Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and Performance Goals
Released: 2004-06-24T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Since September 11, 2001, there has been broad acknowledgment by the federal government, state and local governments, and a range of independent research organizations of the need for a coordinated intergovernmental approach to allocating the nation’s resources to address the threat of terrorism and improve our security. This coordinated approach includes developing national guidelines and standards and monitoring and assessing preparedness against those standards to effectively manage risk. The National Strategy for Homeland Security (National Strategy), released in 2002 following the proposal for DHS, emphasized a shared national responsibility for security involving close cooperation among all levels of government and acknowledged the complexity of developing a coordinated approach within our federal system of government and among a broad range of organizations and institutions involved in homeland security. The national strategy highlighted the challenge of developing complementary systems that avoid unintended duplication and increase collaboration and coordination so that public and private resources are better aligned for homeland security. The national strategy established a framework for this approach by identifying critical mission areas with intergovernmental initiatives in each area. For example, the strategy identified such initiatives as modifying federal grant requirements and consolidating funding sources to state and local governments. The strategy further recognized the importance of assessing the capability of state and local governments, developing plans, and establishing standards and performance measures to achieve national preparedness goals.

Recent reports by independent research organizations have highlighted the same issues of the need for intergovernmental coordination, planning, and assessment. For example, the fifth annual report of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Gilmore Commission) also emphasizes the importance of a comprehensive, collaborative approach to improve the nation’s preparedness. The report states that there is a need for a coordinated system for the development, delivery, and administration of programs that engage a broad range of stakeholders. The Gilmore Commission notes that preparedness for combating terrorism requires measurable demonstrated capacity by communities, states, and the private sector to respond to threats with well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective efforts by all participants. The Gilmore Commission recommends a comprehensive process for establishing training and exercise standards for responders that includes state and local response organizations on an ongoing basis. The National Academy of Public Administration’s recent panel report also notes the importance of coordinated and integrated efforts at all levels of government and in the private sector to develop a national approach to homeland security. Regarding assessment, the report recommends establishing national standards in selected areas and developing impact and outcome measures for those standards.

The creation of DHS was an initial step toward reorganizing the federal government to respond to some of the intergovernmental challenges identified in the national strategy. The reorganization consolidated 22 agencies with responsibility for domestic preparedness functions to, among other things, enhance the ability of the nation’s police, fire, and other first responders to respond to terrorism and other emergencies through grants. Many aspects of DHS’s success depend on its maintaining and enhancing working relationships within the intergovernmental system as the department relies on state and local governments to accomplish its mission. The Homeland Security Act contains provisions intended to foster coordination among levels of government, such as the creation of the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and ONCRC.

The Homeland Security Act established ONCRC within DHS to oversee and coordinate federal programs for, and relationships with, state, local, and regional authorities in the National Capital Region. Pursuant to the act, ONCRC’s responsibilities include coordinating the activities of DHS relating to NCR, including cooperating with the Office for State and Local Government Coordination; assessing and advocating for resources needed by state, local, and regional authorities in NCR to implement efforts to secure the homeland; providing state, local, and regional authorities in NCR with regular information, research, and technical support to assist the efforts of state, local, and regional authorities in NCR in securing the homeland; developing a process for receiving meaningful input from state, local, and regional authorities and the private sector in NCR to assist in the development of the federal government’s homeland security plans and activities; coordinating with federal agencies in NCR on terrorism preparedness to ensure adequate planning, information sharing, training, and execution of the federal role in domestic preparedness activities; coordinating with federal, state, and regional agencies and the private sector in NCR on terrorism preparedness to ensure adequate planning, information sharing, training, and execution of domestic preparedness activities among these agencies and entities; and serving as a liaison between the federal government and state, local, and regional authorities, and private sector entities in NCR to facilitate access to federal grants and other programs.

The act also requires ONCRC to submit an annual report to Congress that includes the identification of resources required to fully implement homeland security efforts in NCR, an assessment of the progress made by NCR in implementing homeland security efforts in NCR, and recommendations to Congress regarding the additional resources needed to fully implement homeland security efforts in NCR.

The first ONCRC Director served from March to November 2003, and the Secretary of DHS appointed a new Director on April 30, 2004. The ONCRC has a small staff including full-time and contract employees and staff on detail to the office.

NCR is a complex multijurisdictional area comprising the District of Columbia and surrounding counties and cities in the states of Maryland and Virginia and is home to the federal government, many national landmarks, and military installations. Coordination within this region presents the challenge of working with eight NCR jurisdictions that vary in size, political organization, and experience with managing emergencies. The largest municipality in the region is the District of Columbia, with a population of about 572,000. However, the region also includes large counties, such as Montgomery County, Maryland, with a total population of about 873,000, incorporating 19 municipalities, and Fairfax County, Virginia, the most populous jurisdiction (about 984,000), which is composed of nine districts. NCR also includes smaller jurisdictions, such as Loudoun County and the City of Alexandria, each with a population below 200,000. The region has significant experience with emergencies, including natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and blizzards, and terrorist incidents such as the attacks of September 11, and subsequent events, and the sniper incidents of the fall of 2002. For more details on the characteristics of the individual jurisdictions, see table 1.

Multiple Grants Support a Wide Variety of Uses, Including Equipment, Training and Exercises, Planning, and Bioterrorism Preparedness

In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, Congress provided billions of dollars in grants to state and local governments to enhance the ability of the nation’s first responders to prevent and respond to terrorism events. We reviewed 16 of the funding sources available for use by first responders and emergency managers that were targeted for improving preparedness for terrorism and other emergencies. In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, these grant programs, administered by DHS, Health and Human Services (HHS), and Justice awarded about $340 million to the District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, and state and local emergency management, law enforcement, fire departments, and other emergency response agencies in NCR. Table 2 shows the individual grant awards to the jurisdictions. The funding sources we reviewed include a range of grants that can be used for broad purposes, such as ODP’s State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Emergency Management Performance Grant, as well as more targeted grants for specific disciplines such as FEMA’s Assistance to Firefighters Grant and HHS’s Bioterrorism Preparedness Grants.

