The support units that accompany active combat forces are organized into seven packages. The first three packages, called Contingency Force Pool (CFP) 1-3, support the first 5-1/3 divisions. While the fourth package, CFP 4, does not support the first 5-1/3 divisions directly, it rounds out the theater support that would be required for these early deploying forces. The follow-on 3-1/3 divisions are supported principally by CFP 5-7.

Army planners try to avoid using forces designated for early deployment to a MRC for contingencies such as peace operations. Although planners have been able to minimize the use of these forces in peace operations, they have had to use a large portion of some of the Army’s CFP 1-3 support forces in large-scale and/or multiple peace operations because there is a limited number of such forces in the active component.

In the Somalia operation, 50 percent of the active support forces used were from CFP 1-3 units. Specifically, 92 percent of quartermaster forces, 69 percent of engineering support forces, 64 percent of miscellaneous support forces, and 65 percent of transportation forces deployed to Somalia were CFP 1-3 units. As shown in table 3.1, certain support capabilities within those areas had an even higher percentage of CFP 1-3 units.

Similarly, should a peace plan be signed and U.S. military forces deploy to Bosnia to support the implementation of this plan, the Army likely would need to draw on support forces, including CFP units, to meet support requirements. For example, approximately 64 percent of the total number of forces planned to deploy are support forces, and approximately 14 percent of those forces will likely come from CFP 1-3 units.

Air Force Will Need Specialized Aircraft for MRCs That Are Also Used in Peace Operations

The Air Force anticipates needing almost all its specialized and unique capability aircraft, such as the EF-111, F-4Gs, E-3 AWACS, EC-130 ABCCC, and F-15E in the early days of a MRC. The Air Force’s experience in Operation Desert Storm documents the early demand for these aircraft.

For example, approximately 63 percent of the F-4G aircraft were deployed in support of Operation Desert Storm at the beginning of the hostilities. According to the bottom-up review, some of these aircraft are so important to a MRC’s success and are of such limited number in the active force structure that they are tasked to both MRCs, even in the case of nearly simultaneous MRCs. Recent peace operations have required varying numbers of the Air Force’s specialized and unique capability aircraft on a fairly continuous basis. For June 1994, we calculated that approximately 46 percent of these aircraft were involved in Operations Provide Comfort, Provide Promise, Deny Flight, and Southern Watch.

According to DOD officials, participation in the enforcement of no fly zones and other operations that require the forward deployment of U.S. forces can also enhance the ability of the U.S. military to respond quickly to regional contingencies. These officials said that this was the case in Operation Vigilant Warrior in October 1994, where having U.S. aircraft already operating from Saudi Arabia greatly facilitated the initial coalition response to Iraq’s threatened aggression against Kuwait.

Naval Services Use Forward-Deployed Forces for Peace Operations and MRCs

U.S. naval forces are structured to respond to regional contingencies with their forward-deployed carrier battle groups and amphibious-ready groups, which rotate on a regular basis between home ports and regional theaters. The Navy and the Marine Corps respond to many types of operations, from MRCs to peace operations, with the same forward-deployed forces. Generally, this has not been a problem because of the flexibility and rotational nature of naval forces. However, to respond to recent peace operations in the Caribbean Sea, the Navy has had to use its non-deployed forces, which were training and conducting maintenance in preparation for their upcoming scheduled 6-month deployments.

Army and Marine Corps Use Prepositioned Equipment and Stocks for Peace Operations

The Marine Corps and the Army have prepositioned equipment and stocks afloat for use in the event of a MRC. The Marine Corps has relied on prepositioned equipment and supplies stored on their Maritime Prepositioned Ships for a quick contingency response capability. Equipment and supplies that the Marines used in Somalia came from 4 of the 13 Maritime Prepositioned Ships that are organized into three squadrons positioned throughout the world. Each squadron is designed to provide enough ground combat and combat support equipment and supplies to sustain about 17,300 Marines for 30 days. The equipment and supplies aboard these ships are also needed to support other conflicts in which U.S. Marine forces are involved. To the extent these ships have been off-loaded to support a peace operation, their equipment and supplies are unavailable to respond to a MRC.

