Homeland Security: Civil Air Patrol Involved in Certain Missions, but DHS Should Assess the Benefits of Further Involvement
Released: 2012-11-01T00:00:00

Letter

Background

DHS’s Mission

In early 2010, DHS defined its mission and strategy for responding to homeland security threats. The result of this effort was the completion of the QHSR report––a strategic framework to guide the activities of participants in homeland security toward a common goal. One of the key themes of the QHSR report is the importance of sharing homeland security responsibilities across a variety of actors including federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private sector entities. Emphasizing this shared responsibility, the QHSR report notes that in some areas—such as border security or immigration management—DHS possesses unique capabilities and responsibilities that are not likely to be found elsewhere. However, in other areas, such as critical infrastructure protection or emergency management, DHS mainly provides leadership and stewardship because the capabilities for these areas are often found at the state and local levels.

History and Administrative Structure of CAP

In December 1941, CAP was established out of the desire of civil airmen of the country to be mobilized with their equipment in the common defense of the Nation. Under the jurisdiction of the Army’s Air Forces, CAP pilots were active during World War II, performing border patrol, search and rescue, and emergency transport, among other missions. In 1946, CAP was established as a federally chartered organization. In 1948, shortly after the Air Force was established, CAP was designated as the civilian auxiliary of the Air Force, and later, in October 2000, CAP was designated as the volunteer civilian auxiliary of the Air Force when CAP provides services to any department or agency in any branch of the federal government.cadet programs, and emergency services.

CAP has three missions: aerospace education, As a nonprofit organization, CAP has a unique relationship with the Air Force, which may use CAP’s services to fulfill its noncombat programs and missions. The Secretary of the Air Force governs the conduct of CAP when it is operating as the auxiliary of the Air Force and prescribes regulations governing the conduct of CAP. CAP is embedded in the Air Force’s command structure under the Air Education and Training Command. provides technical advice to ensure flying safety, ensures that CAP’s federal funds are used appropriately, and provides building space, among other things. CAP also has its own administrative structure governed by a volunteer national commander, national vice-commander, and an 11 member Board of Governors. A paid chief operating officer manages CAP’s headquarters at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama.

The Air Force’s Air Education and Training Command provides basic military training, initial and advanced technical training, flight training, and professional military and degree- granting professional education.

However, the chief operating officer has no command authority over the volunteers and assets spread throughout the United States.

Field Organization and Resources of CAP

CAP is divided into eight geographic regions consisting of 52 state wings (the 50 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia). Each state wing is divided into smaller squadrons, of which there are approximately 1,500 nationwide. CAP has more than 61,000 members divided between cadet (26,725) and adult (34,693) members. According to CAP officials, of the adult members, there are approximately 3,000 active mission pilots.Nonpilot adult members contribute to the organization in various ways, serving as crew members, administering wing operations, and managing cadet programs, among other things. CAP has 550 single-engine aircraft, 42 gliders, and 960 vehicles. Figure 1 depicts a CAP aircraft.

The majority of CAP’s operating budget comes from funds included in the Department of Defense’s appropriation and designated by Congress for CAP. CAP is included in the Air Force’s internal budgeting process and submits each year a financial plan to the Air Force for consideration. CAP’s financial plan is reviewed and adjusted by both the Air Education and Training Command and Air Force headquarters. According to an Air Force official involved with CAP’s budget submission, the Air Force attempts to ensure that CAP receives at least the same amount of funding it had the previous year. However, CAP is competing against other Air Force priorities in the normal Air Force budget development process. Still, according to the Air Force official, CAP often receives additional funding from Congress above the Air Force’s request. For example, in fiscal year 2011, Congress provided an additional $4.2 million of funding above the Air Force’s request. See table 1 for CAP’s appropriations since fiscal year 2007.

The funds in table 1 are used to reimburse CAP for some Air Force- assigned missions, cover the costs associated with maintenance, and fund aircraft and other procurement, including vehicles. For example, these funds cover mission costs associated with some Air Force- assigned missions, such as air intercept exercises and counterdrug activities. CAP also receives mission reimbursement from other federal, state, and local agencies. For example, in fiscal year 2011, FEMA reimbursed CAP approximately $155,000 for a variety of disaster-related missions. In addition, CAP receives funding from other sources throughout the course of the year, including state appropriations, membership dues, and member contributions. In fiscal year 2011, CAP received approximately $3.2 million in appropriations from 37 states. State funding is sometimes earmarked for a specific state activity, such as disaster response. CAP also received in fiscal year 2011 $3,076,925 in membership dues.