While some of these grants are targeted to different recipients, many of them can be used to fund similar projects and purposes. For example, there are multiple grants that can be used to fund equipment, training, and exercises. We have previously reported the fragmented delivery of federal assistance can complicate coordination and integration of services and planning at state and local levels. Multiple fragmented grant programs can create a confusing and administratively burdensome process for state and local officials seeking to use federal resources for homeland security needs. In addition, many of these grant programs have separate administrative requirements such as applications and different funding and reporting requirements.

In fiscal year 2004, in an effort to reduce the multiplicity of separate funding sources and to allow greater flexibility in the use of grants, several ODP State and Local Domestic Preparedness grants, which were targeted for separate purposes such as equipment, training, and exercises, were consolidated into a single funding source and renamed the State Homeland Security Grant Program. In addition, four FEMA grants (Citizen Corps, Community Emergency Response Teams, Emergency Operations Centers, and State and Local All-Hazards Emergency Operations Planning) now have a joint application process; the same program office at FEMA administers these grants. Overall, NCR jurisdictions used the 16 funding sources we reviewed to address a wide variety of emergency preparedness activities such as (1) purchasing equipment and supplies; (2) training first responders; (3) planning, conducting, and evaluating exercises; (4) planning and administration; and (5) providing technical assistance. Table 3 shows the eligible uses for each of the 16 grants.

Two Largest Funding Sources Supported a Range of Efforts

Of the $340 million awarded for the 16 funding sources, the two largest funding sources—which collectively provided about $290.5 million (85 percent) in federal funding to NCR—were the Fiscal Year 2002 Department of Defense (DOD) Emergency Supplemental Appropriation and the Fiscal Year 2003 Urban Area Security Initiative. Both of these sources fund a range of purposes and activities such as equipment purchases, including communications systems; training and exercises; technical assistance; and planning.

The Fiscal Year 2002 DOD Emergency Supplemental Appropriation, which was provided in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, provided approximately $230 million to enhance emergency preparedness. Individual NCR jurisdictions independently decided how to use these dollars and used them to fund a wide array of purchases to support first responders and emergency management agencies. Our review of the budgets for this appropriation submitted by NCR jurisdictions showed that many of these grant funds were budgeted for communications equipment and other equipment and supplies. Table 4 provides examples of major projects funded by each jurisdiction with these funds.

UASI Targets Regionwide Preparedness Needs

In 2003, DHS announced a new source of funding targeted to large urban areas under UASI to enhance the ability of metropolitan areas to prepare for and respond to threats or incidents of terrorism. This initiative included a total of $60.5 million to NCR, which was one of seven metropolitan areas included in the initial round of funding. The cities were chosen by applying a formula based on a combination of factors, including population density, critical infrastructure, and threat/vulnerability assessment. UASI’s strategy for NCR includes plans to fund 21 individual lines of effort for the region in the areas of planning, training, exercises, and equipment. In addition, funds are provided for administration and planning and to reimburse localities for changing levels of homeland security threat alerts. Table 5 summarizes the planned use of the UASI funds.

Challenges to Effective Grants Management Include Lack of Standards, Planning, and Data

Effectively managing first responder federal grant funds requires the ability to measure progress and provide accountability for the use of public funds. As with other major policy areas, demonstrating the results of homeland security efforts includes developing and implementing strategies, establishing baselines, developing and implementing performance goals and data quality standards, collecting reliable data, analyzing the data, assessing the results, and taking action based on the results. This strategic approach to homeland security includes identifying threats and managing risks, aligning resources to address them, and assessing progress in preparing for those threats and risks. Without a NCR baseline on emergency preparedness, a plan for prioritizing expenditures and assessing their benefits, and reliable information on funds available and spent on first responder needs in NCR, it is difficult for ONCRC to fulfill its statutory responsibility to oversee and coordinate federal programs and domestic preparedness initiatives for state, local, and regional authorities in NCR.

Regarding first responders, the purpose of these efforts is to be able to address three basic, but difficult, questions: “For what types of threats and emergencies should first responders be prepared?” “What is required— coordination, equipment, training, etc.—to be prepared for these threats and emergencies?” “How do first responders know that they have met their preparedness goals?”

NCR is an example of the difficulties of answering the second and third questions in particular. ONCRC and its jurisdictions face three interrelated challenges that limit their ability to jointly manage federal funds in a way that demonstrates increased first responder capacities and preparedness while minimizing inefficiency and unnecessary duplication of expenditures. First and most fundamental are the lack of preparedness standards and a baseline assessment of existing NCR-wide first responder capacities that is linked to those standards.

Performance Goals for First Responders Needed to Assess Spending Benefits

As in other areas of the nation generally, NCR does not have a set of accepted benchmarks (best practices) and performance goals that could be used to identify desired goals and determine whether first responders have the ability to respond to threats and emergencies with well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective efforts that involve police, fire, emergency medical, public health, and other personnel from multiple jurisdictions. The Gilmore Commission’s most recent report noted that there is a continuing problem of a lack of clear guidance from the federal level about the definition and objectives of preparedness, a process to implement those objectives, and how states and localities will be evaluated in meeting those objectives. The report states the need for a coordinated system for the development, delivery, and administration of programs that engages a broad range of stakeholders.

Over the past few years, some state and local officials and independent research organizations have expressed an interest in some type of performance standards or goals that could be used as guidelines for measuring the quality and level of first responder preparedness, including key gaps. However, in discussing “standards” for first responders, it is useful to distinguish between three different types of measures that are often lumped together in the discussion of standards.

