Chemical Terrorism: A Strategy and Implementation Plan Would Help DHS Better Manage Fragmented Chemical Defense Programs and Activities
Released: 2018-09-21T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Chemical attacks have emerged as a prominent homeland security risk because of recent attacks abroad using chemical agents and the interest of ISIS in conducting and inspiring chemical attacks against the West. DHS’s OHA officials have stated that nationwide preparedness for a chemical attack is critical to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from such an attack because it could occur abruptly, with many victims falling ill quickly, and with a window of opportunity of a few hours to respond effectively. Also, recent incidents in Malaysia and the United Kingdom demonstrate that chemical agents can be used to target individuals and can contaminate other individuals near the attack area. Chemicals that have been used in attacks include chlorine, sarin, and ricin, all of which can have deadly or debilitating consequences for individuals exposed to them; see figure 1.

Laws and Presidential Directives Guiding DHS’s Chemical Defense Efforts

Various laws guide DHS’s efforts to defend the nation from chemical threats and attacks. For example, under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, has various responsibilities, to include conducting national research and developing, testing, evaluating, and procuring technology and systems for preventing the importation of chemical and other weapons and material; and detecting, preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist attacks. Under former Section 550 of the DHS Appropriations Act, 2007, DHS established the CFATS program to, among other things, identify chemical facilities and assess the security risk posed by each, categorize the facilities into risk-based tiers, and inspect the high-risk facilities to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

DHS’s responsibilities with regard to chemical defense are also guided by various presidential directives promulgated following the September 11, 2001, terror attacks against the United States; see table 1.

Our Work on Duplication, Overlap, and Fragmentation of Federal Programs

In 2010, Public Law 111-139 included a provision for us to identify and report annually on programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives—either within departments or government-wide—with duplicative goals and activities. In our annual reports to Congress from 2011 through 2018 in fulfillment of this provision, we described areas in which we found evidence of duplication, overlap, and fragmentation among federal programs, including those managed by DHS. To supplement these reports, we developed a guide to identify options to reduce or better manage the negative effects of duplication, overlap, and fragmentation, and evaluate the potential trade-offs and unintended consequences of these options. In this report, we use the following definitions:

Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same activities or provide the same services to the same beneficiaries.

Overlap occurs when multiple programs have similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve those goals, or target similar beneficiaries. Overlap may result from statutory or other limitations beyond the agency’s control.

Fragmentation occurs when more than one agency (or more than one organization within an agency) is involved in the same broad area of national interest and opportunities exist to improve service delivery.

DHS Has Several Chemical Defense Programs and Activities Intended to Prevent and Protect Against Chemical Attacks

DHS manages several programs and activities designed to prevent and protect against domestic chemical attacks. Prior to December 2017, for example, three DHS components—OHA, S&T, and NPPD—had specific programs and activities focused on chemical defense. In December 2017, DHS created the CWMD Office, which, as discussed later in this report, consolidated the majority of OHA and some other DHS programs and activities intended to counter weapons of mass destruction such as chemical weapons. Other DHS components—such as CBP, the Coast Guard, and TSA—have chemical defense programs and activities as part of their broader missions. These components address potential chemical attacks as part of an all-hazards approach to address a wide range of threats and hazards. Appendix I discusses in greater detail DHS’s programs and activities that focus on chemical defense, and appendix II discusses DHS components that have chemical defense responsibilities as part of an all-hazards approach. Table 2 identifies the chemical defense responsibilities of each DHS component, and whether that component has a specific chemical defense program or an all-hazards approach to chemical defense.

Figure 2 shows that fiscal year 2017 funding levels for three of the programs that focus on chemical defense totaled $77.3 million. Specifically, about $1.3 million in appropriated funds was available for OHA for its Chemical Defense Program activities and S&T had access to about $6.4 million in appropriated funds for its Chemical Security Analysis Center activities. The CFATS program had access to about $69.6 million in appropriated funds—or 90 percent of the $77.3 million for the three programs—to regulate high-risk facilities that produce, store, or use certain chemicals. OHA officials stated that their efforts regarding weapons of mass destruction over the last few years had focused mostly on biological threats rather than chemical threats. For example, $77.2 million in fiscal year 2017 appropriated funds supported OHA’s BioWatch Program to provide detection and early warning of the intentional release of selected aerosolized biological agents in more than 30 jurisdictions nationwide. By contrast, as stated above, OHA and S&T had access to about $7.7 million in fiscal year 2017 appropriated funds for chemical defense efforts.

