Defense Infrastructure: Management Actions Needed to Ensure Effectiveness of DOD's Risk Management Approach for the Defense Industrial Base
Released: 2007-08-31T00:00:00

Letter

Background

According to DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, dated June 2005, without the important contributions of the private sector, DOD cannot effectively execute its core defense missions. Private industry manufacturers provide the majority of equipment, materials, services, and weapons for the U.S. armed forces. The President designated DOD as the sector-specific agency for the DIB. In this role, DOD is responsible for collaborating with all relevant federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector; encouraging risk management strategies; and conducting or facilitating vulnerability assessments of the DIB as set forth in HSPD-7.

In executing these responsibilities, the Secretary of Defense requires a network of organizations with diverse roles and missions. Key participants in the network include the following: The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, USD(AT&L), who is responsible for, among other things, integrating DCIP policies into acquisition, procurement, and installation policy guidance and for coordinating with ASD(HD&ASA) to ensure DCIP-related guidance is developed and implemented, and that system providers remediate vulnerabilities identified prior to system fielding or deployment.

ASD(HD&ASA), which serves as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on the identification, prioritization, and protection of DOD’s critical infrastructure. ASD(HD&ASA) assigned responsibility for the DCIP, including DIB sector-specific agency responsibilities, to the Director for Critical Infrastructure Protection under the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Crisis Management and Defense Support to Civil Authorities. The DCIP office provides policy, program oversight, integration, and coordination of activities.

DCMA, which is the defense sector lead agent responsible for the coordination and oversight of DCIP matters pertaining to the DIB because of DCMA’s established working relationship with DIB owners/operators. DCMA responsibilities include planning and coordinating with all DOD components and private-sector partners that own or operate elements of the DIB.

Private-sector owners, operators, and organizations; and other federal departments and agencies, including DHS, the FBI, and the Departments of Energy, Commerce, the Treasury, and State. It also includes state and local agencies, international organizations, and foreign countries.

Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, federal departments and agencies are to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources in order to prevent, deter, and mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit the infrastructure and resources; and they are to work with state and local governments and the private sector to accomplish this objective. Sector- specific agencies, among other things, are to encourage risk management strategies to protect against and mitigate the effect of attacks against critical infrastructure and key resources.

DOD’s risk management approach is based on assessing threats, vulnerabilities, criticalities, and the ability to respond to incidents. Threat assessments identify and evaluate potential threats on the basis of capabilities, intentions, and past activities. Vulnerability assessments identify potential weaknesses that may be exploited and recommend options to address those weaknesses. Criticality assessments evaluate and prioritize contractors on the basis of their importance to mission success. These assessments help prioritize limited resources and thus, if implemented properly, would reduce the expense of resources on lower- priority contractors. DOD’s risk management approach also includes an assessment of the ability to respond to, and recover from, an incident.

ASD(HD&ASA) officials said it provided research and development funding for program development in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 of $550,000 and $675,000, respectively. It did not provide research and development funding to DCMA in 2007 and said it did not intend to provide any during the period of fiscal years 2008 to 2013. They said that for operations and maintenance, DOD funded the program at about $1.1 million and $1.0 million in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, respectively; and $2.5 million and $2.0 million in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively. DOD plans to increase operations and maintenance funding to about $8.3 million in fiscal year 2008, about $9.4 million in 2009, and about $10.1 million in 2010 before decreasing it to about $8.8–$8.7 million in subsequent fiscal years through fiscal year 2013. In January 2007, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved the National Guard Critical Infrastructure Program— Mission Assurance Assessment (CIP-MAA) capability for the DIB. The council agreed that the services will provide funding to meet the requirements for fiscal years 2008–2013, and it endorsed the National Guard as the overall lead agency to implement the CIP-MAA. The operations and maintenance funding is summarized in figure 1.

DOD Has Begun Developing and Implementing a Risk Management Approach to Ensure the Availability of the DIB

DOD has begun developing and implementing a risk management approach to ensure the availability of DIB assets needed to support mission-essential tasks, though implementation is still at an early stage. The approach comprises two plans. First, the DIB sector assurance plan, issued in May 2005 and updated in May 2007, outlines an approach for identifying vulnerabilities, risks, and effect on business; implementing remediation and mitigation strategies; and managing consequences to ensure continuity of operations. Second, the DIB sector-specific plan, submitted in December 2006, outlines DOD’s approach to executing its sector-specific responsibilities, follows guidance established by DHS, and complements other DOD critical infrastructure policy. It focuses efforts on assets, systems, networks, and functions that, if damaged, would result in unacceptable consequences to the DOD mission, national economic security, public health and safety, or public confidence. The sector assurance plan provides a coordinated strategy for managing risk at DIB critical asset sites located throughout the world and describes a risk management approach and plans for the DIB. It focuses on steps to (1) identify a critical asset list; (2) prioritize the critical assets on that list; (3) perform vulnerability assessments on high-priority critical assets; and (4) encourage contractors’ actions to remediate or mitigate adverse effects found during these assessments, as appropriate, to ensure continuity of business operations.

