Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry
Released: 2007-11-05T00:00:00

Letter

Background

CBP is the lead federal agency charged with keeping terrorists, criminals, and inadmissible aliens out of the country while facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and commerce at the nation’s borders. CBP has three main components that have border security responsibilities. First, CBP’s Office of Field Operations is responsible for processing the flow of people and goods that enter the country through air, land, and sea ports of entry where CBP officers inspect travelers and goods to determine whether they may be legally admitted into the country. Second, CBP’s Border Patrol works to prevent the illegal entry of persons and contraband into the United States between the ports of entry. The Border Patrol is responsible for controlling nearly 7,000 miles of the nation’s land borders between ports of entry and 95,000 miles of maritime border in partnership with the United States Coast Guard. Third, CBP’s Office of Air and Marine helps to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure through the coordinated use of an integrated force of air and marine resources and provides mission support to the other CBP components. For fiscal year 2007, CBP had a $9.3 billion budget, of which $2.5 billion was for border security and trade facilitation at ports of entry.

In carrying out its responsibilities, CBP operates 326 official ports of entry, composed of airports, seaports, and designated land ports of entry along the northern and southern borders. Ports of entry vary considerably in size and volume, including diverse locations such as major airports like New York’s John F. Kennedy (JFK) International Airport, and the busiest land crossing in the United States at San Ysidro, California, which processes over 17 million vehicles a year (see fig. 1); small ports in remote rural locations along the Canadian border that process only a few thousand vehicles every year; and seaports like the Port of Miami where cruise ships transport more than 3 million travelers into and out of the country each year. Most ports of entry are land border crossings located along the northern border with Canada or the southern border with Mexico. The four largest land border ports of entry by traveler volume are at San Ysidro, Calexico, and Otay Mesa in California, and the Bridge of Americas in El Paso, Texas. In total, these four ports process about 27 percent of all travelers who enter the country by land.

CBP annually processes over 400 million passenger and pedestrian entries, 20 million containers, and 130 million conveyances through ports of entry. In fiscal year 2005, the most recent year for which traveler data are available by mode of entry, land border crossings were by far the busiest for processing people, with about three out of four entries into the country occurring through a land port of entry (see fig. 2).

Process for Inspecting Travelers Differs between Air and Land Ports of Entry

The process for inspecting travelers at airports is significantly different than the process at land ports of entry. Prior to departure from foreign airports, airline carriers electronically submit passenger manifest information to CBP. CBP officers cross-check passengers against a wide range of law enforcement databases before travelers enter the country. Upon arrival in the United States, international airline passengers are first subject to immigration inspections that check visas, passports, and biometric data (see fig. 3). Generally, international passengers arriving by air must present a U.S. passport, permanent resident card, foreign passport, or a foreign passport containing a visa issued by the Department of State. CBP officers may also inspect the luggage of travelers.

CBP faces a much greater challenge to identify and screen individuals at land ports of entry, in part because of the lack of advance traveler information and the high volume of traffic at many locations. Unlike travelers who enter the country at airports, travelers entering through land ports of entry can arrive at virtually any time and may present thousands of different forms of documentation, ranging from oral declarations of U.S. or Canadian citizenship, driver’s licenses, birth certificates, passports, visas, permanent resident cards, or U.S. military identity cards. Travelers entering the country by bus or rail must provide documentation and may be subject to further inspection. CBP has implemented measures to help provide advance information on passengers arriving at land ports of entry, including trusted traveler programs that register frequent, low-risk travelers for expedited entry, and license plate readers that match license plate numbers against law enforcement databases.

Traveler Inspection Policies and Procedures Call for Establishing Citizenship and Admissibility

The Immigration and Nationality Act, implementing regulations, and CBP policies and procedures for traveler inspection at all ports of entry require officers to establish, at a minimum, the nationality of individuals and whether they are eligible to enter the country. The first requirement is for the CBP officer to determine if the person is a U.S. citizen or an alien, and if an alien, establish whether the person meets the criteria for admission into the country. Current documentation requirements for entry into the country vary depending on the nationality of the traveler and the mode of entry. For example, U.S. citizens arriving at land ports of entry currently may seek to establish citizenship to a CBP officer through an oral declaration of citizenship. In general, nonimmigrant aliens arriving at land and air ports of entry must present a valid, unexpired passport as well as, depending on country of origin and intended length of stay in the United States, a valid, unexpired visa issued by a U.S. embassy or consulate for entry into the country. As most travelers attempting to enter the country through ports of entry have a legal basis for doing so, a streamlined screening procedure referred to as a primary inspection is used to process those individuals who can be readily identified as admissible. Persons whose admissibility cannot be readily determined and persons selected as part of a random selection process are subjected to a more detailed review called a secondary inspection. This involves a closer inspection of travel documents and possessions, additional questioning by CBP officers, and cross references through multiple law enforcement databases to verify the traveler’s identity, background, purpose for entering the country, and other corroborating information. At the end of this process, the individual may be admitted, refused entry and returned to the country of origin, or detained while admissibility is subject to further review.

Transforming the Role of CBP Officers Is a Work in Progress

As part of the original reorganization plan for border security, DHS found that having border security and inspections performed by three separate legacy agencies with different priorities, conflicting policies, and varying leadership structures had led to inconsistent inspections and gaps in the sharing of information between these agencies. As part of its actions to address these concerns, in March 2003, DHS created CBP by merging employees from the three legacy agencies previously responsible for border security. Among other considerations, DHS formed CBP to establish a unified command structure that was intended to reduce duplication of efforts while improving the sharing of information. For operations at ports of entry, in September 2003 CBP issued its plan for consolidating the inspection functions formerly performed by separate inspectors from the three legacy agencies. The plan, referred to as “One Face at the Border,” called for unifying and integrating the legacy inspectors into two new positions—a CBP officer and a CBP agricultural specialist. The new CBP officer would serve as the frontline officer responsible for carrying out the priority anti-terrorism mission as well as the traditional customs and immigration inspection functions, while also identifying and referring goods in need of a more extensive agricultural inspection to the agricultural specialist. CBP anticipated that having a well-trained and well-integrated workforce that could carry out the complete range of inspection functions involving the processing of individuals and goods would allow it to utilize its inspection resources more effectively and enable it to better target potentially high-risk travelers. Together, CBP envisioned the result to be more effective inspections and enhanced security at ports of entry while also accelerating the processing of legitimate trade and travel.

While it has been about 4 years since the formation of DHS and CBP, our prior work on mergers and acquisitions found that it generally takes 5 to 7 years to successfully complete such a transformation. For example, GAO designated DHS’s overall transformation as a high-risk area in 2003 based on three factors. First, DHS faced a formidable task in implementing a transformation process that would effectively combine 22 disparate agencies with an estimated 170,000 employees into one department. Second, many of these agencies were facing their own challenges in management areas such as strategic human capital, information technology, and financial management; thus, DHS inherited a host of operational and management challenges from the beginning. Third, DHS’s national security mission is critically important and failure to effectively address its management challenges and program risks could have serious consequences for national security as well as have major economic impacts. CBP, as part of DHS, faces many similar challenges in its efforts to unify three agencies into one and in transforming the role of its officers. For example, with over 40,000 employees, CBP represented the largest merger of people and functions within DHS. Additionally, our prior work on the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the U.S. Customs Service, two of the primary agencies involved in the merger, showed that these agencies experienced many management challenges before their merger into CBP. Finally, like DHS, CBP’ has a primary mission of preventing terrorist attacks that is critical to national security.

