Turkey: Update on Selected Issues
Released: 2004-08-12T00:00:00

Domestic Situation

Politics

Justice and Development Party. In November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a party with Islamist roots, won 363 out of 550seats in parliament and formed the first single-party government in Turkey in over a decade. (1) Deputyparty leader Abdullah Gul became the first AKP prime minister. He ceded the position to partyleader Recep Tayyip Erdogan in March 2003, after parliament lifted a ban on Erdogan's politicalparticipation and he won a seat in parliament. (2) Gulthen became Deputy Prime Minister and ForeignMinister.

Prime Minister Erdogan and the AKP appear to be securely in power and, with its parliamentarymajority, AKP has been able to pass its legislative program. Divisions within the AKP evident onMarch 1, 2003, when parliament rejected a government resolution to approve the deployment of U.S.forces to Turkey to open a northern front against Iraq, have faded. (3) Although AKP's parliamentarygroup is cumbersome, it is not ripe for fissures mainly because of the strength of Erdogan'spersonality and his popularity with the grass roots, and partly because Members enjoy the perquisitesof office. Erdogan's power and charisma are making AKP increasingly similar to traditional Turkishpersonality-dominated political parties.

To avoid the short lives of a series of earlier Islamist political parties, the AKP claims thepopular center-right of the political spectrum. Erdogan rejects the Islamist label, preferring to callhimself and his party "conservative democrats." Some of his statements could be part of anAmerican debate regarding church-state relations. For example, he has said,

"While attaching importance to religion as a social value, we do not think it right to conduct politics through religion, to attempt to transformgovernment ideologically by using religion.... Religion is a sacred and collective value.... It shouldnot be made a subject of political partisanship causing divisiveness ... to make religion an instrumentof politics and to adopt an exclusionary approach to politics in the name of religion harms not onlypolitical pluralism but also religion itself." (4)

The priority that Erdogan and other party leaders give to beginning accession talks with the European Union (EU) aids the AKP's political repositioning. EU reforms and the values theyimpose would pull the entire country to the center and to Western values. For example, the EUrequires equal freedoms for all believers -- for Muslims who are not Sunni and not accepted asMuslim by the AKP's more passionate Islamists, for Christians, Jews, and others who heretoforehave not been treated equally in Turkey. (For more on reforms, see European Union below.)

However, Erdogan's attempt to distance AKP from its Islamist roots is undermined when some party officials and Members of Parliament raise issues with religio-political overtones that generatefriction with the secular establishment in the military, political opposition, and elements in themedia. For their part, secularists create discord when acting preemptively to counter real orsuspected signs of encroaching Islamism. There have been many instances of such tension. Headscarves are a major issue. In Turkey, a head scarf can simply be a sign of religious piety or it can bean assertive expression of opposition to secularism. The wearing of head scarves is banned in publicbuildings, such as parliament and universities. The military is particularly sensitive to this matter. On April 23, 2003, armed forces' commanders declined to attend a reception because the Speaker'swife wears a head scarf, and they did not know if she would attend. (She did not.) In August 2003,Chief of Staff General Hilmi Ozkok pointedly did not invite any officials' wives to a reception. InOctober, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer invited wives of all his guests except those of AKP deputieswho might wear head scarves to a Republic Day reception. Even some ardent secularists criticizedthe President's action as divisive. Erdogan refuses to enter this fray, saying that he is waiting for asocial/national consensus to emerge on the issue. He was "saddened" by the President'sdiscrimination, but attended the reception briefly with most members of his cabinet to avoid furthertension. The European Court of Human Rights has ruled, once again on June 29, 2004, that Turkey'sban on wearing head scarves in state schools does not violate freedom of religion, but rathersafeguards the principle of secularism necessary for the protection of the democratic system. (5)

There have been other controversies about AKP's supposed "Islamist agenda." Foreign Minster Gul sent a circular to embassies encouraging contact with Turkish non-governmental organizationsabroad, including the National View ( Milli Gorus ), which promotes an Islamic state in Turkey. AnAKP-dominated parliamentary committee voted to add 15,000 new positions in the Directorate ofReligious Affairs, which oversees mosques, reportedly horrifying AKP leaders and defyinggovernment promises to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of public employment cuts. (6) TheFinance Minister said that no such appointments would be made. (7) Finally, on three occasions, thePrime Ministers (first Gul, then Erdogan) and Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul have expressedreservations about the expulsion of allegedly fundamentalist soldiers from the armed forces atmeetings of the Supreme Military Council (YAS), insisting that those expelled be afforded the rightto judicial review. (8)

Of potentially long-term consequence for Turkey's secular identity is education. The most heated disputes involve the AKP's attempts, in October 2003 and May 2004, to have the governmentexert greater control over the Higher Education Board and to allow graduates of religious ( imamhatip ) vocational high schools equal access to universities as those of normal high schools. Opponents viewed the bills as an effort to boost attendance at religious schools or to enable imamhatip graduates to qualify for government positions. Secularists on the Board, in opposition parties,universities, and the Office of the Chief of the General Staff, argued that the initiative was aimed atundermining "the basic principles of the republic," and they denounced it. (9) The prominence of themilitary command in the debate raised concerns about the country's political stability and highlighteddifferences between civil-military relations in Turkey and the rest of Europe at a time when the AKPgovernment is seeking EU accession talks. Some questioned why AKP decided to raise the issueat this time since the military's sensitivities are well known. With municipal elections just over andnational elections years off, AKP's stated rationale of needing to reward grassroots wasunconvincing. President Sezer vetoed the bills, asserting that they were "incompatible with the spiritof the Constitution, which is based on the Ataturk (Mustafa Kemal, founder of the Turkish Republic)principles...." (10) Although it could have overriddenthe vetoes by passing an identical bill again, thegovernment withdrew the bills from consideration. It may resubmit the bill again.

Aside from the education bills, Erdogan has generally been politically adroit considering that the Turkish armed forces are the constitutional guarantors of Turkey's secularism and have displacedcivilian governments several times in the past. For example, he acceded to Chief of Staff GeneralHilmi Ozkok's request that the National Security Council (MGK) be headed by a military figure forone more year before it passed to a civilian in August 2004 as required by EU-related reforms. (Formore on the MGK changes, see European Union , below.) Erdogan has benefitted from having themoderate, enlightened, discreet Ozkok as chief of staff. Ozkok consults privately with governmentofficials, voices his opinions at closed National Security Council meetings. At an April 2004 newsconference, he noted that the Turkish Armed Forces "should not be expected to adopt a standregarding every issue or to share everything with the public." (11) Ozkok supports Turkey's EUambitions as the fulfillment of Ataturk's vision of Turkey as a modern, European state, even if thismeans a diminished role for the armed forces and the continuation in office of what the militaryviews as an Islamist government. The imam hatip bill provoked the general to issue rare publiccriticism of a government action.

In addition to the military, Erdogan and the AKP often clash with President Sezer, a popular former judge and ardent secularist, who wields his veto power liberally. (12) Sezer's vetoes havedelayed, but not prevented, passage of parts of the government program. He has been moresuccessful in blocking AKP's appointees to the government, many of whom he views asnon-supportive of the secular state. (13) However,the AKP reportedly has placed many of those deniedpresidential approval in government positions not requiring presidential action.

