Cyber Analysis and Warning: DHS Faces Challenges in Establishing a Comprehensive National Capability
Released: 2008-09-16T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Increasing computer interconnectivity—most notably growth in the use of the Internet—has revolutionized the way that our government, our nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct business. While the benefits have been enormous, they are accompanied by significant risks to the nation’s computer systems and to the critical operations and infrastructures that those systems support.

Cyber Threats and Incidents Adversely Affect the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure

Different types of cyber threats from numerous sources may adversely affect computers, software, a network, an agency’s operations, an industry, or the Internet itself. Cyber threats can be unintentional or intentional. Unintentional threats can be caused by software upgrades or maintenance procedures that inadvertently disrupt systems. Intentional threats include both targeted and untargeted attacks. A targeted attack occurs when a group or individual specifically attacks a cyber asset. An untargeted attack occurs when the intended target of the attack is uncertain, such as when a virus, worm, or malware is released on the Internet with no specific target.

Threats to the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure Are Proliferating

There is increasing concern among both government officials and industry experts regarding the potential for a cyber attack on the national critical infrastructure, including the infrastructure’s control systems. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, among others, have identified multiple sources of threats to our nation’s critical infrastructure, including foreign nation states engaged in information warfare, domestic criminals, hackers, virus writers, and disgruntled employees working within an organization. In addition, there is concern about the growing vulnerabilities to our nation as the design, manufacture, and service of information technology have moved overseas. For example, according to media reports, technology has been shipped to the United States from foreign countries with viruses on the storage devices. Further, U.S. authorities are concerned about the prospect of combined physical and cyber attacks, which could have devastating consequences. For example, a cyber attack could disable a security system in order to facilitate a physical attack. Table 2 lists sources of threats that have been identified by the U.S. intelligence community and others.

The nation’s critical infrastructure operates in an environment of increasing and dynamic threats, and adversaries are becoming more agile and sophisticated. Terrorists, transnational criminals, and intelligence services use various cyber tools that can deny access, degrade the integrity of, intercept, or destroy data and jeopardize the security of the nation’s critical infrastructure (see table 3).

The growing number of known vulnerabilities increases the potential number of attacks. By exploiting software vulnerabilities, hackers and others who spread malicious code can cause significant damage, ranging from defacing Web sites to taking control of entire systems and thereby being able to read, modify, or delete sensitive information; disrupt operations; launch attacks against other organizations’ systems; or destroy systems. Reports of attacks involving critical infrastructure demonstrate that a serious attack could be devastating, as the following examples illustrate.

In June 2003, the U.S. government issued a warning concerning a virus that specifically targeted financial institutions. Experts said the BugBear.b virus was programmed to determine whether a victim had used an e-mail address for any of the roughly 1,300 financial institutions listed in the virus’s code. If a match was found, the software attempted to collect and document user input by logging keystrokes and then provide this information to a hacker, who could use it in attempts to break into the banks’ networks.

In August 2006, two Los Angeles city employees hacked into computers controlling the city’s traffic lights and disrupted signal lights at four intersections, causing substantial backups and delays. The attacks were launched prior to an anticipated labor protest by the employees.

In October 2006, a foreign hacker penetrated security at a water filtering plant in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The intruder planted malicious software that was capable of affecting the plant’s water treatment operations.

In May 2007, Estonia was the reported target of a denial-of-service cyber attack with national consequences. The coordinated attack created mass outages of its government and commercial Web sites.

In March 2008, the Department of Defense reported that in 2007 computer networks operated by Defense, other federal agencies, and defense-related think tanks and contractors were targets of cyber warfare intrusion techniques. Although those responsible were not definitively substantiated, the attacks appeared to have originated in China.

As these examples illustrate, attacks resulting in the incapacitation or destruction of the nation’s critical infrastructures could have a debilitating impact on national and economic security and on public health and safety.

Federal Law and Policy Establish the Need for National Cyber Analysis and Warning

To protect the nation’s critical computer-dependent infrastructures against cyber threats and attacks, federal law and policy have identified the need to enhance cybersecurity and establish cyber analytical and warning capabilities, which are sometimes referred to as “indications and warnings.” The laws and policies include (1) the Homeland Security Act of 2002, (2) the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, (3) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, and (4) the National Response Framework. In addition, the President issued in January 2008 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23, which, according to US-CERT officials, has provisions that affect cyber analysis and warning efforts of the federal government.

Homeland Security Act of 2002

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland Security and gave it lead responsibility for preventing terrorist attacks in the United States, reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorist attacks, and minimizing the damage and assisting in recovery from attacks that do occur. The act assigned the department, among other things, a number of critical infrastructure protection responsibilities, including gathering of threat information, including cyber-related, from law enforcement, intelligence sources, and other agencies of the federal, state, and local governments and private sector entities to identify, assess, and understand threats; carrying out assessments of the vulnerabilities of key resources to determine the risks posed by attacks; and integrating information, analyses, and vulnerability assessments in order to identify priorities for protection. In addition, the department is responsible for disseminating, as appropriate, information that it analyzes—both within the department and to other federal, state, and local government agencies and private sector entities—to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to terrorist acts.

National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace

The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace proposes that a public/private architecture be provided for analyzing, warning, and managing incidents of national significance. The strategy states that cyber analysis includes both (1) tactical analytical support during a cyber incident and (2) strategic analyses of threats. Tactical support involves providing current information on specific factors associated with incidents under investigation or specific identified vulnerabilities. Examples of tactical support include analysis of (1) a computer virus delivery mechanism to issue immediate guidance on ways to prevent or mitigate damage related to an imminent threat or (2) a specific computer intrusion or set of intrusions to determine the perpetrator, motive, and method of attack. Strategic analysis is predictive in that it looks beyond one specific incident to consider a broader set of incidents or implications that may indicate a potential future threat of national importance. For example, strategic analyses may identify long-term vulnerability and threat trends that provide advance warnings of increased risk, such as emerging attack methods. Strategic analyses are intended to provide policymakers with information that they can use to anticipate and prepare for attacks, thereby diminishing the damage from such attacks.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD 7) directs DHS to, among other things, serve as the focal point for securing cyberspace. This includes analysis, warning, information sharing, vulnerability reduction, mitigation, and recovery efforts for critical infrastructure information systems. It also directs DHS to develop a national indications and warnings architecture for infrastructure protection and capabilities, including cyber, that will facilitate an understanding of baseline infrastructure operations, the identification of indicators and precursors to an attack, and create a surge capacity for detecting and analyzing patterns of potential attacks.