We could not determine the level of funding for components that treated chemical defense as part of their missions under an all-hazards approach because those components do not have chemical defense funding that can be isolated from funding for their other responsibilities. For example, among other things, CBP identifies and interdicts hazardous chemicals at and between ports of entry as part of its overall mission to protect the United States from threats entering the country.

A Chemical Strategy and Implementation Plan Would Enhance DHS Efforts to Integrate and Coordinate Its Chemical Defense Programs and Activities

DHS’s chemical defense programs and activities have been fragmented and not well coordinated, but DHS recently created the CWMD Office to, among other things, promote better integration and coordination among these programs and activities. While it is too early to tell the extent to which this new office will enhance this integration and coordination, developing a chemical defense strategy and related implementation plan would further assist DHS’s efforts.

DHS’s Efforts to Address Chemical Attacks Have Been Fragmented and Not Well Coordinated

DHS’s chemical defense programs and activities have been fragmented and not well coordinated across the department. As listed in table 2 above, we identified nine separate DHS organizational units that have roles and responsibilities that involve conducting some chemical defense programs and activities, either as a direct mission activity or as part of their broader missions under an all-hazards approach. We also found examples of components conducting similar but separate chemical defense activities without DHS-wide direction and coordination.

OHA and S&T—two components with specific chemical defense programs—both conducted similar but separate projects to assist local jurisdictions with preparedness. Specifically, from fiscal years 2009 to 2017, OHA’s Chemical Defense Program conducted chemical demonstration projects in five jurisdictions—Baltimore, Maryland; Boise, Idaho; Houston, Texas; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Nassau County, New York—to assist the jurisdictions in enhancing their preparedness for a large-scale chemical terrorist attack. According to OHA officials, they worked with local officials in one jurisdiction to install and test chemical detectors without having department-wide direction on these detectors’ requirements. Also, according to S&T officials, the Chemical and Biological Defense Division worked with three jurisdictions in New York and New Jersey to help them purchase and install chemical detectors for their transit systems beginning in 2016 again without having department-wide direction on chemical detector requirements.

The Secret Service, CBP, and the Coast Guard—three components with chemical defense activities that are part of their all-hazards approach—also conducted separate acquisitions of chemical detection or identification equipment, according to officials from those components. For example, according to Secret Service officials, the agency has purchased chemical detectors that agents use for personal protection of protectees and assessing the safety of designated fixed sites and temporary venues. Also, according to CBP officials, CBP has purchased chemical detectors for identifying chemical agents at ports of entry nationwide. Finally, according to Coast Guard officials, the agency has purchased chemical detectors for use in maritime locations subject to Coast Guard jurisdiction.

Officials from OHA, S&T, and the CWMD Office acknowledged that chemical defense activities had been fragmented and not well- coordinated. They stated that this fragmentation occurred because DHS had no department-wide leadership and direction for chemical defense activities.

We recognize that equipment, such as chemical detectors, may be designed to meet the specific needs of components when they carry out their missions under different operating conditions, such as an enclosed space by CBP or on open waterways by the Coast Guard. Nevertheless, when fragmented programs and activities that are within the same department and are responsible for the same or similar functions are executed without a mechanism to coordinate them, the department may miss opportunities to leverage resources and share information that leads to greater effectiveness.

DHS Has Begun to Consolidate Some Chemical Defense Programs and Activities

As discussed earlier, DHS has taken action to consolidate some chemical defense programs and activities. Specifically, in December 2017, DHS consolidated some of its chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense programs and activities under the CWMD Office. The CWMD Office consolidated the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office; the majority of OHA; selected elements of the Science and Technology Directorate, such as elements involved in chemical, biological, and integrated terrorism risk assessments and material threat assessments; and certain personnel from the DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans and the Office of Operations Coordination with expertise on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear issues. According to officials from the CWMD Office, the fiscal year 2018 funding for the office is $457 million. Of this funding, OHA contributed about $121.6 million and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office contributed about $335.4 million. Figure 3 shows the initial organizational structure of the CWMD Office as of June 2018.