March 28, 2004, Municipal Elections. (14) AKPwon 41.6% of the vote in the municipal elections -- a strong showing which exceeded the combinedtotal of 38% of the vote won by its next three rivals. Strikingly, AKP won 57 out of 81 mayoralraces, including 12 out of 15 races in major metropolitan areas. In other words, AKP confirmed itsdominance of the center-right, the most popular segment of the Turkish political spectrum.

There are several reasons for AKP's victory: First, its success in sustaining the country's economic stability has created widespread optimism. Second, its steady pursuit of EU membershipis very popular because of people's expectations of economic advancement with accession. (15) Third,its national leaders, including the charismatic Erdogan who spoke in 55 cities, campaignedenergetically and throughout the country. Finally, AKP profited from generally tame, uncriticalmedia coverage of its tenure. AKP also courted its Islamist grassroots by choosing 80% of itsmayoral candidates from the National View movement. The party fielded almost no women mayoralcandidates ostensibly in order to avoid raising the visibility of the controversial head scarf issue. Women who wear head scarves ran for less prominent local assembly seats and won.

AKP made noteworthy inroads into opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) strongholds on the Mediterranean and Aegean coasts and into the Kurdish Democratic People's Party (DEHAP)cities in the southeast. The retrogressive, poorly led, center-left CHP nationalistically opposes thegovernment's Cyprus policy and many of its other policies, but has not truly led opposition to them. It made no electoral headway by taking these positions, receiving 18.2% of the vote, down from19.4% in the 2002 national election. This "leftist" party failed to draw the working class and middleclass vote and is now said to be a party of fierce secularists, the upper middle class, and the Alevis,a heterodox sect mixing Turkish customs with Shi'a Islam whose secularism provides shelter fromdominant Sunni Islam. CHP leader Deniz Baykal has kept his position by outmaneuvering partydissidents, not by policy achievements. DEHAP had allied with four small leftist parties to fieldcandidates jointly as the Union of Democratic Forces, but together they polled fewer votes thanDEHAP alone had won in 2002. AKP won 37% of the vote in the southeast. In other words, AKP'sconservatism (or Islamism) trumped Kurdish nationalism. The combined votes of all of the so-called"left" parties fell from 30% in 2002 to 25% in 2004.

Nonetheless, the election results failed to herald the demise of the opposition. The center-right True Path Party (DYP) and the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) made comebacks,registering some gains and rising to 10.3% and 10.4% of the vote, respectively, primarily due to theirjingoistic dissent from AKP's compromises on Cyprus. Were this a national election, they wouldhave passed the threshold for entry into parliament.

Economy

Turkey appears to have recovered from the severe recession of 2000-2001. It achieved economic targets for 2003 set by an International Monetary Fund (IMF)-monitored reform program,including a 5% (5.9%) Gross National Product (GNP) growth rate, an inflation rate of below 20%(18.4%), and a 6.5% budget surplus. The rate of inflation was the lowest in decades, exports grew30% to $48 billion, and interest rates dropped. Targets for 2004 -- a 5% growth rate, 12% rate ofinflation, and 6.5% budget surplus -- are expected to be met. The State Institute of Statistics hasannounced that the GNP growth rate for the first quarter of 2004 was 12.4%, while the rate ofinflation fell to 9.5%. (16) IMF reviews of Turkey'seconomic performance have been complimentary.

Yet significant problems remain. Unemployment remains high at more than 12% andunderemployment is probably higher. Imports outstrip exports, despite export growth. The goal ofearning $4 billion in revenues from privatization of state enterprises was not met in 2003, with only$2.2 billion gained, and government expectations of $3 billion in revenues from privatization in 2004are probably unrealistic. In June 2004, the court halted the sale of the Turkish Oil RefineryCorporation (TUPRAS) to a Russian firm for about $1.3 billion. Earlier, the government hadcanceled the sale of the state tobacco monopoly after bids were deemed too low, while protractedpreparations for the sale of 51% of the state telecommunications monopoly (TURK TELECOM)have not been concluded. Moreover, corruption scandals involving the Uzan family, accused ofdefrauding Motorola of billions of dollars, probably have affected sales to Western investors.

Despite the effects of privatization difficulties on revenues, the government increased pension payments and the minimum wage, prompting the IMF to seek and obtain offsetting budget cuts andincreases in tax revenues. The IMF continues to encourage Turkey to improve tax administrationto combat tax evasion and to undertake social security reforms, saying such measures would boostpolicy credibility and underpin the success of the reform program. (17) Current arrangements betweenTurkey and the IMF end in February 2005. Officials plan to sign a new three-year stand-byagreement to cover the period 2005-2007.

Turkey remains economically vulnerable because its public debt consumed about 75% of gross domestic product (GDP) as of December 2003. Although the ratio of debt to GDP is diminishing,much of the debt is short-term and rolled over at fluctuating interest rates. (18) The need to pay downthe debt, especially the part carrying high interest rates, is the reason for IMF demands a 6.5% budgetsurplus.

Turkey relies heavily on borrowing partly because of lack of alternative sources of capital. It has very low foreign direct investment -- only 0.15% of the world's foreign direct investmentinflows in 2002. (19) Foreign investors have beenwary of investing in Turkey because oftime-consuming bureaucratic procedures and problems with transparency and rule of law in businessrelationships. The average time between authorization and investment reportedly is two years. Turkey ranked 77 out of 133 countries on the 2003 Transparency International CorruptionPerceptions Index. (20) In June 2003, parliamentpassed a new foreign investment law to guaranteeequal rights for foreign investors and ease procedures for establishing companies. Investors probablywill monitor implementation of the law before rushing to invest in Turkey. In addition to thesemeasures, the government believes that economic stability resulting from the economic reformprogram and possible accession talks with the EU in 2005 should attract more investors.

Terrorism

Kurdistan Workers Party. For a long time, terrorism in Turkey referred mainly to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its successor groups. From 1984-1999, the Turkish armed forces fought a war against PKK insurgents (Turkish Kurds)who sought autonomy or independence. The PKK operated mainly in southeast Turkey, althoughit also attacked elsewhere in Turkey and Turkish targets in Europe. The PKK has appeared toflounder since its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured and imprisoned in 1999.

In April 2002, the PKK renamed itself the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK), but retained many of the same leaders. In November 2003, KADEK dissolved itself andthe People's Congress of Kurdistan (KONGRA-GEL) was established. KONGRA-GEL claims tobe a purely political organization embracing the Kurds of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. ItsConstitution calls for "a durable solution to the Kurdish Question" by "promoting democratic forces"and does not mention independence or autonomy. (21) As the PKK transformed itself into KADEK andKONGRA-GEL, its military wing, the People's Defense Forces, was termed "independent" and didnot dissolve or disarm. Turkish officials and media refer to PKK successor groups jointly with thePKK, e.g., PKK/KADEK or PKK/KONGRA-GEL. On November 14, 2003, the U.S. StateDepartment spokesman said, "The PKK/KADEK, under any alias, is a terrorist organization, and noname change or press release can alter that fact" and, on January 13, 2004, the Departmentdesignated KONGRA-GEL as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

The PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL was relatively inactive as a terrorist group until recently, and its capabilities may be doubted. Although the State Departments and Turkish authorities allegethat about 4,000 PKK members have taken safe haven in northern Iraq, that number dates frombefore Ocalan's capture and, given the possible dispersal of followers since then, the real strengthof the group may be lower or different. (22) Moreover, KONGRA-GEL appeared to suffer a schism in2004 involving Ocalan's brother Osman and others, which may have distracted it from the fight. (23) Another sign of PKK decline may have been apparent in KONGRA-GEL/PKK's support for theUnion of Democratic Forces, which included the Kurdish party DEHAP and performed poorly inthe March 2004 municipal elections.

