Afghanistan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability
Released: 2008-06-18T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Afghanistan’s security institutions, including its police and judiciary, were severely damaged prior to the U.S. and coalition overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001. Reconstitution of the ANP formally began in February 2002 when donor nations agreed to establish a multiethnic, sustainable, 62,000- member professional police service committed to the rule of law. Germany volunteered to lead the police reform effort; however, due, in part, to Afghanistan’s pressing security needs and concerns that the German training program was moving too slowly, the United States expanded its role in the police training effort in 2005—including involvement, for the first time, of the U.S. Department of Defense, as well as increased funding. In May 2007, the Afghan government and its international partners approved an interim increase in the number of police forces from 62,000 to 82,000, to be reviewed every 6 months. The force structure for the police includes Ministry of Interior headquarters and administrative staff, uniformed police personnel, and several specialized police units. (See app. I for further details on the force structure and functions of the ANP.)

In addition to enforcing the rule of law, the role of the ANP is to protect the rights of citizens, maintain civil order and public safety, control national borders, and reduce the level of domestic and international organized crime, among other activities. Also, the deterioration in Afghanistan’s security situation since 2005 has led to increased ANP involvement in counterinsurgency operations, resulting in additional training in weapons and survival skills and counterinsurgency tactics.

U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip the ANP are directed by Defense through its Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC- A), with support from State, which provides policy guidance to the effort and oversight of civilian contractors implementing police training courses. The primary U.S. contractor involved in training the ANP is DynCorp International.

From 2002 to 2008, the United States provided about $16.5 billion to train and equip the ANSF, including about $6.2 billion for the ANP (see table 1). Over 40 percent (about $2.7 billion) of funds for training and equipping the ANP were provided in fiscal year 2007, in an effort to accelerate ANP development and enhance its capability in response to increased levels of violence and insurgent activity.

Defense has developed criteria—called capability milestones (CM)—to assess police and army capability. The table below provides descriptions of the capability milestones.

Most Afghan National Police Units Are Rated as Not Capable of Performing Their Mission

After an investment of more than $6 billion, Defense reporting indicates that, as of April 2008, no police unit (0 of 433) was assessed as fully capable of performing its mission and more than three-fourths of units rated (334 of 433) were assessed as not capable (see table 3). Furthermore, among rated units, about 96 percent (296 of 308) of uniformed police districts and all border police battalions (33 of 33), which together comprise about 75 percent of the ANP’s authorized end- strength, were rated as not capable.

Six of the remaining 12 uniformed police districts were rated as capable of leading operations with coalition support, and the other 6 as partially capable. Overall, Defense assessed approximately 4 percent (18 of 433 units rated) of police units as partially capable and about 3 percent (12 of 433 units rated) as capable of leading operations with coalition support. According to Defense reporting as of April 2008, the expected date for completion of a fully capable Afghan police force is December 2012. However, the benchmark set by the Afghan government and the international community for establishing police forces that can effectively meet Afghanistan’s security needs is the end of 2010.

Growth of Police Force Is Difficult to Quantify

Defense reporting indicates that, as of April 2008, nearly 80,000 police had been assigned out of an end-strength of 82,000. This is an increase of more than double the approximately 35,000 we reported as trained as of January 2005. Despite this reported increase in police manning, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the police force has grown. As we noted in May 2007, the Afghan Ministry of Interior produces the number of police assigned and the reliability of these numbers has been questioned. A Defense census undertaken since our May 2007 report to check the reliability of ministry payroll records raises additional concerns about numbers of police reportedly assigned. In September 2007, Defense reported that it was unable to verify the physical existence of about 20 percent of the uniformed police and more than 10 percent of the border police listed on the ministry payroll records for the provinces surveyed. Because Defense’s census did not cover all 34 Afghan provinces, these percentages cannot be applied to the entire police force. Nonetheless, the results of Defense’s census raise questions about the reliability of the nearly 80,000 number of police reportedly assigned.

Several Challenges Impede Development of Capable Police Forces

Several challenges impede U.S. efforts to build a capable police force. These include (1) shortages in the police mentors needed to provide training and evaluation and verify that police are on duty; (2) shortfalls in several types of equipment that Defense considers critical; (3) a weak judicial system; and (4) consistent problems with police pay, corruption, and attacks by insurgents. Recognizing these challenges to ANP development, Defense began a new initiative in November 2007 to reconstitute the uniformed police—the largest component of the Afghan police. Although this effort is too new to fully assess, the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put the initiative at risk.