As of July 2018, according to the Assistant Secretary of CWMD, his office supported by DHS leadership is working to develop and implement its initial structure, plans, processes, and procedures. To guide the initial consolidation, officials representing the CWMD Office said they plan to use the key practices for successful transformations and reorganizations identified in our past work. For example, they noted that they intend to establish integrated strategic goals, consistent with one of these key practices—establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation. These officials stated that the goals include those intended to enhance the nation’s ability to prevent attacks using weapons of mass destruction, including toxic chemical agents; support operational components in closing capability gaps; and invest in and develop innovative technologies to meet technical requirements and improve operations. They noted that the latter might include networked chemical detectors that could be used by various components to help them carry out their mission responsibilities in the future. However, the officials stated that all of the new office’s efforts were in the initial planning stages and none had been finalized. They further stated that the initial setup of the CWMD Office covering the efforts to consolidate OHA and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office may not be completed until the end of fiscal year 2018.

It is still too early to determine the extent to which the creation of the CWMD Office will help address the fragmentation and lack of coordination on chemical defense efforts that we have identified. Our prior work on key steps for assisting mergers and transformations shows that transformation can take years to complete. One factor that could complicate this transformation is that the consolidation of chemical defense programs and activities is limited to certain components within DHS, such as OHA, and not others, such as some parts of S&T and NPPD. Officials from the CWMD Office stated that they intend to address this issue by coordinating the office’s chemical security efforts with other DHS components that are not covered by the consolidation, such as those S&T functions that are responsible for developing chemical detector requirements. These officials also stated that they intend to address fragmentation by coordinating with and supporting DHS components that have chemical defense responsibilities as part of their missions under an all-hazards approach, such as the Federal Protective Service, CBP, TSA, the Coast Guard, and the Secret Service. Furthermore, the officials stated that they plan to coordinate DHS’s chemical defense efforts with other government agencies having chemical programs and activities at the federal and local levels.

DHS’s Prior Efforts and Recent Reorganization Offer an Opportunity for More Strategic Coordination

In October 2011, the Secretary of Homeland Security designated FEMA to coordinate the development of a strategy and implementation plan to enhance federal, state, local, tribal and territorial government agencies’ ability to respond to and recover from a catastrophic chemical attack. In November 2012, DHS issued a chemical response and recovery strategy that examined core capabilities and identified areas where improvements were needed. The strategy identified a need for, among other things, (1) a common set of catastrophic chemical attack planning assumptions, (2) a formally established DHS oversight body responsible for chemical incident response and recovery, (3) a more rapid way to identify the wide range of chemical agents and contaminants that comprise chemical threats, and (4) reserve capacity for mass casualty medical care. The strategy also identified the principal actions needed to fill these gaps.

For example, with regard to identifying the range of chemical agents and contaminants that comprise chemical threats, the strategy focused on the capacity to screen, search for, and detect chemical hazards (and noted that this area was cross-cutting with prevention and protection). The strategy stated that, among other things, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Department of Agriculture and Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Defense, the Environmental Protection Agency, and DHS components, including the Coast Guard, provide screening, search, and detection capabilities. However, the strategy noted that “DHS does not have the requirement to test, verify, and validate commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) chemical detection equipment purchased and fielded by its various constituent agencies and components, nor by the first responder community.”

According to a November 2012 memorandum transmitting the response and recovery strategy to DHS employees, the distribution of the strategy was only to be used for internal discussion purposes and was not to be distributed outside of DHS because it had not been vetted by other federal agencies and state, local, tribal, and territorial partners. The memorandum and the strategy further stated that DHS was developing a companion strategy focused on improving the national capacity to prevent, protect against, and mitigate catastrophic chemical threats and attacks and noted that once this document was complete, DHS would engage with its partners to solicit comments and feedback. The strategy also stated that DHS intended to develop a separate implementation plan that would define potential solutions for any gaps identified, program any needed budget initiatives, and discuss programs to enhance DHS’s core capabilities and close any gaps.