Similarly, the Army has prepositioned equipment afloat to facilitate the rapid deployment of a heavy Army brigade. Ships from the Army’s Prepositioning Afloat Program, which contains 12 ships with combat and support equipment and supplies, were recently positioned for use in supporting the Rwanda humanitarian operation. Five of these ships, containing support equipment and supplies, were positioned off the coast of Africa to support this operation if necessary. The need to unload these ships’ equipment and supplies never arose. In early October 1994, all 12 of these ships were sent to Southwest Asia to support U.S. forces responding to Iraqi troop movements. Had the five ships positioned off the African Coast been unloaded to support the Rwanda operation, their supplies and equipment likely would not have been available for use in Southwest Asia.

Disengagement From Peace Operations and Redeployment to MRCs Would Be Difficult

U.S. military forces would encounter numerous challenges if they needed to redeploy on short notice from one or more sizable peace operations to a MRC. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements stated in June 1994 that the United States would “liquidate” its commitments to peace operations in the event of two simultaneous regional conflicts. Discussions with service officials and review of data concerning the types and number of forces committed to peace operations indicate that disengagement from one or more sizable peace operations and redeployment of forces to a MRC on short notice could be difficult.

Obtaining sufficient airlift would be one of the primary challenges encountered in redeploying forces from one or more peace operations to a MRC. In order to redeploy ground personnel and equipment from the peace operations, the already limited number of airlift assets flying from the United States to the MRC would have to divert to the peace operation, in some cases pick up personnel and equipment, and take them to the MRC. The Air Force has not yet fully studied the implication of such a redeployment and hence could not quantify the impact of this delay on the Air Force’s ability to meet MRC deployment requirements. Air Force officials did say that it would make a difficult situation even worse. According to Air Force officials, the Air Force’s tactical forces would also encounter an airlift problem in moving from a peace operation to a MRC. While aircraft and aircrews could easily fly from one operation to another, the maintenance and logistics support needed to keep the aircraft flying—supplies, equipment, and personnel—would have to wait for available airlift.

Another challenge that would be encountered is that certain Army contingency support forces (such as port handlers, air and sea movement control personnel, and petroleum handlers) needed in the early days of a MRC, would still be needed within the peace operation theater to facilitate the disengagement and redeployment. As a result of our analysis comparing the support capabilities needed in the first 30 days of a MRC with the contingency support capabilities deployed to Somalia, we found that in some cases 100 percent of some of these active component support forces were used in the Somalia peace operation. Had a MRC arisen during this time, immediate access to reserve component forces would have been necessary. According to DOD officials, the Army has recognized this as a challenge and is currently examining this issue as part of the Total Army Analysis 2003, which it expects to complete in mid-1995.

According to Navy officials, the response of Navy ships to a MRC would depend more on their overall distance to the crisis location than on the operations they were currently conducting. With some peace operations, however, Navy ships may not be directed to disengage quickly and move to a MRC. A senior Navy official noted, for example, that it took approximately 7 months to resolve a crisis in Liberia in 1990-91 and until that time the amphibious ready group was not directed to participate in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Each service faces challenges with reconstituting its forces in terms of training, equipment, and supplies in order to deploy directly to a MRC. Army officials have expressed some concern that participating in peace operations may degrade combat unit readiness for combat operations because of the inability to practice certain individual and collective wartime skills. In Somalia, for example, while the combat forces received extensive experience in military operations conducted in an urban environment, they were not able to practice collective training skills. According to 10th Mountain Division officials, in some cases it took approximately 3 to 6 months to bring these skills back to a level acceptable for combat operations once they returned from Somalia. Army officials also noted that while peace operations offered the opportunity to practice and enhance logistic skills, logistics training provided in Somalia did not substitute completely for the training that would result from a prepared training exercise, such as those at the National Training Center. In the latter, the support forces would work with combat forces as they would in high-intensity combat operations. Marine Corps ground forces had similar experiences in Somalia.

