Conflict Minerals: Information on Artisanal Mined Gold and Efforts to Encourage Responsible Sourcing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Released: 2017-08-23T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Artisanal and small-scale mining of gold in the DRC is a significant driver of the country’s economy. ASM gold mining in the DRC employs a large number of people, constitutes a potential major source of tax revenue, and represents a potential engine of development for the country, according to a 2015 study by USAID. More than 1,000 ASM gold mine sites of varying size operate in the DRC, primarily in remote provinces in the eastern region, commonly employing groups of 30 to 300 miners (see app. II for a map showing DRC provinces). In parts of the DRC, artisanal and small-scale mining provides alternative employment opportunities in the absence of a viable agricultural sector. In addition, mining—including ASM gold mining—provides miners with cash-on-hand and requires little or no specialized knowledge.

ASM gold miners work as diggers, rock crushers, sorters, and traders. Most ASM gold miners use shovels, picks, and other rudimentary tools, such as mining pans. Because of the scarcity of mechanical equipment in some areas, ASM gold miners grind the mined gold manually into a powder, often with a pair of rocks or a tire rim, and extract gold from this powder using a sluice, mining pan, and washing pool and sometimes using hazardous chemicals such as mercury (see fig. 1).

According to a 2016 study by the International Peace Information Service (IPIS), ASM gold mining sites in the eastern DRC annually produced a combined total of about 12 metric tons of gold, with an estimated value of $437 million, in 2013 through 2015. This study found that a miner produced an average of 0.17 grams per day, worth about $6.07 on global markets, but retained earnings of $1.84 to $2.75 per day. However, significant portions of many miners’ wages went toward paying off loans (i.e., prefinancing) that the miners incurred for food, tools, and other basic necessities. As a result, when production levels were low, miners could easily enter a cycle of indebtedness.

According to the government of the DRC, the average annual official ASM gold production in 2010 through 2016 was about 279 kilograms (0.28 metric tons) of gold, with an estimated value of $10.1 million per year. Total official ASM gold production was about 1,955 kilograms (1.95 metric tons), with an estimated value of about $71 million in 2010 through 2016 (see table 1).

Reported Supply Chain for DRC- Sourced ASM Gold

The reported official supply chain for ASM gold produced in the DRC involves multiple key actors authorized by the DRC government, according to reports we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed. However, these and other sources indicate that the vast majority of DRC- sourced ASM gold is mined, traded, and exported unofficially, without authorization. Additionally, the majority of ASM gold miners reportedly work in the presence of elements of the Congolese army or illegal armed actors, according to a report and stakeholders.

Reported Official Supply Chain for DRC-Sourced ASM Gold Involves Multiple Actors, but Almost All ASM Gold Is Reportedly Smuggled

The official supply chain for ASM gold produced in the DRC involves multiple actors, including miners, local traders, and exporters, according to USAID and UNGoE reports we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed. Those sources indicated that these key actors are required to obtain government authorization, such as official mining cards, or register with the provincial or national government to trade or export ASM gold in the DRC. However, according to these reports and stakeholders, almost all DRC-sourced ASM gold is produced and traded unofficially and smuggled from the country. Figure 2 illustrates the reported official and unofficial supply chains for DRC-sourced ASM gold.

According to these sources, unregistered local traders or exporters generally sell DRC-sourced ASM gold to regional buyers in Uganda, Burundi, or Rwanda or global buyers in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

The USAID and UNGoE reports we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed generally described the official supply chain for DRC-sourced ASM gold as follows:

Artisanal and small-scale miners purchase government mining cards and join cooperatives, which allows them to work in artisanal mining zones known as the zone d’exploitation artisanal (ZEA). According to a USAID report, ASM gold is considered legal under DRC law when it is produced by a registered cooperative working within a ZEA or a mining area that has been inspected and found to be “green”—that is, conflict free—within the past year by a government-accredited, validated mission. Miners in provinces where most of the ASM gold is produced are subject to an average provincial production tax of about 8 percent, according to USAID.

Local traders, known as negociants, register with the government to purchase gold from villages near mine sites and sell it to larger traders or exporters. Generally, there are two types of local traders: petit negociants, who buy and sell small quantities (one-half gram or less), and grande negociants, who buy and sell larger quantities (1 to 50 kilograms) of gold. According to a USAID report, registered local traders in these provinces are subject to an average provincial tax of about 1 percent on sales volume.