CBP Has Had Some Success in Interdicting Inadmissible Aliens and Other Violators, but It Still Needs to Overcome Weaknesses in Its Traveler Inspections and Physical Infrastructure

CBP has had some success in identifying inadmissible aliens and other violators. In fiscal year 2006, CBP successfully caught tens of thousands of violators and it made security improvements at its ports of entry, such as installing new cargo inspection technology. Nevertheless, the agency faces major challenges in overcoming weaknesses in both traveler inspections and physical infrastructure. In regards to traveler inspections, at our request, CBP officials showed us a videotape that identified numerous examples of officers not establishing the nationality of individuals and their eligibility for entering the country as required by law. CBP took action in the summer of 2006 to address the problems by holding high- level management meetings and delivering training on traveler inspections to its officers. However, we later found that CBP’s initial set of corrective actions did not always address the problems and we found similar problems as those on the videotape. CBP issued new policies and procedures to overcome these inspection weaknesses at its land ports of entry including requiring field office directors to conduct assessments to ensure compliance with these new inspection procedures. However, the policies and procedures do not require that field office directors share their assessment results with CBP headquarters management, which may hinder its ability to use the information to overcome weaknesses in traveler inspections and to identify best practices that may occur during implementation of its new policies and procedures. CBP faces a challenge in addressing physical infrastructure weaknesses at land ports of entry in a timely way because some ports are owned by other governmental or private entities, potentially adding to the time needed to agree on infrastructure changes and put them in place.

CBP Has Had Some Success Identifying Inadmissible Aliens and Other Violators

CBP has identified and interdicted thousands of potentially dangerous people and significant amounts of illegal goods at ports of entry. According to CBP, in fiscal year 2006, CBP officers arrested more than 23,000 suspected criminals, denied entry to over 200,000 inadmissible aliens, seized more than 644,000 pounds of illegal drugs, intercepted nearly 1.7 million prohibited agricultural items, and seized over $155 million in illegal commercial merchandise, such as counterfeit footwear and handbags. CBP officers also intercepted 40,362 fraudulent documents used in attempts to enter the country illegally in fiscal year 2006. Over half (21,292) of the fraudulent documents intercepted by CBP involved the alteration or improper use of travel documents issued by the U.S Department of State. About 80 percent of these documents involved impostors—that is, people using authentic, unaltered documents that had been validly issued to another person. The remaining 20 percent attempted to enter with fraudulent documents that were altered in some way, such as a fake or altered U.S. visa, or were entirely counterfeit.

CBP’s success in identifying inadmissible aliens and other violators has been enhanced by several new initiatives and programs that aim to further improve security at ports of entry. They include the following: New cargo inspection technology. According to CBP, it has installed nonintrusive inspection technologies at ports of entry that enable officers to rapidly inspect vehicles and truck containers for inadmissible aliens and other violators, nuclear or radiological weapons, or other contraband (see fig. 4). Other nonintrusive technologies, such as radiation detectors, allow CBP to inspect containerized truck and sea cargo without having to perform a time- intensive manual search or other intrusive examinations of the contents.

Additional requirements for screening passengers. To improve its ability to target high-risk individuals that are on international flights bound for the United States, CBP in fiscal year 2007, issued a ruling that requires airlines provide passenger manifest information prior to departure. These data are critical in screening passengers against watch lists and other databases and identifying potentially dangerous individuals attempting to enter the United States.

CBP also expanded the entry capability of the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to a total of 116 airports, 15 seaports, and 154 land ports of entry. Through this program, CBP is able to collect, maintain, and share data, including biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, on selected foreign nationals entering the United States to verify their identities as they Inspection Equipment arrive at air, sea, and land ports of entry. CBP also uses these data to screen persons against watch lists and other law enforcement databases to determine their eligibility to enter the country.

Prescreening programs for low-risk travelers. As part of CBP efforts to facilitate legitimate trade and travel, CBP has implemented several initiatives to increase enrollment in its trusted traveler programs, such as the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) program on the southern border and the NEXUS program on the northern border. These programs allow registered border residents and frequent cross-border travelers identified as low- risk individuals access to dedicated lanes and expedited processing with minimal inspection (see fig. 5). Participants undergo a thorough background check, a fingerprint law enforcement check, and a personal interview with a CBP officer. Enrollment in these two programs totaled nearly 260,000 members in fiscal year 2007. In addition, as part of an initiative among the United States, Canada, and Mexico, CBP operates a trusted traveler program called the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program, for truck companies involved in transporting cargo through land ports of entry. Participants in FAST have access to dedicated lanes as well as reduced number of examinations. In 2006, CBP certified 124 new commercial partners and approved over 8,000 new drivers to participate in the program, bringing total FAST enrollment to 84,000 participants.

Automated license plate and document readers. CBP has also increased deployment of automated license plate and document readers at land ports of entry. License plate readers automatically read front and rear license plates of vehicles as they enter the primary inspection area, with the data simultaneously queried against CBP and law enforcement databases (see fig. 6). In addition, CBP has installed document readers that electronically read documents, such as passports or border crossing cards, that allow CBP officers to automatically query law enforcement databases. With these readers in place, CBP officers spend less time manually inputting information, thereby reducing inspection times, improving the accuracy of the collected information, and affording the officers the ability to interact more with vehicle occupants.

Improvements Notwithstanding, CBP Acknowledges that It Did Not Apprehend All Inadmissible Aliens and Other Violators

While CBP has had some success in interdicting inadmissible aliens and other violators, CBP acknowledges that it did not apprehend all inadmissible aliens and other violators who sought to enter the country at air and land ports of entry. CBP’s estimates of how many inadmissible aliens and other violators evade detection are based on a sample of travelers who arrive at land and air ports of entry. This program, called Compliance Examination (COMPEX), randomly selects travelers entering the country for more detailed inspections. CBP carries out this program at air and land ports of entry. At land ports, CBP randomly selects vehicles and conducts more detailed inspections of the vehicles and possessions of the traveler. At airports, CBP supervisors randomly select travelers. In both cases, the program is designed to select travelers who would not normally be referred to a secondary inspection and would therefore be allowed to enter the country. On the basis of the extent to which violations are found in the in-depth inspections, CBP estimates the total number of inadmissible aliens and other violators who seek to enter the country at locations where COMPEX is carried out. CBP then calculates an apprehension rate by comparing the number of violators it actually apprehends with the estimated number of violators that attempted entry. Using COMPEX, CBP estimates that several thousand inadmissible aliens and other violators entered the country through air and land ports of entry in fiscal year 2006.

Weaknesses in How Well Inspection Procedures Were Followed Increased the Potential of Illegal Entry

Weaknesses in how well inspection procedures were followed increased the potential that inadmissible aliens and other violators successfully entered the country. In the summer of 2006, CBP reviewed hundreds of hours of video from 150 large and small land ports of entry and determined that while CBP officers carried out thorough traveler inspections in many instances, they also identified numerous examples where officers did not comply with inspection requirements, according to CBP officials. At our request, CBP officials showed us a 15-minute video that CBP had prepared that documented noncompliance with inspection requirements. The following were examples of weaknesses that were on the video: In one instance, officers waved vehicles into the United States without stopping the vehicle or interviewing the driver or its passengers as required. In another instance, motorcycles passed through inspection lanes without stopping and making any contact with an officer. In a third instance, during “lane switches” when CBP officers were relieved of their duty and replaced by other officers, officers waved traffic through the lane while the officer logged into the computer. The proper procedure is for traffic to be stopped until the officer is logged into the system and is available to perform proper inspections.

In another instance, while the CBP officer was reviewing information on his computer screen, he waved pedestrians through the lane without looking at them, making verbal contact, or inspecting travel documents. In another instance, travelers would simply hold up their identification cards and officers would view them without stepping out of the booth before waving the vehicle through. In these cases, the officers did not appear to make verbal contact with the passengers and did not interview any passengers sitting in the back seat of the vehicle. As a final example, officers did not board recreational vehicles to determine whether additional traveler inspections should be carried out.

Without checking the identity, citizenship, and admissibility of travelers, there is an increased potential that dangerous people and inadmissible goods may enter the country and cause harm to American citizens and the economy. According to CBP interviews with apprehended alien smugglers, alien smuggling organizations have been aware of weaknesses in CBP’s inspection procedures and they have trained operatives to take advantage of these weaknesses. This awareness heightens the potential that failed inspections will occur at ports of entry when such procedural weaknesses exist.

According to CBP senior management, the factors that may have contributed to these weaknesses included the following: Failure to engage, lack of focus, and complacency. According to CBP senior management, emphasis is not being placed on all missions, and there is a failure by some of its officers to recognize the threat associated with dangerous people and goods entering the country.