According to Air Force officials, peace operations tend to degrade the overall combat readiness of Air Force flight crews that participate in these operations on a sustained basis because they often restrict night and low-level flight operations and do not provide experience in other combat skills such as night intercept maneuvers. Similarly, naval aviators find that they lose proficiency in some combat skills, such as air combat maneuvering, through prolonged participation in peace operations. As with the Air Force, naval aviators who participate in these operations on a sustained basis are not as able to get to combat ranges where they can practice their full breadth of combat capabilities.

The reconstitution of equipment used in peace operations may also hinder a timely disengagement and redeployment to a MRC. The extensive use of certain equipment, combined with the harsh environmental effects encountered in certain peace operations, has required extensive maintenance before the equipment can be used again. For example, upon their return from Somalia, the 10th Mountain Division’s AH-60 helicopters had to enter depot level maintenance as a result of the harsh desert environment and the extensive use of these helicopters in Somalia.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

DOD disagrees with our conclusion that participation in peace operations could impede the timely response of U.S. forces to MRCs. It agrees that there are only a small number of certain active support units that are likely to be needed to conduct both peace operations and MRCs. However, it believes that our resultant conclusions reflect a lack of understanding of how U.S. forces would respond to a MRC. Our conclusions in this regard focus on certain critical capabilities that exist in limited numbers, specifically certain Army support units and certain Air Force aircraft. We reached our conclusions through analysis of how these capabilities have been used in peace operations and past conflicts and their planned use in future conflicts. We agree that most combat forces would be readily available to respond to a MRC.

In its comments DOD states that, on the basis of the recent response of U.S. forces to the possibility of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait while U.S. forces were engaged in Haiti, it does not see any evidence that significant support unit shortfalls exist. It further states that the participation of certain Air Force aircraft in peace operations in that part of the world facilitated the response to Iraqi movements. Since these events occurred after we had completed our audit work, we were not in a position to analyze them.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Participation in large-scale and/or multiple peace operations could impede the ability of U.S. forces to rapidly respond to MRCs because of several factors. First, certain critical support forces needed in the early days of a major regional conflict would also be needed to facilitate a redeployment from the peace operation. Second, airlift assets would have to be diverted to pick up personnel and equipment from the peace operation. Finally, some of the forces would need training, supplies, and equipment before deploying to another major operation.

Forces with capabilities that exist in limited numbers in the active Army and would be needed in the early stages of a MRC have been used repeatedly in peace operations. Similar-type units that are not engaged in peace operations may not be able to respond quickly or effectively to MRCs because they are assigned fewer people than authorized and they may have loaned some people to the units engaged in the peace operations, which exacerbates an already difficult situation.

Specialized aircraft that exist in limited numbers in the active force structure and their crews are also being used more frequently in peace operations. The Air Force anticipates needing almost all its specialized aircraft in the early days of a MRC.

Some forces in each service are missing training and exercises that affect their overall combat readiness and their ability to redeploy directly to a MRC. Numerous waivers have been issued for aircrews that have not been able to complete required training due to the demands of peace operations. Naval forces involved in peace operations are spending almost all their time at sea conducting operations and so have been unable to participate in some exercises and training.

Peace operations are also likely to have a long-term impact on the people who participate in them although it is difficult to quantify that impact. In 1994 personnel for specialized aircraft have approached the Air Force’s recommended maximum number of temporary duty days away from home station in a year—120. In the case of the F-4Gs, squadron personnel are likely to exceed the recommended maximum by 50 percent. There are reports that increased temporary duty days for Air Force personnel are affecting their morale and their families and that it is contributing to increased instances of divorce and decisions to leave the Air Force. Naval personnel, unable to perform as much maintenance, training, and operational inspections while at sea, are working longer hours in port and have less time for their families prior to a major deployment.

A June 1994 Defense Science Board Report on Readiness notes that the amount of time individuals are away from home has been affected by, among other things, the rapid force drawdown and a higher level of contingency operations. This has increased deployment frequency and placed new strains on personnel. The report further notes that family separation has always been a major, if not the number one, retention variable.