Functional standards generally set up to measure such things as functionality, quantity, weight, and extent and in the context of first responders generally apply to equipment. Examples include the number of gallons of water per minute that a fire truck can deliver or the ability of a biohazard suit to filter out specific pathogens, such as anthrax.

Benchmarks are products, services, or work processes that are generally recognized as representing best practices for the purposes of organizational improvement. An example might be joint training of fire and police for biohazard response—a means of achieving a specific performance goal for responding to biohazard threats and incidents.

Performance goals are measurable objectives against which actual achievement may be compared. An example might be the number of persons per hour who could be decontaminated after a chemical attack. Realistic training exercises could then be used to test the ability to meet that objective.

Homeland security standards should include both functional standards and performance goals. In February 2004, DHS adopted its first set of functional standards for protective equipment. The eight standards, previously developed by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), are intended to provide minimum requirements for equipment. These standards include NIOSH standards for three main categories of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) respiratory protection equipment and five NFPA standards for protective suits and clothing to be used in responding to chemical, biological, and radiological attacks.

Performance and readiness standards are more complicated and difficult to develop than functional standards. In a large, diverse nation, not all regions of the nation require exactly the same level of preparedness because, for example, not all areas of the nation face the same types and levels of risks and, thus, first responder challenges. For example, first responder performance goals and needs are likely to be different in New York City and Hudson, New York. Thus, different levels of performance goals may be needed for different types and levels of risk.

Recently, the administration has focused more attention on the development of homeland security standards, including the more difficult performance goals or standards. For example, DHS’s recently issued strategic plan makes reference to establishing, implementing, and evaluating capabilities through a system of national standards. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (December 2003) requires the development of a national preparedness goal to include readiness metrics and a system for assessing the nation’s overall preparedness by the fiscal year 2006 budget submission.

Coordinated NCR-wide Plan Needed to Guide First Responder Spending

The lack of benchmarks and performance goals may contribute to difficulties in meeting the second challenge in NCR—developing a coordinated regionwide plan for determining how to spend federal funds received and assess the benefit of that spending. A strategic plan for the use of homeland security funds—whether in NCR or elsewhere—should be based on established priorities, goals, and measures and align spending plans with those priorities and goals. At the time of our review, such a strategic plan had yet to be developed. Although ONCRC had developed a regional spending plan for the UASI grants, this plan was not part of a broader coordinated plan for spending federal grant funds and developing first responder capacity and preparedness in NCR. The former ONCRC Director said that ONCRC and the Senior Policy Group could have a greater role in overseeing the use of other homeland security funds in the future.

Consistent Data on Funding and Spending Needed to Establish Accountability

There is no established process or means for regularly and reliably collecting and reporting data on the amount of federal funds available to first responders in each of NCR’s eight jurisdictions, the planned and actual use of those funds, and the criteria used to determine how the funds would be spent. Reliable data are needed to establish accountability, analyze gaps, and assess progress toward meeting established performance goals. Credible data should also be used to develop and revise plans and to set goals during the planning process. Were these data available, the lack of standards against which to evaluate the data would make it difficult to assess gaps.

It should be noted that the fragmented nature of the multiple federal grants available to first responders—some awarded to states, some to localities, some directly to first responder agencies—may make it more difficult to collect and maintain regionwide data on the grant funds received and the use of those funds in NCR. Our previous work suggests that this fragmentation in federal grants may reinforce state and local fragmentation and can also make it more difficult to coordinate and use those multiple sources of funds to achieve specific objectives.

DHS Efforts to Assess First Responder Needs Did Not Include Feedback to NCR Jurisdictions

NCR jurisdictions completed the Office for Domestic Preparedness State Homeland Security Assessment (ODP assessment) in the summer of 2003. At the time of our review, NCR jurisdictions said that they had not received any feedback from ODP or ONCRC on the review of those assessments. Preparedness expectations should be established based on likely threat and risk scenarios and an analysis of the gap between current and needed capabilities based on national guidelines. In keeping with the requirement of the Homeland Security Act that DHS conduct an assessment of threats and state and local response capabilities, risks, and needs with regard to terrorist incidents, DHS developed the ODP State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Program. The ODP assessment was aligned with the six critical mission areas in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and generally followed the structure of a risk management approach. The assessment used the same scenarios for all jurisdictions nationwide, allowing ODP to compare different jurisdictions using the same set of facts and assumptions. Of course, the scenarios used may not be equally applicable to all jurisdictions nationwide.

The assessment collected data in three major areas: risk, capability, and needs related to terrorism prevention. The risk assessment portion includes threat and vulnerability assessments. The capability assessment includes discipline-specific tasks for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) events. The needs assessment portion covers five functional areas of planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises. Supporting materials and worksheets on a threat profile, capability to respond to specific WMD, an equipment inventory, and training needs are provided to assist local jurisdictions in completing the assessment.

A feedback loop is a key part of a risk management process. It involves evaluating the assessment results to inform decision making and establish priorities; it is not clear how the results of the assessment were used to complete this process for NCR. ONCRC did not present any formal analysis of the gap in capabilities identified by the assessment, and several NCR jurisdictions said they did not receive any feedback on the results of the assessment for their individual jurisdictions. The former ONCRC Director said that the results of the assessment for each of the NCR jurisdictions were combined to establish priorities and develop the strategy for the use of the UASI funds, but he did not provide any information on how the individual assessments were combined or the methodology used to analyze the assessment results. While the former Director said the results of the assessment were used to develop the plan for the use of the UASI funds within NCR, he said that they were not applied beyond that one funding source to establish priorities for the use of other federal grants.