Shortage of Police Mentors Hinders Training, Evaluation, and Verification of Police on Duty

According to Defense officials, the shortage of available police mentors has been a key impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct training and evaluation and to verify that police are on duty. Police mentor teams in Afghanistan consist of both civilian mentors, who teach law enforcement and police management, and military mentors, who provide training in basic combat operations and offer force protection for the civilian mentors. As of April 2008, only about 32 percent (746 of 2,358) of required military mentors were present in country. Due to this shortage of military mentors to provide force protection, movement of available civilian mentors is constrained. According to Defense officials, the shortfall in military mentors for the ANP is due to the higher priority assigned to deploying U.S. military personnel elsewhere, particularly Iraq.

Defense officials identified the continuing shortfall in police mentors as an impediment to U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan police in three areas.

First, senior Defense officials, including the commanding general of CSTC- A, stated that the ongoing shortfall in police mentors has been the primary obstacle to providing the field-based training necessary to develop a fully capable police force. Second, while Defense recently introduced a monthly assessment tool to be used by mentors to evaluate police capability and identify areas in need of further attention, CSTC-A identified extremely limited mentor coverage as a significant challenge to using this tool. Third, the shortage of available police mentors has impeded U.S. efforts to verify the number of Afghan police on duty. For example, as of April 2008, Defense could not verify whether any police were reporting for duty in 5 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces due to the lack of mentors. Without sufficient police mentors present to conduct field-based training and evaluation and verify police manning, the development of fully capable, fully staffed Afghan police forces may continue to be delayed.

Police Continue to Face Difficulties with Equipment Shortages and Quality

As of February 2008, shortages remained in several types of police equipment that Defense considers critical, such as trucks, radios, and body armor. In addition, Defense officials expressed concerns with the quality and usability of thousands of weapons donated to the police. For example, officials estimated that only about 1 in 5 of the nearly 50,000 AK-47 automatic rifles received through donation was of good quality (see fig. 1).

Our analysis of weekly progress reports produced in 2007 by DynCorp civilian police mentors provides additional evidence of equipment-related challenges and other logistical difficulties. Specifically, 88 percent (46 of 52) of weekly reports contained instances of police operating with equipment of insufficient quality or quantity or facing problems with facilities or supplies. In addition, 81 percent (42 of 52) of weekly reports contained examples of limited police ability to account for the equipment provided to them. In July 2007, CSTC-A initiated efforts to train the police in basic supply and property accountability procedures. According to CSTC-A, equipment is no longer being issued to police districts unless the districts’ property officers are first trained. For example, according to Defense, more than 1,500 trucks have been on hand and ready for issue since late 2007 (see fig. 2), but the Afghan Minister of Interior has delayed distribution of these vehicles until adequate accountability procedures are established in the target districts.

Police Face Problems with Weak Judicial Sector, Pay, Corruption, and Attacks

Establishing a working judiciary in Afghanistan based on the rule of law is a prerequisite for effective policing. However, in 2005, we reported that few linkages existed in Afghanistan between the Afghan judiciary and police, and the police had little ability to enforce judicial rulings. Our 2005 report also noted that overall justice sector reform was underfunded and understaffed. Subsequently, we reported in 2006 and 2007 that rebuilding the Afghan judicial sector lagged behind the other four security pillars—army, police, combating drugs, and disarmament. According to State, much of Afghanistan continues to lack a functioning justice system. In addition, according to CSTC-A, the slow rate at which the rule of law is being implemented across Afghanistan inhibits effective community policing.

Furthermore, our analysis of DynCorp’s weekly progress reports from 2007 indicates that police in the field also face persistent problems with pay, corruption, and attacks (see table 4).

