NextGen Air Transportation System: FAA Has Made Some Progress in Midterm Implementation, but Ongoing Challenges Limit Expected Benefits
Released: 2013-04-08T00:00:00

Letter

Background

FAA’s planning for the midterm includes improvements based on existing technologies that respond to recommendations made in 2009 by the RTCA task force. The agency seeks to demonstrate tangible NextGen benefits to build industry support and encourage future needed investments from airlines and others to complete the transformation of the air-traffic control system. Industry investments can be significant; for example, FAA estimates that it would cost $260,000 in 2011 dollars to equip—or $525,000 to retrofit—a commercial aircraft with a Required Navigation Performance (RNP) package, which allows precision curved flight paths. In 2012, 50 percent of the domestic commercial aircraft fleet was RNP equipped. In 2011, RTCA reported that 80 percent of the airline fleet at high-density airports might need to be RNP equipped to accrue significant benefits for operators. In total, FAA estimates that airlines will need to invest $6.6 billion—of the estimated $18.1-billion overall implementation cost shared between airlines and FAA—on avionics through 2018 to realize the full potential benefits from NextGen capabilities.

The RTCA task force and the NAC work group identified priority operational improvements that could provide substantive benefits and are viewed as feasible to implement between now and the end of 2018, and we grouped these into three improvement areas:

Performance Based Navigation (PBN), which uses satellite-based guidance to route aircraft and improve approaches at airports. There are two main types of PBN procedures, including Area Navigation (RNAV) and RNP, which vary in the level of precision guidance they can provide.

Enhanced airborne and surface traffic management, which includes tools that help air traffic controllers merge and sequence planes in the air and on the ground.

Additional or revised aviation safety standards, such as those that establish the minimum required distances between aircraft in the air or minimum visibility distances to the ground. These changes are made possible by leveraging advances in technology and are anticipated to maintain or enhance safety.

FAA and the aviation industry have emphasized the interrelated nature of NextGen’s many components (see fig. 1). Although NextGen improvements in each of these three areas offer some benefits when implemented individually, they achieve the greatest benefits when integrated, according to FAA officials, air traffic controllers, and other industry stakeholders, including airline representatives.

Through 2018, FAA’s implementation of key NextGen operational improvement areas is focused on 30 core airports and key air-traffic control facilities. These air-traffic control facilities include terminal radar- approach control (TRACON) facilities and the 20 traffic control centers that manage enroute traffic throughout the NAS. In an effort to help FAA prioritize the implementation of NextGen, in 2012 the NAC work group identified seven priority multi-airport metroplexes based on an assessment of operational need (see fig. 2). Because of the integrated nature of the NAS, improvements or changes to a portion of the airspace or at one airport can affect other parts of the system.

A number of offices within FAA, including ATO, the Office of Aviation Safety, and the Aeronautical Navigation Product Group (AeroNav Products), are involved in the management and implementation of NextGen, as well as the NextGen Office, which oversees implementation and reports directly to the Deputy Administrator. The NextGen Office is tasked with linking NextGen’s strategic objectives with operational requirements in an effort to ensure integration and implementation across FAA program offices. The NextGen Office includes a Performance and Outreach Office that is tasked with providing information on implementation progress, enabling successful collaboration and decision making with internal and external stakeholders, and reporting on performance measurements. At present, the position heading the NextGen office is vacant, which is further discussed later in this report. FAA’s Office of Environment and Energy develops and coordinates policy relating to NextGen’s environmental impact, including noise and emissions. In 2011, this office developed a new NextGen National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Plan to help ensure timely, effective, and efficient environmental review of proposed NextGen improvements.

To address the majority of current flight delays throughout the NAS, the RTCA task force identified the implementation of new PBN procedures as a high priority initiative. Requests for new air-traffic control procedures, including PBN procedures, can come from a variety of sources, including airlines, airports, Congress, or individual air-traffic control facilities. According to FAA, there are core steps and processes that are common to the development of most procedures and involve a number of offices within the agency.

ATO designs and develops procedures and conducts environmental reviews. According to FAA officials, environmental reviews typically take from 30 days to 2 years, depending on project factors such as the presence of sensitive environmental resources (e.g., national parks) and the potential for significant impacts such as noise or emissions. ATO also helps implement new procedures once they have been published by providing needed documentation or training to air traffic controllers.

The Office of Aviation Safety establishes design criteriaprocedures and conducts safety testing, such as flight simulations testing that includes controllers and pilots. It also grants operations approval and certification for aircraft equipment used to fly air-traffic control procedures.

AeroNav Products tests new procedures against design criteria and includes new procedures on published charts for pilots. AeroNav Products also maintains existing procedures, which need to be assessed every 2 years to assure that they still meet criteria and that conditions have not changed to render the existing procedures unsafe.

The other priority operational improvements, including those related to airborne and surface traffic management and enhanced standards, are largely managed by offices within ATO and the Office of Aviation Safety.

The conditions around an airport may change over time, making procedures unsafe. For example, new construction may result in taller structures around an airport or other changes that would affect minimal altitude requirements. categorical exclusion—then the agency generally need not prepare an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement.

For the development of new flight procedures, FAA assesses the potential environmental impacts of proposed changes, including changes to carbon dioxide emissions and noise levels for communities below the new or changed routes. New or revised routes above 3,000 feet above ground level (AGL) typically qualify for categorical exclusion in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. Additionally, the FAA Modernization and Reform Act introduced two new categorical exclusions, one of which categorically excluded RNAV and RNP procedures below 3,000 feet AGL at core airports and certain other airports, absent extraordinary circumstances.extraordinary circumstances would include significant increases in noise over noise-sensitive areas (e.g., homes, schools, hospitals) under the new or changed flight path. Noise screening and carbon dioxide emissions analysis are required for procedures from 3,000 feet AGL to 7,000 feet AGL for arrivals and up to 10,000 feet AGL for departures. Noise screening may be required up to 18,000 feet AGL for special resources, such as national parks or wilderness areas. For changes closer to the ground, below 3,000 feet AGL, more environmental review may be required because of the potential for significant noise or emissions increases. Figure 3 illustrates the appropriate level of NEPA review needed for actions at various heights AGL.

Operational Improvements Largely Target Key Airports for Benefits, but Lack Integration and Have Limited Results to Date

FAA is concentrating its operational improvement efforts at key airports and metropolitan areas and focusing primarily on PBN procedures, including in its Optimization of Airspace and Procedures in the Metroplex (OAPM) initiative and another effort in the Seattle metropolitan area called “Greener Skies over Seattle” (Greener Skies). Increasing the number and use of PBN procedures is viewed as a way to accelerate the delivery of benefits, such as fuel savings, to airlines in some of the most- congested metroplex areas. To deliver benefits more quickly and avoid some obstacles that have hampered prior NextGen efforts, FAA has made trade-offs in selecting sites and the scope of proposed improvements, concentrating on those projects that can demonstrate some benefits in the midterm and leaving more time-consuming but potentially higher benefit-yielding projects for the longer term. The agency has also made some progress in the other key operational improvement areas, such as upgrading airborne traffic management to enhance the flow of aircraft in congested airspace and revising standards to enhance airport capacity. By contrast, FAA has made more limited progress enhancing surface traffic management at airports, which will likely limit overall benefits in the midterm. Finally, there has been little integration of key operational improvements, which limits the potential benefits offered by any single improvement as well as the potential impacts on the NAS.

FAA Has Made Certain Trade-offs in Designing and Implementing PBN Efforts to Deliver Midterm Benefits

FAA’s primary effort to implement new PBN procedures in the midterm is the OAPM initiative, which focuses on priority metroplexes with airport operations that have a large effect on the overall efficiency of the NAS. This initiative is also designed to provide benefits to airlines and airports in those metroplexes. If OAPM proceeds as planned, FAA expects to begin to demonstrate benefits at the eight sites that are currently active by the end of 2015. (See fig. 4.) Projects at five additional sites are expected to be fully operational before the end of 2017, according to current FAA plans. With the exception of the Houston project, each OAPM project has about a 3-year implementation time frame, which includes 12 to 18 months for the environment assessment process.