Insufficient staffing. According to CBP senior management, they are unable to staff ports of entry to sufficiently accommodate the workload. Lack of sufficient staff contributes to officers working double shifts, sometimes resulting in fatigue that can affect decisions.

Lack of supervisory presence in primary inspections. CBP senior management noted that lack of supervisory presence at primary inspection booths can contribute to less than optimal inspections.

Lack of training. CBP senior management acknowledged that, in some cases, periodic and on-the-job training is not being delivered.

CBP Is Taking Action to Address Inspection Weaknesses, but Challenges Remain

CBP has taken action to address weaknesses in its inspection procedures by renewing its emphasis on the need to improve inspections at ports of entry and by revising traveler inspection policies and procedures. In July 2006, CBP headquarters showed field office directors the 15-minute videotape that documented the type of noncompliant inspections that were taking place at land ports of entry. CBP management emphasized the importance of thorough inspection procedures at all ports of entry, including airports and seaports, by requesting field office directors to review current procedures and identify best practices for more thorough inspections. As requested by the Assistant Commissioner of Field Operations, the field office directors conducted a series of meetings with senior port management to review and evaluate their ports’ performance, make corrections where necessary, and identify best practices when inspecting travelers. Through efforts such as these, CBP managers identified best practices that included (1) increased supervisory presence in primary inspection areas; (2) detailing specific steps that should be conducted during primary inspections, such as interviewing travelers and conducting thorough document review (e.g., handling and inspecting documents); and (3) personal visits to ports of entry by directors and managers.

CBP also revised its policies and procedures for traveler inspections at land ports of entry to deal with weaknesses that were identified. In July 2007, CBP issued new policies and procedures for inspecting travelers at land ports of entry, including pedestrians and those who enter by vehicle. Among other things, the policies and procedures call on officers to obtain photo identification for all travelers in a vehicle and match the traveler with the photograph. In doing so, the CBP officer is required to obtain a declaration of citizenship, either in the form of travel documents, such as passports, or in the case of a U.S. citizen or Canadian citizen, an oral statement. To the extent possible, officers are required to query law enforcement databases for all travelers in a vehicle. The new policies identify roles and responsibilities of CBP officials at ports of entry, including directors of field offices, port directors, supervisory CBP officers, as well as CBP officers. In the near future, CBP officials are also planning to issue new policies and procedures for processing cargo at land borders and for inspecting travelers who enter the country at airports and seaports.

However, issuing new policies and procedures alone does not ensure they will be carried out. For example, after CBP headquarters issued directives, held musters, and issued memorandums to field office and port managers that emphasized the importance of carrying out improved traveler inspections in July 2006, many of the same weaknesses they attempted to deal with continued to exist at ports of entry we visited. In October 2006 and January 2007, or as much as 5 months after managers informed officers of the need to carry out traveler inspections in a more rigorous way by interviewing travelers and examining their travel documents, our investigators identified weaknesses in traveler inspections that were similar to those identified in CBP’s 15-minute video. At several ports of entry, our investigators found that a CBP officer was not staffing the booth when they arrived for inspection. At other locations, CBP officers did not ask for travel documents from our investigators. For example, at one port, when our investigators arrived at the port of entry, one of them called over to three officers who were seated at desks behind a counter about ten feet away. One of the officers asked our investigator if he was a U.S. citizen and the investigator said “yes.” The CBP officers did not get up from their desks to ask for any identification, asked no other question, and allowed our investigator to enter the country. At another port of entry, a CBP officer was not present at the primary inspection booth when our investigator arrived for inspection and he had to wait approximately 3 to 4 minutes before an officer arrived.

While CBP’s new policies and procedures are a step in the right direction, ensuring their proper implementation will be key to overcoming weaknesses in traveler inspections. An effective internal control environment is a key method to help agency managers achieve program objectives and enhance their ability to address identified weaknesses. CBP is taking positive steps to implement some control requirements. For example, one of the standards for internal control in the federal government involves monitoring to assess the quality of performance over time. To monitor how traveler inspections are conducted at ports of entry, CBP headquarters has developed a program to covertly test the integrity of existing security measures at ports of entry, including the work carried out by CBP officers. In addition, CBP headquarters officials are called on to conduct compliance reviews. Last, CBP’s new policies and procedures on traveler inspections call on field office directors to ensure compliance with the new inspection procedures at all ports of entry by conducting audits and assessments. Internal control standards state that information should be communicated to management to enable it to carry out its program responsibilities. However, CBP does not require that field offices share the results of their audits and assessments with CBP headquarters management. Without obtaining and receiving the results of field office audits and assessments, CBP management may be hindered in its ability to efficiently use the information to overcome weaknesses in traveler inspections and identify best practices that may occur during implementation of its new policies and procedures.

Querying all travelers arriving at land ports of entry against CBP law enforcement databases represents a major challenge for CBP. As discussed earlier in this report, CBP’s new policies and procedures require officers, to the extent feasible, to query travel documents of all travelers who arrive at primary inspection at land ports of entry. In contrast, CBP officers at airports generally handle and query documents of all travelers. Taking the time to enter information into CBP’s law enforcement database for the several hundred million travelers arriving at primary inspection could hinder CBP’s ability to facilitate the movement of legitimate travel and commerce.

DHS’s planned Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, when implemented at land ports of entry, may allow CBP to query more travelers against law enforcement databases and could improve CBP’s ability to identify inadmissible aliens and other violators without harming commerce and travel. The initiative generally requires travelers to have a passport or passport-like document to enter the United States from Canada, Mexico, and other countries in the western hemisphere that is machine-readable and therefore can be more quickly and accurately checked against CBP’s law enforcement database than currently acceptable documents. CBP has already implemented the initiative at air ports of entry, but has yet to do so at land ports of entry. When the initiative is implemented at land ports of entry, CBP officers may be able to query more documents because DHS estimates that processing a traveler at primary inspection will be reduced by 15 to 25 seconds because all travelers will have documents that will be machine readable.

Problems with Physical Infrastructure Increase the Risk That Vehicles Could Bypass Land Ports of Entry

CBP’s effectiveness at securing the nation’s borders depends not only on the quality of traveler inspections, but also on the degree to which physical infrastructure is in place to reduce the risk that inadmissible aliens and other violators could bypass inspection points and enter the country. During our site visits, we identified weaknesses in physical infrastructure at some land ports of entry.

Making Changes to Address Physical Infrastructure Weaknesses at Land Ports of Entry Can Be Challenging

CBP has developed a process to identify and prioritize capital infrastructure needs at land ports of entry. One component of this planning process is called the Strategic Resource Assessment—an assessment that identifies capital needs at ports of entry by evaluating existing facility conditions, predicting future workload trends, performing space capacity analyses, and estimating costs for the recommended options. CBP’s Office of Finance has compiled resource assessments for 163 land crossings and has prioritized the ports with the greatest need. On the basis of the assessments, CBP estimates that the cost of making capital improvements at land crossings totals about $4 billion. In addition, the assessments identify a planning process to ensure that funding is allocated in a systematic and objective manner.

While CBP has made progress in identifying its capital needs, making infrastructure changes to address the problems is not always easy, according to CBP officials responsible for infrastructure improvements. For example, these senior CBP officials noted that they do not have the discretion to make infrastructure improvements on their own, such as installing barriers and bollards, when they do not own the property and therefore need to coordinate their efforts with other entities, such as private bridge commissions or state highway departments. For capital improvements at ports of entry, such as building new vehicle lanes or secondary inspection facilities, the CBP officials said the lead time for making such improvements was long. For example, according to these CBP officials, for the 96 ports of entry that are owned by the General Services Administration (GSA), GSA approves and prioritizes capital improvement projects. The process of submitting a request for an infrastructure improvement and completion of the project is approximately 7 years from start to finish, according to a GSA official. For the 23 ports of entry that are privately owned and leased by GSA, CBP officials noted that coordinating with privately owned companies on infrastructure improvements is a difficult process because the private owner’s interest in facilitating commerce must be balanced with CBP’s interest in national security. According to CBP officials, the degree to which improvements will be made at land ports of entry and how long it will take depend on available funding and the results of discussions with various stakeholders, such as GSA and private port owners. Each year, depending upon funding availability, CBP submits its proposed capital improvement projects based upon the prioritized list it has developed. As of September 2007, CBP had infrastructure projects related to 20 different ports of entry in various stages of development, according to a CBP official.