KONGRA-GEL announced that it was ending a five-year unilateral cease-fire on June 1, 2004, and warned foreign investors and tourists against coming to Turkey. There has since been anupsurge in incidents in southeast Turkey, which Turkish officials attribute to the return of militantsfrom northern Iraq. Turkish Kurds in the southeast, benefitting from reforms such as Kurdishlanguage broadcasting and other language and cultural rights, do not want a return to war. Fourformer Turkish Kurdish parliamentarians released from prison in June called for the KONGRA-GELto continue the cease-fire -- an unusual public display of dissent.

The PKK remnants may no longer pose a major threat to Turkey. They nonetheless remain an obsession of the Turkish military, which views a PKK with a possibly nonviolent, political agendaas the same as an active terrorist PKK. (24) Thisunchanging view of the PKK is the prism throughwhich much of Turkey's policy toward Iraq is formulated. (See also Iraq , below.)

Radical Religious Terrorism. In November 2003, local Turkish terrorists reportedly connected to the Al Qaeda international network perpetrated foursuicide bombings in Istanbul: two targeting synagogues, one the British consulate, and one a localoffice of HSBC, an international bank based in London. Sixty-two people were killed, including theBritish consul, and more than 700 injured. Most of the victims were Turks. All of the suspects wereTurks, and several have been charged with trying to overthrow the constitutional order, i.e., withtreason.

Soon after the bombings, Turkish government spokesmen alleged that the terrorists and their associates "appear to be close to Al Qaeda." (25) Some perpetrators reportedly were former membersof the Islamic Great Raiders Front (IBDA-C) and Hezbollah (not affiliated with the Lebanese groupof the same name), which are two domestic fundamentalist terror groups. (26) These operatives weresaid to have trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1990's, and to have fought in Bosnia andChechnya. (27) They returned to Turkey as"sleepers." (28) Several reportedly had met Al QaedaleaderAyman al Zawahiri, who may have ordered the attacks in Istanbul; one was said to have met Osamabin Laden. Prime Minister Erdogan stated that the attacks had been planned and organized abroad. (29) The attacks marked a significant increase in the operational capabilities of domestic terror groupsand in their financial resources, seeming to confirm assumptions of foreign assistance withintelligence, explosives, and finances. U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Eric Edelman observed that thesophistication of the attacks, the multiple attacks, and their coincidental timing were consistent withthe pattern of previous Al Qaeda attacks. (30) Otheroutside links may have been evident when severalsuspects were captured at the Iranian border and the Syrian government handed over 22 others,although only one of them was charged. A telephone caller to a Turkish news agency claimed jointresponsibility for all four bombings in the name of Al Qaeda and IBDA-C. A group calling itselfAbu Hafs al Masri Brigades, Al Qaeda, (taking the nom de guerre of Mohammed Atef, an Al Qaedaleader killed in Afghanistan in November 2001) made claims of responsibility to Arab media. (31)

In June 2004, the government postponed the trial of 69 men charged in connection with the November 2003 bombings because the recently abolished state security courts had not yet beenreplaced. The indictment alleges that some defendants had direct contacts with Osama bin Laden,had trained at Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, and had received $150,000 from Al Qaeda to carryout the Istanbul bombings. Cell leaders were said to be still at large. (32)

On March 9, 2004, suicide bombers killed two, including one attacker, and injured six others at a Masonic lodge in Istanbul. A statement in the name of Al Qaeda sent to a London-based Arabicnewspaper claimed responsibility. The indictment of the surviving bomber charged that he hadreceived training at a Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT) camp in Kashmir and had subsequently fought inChechnya. LT may have ties to Al Qaeda. (33) Islamist radicals view the Masons, who have awell-established presence in Turkey, as supporters of the United States and Israel.

In May, 25 Turks were arrested simultaneously in Bursa and Istanbul; nine of them were charged with plotting to set off a bomb at the June 28-29 NATO summit in Istanbul and withmembership in an illegal organization. A provincial governor claimed that the suspects included aleader and members of Ansar al Islam, a group linked to Al Qaeda, and described bomb-making andother equipment seized by police. Turkish television reported that some of those arrested hadparticipated in the insurgency in Iraq. (34) In June,four more Al Ansar suspects were detained inIstanbul also in possession of bomb-making materials and charged with belonging to an illegalorganization; two others were released.

The idea of Islamist terrorism appears to pose a philosophical dilemma for the AKP. Prime Minister Erdogan has denied that there could be "Islamic terror" and challenged attributions of "qualities such as terrorism to our sacred religion...." (35) He declared that terror is an act of perversiondetached from all beliefs and that Islam "can never be associated with terrorism." (36) A well-knownTurkish commentator suggested that in order for the government to succeed against terroristorganizations, however, it had to identify the target by name and to focus on it resolutely. (37) Heimplied that the AKP could not crack down on Islamist terrorists if it could not recognize theirpossibility.

The broad intent of the November 2003 Istanbul bombings was to kill Jews and strike at Britain, a U.S. ally and former regional colonial power. The attacks coincided with President Bush'sstate visit to the United Kingdom, which may or may not have been significant. Turkey also mayhave been the target because of its secular identity, close ties to the West, especially the UnitedStates, membership in NATO, and perceived good relations with Israel. Moreover, it is apredominantly Muslim state led by a party with Islamic roots, which has vowed loyalty to Turkey'ssecular identity and the goal of building a pro-Western democracy.

Other.

On June 24, 2004, two days before President Bush's arrival in Turkey for an official visit and the NATO summit, bombs exploded in Istanbul and Ankara, killing four and injuring more than 20.A small Marxist-Leninist group claimed responsibility and the police arrested three suspects. (38)

The Al Qaeda-linked Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades claimed responsibility on an Islamist website for bombing two hotels and a liquefied natural gas pumping station in Istanbul on August 9, killingtwo and injuring nine. The Abu Hafs statement declared that the bombings were the first in a seriesto in response to the Europeans' "rejection" of Osama bin Laden's offer of a truce. A previouslyunheard of group, the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks, which Turkish authorities suspect is linked to thePKK/KONGRA-GEL, also claimed the act. (39) Thepolice are focusing on the Kurds.

European Union Prospects (40)

Accession Issues

Turkey signed an association agreement with the European Community, the precursor to the European Union (EU) in 1963, submitted an application for membership in 1987, and began acustoms union with the EU in 1996. Turkey wants the EU summit in December 2004 to set a datefor accession (membership) talks. The EU reaffirmed Turkey's candidacy for membership in 1999,but Turkey must meet the EU's political and economic criteria for membership before accessiontalks can begin. (41) The Turkish parliament haspassed nine packages of reforms since October 2001-- five since the AKP took office -- to harmonize Turkish laws and Constitution with EUstandards. (42) Among other actions, new lawslegalize Kurdish broadcasting and education, abolishthe death penalty, enhance freedoms of speech and association, and hasten investigations ofallegations of torture and mistreatment of prisoners.