OAPM focuses primarily on implementing PBN procedures—long viewed as a cornerstone of NextGen—and any necessary airspace redesign for deployment of the new procedures.foundation for flight paths, airspace design, route separation, and obstacle clearance. (See fig. 5 for an illustration of these procedures.) Potential PBN benefits include shorter, more direct flight paths, reduced aircraft fuel burned—and resulting reductions in carbon dioxide emissions—and reduced noise in surrounding communities. The following are the key types of PBN procedures.

RNAV procedures, which are enabled by technology available on nearly all commercial aircraft in the United States, provide aircraft with routing flexibility and more efficient flight paths than conventional procedures, and can allow improved access to airports in congested airspace or in bad weather. In 2011, 96 percent of the domestic commercial fleet was equipped for RNAV. As of January 10, 2013, there were over 12,500 public RNAV procedures available for all aircraft capable of flying them.

RNP procedures (a subset of RNAV) add additional onboard-aircraft performance monitoring and alerting and require additional equipment as well as specialized crew training. In some cases, RNP can increase aircraft access to airports in adverse weather and terrain and help air traffic controllers keep aircraft operations at one airport from interfering with aircraft operations at adjacent airports by using curved flight paths. As mentioned above, in 2012, approximately 50 percent of the domestic commercial fleet was equipped for RNP. As of January 10, 2013, 352 public RNP procedures are included on charts for pilots.

Optimized Profile Descent (OPD) procedures allow aircraft to descend from cruise altitude to final approach more efficiently, eliminating or reducing the level offs or step downs of a traditional descent. Low or idle engine power settings save fuel and reduce emissions. OPD procedures also require less dialogue between air traffic controllers and pilots, which may improve safety by reducing the potential for miscommunications.

According to reports by teams planning OAPM implementation, OAPM’s benefits for airspace users will stem mostly from implementing OPD procedures enabled through the use of RNAV and the resulting reductions to fuel use and associated fuel costs. (See fig. 6.) For example, FAA projected that shorter routes and OPDs at its eight active sites could save at least 29-million gallons of fuel and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 299,000 metric tons annually when fully implemented. In turn, improved efficiency and predictability at key metroplexes is expected to improve the efficiency of the NAS. FAA estimated total annual benefits resulting from new OAPM procedures and associated airspace changes using aircraft simulators. As previously mentioned, all eight active sites are predicted to begin demonstrating benefits in the 2013 through 2015 time frame.

To achieve the time frames of its OAPM initiative, FAA has made trade- offs, which are summarized below, between procedures that yield some benefits and can be implemented relatively quickly and those that could result in greater benefits but would take much longer to implement.

Excluded new procedures that would require route changes below 3,000 feet AGL or very close in to the airport. Although all new flight procedures require NEPA review, those deemed to have extraordinary circumstances such as significant environmental impacts—including a significant increase in noise or emissions around an airport—would require a full environmental impact statement, which can take several years to complete. By excluding changes closer to the airport, FAA is seeking to avoid the lengthy environmental reviews that have delayed the implementation of some other FAA efforts. For example, we previously reported that FAA’s airspace redesign effort in the New York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia area has provoked significant community opposition, including legal challenges to the environmental review process used by FAA. That effort, which began in 1998, is currently scheduled for completion in 2016. Representatives from airlines, equipment manufacturers, and industry associations that we spoke with acknowledged that there could be additional efficiency benefits from new PBN procedures closer to the airport. For example, new procedures that would allow for tight turns for the arrival into the airport can reduce flight times and associated fuel use and costs and facilitate the flow of air traffic flying into or out of different airports in a metroplex, as well as increasing predictability of flight schedules. Nonetheless, most of these stakeholders did not believe that these potential additional benefits warranted the longer project timeframes that would be necessary to complete more detailed environmental reviews.

Excluded new procedures that would require new design criteria. FAA officials explained that having to wait for new design criteria for procedures could jeopardize the OAPM time frames. Outside of the OAPM initiative, FAA acknowledged that its staff had at times initiated work on a requested PBN procedure only to discover that the design criteria—which ensure the safety of procedures—do not yet exist for the desired procedure. FAA officials stated that new design criteria would be needed to more widely deploy PBN procedures, but that effort is being undertaken independently of the OAPM initiative.

Excluded sites with ongoing airspace redesign projects. Concerns about potential implementation delays also factored into FAA’s decision about which metroplexes to address in the midterm. Some industry stakeholders have voiced concerns that FAA did not include in its current OAPM plans the New York/Philadelphia metroplex, which is the nation’s most congested airspace and contributes to over half of domestic flight delays. However, FAA decided to exclude that metroplex in light of the Record of Decision for the existing environmental reviews for FAA’s ongoing airspace redesign work for that area, because the agency did not want to initiate a new environmental review process.

In addition to the OAPM initiative, FAA has other PBN initiatives that aim to deliver midterm benefits in less congested areas. For example, FAA’s Greener Skies project, which was initiated by Alaska Airlines, aims to deliver benefits to the Seattle metroplex beginning in 2013, and was shaped by local considerations. new set of PBN procedures planned for implementation in March 2013.

Greener Skies was initiated by Alaska Airlines in collaboration with Boeing, other airlines, and the Port of Seattle, which operates Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. Greener Skies became an FAA-sponsored NextGen initiative in 2010.

The procedures are designed to shorten flight tracks and route aircraft over water. FAA estimates that the new Greener Skies procedures would reduce annual fuel consumption by 112,420 barrels annually, resulting in potential annual savings of $13.5 million. To facilitate implementation of the project, a number of potentially beneficial procedures were scoped out of the Greener Skies effort based on local concerns. For example, FAA officials and other Greener Skies participants stated that new procedures to the east of the airport were not included because of known community concerns about new aviation noise in those areas and to avoid any changes that could violate noise commitments made in a recent Record of Decision. In addition to Greener Skies, FAA also has non-OAPM PBN efforts in place in Denver and Minneapolis.

According to analysis done by Alaska Airlines, of the 27 RNP charts that are carried by the airline’s flight crews, 5 of the routes in Alaska were flown more than 40 percent of the time, while at least 11 of the routes in the lower 48 states were flown less than 1 percent of the time. number of times by air traffic controllers. Southwest Airlines has expressed similar concerns about not being able to obtain projected benefits of new PBN procedures. For example, in 2011 the airline reported that its usage of RNP procedures had dropped, in part, because approval to use existing procedures was often not granted by air traffic controllers. Some controllers told us that using new PBN procedures can be difficult for a number of reasons, including a lack of guidance and tools, which will be further discussed later in this report. Finally, in some cases, pilots prefer to fly traditional routes—particularly if the PBN route is longer or less efficient than a shortcut that may be approved by an air traffic controller on a traditional procedure when conditions allow it. According to FAA officials, when conditions do not allow for such shortcuts, pilots can use the PBN procedures.

FAA does not currently have a system to track the use of PBN procedures, and is unable to provide information on the extent to which existing procedures are either unused or are used on a limited basis. There are currently no automatic data collection systems to track the use of procedures, either on the aircraft flying the routes or at the air-traffic control facilities managing those aircraft. FAA officials stated that current efforts to track the use of procedures through pilot reporting have been hindered by insufficient and unreliable data. Without a way to systematically measure the use of particular procedures, the agency may not recognize routes that need to be revised to ensure that airlines are able to get expected benefits such as reduced fuel use or improved access in bad weather. As we have previously reported, critical success factors for goal setting and performance management by leading organizations include systematically measuring their performance to guide goal-setting, managerial decision-making, resource allocations, and day-to-day operations.

Mixed Progress in Other Key NextGen Improvement Areas Could Limit Benefits

Airborne and Surface Traffic Management

Through 2018, FAA is focusing on updating its Traffic Management Advisor (TMA), which is an airborne arrival-sequencing program that assigns times when aircraft destined for the same airport should cross certain points in order to reach the destination airport at a specific time and in an efficient order. TMA can enhance the effectiveness of new PBN procedures, particularly when controllers are mixing traffic using different types of procedures and aircraft with different levels of equipment (e.g., RNP equipped mixed with non-RNP equipped aircraft). For example, controllers can better merge aircraft on conventional, straight flight paths with those on PBN curved approaches and obtain a clearer picture of traffic on the ground and in terminal airspace when TMA is used with surface management tools (see fig. 7). Currently, TMA is primarily used for arrival sequencing by certain air-traffic control facilities at times when the demand for arrivals exceeds the capacity of a specific airspace or airport. The upgrades could allow for TMA to be used more often, for more purposes (e.g., sequencing aircraft further away from the airport), and at additional facilities.