New Initiative to Reconstitute Police Has Begun, but Limited Mentor Coverage Is a Risk Factor

Defense has recognized challenges to ANP development and began a new initiative called Focused District Development in November 2007 to address them. According to Defense documentation, the objective of this initiative is to focus resources on reforming the uniformed police—the largest component of the ANP—as the key to the overall reform of the ANP. Under this initiative, the entire police force of a district is withdrawn from the district and sent to a regional training center for 8 weeks to train as a unit—similar to how Defense trains the Afghan army— and receive all authorized equipment while their district is covered by the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), a specialized police force trained and equipped to counter civil unrest and lawlessness. The police force then returns to its district, where a dedicated police mentor team provides follow-on training and closely monitors the police for at least 60 days. Defense expects to be able to reconstitute about 5 to 10 districts at a time, with each training cycle lasting about 6 to 8 months. Overall, according to State, it will take a minimum of 4 to 5 years to complete the initiative.

Defense documentation indicates that no districts had completed an entire Focused District Development cycle as of April 2008. Until an entire cycle is completed, it will be difficult to fully assess the initiative. However, limited police mentor coverage may complicate efforts to execute this new program. Defense documentation identifies sufficient police mentor teams as the most important requirement for successful reform. However, according to the commanding general of CSTC-A, the ongoing shortfall in police mentors available to work with newly trained district police will slow implementation of the initiative. In addition, a senior Defense official stated that unless the mentor shortage is alleviated, the number of police mentor teams available to provide dedicated training and monitoring will eventually be exhausted.

Defense and State Have Not Developed a Coordinated, Detailed Plan for Completing and Sustaining the ANSF

In our June 2005 report, we recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and State develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the ANSF that contain several elements, including milestones for achieving stated objectives and a sustainability strategy. Despite the concurrence of both agencies with our recommendation, Defense and State have not completed a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF. In the absence of such a plan, coordination difficulties have occurred and progress is difficult to assess. In 2008, Congress mandated that the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense, submit reports to Congress on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan, including a comprehensive and long-term strategy and budget for strengthening the ANSF. Congress also mandated that Defense submit reports on a long-term detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF. The first submission of each of these reports was due at the end of April 2008, but neither has yet been provided to Congress.

Recurrent Coordination Difficulties Have Arisen in the Absence of a Coordinated Plan

In February 2007, Defense provided us a 5-page document that, according to Defense officials, is intended to meet GAO’s 2005 recommendation for detailed plans to complete and sustain the ANSF. Although Defense and State are partners in training the ANP, the Defense document does not identify or discuss the roles and responsibilities of State. State also did not contribute to the development of this document and has not developed a plan of its own. In the absence of such a plan, coordination has been a problem. For example, DynCorp stated that a dual chain of command between Defense and State has affected the efforts of civilian mentors in multiple ways, such as by producing conflicting guidance and complicating reporting, placement of personnel, the use of facilities, and training and mentoring activities. Prior work by the State and Defense inspectors general highlighted the same challenge over a year ago. While Defense and State have both cited improvements in coordination since our August 2007 visit to Afghanistan, a coordinated plan that clearly states the various agencies’ roles and responsibilities would nonetheless be beneficial given the continuous turnover of U.S. government staff. For example, Defense officials told us that CSTC-A staff typically serve tours of 1 year or less and often have no period of overlap with outgoing officials during which to gain knowledge about their new positions. Given such turnover and loss of institutional knowledge, a coordinated, detailed plan that clearly identifies the agencies involved in developing the ANP and their respective roles and responsibilities could help incoming personnel become familiarized with their new duties.

Limited Milestones Hinder Assessment of Progress

Defense’s 5-page document developed in response to our 2005 recommendation contains few milestones, including no interim milestones that would help assess progress made in developing the ANP. Furthermore, while Defense maintains that the monthly status reports it produces allow progress to be monitored, these status reports also lack the interim milestones needed to determine if the program is on track. For instance, Defense status reports as of April 2008 note that no ANP units (0 of 433) are rated as fully capable and 3 percent (12 of 433) are capable of leading operations with coalition support. Without interim milestones against which to assess the ANP, it is difficult to know if this status represents what the United States intended to achieve after 3 years of increased efforts and an investment of more than $6 billion in the program.

Defense’s monthly status reports also lack consistent end dates. In particular, completion dates cited in Defense status reports have shifted numerous times during the course of our review. For instance, the completion dates for development of the ANP stated in monthly status reports dated June 2007, November 2007, and May 2008 fluctuated from December 2008 to March 2009 to December 2012, with a 3-month period when the completion date was reported as “to be determined.”