In May 2005, we reported that DHS has many cybersecurity-related roles and responsibilities, including developing and enhancing national cyber analysis and warning capabilities. However, we found that DHS had not fully addressed all its cybersecurity-related responsibilities and that it faced challenges that impeded its ability to fulfill its responsibilities. These challenges included having organizational stability and authority, hiring employees, establishing information sharing and effective partnerships, and developing strategic analysis and warning. We made recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security to engage appropriate stakeholders to prioritize key cybersecurity responsibilities, develop a prioritized list of key activities to addressing underlying challenges, and identify performance measures and milestones for fulfilling its responsibilities and for addressing its challenges. We did not make new recommendations regarding cyber-related analysis and warning because our previous recommendations had not been fully implemented. Specifically, in 2001, we recommended that responsible executive branch officials and agencies establish a capability for strategic analysis of computer-based threats, including developing a methodology, acquiring expertise, and obtaining infrastructure data.

National Response Framework

The National Response Framework, issued by DHS in January 2008, provides guidance to coordinate cyber incident response among federal entities and, upon request, state and local governments and private sector entities. Specifically, the Cyber Incident Annex describes the framework for federal cyber incident response in the event of a cyber-related incident of national significance affecting the critical national processes. Further, the annex formalizes the National Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG). As established under the preceding National Response Plan, the NCRCG continues to be cochaired by DHS’s National Cyber Security Division (NCSD), the Department of Justice’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, and the DOD. It is to bring together officials from all agencies that have responsibility for cybersecurity and the sector- specific agencies identified in HSPD 7. The group coordinates intergovernmental and public/private preparedness and response to and recovery from national-level cyber incidents and physical attacks that have significant cyber-related consequences. During and in anticipation of such an incident, the NCRCG’s senior-level membership is responsible for providing subject matter expertise, recommendations, and strategic policy support and ensuring that the full range of federal capabilities is deployed in a coordinated and effective fashion.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23

In January 2008, the President issued HSPD 23—also referred to as National Security Presidential Directive 54 and the President’s “Cyber Initiative”—to improve the federal government’s cybersecurity efforts, including protecting against intrusion attempts and better anticipating future threats. While the directive is a classified document, US-CERT officials stated that it includes steps to enhance cyber analysis related efforts, such as requirements that federal agencies implement a centralized monitoring tool and that the federal government reduce the number of connections to the Internet, referred to as Trusted Internet Connections.

DHS Established US-CERT to Provide National Cyber Analysis and Warning

To help protect the nation’s information infrastructure, DHS established the US-CERT. It is currently positioned within the NCSD of DHS’s Office of Cybersecurity and Communications. Figure 1 shows the position of these offices within DHS’s organizational structure.

US-CERT is to serve as a focal point for the government’s interaction with federal and nonfederal entities on a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week basis regarding cyber-related analysis, warning, information sharing, major incident response, and national-level recovery efforts. It is charged with aggregating and disseminating cybersecurity information to improve warning of and response to incidents, increasing coordination of response information, reducing vulnerabilities, and enhancing prevention and protection. In addition, the organization is to collect incident reports from all federal agencies and assist agencies in their incident response efforts. It is also to accept incident reports when voluntarily submitted by other public and private entities and assist them in their response efforts, as requested.

US-CERT is composed of five branches, as shown in figure 2: Operations, Situational Awareness, Law Enforcement and Intelligence, Future Operations, and Mission Support. Each branch has specific responsibilities The Operations branch is to receive and respond to incidents, disseminate reasoned and actionable cybersecurity information, and analyze various types of data to improve overall understanding of current or emerging cyber threats affecting the nation’s critical infrastructure.

The Situational Awareness branch is to identify, analyze, and comprehend broad network activity and to support incident handling and analysis of cybersecurity trends for federal agencies so that they may increase their own situational awareness and reduce cyber threats and vulnerabilities. As part of its responsibilities, the branch is responsible for managing the information garnered from the US-CERT Einstein program, which obtains network flow data from federal agencies, and analyzing the traffic patterns and behavior. This information is then combined with other relevant data to (1) detect potential deviations and identify how Internet activities are likely to affect federal agencies and (2) provide insight into the health of the Internet and into suspicious activities.

The Law Enforcement and Intelligence branch is to facilitate information sharing and collaboration among law enforcement agencies, the intelligence community, and US-CERT through the presence of liaisons from those organizations at US-CERT.

The Future Operations branch was established in January 2007 to lead or participate in the development of related policies, protocols, procedures, and plans to support US-CERT’s coordination of national response to cyber incidents.

The Mission Support branch is to manage US-CERT’s communications mechanisms, including reports, alerts, notices, and its public and classified Web site content.

Cyber Analysis and Warning Encompasses Four Key Capabilities

Our research and observations at federal and nonfederal entities show that cyber analysis and warning typically encompasses four key capabilities: Monitoring—detecting cyber threats, attacks, and vulnerabilities and establishing a baseline of system and communication network assets and normal traffic.

Analysis—using the information or intelligence gathered from monitoring to hypothesize about what the threat might be, investigate it with technical and contextual expertise and identify the threat and its impact, and determine possible mitigation steps. Analysis may be initiated in reaction to a detected anomaly. This is a tactical approach intended to triage information during a cyber incident and help make decisions. It may also be predictive, proactively reviewing data collected during monitoring to look at cyber events and the network environment to find trends, patterns, or anomaly correlations that indicate more serious attacks or future threats.

Warning—developing and issuing informal and formal notifications that alert recipients in advance of potential or imminent, as well as ongoing, cyber threats or attacks. Warnings are intended to alert entities to the presence of cyber attack, help delineate the relevance and immediacy of cyber attacks, provide information on how to remediate vulnerabilities and mitigate incidents, or make overall statements about the health and welfare of the Internet.

Response—taking actions to contain an incident, manage the protection of network operations, and recover from damages when vulnerabilities are revealed or when cyber incidents occur. In addition, response includes lessons learned and cyber threat data being documented and integrated back into the capabilities to improve overall cyber analysis and warning.

Through our consultations with experts, we found that the terminology may vary, but the functions of these capabilities are fairly consistent across cyber analysis and warning entities. Figure 3 depicts the basic process of cyber analysis and warning capabilities.