A legislative package passed on August 8, 2003 was aimed at answering EU criticism of the lack of adequate civilian control over the military by introducing revolutionary changes incivilian-military relations. It limited the power of the National Security Council (MGK), theinfluential, military-dominated civilian-military government body which traditionally has madebinding security and foreign policy recommendations to the government. The new law downgradesthe MGK to an advisory board, allows a civilian to become its secretary general (although Erdoganagreed that a soldier would hold the position until August 2004), changes the frequency of meetingsfrom monthly to bimonthly, gives authority to follow up decisions to a civilian deputy primeminister, and subjects military expenditures to legislative oversight but not public disclosure. TheMGK budget was cut 60% for FY2004. Subsequent reforms legislated in May 2004 removedmilitary designees from the national broadcasting and higher education boards. If fully implemented,the reforms have the potential to transform Turkey's political system.

Another EU priority has been improving the treatment of Turkish Kurds, who constitute about 20% of a population of 70 million. New laws are intended to improve cultural rights. Parliamentalso passed a Reassociation (or Rehabilitation) Law, a limited amnesty, reducing sentences of someprisoners and pardoning others. It did not apply to PKK leaders and expired on February 8, 2004. The PKK denounced the law and demanded a total amnesty. The government was not able toconvince many PKK members to take advantage of the law, and it appears to have benefitted alreadyimprisoned members of other domestic terror groups, such as Hezbollah, IBDA-C, and theRevolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C), who made more applications for amnestythan did members of the PKK. On June 9, four former Kurdish Members of Parliament, mostprominently Leyla Zana, were released from prison after serving 10 years for membership in aseparatist organization (the PKK), pending appeal. Their case is a cause celebre in Europe and willbe retried in October. Foreign Minister Gul met the four shortly after their release.

In November 2003, the European Commission issued its annual progress report assessing Turkey's compliance with the criteria for EU membership. (43) While recognizing significant progress,the report noted many shortcomings in meeting political criteria and in implementing reforms. Similarly the European Council (summit of leaders) in December 2003, called for "further sustainedefforts," to achieve independence of the judiciary, fuller exercise of freedoms of association,expression, and religion, alignment of civil-military relations with European practice, andimprovements in the "situation in the Southeast of the country and cultural rights." Prime MinisterErdogan tasked the Foreign Minister, Justice Minister, and Interior Minister to facilitateimplementation of reforms.

A preliminary Council of Europe (COE) report, issued in March 2004, saluted Turkey's progress in human rights, while noting remaining deficiencies and making recommendations on howto address them. In June, the COE dropped Turkey from a list of countries monitored for democraticshortcomings. The COE had removed other EU candidates from monitoring before they beganaccession talks. Then, on April 1, the European Parliament (EP) approved a report which praisedthe "strong motivation and political will" demonstrated by the AKP government in passing"revolutionary" reforms. However, the EP said that reforms could only be judged on the basis ofhow they are put into practice, and repeated criticisms of the role of the military in politics anddeficiencies in human rights practices. The report suggested that Turkey may need a newconstitution to replace the current one which "carried the seal of the authoritarian regime of 1982,"i.e., a military government. (44)

Erdogan has lobbied for Turkey's EU accession extensively in Europe. He emphasizes the beneficial effects that entry into the EU of a country that successfully reconciled Islamic culture withdemocracy could have on the EU image in the eyes of the world's 1.5 billion Muslims. Accordingto him, "it would prove that the EU is not a Christian club" (45) and that a compromise of civilizationsis preferable to a clash of civilizations. (46)

It is not certain if Turkey will be able to adequately address deficiencies in its implementation of reforms or to overcome the qualms of many Europeans regarding its membership by December.The predominantly Christian member states already face problems integrating Muslim immigrants,and many Europeans blame Muslims for extremism, terrorism, and anti-Semitism. Many Europeansare grappling with issues of identity, and do not believe that Turkey can be European. They disagreewith the U.S. official argument that admitting Turkey might help to spread democracy andmoderation to other Muslim states. Some Europeans know that if populous Turkey enters the EU,it would be more populous than France and soon be larger than Germany, with the right to demandcommensurate clout in EU political bodies. This undoubtedly adds to their doubts. As a sign of thesensitivity of the issue, the European Commission has decided to formally consult all 25 membercountries before issuing its next progress report in October 2004.

Cyprus (47)

Although a settlement on Cyprus is not a criterion for EU membership, it is generally understood that Turkey will not be admitted to the EU unless there is a settlement. Without asettlement, Greece and (Greek) Cyprus, both EU members, probably will veto Turkey's accession. However, Greece supports the beginning of accession talks, and the (Greek) Cypriot government hasindicated that it will not veto accession talks if there is a consensus among all other members on theissue. The November 2003 EU progress report declared, "The absence of a settlement could becomea serious obstacle to Turkey's EU aspirations." European Commission President Romano Prodiobserved during his visit to Turkey in January 2004 that while Cyprus is not a precondition toTurkey's entry, "it is a political reality." (48)

Cyprus has been divided between Greek and Turkish Cypriots since a 1974 Turkish invasion/intervention (some Turks prefer "peace operation"). Turkish Cypriots administer thenorthern part of the island; Greek Cypriots govern the southern part of the island and are theinternationally recognized government of Cyprus. The United Nations has made repeated efforts toreunify the island. In November 2002, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan presented a newsettlement plan and subsequently revised it several times based on comments from the parties. PrimeMinister Erdogan accepted the Annan Plan as the basis for further negotiations. Under pressure dueto his EU aspirations, Erdogan repeatedly asserted that the continuation of no solution on Cyprus isnot a solution, in contrast to former Turkish leaders who had argued that the issue had been settledin 1974. His government was able to make a joint reassessment of policy with the Turkish Cypriotsafter December 14, 2003, parliamentary elections in northern Cyprus brought pro-settlement forcesto power.

Erdogan first secured the support of the National Security Council for a new initiative. On January 23, 2004, the Council reiterated "its political determination to rapidly reach a solutionthrough negotiations in line with the realities on the island with the Annan Plan as a reference." (49) On January 24, Erdogan informed Annan that Turkey was ready to resume negotiations with his planas a reference, with the goal of reaching an agreement and holding referenda to approve it beforeMay 1 (when Cyprus was scheduled to join the EU). Erdogan boldly said that if the two sides cannotfill in all the "blanks," then Turkey would allow Annan to fill them in if the Greek Cypriots acceptthat as well.

Talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders on a Cyprus settlement resumed in mid-February. Predictably due to their hard line views, (Greek) Cypriot President TassosPapadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash failed to agree on revising Annan's plan. Denktash then bowed out of the talks, and Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat, who favors asettlement, negotiated for the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers joined theCypriots in consultations with the U.N. in Switzerland. On March 29, Annan presented a revisedplan. Turkey accepted it. The Plan was put to referenda on the island on April 24. The GreekCypriots decisively rejected it with 76% of the vote, while the Turkish Cypriots clearly accepted itwith 65% of their votes. Notwithstanding the outcome, Cyprus entered the EU on May 1, aspreviously scheduled. The Turkish government escaped blame for the failure, which shifted to theGreek Cypriot leadership. Many in the EU no longer view a Cyprus settlement as a precondition forcommencing accession negotiations with Turkey. Other issues have greater bearing on theirdetermination.

Iraq

After the March 1, 2003 Vote

The Turkish parliament's refusal on March 1, 2003, to authorize the deployment of U.S. forces to Turkey for the purpose of opening a northern front against Iraq jolted the settled U.S. view ofTurkey as a malleable strategic partner. (50) Although widely popular in Turkey as a statement ofnational independence and sign of democratic progress, the vote shook the AKP government whichscrambled to repair the damage to the bilateral relationship.