Some Regional Planning Efforts Exist but Do Not Include Coordination for Funding

While the NCR jurisdictions had emergency coordination practices and procedures, such as mutual aid agreements, in place long before September 11,2001, the terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax events in NCR highlighted the need for better coordination and communication within the region. As a result, WashCOG developed a regional emergency coordination plan (RECP) to facilitate coordination and communication for regional incidents or emergencies. While this new plan and the related procedures represent efforts to improve coordination, more comprehensive planning would include a coordinated regional approach for the use of federal homeland security funds.

NCR is one of the first regions in the country to prepare a regional emergency coordination plan. The plan is intended to provide structure through which the NCR jurisdictions can collaborate on planning, communication, information sharing, and coordination activities before, during, and after a regional emergency. RECP, which is based on FEMA’s Federal Response Plan, identifies 15 specific regional emergency support functions, including transportation, hazardous materials, and law enforcement. The Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS), which is included in the WashCOG plan, provides a system for WashCOG members, the state of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, the federal government, public agencies, and others to collaborate in planning, communicating, sharing information, and coordinating activities before, during, and after a regional incident or emergency. RICCS relies on multiple means of communication, including conference calling, secure Web sites, and wireless communications. The system has been used on several occasions to notify local officials of such events as a demonstration in downtown Washington, D.C., and the October 2002 sniper incidents. For example, RICCS allowed regional school systems to coordinate with one another regarding closure policies during the sniper events.

Planning and Budgeting of Federal Grant Funds Is Not Coordinated among the NCR Jurisdictions

Our work in NCR found that no regional coordination methods have been developed for planning for the use of 15 of the 16 funding sources we reviewed. While the region has experience with working together for regional emergency preparedness and response, NCR officials told us that they have not worked together to develop plans and coordinate expenditures for the use of federal funds. Most NCR jurisdictions did not have a formal overall plan for the use of these funds within their individual jurisdictions. In addition, while the grant recipients are required to report to the administering federal agencies on each individual grant, DHS and ONCRC have not implemented a process to collect and analyze the information reported for NCR as a whole. The one exception to this lack of coordination is UASI, for which ONCRC developed a regional plan for the use of the funds. Internal control standards support developing documentation, such as plans, to assist in controlling management operations and making decisions. Without this type of documentation, it is difficult for ONCRC to monitor the overall use of funds within NCR and to evaluate their effectiveness and plan for future use of grant funds. While some NCR and ONCRC officials said that there was a need for DHS and the NCR jurisdictions to establish controls over how emergency preparedness grant funds are used in the region, they did not indicate any plans to do so.

Within NCR, planning for the use of federal emergency and homeland security grant funds is generally informal and is done separately by each of the NCR jurisdictions. Most of the jurisdictions told us that they have undocumented or informal plans for the uses of the federal grant monies for emergency preparedness activities. Only two jurisdictions have formal written plans that indicate how the jurisdiction would use its federal homeland security grants. NCR states and local jurisdictions had various budgets for uses of emergency preparedness grant funds they received from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2003. However, they did not coordinate with one another in defining their emergency preparedness needs, in developing their budgets, or in using the federal grant funds to avoid unnecessary duplication of equipment and other resources within the region. In general, budgeting for the use of federal emergency preparedness grants was done on a grant-by-grant basis within each jurisdiction and is largely based on requests from first responder and emergency management officials. Budgets indicate how the individual jurisdictions intend to spend funds from a specific grant but do not indicate whether those budgets are based on any strategic plan or set of priorities.

One Maryland county developed an overall plan for the use of federal homeland security and emergency preparedness grants. The July 1, 2003, homeland security strategy outlined the priorities for the county in using federal emergency preparedness grant funds. However, it did not specify grants or amounts for each of the initiatives. The priorities for such funding were focused on equipping and training its first responders; conducting exercises and drills for its government employees; training other essential and critical government workers, as well as the citizens and residents of the county; working vigorously to implement recommendations from its Homeland Security Task Force; and solidifying the county’s relationships with other federal, state, and regional homeland security entities.

While officials from other NCR jurisdictions do not have a formal plan, some have established a process for reviewing proposals for the use of the homeland security grants. For example, one Northern Virginia jurisdiction recently adopted a planning process in which its Emergency Management Coordination Committee, composed of the county’s senior management team, solicits budget proposals from first responder and emergency management agencies for potential grant funds. This committee then makes funding recommendations based upon a review of these proposals and their funding priorities for the county. Officials from other jurisdictions described similar processes for developing budget proposals, but they have not developed longer-term or comprehensive strategic plans.

To determine how the NCR jurisdictions used the funds, we reviewed the use of funds of the Fiscal Year 2002 Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriation, which was the largest source of funding for the period of our review. Each NCR jurisdiction used those funds to buy emergency equipment for first responders. However, officials said they did not coordinate on planning for these expenditures with the other NCR jurisdictions. For example, five of the eight NCR jurisdictions planned to either purchase or upgrade their command vehicles. One of the jurisdictions allocated $310,000 for a police command bus and $350,000 for a fire and rescue command bus; a neighboring jurisdiction allocated $350,000 for a mobile command unit for its fire department; another jurisdiction allocated $500,000 for a police command vehicle replacement; a nearby jurisdiction allocated $149,000 to upgrade its incident command vehicle; and its neighboring jurisdiction allocated $200,000 to modify and upgrade its mobile command van. In another example, four nearby jurisdictions allocated grant funds on hazardous response vehicles or hazardous materials supplies that reflected costs of $155,289 for one jurisdiction’s rapid hazmat unit, $355,000 for a neighboring jurisdiction’s hazardous materials response vehicle, $550,000 for a jurisdiction’s fire and rescue hazmat unit vehicle, and $115,246 for a jurisdiction’s hazardous materials supplies. While such purchases might not be duplicative, discussions among neighboring jurisdictions could have facilitated a plan and determined whether these purchases were necessary or whether the equipment purchased could be shared among the jurisdictions, thereby freeing up grant dollars for other needed, equipment to create greater combined capacity within the region. Maximizing the use of resources entails avoiding unnecessary duplication wherever possible. This requires some discussion and general agreement on priorities, roles, and responsibilities among the jurisdictions. Some NCR and ONCRC officials said they believed the NCR jurisdictions could plan better to share resources and work to prevent redundancy while avoiding gaps in inventory.