Options for Easing the Strain of Peace Operations

There are options available to allow DOD to meet the demands of participation in numerous and/or sizable sustained peace operations on military forces while maintaining the capability to rapidly respond to MRCs. These options have their own advantages and disadvantages and will require choices on the use of the nation’s resources. Although no one option addresses all the problems we have identified, a combination of these options could substantially ease the problems. While there are costs associated with some of these options, we have not examined their magnitude and how DOD might fund them. DOD is currently examining a range of such options.

Change the Mix of Army Combat and Support Forces

One option involves increasing the availability of support forces for peace operations by maintaining fewer combat and more support forces on active duty. At present, the Army has placed many support functions in the reserve component. For example, many units that open and operate ports overseas are in the reserve component. This capability was placed in the reserve component during the Cold War, and DOD expected that when forces were needed in wartime it would be able to quickly access and deploy these reserve forces. However, many of these forces that are in the active component have been required in peace operations because the Army has not been authorized to involuntarily access reserve units in most peace operations. While the Army maintains limited numbers of certain types of support capability on active duty, it maintains substantial combat capability in the active component. More support forces could be made available for peace operations if the Army maintained fewer combat forces and redirected those resources to maintaining more support forces. According to Army officials, this is one of the issues that is being examined as part of the Total Army Analysis, which should be completed by mid-1995.

Alternatively, DOD may be able to increase the number of combat and combat service support forces without decreasing the number of combat forces by making more use of civilian employees. We recently reported that the services use thousands of military personnel in support functions, such as personnel management and data processing, that are typically performed by civilian personnel and do not require skills gained from military experience. We further reported that replacing these military personnel with civilian employees would reduce peacetime personnel costs and could release military members for use in more combat-specific duties.

Make Greater Use of the Reserves

Making greater use of the reserves would ease the burden on Army active support forces and Air Force airlift and combat forces. Authority to call up the reserves rests with the President. There are three provisions of Title 10 of the U.S. Code that provide access to large numbers of reservists, one of which is section 673b—Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC). This section provides access to 200,000 members in the Selected Reserve for up to 270 days and would only require the President to notify Congress that he was making the call-up.

DOD policy guidance regarding the use of reserves for peace operations requires that maximum consideration be given to the use of volunteers before involuntary activation is ordered. The President called up approximately 1,900 reservists to support the September 1994 military intervention in Haiti. Prior to that call-up, PSRC had been invoked only once (for the Gulf War) since its 1976 enactment. The reserves were not activated for the operations in Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, or Somalia in 1992. According to senior Army officials, a request went from the Army to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for involuntary access to reserves for Somalia. The request ultimately was never presented to the President. An April 1994 DOD report on accessibility of reserve forces notes that using PSRC authority would raise sensitive domestic and foreign policy concerns that require time to resolve before the President could be expected to decide on when large numbers of reservists should be ordered to active duty.

Prior to the Haiti intervention, DOD had stated in its April 1994 report on accessibility of reserve forces that the decision to not invoke PSRC in Grenada, Panama, and Somalia supported the perception that PSRC has evolved into a de facto mobilization authority.

As DOD’s report on the reserves notes, gaining involuntary access to reserve personnel for any mission is a sensitive matter. A reserve call-up has the potential to disrupt the lives of reservists, their families, and their employers or customers. According to DOD, the assumption of many reservists is that reservists would be called up for service only when vital interests of the United States are threatened. This is based on Cold War experiences and certain post-Cold War contingencies such as Desert Storm. U.S. Army Reserve Command officials advised us of their concern that involuntary use of the reserves for peace operations would be disruptive to reservists’ lives and ultimately could affect the willingness of Americans to join the reserves.

The Office of Reserve Affairs, within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is examining the limits and impediments to volunteerism and how to expand their use. That office has identified several impediments, including statutory requirements involving the lack of some benefits for reservists on duty for less than 31 days, the lack of employer support, and the lack of funds to pay the costs of reservists on active duty, which currently is not included in the annual defense budget, that must be eliminated if DOD is to rely on expanded use of volunteers. DOD reports that it is addressing a wide range of proposals for mitigating these and other impediments.