Many of the active OAPM teams recommended upgrades to TMA’s capabilities for their respective air-traffic control facilities; such upgrades could provide significant benefits to priority metroplexes, as well as at core airports faced with similar congestion issues. For example, the North Texas OAPM study team recommended separating the traffic to Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport from Dallas Love Field’s airport traffic more efficiently, largely through TMA upgrades. North Texas OAPM team members told us that implementation of the procedures they are developing would depend principally on planned TMA upgrades. Likewise, the Houston OAPM study team recommended that arrival procedures it identified for the Houston metroplex to increase efficiency be managed using an enhanced TMA system. FAA has worked to align its plans for upgrading the TMA system with issues and concerns raised For example, FAA plans to launch a new time-based by OAPM teams.metering capability for PBN, which could help facilitate the corresponding launch of new PBN procedures in four priority metroplexes.

As part of its upgrades to airborne traffic management, FAA is also deploying a system to improve air traffic management in metroplexes by sharing information between adjoining air-traffic control facilities. The new system allows these facilities to share information and workload. It has been deployed at air-traffic control facilities for key metroplexes— including Atlanta, Los Angeles, Newark, and San Francisco—and FAA plans to complete the installation at at least three other sites by the end of 2014. Finally, FAA is implementing a system that will enable the sequencing of aircraft further from the destination airport—current sequencing typically occurs at the border between the enroute and terminal airspace. This system is to be implemented at one site in 2014, and the agency plans to subsequently install it at all others, but locations and timeframes have not been specified.

FAA-led surface-traffic management enhancements are not expected to begin to be implemented until 2015 at the earliest, mostly through the greater use of automated departure-queue management programs that These existing are already in place at a number of metroplex airports.programs include queue-managements programs currently in use at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York and in Memphis, for example, which allow pilots to put their aircraft into a virtual departure queue before leaving the gate or ramp area instead of taxiing out and waiting on the runway for takeoff. Fuel savings, reduced taxiway congestion, and enhanced safety are among the benefits. FAA is working to determine which surface-traffic management capabilities to implement through testing with air traffic controllers, airlines, general aviation, and airport operators. While the airports have not yet been identified and the capabilities are still being determined, according to FAA officials, the agency tentatively plans to complete the rollout of enhanced surface- traffic management improvements by the end of the midterm.

FAA is also developing a new surface-management capability system, the Terminal Flight Data Manager, but does not plan to implement it until at least 2017, which will likely limit potential midterm benefits. According to FAA, reductions in surface traffic congestion largely depend on the new system’s implementation. Further, the Terminal Flight Data Manager is also key to producing desired efficiency benefits—that is increasing arrivals and departures at busy metroplex airports where demand for runway capacity is high or where there are multiple runways with conflicting traffic. As a result, the agency will not be able to manage traffic throughout all phases of a flight—referred to as “end-to-end metering”— until these improvements are completed, including the integration of TMA enhancements with the Tower Flight Data Manager.envisioned for the midterm, end-to-end metering is now scheduled to be implemented in the long term (by 2025).

FAA has already implemented systems to increase the safety of surface traffic. To improve safety for taxi and surface movement at airports, for example, FAA installed Airport Surface Detection Equipment–Model X (ASDE-X)—a ground monitoring system—for 35 major airports from 2003 to 2011. FAA is also installing Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) for another 9 busy and complex airports. These operational improvements were prioritized by the RTCA task force and enhance safety and traffic flow on runways, taxiways, and some ramps and allow for collaborative decision making among air traffic controllers and pilots.

FAA has recently approved a few revisions to existing standards, which should benefit a handful of airports in the midterm, but further revisions are required before the envisioned efficiency and capacity benefits of midterm NextGen improvements can be fully realized. A key component of FAA’s NextGen plans involves updating separation and other flight safety standards to better accommodate modern aircraft and advances in technology. Separation standards—required minimum distances used for safely spacing aircraft from other aircraft, terrain, and objects—have a large effect on airport capacity and the overall capacity of the NAS. Consequently, according to FAA and industry stakeholders, updating separation and other standards could increase the efficiency, capacity, and predictability of the NAS. By contrast, if standards are not updated to facilitate the use of new technologies and procedures, projected NextGen benefits might not be achievable to the same degree. Such revisions to standards can be time intensive because safety assessments are required to ensure the safety of the changes. Figure 8 provides examples of key additional or revised standards that FAA is pursuing through 2018.

Recent work completed by FAA’s Closely Spaced Parallel Operations working groupairport and several smaller airports. In 2008, the working group initiated a could soon provide benefits to one large metroplex series of research studies to investigate the potential for reducing runway separation standards—the required distance between runway centerlines for simultaneous use—to provide increased arrival and departure capacity in all weather conditions. After a lengthy safety assessment, the working group determined in 2011 that this standard could be reduced from 4300 feet to 3600 feet. FAA is proceeding with the implementation of the new standard. According to FAA officials, once this new standard is implemented, it will benefit four airports immediately. FAA’s 2012 NextGen Implementation Plan indicates that such reductions in runway separation standards should improve overall capability on runways, especially during poor weather conditions, but does not provide any quantitative estimates of benefits from this new standard.

FAA has also recently revised standards in two key metroplex areas in an effort to increase capacity and efficiency.

In October 2011, FAA implemented a new standard that decreases the required angle of divergence between aircraft using RNAV departure procedures on the same or parallel runways at Hartsfield- Jackson Atlanta International Airport—the busiest airport in the NAS. According to FAA, this reduction has given controllers the ability to allow between 8 and 12 additional aircraft to depart the airport every hour and is expected to save airlines $10 million annually from reduced fuel burn on taxiways.

Throughout 2011 and 2012, FAA implemented several revised standards at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) that FAA officials said could improve airport efficiency. An FAA official and industry representatives who participated in this initiative noted that these revisions should help address capacity issues at the airport created by regional wind and fog patterns. Revised standards include a lower visibility minimum for certain types of approaches, as well as departures. FAA also increased the use of the airport’s optimal runway configurations during various wind conditions.

Integration of Improvements Is Minimal

FAA has had varying success in integrating its NextGen implementation efforts, and stakeholders see opportunities for additional integration to better deliver benefits in the midterm. In 2010, the NAC approved of FAA’s plans to focus its early OAPM efforts on new PBN procedures and airspace changes to expedite the delivery of benefits for operators, but suggested that FAA incorporate additional operational improvements— such as revised standards—into future OAPM efforts. In 2012, the NAC recommended that FAA incorporate into future OAPM efforts additional midterm operational improvements, such as enhanced airborne and surface-traffic management tools and other capabilities to enhance the capacity of metroplex areas. FAA has coordinated the development of PBN procedures with the implementation of airborne-traffic management tools in some OAPM projects when study teams identified improvements that would facilitate the implementation or usage of new PBN routes, but this integration has not been systematic for current OAPM efforts. For example, in response to a request from the North California OAPM team, FAA has added the San Francisco metroplex to the list of metroplexes that will receive an upgraded TMA system, which would allow the enroute center to manage traffic in concert with those air-traffic control facilities that manage surrounding airspace. The consideration of other non-PBN improvements, however, has been done at the discretion of OAPM teams—rather than being included as a goal of the overall OAPM effort— and has been largely limited to enhancements to TMA.

More broadly, FAA’s obstacles study pointed to the lack of airborne management tools as a key obstacle to the use of existing PBN procedures, including tools that help air traffic controllers sequence aircraft and better predict and visualize the flight trajectories of aircraft on PBN procedures. These tools are needed to fully use RNP curved approaches in congested metroplex areas, according to the study. One such tool will not be operationally available until 2016, according to FAA’s 2012 NextGen Implementation Plan, and the plan did not clearly indicate how or where this capability would be rolled out. Stakeholders have raised concerns that the lack of some key tools will slow the potential benefits of PBN efforts, including those associated with the OAPM initiative. Likewise, as mentioned above, the rollout of surface-traffic management improvements are scheduled to begin in 2015 at a few airports, which may hinder FAA’s ability to deliver the full benefits of its other improvement efforts, including PBN.