DOD depends on the DIB to accomplish its work in support of military missions. The absence or unavailability of some assets designated as critical DIB assets, and the products and services these assets produce, could cause military mission failure. To identify DIB critical assets, DCMA industrial analysts and other DOD personnel compiled a list of approximately 900 important defense contractor assets, and then narrowed this number by using another set of criteria. DCMA has also developed an asset prioritization model for determining a criticality score and ranking critical assets, from highest to lowest risk. It has established a standardized mission assurance vulnerability assessment process for critical DIB assets, and as of June 1, 2007, had completed and issued reports for eight assessments and had three other assessments in process. ASD(HD&ASA) is developing guidance to provide a standardized process for determining, planning, and implementing remediation actions for DOD personnel involved in remediating risks and supporting overall DOD mission assurance. Table 1 provides a summary of the current number of important and critical DIB assets identified and the number of contractors assessed.

DCMA Has Taken Steps to Identify Critical Assets

DCMA has developed a process to identify the most important DIB assets and to narrow this list to those it considers critical using a tiered approach that enables identification of important capabilities and critical assets from the hundreds of thousands of entities constituting the DIB. The collection of data on each entity within the DIB was considered neither practical nor an effective use of limited resources, so DCMA focused on reducing the magnitude of assets to a manageable number through the use of government DIB subject-matter experts. DCMA has developed a process to identify the most important DIB assets and to narrow this list to those it considers critical. The criteria used for both lists are shown below in table 2.

The critical asset list is reviewed, updated, and approved annually. DCMA identifies potential assets meeting the criteria, and the military services and defense agencies then validate and update the list. DCMA reviews and validates the updated list and prioritizes it using the asset priority model. DCMA then coordinates with senior acquisition executives and submits the revised critical asset list for approval to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy, USD(AT&L), and ASD(HD&ASA).

DCMA Has Been Developing an Asset Prioritization Model

DCMA has been developing an asset prioritization model for determining a criticality score and ranking critical assets from highest to lowest risk. This model is to provide a mechanism for DCMA to allocate limited resources to those critical DIB assets assessed to be most vulnerable: the higher the score, the higher the priority of the asset for vulnerability assessment and possible remediation/mitigation actions. The model uses 16 weighted factors that are aggregated to assign a vulnerability score to each asset. These factors are broadly classified into mission (5), economic (4), threat (5), and other (2), as shown below in table 3.

Data for the determination of these factors are collected from DCMA surveys and analysis, supplemented by various commercial and government sources, including the Defense Logistics Agency, the military services, and the combatant commands. If there are missing data for a given item, DCMA’s rule is to default to a high-risk score, as this is the most conservative assumption.

For threat data currently obtained by DCMA, the model includes an assessment of current, potential, and technologically feasible threats to assets from hostile parties as well as from natural or accidental disasters inherent to the asset or its location. Hostile threat information is collected by the Counter Intelligence Field Activity office from various intelligence sources and then summarized in a threat assessment document for specific sites during the prioritization process, and in a detailed threat assessment prior to conducting an actual National Guard assessment of a site. The Counter Intelligence Field Activity has also established an arrayed threats data system as the DIB sector’s primary method for obtaining threat-related information.

DCMA Has Established a Standardized Vulnerability Assessment Process

DCMA has established a standardized mission assurance vulnerability assessment process for critical DIB assets. As of June 1, 2007, it had completed and issued eight assessment reports. Lessons learned from earlier assessments have been incorporated into training for the assessments scheduled for fiscal year 2007.

The current approach for performing assessments has evolved from earlier efforts designed to protect the mission of the asset from a broad spectrum of threats. The approach calls for multidisciplinary teams to conduct performance-based assessments to identify vulnerabilities of critical missions and recommend ways to mitigate those vulnerabilities. DOD found these efforts to be effective, but costly and time consuming. It developed a set of standards to conduct vulnerability assessments, building on other vulnerability assessment methods DOD has used. Working through DCMA and the National Guard Bureau, DOD has established a standardized mission assurance assessment for application to critical DIB assets. These assessments consider effect, vulnerability, and threat/hazard from natural disaster, technological failure, human error, criminal activity, or terrorist attack. To perform assessments, DCMA partners with the Defense Security Service (DSS), the Counter Intelligence Field Activity, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and appropriate federal, state, and local law enforcement to identify and characterize all hazard threats to key assets, and uses benchmarks and standards to ensure consistency within the DIB and the broader DCIP community.

The assessment process typically involves (1) using the critical asset list to select the DIB contractor candidate for assessment; (2) notifying the selected DIB asset to schedule the vulnerability assessment; (3) conducting a preassessment briefing with the contractor; (4) scheduling the assessment; (5) negotiating a memorandum of agreement with the contractor to coordinate the terms of the assessment; (6) performing the assessment, which is designed to assess vulnerability to a broad spectrum of threats; (7) providing an outbriefing; and (8) writing a final vulnerability assessment report.