Progress Being Made, but Challenges Still Exist in CBP Officer Staffing and Training

CBP has taken action to improve staffing and training at ports of entry by assessing staffing needs, adding staff, and developing an extensive training program, but it faces challenges in hiring and retaining staff and providing required training. To address staffing, CBP developed a staffing model to identify the resources needed at the nation’s ports of entry. While CBP has had a net increase of about 1,000 more staff since 2005, the results of the staffing model indicate that CBP may need additional officers at ports. Not having sufficient staff contributes to morale problems, fatigue, and safety issues for officers. It also makes it difficult for ports of entry to fully carry out anti-terrorism and other traveler inspection programs. The problems are exacerbated by difficulties in retaining experienced staff. Regarding training, CBP has made progress in developing 37 training modules for CBP officers and a national on-the-job training program for new officers. While it has delivered training to thousands of CBP officers, CBP faces challenges in (1) delivering the required training modules to those who need it and (2) providing on-the-job training to new CBP officers consistent with national program guidance. When staff do not receive required training or are not trained consistently with program guidance, it limits knowledge building and increases the risk that needed expertise is not developed. Senior CBP headquarters officials also stated that the lack of training and training that is inconsistently delivered may increase the risk that terrorists, inadmissible travelers, and illicit goods could be admitted into the country.

Staffing Shortfalls and Retention Problems Exist at Ports of Entry

Congressional concern about CBP’s ability to link resources to its mission led Congress to call on CBP to develop resource allocation models. In responding to language in the conference report for the fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations and the SAFE Port Act of 2006, CBP developed a staffing model for its land, air, and sea ports of entry. The conference report directed CBP to develop the staffing model in a way that would align officer resources with threats, vulnerabilities, and workload. This directive stemmed, in part, from concern about CBP’s ability to effectively manage its growing workload, minimize wait times, and ensure that CBP officers receive adequate training in all relevant inspection functions. The staffing model is designed to determine the optimum number of CBP officers that each port of entry needs in order to accomplish its mission responsibilities. According to CBP staff involved in developing the staffing model, it is primarily driven by traveler volume and inspection processing times. The staffing model also incorporates assumptions for training, anti- terrorism activities, and staffing for special equipment, such as radiation portal monitors. According to CBP officials, the model’s assumptions will be recalculated each fiscal year in order to account for changes caused by new requirements, procedures, or changes in workload. For example, when the new inspection requirements come into effect under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, CBP can adjust the processing times in the staffing model, which may result in changes in the number of staff needed, according to CBP officials. CBP plans to use the staffing model to help management decide on the number of staff needed and where they should be deployed.

In July 2007, CBP provided us with the results for the staffing model. The model’s results showed that CBP would need up to several thousand additional CBP officers and agricultural specialists at its ports of entry. In addition, the staffing model showed the relative need among different CBP locations. CBP has determined that data from the staffing model are law enforcement sensitive. Therefore, we are not providing more detailed data and information from the model in this report.

The staffing model was not finalized in time to prepare CBP’s fiscal year 2008 budget request. CBP officials told us that they plan to use the results of the staffing model to determine which locations are to receive additional staffing in fiscal year 2008, should Congress approve their request for additional positions.

CBP Cites Insufficient Staffing as an Impediment to Traveler Inspection Efforts

Before the staffing model was finalized, CBP used other data to determine staffing needs and provide an indication of the degree to which insufficient staffing affects operations at ports of entry. CBP’s 20 field offices and its pre-clearance headquarters office requested additional officers through quarterly resource assessment reports that quantified perceived staffing needs and provided justifications for the request. CBP used the quarterly resource assessment reports to help determine the number of officers to allocate to each office, but the majority of the requests went unfilled due, in part, to budget constraints. In January 2007, 19 of CBP’s 21 offices identified a need for additional officers to accomplish their anti-terrorism responsibilities through special operations and anti-terrorism teams; operate new equipment, such as radiation portal monitors and non- intrusive inspection technologies, both of which are relatively new additions to CBP’s mission responsibilities; and to deal with increased workload from increased traveler volume and the expansion of primary inspection lanes and other facilities.

Managers, supervisors, and officers at seven of the eight ports of entry that we visited provided examples of how insufficient staffing affects their ability to carry out primary and secondary inspections: Anti-terrorism and other traveler inspection programs are not fully carried out. CBP uses a “layered” enforcement approach when it inspects travelers. In implementing this approach, port officials told us that when possible, they perform enforcement operations that include anti-terrorism teams and canine inspections (see fig. 7). While considered discretionary, according to CBP officials, these inspections can result in significant numbers of seizures and adverse actions and, thus, are a key tool in traveler inspection efforts. For example, one port conducted a 30-day pilot project during which it focused its efforts on such operations. During this time, CBP officers said they apprehended 96 criminals, inadmissible aliens, and other violators who were in line for primary inspection.

Double shifts can result in officer fatigue. Due to staffing shortages, ports of entry rely on overtime to accomplish their inspection responsibilities. Officers at six of the eight ports of entry we visited indicated that officer fatigue caused by excessive overtime negatively affected inspections at their ports of entry. On occasion, officers said they are called upon to work 16-hour shifts, spending long stints in the primary passenger processing lanes in order to keep lanes open, in part to minimize traveler wait times. Further evidence of fatigue came from officers who said that CBP officers call in sick due to exhaustion, in part to avoid mandatory overtime, which in turn exacerbates the staffing challenges faced by the ports.

CBP Faces Challenges in Retaining Officers

CBP’s onboard staffing level is below its budgeted level, partly due to attrition. According to CBP officials at headquarters and the ports of entry we visited, the gap between the budgeted staffing level and the number of officers onboard is attributable in part to high attrition, with ports of entry losing officers faster than they can hire replacements. Through March 2007, CBP data show that, on average, 52 CBP officers left the agency each 2-week pay period in fiscal year 2007, up from 34 officers in fiscal year 2005. Port managers at five locations indicated that the rising attrition consistently keeps their ports of entry below the budgeted staffing level because of the lengthy amount of time—up to a year—that it can take to hire and train a new officer. On a case-by-case basis, CBP has allowed five field offices to hire above their budgeted staffing levels in order to account for the expected attrition before the next hiring cycle. For example, one field office was allowed to hire over its budgeted staffing level by 100 staff in anticipation of expected officer attrition. However, the use of this option is limited and port managers stated that attrition still outpaces hiring at such locations.

Numerous reasons exist for officer attrition. As with other federal agencies, officer retirements are taking a toll on the agency’s workforce. In the next 4 years, over 3,700 CBP officers, or about 20 percent of CBP’s authorized level of 18,530 officers, will become eligible for retirement. In addition, according to CBP officials, CBP officers are leaving the agency to take positions at other DHS components and other federal agencies to obtain law enforcement officer benefits not authorized to them at CBP. In fiscal year 2006, about 24 percent of the officers leaving CBP, or about 339 officers, left for a position in another DHS component. Further, extensive overtime, poor officer morale, and the high cost of living in certain areas were frequently cited by employees who left as reasons for attrition. Our analysis of responses by nonsupervisory CBP staff to the 2006 OPM Federal Human Capital Survey corroborated that they have concerns about efforts to develop staff and agency leadership that could contribute to low morale and attrition. See appendix II for a more complete analysis of responses by nonsupervisory employees to OPM’s Federal Human Capital Survey.

CBP recognizes that attrition of officers is adversely affecting its operations and that it must reassess aspects of its human capital approach if it is to hire and retain a high-performing, motivated workforce. CBP officials told us that CBP is considering a number actions including establishing personnel incentive programs, such as a tuition reimbursement program. In addition, the Office of Field Operations plans to work with CBP’s Office of Human Resources Management to develop and distribute a personnel satisfaction survey to obtain employee feedback so that leadership can better address the needs of its workforce. CBP has also revised the exit survey it gives to employees prior to their leaving the agency to better assess their reasons for leaving and to help CBP identify where it is losing employees. CBP plans to analyze data from OPM’s Human Capital Survey, the employee satisfaction and exit surveys, and attrition data to help identify what specific actions CBP may need to take to curb attrition. CBP plans to develop some initial retention strategies by December 2008 and by September 2009 develop approaches to retain staff based on areas of concern identified in the employee exit survey.