Typically, cyber analysis and warning is executed, or managed, from a central focal point known as an operation center or watch center. Such centers can serve a single organization or a number of organizations. Centers generally include physically and electronically connected multidisciplinary teams with access to a variety of communication and software tools. The teams are made up of specialized analysts, sometimes referred to as watch standers, with a combination of expertise in information security, intelligence, and cyber forensics. Teams may also include subject area experts with specialized expertise in certain critical infrastructure sectors, industries, or technologies. The centers operate tools that integrate data and facilitate analysis by the watch standers. The data come from a multitude of sources, including internal or external monitoring, human or signals intelligence, analytical results, warnings from other entities, and information collected from previous threat responses. Centers decide when and how to issue formal and informal warnings that contribute to further analysis or provide information that aids in decisions about how to respond to an incident.

Depending on the size and organizational structure of an organization, the analysis and warning team may work with incident response teams during a cyber incident. The incident response team manages the decisions required for handling an incident using information discovered during monitoring, analysis, and warning. The team may also coordinate with those responsible for information security for the organization in order to assess risks, remediate vulnerabilities, and prepare for and respond to attacks.

Fifteen Key Attributes Essential to Establishing Cyber Analysis and Warning Capabilities

Our research and past experience at federal and nonfederal entities identified 15 key attributes associated with the cyber analysis and warning capabilities of monitoring, analysis, warning, and response. These attributes are displayed in table 4, which is followed by a detailed description by capability of each attribute.

Monitoring

Monitoring provides the data used to understand one’s operating environment and detect changes that indicate the presence of anomalies that may be cyber attacks. It encompasses five key attributes: 1. Establishing a baseline understanding of network assets and normal network traffic volume and flow In order to detect unusual activity in network traffic or changes in an operating environment, organizations require knowledge of ordinary traffic and environmental conditions. This knowledge forms the baseline against which changes or anomalies can be detected, identified, and mitigated. A baseline is established through activities such as creating an accurate inventory of systems, prioritizing resources and assets, maintaining an understanding of the expected volume and nature of network traffic, and instituting operational procedures such as procedures for handling incidents. Without a baseline, it may be difficult to effectively detect threats or respond to a warning with the appropriate resources. 2. Assessing risks to network assets Assessments should be conducted to determine what risks are posed by combinations of threats and vulnerabilities and inform the monitoring capability so that it is focused on the most critical assets. According to CERT® Coordination Center (CERT/CC) officials, having a baseline knowledge of networks and systems and their associated risks in advance helps individual organizations understand what threats they may be susceptible to, what resources are at risk, and what the potential damage of an attack might be. Risks should be prioritized and mitigated until a reasonable acceptable level of risk is reached. 3. Obtain internal information on network operations via technical tools and user reports Another key attribute is monitoring traffic on internal networks using (1) network and information security-related technology tools and (2) reports on network activity. As table 5 shows, various technologies can be used for internal network monitoring to help compile and identify patterns in network data. Each type of technology may detect anomalies that the other types of software cannot.

These technologies can be used to examine data logs from networks on a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week schedule in an effort to identify (1) precursors and indicators of cyber threats or other anomalies and (2) the occurrence of known attacks. The data logged from these technologies are typically prepared using automated tools to help analysts observe or detect a single anomaly or to discover patterns in data over time. According to several federal and nonfederal entities, hands-on monitoring by trained analysts is essential because it can be difficult for automated tools to identify anomalies and incidents. For example, some automated signature-based tools focus on known threats and may not automatically recognize or alert analysts to new attack patterns or new threat delivery techniques. Other intrusion detection systems can produce large numbers of alerts indicating a problem when one does not exist (false positives); therefore, an analyst must look into anomalies more closely to see if detected intrusions are indications of a threat or simply an equipment malfunction. 4. Obtaining external information on threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents through various relationships, alerts, and other sources External monitoring includes observing and receiving information that is either publicly or not publicly available for the purpose of maintaining environmental or situational awareness, detecting anomalies, and providing data for analysis, warning, and response. External sources of information include formal relationships, such as with and between critical infrastructure sector-related information sharing and analysis centers (ISAC); federal agencies, including military, civilian, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies; international computer emergency response team organizations; the CERT/CC and vendors under contract for services; informal relationships established on a personal basis between analysts located at different operations centers; alerts issued by federal, state, and local governments; alerts issued by commercial external sources such as network security and vulnerability databases, standards, and frameworks such as the National Vulnerability Database, the Common Vulnerability and Exposures List, Common Vulnerability Scoring System, and the Open Vulnerability Assessment Language; media outlets, such as television news and newspapers; and Web sites, such as law enforcement entities’ sites, known hacker and criminal sites and chat rooms, and cooperative cyber analysis and warning services. 5. Detecting anomalous activities Continuous monitoring occurs in order to detect significant changes from the baseline operations or the occurrence of an attack through an already known threat or vulnerability. It is ultimately the detection of an anomaly—observed internally or received from external information—and the recognition of its relevance that triggers analysis of the incident to begin.

Analysis

Analysis uses technical methods in combination with contextual expertise to hypothesize about the threat and associated risks concerning an anomaly and, if necessary, determine mitigation solutions. It encompasses four key attributes: 1. Verifying that an anomaly is an incident Once an anomaly is detected, it should be verified whether it is a genuine cyber incident by determining that the data are from a trusted source and are accurate. For example, if the anomaly was identified by an internal sensor, analysts start by confirming that the sensor was working correctly and not indicating a false positive. If the anomaly was reported by an external source, analysts try to determine the trustworthiness of that source and begin to identify internal and external corroborating sources. Anomalies that are verified may require in-depth investigation and incident handling or more observation through monitoring. 2. Investigating the incident to identify the type of cyber attack, estimate impacts, and collect evidence Once the anomaly is verified as a potential, impending, or occurring incident, analysts should combine information from multiple sources and/or perform investigative testing using available tools. Analysis often occurs through collaboration between analysts, the exchange of notifications and warnings, and the use of analytical research techniques. Analysts use these techniques to investigate the type of attack, its source (where it originates), its target (whom it affects), and the immediate risk to network assets and mission performance. In addition, these techniques are used to compile evidence for law enforcement. Techniques for investigation include comparing and correlating additional monitoring data available with the anomaly to determine what other internal and external entities are experiencing; comparing data about the anomaly with standardized databases to determine if the threats are known; and performing investigations, such as cyber forensic examinations, reverse engineering, malware analysis, and isolating anomalies in a test environment such as a honeypot or a sandbox. 3. Identifying possible actions to mitigate the impact of the Analysis should culminate in identifying essential details about an anomaly such as what specific vulnerabilities are exploited or what impacts are expected for a specific incident. Steps should then be taken to identify alternative courses of action to mitigate the risks of the incident according to the severity of the exploit, available resources, and mission priorities. Such steps may include isolating the affected system to prevent further compromise, disabling the affected service that is being exploited, or blocking the connections providing the attacker a route into the network environment. These courses of action may lead to more analysis or be used to support the warning capability. 4. Integrating results into predictive analysis of broader implications or potential future attacks Information resulting from analysis of an individual incident should be used to determine any broader implications and predict and protect against future threats. This type of effort, or predictive analysis, should look beyond one specific incident to consider a broader set of incidents or implications that may indicate a potential threat of importance. For example, it may include detailed trend analysis of threats that have occurred over a certain period of time that is issued in public reports that discuss current trends, predict future incident activity, or emerging attack methods. However, according to many experts, this type of predictive analysis is complex and it is still difficult to predict future threats with current data.