Similarly, although Defense’s newly adopted Focused District Development initiative to reconstitute the uniformed police involves considerable resources and is expected to last 4 to 5 years at a minimum, no interim milestones or consistent end date for the effort are identified in Defense’s 5-page document, monthly status reports, or briefings that outline the effort. In the absence of interim milestones and a consistent end date for Focused District Development, it will be difficult to determine if this ambitious new effort is progressing as intended. Furthermore, without an end date and milestones for the U.S. effort to complete and sustain the entire ANP, it is difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue providing funding and other resources for this important mission—one that U.S. military officials stated may extend beyond a decade.

Defense Document Lacks Sustainment Strategy

Defense’s 5-page document developed in response to our 2005 recommendation does not provide a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF. Defense currently estimates that approximately $1 billion a year will be needed to sustain the ANP, and expects the sustainment transition to begin in fiscal year 2009. However, despite the estimate of U.S. military officials in Afghanistan that U.S. involvement in training and equipping the ANSF may extend beyond a decade, neither Defense nor State has identified funding requirements or forecasts beyond 2013.

U.S. officials stated that until Afghan revenues increase substantially, the international community would likely need to assist in paying sustainability costs. At present, Afghanistan is unable to support the recurring costs of its security forces, such as salaries, equipment replacement, and facilities maintenance, without substantial foreign assistance. According to Defense and State, sustainment costs will be transitioned to the government of Afghanistan commensurate with the nation’s economic capacity, and the United States and the international community will need to assist Afghanistan in developing revenues. Defense officials in Washington have not indicated how long and in what ways the U.S. government expects to continue assisting the ANSF. Without a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF, it is difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue providing funding and other resources for this important mission.

Conclusion

Establishing capable Afghan police is critical to improving security in Afghanistan. The United States has invested more than $6 billion since 2002 to develop the ANP, but no police forces are assessed as fully capable of conducting their primary mission. As such, interagency coordination, assessment of progress, and estimation of long-term costs are particularly important given that Defense has begun a new initiative that is expected to last at least 4 to 5 years and military officials estimate that U.S. involvement in developing the ANP could exceed a decade. We believe a coordinated, detailed plan that outlines agency roles and responsibilities, lists clear milestones for achieving stated objectives, and includes a sustainment strategy may improve coordination and would enable assessment of progress and estimation of costs. However, despite our prior recommendation and a mandate from Congress that a plan be developed, Defense and State have not done so. Until a coordinated, detailed plan is completed, Congress will continue to lack visibility into the progress made to date and the cost of completing this mission— information that is essential to holding the performing agencies accountable.

Matter for Congressional Consideration

Because Defense and State have not developed a coordinated, detailed plan, we state in our concurrently issued report that Congress should consider conditioning a portion of future appropriations related to training and equipping the ANSF on completion of a coordinated, detailed plan. This plan should include, among other things, clearly defined objectives and performance measures, clearly defined roles and responsibilities, milestones for achieving these objectives, future funding requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved, including plans for transitioning responsibilities to Afghanistan.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In response to our concurrently issued report, Defense disagreed that Congress should consider conditioning a portion of future appropriations on completion of a detailed plan to develop the ANSF, stating that current guidance provided by State and Defense to the field is sufficient to implement a successful program to train and equip the ANSF. State also expressed concerns about conditioning future appropriations on the completion of a detailed plan. We continue to believe that a coordinated, detailed plan that outlines agency roles and responsibilities and includes clear milestones is essential to ensuring accountability of U.S. efforts and facilitating assessment of progress.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements

For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Other contributors to this statement were Hynek Kalkus (Assistant Director), Elizabeth Guran, Aniruddha Dasgupta, Elizabeth Repko, Al Huntington, Lynn Cothern, Cindy Gilbert, and Mark Dowling.

Appendix I: Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police

The Afghan National Police (ANP) currently consists of six authorized components under the Ministry of Interior. The uniformed police, the largest of these six components, report to the police commanders of each Afghan province. Provincial commanders report to one of five regional commanders, who report back to the Ministry of Interior. The other five authorized components of the ANP all report directly to the ministry (see fig. 2).

Table 5 provides further detail on the Ministry of Interior and the various components of the ANP that it oversees.