National exporters, known as comptoirs, register with the national government to export gold purchased from the local traders. Registered exporters are subject to a 2 percent national export tax, according to a USAID report.

Global buyers, including international refiners, jewelers, and banks, buy ASM gold from registered exporters in the DRC for further processing for use in electronic components, jewelry, or gold bars.

Despite the existence of an official supply chain, almost all ASM gold is smuggled out of the DRC and is therefore not reflected in official export statistics or subject to provincial or national taxes, according to reports we reviewed as well as stakeholders we interviewed. These sources indicate that smuggling activities often begin at the mine site and involve both registered and unregistered actors. For example, ASM gold miners mine for gold at undesignated sites and sell it to both registered and unregistered local traders. Unregistered traders purchase gold at or near mining areas and either sell the gold to larger registered or unregistered traders or exporters located in regional trading centers in the DRC—for example, in Bukavu, South Kivu Province, or Butembo, North Kivu Province—or smuggle the gold from the DRC themselves, according to USAID and UNGoE reports reflecting fieldwork completed in 2014 and 2016. Registered local traders also participate in smuggling by selling gold to unregistered exporters and to regional and global buyers outside the DRC. Additionally, registered exporters participate in smuggling by underreporting their exports of ASM gold to avoid taxes, according to reports reflecting fieldwork completed in 2014 through 2016. A UNGoE study estimated that unreported exports of ASM gold from the DRC and neighboring countries in the first 9 months of 2015 amounted to about $200 million. Some of the factors that contribute to smuggling include limited government control over the remote areas where ASM gold is primarily produced, inadequate infrastructure, and corruption, according to reports we reviewed and DRC government officials we interviewed. DRC government officials told us that smuggling is also a consequence of weak border enforcement. Reports we reviewed indicate that the smuggling of ASM gold from the DRC has resulted in a substantial loss of tax revenue.

Most ASM gold produced in the DRC is smuggled through regional buyers in neighboring African countries and then to Dubai, UAE, according to several reports. UNGoE, OECD, and NGO officials told us that gold buyers located outside the DRC—for example, in Uganda— often rely on networks of traders who purchase gold at mines in the eastern DRC and smuggle it out of the country. These sometimes- complex supply chain networks include traders and exporters who are often from other countries in the region or from China, India, the Middle East, or Europe, according to an OECD representative. Reports we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed also noted that ASM gold smuggled from the DRC is typically transported from Dubai to other international markets such as India or Switzerland.

Since 2012, the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre, a UAE government entity, has provided guidelines on responsible sourcing to gold refiners through its accreditation program. However, joining the program is voluntary, and the entity’s jurisdiction does not include all refineries in the UAE, according to Dubai Multi Commodities Centre officials. In interviews, Dubai government officials and refiners and a representative of an auditing firm told us that accredited refiners generally do not purchase gold directly from the DRC or most adjoining countries (see app. II for a map showing the countries adjoining the DRC). Furthermore, these individuals noted that refiners take various actions to ensure that gold sourced from these countries does not enter their supply chains. However, the refiners also acknowledged having purchased gold in the local gold market in Dubai (known as the gold souk), despite the fact that, according to a UNGoE report, traders and jewelers operating in the souk may have purchased gold from the DRC. In interviews, traders and jewelers at the gold souk told us that they required minimal documentation and generally did not ask questions about country of origin when buying gold. For example, one trader told us he was willing to purchase up to 50 kilograms of gold without any source-of-origin documentation. As a result, the extent of comingling of gold from the souk and gold from refiners who follow responsible sourcing guidelines is unclear.

Armed Groups Reportedly Interfere at ASM Gold Mine Sites in Several Ways, Including Imposing Illegal Taxes on Miners

In recent years, progress has been made in reducing the presence of armed groups at tantalum, tin, and tungsten mine sites, according to UNGoE, OECD, and IPIS reports. However, the widespread availability of gold in remote, difficult-to-access areas of the eastern DRC and the lack of a functioning traceability system allow armed groups to operate at gold mine sites with minimal government and international oversight. According to reports we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed, interference by armed groups of state and nonstate actors occurs primarily at mine sites through, among other things, illegal taxation and control of mining areas, pillaging, and forced labor. For example, a 2016 IPIS study found that, as of 2015, an estimated 64 percent of ASM gold miners worked at mines with state and nonstate armed group interference. Armed groups have also been known to operate illegal road barriers, where they collect revenue from miners or traders transporting gold. Furthermore, according to the IPIS study and UNGoE officials, most instances of armed group interference at mining sites involve illegal taxation. As of 2016, among the conflict minerals, gold provided by far the most significant financial benefit to armed groups, according to UNGoE.