The process for conducting vulnerability assessments on critical DIB contractors is early in implementation and only 8 of the planned 203 have been completed, with reports issued, as of June 1, 2007. DCMA estimated that conducting assessments on all critical DIB assets will take several years. Between fiscal years 2003 and 2006, DOD considered and evaluated different approaches that might be used in conducting on-site vulnerability assessments. For example, five assessments of different types were done by different DOD groups prior to fiscal year 2006. With the benefit of the earlier assessments, DCMA in fiscal year 2006 developed a pilot project that included six vulnerability assessments and used the information gained to develop an approach for conducting on-site vulnerability assessments at all critical DIB asset locations. DCMA had settled on a methodology for outreach to contractors, a standardized approach for conducting on-site vulnerability assessments, and training for National Guard teams to conduct these assessments. DCMA is planning a number of improvements as a result of lessons learned from the six pilot project assessments. For example, DCMA officials said they planned to update the existing benchmarks, develop additional benchmarks for security operations and emergency management, and determine the final report format to use for future assessments. In addition, DCMA officials said that, as a result of the pilot assessments, they plan to change the process on future assessments. For example, rather than a single visit to the contractor to perform the entire assessment, they intend to conduct an advance site visit to identify key officials, gather information, and perform preliminary analyses on manufacturing and infrastructure. They said this will allow more time for up-front analysis and alleviate the workload and reduce the hours needed at the time of the assessment visit.

In fiscal year 2007, DCMA planned to have National Guard teams conduct 19 vulnerability assessments and then to increase its pace to complete these vulnerability assessments at a rate of 50 per year. However, it has changed this goal for 2007, and even at the rates planned it would take 6 years, or until 2012, to complete the initial vulnerability assessments on the 203 critical DIB contractors identified in 2006, as shown in table 4.

ASD(HD&ASA) Has Been Developing a Remediation Guide

ASD(HD&ASA) has been developing the DOD Remediation Planning Guide for the DCIP remediation process in order to provide a standardized process for determining, planning, and implementing remediation actions for DOD personnel involved in remediating risks and supporting overall DOD mission assurance. The planning guide encompasses: (1) DOD- owned assets that support the National Military Strategy; (2) non-DOD- owned assets that support the National Military Strategy (i.e., government- owned infrastructure, commercial-owned infrastructure, and the defense industrial base); and (3) non-DOD-owned assets that are so vital to the nation that their incapacitation, exploitation, or destruction could have a debilitating effect on the security or economic well-being of the nation or could negatively affect national prestige, morale, and confidence.

Because proper remediation lessens the negative effect of an event, it makes sense in many cases to strengthen, through a reduction of risk, those assets critical to DOD missions. When unacceptable levels of risk are identified, an asset owner should seek to remediate them in a prioritized fashion based on their overall risk to DOD. This planning guide identifies and discusses specific actions that are essential to remediation strategy development and implementation. The planning guide calls for an effective plan of action and milestones focusing on a remediation strategy to be developed as soon as feasible following the risk assessment. The planning guide provides the basic steps for an effective plan and suggested time frames: (1) confirm ownership and prioritize risk as soon as possible after completion of assessment; (2) analyze options and determine the best approach within 30 days after a risk assessment is completed; (3) develop the remediation plan as soon as practicable, but not later than 60 days after the risk assessment; (4) implement the remediation plan within 2–4 weeks following remediation plan approval; (5) keep appropriate officials informed at plan commencement and within 2–4 weeks of remediation plan completion; and (6) execute follow-up actions no more than 3 years after risk assessment.

The planning guide also includes a chapter focused on DIB remediation. It states that the remediation measures for the DIB focus on facilitating relationships and sharing information to implement the appropriate level of protection. The chapter referring to the DIB is designed to assist asset owners, operators, and DOD managers in determining whether a remediation action is justified and required. The DIB sector remediation process includes a step-by-step approach for analyzing issues and making judgments. It describes a remediation process that will help preserve privately owned DIB critical asset capabilities. ASD(HD&ASA) officials told us it was designed in a general way without suggested time frames because of the voluntary nature of the DIB participation in the DCIP.

DOD Will Need to Address Several Key Challenges in Implementing Its DIB Risk Management Approach

DOD faces several key challenges in implementing its DIB risk management approach and will need to address them to ensure that its approach is sound and its progress can be measured. First, the critical asset list used by DCMA does not incorporate comprehensive, mission- essential task information from the military services. Second, the prioritization model used by DCMA has not yet undergone external technical review and lacks both contractor-specific data and comprehensive threat information. Third, DCMA is not scheduling and conducting its vulnerability assessments in accordance with the asset rankings in its prioritization model. Fourth, DOD lacks a plan for identifying and addressing challenges in assessing vulnerabilities of critical foreign contractors.