FAA Is Addressing Some Obstacles, but Project Prioritization, Stakeholder Participation, and Consistent NextGen Leadership Remain Challenges

As noted above, FAA’s current operational improvement efforts have involved certain trade-offs to achieve some near and midterm benefits, in large part, because of the context within which these improvements are being made. FAA has long-established processes and requirements in place that have made the U.S. airspace among the safest in the world. A number of those processes are, however, complex, lengthy, and at times, unclear as they relate to new technologies, procedures, and capabilities. FAA has a number of efforts under way to help overcome previously identified, overarching obstacles to NextGen implementation, such as streamlining processes and updating the air traffic controller handbook Many of these efforts are scheduled to and procedure design criteria.take a number of years, particularly when proposed changes must be evaluated to ensure that they will maintain, if not enhance, the system’s current level of safety. Some, such as those aimed at increasing stakeholder involvement in planning and implementation of PBN procedures, do not, however, fully address previously identified obstacles. Nor do they change FAA’s overall approach to identifying potential PBN procedures for development or amendment, which relies on requests from airlines and other stakeholders without determining their impact on improving efficiency in the NAS. Finally, continued uncertainty about the FAA’s leadership of NextGen affects the agency’s ability to manage and oversee the various improvements and efforts needed to achieve the full implementation of NextGen.

Flight Procedure Implementation Process Is Being Streamlined, but Impact Will Not Be Known for Several Years

FAA and others have identified the process for developing PBN and other new flight procedures as a challenge. For example, in 2009 the RTCA task force recommended streamlining the operational approval and certification processes for new flight procedures. Likewise, an FAA report described the existing process as a bundle of interconnected, overlapping, and sometimes competing processes. It also found variations and contradictions in existing guidance on procedure development and implementation, which result in a process that is “far from optimal, frequently generates rework, and on occasion results in the implementation of low- or no-benefit procedures.” To address these challenges, FAA initiated the Navigation Lean (NAV Lean) initiative to focus on streamlining the implementation and amendment processes for all flight procedures, releasing a report with planned improvements in 2010. FAA anticipates that the initiative will cumulatively cut 40 percent off the time needed to implement new procedures (assuming a full environmental impact statement is not required), though it acknowledged that it will be difficult to measure actual time saved. ATO and the Office of Aviation Safety share responsibility for overseeing the initiative, which began with the identification of overarching issues that negatively affect procedure implementation efficiency. The NAV Lean working groups identified nine issue areas with 21 associated recommendations, which focus, among other things, on minimizing the workload and delayed implementation associated with minor amendments of procedures, amending agency guidance to clarify and promote preparation of focused environmental assessments, and overcoming challenges to the development and implementation of criteria for flight procedures. (See fig. 9.)

According to the NAV Lean implementation plan, all planned improvements are scheduled to be completed from 2013 through 2015. FAA envisions that some are likely to produce benefits soon after implementation. However, FAA has acknowledged that it will have difficulty setting a baseline from which to measure many of the NAV Lean improvements. Agency officials, for example, told us that it would not be possible to determine how long the current PBN procedure implementation process takes both because the process varies for each effort and because agency databases do not track the amount of time taken for individual steps in the process. They explained that the more than 40 percent cumulative NAV Lean timesaving estimate was developed by asking officials the amount of time they expected to save in the procedure development process. In February 2013, FAA reported that it had made progress on all but one of the recommendations and had completed work on three recommendations, including a recommendation regarding the use of focused NEPA reviews in some circumstances. However, it is too early to determine outcomes associated with the implementation of these recommendations such as developing more procedures in less time.

As part of addressing concerns about the length of its environmental review process, FAA released guidance on preparing concise and focused environmental assessments for proposed FAA actions (including new procedures) in January 2011. Lengthy environmental reviews have been identified as an obstacle to the timely implementation of PBN by FAA and others. Environmental considerations were frequently not addressed until late in the procedure development process. The NAV Lean working group found that previous FAA guidance on the preparation of environmental assessments did not adequately address circumstances where the environment analysis could be more narrowly focused on only certain potential environmental impacts. In those circumstances, FAA offices should be preparing environmental assessments that consider all impact categories for applicability and significance, but focus the analysis only on the impact categories (e.g., noise) where there is potential for significant impacts caused by the proposed action (i.e., procedures). FAA anticipates that for small, non-OAPM projects involving one airport, “focused” environmental assessments could potentially take from 3 to 6 months, with a cost of $300,000 or less. For more complex OAPM projects—involving multiple airports and the assessment of numerous new flight procedures—focused environmental assessments generally will have 12- to 18-month time frames. By contrast, FAA officials estimate that non-focused environmental assessments traditionally take 6 months to 2 years for new flight procedures and cost $300,000 to over $1 million.

Although FAA has used focused environmental assessments for other types of proposed agency actions, FAA is first applying the new guidance to procedure-related actions for projects in Houston and Denver. Thereafter, the agency intends to use the new guidance at select OAPM sites (i.e., based on their complexity, number of potential environmental impacts, local considerations, and where proposed changes would not qualify for a categorical exclusion under NEPA), and will apply this approach to other projects as appropriate. FAA is also working to enhance or integrate several environmental screening and modeling tools—by including fuel burn analysis in its noise screening tools and incorporating environmental screening into a traffic simulator used to design PBN procedures. These screening tools allow procedure developers to evaluate environmental implications early in the design process and determine the potential for extraordinary circumstances that would warrant environmental assessments rather than categorical exclusions. FAA has also been developing a new tool—the Aviation Environmental Design Tool—to facilitate its environmental assessment process.

The FAA reauthorization act included a second new categorical exclusion for new PBN procedures that would result in measurable reductions in fuel consumption, carbon dioxide emissions, and noise, on a per-flight basis, as compared to aircraft operations that follow existing procedures. cumulatively for all flights, and FAA has not yet identified an approach for such per-flight assessments. According to FAA officials, no currently available methodology resolves the technical problems involved in making such a determination, so the agency has not applied this new categorical exclusion. FAA officials have requested NAC’s input on how to address these technical challenges.

Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 213(c)(1), (2), 126 Stat., 49 (2012). amendments from the regional and national prioritization processes. This would allow FAA to make minor changes to existing—but potentially underused—RNAV arrival and departure procedures more expeditiously. This could be an efficient and cost-effective way for FAA to increase PBN usage.

While NAV Lean does not assign one FAA office responsibility for developing and implementing new procedures, implementation of several NAV Lean recommendations will provide additional tools to allow for better coordination among ATO, the Office of Aviation Safety, AeroNav Products, and others involved in the process. In 2012, FAA’s obstacles study pointed to the lack of an accountable FAA office for the development of PBN to oversee a coherent design, development, production, and implementation strategy for new procedures. FAA is developing a web-based system to allow each interested party to access procedure designs and suggest improvements or mitigate potential problems throughout the development process. This is expected to result in a more cohesive procedure-development process when implemented in 2015. Furthermore, NAV Lean efforts are also intended to strengthen the role of the United States Instrument Flight Procedures Panel to improve coordination among parties responsible for the development and implementation of procedure design criteria.

New Efforts May Better Address New Procedure Requests, but Do Not Proactively Identify Needs

The RTCA task force and the NAC work group have pointed to the importance of prioritizing the implementation of key operational improvements, including focusing on the most appropriate PBN options such as RNAV or RNP. FAA officials said that they are in the early stages of developing a toolbox for those requesting new procedures, which would match solutions to identified problems and allow the agency to better target its efforts. FAA does not currently assess individual procedure requests—which can be made by a number of parties, including airlines—to determine if the proposed new procedures would generate expected benefits or resolve problems for airports or airspace. Rather, once a request for a new PBN procedure is received it is prioritized for development as requested on a first-come, first-served basis. Requests for new RNP procedures do not currently trigger an assessment by FAA (or by the requester) of the potential to use a less- costly option to resolve the underlying problem or gain the expected benefits.procedures could be used by more aircraft and pilots than the more precise RNP curved routes that were being or had been developed. Over 90 percent of commercial aircraft are equipped for RNAV procedures— which also allow for curved flight paths—and the RTCA task force recommended that FAA should focus on leveraging RNAV and reserve RNP to locations where tighter turns are needed.