Data on Grants to NCR Jurisdictions Were Not Consistently Available

During our review, NCR jurisdictions and federal grantor agencies could not consistently provide data on the 16 grants and funding sources within the scope of our study, such as award amounts, budgets, and financial records. The individual jurisdictions and ONCRC did not have systems in place to identify and account for all federal grants that can be used to enhance domestic preparedness in NCR and elsewhere. The lack of consistently available budget data for all emergency preparedness and homeland security grants limits the ability to analyze and assess the impact of federal funding and to make management decisions to ensure the effective use of federal grant dollars.

No Central Source Exists for Data on Emergency Preparedness Grants and Information Varies by Jurisdiction

There is no central source within each jurisdiction or at the federal level to identify all of the emergency preparedness grants that have been allocated to NCR. At the local level, such information is needed to meet legislative and regulatory reporting requirements for federal grant expenditures of $300,000 or more. In addition, each grant has specific reporting requirements, such as quarterly financial status reports, semiannual program progress reports, and related performance information to comply with the Government Performance and Results Act (P.L. 103-62). Moreover, federal grant financial system guidelines require that federal agencies implement systems that include complete, accurate, and prompt generation and maintenance of financial records and transactions. Those federal system requirements also require timely and efficient access to complete and accurate information, without extraneous material, to internal and external parties that require that information. We asked ONCRC, the Virginia and Maryland emergency management agencies, and the eight NCR jurisdictions for data on the emergency preparedness grants allocated in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. ONCRC could not provide a complete list of grants allocated to the NCR as a whole, and the state emergency management agencies did not provide complete lists of grants for NCR jurisdictions within their respective states. For example, the Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) provided data on the federal grants for Montgomery and Prince George’s counties that were allocated through the state. MEMA is not required to oversee grants not allocated through the state and, therefore, it did not provide grant data on all of the federal grants provided to the two counties. Similarly, the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) did not provide data on all of the grants to the jurisdictions in Virginia. We compiled grant data for the NCR jurisdictions by combining information received from the NCR jurisdictions and the state emergency management agencies. This involved contacting several different budget officials at the NCR jurisdictions and at the state level.

The availability of emergency preparedness grant data at the local level also varied by NCR jurisdiction, and complete data were not readily available. After repeated requests for the grant awards, budgets, and plans over a period of 7 months, NCR jurisdictions or the State emergency management agencies provided us with the grant amounts awarded to them during fiscal years 2002 and 2003. Some jurisdictions provided documentation on amounts awarded, but did not provide supporting budget detail for individual grants to substantiate the amounts awarded. Regarding budgets, we obtained a range of information from the NCR jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions provided budget documentation on all the federal grants that were allocated to them; others provided budget documentation on some of their grants; and two did not provide any grant budget documentation. This lack of supporting documentation indicates a lack of financial controls that should be in place to provide accurate and timely data on federal grants.

Guidance on financial management practices notes that to effectively evaluate government programs and spending, Congress and other decision makers must have timely, accurate, and reliable financial information on program cost and performance. Moreover, the Comptroller General’s standards for internal control state that “program managers need both operational and financial data to determine whether they are meeting their agencies’ strategic and annual performance plans and meeting their goals for accountability for effective and efficient use of resources.” These standards stress the importance of this information to make operating decisions, monitor performance, and allocate resources and that “pertinent information is identified, captured, and distributed to the right people in sufficient detail, in the right form, and at the appropriate time to enable them to carry out their duties and responsibilities efficiently and effectively.” Having this information could help NCR officials make informed decisions about the use of grant funds in a timely manner.

Assessing the Remaining Gaps in NCR is Difficult without Guidance, Reliable Data, or Analysis

Without national standards, guidance on likely scenarios for which to be prepared, plans, and reliable data, NCR officials assess their gaps in preparedness based on their own judgment. The lack of standards and consistently available data makes it difficult for the NCR officials to use the results of DHS’s ODP assessment to identify the most critical gaps in capacities and to verify the results of the assessment and establish a baseline that could then be used to develop plans to address outstanding needs. Consequently, it is difficult for us or ONCRC to determine what gaps, if any, remain in the emergency response capacities and preparedness within the NCR. Each jurisdiction provided us with information on their perceived gaps and specific needs for improving emergency preparedness. However, there is no consistent method for identifying these gaps among jurisdictions within NCR. Some officials from NCR jurisdictions said that in the absence of a set of national standards, they use the standards and accreditation guidelines for disciplines such as police, fire, hazardous materials, and emergency management in assessing their individual needs. While these standards may provide some general guidance, some NCR officials said that they need more specific guidance from DHS, including information about threats, guidance on how to set priorities, and standards. Some of the jurisdictions reported that they have conducted their own assessments of need based on their knowledge of threat and risk. Officials from other jurisdictions said they have used FEMA’s Local Capability Assessment for Readiness or the hazardous materials assessment to identify areas for improvement.

Several jurisdictions told us that they identify remaining gaps based on requests from emergency responder agencies. Other jurisdictions said that they have established emergency management councils or task forces to review their preparedness needs and begin to develop a more strategic plan for funding those needs. Officials of most NCR jurisdictions commonly identified the need for more comprehensive and redundant communications systems and upgraded emergency operations centers. Some officials of NCR jurisdictions also expressed an interest in training exercises for the region as a whole to practice joint response among the Maryland and Virginia jurisdictions and the District of Columbia.