Critical Asset List Does Not Yet Have Comprehensive Mission- Essential Task Information

DCMA is not currently obtaining comprehensive information from all of the combatant commands and services needed to develop a critical asset list that is linked to DOD’s mission-essential tasks. Both the 2006 DIB critical asset list and the list in development for 2007 do not reflect data from all the combatant commands and services using mission-essential task information. The DOD risk management approach calls for identifying DIB assets critical to supporting combatant commanders’ mission- essential tasks that would result in DOD-wide mission failure if the asset were to be damaged, degraded, or destroyed. According to DCMA and the services, DCMA and the Army and Navy provided most of the data for the 2006 critical asset list, but the Air Force did not provide input for the list. In responding to DCMA’s request for the 2007 critical asset list, the Air Force limited its participation to the review and validation of DIB critical assets identified and compiled by DCMA, which used DCMA’s methodology only. This service has made no independent submission of DIB-like assets to DCMA. DCMA officials told us they were aware of the need to link DIB assets to mission-essential tasks. The DIB sector assurance plan calls for identifying assets critical to supporting combatant commanders’ mission-essential tasks that would result in DOD-wide mission failure if the asset were to be damaged, degraded, or destroyed, and DCMA says it plans to continue to collaborate and strengthen relationships with the combatant commands and other DOD organizations in identifying DIB assets and systems supporting their critical missions.

According to OSD officials, the services are still working on identifying the mission-essential tasks and the defense critical assets that support these tasks, including DIB defense critical assets. The method for identifying critical DIB assets has evolved, and refinements are continuing. Thus far, a plan with targets and time frames has not been established for identifying all of the mission-essential tasks for all of the services.

DCMA’s Prioritization Model Has Not Yet Been Reviewed and Does Not Yet Have Contractor- Specific Data or Comprehensive Threat Information

The asset prioritization model has not undergone external technical review. Further, some needed contractor-specific data were missing for a number of the critical assets. Additionally, the absence of comprehensive threat data undermines the utility of the index score for prioritizing contractors.

Model Has Not Yet Had External Technical Review

Our review of the asset prioritization model revealed that weighting factors were selected and much of the input data were determined according to subjective decisions made with only limited review. According to the DCMA official who developed the model, the subjectivity involved in assigning the precise values of the weights in the model is the most controversial aspect of the model. Cross-disciplinary collaboration and peer review are, in our opinion as well as that of DOD officials with whom we spoke, important means of validating modeling strategies. As of the time of our review, DCMA had not had its model independently reviewed.

The model, created in September 2004, has undergone a number of refinements, and more are planned. According to the DCMA staff member who developed the model, he is the only individual who fully understands the model and all submodels and is responsible for assigning factor risk scores to each asset. Future initiatives for refining the model include (1) developing submodels in 2007, (2) addressing issues regarding data absence and data obsolescence in 2008, (3) developing guidance for others on how to use the model (no established target date), and (4) moving from a spreadsheet format to a Web-based application (no established target date). Without independent formal review of its asset prioritization model, DCMA cannot be assured that the model is valid and suitable for its intended purpose.

Needed Contractor-Specific Data Are Missing

Our review of the model also revealed that contractor-specific data were missing for a number of the critical assets. DCMA collects open-source and in-house statistical data on contractor operations, but it lacks some needed contractor-specific information from the DIB contractors on their operations for use in the model. DCMA has undertaken two surveys to obtain these needed data and is planning a third survey, but these efforts depend on contractors’ willingness to provide business sensitive information and they have thus far not been fully successful.

The model does not distinguish between assets marked as high risk by default for lack of data and those for whom data corroborate the high-risk designation. Our review of the asset prioritization model found that DIB contractors with similar entries based on missing data for several factors may not be differentiated one from another; it was not always apparent whether some contractors were identified as high risk because of an unavailability of data or the presence of data that justified the identification. The ability to distinguish between high scores due to risk and high scores due to missing data has important implications for resource allocation, for data collection and assessment, and for risk remediation. Additionally, prioritization of data collection should focus on those items that are most mission-critical and have the highest weight in the model’s scores.

DCMA has conducted two surveys, called industrial capabilities assessments, to obtain contractor-specific information on DIB assets, but both of these efforts have met with limited response rates. DCMA officials said this was due at least partly to contractors’ reluctance to provide information. In 2004 DCMA sent a questionnaire to obtain additional information from DIB contractors. DCMA had requested this information using a cover letter to the companies signed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD-HD) and coordinated with DCMA officials in the field. DCMA officials said that these steps were taken to help ensure a greater response to the survey. Nevertheless, of those responding, some of the survey forms were incomplete and some of the data provided were determined to be unreliable. In 2005, DCMA sent a revised questionnaire, but it was not administered with the same level of discipline used in the first one. For example, it did not use DOD on-site personnel to help ensure high response rates, and only 30 percent of those surveyed responded. Again, responses were incomplete and some of the data were not considered reliable. DOD officials said that contractors were more reluctant to provide certain types of data, such as financial, disaster planning, reconstitution, and especially forecast data. DCMA did not conduct a survey in 2006.