Major Cross-Training Program Developed, but Ports of Entry We Visited Faced Challenges in Delivering Required Training

Starting in 2003, CBP began developing a series of 37 training modules aimed at improving the skills of and to cross-train CBP officers in carrying out inspections at ports of entry. CBP recognized the importance of training in transforming the role of its officers, and has made officer training a focus of the agency. CBP initiated a multiyear cross-training program effort to equip new and legacy officers with the tools necessary to perform primary immigration and customs inspections, and sufficient knowledge to identify agricultural threats in need of further examination by the agricultural specialists. For example, through a combination of computer-based “fundamentals” courses followed by classroom and on- the-job training, a former customs inspector would take training that prepared him or her to conduct secondary inspections related to possible immigration violations. At airports, former customs officers might receive instruction so that they could better conduct traveler inspections. Legacy immigration officers in air and land ports of entry would be trained so that they could work in inspecting baggage or vehicles, respectively. The program involved developing training modules on such topics as anti- terrorism and detecting fraudulent documents. Through its efforts, CBP has cross-trained thousands of officers since 2004. For example, CBP has trained about 12,000 staff in the anti-terrorism module.

In August 2007, CBP officials involved in developing the training program at ports of entry told us that CBP is in the process of changing its cross- training program. The officials told us that they hope to update existing cross-training materials and align them with recent changes in policies and procedures. Further, the officials said that the new program will be geared toward delivering training that provides specific expertise in immigration or customs-related inspection activities to new officers or CBP officers transferring to a different job function. According to these officials, they will begin implementing the program in January 2008.

Mission Demands Cited as Reason for Challenges in Delivering Cross-Training

While CBP has made progress in developing training modules and in training its officers, CBP managers at seven of the eight ports of entry we visited said they had experienced difficulty in providing their officers with required training in a timely manner because staffing challenges force the ports to choose between performing port operations and providing training. In these instances, port of entry managers told us that training is often sacrificed. One port of entry director stated, “the port is thinking out of the box just to do basic functions cannot even begin to focus on training.” Managers at this port of entry also indicated that training courses are scheduled and then canceled because of staffing concerns. At two other ports of entry we visited, managers indicated that staffing challenges cause the ports of entry to use overtime to fill positions temporarily vacated by officers who participate in training. For example, to provide its officers with four basic cross-training courses, including a course in processing immigration cases, management at one port estimated they would need nearly $4 million in overtime—a condition that would make the port go over its budget for overtime and add to the problems we discussed earlier caused by excessive overtime.

We also identified examples where ports of entry we visited did not consistently provide cross-training courses in the manner expected by CBP headquarters. For example, headquarters informed field offices that course content may not be shortened. However, according to a CBP official at one location, his port of entry trained officers to work in the immigration secondary area by pushing officers through a compressed 5- day version of the course rather than the 9-day version developed by headquarters. At another port, new officers we spoke with had not taken the immigration course after working for 3 years, even though CBP guidance states that new officers should take the course during their second year at the port. Challenges in providing training are not new. We have previously reported that staffing shortages have affected training efforts at ports of entry even before CBP was created in March 2003.

Insufficient Cross-Training Creates Vulnerabilities in Traveler Inspections

Managers and supervisors at six of eight ports of entry we visited told us that vulnerabilities in traveler inspections occurred when officers did not receive cross-training before rotating to new inspection areas. Although CBP’s training policy calls for no officer to be placed in an area without receiving the proper cross-training module, officers and supervisors at ports of entry we visited told us that officers are placed in situations for which they had not been trained. While we cannot determine the degree to which this is happening in other ports of entry cross the country, we identified several examples where this policy is not being followed at the ports of entry we visited. For example, legacy customs officers at one port of entry reported feeling ill prepared when called upon to inspect passengers because they had not received the requisite training. One supervisor at this port of entry stated that he had “no confidence” that the officers he supervised could process the casework for a marijuana seizure correctly in order to successfully prosecute the violator because they had not received training. Supervisors at another port of entry told us that they were rotated to areas in which they had not received training. With responsibility over admissibility decisions, these supervisors were concerned that they could not answer questions from their subordinates or make necessary determinations beyond their area of expertise. As a result of not being trained, officers at this port stated that they relied heavily on senior officers from legacy agencies. The officers also told us that these senior officers have been leaving the agency. CBP managers in headquarters recognize that insufficient training can lead to a higher risk of failed inspections. In a presentation that was given to all field office directors, CBP headquarters officials stated that untrained officers increase the risk that terrorists, inadmissible travelers, and illicit goods could enter the country.

Data for Measuring Progress in Providing Cross-Training Are Not Available

CBP is attempting to capture information that better reflects whether training requirements are being met. In November 2006, CBP’s field offices submitted their revised training plans indicating how many additional officers needed to be cross-trained over the next several years. However, CBP officials told us that they do not track specifically which officers need to take a particular training module, nor do they track whether those officers have received the needed training. Without data on which CBP officers need which particular cross-training modules and whether they have received the training, CBP does not know the extent that its officers have received the necessary cross-training and are not in a position to measure progress toward achieving its cross-training program goals.

Standards for internal control in the federal government provide a framework for agencies to achieve effective and efficient operations and ultimately to improve accountability. One of the standards involves having good controls in place to ensure that management’s directives are carried out. To do so, the standards call on agencies to compare actual performance to planned or expected results throughout the organization and to analyze significant differences. Having reliable data to measure the degree to which training has been delivered to those who are required to receive it would help meet this standard and put CBP management in a position to better gauge the results of its cross-training program.

On-the-Job Training Program for New CBP Officers Faces Implementation Challenges at Ports of Entry We Visited

In addition to developing cross-training modules for its officers, CBP also has an on-the-job training program for new officers once they arrive at a port of entry. In a July 2003 report on inspections at land border ports of entry, we recommended that CBP develop and implement a field training program for new officers before they independently conduct inspections. In response to this recommendation, CBP issued guidance for on-the-job training of new CBP officers. According to the guidance, new officers should receive up to 12 and 14 weeks of on-the-job training at land and air ports of entry, respectively. The guidance provides an outline of the type of experiences that a port of entry needs to provide to an officer as part of the on-the-job training program, such as reviewing emergency port of entry procedures and computer systems used in primary inspections.

However, at seven of the eight ports of entry we visited officials told us that they had difficulty in providing on-the-job training in compliance with the guidance. For example: Management at one land port of entry stated that it could not provide 12 weeks of on-the-job training to its new officers because of workload, budget, and staffing challenges, but indicated that it tried to provide 6 weeks of on-the-job training. CBP officers at another port of entry told us that the length of their on-the-job training varied from 2 weeks to 6 weeks and they told us that they needed more on-the-job training before inspecting travelers on their own.

CBP’s on-the-job training guidance recommends, but does not require, new officers receive 3 weeks of the training under close supervision of a coach or field training officer in order to receive direct guidance and feedback in their performance. However, officials at seven of the ports of entry we visited said that their port of entry had difficulty providing new officers with field training officers. For example, at two ports of entry, experienced officers were unwilling to take on the extra responsibility of training new officers, according to CBP officials at these locations.

Weaknesses in On-the-Job Training Can Reduce the Effectiveness of Traveler Inspections

Vulnerabilities in traveler inspections are created when new officers do not receive required training. For example, new officers who received as little as 2 weeks of on-the-job training rather than the recommended 12 weeks told us that they needed more training before inspecting travelers. In our July 2003 report, we reported that discrepancies in on-the-job training decrease the effectiveness of traveler inspections at ports of entry when little or no on-the-job training is given to new officers. For example, we found that the ports that graded their officers as being the least prepared to carry out traveler inspections were among the ports that provided the least amount of on-the-job training.