Warning

Warnings are intended to alert entities to the presence of anomalies, help delineate the relevancy and immediacy of cyber attacks, provide information on how to remediate vulnerabilities and mitigate incidents, or make overall statements about the health and welfare of the Internet. Warning includes three key attributes: 1. Developing notifications that are targeted and actionable Warning messages should be targeted to the appropriate audience and provide details that are accurate, specific, and relevant enough to be acted upon. Developing actionable notifications requires providing the right incident information to the right person or group. If a single group is the only target of a threat, a warning directly to it may be more appropriate than a general public announcement. In addition, warnings are tailored to address technical or nontechnical recipients. Some warnings may be more appropriate for chief information officers, while other may include technical details for network administrators. Although notifications and warnings are delivered throughout incident handling, it is important to reach a balance between releasing actionable information and disclosing warnings too often, which can overwhelm the recipients and stretch limited resources. By addressing the specific audience, warnings avoid overwhelming recipients with extraneous or irrelevant information.

Also, recipients of notifications and warnings need to be able to use them to protect or defend their networks against cyber attacks. For example, many organizations have designated thresholds that determine how and when warnings are issued. To do so, the messages must include specific and accurate information about the incident as it relates to the recipient’s monitoring, analysis, or response capabilities. An actionable warning may also include recommendations about how to respond to an incident. Federal and nonfederal entities also noted that sensitivity of information and privacy are key considerations when trying to develop an actionable warning. Warnings are sanitized or stripped of identifying or proprietary information in order to protect the privacy of individuals or entities involved in the incident. In addition, the federal government and its private sector partners must also adhere to procedures to make sure that they share useful information at the appropriate clearance level. 2. Providing notifications in a timely manner Warnings are intended to give information to recipients as early as possible—preferably in advance of a cyber attack—to give them time to take appropriate action. In addition, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) provides guidance to federal agencies that describes when incidents are considered reportable and how long they may take to report them to US-CERT. Similarly, several ISACs stated that they have procedures that determine when and how warnings are issued and when and how members should report incidents. 3. Distributing notifications using the most appropriate communications methods Once a warning is developed, it is important to determine the best method for getting that message out without overwhelming the public or incident handlers. Warnings can be provided both informally and formally. Informal warnings between colleagues with established trusted relationships can happen quickly and without significant regard to the organizational structure. Formal warnings, which are typically held to a higher standard of accuracy by recipients than informal warnings, come in many forms, such as e-mail bulletins, vulnerability alerts, Web postings, targeted warnings to a specific entity, or broad security notices to the general public. In addition to specific formal warnings, operations centers that perform analysis and warning for multiple organizations, such as the ISACs and commercial vendors, use level-based or color-coded alert systems on their Web sites to quickly notify members and the public of the general threat status of the infrastructure or Internet. Changing from one level or color to another indicates that the threat level is increasing or decreasing. These same organizations send alerts about threats and vulnerabilities to members only or may issue specific warnings to a single organization that has been identified through analysis as being targeted by a cyber threat.

Response

Response includes actions to contain an incident, manage the protection of network operations, and recover from damages when vulnerabilities are revealed or when cyber incidents occur. It encompasses three key attributes: 1. Containing and mitigating the incident When an incident is identified, immediate steps should be taken to protect network assets. Decisions are made to control further impacts on the network and then eliminate the threat. These actions may include installing a software patch, blocking a port known to be used by a particular threat, or deploying other appropriate network resources. In the case of a serious threat, the decision may be to turn off the network gateway and temporarily isolate the network from the Internet, depending upon what assets are at risk. One industry expert noted that investigation may occur before any mitigation steps are taken in order to consider the necessity of law enforcement involvement. On the other hand, if little is known about a threat and it does not appear to endanger critical assets, a decision might be made to watch the threat emerge in a contained area to allow for further monitoring and analysis. Decisions to act or not are based on acceptable risks, available resources, and ability to remedy the known threat. In addition, decisions must be made in the context of the impact that actions will have on other related efforts, such as a law enforcement investigation. 2. Recovering from damage and remediating vulnerabilities Once an incident is contained and mitigated, restoring damaged areas of the network to return it to its baseline becomes a priority. To understand the damage, a cyber damage or loss assessment may be conducted to identify, among other things, how the incident was discovered, what network(s) were affected, when the incident occurred, who attacked the network and by what methods, what was the intention of the attacker, what occurred during the attack, and what is the impact or severity of the incident. The recovery efforts may involve restoring or reinstalling computers, network devices, applications, or systems that have been compromised.

Taking action to remediate vulnerabilities in a network may also result from analysis and incident management. Entities work to discover and reduce the number of vulnerabilities in their computers, network devices, applications, or systems. 3. Evaluating actions and incorporating lessons learned Entities should ensure that threat data, results, and lessons learned are evaluated and appropriately incorporated to improve the overall cyber analysis and warning capability. For example, teams can be used to simulate network threats by purposefully attacking a network in order to see how the network responds. From these simulations, an evaluation can be made about the response, and recommendations on how to improve can be developed. In addition, cyber simulations allow critical infrastructure organizations to prepare for threat scenarios and to test analysis, warning, and response capabilities. NIST guidance also states that holding lessons learned meetings after major incidents is helpful in improving security measures and the incident handling process itself.

US-CERT’s Capabilities Include Some but Not All Aspects of Key Attributes

US-CERT has established cyber analysis and warning capabilities that include aspects of each of the key attributes. However, they do not fully incorporate all of them.