FAA officials noted that, in some cases, new RNAV Industry stakeholders have argued that third parties could play a greater role in the development of flight procedures, a move that would help FAA respond to the current demand for new PBN procedures in the face of The FAA reauthorization act called for the limited agency resources. agency to establish a program for qualified third parties to develop, test, and maintain flight procedures. In May 2012, FAA awarded a $2.8- million contract to GE’s Naverus and a partner to develop two RNP approach procedures each at five mid-sized airports. The contractors are to design, evaluate, and maintain these RNP approaches and be responsible for providing environmental data and analysis to FAA to support categorical exclusions and for drafting any required NEPA reviews, for review and approval by FAA. According to FAA officials, the pilot project will allow FAA to assess the potential for third parties to have an expanded role in helping address those PBN procedures that FAA, FAA has because of a lack of resources, may be unable to address.made progress in recent years in developing a framework plan for leveraging third-party procedure developers and overseeing them. The potential of third party procedure development may be limited, however, given that there are currently two third-party procedure developers—GE’s Naverus and Boeing’s Jeppesen—that are eligible to develop public RNP approach procedures. The use of third-party developers may be more costly than the in-house FAA development and maintenance of procedures. FAA officials estimate that new RNP procedures cost $58,100 on average to develop, conduct safety testing, and implement— and $2,300 per year to maintain—when these efforts are undertaken in house. This total is significantly less than the $280,000 average cost for each of the 10 procedures that are being developed by the third party, although these FAA procedure-development costs do not include additional expenses for any NEPA reviews above a categorical exclusion. If an environmental assessment is required, then FAA costs could exceed $58,100, as the cost of conducting a focused environmental assessment can range from $0 to $300,000.

Despite efforts to streamline the development of flight procedures, FAA does not have a process to proactively identify those PBN procedures that would best further NextGen goals. Much of the work done by the RTCA task force and the NAC work group has focused on prioritizing improvements, and the identification of needed new routes might prove beneficial in easing congestion in the NAS and key airspace, or in solving local problems that have ripple effects across the NAS. OAPM was designed, in part, to fill this void, but for airspace or airports that are not included in the initiative, FAA depends on stakeholders to initiate requests. Once requests are made, however, they are added to the procedure-development queue, and are not assessed against other PBN procedures in the queue to determine their respective potential to benefit the NAS or to resolve problems at specific airports. Further, requests may be driven by where a requesting airline flies and not where new procedures are most needed. In 2012, Airlines for America, an airline trade organization, led an effort—called 20/20—to identify those 20 new procedures most wanted by airlines, as well as the 20 procedures they viewed as most in need of amendment. Four of the identified new procedures were at airports included in the OAPM initiative, so participating airlines agreed that FAA should address those new procedures through ongoing airspace redesign efforts. Of the remaining 16 identified procedures, 13 were found to already be under development by FAA. Similarly, for procedures needing revision, FAA found that 13 of the 20 identified procedures were already in the process of being revised. In the absence of a procedure-development tracking tool, such as is being developed as part of NAV Lean, airlines were not able to monitor FAA’s procedure development process for these routes. In response to the 20/20 effort, FAA agreed to track the development of the 16 desired new routes on its website, although it is not tracking those procedures Without a systematic that were identified for revision on the website.means to identify procedures that are most critical to achieving NextGen goals and sharing information about its plans and progress in developing needed new procedures, it will be difficult for FAA to provide reasonable assurance that its efforts are efficiently delivering benefits.

OAPM or similar efforts may present an opportunity to assess the utility of some existing, but underused, conventional air-traffic control routes in a more efficient, systematic way. FAA maintains more than 22,000 PBN and conventional procedures in the NAS, and the agency is looking to cancel underused or redundant flight procedures. As noted, these procedures cost $2,300 or more per year to maintain and may be used only occasionally, if at all.unneeded routes, in a 2011 report, the Flight Safety Foundation proposed a process to identify 800 such procedures for potential elimination, representing a 12 percent reduction in the total number of ground-based approach procedures and a 4 percent reduction in the total number of procedures. Identifying these procedures for decommissioning could result in savings of approximately $1.8 million per year—or about $18 million over 10 years—in maintenance costs. An official with AeroNav Products pointed out that when OAPM teams assess current needs within a metroplex’s airspace, they are ideally positioned to identify some of the existing procedures that could be decommissioned, although they are not currently tasked with assessing the continued utility of existing routes. Once good candidates for route decommissioning are identified, FAA could further assess these routes and begin the public-notification process that leads to decommissioning.

Standards and the Air Traffic Controller Handbook Are Being Amended

The lack of design criteria can impede the development of new procedures. FAA’s obstacles study, for example, notes that AeroNav Products is often unable to design a requested procedure because the criteria for the procedure have yet to be developed by the Office of Aviation Safety. According to the report, this lack of a coherent design, development, production, and implementation strategy slows down the process and creates frustration among air traffic controllers and system users, such as airlines. FAA officials in the Office of Aviation Safety responsible for developing PBN criteria told us that their units have made progress in recent years in updating the design criteria to better use the capabilities of PBN to respond to requests for new procedures. They also told us that they are currently focused on clarifying and consolidating all the PBN criteria into one document to make it easier for air traffic controllers and others, and have in place several efforts related to specific design criteria, such as updating the criteria for holding—a maneuver used to delay an aircraft already in flight—for RNAV and RNP procedures. However, officials in the Office of Aviation Safety and other FAA officials acknowledged that much work remains to be done to develop new criteria before PBN can be deployed nationwide. Several officials also acknowledged that it can be difficult to meet user requests for new PBN design criteria given variations in terrain and changing technology, especially because the safety tests that are often required for changing or amending the design criteria can be time and labor intensive.

RTCA has pointed to the potential for changes in the way FAA tracks and assesses any errors—notably losses of separation where aircraft come in closer proximity than allowed—made by air traffic controllers to encourage closer adherence to existing standards by eliminating incentives to add buffers between planes. For example, the RTCA task force recommended and FAA implemented a non-punitive reporting system for losses of separation. For more information about FAA’s new systems for assessing losses of separation caused by controllers, see GAO, Aviation Safety: Enhanced Oversight and Improved Availability of Risk- Based Data Could Further Improve Safety, GAO-12-24 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 5, 2011). procedures to parallel runways. Potential solutions are then forwarded to FAA for consideration, such as a 2011 proposal that would better leverage the safety benefits of PBN to change certain separation standards for the use of parallel runways based on safety assessments conducted by the Greener Skies team.

FAA’s primary effort to address issues with the air traffic controller handbook is also part of the Greener Skies initiative. The Greener Skies team has identified 95 needed changes in FAA orders and regulations to date to address obstacles that have contributed to limiting the usage of PBN procedures. FAA’s obstacles study noted that the lack of standard language for controllers and pilots for certain types of PBN procedures could create uncertainty in communications, which would require such a change to the handbook. Officials we interviewed at a Seattle-area air- traffic control facility acknowledged that they had known for years before the Greener Skies project began that the handbook was outdated. According to these officials, although FAA has published many PBN routes throughout the NAS, from a controllers’ perspective, there were few rules in place for using those procedures. For example, under the current handbook there is little guidance on how to safely give less than the standard separation for merging planes—as is often done for traditional procedures in clear weather conditions—even if the aircraft are on precise paths. The separation standards heavily influence the guidance in the controller handbook, because much of a controllers’ responsibility is to keep safe distances between aircraft. According to FAA’s obstacles study, these concerns have led controllers to not approve the use of PBN procedures, in some cases.

FAA and others have also pointed to the need for additional training of air traffic controllers as a potential obstacle to the use of PBN procedures, and FAA’s obstacles study suggested developing a national training plan for PBN operations. While we did not look at the extent of training provided when PBN procedures are implemented at individual airports, the larger-scale initiatives in our review have included time and resources for controller training. For example, OAPM plans dedicate from 9 to 15 months to the implementation phase, which includes controller training. Officials with the North Texas team told us that some new OAPM procedures, such as OPDs, would require significant changes from the way local controllers traditionally managed aircraft, so adequate training would be especially important for the successful implementation of their OAPM procedures. Likewise, officials from the Seattle-area TRACON noted that it had taken them about 2 months to develop the controller training for using new Greener Skies procedures.