Opportunities for Strengthening CBP’s On-the- Job Training Program for New CBP Officers

In addition to new CBP officers not receiving on-the-job training consistent with CBP’s national program guidance, the training program lacks certain elements that may be limiting CBP’s ability to effectively train new officers. Internal control standards related to management of human capital state that management should ensure that the organization has a workforce that has the required skills necessary to achieve organizational goals. While CBP’s on-the-job training guidance requires supervisors to document the tasks officers have performed while in the on-the-job training program, the guidance does not require that officers perform certain tasks to develop needed skills nor does it call on officers to demonstrate proficiency in specific job tasks.

The U.S. Border Patrol, an office within CBP, developed a field training program that contains mechanisms to help ensure new Border Patrol agents obtain the needed skills to do their job and demonstrate proficiency in those skills. For example, the Border Patrol identified 32 different specific skills, knowledge, and behavior traits intrinsic to Border Patrol operations, such as processing an expedited removal case, that agents must perform over the 12-week training period. If the new agent cannot gain experience in a specific task, the training officer must arrange for the new agent to conduct a practical exercise. The program requires that agents be evaluated in all 32 areas and be provided weekly feedback on those areas covered in training during the week. Agents are required to demonstrate competency in performing the 32 skills. In addition, training officers are required to write specific comments on performance that is rated as significantly deficient or exceptional.

We discussed the utility of the Border Patrol’s on-the-job training program with CBP officials. CBP officials told us that they are planning to revise CBP’s on-the-job field training program for new CBP officers to make it a more robust program. They stated that they would review the Border Patrol’s field training program to identify best practices that they might incorporate into CBP’s on-the-job training program for new CBP officers.

Results from OPM’s 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey Show that NonSupervisory CBP Staff Are Concerned about Training

Similar to the issues discussed above, our analysis of OPM’s 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey shows that CBP staff expressed concern about training. Our analysis shows that less than half of nonsupervisory CBP staff were satisfied with how CBP assesses their training needs (43 percent), the extent to which supervisors support employee development (43 percent), and the degree to which supervisors provide constructive feedback on how to improve (42 percent). In responding to these three questions, a significantly lower percentage of nonsupervisory staff at CBP was satisfied with their training experiences than nonsupervisory staff in other federal agencies.

CBP Has Developed Strategic Goals for Its Traveler Inspection Program, but Challenges Remain in Formalizing Related Performance Measures

Strategic Plan Establishes Goals and Objectives for Traveler Inspection Program

CBP has developed strategic goals for its traveler inspection program, but it faces challenges in formalizing a set of performance measures that track what progress it is making toward achieving these goals. In September 2006, CBP’s Office of Field Operations issued its 5-year strategic plan called Securing America’s Borders at Ports of Entry, which defines CBP’s national strategy for securing America’s borders, specifically at ports of entry for fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011. Building on the key themes in DHS’s and other CBP strategic plans and applying them specifically to ports of entry, the plan outlines the Office of Field Operation’s vision on establishing secure ports of entry where potential threats are deterred; threats and inadmissible people, goods, and conveyances are intercepted; legitimate trade and travel are facilitated; and operations and outcomes are consistent across locations and modes of transportation. The plan outlines five strategic goals. They are (1) expanding advance knowledge—increasing and improving the information and analysis CBP has about people, goods, and conveyances before they arrive at the ports of entry; (2) modernizing the inspection process to ensure that all people and goods are inspected appropriately; (3) ensuring a flexible enforcement focus to improve CBP’s effectiveness in assessing, detecting, and predicting threats; (4) strengthening physical security at the ports of entry to maintain a secure environment for officers to perform inspections; and (5) building organizational partnerships, maintaining a skilled workforce, and utilizing emerging technologies to achieve CBP’s mission.

Reported Performance Measures for Traveler Inspection Program Do Not Assess CBP’s Effectiveness at Apprehending Inadmissible Aliens and Other Violators

Although one of CBP’s main goals is to intercept inadmissible aliens and other violators, CBP’s reported performance measure does not address this goal. In its fiscal year 2006 Performance and Accountability Report, CBP reported on the degree to which travelers who arrive at the port of entry are in compliance with immigration, agricultural, and other laws, rules, and regulations as a way to gauge the success of its traveler inspection efforts. Using data from its COMPEX program, CBP uses a measure—called the compliance rate—which showed that in fiscal year 2006 about 99 percent of travelers who seek to enter the United States through 19 major airports and by vehicle at 25 major land ports were in compliance with laws, rules, and regulations.

We have reported that linking performance to strategic goals and objectives and publicly reporting this information are important so that Congress and agency management have better information about agency performance and help to ensure accountability. CBP’s current performance measure, the compliance rate, shows the extent to which travelers arriving at ports of entry meet the legal requirements for entering the country. CBP does not use data that measure the extent to which it is intercepting inadmissible aliens and other violators, one of CBP’s key strategic objectives. As discussed earlier in our report, CBP calculates a measure known as the apprehension rate as part of its COMPEX program, which provides an estimate of the agency’s effectiveness in apprehending travelers seeking to enter the country illegally or in violation of other laws. The COMPEX program was originally developed by the former U.S. Customs Service to comply with the Government Performance and Results Act, which requires federal agencies to develop outcome-based performance goals and measures, when possible, as a way to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of their programs.

During the course of our review, we discussed with CBP officials the potential of using the apprehension rate as one way of measuring the effectiveness of CBP interdiction efforts. In June 2007, CBP officials told us that CBP was in the process of selecting performance measures for fiscal year 2008 and a decision had not yet been made on whether to include the apprehension rate or some other similar outcome-based measure.

Conclusions

Effective inspection of the millions of travelers entering the country each year is critical to the security of the United States. As CBP matures as an organization, having effective inspection procedures, retaining its officer corps, and developing the necessary skills in its officer corps are essential given the critical role that CBP plays in national security. Although CBP developed new inspection procedures that require CBP field office directors to monitor and assess compliance with the new procedures, a key internal control requiring field office directors to communicate with CBP management the results of their monitoring and assessment efforts is not in place. As a result, CBP management may not get information that would identify weaknesses in the traveler inspections process that need to be addressed. The initial set of actions that CBP has taken for dealing with challenges in training at ports of entry is a positive start, but it has not established a mechanism to know whether officers who need specific cross-training have received it and whether new CBP officers have experience in the necessary job tasks and are proficient in them. This means that some officers may be called on to perform certain inspection tasks without having the knowledge and skills to do them.

It is also important to have performance measures in place to permit agency management to gauge progress in achieving program goals and, if not, to take corrective action. In regard to traveler inspections, CBP is missing an important performance measure that shows what results are achieved in apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators. CBP has apprehension rate data that could be used to develop such a performance measure. Having performance measures related to the effectiveness of CBP interdiction efforts would help inform Congress and agency management of improvements resulting from changes in CBP’s traveler inspection program and what gaps in coverage, if any, remain.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To mitigate the risk of failed traveler inspections at ports of entry, we recommended in our October 5, 2007 report that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection to take the following four actions: implement internal controls to help ensure that field office directors communicate to agency management the results of their monitoring and assessment efforts so that agencywide results can be analyzed and necessary actions taken to ensure that new traveler inspection procedures are carried out in a consistent way across all ports of entry; develop data on cross-training programs that measure whether the individuals who require training are receiving it so that agency management is in a better position to measure progress toward achieving training goals; incorporate into CBP’s procedures for its on-the-job training program (1) specific tasks that CBP officers must experience during on-the-job training and (2) requirements for measuring officer proficiency in performing those tasks; and formalize a performance measure for the traveler inspection program that identifies CBP’s effectiveness in apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of the For Official Use Only version of this report to DHS for comment. In commenting on our draft report, DHS, including CBP, agreed with our recommendations. Specifically, DHS stated that CBP is taking action or has taken action to address each recommendation.

For example, DHS stated that CBP will develop a measurement validation tool to help confirm that officers have received the necessary cross- training courses before they are assigned to a different work environment. In addition, CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) will evaluate how the Border Patrol is implementing its on-the-job training program and analyze its compatibility to OFO. If effectively implemented, these actions should help address the intent of our recommendations.