Monitoring Capability Includes Most but Not All Aspects of Key Attributes

US-CERT has established capabilities that include aspects of key attributes of monitoring. For example, it obtains internal network operation information via technical tools and Einstein; obtains external information on threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents; and detects anomalous activities based on the information it receives. However, its capabilities do not fully incorporate all of the key attributes of monitoring. For example, it has not established a baseline of our nation’s critical infrastructure information systems. Table 6 shows our analysis of its monitoring capability.

As part of the President’s Cyber Initiative, DHS has a lead role for several provisions that, if implemented appropriately, could address key monitoring deficiencies, such as not having a comprehensive national baseline and sufficient external information on threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents. According to testimony by the Under Secretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate, the initiative makes the Einstein program mandatory across all federal agencies. In addition, DHS plans to enhance Einstein’s capabilities to be a real-time intrusion detection and situational awareness system. Further, DHS, along with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), is responsible for working with federal agencies to reduce the number of Trusted Internet Connections used by the federal government. According to DHS and OMB officials, these initiatives will enhance the ability of the US-CERT to monitor federal systems for cyber attacks and other threats. According to US-CERT officials, the reduction in Trusted Internet Connections, along with the positioning of Einstein in front of those connections to the Internet, will help provide a governmentwide baseline and view of the traffic entering and leaving federal networks as well as access to the content of the traffic. In addition, according to the Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and Communications, the recently announced National Cybersecurity Center, which reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security, will be responsible for ensuring coordination among the cyber-related efforts across the federal government, including improving the sharing of incident and threat information. However, the efforts to use Einstein, reduce Internet connections, and implement the National Cybersecurity Center are in their early stages and have not yet been fully planned or implemented, so whether these efforts will fully address all five of the monitoring attributes is not known at this time.

Analysis Capability Does Not Fully Incorporate All Aspects of Key Attributes

US-CERT has established capabilities that include key attributes of analysis. For example, it verifies anomalies, performs investigations, and identifies possible courses of action. However, its capabilities do not fully incorporate other attributes because of technical and human resource constraints and the gaps in the monitoring capability. Table 8 shows our analysis of the organization’s analysis capability.

As part of the Cyber Initiative, the organization has received additional resources to develop the next version of the Einstein situational awareness tool. According to US-CERT officials, this new version, referred to as Einstein 2.0, will provide real-time intrusion detection monitoring, a content analysis capability, and automated analysis functions that are currently manual. In addition, it has received authorization for an additional 30 government and 50 contractor employee full-time equivalents. According to US-CERT officials, they plan to fill the additional positions by leveraging graduates of the Scholarship for Service program, which provides cybersecurity-related scholarships to students willing to serve the federal government for a time commitment. However, these efforts are in their early stages and have not yet been fully planned or implemented. Consequently, whether these efforts will fully address all four of the analysis attributes is not known at this time.

Warning Capability Exhibits Some but Not All Characteristics of Key Attributes

The organization has established capabilities that include key attributes of warning. For example, it develops and distributes a number of attack and other notifications targeted to different audiences with varying frequency. However, according to customers, these warning products are not consistently actionable and timely. Table 8 shows our analysis of the organization’s warning capability. Tables 9 and 10 show types of warning products and the quantity of products issued during fiscal year 2007. (This page left blank intentionally)

As part of the Cyber Initiative, the enhancements to the Einstein program, as well as the reduction in the number of Trusted Internet Connections can lead to more complete data. According to US-CERT officials, the improved data will lead to an enhanced warning capability that could provide the ability to issue targeted and actionable alerts in advance of actual cyber attacks. However, these efforts are in their early stages and have not yet been fully planned or implemented; thus, it is not clear whether these efforts will fully address the three warning attributes.

Response Capability Satisfies Some but Not All Aspects of Key Attributes

US-CERT possesses a limited response capability to assist other entities in the containment, mitigation, and recovery from significant cyber incidents. For example, while it provides on-site assistance to various entities, its ability to provide response at the national level is hindered by limitations in the resources available and authority over affected entities. Table 11 shows our analysis of its response capability.

To improve the organization’s response capability, US-CERT officials stated that they needed to perform internal exercises that test its national- level response capability more often than every 2 years, as is the case with the Cyber Storm exercise. It plans to develop “tabletop” exercises to more frequently test its response capabilities. In addition, according to NCSD officials, they are working collaboratively with other federal and nonfederal working groups to improve their performance measures so that they can understand the value and use of their products and make continuous improvements. However, until they do so, it is not clear whether these efforts will lead to US-CERT fully addressing the three response attributes.

US-CERT Faces New and Ongoing Challenges to Fulfilling Its Mission

US-CERT faces a number of newly identified and ongoing challenges that impede it from fully implementing the key attributes and in turn establishing cyber analysis and warning capabilities essential to coordinating the national effort to prepare for, prevent, and respond to cyber threats. The new challenge is creating warnings that are actionable and timely—it does not consistently issue warning and other notifications that its customers find useful. In addition, US-CERT continues to face four challenges that we previously identified: (1) employing predictive cyber analysis, (2) developing more trusted relationships to encourage information sharing, (3) having sufficient analytical and technical capabilities, and (4) operating without organizational stability and leadership within DHS. Until DHS addresses these challenges and fully incorporates all key attributes into its capabilities, it will not have the full complement of cyber analysis and warning capabilities essential to effectively performing its national mission.

New Challenge Involves Creating Warnings That Are Actionable and Timely

Developing and disseminating cyber threat warnings to enable customers to effectively mitigate a threat in advance of an attack can be challenging for the US-CERT. According to the organization’s Acting Deputy Director, it serves as the nation’s cyber analysis and warning center and must ensure that its warnings are accurate. In addition, owners of classified or law enforcement information must review and agree to the release of related information. Therefore, the organization’s products are subjected to a stringent review and revision process that could adversely affect the timeliness of its products—potentially adding days to the release if classified or law enforcement information must be removed from the product. For example, an official from a cybersecurity-focused organization at a university stated that the alerts from US-CERT generally arrive a day or two after they might have been helpful. An official from another private entity stated that the bureaucratic process US-CERT must follow prevents it from providing useful alerts in a timely manner and that as a result, it does not have the credibility to drive a reaction when an alert is finally issued. Another private sector official stated that, in some cases, the organization gets information on cyber incidents and attacks faster from media sources than US-CERT because its analysts need time to verify the reliability of the data they receive.