Elements of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) constitute the largest armed presence and source of interference at gold mine sites, according to the 2016 IPIS study. According to DRC government officials, although FARDC is present to maintain security at or around gold mine sites, some undisciplined FARDC elements have interfered at mining sites. However, these officials noted that the military is working to bring such elements under control by taking legal action against FARDC officers and soldiers found to be in violation of the law. In addition, a report by the Congo Research Group, based on fieldwork conducted in 2015, indicates that fragmentation has greatly increased among illegal nonstate armed groups in eastern DRC. With the disappearance or weakening of armed groups such as the March 23 Movement and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda from the DRC, illegal armed groups are now smaller and more fragmented, tending to pillage mines rather than impose permanent control, according to IPIS representatives. IPIS representatives noted that FARDC elements, in contrast, tend to impose more permanent control and illegal taxation.

DRC Government’s, USAID’s, and Other Entities’ Efforts to Encourage Responsible Sourcing of ASM Gold

The DRC government and USAID, as well as several other entities, have undertaken initiatives to encourage the sourcing of conflict-free ASM gold from the DRC. However, some of these initiatives face challenges, such as the limited number of validated mine sites, as well as ongoing security risks.

DRC Government Initiatives

To mitigate supply chain–related concerns, in 2015, the DRC government developed the Traceability Initiative for Artisanal Gold (ITOA) to establish conflict-free sources of ASM gold. ITOA relies on a system of tamper- proof envelopes and agents to track and certify the source and chain of custody of gold. The DRC government seeks to implement ITOA at mining sites that have been validated as “green” (i.e., conflict free, with no child labor) and are located in officially designated ZEAs. According to USAID documents, the DRC government aims to pilot ITOA at two mine sites in the Maniema and South Kivu provinces and to scale the system on the basis of the pilot. DRC officials told us that they expect the ITOA pilot to be launched in the summer of 2017.

However, the limited number of mine sites that have been validated and thus licensed to operate, as well as the relatively high provincial taxes in the mining sector in the DRC compared with taxes in neighboring countries, as reported by USAID and UNGoE, continue to limit incentives for sourcing conflict-free ASM gold. For example, as of April 2016, only 37 of more than 1,000 ASM gold mine sites had been validated as green, according to a DRC government accredited joint validated mission. The government’s ability to validate mines has been hindered by factors such as insecure conditions and lack of funding, according to a 2015 report by the Enough Project. Furthermore, relatively high government taxes discourage actors along the supply chain from selling gold through legal channels, according to reports we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed. A USAID report found that regional tax rates in the DRC and neighboring countries had been largely equalized but that provincial taxes in the DRC remained high. For example, Support Service and Management of Small Scale Mining, or SAESSCAM—a provincial government entity—requires miners to pay a 10-percent production tax in addition to other fees, according to a USAID document. SAESSCAM is responsible for providing training in safe and effective mining techniques, among other things, but focuses primarily on collecting taxes from miners, according to USAID and OECD reports we reviewed.

USAID Initiatives

USAID is assisting the DRC government in its efforts to encourage the responsible sourcing of conflict-free ASM gold and provides training to mining cooperatives and government officials in the mining sector. Since 2015, USAID has partnered with the DRC government to assist with implementing ITOA, including helping to validate mine sites. In addition, since 2016, USAID has worked with Tetra Tech through the Capacity Building for Responsible Minerals Trade Program and Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) through the Just Gold project to scale up pilot initiatives for the production and sale of ASM gold. The pilot is focused on increasing the volume of conflict-free gold and improving the integrity of traceability systems in the DRC. For example, miners are taught more-sustainable exploitation techniques and offered project equipment. As of March 2017, the Just Gold project had exported about 1,429 grams (1.4 kilograms) of ASM gold. Table 2 shows the two pilot projects USAID had initiated as of June 2017 to develop and expand existing traceability schemes for ASM gold produced in the DRC.