CBP took issue with an example we used in our draft report describing a situation where two GAO investigators who tested the traveler inspection process at land port of entry were not asked for any identification. We stated that as our investigators attempted to enter at the port, the CBP officer—who was seated behind a desk about 10 feet away—only asked our investigators if they were U.S. citizens and the investigators said “yes.” DHS stated that under current statute and regulation, a person claiming to be a United States citizen arriving at a port of entry is not required to provide identity documents as long as the subject can establish, to the satisfaction of the inspecting officer, citizenship. DHS stated that because CBP officers were satisfied with the citizenship of the two investigators at the time of inspection, identity documents were not required.

We agree that an identity document is not required for U.S. citizens at land ports of entry. However, this example is meant to convey that some inspections were not meeting the intent of CBP’s July 2006 management guidance calling for more thorough inspections through traveler interviews and document review. Asking a traveler one question about citizenship when seated at a desk about 10 feet away does not seem to be consistent with the more thorough inspections called for in CBP’s management guidance. We modified our report to include additional information on this episode.

DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the For Official Use Only version of this report as appropriate. Appendix III contains written comments from DHS.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report addresses the progress the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has made and the remaining challenges it faces in conducting traveler inspections, staffing, and training at ports of entry. Specifically, we answered the following questions: (1) What success and challenges has CBP had in interdicting inadmissible aliens and other violators at its ports of entry? (2) What progress has CBP made in improving staffing and training at its ports of entry and how successful has it been in carrying out these workforce programs? (3) What progress and problems CBP has encountered in setting goals and performance measures for its traveler inspection program?

On October 5, 2007, we issued a report that answered the above questions, but it contained information that DHS considered law enforcement sensitive. This version of the report omits sensitive information about CBP’s traveler inspection efforts, including information on the techniques used to carry out inspections, data on the number of inadmissible aliens and other violators that enter the country each year, and data on staffing at ports of entry. In addition, at DHS’s request, we have redacted the specific locations that we visited.

The overall methodology used for our initial report is relevant to this version of the report since the information in this product is derived from our first report. Specifically, we, performed our work at the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) CBP offices, based in Washington, D.C. We also conducted work at 8 ports of entry—three airports and five land crossings. While we cannot generalize our work from our visits to all ports of entry, we chose these ports of entry to provide examples of operations at ports of entry. At each location, we held group sessions with CBP officers and supervisors. We also interviewed port management and staff involved in training. In addition, our investigators conducted vulnerability assessments of inspection procedures at 8 additional ports of entry. Our investigators conducted covert operations to evaluate screening procedures at small ports of entry. Although we cannot generalize our investigators‘ work at these locations to all ports of entry, we selected these ports of entry to provide examples of traveler inspections at small ports of entry. Our investigators did their work in accordance with quality standards for investigations as set forth by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. In assessing the adequacy of internal controls, we used the criteria in GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD 00-21.3.1, dated November 1999. These standards, issued pursuant to the requirements of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA), provide the overall framework for establishing and maintaining internal control in the federal government. Also pursuant to FMFIA, the Office of Management and Budget issued Circular A-123, revised December 21, 2004, to provide the specific requirements for assessing the reporting on internal controls. Internal control standards and the definition of internal control in Circular A-123 are based on the GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.

To determine what success and challenges CBP has had in interdicting inadmissible aliens and other violators at its ports of entry, we interviewed CBP headquarters officials, such as officials from the Offices of Field Operations, Policy and Planning, Finance, and Training and Development. We obtained and analyzed available DHS documents on traveler inspections, more specifically on COMPEX data (a compliance measurement to determine an overall estimated rate of compliance for travelers), and port infrastructure assessments. For example, we examined COMPEX data that estimate the total number of inadmissible aliens and other violators that seek to enter the country, and compared their compliance and apprehension rates. We assessed the reliability of the COMPEX data by (1) talking with knowledgeable officials about how COMPEX inspections are conducted, documented, and how the apprehension rate estimates are generated; (2) reviewing relevant documentation; and (3) replicating the calculations for the apprehension rates that were provided in the COMPEX reports. We determined the COMPEX estimates were sufficiently reliable for illustrating apprehension rates for the ports of entry the COMPEX program covers. Additionally, we also analyzed CBP’s Strategic Resource Assessment, an evaluation and planning tool designed to identify a port’s infrastructure needs and operational impact on traveler inspections. We also evaluated the CBP Inspector’s Field Manual to determine inspections-related requirements. During our eight site visits, we met with and interviewed field office directors and senior port management staff. During our interviews, we (1) discussed CBP’s success in interdicting inadmissible aliens and other violators and the vulnerabilities in the inspections procedures and concerns related to physical infrastructure and (2) obtained available documentation regarding traveler-related inspections policies and procedures. At each port of entry we visited, we observed both primary and secondary screening procedures and conducted discussion group sessions with officers and supervisors. At each port of entry we visited, we obtained a list of CBP officers scheduled to work during our site visit and from that list we randomly selected officers and supervisors to participate in our sessions at six of the eight ports we visited. We organized the discussion groups by whether they were from legacy organizations or became CBP officers after the merger. At two ports of entry, local management selected officers who would attend the discussion groups and interviews. The group discussions covered a variety of discussion topics, particularly officers’ perceptions and experiences with the “One Face at the Border” initiative and associated challenges in conducting inspections at ports of entry. Over 200 CBP officers participated in our discussion group sessions. In addition to the discussion groups, we also conducted meetings (usually groups of two to four) with CBP chiefs, line supervisors, and specialists (e.g., officers assigned to the intelligence or canine units). These meetings were designed to collect perceptions from CBP middle management and specialists. Additionally, we reviewed a videotape prepared by CBP that documented noncompliance with inspection requirements. Finally, we reviewed CBP’s new policies and procedures for traveler inspections at land ports of entry.

To examine what progress CBP has made in improving staffing and training at its ports of entry and how successful has it been in carrying out these workforce programs, we interviewed CBP headquarters officials, including those from the Offices of Field Operations, Policy and Planning, Human Resource Management, and Training and Development. We obtained and analyzed available CBP reports on staffing and training data. For example, we analyzed staffing data from CBP’s Quarterly Resource Assessment, an allocation tool used by field offices to identify the port’s need for additional resources (e.g., request for additional officers). We also collected and analyzed data from CBP’s National Training Plan, a comprehensive guide that documents recommended training guidelines for CBP officers. At each major port we visited, we met with field office directors and senior port management. During our meetings we discussed staffing and training challenges that affected port operations. Follow-up meetings with CBP headquarters officials resulted in receiving staffing numbers from the Quarterly Resource Assessment—an assessment tool used by CBP to identify field office needs and resources—that documented field offices’ request for additional officers. We reviewed headquarters guidance on the on-the-job training program, then met with field office directors and training coordinators. We assessed the reliability of the staffing data by (1) talking with knowledgeable officials about staffing resources, (2) reviewing relevant documentation, and (3) comparing budgeted staffing numbers to officers currently onboard. Although CBP provided us with the results of the staffing model and not the model itself, we reviewed the model with knowledgeable officials, including the assumptions that were used to produce the estimated staffing needs. We understand that the staffing requirements the model produces will vary depending on the assumptions used and we present the key assumptions in the text of our report. Although we discussed the staffing model and its results with CBP officials responsible for the model, validating the model and its results was outside the scope of our review. During the course of our review, we analyzed November 2006 training data from ports of entry that showed the number of officers that had taken cross-training modules as well as the number of officers that local port management had identified as still needing to take a certain module. However, when we compared July 2007 training data with the November 2006 data from ports of entry, we identified inconsistencies with the data. For example, the July 2007 data showed that 120 fewer officers had taken training in a module when compared with the November 2006 data. Because of inconsistencies such as these, we did not use these data in our report. We also reviewed the Border Patrol’s on-the-job training program to identify best practices. Finally, we assessed nonsupervisory CBP employees’ perceptions of the effectiveness of CBP’s workforce management in areas such as job satisfaction, performance evaluation, providing employees sufficient resources to do their jobs, and meeting training needs by analyzing results from the 2004 and 2006 Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Federal Human Capital Survey. In addition, we discussed CBP’s training program with officers during discussion groups at the eight ports of entry we visited. To get a perspective on how these results ranked against other federal agencies, we compared the results of our analysis for nonsupervisory CBP employees with responses from nonsupervisory staff in the other DHS component agencies as well as the responses from the other 36 federal agencies included in the survey.