In addition, according to federal officials responsible for determining cyber-related threats, US-CERT, as well as other organizations with cybersecurity-related responsibilities, must also balance the need to develop and release warnings with the activities of other organizations, such as law enforcement and intelligence support, to identify and mitigate cyber threats. For example, the release of a warning to address a threat or attack may also alert the intruders that their methods have been discovered and cause them to change their methods prior to the completion of an investigation about their activities.

Further, when there is sensitive information to share, US-CERT officials stated that on numerous occasions, they were unable to share the details of threats to customers’ networks because no one within the federal agency or nonfederal entity possessed a security clearance high enough to receive the information. In some organizations, the individuals who do possess security clearances are in the upper echelons of the organization and do not possess a cyber or information security background. As a result, they are not always able to accurately comprehend and relay the threat information to those who would actually handle the mitigation efforts. In September 2007, we reported that DHS lacked a rapid, efficient process for disseminating sensitive information to private industry owners and operators of critical infrastructures. We recommended that DHS establish a rapid and secure process for sharing sensitive vulnerability information with critical infrastructure stakeholders, including vendors, owners, and operators; however, DHS has not yet fulfilled this recommendation.

To provide actionable information to its customers, the organization attempts to combine incident information with related cyber threat information to determine the seriousness of the attack. However, according to the Acting Director of US-CERT, its efforts are limited by other federal entities’ abilities to determine specific cyber threats to the nation’s critical infrastructure. One reason for the lack of cyber threat data is that the task is complex and difficult and there are no established, generally accepted methodologies for performing such analysis. In addition, such entities are hampered by the limited number of analysts dedicated to cyber threat identification. For example, in January 2008, the Director of HITRAC stated that only 5 percent of HITRAC’s total number of analyst positions was focused on analyzing and identifying cyber threats to our nation’s critical information infrastructure. According to the director, it had received approval to double the number of cyber-related analysts and was in the process of filling those positions. In addition, the director stated that HITRAC’s primary focus is on identifying physical threats.

Ongoing Challenges Involve Establishing Predictive Analysis, Trusted Relationships, Analytical and Technical Capabilities, and a Stable Organization

US-CERT faces ongoing challenges that we identified in previous reports as impeding DHS’s ability to fulfill its cyber critical infrastructure protection responsibilities.

Employing predictive cyber analysis—US-CERT has been unable to establish the solid foundation needed to perform predictive cyber analysis that would enable it to determine any broader implications from ongoing network activity, predict or protect against future threats, or identify emerging attack methods prior to an attack. Since 2001, we have identified the challenges associated with establishing strategic, predictive analysis and warning and have made recommendations that responsible executive branch officials and agencies establish such capabilities, including developing methodologies. According to the Acting Director of US-CERT, it has not been able to establish such capabilities because there is not a generally accepted methodology for performing predictive cyber analysis and warning. In addition, officials from US-CERT and other federal and nonfederal entities with cyber analysis and warning capabilities stated that while they can determine the motivations for the various threat sources to use cyber attacks, it is a formidable task to foresee prior to attacks how those threats would actually conduct attacks and to establish indicators to recognize that such cyber attacks are about to occur. Also, the relative newness of the cyber analysis and warning discipline and immaturity of the related methodologies and tools add to the complexity.

Developing more trusted relationships to encourage information sharing—Implementing cyber analysis and warning capabilities, including all of the key attributes, requires that entities be willing and able to share information, including details about incidents, threats, vulnerabilities, and network operations. However, US-CERT continues to be challenged to develop relationships with external sources that would encourage information sharing. For example, nonfederal entities do not consistently fully disclose incident and other data—they filter sensitive details from the data reported, thus reducing its value to US-CERT. The lack of such relationships negatively affects the organization’s cyber analysis and warning capability.

In 2005, we reported that entities within critical infrastructure sectors possess an inherent disincentive to share cybersecurity information with DHS. Much of their concern was that the potential release of sensitive information could increase the threat they face. In addition, when information was shared, it was not clear whether the information would be shared with other entities, such as other federal entities, state and local entities, law enforcement, or various regulators, or how it would be used or protected from disclosure. Alternatively, sector representatives expressed concerns that DHS was not effectively communicating information with them and had not matched private sector efforts to share valuable information with a corresponding level of trusted information sharing. We also identified information sharing in support of homeland security as a high-risk area in 2005, and we noted that establishing an effective two-way exchange of information to help detect, prevent, and mitigate potential terrorist attacks requires an extraordinary level of cooperation and perseverance among federal, state, and local governments and the private sector.

Federal and nonfederal officials raised similar concerns about the ability to develop trusted relationships and share information with and between cyber analysis and warning entities, including US-CERT. For example, frequent staff turnover at NCSD and US-CERT hindered the ability to build trusted relationships with both public and private entities. Federal and nonfederal officials stated that reliance was placed on personal relationships to support sharing of sensitive information about cybersecurity and cyber incidents. However, according to the NCSD director, six senior staff members within the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (the national focal point for addressing cybersecurity issues) were leaving for various reasons, affecting the ability to develop such relationships. In addition, private sector officials stated that their organizations continued to be hesitant to share information on vulnerabilities and threats because of the fear that such sharing might negatively affect their financial bottom line. For example, private sector officials stated that it was difficult to share unfiltered information with their respective infrastructure sector ISAC because a competitor operated the ISAC, thus negatively affecting the information received by US-CERT.

Having sufficient analytical and technical capabilities—Obtaining and retaining adequately trained cyber analysts and acquiring up-to-date technological tools to implement the analysis capability attributes is an ongoing challenge to US-CERT and other analysis and warning centers, hindering their ability to respond to increasingly fast, nimble, and sophisticated cyber attacks. As we have reported, NCSD has had difficulty hiring personnel to fill vacant positions. We reported that once it found qualified candidates, some candidates decided not to apply or withdrew their applications because it took too long to be hired. This is still a concern because current staff has limited organizational backup and, in some cases, performs multiple roles. In addition, a private sector official stated that it is not clear whether or not the government has the number of technical analysts necessary to perform analysis on large and complex data sets that are generated whether or not an incident is in progress or not.

Keeping cyber analysts trained and up to date on the latest cybersecurity tools and techniques can be difficult. For example, a DOD official representing one of its cyber analysis and warning centers stated that its analysts must develop their expertise on the job because there is no formal training program available that teaches them how to detect and perform analysis of an anomaly or intrusion. A private sector official stated that while analysts are often trained to use existing tools, their understanding of the key attributes of analysis is often limited, resulting in a solution too late to be helpful.