The vote against the U.S. deployment has been attributed to many causes, including alleged U.S. arrogance in deploying ships to Turkish waters before the vote and insulting U.S. mediaportraits of Turkish officials as bazaar merchants bargaining for a higher price. Turkish officials alsohad earlier voiced many concerns about a possible war in Iraq: economic costs, a likely refugeeinflux, the demonstration effect of a possible independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq for TurkishKurdish separatists, possible Kurdish control over oil resources that could support independence, andharm to Turkey's ethnic kin, the Iraqi Turkomen.

Many of Turkey's fears about an Iraq war were not realized. Economic costs were minor and transitory. Bilateral trade between Turkey and Iraq is on course to reach pre-war levels. The UnitedStates is purchasing humanitarian and military supplies from Turkish sources, and contracting withTurkish truckers to deliver them. Turkey's tourism and export sectors experienced temporary losses,but recovered quickly, and the IMF program was not derailed. There was no refugee crisis. IraqiKurds claim to have deferred their dream of independence in favor of participating in a federal Iraqistate. They did not take over oil facilities in the north, and are bargaining with other members of theIraqi government over autonomy, revenue-sharing, and other issues. Kurdish-Turkomen tensionshave not been uncontrollable.

After the war began, U.S. officials cautioned Turkey against sending more forces into northernIraq, where about 5,000 Turkish troops have been posted for some time to act against PKK remnantsand safe havens. (51) Since then, there have beenproblems between the U.S. and Turkish militaries. On April 22, 2003, U.S. troops arrested Turkish soldiers dressed in civilian clothes who reportedlywere escorting a cargo of weapons hidden in an aid convoy. (52) Then, on July 4, 2003, U.S. troopscaptured 11 Turkish special forces soldiers and others at a Turkish liaison office in Sulaymaniyahin northern Iraq, covered their heads with sacks, and took them to Baghdad, where they were heldfor more than two days. U.S. spokesmen claimed that the action was prompted by reports that theTurks had been planning to assassinate the Kurdish governor of Kirkuk and to weaken the Kurds inthe north through support of the Turkomen. (53)

The incident provoked such outrage in Turkey that the personal involvement of Prime Minister Erdogan and Vice President Cheney was needed to dampen it. After a joint military investigation,both sides officially expressed regret that the incident had occurred. (54) To mollify the Turks, U.S.officials reportedly agreed to force PKK guerrillas out of northern Iraq. (55) With their departure,Turkish forces were expected to leave northern Iraq. This U.S. promise has been repeated often, butnot fulfilled. So Turkish troops remain in the north. Bilateral military ties still have not recoveredfrom Sulaymaniyah.

Turkish Peacekeepers

At the request of the United States, the Turkish government considered sending peacekeeping troops to Iraq. To convince a skeptical public, Foreign Minister Gul emphasized the peacekeeping,humanitarian, and developmental aspects of the mission. Chief of Staff General Ozkok supportedthe undertaking, noting, "possible instability in Iraq would be bad for Turkey." (56) U.S.-Turkishnegotiations about peacekeeping involved the command, location, and supply routes for Turkishtroops, but the PKK presence in northern Iraq sometimes seemed to be the main subject of the talks. U.S. officials repeated their commitment to deal with the PKK. Meanwhile, a poll in August 2003indicated that 65% of the Turkish public opposed sending troops to Iraq. (57) The August 19, 2003,bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad aided opponents of a Turkish deployment.

U.S. officials did not press for a rapid decision by Ankara as openly as they had before March 1, but Secretary of State Powell and Undersecretary of Defense Wolfowitz lobbied the Turks. (58) TheAmericans reportedly wanted the presence of Muslim peacekeepers to diffuse charges that the UnitedStates is waging a war against Islam. Moreover, they viewed the addition of up to 10,000 Turkishtroops as a way to relieve U.S. forces.

On October 7, the Turkish parliament approved a government motion to dispatch an unspecified number of troops to Iraq for one year by a vote of 358 to 183. The opposition CHPvoted as a block against the measure. The motion conveyed several messages: it stressed that Turkeywould take "all necessary measures to clear out PKK-KADEK elements in Iraq and prevent Iraq'sbecoming an asylum for terrorists in the future;" it stated that "protection of Iraqi territorial integrityand its national unity and establishment of a new democratic Iraq ... carry vital importance forTurkey;" and it said that in addition to its security and stability missions, the Turkish army would"improve humanitarian aid and the economic structure." (59)

Neither the U.S. nor the Turkish government accurately assessed Iraqi opposition to a Turkish military presence in Iraq. (60) The Iraqi Kurds'antagonism was strongest as they feared that Ankaraintended to use the troops to undermine their autonomy. The Kurds argued that forces fromneighboring countries would bring their own political agenda which could have a destabilizingeffect. (61) The Shi'a also resisted, claiming that theTurkish soldiers would be occupiers, after all theTurks as the Ottoman Empire had controlled the territory that is now Iraq for 400 years, ordisparaging Turks because they are Sunni. Many Iraqis reiterated oft-voiced fears that Turkey seeksto control the oil-rich areas of Mosul and Kirkuk. The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) reached aconsensus on a statement opposing Turkish troops, but U.S. authorities were said to have preventedits release. (62)

As opposition grew in Iraq, it did the same in Turkey. Analysts wrote that Iraq was dangerous, and that Turkish casualties should not replace Americans. They claimed that the U.S. would not giveTurkey a role in determining Iraq's future, and doubted that thinly stretched U.S. forces in Iraq wouldkeep promises to act against the PKK. (63) Turkishofficials publicly sought to discount IGC views,but they were said to be discouraged by the IGC's attitude and by the lack of U.S. influence over theCouncil on the issue. Although U.S. officials in Washington had encouraged Turkey, CoalitionProvisional Authority (CPA) Administrator Paul Bremer suggested that Turkey should discuss itsdeployment with the IGC. Turkey maintained that its interlocutor was the United States.

Events unfolded rapidly. On October 14, a suicide bombing at the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad wounded about 15. On October 16, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 authorized a"multinational force under unified command," answering questions about the internationallegitimacy of a possible Turkish troop deployment. (64) By the end of October, however, PrimeMinister Erdogan told his parliamentary group, "we are in favor of abandoning the dispatch of troopsinto Iraq under the prevailing circumstances." (65) Turkish officials openly criticized the United States. Foreign Minister Gul observed, "there is a question of incompetence here. At first, they were veryeager and did not want the matter to be delayed, but now they have their doubts. We, for our part,do not do business when there are doubts." (66)

The decision not to deploy was announced in Ankara. On November 6, Foreign Minister Gul telephoned Secretary of State Powell to "review the issue of Turkey contributing units to Iraq in lightof the circumstances prevailing currently in Iraq" and said that his government would reconsider theproposal to send troops to Iraq. (67) Turks generallyfelt that the United States had treated themshabbily.

After the Peacekeeping Issue

Although the peacekeeping issue ended awkwardly, the AKP was spared the sight of and responsibility for body bags returning from Iraq. Since the deployment was unpopular, the party alsoescaped a resulting loss of popularity.