DHS officials representing OHA and S&T told us that DHS had intended to move forward with the companion strategy and the accompanying implementation plan but the strategy and plan were never completed because of changes in leadership and other competing priorities within DHS. At the time of our discussion and prior to the establishment of the CWMD Office, OHA officials also noted that DHS did not have a singular entity or office responsible for chemical preparedness. An official representing S&T also said that the consolidation of some chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear efforts may help bring order to chemical defense efforts because DHS did not have an entity in charge of these efforts or a strategy for guiding them.

Now that DHS has established the CWMD Office as the focal point for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear programs and activities, DHS has an opportunity to develop a chemical defense strategy and related implementation plan to better integrate and coordinate the department’s programs and activities to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from a chemical attack. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), as updated by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), includes principles for agencies to focus on the performance and results of programs by putting elements of a strategy and plan in place such as (1) establishing measurable goals and related measures, (2) developing strategies and plans for achieving results, and (3) identifying the resources that will be required to achieve the goals. Although GPRAMA applies to the department or agency level, in our prior work we have reported that these provisions can serve as leading practices for strategic planning at lower levels within federal agencies, such as planning for individual divisions, programs, or initiatives.

Our past work has also shown that a strategy is a starting point and basic underpinning to better manage federal programs and activities such as DHS’s chemical defense efforts. A strategy can serve as a basis for guiding operations and can help policy makers, including congressional decision makers and agency officials, make decisions about programs and activities. It can also be useful in providing accountability and guiding resource and policy decisions, particularly in relation to issues that are national in scope and cross agency jurisdictions, such as chemical defense. When multiple agencies are working to address aspects of the same problem, there is a risk that duplication, overlap, and fragmentation among programs can result in wasting scarce funds, confuse and frustrate program customers, and limit overall program effectiveness. A strategy and implementation plan for DHS’ chemical defense programs and activities would help mitigate these risks. Specifically, a strategy and implementation plan would help DHS further define its chemical defense capability, including opportunities to leverage resources and capabilities and provide a roadmap for addressing any identified gaps. By defining DHS’s chemical defense capability, a strategy and implementation plan may also better position the CWMD Office and other components to work collaboratively and strategically with other organizations, including other federal agencies and state, local, tribal, and territorial jurisdictions.

Officials from the CWMD Office agreed that the establishment of the new office was intended to provide leadership to and help guide, support, integrate, and coordinate DHS’s chemical defense efforts and that a strategy and implementation plan could help DHS better integrate and coordinate its fragmented chemical defense programs and activities.

Conclusions

Recent chemical attacks abroad and the threat of ISIS to use chemical weapons against the West have sparked concerns about the potential for chemical attacks occurring in the United States. DHS components have developed and implemented a number of separate chemical defense programs and activities that, according to DHS officials, have been fragmented and not well coordinated within the department. In December 2017, DHS consolidated some of its programs and activities related to weapons of mass destruction, including those related to chemical defense, by establishing the new CWMD Office. It is too early to tell whether and to what extent this office will help address fragmentation and the lack of coordination across all DHS’s weapons of mass destruction efforts, including chemical efforts. However, as part of its consolidation, the CWMD Office would benefit from developing a strategy and implementation plan to guide, support, integrate, and coordinate DHS’s programs and activities to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from a chemical attack. A strategy and implementation plan would also help the CWMD Office guide DHS’s efforts to address fragmentation and coordination issues and would be consistent with the office’s aim to establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals.

Recommendation for Executive Action

The Assistant Secretary for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction should develop a strategy and implementation plan to help the Department of Homeland Security, among other things, guide, support, integrate and coordinate its chemical defense programs and activities; leverage resources and capabilities; and provide a roadmap for addressing any identified gaps. (Recommendation 1)

Agency Comments and GAO Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS provided comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix III and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS concurred with our recommendation and noted that the Assistant Secretary for CWMD will coordinate with the DHS Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans and other stakeholders to develop a strategy and implementation plan that will better integrate and direct DHS chemical defense programs and activities. DHS estimated that it will complete this effort by September 2019. These actions, if fully implemented, should address the intent of this recommendation.