Analysts also need the appropriate technological tools to handle the volume, velocity, and variety of malicious data and activity they are faced with, according to federal officials. For example, although the Einstein flow data are collected in real time, the actual analysis is manually intensive and does not occur simultaneously or in real time. Another limiting factor of Einstein data is that US-CERT is unable to analyze the content of the potentially malicious traffic and must rely on the affected agency to perform any analysis of the content of the traffic. Thus both the reaction time to determine the intent of the anomalous activity and the necessary actions to address it are significantly slowed. In addition, officials from one private sector entity questioned if agencies can sufficiently protect their networks using the tools they are mandated to use.

As part of the efforts to address the President’s Cyber Initiative, US-CERT recently received approval to fill 80 new positions—30 government and 50 contractor—and is attempting to fill these analytical positions by extending offers to candidates in the National Science Foundation’s Scholarship for Service Program. However, these positions have yet to be completely filled with qualified candidates.

Operating without organizational stability and authority—We have identified challenges regarding DHS’s organizational stability, leadership, and authority that affect US-CERT’s ability to successfully perform its mission. In the past, we have reported that the lack of stable leadership has diminished NCSD’s ability to maintain trusted relationships with its infrastructure partners and has hindered its ability to adequately plan and execute activities. While DHS has taken steps to fill key positions, organizational instability among cybersecurity officials continues to affect NCSD and thus US-CERT. For example, at least six senior staff members were leaving DHS’s Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, including the NCSD Director. Losing senior staff members in such large numbers has negatively affected the agency’s long-term planning and hampered the ability of NCSD/US-CERT to establish trusted relationships with public and private entities and to build adequate functions to carry out its mission, including expanded cyber analysis and warning capabilities, according to the official.

Furthermore, when new senior leadership has joined DHS, NCSD/US-CERT’s objectives were reassessed and redirected, thus affecting NCSD’s ability to have a consistent long-term strategy, according to the former official. For example, senior officials wanted to broaden the role and focus of US-CERT by having it provide centralized network monitoring for the entire federal government on a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a- week basis. However, the Director of NCSD disagreed with this strategy, stating that each federal agency should have its own 24-hour-a-day, 7-day- a-week incident-handling capability (either in-house or contracted out) to respond to incidents affecting its own network. He viewed US-CERT as a fusion center that would provide analysis and warning for national-level incidents, support federal agency incident-handling capabilities during crisis situations, and offer a mechanism for federal agencies to coordinate with law enforcement.

The organization’s future position in the government’s efforts to establish a national-level cyber analysis and warning capability is uncertain. Specifically, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23, which is classified, creates questions about US-CERT’s future role as the focal point for national cyber analysis and warning. In addition, DHS established a new National Cybersecurity Center at a higher organizational level, which may diminish the Assistant Secretary of Cyber Security and Communications’ authority as the focal point for the federal government’s cybersecurity-related critical infrastructure protection efforts, and thus US-CERT’s role as the central provider of cyber analysis and warning capabilities across federal and nonfederal critical infrastructure entities.

As stated above, we did not make new recommendations in 2005 regarding cyber analysis and warning because our previous recommendations had not yet been fully implemented. At the time, we did recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security require NCSD to develop a prioritized list of key activities for addressing the underlying challenges related to information sharing, hiring staff with appropriate capabilities, and organizational stability and authority. In addition, we recommended that performance measures and milestones for performing activities to address these challenges be identified. However, since that time, DHS has not provided evidence that it has taken actions on these activities.

Conclusions

In seeking to counter the growing cyber threats to the nation’s critical infrastructures, DHS has established a range of cyber analysis and warning capabilities, such as monitoring federal Internet traffic and the issuance of routine warnings to federal and nonfederal customers. However, while DHS has actions under way aimed at helping US-CERT better fulfill attributes identified as critical to demonstrating a capability, US-CERT still does not exhibit aspects of the attributes essential to having a truly national capability. It lacks a comprehensive baseline understanding of the nation’s critical information infrastructure operations, does not monitor all critical infrastructure information systems, does not consistently provide actionable and timely warnings, and lacks the capacity to assist in mitigation and recovery in the event of multiple, simultaneous incidents of national significance.

Planned actions could help to mitigate deficiencies. For example, as part of the Cyber Initiative, US-CERT plans to enhance its Einstein situational awareness tool so that it has real-time intrusion detection monitoring, a content analysis capability, and automated analysis functions. By placing the tool in front of Trusted Internet Connections, officials expect to obtain a governmentwide baseline view of the traffic and content entering and leaving federal networks. US-CERT also plans to hire 80 additional cyber analysts and to increase the frequency of exercises that test its national- level response capability.

However, at this point, it is unclear whether these actions will help US- CERT—or whatever organizational structure is ultimately charged with coordinating national cyber analysis and warning efforts—achieve the objectives set forth in policy. DHS faces a number of challenges that impede its ability to achieve its objectives, including fostering trusted relationships with critical infrastructure sectors, hiring and retaining skilled cyber analysts, ensuring that US-CERT warning products provide useful information in advance of attacks, enhancing predictive analysis, and ensuring that any changes brought about by HSPD 23 are marked by well-defined and transparent lines of authority and responsibility. We identified most of these challenges in our prior reviews and made broad recommendations to address them. DHS’s actions to address these challenges have not been adequate. Because of this, addressing these challenges is as critical as ever to overcome the growing and formidable threats against our nation’s critical cyber infrastructure. If these challenges are not addressed, US-CERT will not be able to provide an effective national cyber analysis and warning capability.

Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take four actions to fully establish a national cyber analysis and warning capability. Specifically, the Secretary should address deficiencies in each of the attributes identified for monitoring, including establish a comprehensive baseline understanding of the nation’s critical information infrastructure and engage appropriate nonfederal stakeholders to support a national-level cyber monitoring capability; analysis, including expanding its capabilities to investigate incidents; warning, including ensuring consistent notifications that are targeted, actionable, and timely; and response, including ensuring that US-CERT provides assistance in the mitigation of and recovery from simultaneous severe incidents, including incidents of national significance.