DCMA is planning another effort in fiscal year 2007 to send out a revised capabilities-assessment questionnaire to DIB contractors. DCMA officials are in the process of revising and expanding on the assessment to be sent to contractors to more specifically address critical infrastructure protection. Once DCMA has finalized the critical asset list for 2007, it is planning to conduct a new industrial capabilities survey. However, it will take several months for DIB critical contractors to receive, fill out, and return the industrial capabilities survey; and DCMA has not identified specific steps to ensure that this survey receives a high response rate with quality information.

Model Does Not Yet Incorporate Comprehensive Threat Information

Our review of DOD’s asset prioritization model also revealed a lack of comprehensive threat information. DOD officials told us that intelligence- gathering agencies currently provide information to DCMA through ad hoc agreements, as opposed to a more formalized arrangement. The collection and analysis of DIB-related intelligence information has evolved over time between such agencies as DSS, Counter Intelligence Field Activity, and DCMA. According to DCMA as well other DOD officials, DCMA does not receive comprehensive threat information from the appropriate intelligence agencies to enable it to accurately prioritize DIB assets. These intelligence agencies include the National Counterterrorism Center, DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and its Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center, the FBI, and others. While DCMA obtains information for prioritization from the Counter Intelligence Field Activity, DCMA does not routinely obtain full threat information from these other intelligence agencies. The absence of comprehensive threat data undermines the utility of the index score for prioritizing contractors. Until DCMA develops and implements procedures for obtaining the threat data needed, it cannot rely on the outputs of its asset prioritization model.

Vulnerability Assessments Are Being Conducted without Benefit of Asset Prioritization Rankings

DCMA is conducting its vulnerability assessments on critical DIB assets according to contractor accessibility and without regard for those assets’ respective prioritization model rankings. According to DCMA, one purpose of the prioritization model is to rank critical assets and to use this order to prioritize assessments. DCMA should schedule and conduct its vulnerability assessments on the critical DIB assets based upon their respective rankings as validated in the asset prioritization model.

Furthermore, DOD has not established targets or time frames for resolving this issue.

The assessments to be performed should be identified from a comprehensive critical asset list that has been ranked based on a reliable asset prioritization model. However, DCMA has not used the rankings from its asset prioritization model to schedule outreach visits or on-site vulnerability assessments. According to DCMA officials, a high score on the model should result in DCMA’s contacting the contractor to conduct a vulnerability assessment. However, they said that coordinating on-site assessments is complicated and highly sensitive. DCMA officials say that lack of facility security clearances complicates their efforts to get DIB contractors to participate in DOD’s risk management program because DCMA cannot inform uncleared contractors that they are on the classified critical asset list or discuss with them vulnerabilities found at their facilities. Consequently, officials have devoted outreach efforts, first, to those contractors at facilities having the necessary security clearances, and next, to those that DCMA officials believe would be most amenable to undergoing an assessment. About 52 percent of the DIB facilities identified as critical lack security clearances for the facility or any of its personnel, and thus cannot receive vulnerability assessments or discuss needed remediation actions. DSS officials told us that, though they recognized that many critical contractors did not have facility security clearances, DSS lacks the resources needed to preemptively clear all critical DIB facilities.

In further explaining why they have not followed the prioritization ranking in conducting assessments, DCMA officials said that because private- sector DIB contractors’ participation in the program is voluntary, DCMA must rely on the contractors’ willingness to cooperate and provide information. According to DCMA officials, some DIB contractors have had concerns about sharing information that they consider proprietary, and about the possibility of incurring additional costs and liabilities to correct any vulnerabilities identified as part of this program as a result of sharing this information. These concerns regarding sharing information with DOD were echoed by some of the DIB contractors with whom we spoke, for a variety of reasons. For example, when asked about his willingness to share certain information with DOD, one DIB contractor we spoke with said that he was concerned that information that he deemed proprietary or potentially damaging to the company could somehow be released or disclosed, and he was unsure how DOD would protect such information. Furthermore, DOD officials noted that some significant DIB contractors are involved in classified, special access programs that could involve military mission-essential tasks and as a result may not be allowed or willing to share certain types of information. They also noted that there is no similar effort to identify critical DIB assets from the classified special access program perspective. Consequently, some significant critical DIB assets may not currently be included as part of the program.

DCMA officials told us that, in order to overcome resistance from those DIB contractors that may be reluctant to share information and participate in the program, they have developed tactics that in some cases have been successful in promoting greater voluntary participation. For example, in at least one case, DCMA requested that a high-level DOD official reach out to the contractor directly and make the informational request. Also, DCMA officials told us that they develop memoranda of agreement with contractors that delineate what the on-site assessment will entail, what the assessment team and the company are agreeing to do, and the manner in which the contractor’s information will be used and protected. DCMA officials told us that while these steps have resulted in progress, they have also been time-consuming and have affected the sequence according to which critical DIB contractors have been scheduled for assessment.