DHS and ONCRC Appear to Have Had a Limited Role in Promoting Regional Coordination in NCR

DHS and ONCRC appear to have played a limited role in fostering a coordinated approach to the use of federal domestic preparedness funds in NCR. According to the former ONCRC Director, ONCRC has focused its initial coordination efforts on the development of a strategy for the use of the UASI funds of $60.5 million in NCR. However, ONCRC efforts to date have not addressed about $279.5 million in other federal domestic preparedness funding that we reviewed. According to officials from one NCR jurisdiction, they would like additional support and guidance from DHS on setting priorities for the use of federal funds.

ONCRC Has Focused on Planning for UASI Funding

One of ONCRC’s primary responsibilities is to oversee and coordinate federal programs and domestic preparedness initiatives for state, local, and regional authorities in NCR and to cooperate with and integrate the efforts of elected officials of NCR. ONCRC established a governance structure to receive input from state and local authorities through a Senior Policy Group composed of representatives designated by the Governors of Maryland and Virginia and the Mayor of Washington, D.C. The Senior Policy Group developed the UASI strategy to fund a range of projects that would enhance regional capabilities to improve preparedness and reduce the vulnerability of NCR to terrorist attacks. (See table 5.) According to ONCRC’s former Director, the strategy for UASI was an attempt to force a new paradigm, by developing a regional plan for the use of the funds, with input from outside organizations in addition to representatives from the local jurisdictions. The plan for the $60.5 million allocated funds for projects, including planning, training, equipment, and exercises to benefit the region as a whole, as opposed to allocating funds to meet the individual needs of each NCR jurisdiction separately. The former Director said that funding allocations to these regional projects were based on a summary of the results of the assessment that was completed by each NCR jurisdiction.

NCR Jurisdictions Expressed Mixed Views on ONCRC’s Effectiveness

Officials from NCR state and local jurisdictions expressed mixed opinions on the effectiveness of ONCRC. Officials from a Virginia jurisdiction expressed a need for more guidance on how to set priorities and allocate federal domestic preparedness funding. District of Columbia officials said ONCRC has done a good job of coordination and has been very supportive, given its small staff and the newness of the office. Some noted that ONCRC’s role is still evolving. For example, some officials in one jurisdiction said that ONCRC’s long-term mission has not yet been finalized and ONCRC is still in the process of establishing its role within NCR. The officials believe that ONCRC has significant potential for leading and coordinating homeland security efforts in the region. They recommended that ONCRC become a routine part of regional governance and provide guidance to local governments, focus resources, and enhance the ability of localities to work together to implement homeland security strategies. The officials noted that ONCRC’s efforts were motivated primarily by the leadership of the Director and had not become routine.

We discussed NCR officials’ views with the former ONCRC Director. He acknowledged that ONCRC’s initial efforts to coordinate the use of federal grant funds in NCR concentrated on implementing UASI. He said that UASI presented an improvement over previous funding allocations in NCR by allocating funds on a regional basis—rather than jurisdictional perceptions—that considered the results of an assessment of NCR preparedness levels and requirements. The Director said that ONCRC could consider coordinating for other federal programs in addition to UASI, but he did not indicate any concrete plans to do so.

Conclusions

The nation’s ongoing vulnerability to terrorist attacks after September 11, 2001, is magnified in NCR because it is the location of critical government infrastructure, national and international institutions, and significant landmarks. In addition to NCR, there are several other high- threat urban areas that share similar vulnerabilities, and improving homeland security is a concern for the entire nation. The challenges faced in NCR a lack of performance standards; baseline information on preparedness and threat and risk scenarios, plans based on those tools, and reliable data to report on the status of initiativesare fundamental obstacles in achieving desired levels of preparedness. Furthermore, NCR’s complex structure requires working with individual political jurisdictions with varying experience in managing homeland security funds and responding to emergencies. This adds to the challenge of developing and implementing a coordinated plan for enhancing first responder capacity.

Effective regional and local management of the large amounts of available homeland security funding is an important element in improving our national preparedness. However, it is difficult for regional coordinators and local jurisdictions to avoid duplication and inefficiency in the procurement of goods and services without a knowledge of all the grants that can be leveraged to fight the terror threat; without centralized, standard records to account for the use of those grants; and without a coordinated regional plan for using those funds. It is also difficult to target funding in a way that ensures it is used for goods and services that enhance preparedness and response without current threat information or scenarios and standards that reflect performance goals for preparedness and response. The approach taken in planning for the use of the UASI funds, with its emphasis on regional allocations, is a step toward improved coordination that could provide a more rational and effective method for enhancing emergency preparedness within NCR. In addition, DHS’s recently released strategic plan and the endorsement of standards for equipment represent steps toward addressing some of the challenges noted in this report. However, more needs to be done to develop plans, monitor the use of funds, and assess against goals and standards to evaluate progress toward improved homeland security.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that emergency preparedness grants and associated funds are managed in a way that maximizes their effectiveness, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security take the following three actions in order to fulfill the department’s statutory responsibilities in the NCR: work with the NCR jurisdictions to develop a coordinated strategic plan to establish goals and priorities for enhancing first responder capacities that can be used to guide the use of federal emergency preparedness funds; monitor the plan’s implementation to ensure that funds are used in a way that promotes effective expenditures that are not unnecessarily duplicative; and identify and address gaps in emergency preparedness and evaluate the effectiveness of expenditures in meeting those needs by adapting standards and preparedness guidelines based on likely scenarios for NCR and conducting assessments based on them.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

On April 29, 2004, we provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of DHS and to ONCRC’s Senior Policy Group for comment. On May 19, 2004, we received comments from DHS’s GAO/OIG Liaison and the Senior Policy Group that are reprinted in appendix III and IV, respectively.