FAA Has Involved More Stakeholders, but Is Not Fully Engaging Airports

FAA is making progress in systematically involving industry stakeholders, air traffic controllers, and other key subject matter experts in its initiatives, including OAPM and Greener Skies, as well as surface-traffic management initiatives. As we have previously reported, collaboration has been an ongoing challenge for FAA. For example, officials with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey told us that the failure to include controllers early in the procedure design process for the airspace redesign effort for the New York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia area— some of the most complex and congested airspace in the world— contributed to the 4-year-plus implementation delay, because some proposed routes had to be amended following controller input. As such, we as well as others have made numerous recommendations that FAA should collaborate better with key stakeholders to facilitate the implementation of NextGen and enhance results. Many of these key stakeholders are also involved in other efforts to improve capacity in the NAS, such as the development of new or expanded runways, which are or will be pursued concurrently with NextGen. FAA officials, local controllers, airline officials, and others generally agreed that FAA has made significant progress in recent years in its ability to collaborate to achieve results. For example, FAA officials and industry stakeholders emphasized that OAPM is highly collaborative, as the study teams and design teams include local air traffic controllers and airline officials, FAA officials with experience in airspace redesign and other fields, environmental specialists, and others. The following are among the anticipated benefits of this collaborative approach.

Enhances PBN usage: A number of FAA officials and air traffic controllers told us that FAA now recognizes that new procedures are much less likely to be used if controllers are not involved in the design. New procedures developed without controller input may not be feasible from an operational or safety perspective, and controllers may not see that the new routes are advantageous. Controllers serving the Seattle metroplex told us that their level of involvement in Greener Skies was more extensive and occurred earlier than in any previous procedure or airspace project. According to FAA officials and airline representatives, the inclusion of airline stakeholders in the design process also helped keep industry informed and involved and helps assure that the proposed procedures can be flown by participating airlines.

Addresses community concerns: We have previously reported that the inclusion of airports in PBN procedure development and other projects can help address potentially adverse environmental—often noise- related—community impacts, since these entities often have primary responsibility for addressing community concerns and are likely more familiar than FAA with the airport’s environmental impacts and the surrounding communities. According to best practices established by ACRP regarding community involvement in airport projects, trust and respect are the keys to a long-term relationship between stakeholders—in this case between FAA and airport representatives, who are responsible for addressing community concerns about airport-related noise.

While FAA has made progress involving airports in NextGen projects, several FAA officials, a representative of Airport Councils International- North America (ACI-NA), and officials from several airports said that FAA is not fully leveraging the expertise of airport officials about local community concerns, although the ACI-NA representative noted that FAA has begun to involve airports earlier as the OAPM effort has continued. Airport officials in one OAPM metroplex told us that FAA had not adequately included them in early planning for new PBN routes. Consequently, the airport hired environmental consultants to analyze, among other things, the potential noise impacts of proposed PBN procedures and submitted concerns to FAA. In addition, although the Port of Seattle was initially involved in designing procedures for Greener Skies, airport officials told us that they were concerned that FAA had not included them during the environmental assessment process or in conducting local outreach. The project has raised some community concerns about aircraft noise from new flight paths, and some neighborhoods have expressed concerns that FAA had not clearly explained the potential noise impact on their neighborhoods. New aviation noise is one of the largest obstacles to NextGen implementation, according to FAA officials and others. It can be difficult to address community concerns about aviation noise, but FAA may be able to mitigate such concerns by involving airport officials more closely in procedure design and community outreach efforts. FAA officials involved in another OAPM team, for example, noted that local airport officials, who were not included in initial route planning for the metroplex, later provided information about potential community impacts that FAA had not anticipated. Information provided by FAA on establishing OAPM study teams, however, does not include guidance on the timely involvement of airport representatives on these teams, if such involvement is appropriate; rather the information indicates that OAPM teams should brief airport authorities as the process continues. This is in contrast to the best practices established by ACRP, which state that educating—in this case briefing—interested stakeholders after the fact is not sufficient for effective involvement; rather, proactive involvement is required. A collaborative approach for NextGen that involves key stakeholders, such as airport officials, would better position FAA to fully leverage those stakeholders’ expertise, help identify possible solutions, and facilitate implementation of NextGen improvements.

Consistent NextGen Leadership Remains a Challenge

Although the RTCA task force and NAC work group did not make recommendations regarding NextGen organizational issues, more broadly, FAA has struggled to have the leadership in place to manage and oversee NextGen implementation. In the past, industry stakeholders have expressed concerns about the fragmentation of authority and lack of accountability for NextGen, two factors that could delay its implementation. Leading practices of successful organizations reflect that programs can be implemented most efficiently when managers are empowered to make critical decisions and are held accountable for results. To ensure accountability for NextGen results, several stakeholders suggested that an office was needed that would report directly to the FAA Administrator or the Secretary of Transportation. FAA has made organizational changes in the past in an effort to address these concerns.

Beginning in 2011, FAA made additional changes to its NextGen organizational structure to address NextGen leadership issues. Specifically, FAA reorganized the structure of the office responsible for carrying out NextGen implementation, moving the office from within the ATO to under FAA’s Deputy Administrator. According to FAA, this change increased NextGen’s visibility within and outside the agency and created a direct line of authority and responsibility for NextGen. In addition, in February 2012, the FAA reauthorization act designated that the Director of JPDO—who is responsible for NextGen planning and coordination— and created a new leadership report directly to the FAA Administrator position—the Chief NextGen Officer.

While these changes indicate a positive step towards addressing accountability issues, FAA continues to work to fill NextGen leadership positions. As of February 2013, FAA had not yet made all the organizational changes called for by the FAA reauthorization act. The Administrator has indicated that the new Deputy Administrator will serve as Chief NextGen Officer and that a search is on for qualified candidates for both the Deputy Administrator and Assistant Administrator of NextGen positions. The Administrator, who was sworn-in to the office in January 2013, has not yet clearly defined the relationship between the JPDO Director and other NextGen officials. Appointing a new Deputy Administrator to also serve as Chief NextGen Officer and concluding its candidate search for the Assistant Administrator of NextGen position, would better position FAA to resolve these remaining leadership challenges.

FAA Has Limited Data to Demonstrate Midterm NextGen Benefits, and More Information Is Needed in NextGen Plans

Performance Metrics Are Being Developed and Linked to Targets

FAA has made some progress developing performance metrics, which we recommended that the agency do in 2010. The NAC recommended in 2011 that FAA adopt performance areas used by ICAO and, as of February 2013, FAA had adopted 6 of the 11 ICAO performance areas.FAA provided information about 5 of these performance areas— Environment, Safety, Efficiency, Capacity, and Cost Effectiveness—and the metrics associated with these areas. Performance metrics for the sixth performance area—Predictability—are being developed. As we have reported in the past, having performance measures is important, because they allow an agency to track its progress in achieving intended results and develop contingency plans if milestones to complete tasks are not met, both of which can be particularly important during the implementation stage of a new program. Performance metrics would also enable stakeholders, such as airlines, to hold FAA accountable for results, as well as to make their own business decisions about whether to invest in equipment needed to enable the use of NextGen technologies and procedures.

FAA is currently conducting an agency-wide effort to review and harmonize its performance metrics to bring order, consistency, and accuracy to metrics reporting across its lines of business. The agency began this effort to address several problems, including managing and monitoring an increasing number of metrics and inconsistent metrics names and definitions. Once the harmonization is complete, ATO will create a website to display the harmonized metrics, which, according to FAA officials, will provide information for many FAA activities, including the implementation of NextGen. The ongoing modifications to performance metrics must be completed before FAA can establish baselines from which it can measure progress. Baselines are essential to compare past performance to current performance. For some established metrics for which FAA already has extensive data, establishing a baseline is not expected to be a challenge. By contrast, establishing a baseline for new metrics for which FAA has not yet collected data may present challenges and is expected to take time.