The program, and DCMA’s outreach and educational efforts in eliciting contractor information, continue to evolve. For example, the sector- specific plan states that DOD plans to develop an accreditation plan for identifying and certifying Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) under DHS’s PCII program. The PCII program was established by DHS pursuant to the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002. The act provides that critical infrastructure information that is voluntarily submitted to DHS for use by DHS regarding the security of critical infrastructure and protected systems, analysis, warning, interdependency study, recovery, reconstitution, or other informational purpose, when accompanied by an express statement, shall receive various protections, including exemption from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. If such information is validated by DHS as PCII, then the information can only be shared with authorized users. Before accessing and storing PCII, organizations or entities must be accredited and have a PCII officer. Authorized users can request access to PCII on a need-to-know basis, but users outside of DHS do not have the authority to store PCII until their agency is accredited. However, the lack of accreditation does not otherwise prevent entities from sharing information directly with DOD.

However, we noted in our April 2006 report that nonfederal entities continued to be reluctant to provide their sensitive information to DHS because they were not certain that their information will be fully protected, used for future legal or regulatory action, or inadvertently released. Since our April report, DHS published on September 1, 2006, its final rule implementing the act, but we have not examined whether nonfederal entities are more willing to provide sensitive information to DHS under the act at this time, or DOD’s cost to apply for, receive, and maintain accreditation. However, one of the DIB contractors we interviewed mentioned generally that while some advances have been made in information protection, such as the establishment of the PCII program, the contractor continues to be concerned that the program has yet to demonstrate that it can provide good security for contractor- provided information, and remains wary about damage from public or competitor disclosure.

DCMA officials also pursued new legislation and additional provisions for the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation in order to, in their view, potentially increase industry participation, but these changes were ultimately not enacted. For example, DCMA officials had drafted a legislative proposal that stated that “critical supplier assessments and company specific assessments developed under the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program, evaluating the security of Defense Critical Suppliers, shall not be disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act.”

However, DCMA officials told us that the legislative proposal was ultimately not approved to be included in the DOD legislative proposals that are sent to the Congress for consideration and there are no current plans within DOD to pursue this legislation. In addition, DCMA officials also pursued the addition of clauses to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation. The language that was proposed would have included several provisions pertaining to the critical infrastructure of the defense industrial base, such as stating that the contractor shall be responsible for the overall organizational physical protection and security of its own critical infrastructures; have in place a comprehensive security plan relating to overall plant and facility security designed to protect its critical infrastructures; that the government shall be permitted to conduct or facilitate vulnerability and mission assurance assessments under the DCIP. However, these changes were ultimately not submitted to the Defense Acquisition Regulation Council.

DCMA Does Not Yet Have a Plan for Assessing Foreign DIB Critical Assets

DCMA has not established a plan to deal with the potential challenges inherent in assessing vulnerabilities of foreign contractors. In order to do so, DCMA needs to coordinate with other agencies, such as the Department of State, to develop strategies to better ensure that foreign contractor vulnerabilities can be identified and addressed. DCMA has not conducted any assessments of foreign contractors.

The critical asset list identifies nine foreign contractors. DCMA planned to conduct a pilot assessment on one of these contractors in 2006, but did not do so, according to DCMA officials, because procedures are not yet in place for assessing foreign suppliers of products manufactured overseas. The DIB sector-specific plan recognizes the challenge involved when DIB assets are located in foreign countries, and states that where DIB assets are located in foreign countries many of the plan’s proposed activities could be perceived as U.S. government intrusion into sovereign areas of the host country, particularly with respect to threats and vulnerabilities. The plan also recognizes that DOD and the DIB Sector Coordinating Council must ensure that DIB protection activities are coordinated with U.S. embassies and host governments; that where pertinent treaties exist, activities should conform to them; and that a strategy needs to be developed for an action plan in foreign countries with DIB assets.