Make Greater Use of Contractors

DOD could also use contractors to augment support forces. The Army is already making greater use of contract personnel to provide many of the support services typically provided by its combat service support personnel. In Somalia, for example, the Army used the logistics civil augmentation program, which uses a civilian contractor to provide construction services and general logistic support. This reduced the Army support requirement. The Army has also tasked this contractor with developing a worldwide logistics civil augmentation plan and a specific plan for a potential future deployment to Bosnia. The Bosnia plan describes the military support the contractor personnel can provide and the types of military units it can replace.

Use of the contractor entails additional costs that, in Somalia, were paid first from the Marine Corps’ and then the Army’s operations and maintenance budget. In addition, Army officials said that in Somalia, the contractor needed to use Army equipment to perform its tasks, which required taking equipment from Army units.

Use Worldwide Military Assets

The use of worldwide military assets could ease the strain on military forces. Peace operations had a number of negative impacts on USAFE because USAFE followed its traditional practice of meeting operational requirements with its own forces as much as possible. While USAFE’s two F-15E squadrons and one A-10 squadron were heavily engaged in supporting peace operations, there were several active-duty F-15E and active-duty A-10 squadrons based in the United States that might have been able to ease the strain if they could have taken turns rotating aircraft and personnel to those operations. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD noted that the Air Force has recognized these challenges and is addressing them by relying more on active, reserve, and Guard units based in the continental United States, which have deployed to Operations Provide Comfort and Deny Flight to relieve some of the operational burden.

Change Forward Presence Goals

At present, one of the Navy’s principal missions is to maintain forward presence around the world. Forward presence is also a key component of national military strategy as described in the report on the bottom-up review. However, the extent of forward presence necessary is a matter of judgement for the Navy and the Joint Staff.

DOD could change the required level of forward presence to relieve the strain on naval forces. This would require a significant military and diplomatic policy decision. It could also result in reduced crisis response capability and less opportunity to participate in multilateral exercises.

Accept the Status Quo

The alternative to using defense resources differently is to accept the status quo and so continue to treat peace operations as a secondary mission. The risk of accepting the status quo is that it would continue the strain on the military as a result of its participation in peace operations and could adversely affect the military’s ability to respond to a MRC if one should occur while military forces were engaged in a sizable peace operation or several smaller ones.

Whether the risk is acceptable in part depends on the frequency with which the United States engages in sizable peace operations and the duration of these operations. Each operation is different in terms of size, operating environment, and duration. For example, the operation in Somalia required large numbers of ground forces in an austere environment for over a year, while the Rwanda operation required smaller numbers of ground and airlift forces for several months. Estimates for a potential Bosnia deployment call for even larger numbers of ground forces in an austere environment for about 2 years. Other operations, such as enforcement of the no-fly zones over Iraq and Bosnia, have required aviation assets for an extended period but few ground forces.

Whether the risk is acceptable also depends on the extent to which the services can mitigate the risks. For example, the services might be able to use civilian contractor logistics support, or use some of the other options we have identified. Ultimately, however, if policymakers believe that the likelihood of U.S. involvement in large scale, extended duration operations is low, the risk may be much more acceptable than if they believe that the likelihood is high.

Recommendation

Concerned about the bottom-up review and the defense budget, Congress directed DOD to review the assumptions and conclusions of the President’s budget, the bottom-up review, and the Future Years Defense Program. DOD is to review peace operations and report in detail on the force structure required to fight and win two MRCs nearly simultaneously while responding to other ongoing or potential operations. Consequently, we are not making recommendations regarding reassessing the impact of participation in peace operations in this report.

We recently reported on the bottom-up review’s assumptions concerning the broader force structure issues, including the redeployment of forces from other operations to MRCs, the availability of strategic mobility, and the deployability of reserve combat forces.

On another matter, however, we believe that because of the Army’s significantly reduced size the staffing of support forces at 10 to 20 percent below their authorized levels needs to be reassessed. Consequently, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army, as part of the Total Army Analysis 2003, to reexamine whether high priority support units that would deploy early in a crisis should still be staffed at less than 100 percent of their authorized strength.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

DOD states that it is addressing the matter we raise in our recommendation as part of Total Army Analysis 2003. If the Army fully assesses the issue of staffing high priority support units as part of the Total Army Analysis 2003, we believe that the intent of our recommendation would be met.