The Turkish government has since worked to normalize relations with the Iraqi government by hosting its leaders, expediting aid shipments, and boosting trade. At the Madrid donors' conferencein October 2003, Turkey pledged $50 million in aid for Iraq over five years. Turkey provideselectricity, water, and fuel to Iraq. Nearly 1,000 Turkish businessmen are working in Iraq, andTurkey expects to export over $1.6 billion in goods to Iraq in 2004. However, this goal may bethreatened by terrorists who have kidnaped and murdered Turkish truck drivers in Iraq, demandingthat Turks demonstrate against the United States and stop doing business with U.S. forces. Inreaction, the Turkish trucking association called on its members to stop all deliveries to U.S. forcesin Iraq. The Turkish government is determined to continue to trade with Iraq and says that it is takingmeasures to minimize risks.

Ankara granted a major concession to Washington when it approved (without recourse to parliament) a November 28, 2003, U.S. EUCOM request to use Incirlik Air Base for the rotation(transit) of tens of thousands of troops from Iraq between January and April 2004. Half of all U.S.troops rotated traveled via Incirlik. Others traveled through other countries.

There still has been no U.S. military action against the PKK/KADEK/ KONGRA-GEL in northern Iraq. On April 29, 2004, U.S. Counterterrorism Coordinator Cofer Black amended earlierU.S. promises when he stated, "The most efficient and effective way to address this is using elementsof diplomacy, to get the community of nations to assist us in this, to use law enforcement, to usefinancial means.... And if we are unable to reach out objective using this spectrum of elements ofstatecraft, we will use military force when is appropriate." (68) On June 18, U.S. Ambassador to TurkeyEric Adelman said that he did not expect a U.S. military operation against the PKK in the nearfuture. (69) On July 9, Deputy Chief of Staff GeneralIlker Basbug observed, "It is clear that the UnitedStates has so far failed to ... live up to expectations." (70) He declared that Turkish troops would notwithdraw from northern Iraq until the PKK is eradicated.

The Future

During their meeting at the White House on January 28, 2004, President Bush assured Prime Minister Erdogan, "The United States' ambition is for a peaceful country, a democratic Iraq that isterritorially intact," (71) but the two leadersreportedly did not discuss Iraq's governmental structure,Kirkuk, its oil revenues, or the Turkomen. (72) Hence, the Turks were not fully reassured about thefuture of Iraq and how the Administration will handle the Iraqi Kurds, and were troubled when thedraft Iraqi constitution's failed to give Turkomen equal status to Arabs and Kurds and granted theKurds a favorable position in the government. (73) Despite its concerns, Ankara supported the U.S.transfer of political sovereignty to Iraqis on June 28 and welcomed NATO's decision to train Iraq'ssecurity forces.

Turkish officials state that the people of Iraq will decide on their form of government, but the Turks openly oppose a federation based on ethnic or religious identity -- "structures that may leadto divisions and breakups in the future." (74) Ambassador Osman Koruturk, Turkey's specialrepresentative to Iraq, said that Turkey would not oppose status granted to the Kurds in an Iraqiconstitution adopted in a future referendum provided that it respects Iraq's territorial integrity. Healso conveyed Turkey's "serious sensitivities" regarding Kirkuk. (75) Turkish arguments are usuallycouched in terms of concern for the Turkomen. Foreign Minister Gul warned against what he termed"faits accomplis and at changing the demographic situation" in the city, although it is not clear whatTurkey could do. (76) As one observed commented,the Kurds seek to enlarge the scope of "theirgeographic, political, and economic sovereignty in the federal structure to be established," whileAnkara seeks to limit it to minimize the harm it might cause to its national interest. (77) So tensionpersists. Ankara thus far has chosen a dialogue with Kurdish leaders and other Iraqi officials as theway to communicate its reservations and uneasiness and to achieve its preferred outcomes.

Relations with Israel (78)

The New Chill

After warming in the 1990s with defense cooperation and fast-growing trade, Turkish-Israeli relations are cooling for several reasons. The Oslo peace process had provided political cover forTurkey to improve relations with Israel in the 1990's; but that process is now all but dead. Meanwhile, the AKP government came to power seeking better relations with Arab and Muslimgovernments. Its attitude toward Israel was prominent in the months before the June 2004 meetingof the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), a solidarity group of 57 countries and otherswith significant Muslim populations in Istanbul. The AKP wanted its policies to be perceived as inline with those of other Muslim countries. Those countries and a majority of Turks were upset byIsrael's actions against Palestinians, its construction of the security barrier in the West Bank, and itsproposed unilateral disengagement from Gaza. Moreover, distancing Turkey from Israel enabledAKP leaders to reassure their political base, which was probably disappointed by the party's failureto win acceptance of head scarves in state institutions and of imam hatip students in universities, oftheir loyalty. It should be noted, however, that criticism of Israel In Turkey is not limited toIslamists. The respected former Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen, for example, has called forrethinking relations. (79) In a recent Turkish poll,75% of the respondents agreed that "it isunnecessary to cooperate with Israel." (80)

The Kurdish Issue

At the same time that Turks are outraged by Israel's actions, they have a common interest with neighboring Iran and Syria in opposing a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. All three fear the potentialimpact that such a state could have on their own Kurdish populations. Damascus had produced achange in Ankara's views of it by expelling PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, obviatingTurkey's need for Israel to pressure Syria to end its support of the PKK. Meanwhile, Iran iscementing ties with Turkey by conducting operations against the PKK in regions bordering Turkey.Turkey does not view Iran and its reported plans to develop weapons of mass destruction as a threat. Bilateral trade between Turkey and both countries is growing, and high level visits have beenexchanged. In January 2004, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad visited Turkey and, in July, PrimeMinister Erdogan visited Iran.

The commonality Turkey has achieved with its neighbors contrasts with its increasing suspicions about Israel's intentions in northern Iraq. It has been suggested that Israel hopes for a"decentralized, weak, and non-threatening Iraq" which the Iraqi Kurds may help them achieve, whileTurkey seeks a strong, predominantly Arab, central government in Baghdad to constrain Kurdishnationalism. (81) Media reports have added toAnkara's distrust of Israeli actions. Most notably, arecent, controversial article by Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker claimed that Israelis are trainingKurdish militias in northern Iraq and running covert operations from there into Kurdish areas of Iranand Syria. (82) Turkish newspapers independentlycharged that Israeli Kurds are buying land fromArabs in northern Iraq with the assistance of Iraqi Kurdish groups and that the Israeli intelligenceagency, Mossad, is present in the region. The reports describe the alleged Israeli land purchases asa threat to Turkomen. (83) Israeli Foreign MinisterSilvan Shalom has said that Israeli businessmenactive in northern Iraq are not acting on behalf of the Israeli government, and stressed that Israel"will not do anything that could undermine Turkey's interests in northern Iraq." (84) The Israeligovernment specifically denied Hersh's report. Foreign Minister Gul publicly accepted the denial. Yet, official Israeli statements are not widely believed in Turkey -- 65% of the respondents in arecent poll asserted that they believe that Israel is supporting the PKK. (85)

The EU Factor

Turkey may be attempting to conform its foreign policies to those of major European Union members in order to get a date for accession talks. The EU, the largest foreign donor to thePalestinian Authority, is generally critical of Israeli conduct toward the Palestinians. Turkey'srapprochement with Syria and Iran may also appeal to Europeans concerned about instability alongTurkey's borders.