USAID progress reports cite the limited number of buyers, including refiners, and security as key challenges affecting these pilot projects. According to USAID officials, some potential buyers are unwilling to purchase ASM gold from the DRC because of associated risks related to potential armed group interference. USAID officials also told us that the low volume of ASM gold available from the limited number of pilot mine sites poses an additional challenge to attracting buyers. In interviews, Dubai Multi Commodities Centre officials and refinery representatives in Dubai told us that, while they do not currently purchase any ASM gold produced in the DRC, they would be open to exploring options to buy such gold if they had some assurance from a partner such as USAID. USAID officials explained that their current focus is on identifying London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) refiners, who examine their supply chains more closely. Additionally, ongoing security risks affect the implementation of pilot projects, according to USAID progress reports. For example, in February 2017, one of the potential pilot sites at Matete was attacked, leading to suspension of on-site activities. According to USAID documents, an armed group of approximately 30 men attacked several buildings in Matete, killing one military soldier and taking hostages. Contractor staff were immediately moved to another compound for security and were subsequently evacuated, unharmed.

In 2016, USAID established a pilot projects target of developing traceability and due diligence schemes for ASM gold at 25 mine sites. USAID met this target in December 2016, having developed traceability and due diligence schemes at 26 mine sites, primarily through the Just Gold project. USAID officials told us that they are supporting the development of a traceability scheme for ASM gold so that gold from validated sites can comply with ICGLR standards.

Other Entities’ Initiatives

Other entities—OECD, ICGLR, and LBMA—have undertaken regional initiatives to encourage the responsible sourcing of gold.

OECD guidance. Since 2012, OECD has developed guidance on encouraging responsible supply chains for ASM gold. For example, the guidance notes that stakeholders should engage in legalizing and formalizing the artisanal mining communities to encourage conflict- free sourcing. In 2016, OECD reported that implementation of Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act had increased awareness about the supply chain of conflict minerals in the region.

ICGLR regional certification mechanism. In 2010, ICGLR developed a regional certification mechanism to ensure that conflict minerals, including gold, are fully traceable. However, two reports we reviewed raised concerns about the validity of ICGLR certificates issued to comptoirs exporting ASM gold, given that traceability schemes for ASM gold are lacking. In addition, UNGoE, OECD, and DRC officials told us that the ICGLR’s mechanism has not been fully implemented and is not adequately monitored owing to limited incentives for member states to accomplish regional goals.

LBMA accreditation. In 2012, LBMA, which represents the global market for gold and silver, established its “Responsible Gold Guidance” to ensure that the gold refiners it accredits purchase only conflict-free gold. According to LBMA, compliance with this framework is mandatory for all refiners wishing to sell into the London bullion market. USAID officials told us that USAID is seeking to identify buyers from the LBMA refiners for its ASM gold pilot projects.

Additional Information on Sexual Violence in Eastern DRC Published since August 2016

Since we reported in August 2016, a USAID-funded, population-based study published in 2016 has provided additional data on sexual violence in the DRC. In addition, as we previously reported, population-based surveys on sexual violence are under way or planned in two adjoining countries, Burundi and Uganda. We also identified some new case-file data on sexual violence in the DRC and adjoining countries; however, as we reported previously, case-file data on sexual violence are not suitable for estimating an overall rate of sexual violence. Finally, a 2017 UN report indicates that the DRC government has made some progress in addressing sexual violence.

USAID-Funded Study Provides Additional Data on Sexual Violence in the DRC, and Studies for Adjoining Countries Are Under Way

We identified a USAID-funded, population-based study surveying the rate of sexual violence in the eastern DRC that had been published since August 2016. Published in September 2016, the study used data collected in June and July 2016 to estimate that 31.6 percent of women and 32.9 percent of men reported exposure to some form of sexual and gender-based violence in their lifetime. Among women who were exposed to sexual violence, 12.7 percent reported exposure to conflict-related sexual violence, while 87.4 percent reported exposure to community- based sexual violence. Among men who were exposed to sexual violence, 68.1 percent reported exposure to conflict-related sexual violence, while 31.9 percent reported exposure to community-based sexual violence.

Table 3 summarizes the results of this and other selected, population- based surveys of the rate of gender-based sexual violence in the DRC that have been published since 2008. The surveys’ results are not directly comparable because of variations in the periods of reported incidents, the genders and ages of survey participants, and the geographic areas covered, as well as the definitions of sexual violence used. For example, while the August 2010 survey estimated the rate of sexual violence over a lifetime, other surveys estimated the rate of sexual violence over both a lifetime and a 12-month period. Additionally, some surveys collected information only on women, while others surveyed both men and women.