Conclusions

DOD is in the process of implementing a risk management approach to identify, prioritize, evaluate, and remediate threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to critical DIB assets, including those DIB assets that are critical to achieving DOD’s mission-essential tasks. Several key challenges to the implementation of this program need to be addressed in order for DOD to be able to ensure that its approach is sound. First, in identifying and prioritizing critical DIB assets, DOD is not currently incorporating data reflecting mission-essential task information from all of the services. Second, in order for DOD’s asset prioritization model to be reliable, the model would benefit from appropriate external technical review, and it also lacks selected contractor-specific data that need to be provided by DIB contractors, as well as comprehensive threat information from the appropriate intelligence agencies. Without a comprehensive list of critical assets and a reliable asset prioritization model, DOD cannot ensure that it has identified the most important DIB critical assets, as is necessary for carrying out the National Military Strategy. Third, DOD is currently scheduling and conducting assessments based on contractor amenability and security clearance status, rather than on the rankings assigned to critical DIB assets according to its asset prioritization model. Unless DOD assesses assets based on their rankings determined by a reliable asset prioritization model, DOD will not be in a sound position to know that it is assessing the most critical DIB assets or making the best use of limited resources. Fourth, DOD has not yet developed a plan for identifying and addressing potential challenges in assessing vulnerabilities of critical foreign DIB contractors. As a result, vulnerabilities in these critical foreign contractors can potentially threaten their availability to DOD. Until all of these issues are addressed, DOD will lack the visibility it needs over critical DIB asset vulnerabilities, will be unable to encourage critical DIB contractors to take needed remediation actions, and will be unable to make informed decisions regarding limited resources.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To manage the complete development of the risk management approach to better ensure its effectiveness we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the ASD(HD&ASA) to develop a management framework that includes targets and time frames and undertakes the following steps: Obtain comprehensive data from all the combatant commands and services based on mission-essential task information, and incorporate these data with those set forth in DCMA guidance, to develop a comprehensive list of the critical DIB assets. Improve the reliability of its asset prioritization model by obtaining the appropriate external technical review; developing a detailed plan for improving response rate and data quality from DIB contractors in conducting its next capabilities survey, to ensure that DCMA obtains contractor-specific data needed for establishing priorities; and identifying and developing procedures for obtaining comprehensive threat information from the appropriate intelligence agencies, including DHS, the FBI, and others to use as model inputs to prioritize DIB assets and conduct vulnerability assessments.

Schedule and conduct vulnerability assessments on the critical DIB assets based on their respective rankings as validated in the asset prioritization model, to ensure that the most critical DIB assets are assessed in a timely manner and DOD maximizes its use of limited resources.

Prepare a plan to collaborate with the Department of State and other agencies, as appropriate, to develop options to identify and address potential challenges in assessing vulnerabilities of critical foreign contractors.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with all four recommendations. In its response, DOD cited actions it planned to take that are generally responsive to our recommendations. DOD also provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated in the report, as appropriate. DOD’s response is reprinted in appendix II.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to develop a management framework that includes targets and time frames and to obtain comprehensive data from all the combatant commands and services based on mission-essential task information. DOD stated that DCMA is aware of the need to link DIB assets to mission-essential tasks and that ASD(HD&ASA) has developed a draft DOD instruction to formalize this process. DOD also said that DCMA is incorporating this framework into its process for critical asset identification and that ASD(HD&ASA) is developing a DCIP program plan that will address targets and time frames for achieving these goals. DOD commented that this plan should be completed by the first quarter of fiscal year 2008.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to improve the reliability of its asset prioritization model by obtaining the appropriate external technical review, needed contractor specific data, and comprehensive threat information from the appropriate intelligence agencies and stated that DCMA had coordinated the review of the asset prioritization model with the DOD Modeling and Simulation Office, the Canadian Department of National Defense, and various DOD activities. However, at the time of our review, DCMA had not yet coordinated the review of the asset prioritization model with these offices, and other feedback on the model was informal and undocumented. We found that the model has had a number of refinements over the years and that there are fundamental processes that have not been reviewed. We believe that DOD is responsive to our recommendation in its comment that DCMA is open to further technical review of the APM and will work with ASD(HD&ASA) to identify credible and capable subject matter experts to support this effort, and we would stress the need to develop targets and time frames for completing these actions. DOD also commented that developing a detailed plan may improve the contractor response rate and data quality; but noted that participation by industry to provide information is voluntary and contractors continue to be concerned with the release of certain types of data, such as financial, disaster planning, reconstitution, and especially forecast data. We agree that contractor participation is voluntary but there are strategies available to DCMA to improve response rates. As noted in our report, DCMA response rates declined when the process lacked a coordinated plan. DOD also stated that a draft DOD Instruction 3020.nn identifies the intelligence agencies that DCMA will work with to obtain threat and hazard information on DIB critical assets. However, we found that the draft instruction only identified the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to secure support from other DOD activities and does not reference securing support from agencies we note in the report such as DHS and the FBI. As noted in DCMA’s May 2007 sector assurance plan, barriers in the area of threat assessment information and sharing information still require management attention.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to schedule and conduct vulnerability assessments on the critical DIB assets based on their respective rankings as validated in the asset prioritization model, and noted a number of factors that exist that may prevent scheduling assessments in accordance with the model’s numerical ranking. For example, DOD noted if a contractor on the list is reluctant at first or refuses to participate, it should move to the next contractor on the list, while simultaneously negotiating with the first contractor to gain its participation. DOD also noted that the list is dynamic and may change year-to-year. In addition, DOD may accept the vulnerability assessments performed internally by the contractor providing the company meets established requirements and standards. We believe that the approach described by DOD acknowledges the intent of our recommendation to conduct assessments on the basis of those deemed most critical. We recognize that there will be reasons to conduct assessments out of order, and would expect that those decisions will be documented.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to prepare a plan to collaborate with the Department of State and other agencies, as appropriate, to develop options to identify and address potential challenges in assessing vulnerabilities in foreign critical DIB assets. DOD stated that DCMA efforts to date have focused primarily on Continental United States assets as they constitute 95 percent of the assets on the critical asset list and that the DIB sector specific plan recognizes the challenges involved when DIB assets are located in foreign countries. DOD further stated that DCMA will continue to work with ASD(HD&ASA) in laying out a framework to both address the issue and to work in collaboration with other government agencies, including the Department of State.