Erdogan Lambastes Israel

Prime Minister Erdogan has taken the lead in criticizing Israel. He condemned Israel's assassination of Hamas leader Shaykh Ahmed Yassin in March 2004; On May 20, he labeled it"practically state terrorism." Turkish officials describe Yassin sympathetically as a "spiritual leader"and "invalid." On May 25, Erdogan asked a visiting Israeli minister, "How is what you are doingdifferent than what the terrorists are doing? They kill civilians, you also kill civilians." He addedthat Israel's actions do not promote peace, and renewed an oft-made offer to mediate between Israeland both the Palestinians and Syria. (86) On May31, Erdogan repeated his criticism of the"assassinations," arguing a government must uphold international law. (87)

One day later, Foreign Minister Gul recalled Turkey's ambassador to Israel for consultations. Gul said, "We attach importance to our relations with Israel, but ... we are openly declaring that thepolicy pursued by the Israeli prime minister in the Middle East is wrong." Erdogan subsequentlydenounced what he called Israel's lack of sincerity in talking about evacuating Gaza, whilecontinuing operations there. (88) In an interview withan Israeli newspaper, Erdogan repeated hisaccusation that Israel is "killing people without any consideration -- children, women, the elderly-- razing their buildings ... and there is no way to describe such actions except as 'state terrorism.'" (89) Israelis were particularly offended when Erdogan later charged that "Israel is causing a rise inanti-Semitism in the world." (90)

Israel's Reaction

The Israeli government had been circumspect in reacting to the barrage of criticism from Turkey because it values relations with its sole friend in the region. However, the Foreign Ministryresponded on June 13, rejecting Erdogan's "statements and implications." It noted that "Israel is notfighting against stones but against the terror of suicide bombers...." It advised those wishing topromote the peace process to "display a balanced and realistic view of the situation in the area." (91)

In June, the Israeli airline El Al cancelled dozens of flights to Turkey ostensibly because Turkish authorities refused requests concerning armed guards on flights and at the Istanbul airport. However, some interpreted the action as a warning to Ankara that 400,000 Israeli tourists, who spendmillions of dollars on vacation in Turkey, could be withheld if relations deteriorate further. (92) OnJune 21, Foreign Minister Shalom warned that Erdogan's remarks were liable to harm the "fabric"of Israeli-Turkish ties and that Israel would not be able to "restrain itself" over a long period of timein light of the recent developments in relations. (93)

Current Situation

While levying accusations, Erdogan also noted that Turkey had "positive relations with Israel and will continue so." (94) Turkey's military,political, economic, and commercial ties with Israelcontinue. The recall of the ambassador was brief. Bilateral trade is about $1.7 billion a year, andboth countries want to expand it. The trade balance favors Turkey. (Neither is a major tradingpartner of the other.). Israel is upgrading Turkey's weapons systems, although no new contracts havebeen signed since early 2003. In March 2004, Israel signed a framework agreement to buy 50million cubic meters of water annually from Turkey for 20 years, but the Turkish government hasnot yet authorized Israeli companies to begin work on the project. Agreements signed for Israeliparticipation in the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) (95) region similarly have not been implementedbecause, Turkish officials say, of a lack of financial resources. In May, a Turkish company signedan agreement to construct three natural gas power stations in Israel for $800 million

On July 14, Israel's Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert visited Turkey to heal relations. He met with President Sezer, Foreign Minister Gul, State Minister Babacan and others, but not withPrime Minister Erdogan. The Prime Minister was on vacation -- which he interrupted to lunch withvisiting Syrian Prime Minister Muhammad Naji al-Itri on July 13. Gul noted that bilateral relationswere in the interests of both countries and "would continue strongly," while Olmert gavereassurances concerning Israel's interest in a unified Iraq, and maintained that "there is no officialor unofficial Israeli presence there, and no attempts are being made to set up a Kurdish state. Israelis opposed to this, and its position in this respect is identical to the U.S. position." (96) Gul reiteratedTurkey's long standing offer to contribute to the Arab-Israeli peace process, but said that he had noplans to visit Israel. Since the AKP came to power, neither Erdogan nor Gul has visited Israel. Erdogan has not met Prime Minister Sharon, although Gul has met Foreign Minister Shalom.

Other Issues in U.S.- Turkish Relations

U.S. Interests in Turkey

Most analysts conclude that, despite difficulties in the relationship, Turkey is still strategically important to the United States. It remains geographically near to crisis areas in the Middle East, theCaucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans. For over a decade, U.S. and allied planes flew out ofIncirlik Air Base in southeast Turkey to enforce a no-fly zone over northern Iraq. U.S. planes haveflown more than 8,000 flights out of Incirlik in support of Afghan operations. NATO is usingIncirlik to support the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. And, althoughnot using Turkish air bases, U.S. planes flew more than 4,000 flights through Turkish airspace duringthe Iraq war. Since the war, the United States has used Turkish ports and overland routes to resupplycoalition forces in Iraq. Turkey is a source of water, gas, and other supplies for U.S. forces there. Turkey allows the use of Turkish bases, ports, and airports to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq. And, as noted above, thousands of U.S. troops are rotating from Iraq via Incirlik. On June 12, 2003,NATO defense ministers agreed to move NATO's southern air command headquarters from Naplesto Izmir, affirming NATO's growing interest in the east.

Turkey's role as a transit route for energy resources from Caucasus and Central Asia is being realized with construction of the long-awaited Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and of a gas pipelinefrom Azerbaijan to Turkey, with both pipelines scheduled for completion in 2005. The oil pipelinefrom Iraq to Turkey is considered vital to the revival of Iraq's economy, although the segment in Iraqhas been sabotaged repeatedly.

Turkey is closely cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorism. Arrests of Al Qaeda operatives have been made in Turkey as a result of close cooperation between Turkish andU.S. intelligence agencies. (97) After the November2003 bombings in Istanbul, Deputy Secretary ofState Richard Armitage told the Turks, "Our enemy is your enemy.... We are very much closer now,in the wake of this tragedy." (98)

Turkey's large army is among the most experienced in the world in peacekeeping. Turkish forces have served in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, East Timor, and led ISAF inAfghanistan from July 2002 to February 2003. (99) Turkey lost several soldiers in Afghanistan, andsome of its civilian workers were kidnaped there. After its period of command, Turkey reduced itsforces in Afghanistan and, as of June 15, 2004, only 161 Turkish soldiers remained there. InNovember 2003, respected former Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin became NATO's Senior CivilianRepresentative in Afghanistan. In May 2004, Turkey dispatched three helicopters and 56 flight andmaintenance personnel to assist ISAF. Deputy Chief of Staff General Ilker Basbug said that Turkeymay command ISAF again from February to August 2005.

Turkey also participates in the U.S.-initiated Southeast Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG), Black Sea Naval Group (BLACKSEAFOR), and provides NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) training forcountries of the Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia.

Finally, Turkey is an example of a predominantly Muslim, democratic country at a time when U.S. policy is to encourage democratization in the Muslim world. In this area, Turkish officials echothe U.S. agenda, sometimes with caveats. On May 28, 2003, Foreign Minister Gul delivered alandmark speech at the Organization of the Islamic Conference foreign ministers' meeting inTeheran. He called for the group to act with "a refreshed vision" in which good governance,transparency and accountability would reign, and fundamental rights and freedoms as well as genderequality are upheld. (100) In June 2004, PrimeMinister Erdogan attended the G-8 Summit in SeaIsland, Georgia, as a "democratic partner" for the formal launching of the Broader Middle East andNorth Africa Initiative.