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Appendix I: Department of Homeland Security Chemical Defense Programs

At the time our review began, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had three headquarters components with programs and activities focused on chemical defense. These were the Office of Health Affairs’ (OHA) Chemical Defense Program; the Science and Technology Directorate’s (S&T) Chemical and Biological Defense Division and Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC); and the National Protection and Programs Directorate’s (NPPD) Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program and Sector Outreach and Programs Division. Each component had dedicated funding to manage the particular chemical defense program or activity (with the exception of the Sector Outreach and Programs Division because this division funds DHS activities related to all critical infrastructure sectors, including the chemical sector). On December 7, 2017, DHS established the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, which incorporated most of OHA and selected elements of S&T, together with other DHS programs and activities related to countering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. According to DHS, the CWMD Office was created to, among other things, elevate and streamline DHS’s efforts to prevent terrorists and other national security threat actors from using harmful agents, such as chemical agents, to harm Americans and U.S. interests.

Office of Health Affairs, Chemical Defense Program

OHA, which was subsumed by the CWMD Office in December 2017, was responsible for enhancing federal, state, and local risk awareness and planning and response mechanisms in the event of a chemical incident through the Chemical Defense Program. This program provided medical and technical expertise to OHA leadership and chemical defense stakeholders including DHS leadership, DHS components, the intelligence community, federal interagency partners, and professional and academic preparedness organizations. The program’s efforts focused on optimizing local preparedness and response to chemical incidents that exceed the local communities’ capacity and capability to act during the first critical hours by providing guidance and tools for first responders and supporting chemical exercises for preparedness. DHS’s Chief Medical Officer was responsible for managing OHA.

The Chemical Defense Program expended about $8.3 million between fiscal years 2009 and 2017 in chemical demonstration projects and follow-on funding to assist five jurisdictions in their chemical preparedness: Baltimore, Maryland; Boise, Idaho; Houston, Texas; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Nassau County, New York. For example, in Baltimore, OHA assisted the Maryland Transit Administration with the selection and installation of chemical detection equipment to integrate new technology into community emergency response and planning. In the other four locales, OHA assisted these partners in conducting multiple scenarios specific to each city based on high-risk factors identified by the Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment (CTRA), which is a risk assessment produced by CSAC every 2 years. Such scenarios included indoor and outdoor scenarios in which persons were “exposed” to either an inhalant or a substance on their skin. Figure 4 summarizes the scenarios conducted in each city and some of the lessons learned.

According to OHA summary documentation, a key finding from this work was that timely decisions and actions save lives and manage resources in response to a chemical incident. Since the completion of the five-city project, OHA has been working to, among other things, continue to develop a lessons learned document based on the project, as well as a related concept of operations, that state and local jurisdictions could use to respond to chemical incidents.

As of December 7, 2017, OHA was consolidated into the CWMD Office and its functions transferred to the new office, according to officials from the CWMD Office. The Chief Medical Officer is no longer responsible for managing OHA but serves as an advisor to the Assistant Secretary for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction and as the principal advisor to the Secretary and the Administrator of FEMA on medical and public health issues related to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, among other things.

Science and Technology Directorate, Chemical Defense Activities

S&T’s Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency includes the Chemical and Biological Defense Division, which supports state and local jurisdictions by, for example, providing them help in modeling potential chemical attacks. The Chemical and Biological Defense Division worked with the City of New York to develop chemical detection modeling by simulating a chemical attack. As a result of the simulation, New York City officials wanted to implement mechanisms to prevent the potential consequences of a chemical attack in a large city.

S&T’s Office of National Laboratories includes the CSAC, which identifies and characterizes the chemical threat against the nation through analysis and scientific assessment. CSAC is responsible for producing, among other things, the CTRA, a comprehensive evaluation of the risks associated with domestic toxic chemical releases produced every 2 years. CSAC officials chair the Interagency Chemical Risk Assessment Working Group that meets to develop the CTRA, identify chemical hazards, and produce a list of priority chemicals. This working group is comprised of DHS components, federal partners, and private industry officials that share industry information to ensure accurate and timely threat and risk information is included in the CTRA. To complement the CTRA, CSAC developed a standalone CTRA desktop tool that DHS components can use to conduct risk-based modeling of a potential chemical attack and provide results to DHS components, such as the U.S. Secret Service, for advance planning of large-scale events.