In addition to these studies of sexual violence in the eastern DRC, population-based surveys in Uganda and Burundi are under way or planned, as we previously reported. According to ICF International, fieldwork for the 2016 Uganda Demographic and Health Survey is now complete, and the final report is expected in October 2017; fieldwork for the 2016 Burundi survey is currently ongoing, and the final report is expected in December 2017. Figure 3 shows the anticipated publication dates for population-based surveys on sexual violence that are currently under way or planned in Uganda and Burundi. The figure also shows the publication dates for the population-based surveys, with data on rates of sexual violence in the eastern DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda that have been published since we started reporting on sexual violence in the region in 2011.

Some Additional Case-File Information about Sexual Violence Has Become Available since August 2016

Since we reported in August 2016, State and UN entities have provided additional case-file information about instances of sexual violence in the DRC and adjoining countries. State’s annual country reports on human rights practices provided the following case-file data pertaining to sexual violence in the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda:

DRC. In 2016, the United Nations documented 267 adult victims and 171 child victims of sexual violence in conflict. This violence was perpetrated by illegal armed groups as well as state security forces and civilians and was concentrated in North Kivu Province, according to State.

Burundi. One organization—Seruka Center—working with victims of sexual violence in Bujumbura reported 1,288 cases of sexual assault during 2016. According to State, the actual number of rapes was likely higher, given factors that prevent women and girls from seeking medical treatment. Another organization—Humura Center— responsible for investigating cases of sexual violence and rape received 160 cases of sexual and gender-based violence in 2016, according to State.

Rwanda. In 2016, Rwanda’s National Public Prosecution Authority reported 190 cases of rape. According to State’s report, domestic violence against women in 2016 was common, but most incidents were not reported or prosecuted.

Uganda. State’s 2016 report reiterated that rape remained a serious problem throughout the country and that the government did not consistently enforce the law. As we noted previously, the police crime report through June 2015, the most recent available, registered 10,163 reported sexual offenses.

In addition, UN entities reported the following case-file data about sexual violence in the DRC and Burundi:

DRC. Data collected by the Congolese government with support from the UN Population Fund indicate that from January 2016 through March 2017, gender-based violence service providers responded to at least 24,364 incidents of gender-based violence. Women and girls were the victims in 97 percent of the reported cases in 2016. In addition, in 2016, the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC, known as MONUSCO, verified 637 cases of conflict-related sexual violence, with illegal armed groups responsible for 74 percent of cases, and state security forces, mainly FARDC, responsible for the remaining 26 percent of cases.

Burundi. In 2016, UNHCR—the UN Refugee Agency—reported 2,250 gender-based violence incidents targeting refugees in neighboring countries, with 23 percent of incidents occurring in Burundi or en route from the country.

UN Reports DRC Government Has Made Some Progress in Addressing Sexual Violence

Since 2013, the DRC government has made some progress in addressing sexual violence in the eastern DRC, according to a 2017 UN report. The report notes improvements in the capacity of DRC state security forces to address sexual violence in the following respects: adoption of codes of conduct prohibiting sexual violence; investigation of alleged incidents in order to hold perpetrators accountable; and formation of specialized police units capable of addressing sexual violence.

In addition, law enforcement measures such as arrests and prosecutions have increased, and training for the military has improved, according to an official from the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. This official also noted that in 2014, the DRC government appointed a Personal Representative to the President on Sexual Violence and Child Recruitment to advise the President on sexual violence issues, ensuring that sexual violence remains on the government’s agenda. More recently, the DRC government and the United Nations have expressed interest in exploring linkages between mining and sexual violence, according to this official. However, the official told us that while reports suggest a link between mining and sexual violence in the region, the UN and the DRC government have not been able to prove such a linkage because of limited resources for travel to the areas where mining occurs and the limited availability of women with specialized knowledge to investigate these issues.

Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to the SEC, State, and USAID for comment. State and USAID provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. SEC did not provide comments.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees and to the SEC, State, and USAID. The report is also available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8612 or gianopoulosk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

In this report, we provide information about (1) the supply chain for gold produced through artisanal and small-scale mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); (2) efforts by the DRC and the U.S. government and others that may encourage the sourcing of conflict-free artisanal and small-scale mined (ASM) gold; and (3) sexual violence in the eastern DRC and neighboring countries that has been published since August 2016, when we last reported on this topic.