Turkish officials have cautioned that reforms should be generated from within societies, not imposed, that the agenda and pace of reform must be decided by each country to suit the needs andsensitivities of its society, that it is a gradual process, and that it cannot be thought of in isolationfrom international problems such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq. (101) Gul has noted that reformswould not come automatically even if the Arab-Israeli conflict were solved, and urged that they bestarted without delay. He argued that the Islamic world must address both issues. Gul hasacknowledged that Turkish reforms demonstrate that Islam and modernism can be integrated and thatTurkey could not prevent itself from being used as a model. (102) In contrast, Turkish secularists findinappropriate the idea that Turkey should be a model for Islamic countries. President Sezerreportedly lectured President Bush at the NATO summit in June 2004 that "Turkey is a country withpredominantly Muslim population, but it is not an Islamic country ... religion is separated from stateaffairs." (103)

U.S. officials have accommodated Turkish language preferences and now refer to Turkey as an "example" or "symbol." President Bush declared that he admired "the example" Turkey "has set onhow to be a Muslim country and at the same time a country which embraces democracy and the ruleof law and freedom." (104)

Some observers doubt the sincerity of AKP's commitment to democracy. They question whether behind the party's democratic rhetoric, in the actions of its Islamist elements discussedabove, and in legislation to reduce the power of the secularist military, the party has begun a processthat could transform Turkey into an Islamic republic. (105) Such a transformation, these observersassume, would be contrary to U.S. interests.

U.S. Image in Turkey

Opposition to the war in Iraq and U.S. actions against Turkish soldiers at Sulaymaniyah helped to form an unfavorable image of the United States in Turkey. According to a Pew Research Centerpoll conducted in May 2003, 83% of Turks had a somewhat or very unfavorable view of the UnitedStates, while only 15% viewed it positively. A Pew poll in February 2004 indicated improved, butstill negative, perceptions of the United States: 63% of Turks with negative perceptions, compared to 30% with positive ones. (106) The Foundationfor Social, Economic, and Political Research inTurkey (TUSES) reported poll results in March 2004, which found that 52.6% of responding Turksviewed the United States as a danger to the rest of the world, while 86% viewed the U.S. militaryintervention in Iraq as unjustified. (107) Only 6%of the respondents in a Turkish Pollmark Researchpoll later in 2004 "desire to be close to the United States," 60% oppose the U.S. operation in Iraq,while 42% support the resistance and attacks against U.S. forces there. (108) Turkish far-rightnationalists and leftist secular nationalists promote antipathy toward U.S. policies.

The Turkish government does not appear to be countering these sentiments. AKP leaders didnot argue that relations with the United States were so important that their repair warranted sendingTurkish peacekeepers to Iraq, among reasons for a possible deployment. While Turkish visitors tothe United States and op-ed articles by Turkish officials in U.S. newspapers inform Americanaudiences of the importance of the bilateral relationship, a survey of the Turkish press indicates thatthe same messages are not delivered at home. In fact, Foreign Minister Gul thanked those who haddemonstrated against President Bush during the NATO summit in June 2004 for helping to securethe release of three Turkish hostages in Iraq, thereby fulfilling a demand of abductors. (109) Theabsence of an AKP government response to anti-Americanism at home has led some to suggest thatWashington should question its sincerity. (110)

Trade

U.S.-Turkish trade relations have not developed as planned since 2002. A U.S. initiative to create qualifying industrial zones (QIZs) in Turkey as an extension of the U.S.-Israel Free TradeAgreement has not been achieved. (111) Goodsin the zones were to be eligible for tariff-free andquota-free status. Legislation proposed in the 107th Congress would have excluded Turkish textilesand apparel products from the QIZ program, making 49% of Turkey's exports ineligible for theenhanced treatment. Turks were disappointed that the Administration was unwilling to challengechampions of U.S. textile manufacturing and demanded the inclusion of textiles in the QIZs.Administration officials repeatedly reminded their Turkish counterparts that global textile quotas areto be eliminated in January 2005. In April 2004, Turkish State Minister Kursad Tuzmen signaleda change in Turkey's view of QIZs accepting that they might be limited to high-tech products andthereby recognizing that insistence on textiles was impeding development of the QIZs. (112)

A U.S.-Turkey Economic Partnership Commission under the co-chairmanship of the U.S. Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business, and Commercial Affairs and the TurkishUndersecretary of the Foreign Ministry has met twice. The U.S. team includes representatives fromTreasury, Commerce, U.S. Trade Representative, Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private InvestmentCorporation, and the Trade and Development Agency. Trade is one subject discussed by thecommission.

Recent Assistance

After the September 11, 2001, attacks, Turkey received $20 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) from the Emergency Response Fund set up by P.L. 107-38 , September 18, 2001. On March 19, 2002, Vice President Cheney said that the Administration would provide Turkey with$200 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to help address the financial difficulties caused byTurkey's ongoing economic crises "that seriously affect Turkey's ability to contribute to current andfuture U.S. government policy objectives" and $28 million in FMF to help defray the costs ofassuming leadership of the ISAF in Afghanistan. (113) The funds were provided in the FY2002supplemental appropriations approved in P.L. 107-206 , August 2, 2002.

For FY2003, the Administration requested $17.5 million in FMF and $2.8 million in International Military Education and Training Funds (IMET), which were appropriated in P.L. 108-7 ,February 20, 2003. As part of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L.108-011 , April 16, 2003, Turkey was to receive $1 billion in ESF to support not more than $8.5billion in direct loans or loan guarantees. The Conference Report, H.Rept.108-76 , April 12, 2003,provided that the $1 billion remain available until September 30, 2005. However, the funds may notbe made available if the Secretary of State determines and reports that Turkey is not cooperating withthe United States in Operation Iraqi Freedom, including the facilitation of humanitarian assistanceto Iraq, or has unilaterally deployed troops into northern Iraq. The President will determine the termsand conditions for issuing the assistance, and should take into consideration budgetary and economicreforms undertaken by Turkey. Under the terms of a loan agreement signed by the United States andTurkey on September 22, 2003, the loan will mature in 10 years and have a four-year grace periodfor repayment. Funds may be disbursed in four equal installments over 18 months; none have beendisbursed so far. Minister of State Babacan has said that they are not needed, while Prime MinisterErdogan suggests that "the political condition" that Congress attached to the loan is the reason thatthe funds have not been drawn down.

For FY2004, the Administration requested $50 million in FMF and $200 million in ESF. There were no economic or military assistance earmarks for Turkey in the Consolidated AppropriationsAct, P.L. 108-199 , January 23, 2004, and, in FY2004, Turkey will receive an estimated $40 millionin FMF, $99,410,000 in ESF, and $5 million in IMET. (114)

For FY2005, the Administration has requested $50 million in ESF, $34 million in FMF, and $4 million in IMET. H.Rept. 108-599 , July 13, 2004, for H.R. 4818 , the ForeignOperations Appropriations Act for FY2005, passed on July 15, calls for a $50 million reduction inassistance for Turkey, noting that $1 billion appropriated in P.L. 108-011 remains unexpended. H.R.4818, Sec. 578 would prohibit use of funds made available to Turkey to lobby against H.Res. 193 , which would reaffirm support for the Genocide Convention (and mentionthe Armenian genocide). State Department spokesman Richard Boucher has said that theAdministration opposes the measure. House leaders have observed that the provision is not neededbecause law already prohibits use of U.S. aid for lobbying and said that they will insist that confereesdrop it. House Speaker Dennis Hastert, Majority Leader Tom DeLay, and Majority Whip Roy Bluntissued a statement declaring, "Turkey has been a reliable ally of the United States for decades, andthe deep foundation upon which our mutual economic and security relationship rests should not bedisrupted by this amendment." (115)