In addition, CSAC conducts tailored risk assessments addressing emerging threats such as fentanyl, a synthetic opioid that has caused numerous deaths across the United States. CSAC sends these assessments, along with other intelligence and threat information, to relevant DHS components, federal agencies, state and local partners, and private entities so this information can be used in planning and decision making. Officials from eight DHS components we spoke with said they use CSAC information in their work and that CSAC products are useful.

CSAC conducted two exercises, known as Jack Rabbit I and II, to experimentally characterize the effects of a large-scale chemical release and to understand the reason for the differences seen between real-world events and modeling predictions. These exercises were intended to strengthen industry standards in chemical transportation, as well as response and recovery plans. Outputs and data from these exercises have been used to write first responder guidelines for these types of events and are being taught in nationwide fire and hazmat courses. The fiscal year 2018 President’s Budget request did not ask for an appropriation to fund CSAC. However, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, did provide funding for CSAC. Furthermore, in May 2018, the Secretary delegated responsibility for conducting the non-research and development functions related to the Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment to the CWMD Office.

National Protection and Programs Directorate, Chemical Facility Anti- Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Program and Other Chemical Facility Security Activities

The CFATS program uses a multitiered risk assessment process to determine a facility’s risk profile by requiring facilities in possession of specific quantities of designated chemicals of interest to complete an online questionnaire. CFATS program officials said they also use CSAC data as part of the process for making decisions about which facilities should be covered by CFATS, and their level of risk. If CFATS officials make a determination that a facility is high-risk, the facility must submit a vulnerability assessment and a site security plan or an alternative security program for DHS approval that includes security measures to meet risk- based performance standards. We previously reported on various aspects of the CFATS program and identified challenges that DHS was experiencing in implementing and managing the program. We made a number of recommendations to strengthen the program to include, among other things, that DHS verify that certain data reported by facilities is accurate, enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk, conduct a peer review of the program to validate and verify DHS’s risk assessment approach, and document processes and procedures for managing compliance with site security plans. DHS agreed with all of these recommendations and has either fully implemented them or taken action to address them.

The Sector Outreach and Programs Division works to enhance the security and resilience of chemical facilities that may or may not be considered high-risk under the CFATS program and plays a nonregulatory role as the sector-specific agency for the chemical sector. The Sector Outreach and Programs Division works with the chemical sector through the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council, the Chemical Government Coordinating Council, and others in a public-private partnership to share information on facility security and resilience. In addition, the division and the coordinating councils help enhance the security and resilience of chemical facilities that may or may not be considered high-risk under the CFATS program. The division and councils are to collaborate with federal agencies, chemical facilities, and state, local, tribal, and territorial entities to, among other things, assess risks and share information on chemical threats and chemical facility security and resilience. Further, the Protective Security Coordination Division in the Office of Infrastructure Protection works with facility owners and operators to conduct voluntary assessments at facilities.

Appendix II: Department of Homeland Security Components’ Chemical Defense Responsibilities as Part of an All-Hazards Approach

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components conduct various prevention and protection activities related to chemical defense. These activities are managed by individual components as part of their overall mission under an all-hazards approach.

U.S. Coast Guard - The Coast Guard uses fixed and portable chemical detectors to identify and interdict hazardous chemicals as part of its maritime prevention and protection activities. It also responds to hazardous material and chemical releases in U.S. waterways. The Coast Guard also staffs the 24-hour National Response Center, which is the national point of contact for reporting all oil and hazardous materials releases into the water, including chemicals that are discharged into the environment. The National Response Center also takes maritime reports of suspicious activity and security breaches at facilities regulated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. Under this act, the Coast Guard regulates security at certain chemical facilities and other facilities possessing hazardous materials.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) - CBP interdicts hazardous chemicals at U.S. borders and ports of entry as part of its overall mission to protect the United States from threats entering the country. Among other things, CBP has deployed chemical detectors to point of entry nationwide that were intended for narcotics detection, but can also be used by CBP officers to presumptively identify a limited number of chemicals. Also, CBP’s National Targeting Center helps to screen and identify high-risk packages that may contain hazardous materials at ports of entry. In addition, CBP’s Laboratories and Scientific Services Directorate manages seven nationally accredited field laboratories, where staff detect, analyze, and identify hazardous substances, including those that could be weapons of mass destruction. When CBP officers send suspected chemical weapons, narcotics, and other hazardous materials to the labs, the labs use various confirmatory analysis technologies, such as infrared spectroscopy and mass spectrometry, to positively identify them. Also, the Directorate has a 24-hour Teleforensic Center for on-call scientific support for CBP officers who have questions on suspected chemical agents.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) - FEMA provides preparedness grants to state and local governments for any type of all-hazards preparedness activity, including chemical preparedness. According to FEMA data, in fiscal year 2016, states used about $3.5 million, local municipalities used about $48.5 million, and tribal and territorial municipalities used about $80,000 in preparedness grant funding for chemical defense including prevention and protection activities, as well as mitigation, response, and recovery efforts related to a chemical attack.