To address our first two objectives, we reviewed key reports and documents from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). We reviewed these reports for methodological rigor, relevance, and timeliness to ensure that they were sufficiently reliable to support their own conclusions or conclusions we made based on their work. We also reviewed these reports’ methodologies related to site selection, sources and quality of evidence, and the nature and timing of fieldwork in the DRC. We reviewed U.S. agency documents, such as a 2015 USAID- funded report related to conflict minerals in the DRC, as well as USAID internal documents that included a program implementation plan and annual and quarterly internal progress reports on responsible sourcing of ASM gold in the DRC. We also reviewed annual reports by the United Nations Group of Experts (UNGoE) from 2011 through 2016, annual baseline reports on the DRC by the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) from 2014 and 2015, and reports by NGOs such as the Enough Project and Global Witness. (For a complete listing of the documents we reviewed, see the bibliography at the end of this report.) In reviewing these reports, we focused on discussion of the ASM gold supply chain; associated barriers and incentives, if any; and efforts to encourage responsible sourcing. We also interviewed Department of State (State), USAID, and United Nations (UN) officials and OECD and NGO representatives. We traveled to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, where we interviewed officials from the Ministry of Economy and Dubai Multi Commodities Centre, representatives of gold refineries, accounting firms, local traders, and jewelers. We interviewed DRC government officials in Santa Clara, California, and Washington, D.C., regarding the local supply chain for gold and efforts to ensure responsible sourcing.

To address our third objective, we identified and assessed any information on sexual violence in eastern DRC and the three adjoining countries—Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi—that had been published or become otherwise available since we issued our August 2016 report on sexual violence in these areas. We discussed the collection of sexual violence-related data in the DRC and adjoining countries, including population-based survey data and case-file data, during interviews with State and USAID officials and with NGO representatives and researchers whom we interviewed for our prior review of sexual violence rates in eastern DRC and adjoining countries. We also interviewed an official from the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2016 to August 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Democratic Republic of the Congo Provinces and Adjoining Countries

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a vast, mineral-rich nation with an estimated population of about 75 million people and an area that is roughly one-quarter the size of the United States, according to the United Nations. Nine countries adjoin the DRC. Figure 4 shows the DRC provinces and adjoining countries.

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Godwin Agbara (Assistant Director), Farahnaaz Khakoo-Mausel (Analyst-in-Charge), Andrew Kurtzman, Elisa Yoshiara, Reid Lowe, Justin Fisher, Michael Hoffman, Grace Lui, and Neil Doherty made key contributions to this report.

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Dranginis, Holly. Going for Gold: Engaging the Jewelry Industry in Responsible Gold Sourcing in Africa’s Great Lakes Region. Washington, D.C.: Enough Project, November 2014.

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Related GAO Products

SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: 2017 Review of Company Disclosures in Response to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule, GAO-17-517R. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2017.

Conflict Minerals: Insights from Company Disclosures and Agency Actions. GAO-17-544T. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2017.

SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: Companies Face Continuing Challenges in Determining Whether Their Conflict Minerals Benefit Armed Groups. GAO-16-805. Washington, D.C.: August 25, 2016.

SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: Insights from Companies’ Initial Disclosures and State and USAID Actions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Region. GAO-16-200T. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2015.

SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: Initial Disclosures Indicate Most Companies Were Unable to Determine the Source of Their Conflict Minerals. GAO-15-561. Washington, D.C.: August 18, 2015.

Conflict Minerals: Stakeholder Options for Responsible Sourcing Are Expanding, but More Information on Smelters Is Needed. GAO-14-575. Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2014.

SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: Information on Responsible Sourcing and Companies Affected. GAO-13-689. Washington D.C.: July 18, 2013.

Conflict Minerals Disclosure Rule: SEC’s Actions and Stakeholder- Developed Initiatives. GAO-12-763. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2012.

The Democratic Republic of Congo: Information on the Rate of Sexual Violence in War-Torn Eastern DRC and Adjoining Countries. GAO-11-702. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2011.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo: U.S. Agencies Should Take Further Actions to Contribute to the Effective Regulation and Control of the Minerals Trade in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. GAO-10-1030. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2010.