FAA is also developing additional NextGen performance metrics in response to the FAA reauthorization act, in addition to responding to the NAC recommendations. FAA was mandated to establish and, beginning in 2013, to track 12 performance metrics to measure progress for implementing some NextGen capabilities and improvements. Although these new reauthorization metrics do not clearly link to the existing NextGen key performance areas mentioned above, some of the reauthorization metrics are similar to and reflect the same information that is already expected to be measured. According to FAA officials, 7 of the reauthorization performance metrics are already established, however the agency faces some challenges in developing 5 of the remaining metrics. For example, FAA is working with the NAC to identify a technically feasible way to measure and report on the amount of fuel used between key city-to-city (city-pair) markets—one of the required new metrics. It is not known at this time if these key city pairs will include some or all locations where midterm NextGen operational improvements are being implemented.

FAA has made minimal progress in developing goals for NextGen, which we also recommended in our 2010 report. FAA’s Destination 2025 report establishes cross-cutting agency-wide goals for the midterm, although these are not all related to the implementation of NextGen. Agency officials emphasized that Destination 2025 goals were intended to be aspirational and that FAA business plans, which are developed by each individual business office, would provide NextGen targets and goals. However, agency officials in the NextGen Office acknowledged that individual business offices are still developing their respective targets. When FAA provided information to us in January 2013 about its efforts to align goals and performance metrics, the goals included in Destination 2025 were used as the source for many of the included metrics. As we reported in 2010, having goals and performance measures in place will enable FAA to provide stakeholders, interested parties, Congress, and the American people with a clear picture of where implementation stands at any given time, and whether the technologies, capabilities, and operational improvements that are being implemented are resulting in positive outcomes and improved performance for operators and passengers. Thus, we continue to believe that fully addressing our 2010 recommendations has merit. (See app. II for more information about performance areas and metrics.)

Information on Some Costs and Benefits Is Available, but Insufficient to Encourage Airline Investments in the Midterm

FAA has begun to report on implementation progress and benefits at certain airports and metroplexes, as well as for some capabilities, but implementation and benefits information is incomplete. In March 2012, FAA made publically available the NextGen Performance Snapshot website to provide post-implementation performance data. The website is designed to emphasize the link between NextGen investments and benefits. To date, information on the website provides performance progress on the near-term implementation of some, but not all, locations and initiatives where FAA has implemented NextGen capabilities.January 2013, the website had information on established metrics for three performance areas—efficiency, environment, and access. Efficiency is reported at the core 30 airports; environment and access are reported As of at the NAS-wide level. For example, the NextGen Performance Snapshot website reports some efficiency data, such as the average number of minutes that it takes flights to taxi-in and taxi-out at each of the core 30 airports, and environmental data, such as NAS-wide noise exposure data for the U.S. population. In the absence of specific NextGen targets, we looked to track FAA’s progress vis-à-vis the NextGen-related goals in Destination 2025 on FAA’s NextGen Performance Snapshot website, but found it difficult to do so. Information presented was in many cases neither in the same format nor on the same scale as goals in Destination 2025. For example, one goal in Destination 2025 is to improve throughput at core airports during adverse weather by 14 percent through 2018, but the NextGen Performance Snapshot website tracking progress did not include this information either as an average or for individual core airports. Likewise, another Destination 2025 goal is to reduce the amount of fuel burned per miles flown by at least 2 percent annually—which corresponds to international objectives accepted by ICAO—but information provided showed changes in the cumulative amount of fuel burned per kilometers flown. According to agency officials, the NextGen Performance Snapshot website is currently undergoing improvements that will include more meaningful measures and additional reporting levels—such as metroplex and key city-pair views—to more fully demonstrate progress at core airports, prioritized metroplexes, and across the NAS. An updated NextGen Performance Snapshot website has the potential to help stakeholders—such as airports and airlines—and the public understand the progress and some benefits occurring at various airports and metroplexes across the nation in a more systematic way, as well as providing a link between these benefits and the investments made in NextGen by FAA and others.

FAA is also developing a PBN assessment tool—the PBN dashboard—to enable FAA to assess the PBN capabilities at individual airports and within the NAS. According to FAA officials and the contractors developing the dashboard, it will be able to measure PBN usage and impacts and changes to conditions (fleet, equipage, etc.). Representatives from one airline we spoke with said that they currently do not collect the information on procedure usage that FAA needs for the dashboard. In response to industry stakeholders’ aforementioned concerns and perceptions that some published PBN procedures have provided limited benefits or have not been sufficiently used, FAA had undertaken some analyses to determine how often published PBN procedures are being used. This analysis of flight track data for airspace around some airports showed that more aircraft were following the airborne routes of published PBN procedures than was being reported by airlines or air-traffic control facilities. However, the analysis was unable to determine whether the aircraft were actually flying the published PBN procedure or merely following the same track on the conventional procedure. FAA officials stated that the dashboard could help FAA better assess the extent to which the fleet is able to use existing procedures. The OAPM study team for South/Central Florida used the dashboard to determine the percentage of operations at each airport in the metroplex that would benefit from proposed new procedures. It is unclear the extent to which the dashboard will be used to measure the impact of improvements or assess progress toward overarching NextGen goals. FAA officials do not plan to use the dashboard to proactively identify additional needed procedures at individual airports or make the dashboard available to external stakeholders, such as airlines, that may want to identify additional needed procedures.

RTCA, NextGen Equipage: User Business Case Gaps (Sept. 2011). is currently equipped. For example, RTCA noted that FAA’s long-range implementation plans should provide information on the roll out of RNP procedures at specific airports—the type of information that would be useful for airlines that are considering investing in this technology. However, RTCA found that the plans lacked such information. Nor do FAA implementation plans identify criteria with which additional sites would be selected in the case of demonstration projects. Without greater certainty on when and where NextGen improvements are planned, airlines and others are unlikely to invest in the equipage (and conduct the associated staffing and training) that will help achieve the full benefits of NextGen implementation. FAA has estimated that total industry equipage could cost $6.6 billion—compared to $11.5 billion in NextGen implementation costs for FAA—through 2018. Deciding whether to invest in most of that equipage is at each airline’s discretion.

Conclusions

The implementation of NextGen is expected to enhance safety, improve efficiency, and result in a reduction in the environmental costs of aviation. Achieving the benefits of NextGen is a collaborative task that not only relies on timely and reliable information on progress implementing NextGen, but also depends heavily on airlines’ and other stakeholders’ continued or increased investments in NextGen technology and training. The improvements included in NextGen plans are often interrelated, with benefits in one area dependent on the full implementation of other operational improvements.

FAA does not have a system for systematically tracking the use of existing PBN procedures. As a result, FAA is unable to assure that investment in these routes is worthwhile or that they justify the cost to develop and maintain them. In the absence of data on the use of existing PBN routes, airlines and other stakeholders remain unconvinced that the investments needed for the full implementation of NextGen will be justified. Such information could help the agency demonstrate the value of PBN technologies and any resulting benefits, as well as allow the agency to identify routes that need to be revised to increase their use.

Without a process for proactively identifying new PBN procedures based on NextGen goals and targets, requests for new PBN procedures largely originate from outside FAA. While the agency has attempted to work with industry stakeholders, such as airlines in the 20/20 effort, to identify needed routes, results have been mixed. The use of criteria to proactively identify needed routes at individual airports, such as criteria used by the NAC to prioritize metroplexes, could enable FAA to identify routes that can maximize benefits for the NAS. Furthermore, FAA does not assess requests received to determine whether the requested route or type of procedure (e.g., RNAV or RNP) maximizes potential benefits. Since requestors, such as airlines, may have their own reasons for requesting routes at certain locations or using specific technologies, their requests may not correspond with NextGen goals or result in the most efficient use of resources for PBN implementation or vis-à-vis the needs of other users.

The NAC work group recommended that FAA develop an integrated approach to increase airspace efficiency in key metroplexes, including OAPM sites. While FAA has consistently emphasized the importance of integrating key operational improvements to maximize NextGen benefits, FAA has primarily focused its midterm efforts on PBN and has not systematically integrated airborne- and surface traffic management and revised standards into these efforts. FAA officials explained that non-PBN improvements were not systematically included in the first round of OAPM, in part, to achieve OAPM time frames. However, with the implementation of some first round improvements, as well as progress made in developing and deploying some non-PBN improvements, FAA is better positioned to systematically integrate PBN and other improvements going forward. Insufficient integration of key improvements decreases midterm NextGen benefits, since these benefits are interdependent.