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) - I&A gathers intelligence information on all homeland security threats including chemical threats. Such threat information is compiled and disseminated to relevant DHS components and federal agencies. For example, I&A works with CSAC to provide intelligence information for the CTRA and writes the threat portion of that assessment. I&A also receives information from CSAC on high-risk gaps in intelligence to help better inform chemical defense intelligence reporting. Also, the Under Secretary of I&A serves as the Vice-Chair of the Counterterrorism Advisory Board. This board is responsible for coordinating, facilitating, and sharing information regarding DHS’s activities related to mitigating current, emerging, perceived, or possible terrorist threats, including chemical threats; and providing timely and accurate advice and recommendations to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security on counterterrorism issues.

NPPD’s Federal Protective Service (FPS) - FPS secures federally- owned and leased space in various facilities across the country. Federal facilities are assigned a facility security level determination ranging from a Level 1 (low risk) to a Level 5 (high risk). As part of its responsibility, FPS is to conduct Facility Security Assessments of the buildings and properties it protects that cover all types of hazards including a chemical release, in accordance with Interagency Security Committee standards and guidelines. FPS is to conduct these assessments at least once every 5 years for Level 1 and 2 facilities, and at least once every 3 years for Level 3, 4, and 5 facilities. FPS conducts the assessments using a Modified Infrastructure Survey Tool.

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) - TSA efforts to address the threat of chemical terrorism have been focused on the commercial transportation of bulk quantities of hazardous materials and testing related to the release of commercially transported chemicals that could be used as weapons of mass destruction. TSA’s activities with respect to hazardous materials transportation aim to reduce the vulnerability of shipments of certain hazardous materials through the voluntary implementation of operational practices by motor carriers and railroads, and ensure a secure transfer of custody of hazardous materials to and from rail cars at chemical facilities. Also, in May 2003, TSA began requiring that all commercial motor vehicle operators licensed to transport hazardous materials, including toxic chemicals, must successfully complete a comprehensive background check conducted by TSA. According to TSA documents, approximately 1.5 million of the nation’s estimated 6 million commercial drivers have successfully completed the vetting process. Additionally, TSA has also recently partnered with five mass transit and passenger rail venues, together with other DHS components such as DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate and the U.S. Secret Service, to test chemical detection technologies for such venues. In addition, TSA is responsible for the Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment, which examines the potential threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences of a terrorist attack involving the nation’s transportation systems. This assessment’s risk calculations for several hundred specific risk scenarios, including chemical weapons attacks, are based on the elements of threat, vulnerability and consequence using a combination of subject matter expert judgments and modeling results.

U.S. Secret Service - The Secret Service is responsible for protecting its protectees and designated fixed sites and temporary venues from all threats and hazards, including chemical threats. For example, the Secret Service conducts security assessments of sites, which may involve chemical detection, and coordinates with other agencies for preparedness or response to threats and hazard incidents. In addition, the Secret Service has a Hazardous Agent Mitigation Medical Emergency Response team, dedicated to responding to numerous hazards, including chemical threats and incidents.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements

GAO Contacts

Staff Acknowledgements

In addition to the contact named above, John Mortin (Assistant Director), Juan Tapia-Videla (Analyst-in-Charge), Michelle Fejfar, Ashley Grant, Imoni Hampton, Eric Hauswirth, Tom Lombardi, Sasan J. “Jon” Najmi, Claire Peachey, and Kay Vyas made key contributions to this report.