DHS and the Senior Policy Group generally agreed with our recommendations but also stated that NCR jurisdictions had worked cooperatively together to identify opportunities for synergies and lay a foundation for meeting the challenges noted in the report. DHS and the Senior Policy Group also agreed that there is a need to continue to improve preparedness by developing more specific and improved preparedness standards, clearer performance goals, and an improved method for tracking regional initiatives. In addition, DHS identified the following concerns: DHS stated that the report demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding regarding homeland security grant programs in NCR and the oversight role and responsibilities of ONCRC. DHS stated that GAO fails to distinguish between funds provided to specific jurisdictions for local priorities and enhancements and funds intended to address regional needs. We disagree. The responsibilities of ONCRC are outlined in the Homeland Security Act and on page 8 of this report. These include activities such as coordinating with federal, state, and regional agencies and the private sector to ensure adequate planning and execution of domestic preparedness activities among these agencies and entities, and assessing and advocating for resources that state, local, and regional authorities in the NCR need to implement efforts to secure the homeland. The responsibilities further require an annual report to Congress that identifies resources required to implement homeland security efforts in NCR, assesses progress made in implementing these efforts, and makes recommendations regarding additional resources needed. In order to fulfill this mandate, ONCRC needs information on how all grant monies have been used, not just those designated specifically for regional purposes, information on how those expenditures have enhanced first responder capacity in the region, and an ability to coordinate all federal domestic preparedness funding sources to NCR.

DHS noted that our report recognizes the importance of a coordinated regionwide plan for establishing first responder goals, needs, and priorities and assessing the benefits of all expenditures to enhance first responder capabilities, and our review found that no such coordination methods have been developed. DHS stated that this task is accomplished by the formal NCR Review and Recommendation Process, adopted on February 4, 2004, which ensures coordination of resources among all jurisdictions within NCR. DHS provided us information on this process at our exit conference on April 15, 2004. DHS explained that the Review and Recommendation Process was developed for the UASI program, and ONCRC and NCR officials are in the process of extending it to additional federal programs. While this process could be used to facilitate the development of a regional plan in the future, the process has not included a review of how federal grants have already been used or the development of a coordinated regional plan for establishing needs and priorities and assessing benefits of all federal domestic preparedness programs.

Finally, the comments noted a correction to our draft regarding the establishment of the Senior Policy Group, and we have revised the report accordingly.

As agreed with your office, unless you release this report earlier, we will not distribute it until 30 days from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to relevant congressional committees and subcommittees, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, to members of the NCR Senior Policy Group, and to other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions about this report or wish to discuss it further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or Patricia A. Dalton, Director, (202) 512-6737. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

We met with and obtained documentation from officials of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Office for Domestic Preparedness; the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (WashCOG); the homeland security advisers and officials from the emergency management agencies for the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia; and first responder officials from the National Capital Region (NCR) jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia; the city of Alexandria; and the counties of Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William in Virginia; and Montgomery and Prince Georges counties in Maryland.

To determine what federal funds have been provided to local jurisdictions for emergency preparedness, for what specific purposes, and from what sources, we met with officials from the DHS’s Office for National Capital Region Coordination (ONCRC), ONCRC’s Senior Policy Group, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), homeland security advisers for the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia, and first responders from eight jurisdictions within NCR—the District of Columbia; the city of Alexandria; and Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, Prince William, Montgomery, and Prince George’s counties. We identified 25 emergency preparedness programs that provided funding to NCR, and we selected 16 for our detailed review. These 16 programs were selected to cover a range of programs, including the largest funding sources; grants provided for general purposes such as equipment and training; and grants provided for specific purposes, such as fire prevention and bioterrorism. We obtained and reviewed the emergency preparedness grant data for the period of October 2001 through September 30, 2003, including grant awards, budgets, and detailed plans for purchases, such as equipment and supplies, communications, and training and exercises. To the extent possible, we independently verified the data we received on funds available and the planned and actual use of those funds by comparing federal, state, and local data sources. Our review revealed the lack of consistent data reported by the jurisdictions in the region and the lack of a central source for such data. For example, NCR state and local jurisdictions vary in their ability to provide budget information on the emergency preparedness and homeland security grants they received. Also, DHS and ONCRC do not have systems in place to account for all federal homeland security and emergency preparedness grants covering their respective jurisdictions.

To determine the regional coordination practices and remaining challenges to implementing regional preparedness programs in NCR, we met with officials from WashCOG, DHS, Virginia, Maryland, and local NCR jurisdictions. Oral and documentary evidence obtained from these officials has provided us with an overall perspective on the status of coordination for homeland security within the region and remaining challenges to implementing effective homeland security measures in NCR. We also talked with officials about regional programs that have been successfully implemented in NCR.

To determine the gaps that exist in emergency preparedness in NCR, we obtained oral and documentary information from officials of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments; DHS; the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia emergency management agencies; homeland security advisers; and local first responders. Our discussions with these officials provide their views of the state of preparedness in NCR. We also obtained information from these officials regarding their plans to address those emergency preparedness gaps. In addition, we reviewed relevant reports, studies, and guidelines to provide context for assessing preparedness. However, there are no uniform standards or criteria by which to measure gaps, and self-reported information from local jurisdictions may not be objective.

To determine DHS’s role in enhancing the preparedness of NCR through coordinating the use of federal emergency preparedness grants, assessing preparedness, providing guidance, targeting funds to enhance preparedness, and monitoring the use of those funds, we met with DHS, as well as with state homeland security advisers, state emergency management officials, and local first responders. We obtained and analyzed verbal and documentary evidence on the ODP assessment completed by the NCR jurisdictions, and how that assessment was used, as well as other actions DHS had taken to facilitate homeland security coordination within NCR.