To examine what progress CBP has made in setting goals and performance measures for its traveler inspection program, we interviewed and corresponded with officials in CBP’s Offices of Field Operations, Policy and Planning, and Human Resources Management. In addition, to identify CBP’s strategic goals and performance measures for inspecting travelers, we reviewed agency documents such as CBP’s Strategic Plan for 2005 to 2010, CBP Performance and Accountability Reports for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, and OFO’s strategic plan, Securing America’s Borders at Ports of Entry (FY 2007- 2011).

We conducted our work from August 2006 through September 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: CBP’s Strengths and Challenges, According to OPM Surveys

To gain a broader view of CBP nonsupervisory staff perspectives on workforce issues, we analyzed results from the 2004 and 2006 OPM Federal Human Capital Survey of 36 federal departments or agencies. OPM’s survey represents responses from over 220,000 federal employees, including staff from DHS and CBP. The survey has 73 questions designed to gauge employees’ perceptions about how effectively agencies manage their workforce in the following categories: Personal Work Experiences; Recruitment, Development and Retention; Performance Culture; Leadership; Learning (Knowledge Management); Job Satisfaction; and Satisfaction with Benefits. The following presents our analysis of responses from nonsupervisory CBP staff to questions from OPM’s 2004 and 2006 surveys.

CBP Receives High Marks in Some Areas, but Staff Generally Expressed Low Satisfaction with Their Work Environment

Estimates based on responses by CBP nonsupervisory staff to OPM’s 2006 survey show that weaknesses in the work environment generally outweighed the strengths. Our analysis of the survey data showed that CBP nonsupervisory staff identified strengths in 12 of the 73 survey questions. For example, we estimate that a high percentage of CBP staff (1) view their work as important, (2) use information technology to perform work, (3) like the kind of work they do, and (4) understand how their work relates to the agency’s mission. (See table 1 for the top 10 items.)

Our analysis also showed that CBP nonsupervisory staff identified weaknesses in 22 of 73 areas. (See table 2 for the bottom 10 items.)

When compared with the 2004 survey results, the survey results for 2006 showed that the only area where CBP demonstrated significant progress for non-supervisory staff was increasing employees’ electronic access to learning materials at their desks (an estimated 24 percent improvement from 2004 to 2006). For 19 of 71 items, we estimate that scores for nonsupervisory CBP staff declined by a statistically significant degree. Some of the items where CBP faces greater challenges today than it did in 2004 include (1) having worthwhile discussions with supervisors about performance (an estimated 9.4 percent fewer positive responses in 2006 compared with 2004); (2) rating the overall quality of work done by their unit (6.9 percent fewer); and (3) people I work with cooperate to get the job done (6.2 percent fewer).

CBP Results Generally Mirror Those of DHS, but CBP Has Shown Little or No Improvement in Its Work Environment Since 2004

The estimates for nonsupervisory staff within CBP generally mirror those for the rest of DHS employees. Estimates based on responses from nonsupervisory CBP staff were about the same as those based on the rest of DHS on 47 of the 73 survey items. CBP scored higher on four items, including having a reasonable workload and electronic access to training. CBP was below DHS on the remaining 22 items, including work environment issues such as the quality of work done by the workgroup, feedback from supervisors, and having enough information to do the job well.

Placing the results of our analysis in context with how DHS compared with the other 36 departments or agencies involved in OPM’s survey provides a baseline along which to examine a department or agency’s results. For 2006, DHS ranked at or near the bottom of four main categories measured by the survey. DHS ranked 35th on leadership and knowledge management, 36th on having a results-oriented performance culture, 33rd on talent management, and 36th on job satisfaction. To put the situation at CBP in this context, CBP’s survey results rank the agency 10th out of the 13 DHS subcomponents, which would suggest that CBP similarly ranks at or near the bottom in these categories when compared to other federal agencies.

Quality of CBP’s Work Environment for Nonsupervisory Employees Is Generally Lower than at Other Federal Agencies

For 2006, nonsupervisory CBP staff scored the work environment as lower than elsewhere in the federal government on 61 of the survey’s 73 questions. For example, when we compared CBP with other federal agencies, we estimated that a significantly smaller percentage of CBP nonsupervisory staff said (1) supervisors or team leaders in their work unit support employee development, (2) their work unit recruits people with the right skills, and (3) they are given an opportunity to improve their skills. In contrast, there were no items where CBP staff scored the work environment as significantly better.

When viewed in more detail, our analysis of OPM’s survey data shows that CBP faces challenges in staffing and training its personnel, especially when CBP is compared to other federal agencies. For staffing, we estimate that CBP staff gave low marks to CBP for (1) the adequacy of sufficient resources to get the job done and (2) their work unit being able to recruit people with the right skills. With respect to training, less than half of CBP’s staff were reportedly satisfied with (1) the quality of the training received, (2) CBP’s assessment of their training needs, and (3) supervisory support for employee development (see table 3).

CBP acknowledges that it needs to improve its workforce management, particularly focusing on raising employees’ perceptions of CBP leadership, enhancing training and career development, and attitudes toward the performance culture at CBP. CBP has formulated a business plan that outlines a variety of corrective actions and initiatives it will take to achieve results in each of these areas. From a strategic standpoint, CBP will establish a Human Capital Advisory Board, composed of senior field leadership from the major CBP offices, that will serve as the central contact point for all program offices, advise and assist with implementing the initiatives outlined in the business plan, and asses the potential for forming an Employee Action Team Advisory Board. To facilitate communication with CBP employees about management actions, the plan sets forth a variety of potential actions, such as creating a Web site on the CBP intranet where CBP supervisors and employees can review the current workforce issues being addressed or results from actions taken, adding a link to CBP’s Web site where the public can access information to learn how CBP is addressing the survey results, and holding town hall meetings at key locations with the Commissioner and other high-level management. To better define the scope of the workforce issues and problems identified through the Federal Human Capital Survey, CBP also plans to conduct employee focus groups as well as administer the survey internally to a larger, more representative sample of CBP employees.

Following an in-depth analysis of the results of these actions, CBP will update the business plan in the first quarter of 2008.

As part of its leadership initiative, CBP is exploring options to improve employee perceptions of managers’ job performance, establish better communication of management’s goals and priorities, and encourage managers to build more trust and confidence with their employees. To accomplish these goals, CBP plans to create a leadership development checklist to make sure supervisors are addressing critical areas identified through the employee focus groups, and intends to increase the marketing of its recently implemented training course for incumbent supervisors as well as continue the development of training for supervisors newly promoted into management positions. These courses cover integrity, communication, conflict management, and holding effective roundtable discussions. Within the performance culture initiative, CBP wants to find better ways of recognizing employees’ performance that will improve their perceptions about the fairness of CBP’s performance recognition while also supporting a balance between work and family life, which employees also rated poorly. CBP’s plan includes, among other things, a call for improving the channels of communication used to inform supervisors and managers about the type and scope of discretionary performance awards they have at their disposal to issue throughout the year. It also suggests encouraging management at all levels of CBP to have more frequent employee recognition events, to publish award recipients and best practices, and to make awards management a component of performance standards for supervisory personnel. Finally, within the talent management initiative, the plan calls for Human Resources to complete its competency, skills, and needs assessment by the third quarter of fiscal year 2007, and for the Office of Training and Development to implement an automated development and career path system that will guide employees in their career development by providing occupational “road maps” and recommending training based on the occupations they intend to pursue.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Richard M. Stana (202) 512-8777 or StanaR@gao.gov.

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact listed above, Michael Dino, Assistant Director; Neil Asaba; Frances Cook; Josh Diosomito; Kasea Hamar; Michael Meleady; Christopher Leach; Ron La Due Lake; and Stan Stenersen made key contributions to this report.

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