As agreed with your offices, we are sending copies of this report to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations, Senate and House Committees on Armed Services, and other interested congressional parties. We also are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or by e-mail at dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To conduct our review of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) defense industrial base (DIB) program, we obtained relevant documentation and interviewed officials from the following DOD organizations: Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Information Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy; Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Counterintelligence & Security, Physical Security Programs; DOD Counterintelligence Field Activity, Critical Infrastructure Protection Program Management Directorate; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD), Critical Infrastructure Protection Office; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, Information Management & Technology Directorate; Joint Staff, Directorate for Operations, Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Combat Support Assessments Department of the Army, Asymmetric Warfare Office, Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Branch; Office of the Chief Information Officer; Mission Assurance Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, Dahlgren, Virginia; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Security Division, Critical Department of the Air Force, Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans, and Requirements, Homeland Defense Division; Headquarters, Defense Intelligence Agency, Office for Critical Infrastructure Protection & Homeland Security/Defense; Headquarters, Defense Information Systems Agency, Critical Headquarters, U.S. Strategic Command, Mission Assurance Division, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska To examine the status of DOD’s efforts to develop and implement a risk management approach, we reviewed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan as they relate to the DIB sector-specific and sector assurance plans, as well as other studies conducted by GAO, the Congressional Research Service, and the DOD Inspector General concerning risk management and defense critical infrastructure. We discussed with DOD officials the requirements for a risk management plan for the DIB and the status of the approach’s implementation. We also reviewed and discussed information and data on the Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA) efforts to identify, assess, and remediate critical DIB assets. Specifically, we evaluated the basis for the criteria DCMA established and used to identify important and critical DIB assets; the ways in which these criteria were used by each of the services to help identify important and critical DIB assets; and the ways in which foreign contractors were being identified. We evaluated information concerning the development of the asset prioritization model, the factors used to rank order the critical assets, the refinements that have been made and planned as the model matures, and the outcomes produced by applying the model to the fiscal year 2006 critical asset list. We reviewed the standardized mission assurance assessment process for critical DIB assets, the development of standards to be used, the training for teams to conduct assessments, the reports on six pilot vulnerability assessments performed in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, and lessons learned to be incorporated in future assessments. We reviewed the remediation planning guidance DOD is developing for the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) generally, and we compared the overall guidance to that being developed for the DIB. We also met with the National Guard Bureau and one of the state National Guard teams that conducts DIB sector vulnerability assessments.

To examine the challenges faced by DOD in developing and implementing its approach, we assessed the extent to which key steps in the planned approach have been implemented. We compared DCIP policies for identifying mission-essential tasks and related defense critical assets with DCMA’s criteria for identifying a critical DIB asset; and we discussed reasons for the differences with OSD, ASD(HD&ASA), DCMA, and the services. We assessed the development and use of DCMA’s asset prioritization model, including discussions with DCMA and OSD about the requirements for models used within DOD to undergo external technical review and to incorporate all the needed data in order to ensure the model’s validity and suitability. We reviewed methods DCMA has used previously to obtain contractor-specific data, as well as methods planned for future efforts, to ensure that DCMA will obtain more complete information. We discussed with DCMA and DOD intelligence agency officials the threats to the DIB and the availability of specific threat information to DCMA. We compared the assessments being conducted with the rankings of the critical DIB contractors in the asset priority model, and we discussed with DCMA officials why they have not followed the rankings and the challenges that they have encountered as they have begun working with private-sector contractors. We reviewed DCMA’s efforts to encourage reluctant private-sector DIB contractors to participate in the program, including potential changes suggested for the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation that were ultimately not enacted. We also reviewed DCMA’s current efforts to work with DHS to develop an accreditation approach for identifying and certifying Protected Critical Infrastructure Information, and steps taken by DCMA to overcome resistance. We spoke with a non-probability sample of DIB contractor officials generally about their willingness to participate in the program and the reasons for their respective views, and we discussed with DOD officials and these contractor officials the availability of data concerning foreign contractors. Their comments are not generalizable to a larger population. Lastly, we determined the extent to which DCMA has identified metrics with time frames for completing development of the risk-based management process. We conducted our work between August 2006 and June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Harold Reich, Assistant Director; Aisha Cabrer; Colin Chambers; Lionel Cooper; Kate Lenane; Anna Maria Ortiz; Terry Richardson; Matthew Sakrekoff; and Cheryl Weissman also made key contributions to this report.