Finally, we contacted the District of Columbia Auditor, the Maryland Office of Legislative Audits, and the Virginia Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission to inform them of our review and determine if the agencies had related past or ongoing work. None of the agencies had conducted or planned to conduct reviews of emergency preparedness or homeland security in the NCR.

We conducted our review from June 2003 to February 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: NCR Jurisdictions’ Arrangements to Respond to Public Safety Emergencies

NCR jurisdictions over the years have implemented various mechanisms to ensure planned and coordinated interjurisdictional approaches to the activities of first responders and other public safety professionals. These efforts involve the activities of regional planning and coordinating bodies, such as the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (WashCOG), the regional metropolitan planning organization, and mutual assistance agreements between the first responders of neighboring NCR jurisdictions.

Regional Bodies Facilitate Coordination Efforts in Other Areas

Planning and coordinating bodies have existed in NCR for many years. WashCOG is a regional entity that includes all the jurisdictions within the region. Other planning and coordinating organizations exist in both Maryland and Virginia.

WashCOG is a nonprofit association representing local governments in the District of Columbia, suburban Maryland, and Northern Virginia. Founded in 1957, WashCOG is supported by financial contributions from its 19 participating local governments, federal and state grants and contracts, and donations from foundations and the private sector. WashCOG’s members are the governing officials from local NCR governments, plus area delegation members from Maryland and Virginia legislatures, the U. S. Senate, and the House of Representatives. According to WashCOG, the council provides a focus for action and develops regional responses to such issues as the environment, affordable housing, economic development, health and family concerns, human services, population growth, public safety, and transportation. The full membership, acting through its board of directors, sets WashCOG policies. The National Capital Region Preparedness Council is an advisory body that makes policy recommendations to the board of directors and makes procedural and other recommendations to various regional agencies with emergency preparedness responsibilities or operational response authority. The council also oversees the regional emergency coordination plan.

Other regional coordinating bodies exist in the National Capital Region, including the Northern Virginia Regional Commission (NVRC), the Maryland Terrorism Forum, and the Maryland Emergency Management Assistance Compact. NVRC is one of the 21 planning district commissions in Virginia. A 42-member board of commissioners composed of elected officials and citizen representatives all appointed by 14 member localities establishes NVRC’s programs and policies. The commission is supported by annual contributions from its member local governments, by appropriations of the Virginia General Assembly, and by grants from federal and state governments and private foundations. According to a NVRC official, the commission established an emergency management council to coordinate programs, funding issues, and equipment needs. The emergency management council is composed of local chief administrative officers, fire chiefs, police chiefs, and public works managers.

In 1998, the Governor of Maryland established the Maryland Terrorism Forum to prepare the state to respond to acts of terrorism, especially those involving weapons of mass destruction. The forum also serves as the key means of integrating all services within federal, state, and local entities as well as key private organizations. The forum’s executive committee, composed of agency directors and cabinet members, provides policy guidance and recommendations to the steering committee; which addresses policy concerns. According to Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) officials, the forum’s first focus was on planning in terms of equipment interoperability; evacuation planning; and commonality of standards, procedures, and vocabulary. The forum is in the process of hiring a full-time planner for preparedness assessment and strategic planning for the region.

Mutual Aid Agreements Are in Place within NCR

The terrorist attacks in New York City and on the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, security preparations during the World Bank demonstrations, and the sniper incidents in the summer and fall of 2002 highlighted the need for enhanced mutual cooperation and aid in responding to emergencies. Several NCR jurisdiction public safety officials told us that mutual aid agreements have worked well and are examples of regional programs that have been successfully implemented in NCR. Mutual aid agreements provide a structure for assistance and for sharing resources among jurisdictions in preparing for and responding to emergencies and disasters. Because individual jurisdictions may not have all the resources they need to acquire equipment and respond to all types of emergencies and disasters, these agreements allow for resources to be regionally distributed and quickly deployed. These agreements provide opportunities for state and local governments to share services, personnel, supplies, and equipment. Mutual aid agreements can be both formal and informal and provide cooperative planning, training, and exercises in preparation for emergencies and disasters.

For over 40 years, jurisdictions in the National Capital Region have been supporting one another through mutual aid agreements. According to a WashCOG official, the agency has brokered and facilitated most of these agreements and acts as an informal secretariat for mutual aid issues.

According to WashCOG, there are currently 21 mutual aid agreements in force among one or more of the 18 member jurisdictions, covering one or more issues. These can be as broad as a police services support agreement among 12 jurisdictions and as restricted as a two-party agreement relating to control over the Woodrow Wilson Bridge. In September 2001, for example, WashCOG member jurisdictions developed planning guidance for health system response to a bioterrorism event in NCR. The purpose of this guidance is to strengthen the health care response systems allowing them to, among other things, improve early recognition and provide mass care. According to WashCOG, the planning guidance was developed through the cooperative effort of more than 225 individuals representing key government and private elements with NCR that would likely be involved should such an event occur.

The Maryland Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a mutual aid compact established to help Maryland’s local jurisdictions support one another with their resources during emergencies and disasters and facilitate efficient operational procedures. The compact establishes partnerships among local jurisdictions so that resources can be requested and provided in response to emergencies and disasters. In addition to helping local governments and their emergency response agencies develop risk management decisions, the compact provides a framework that will increase accessibility for maximum compensation in federally declared disasters. The compact, established by legislation in June 2002, is modeled after the Emergency Management Assistance Compact with 48 states and two U.S. territories participating in interstate mutual aid.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix IV: Comments from the National Capital Region’s Senior Policy Group

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to those mentioned above, Ernie Hazera and Amelia Shachoy (Strategic Issues) and Wendy Johnson, Jack Bagnulo, David Brown, R. Rochelle Burns (Homeland Security and Justice) made key contributions to this report.