Furthermore, by not including the identification of unused flight routes for decommissioning in OAPM and similar efforts, FAA could be missing an opportunity to leverage the expertise of participating stakeholders. Decommissioning unused or little-used conventional, non-PBN procedures could allow FAA to make better use of its resources by reducing maintenance costs.

FAA has made progress in recent years in ensuring the inclusion of stakeholders in NextGen efforts, especially air traffic controllers. Some airport officials, however, expressed concern that FAA had not fully involved them in current efforts or involved them too late in the process, although a representative with ACI-NA noted that FAA has recently begun to involve airports more significantly in NextGen design and implementation efforts. However, FAA has not developed guidelines for the timely and consistent inclusion of these stakeholders. Some FAA officials told us that they had not fully appreciated the potential value that airport officials could provide. A collaborative approach that timely involves key stakeholders—including the agency, airport officials, air traffic controllers, and airlines—enables FAA to fully leverage the expertise of these stakeholders, helps identify the best possible solutions, and facilitates the implementation of those improvements.

FAA has made some progress in developing and aligning performance metrics and goals since we recommended these actions in 2010. It is important for FAA to complete this work to measure progress and demonstrate benefits across the NAS, gain confidence, and engender needed investments to support the full implementation of NextGen. Furthermore, RTCA and others have pointed to the importance of having stable, long-term implementation plans for NextGen capabilities and determining specific location benefits and implementation dates, but FAA’s NextGen implementation plans do not detail such deployment information. As a consequence, airlines and other stakeholders have been reluctant to invest in expensive avionics, including RNP equipage.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that NextGen operational improvements are fully implemented in the midterm, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to take the following five actions: work with airlines and other users to develop and implement a system to systematically track the use of existing PBN procedures; develop processes to proactively identify new PBN procedures for the NAS, based on NextGen goals and targets, and evaluate external requests so that FAA can select appropriate solutions; require consideration of other key operational improvements in planning for NextGen improvements, including PBN projects at metroplexes such as OAPM, as well as the identification of unused flight routes for decommissioning; develop and implement guidelines for ensuring timely inclusion of appropriate stakeholders, including airport representatives, in the planning and implementation of NextGen improvement efforts; and assure that NextGen planning documents provide stakeholders information on how and when operational improvements are expected to achieve NextGen goals and targets.

Agency Comments

We provided the Department of Transportation (DOT) with a draft of this report for review and comment. DOT responded by email and did not agree or disagree with our recommendations, but provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.

We are sending copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and interested parties. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me on (202) 512-2834 or at dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to assess the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) progress implementing key Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) operational improvements in the midterm and demonstrating benefits from these improvements. To do so, we addressed the following questions: 1) What key operational improvements is FAA pursuing to deliver NextGen benefits with existing technologies through 2018? 2) To what extent is FAA addressing known obstacles to the implementation and usage of NextGen operational improvements? 3) To what extent is FAA measuring and demonstrating midterm NextGen benefits and assessing outcomes?

To address these three questions, we reviewed our prior reports, met with FAA officials with a role in implementing NextGen, including units within the NextGen Office, the Office of Aviation Safety, the Air Traffic Organization (ATO), Aeronautical Navigation Products (AeroNav Products), and the Office of Environment and Energy. We reviewed FAA planning documents for NextGen, including the 2012 NextGen Implementation Plan and work plans for individual lines of business within FAA, as well as FAA reports and briefings related to ongoing NextGen efforts, including the Optimization of Airspace and Procedures in the Metroplex (OAPM) initiative, and FAA process and procedure documentation. We also interviewed aviation stakeholders and experts with knowledge and experience related to NextGen implementation: representatives from industry associations, including RTCA, Airlines for America, and the Airports Council International–North America; airlines, including Alaska Airlines and Southwest Airlines, which have both advocated for the increased use of Performance Based Navigation (PBN) procedures; airports involved in OAPM efforts in North Texas and Southern California, in the Greener Skies over Seattle (Greener Skies) initiative, and in surface improvement efforts for airports in New York and New Jersey; avionics and aircraft manufacturers and other aviation vendors, including Boeing, Honeywell, and Raytheon; and air traffic controllers with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) and at individual air-traffic control facilities, including facilities involved in the OAPM effort in North Texas and the Greener Skies initiative.

To assess the status of FAA’s implementation of key operational improvements and the potential benefits to be achieved, and identify challenges to the full implementation of those key operational improvements, we assessed FAA implementation progress for operational improvements that were recommended by RTCA’s Midterm Implementation Task Force (RTCA task force) in 2009 and those that were prioritized by the Integrated Working Capabilities Work Group of the NextGen Advisory Council (NAC work group) in 2012. (See table 1.) RTCA’s recommendations are the basis for a number of FAA’s policy, program, and regulatory decisions, and have been incorporated into FAA’s current NextGen implementation plans. Likewise, the NAC—which includes representatives from industry and FAA’s senior leadership— advises FAA on the implementation of NextGen. The recommendations made by the RTCA task force and NAC work group represent consensus views in the aviation community regarding which operational improvements FAA should prioritize and where those improvements should be implemented in the midterm—through 2018—but do not include all operational improvements in FAA’s implementation plans. They are limited to those improvements that use existing technologies. We grouped these operational improvements into three key improvement areas for midterm NextGen implementation: 1. Performance Based Navigation (PBN), 2. enhanced airborne and surface traffic management, and 3. additional or revised aviation safety standards.

Table 1 provides a listing of the operational improvements recommended by the RTCA task force and NAC work group. Operational improvements are grouped by the implementation portfolios used by FAA in its planning documents.

To determine how FAA is addressing known obstacles to the implementation of NextGen operational improvements, we identified obstacles and challenges to developing, implementing, or fully using key NextGen improvements primarily from findings and recommendations made by the RTCA task force and an FAA study on obstacles to PBN implementation. To obtain information about FAA efforts to address these obstacles, we reviewed agency reports and documents, including FAA’s report on efforts to streamline the process for developing and implementing flight procedures, and spoke with officials from relevant program offices and facilities, including environmental review specialists and air-traffic control facilities. To assess agency progress toward addressing these obstacles and identify ongoing challenges, we spoke with industry experts and stakeholders, including airport officials, airline representatives, avionics manufacturers, members of the NAC work group and the Performance Based Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee, and air traffic controllers. We also assessed certain FAA efforts against established criteria, including best practices for stakeholder involvement from the Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) and for organizational goal-setting and performance measurement.

See GAO, NextGen Air Transportation System: FAA’s Metrics Can Be Used to Report on Status of Individual Programs, but Not of Overall NextGen Implementation or Outcomes, GAO-10-629 (Washington, D.C: July 27, 2010). This report assessed FAA’s progress in developing performance goals and metrics against criteria established by GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season Performance Measures, GAO-03-143 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002). and Outreach Office. We also interviewed NAC officials. To evaluate the consistency and meaningful output that would be provided by the NextGen key performance areas, metrics, and measures, we compared and analyzed information that was provided in FAA agency-wide reports and metrics documentation, the NextGen Performance Snapshot website, and the FAA reauthorization act. We reviewed FAA reports, NextGen business case documentation, and the publicly available information on NextGen implementation and expected benefits. We also interviewed industry stakeholders, including representatives from airports, airlines, and equipment manufacturers to assess the extent to which available information builds confidence and buy-in toward full NextGen implementation. Finally, we compared available information with best practices for performance plans.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 through April 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: FAA Performance Areas and Metrics

The following table provides the description of FAA performance areas and metrics. Although some of the performance metrics contained in this table have been established, FAA may continue to refine these metrics to ensure that the measurements align with agency targets and goals. FAA also has a few new metrics under development, and the agency is working to identify a technically feasible way to implement them.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Ed Laughlin, Assistant Director; Russ Burnett; Jessica Bryant-Bertail; Aisha Cabrer; Tim Guinane; Bert Japikse; Delwen Jones; Molly Laster; and Josh Ormond made key contributions to this report.