We also recommend that the Secretary address the challenges that impede DHS from fully implementing the key attributes, including the following 6 items: engaging appropriate stakeholders in federal and nonfederal entities to determine ways to develop closer working and more trusted relationships; expeditiously hiring sufficiently trained cyber analysts and developing strategies for hiring and retaining highly qualified cyber analysts; identifying and acquiring technological tools to strengthen cyber analytical capabilities and handling the steadily increasing workload; developing predictive analysis capabilities by defining terminology, methodologies, and indicators, and engaging appropriate stakeholders in other federal and nonfederal entities; filling key management positions and developing strategies for hiring and retaining those officials; and ensuring that there are distinct and transparent lines of authority and responsibility assigned to DHS organizations with cybersecurity roles and responsibilities, including the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications and the National Cybersecurity Center.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report (see app. II), signed by the Director of DHS’s GAO/OIG Liaison Office, the department concurred with 9 of our 10 recommendations. It also described actions planned and under way to implement the 9 recommendations. In particular, the department said that to fully establish a cyber analysis and warning capability, it plans to continue expansion of the Einstein intrusion detection system and increase US-CERT’s staffing. In addition, to address the challenges that impede DHS from fully implementing key cyber analysis and warning attributes, the department stated that it plans to continue to build new relationships and grow existing ones with stakeholders. Further, to strengthen its analysis and warning capability and develop its predictive analysis capability, the department cited, among other things, its planned implementation of an upgraded version of Einstein.

DHS took exception to our last recommendation, stating that the department had developed a concept-of-operations document that clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the National Cybersecurity Center and NCSD. However, this concept-of-operations document is still in draft, and the department could not provide a date for when the document would be finalized and implemented.

DHS also commented on the report’s description of US-CERT as “the center.” Specifically, DHS was concerned that referring to US-CERT as the center might lead to confusion with the department’s newly established National Cybersecurity Center. DHS requested that we remove references to US-CERT as the center. We agree with this comment and have incorporated it in the report where appropriate.

In addition to its written response, the department provided technical comments that have been incorporated in the report where appropriate.

We also incorporated technical comments provided by other entities involved in this review.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other interested parties. We also will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact David Powner at (202) 512-9286, or pownerd@gao.gov, or Dr. Nabajyoti Barkakati at (202) 512-4499, or barkakatin@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to (1) identify key attributes of cyber analysis and warning capabilities, (2) compare these attributes with the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team’s (US-CERT) current analysis and warning capabilities to identify whether there are gaps, and (3) identify US-CERT’s challenges to developing and implementing key attributes and a successful national cyber analysis and warning capability.

To identify key attributes of cyber analysis and warning capabilities, we identified entities based on our previous work related to cyber critical infrastructure protection, information security, and information sharing and analyzed relevant laws, strategies, and policies. In addition, we solicited suggestions from a variety of sources familiar with cyber analysis and warning organizations, including GAO’s chief information technology officer and members of our Executive Council on Information Management and Technology, which is a group of executives with extensive experience in information technology management who advise us on major information management issues affecting federal agencies. On the basis of the entities identified, we selected those that were relevant and agreed to participate. We then gathered and analyzed policies, reports, and surveys; made site visits to observe the operation of cyber analysis and warning capabilities; conducted structured interviews; and received written responses to structured interview questions. These activities were performed, as appropriate, at the following entities: Department of Defense: Commander and Deputy Commander of the Joint Task Force—Global Network Operations and Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency; Commanding Officer, Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command; Chief Information Officer and Electronic Data Service officials of the Navy’s Global Network Operations Center. We also toured the Joint Task Force’s Global Network Operations Center; the Navy’s Cyber Defense Operation Command Center; and the Navy Marine Corps Intranet Network’s Operations Center, Computer Incident Response Team Laboratory, Request Management Center, and Enterprise Global Networks Operations Center.

Department of Energy: the Associate Chief Information Officer for Cyber Security for the Department of Energy and other relevant officials, and the Chief Information Officer of the National Nuclear Security Administration and other relevant officials.

Department of Homeland Security: the Director of the National Cyber Security Division, the Acting Director of the National Cyber Security Division, and the Acting Director of US-CERT.

National Institute of Standards and Technology: the Director of the Information Technology Laboratory and officials from the Information Technology Laboratory’s Computer Security Division.

Private sector: Carnegie Mellon University’s CERT® Coordination Center, Internet Storm Center, LUMETA, Microsoft, MITRE, National Association of State Chief Information Officers, SANS Institute, SRI International, and Symantec.

Information sharing and analysis centers representing the following sectors: financial services, information technology, states, surface transportation, and research and education.

Federal agencies in the intelligence community.

On the basis of the evidence gathered and our observations regarding each entity’s capabilities and operations, we determined the key common attributes of cyber analysis and warning capabilities. To verify the attributes we identified, we solicited comments from each entity regarding the attributes identified and incorporated the comments as appropriate.

To determine US-CERT’s current national analysis and warning capabilities and compare them with the attributes identified to determine whether there were any gaps, we gathered and analyzed a variety of US- CERT policies, procedures, and program plans to identify the organization’s key activities related to cyber analysis and warning. We also observed US-CERT operations. In addition, we held interviews with key US-CERT officials, including the Director and Acting Director of the National Cyber Security Division, the Acting Director and Deputy Director of the US-CERT, and other relevant officials, to further clarify and confirm the key initiatives we identified through our analysis of the aforementioned documents. In addition, we interviewed the Director of Intelligence for the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center to determine that organization’s interaction with US-CERT and its role regarding identifying cyber threats. We also interviewed the Deputy Director of the Department of Homeland Security’s National Cybersecurity Center to obtain information about its concept-of-operations document. We then compared those activities to the key attributes of cyber analysis and warning capabilities in order to determine US-CERT’s ability to provide cyber analysis and warning and identify any related gaps.

To identify US-CERT’s challenges to developing and implementing the key attributes and a successful national cyber analysis and warning capability, we gathered and analyzed relevant documents, such as past GAO reports and studies by various cybersecurity-related entities, and interviewed key federal and nonfederal officials regarding the challenges associated with cyber analysis and warning. On the basis of the information received and our knowledge of the issues, we determined the major challenges to developing and implementing the key attributes and a successful national cyber analysis and warning capability.

We performed this performance audit between June 2007 and July 2008 in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area; Atlanta, Georgia; Bloomington, Indiana; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and Norfolk, Virginia; in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the persons named above, Neil Doherty, Michael Gilmore, Barbarol James, Kenneth A. Johnson, Kush K. Malhotra, Gary Mountjoy, Jennifer Stavros-Turner, and Amos Tevelow made key contributions to this report.