CAP can conduct missions either as an auxiliary of the Air Force or in its corporate status. Approximately 75 percent of CAP’s missions are conducted in Air Force auxiliary status. While all missions in support of federal agencies must be conducted in its Air Force auxiliary status, CAP may conduct missions in its corporate status on behalf of state and local agencies and nongovernmental organizations. CAP pilots are not afforded federal protections when they fly in corporate status.

All requests for CAP operational missions––with the exception of corporate missions and those for Alaska and Hawaii––are coordinated through CAP’s National Operations Center and approved by 1st Air Force. Agencies requesting CAP support contact the CAP National Operations Center with a formal request for support. The National Operations Center works with the requesting agency and the CAP wing to develop an operations plan, budget, and funding documents for the mission. These are then forwarded to 1st Air Force, which conducts legal, funding, operations, and risk management reviews to ensure that the mission meets CAP requirements. Once these reviews are complete, the Air Force can approve the mission and CAP can task its wings with the assignment. CAP corporate missions undergo a similar review process— wherein legal, funding, and risk reviews are conducted—but are not routed through the Air Force for approval.

CAP Has Performed Certain Homeland Security Missions for Federal, State, and Local Customers

Our review of fiscal year 2011 CAP flight hour data and discussions with officials from 10 CAP wings show that CAP has performed missions that fit within three of the five QHSR homeland security mission areas: (1) preventing terrorism and enhancing security, (2) securing and managing borders, and (3) disaster response. CAP missions related to these areas have accounted for 9 percent of CAP’s flying hours; however, CAP has devoted the majority of its flying hours (approximately 63 percent) to training for these and other missions and cadet and Reserve Officer Training Corps flying orientations. The remaining 28 percent of CAP’s missions consisted chiefly of assistance to law enforcement for domestic drug interdiction activities, such as marijuana crop identification, and maintenance-related flights.

Air Force Auxiliary Missions Include Some Homeland Security Activities, but Consist Primarily of Training and Flight Orientation

CAP flight hour data for fiscal year 2011 show that CAP participated in a variety of homeland security activities, but that a majority of the organization’s Air Force-assigned flying time was devoted to training and flying orientation for cadets and Reserve Officer Training Corps members. Specifically, CAP devoted about 63 percent (46,132 hours) of its total Air Force-assigned mission flying hours to training and flying orientations.Of the remaining 37 percent of Air Force-assigned flight hours, 9 percent (6,575 hours) were dedicated to homeland security-related missions. For example, CAP reported 2,583 Air Force-assigned hours devoted to air defense, which includes CAP’s participation in the Department of Defense’s low-flying aircraft readiness exercises and exercises for training military pilots to intercept low-flying aircraft. These missions relate to the homeland security mission area of preventing terrorism and enhancing security. CAP also devoted 2,314 Air Force-assigned flight hours to defense support to civilian authorities/disaster relief, corresponding to the homeland security mission area of ensuring resilience to disasters. Figure 2 provides a breakdown of CAP fiscal year 2011 flight hours by mission.

CAP headquarters and officials from all 10 CAP wings we spoke with generally concurred that the fiscal year 2011 flight hours are reflective of their activities in recent years—that is, training and cadet activities have accounted for the majority of their missions. CAP intends for its training and pilot certification missions to prepare its pilots and other volunteers to perform homeland security-related missions. In addition, CAP wing officials told us that they have modified training schedules to accommodate the demand for real-world missions when they have occurred—including those related to homeland security—and will continue to do so in the future.

All 10 Select CAP Wings Performed Homeland Security Missions for Federal, State, and Local Customers

Officials from all 10 CAP wings we spoke with said their wings had performed missions related to at least one of the three QHSR mission areas covered by CAP for a variety of federal, state, and local customers. For example, 9 of the 10 wings had contributed to preventing terrorism and enhancing security by participating in military readiness exercises where CAP aircraft acted as mock targets for airborne interceptors or ground-based radar. In most cases CAP aircraft acted as slow-moving, potentially hostile targets that were identified, tracked, and escorted by active-duty, reserve or state Air National Guard radar or airborne fighters. Figure 3 shows examples of these and other homeland security missions conducted by the 10 CAP wings during fiscal years 2007 through 2012.

As part of efforts to secure and manage the nation’s borders, 3 of the 4 CAP wings shown in figure 3 that share a land border with Mexico or Canada were involved in various reconnaissance activities for federal customers that included flights over border regions to identify suspicious activity.conducted reconnaissance for suspicious persons and vehicles in the Barry Goldwater Air Force Testing Range, which is located on the border with Mexico. Similarly, Texas CAP officials stated that they had conducted border reconnaissance missions in support of CBP operations along the state’s border with Mexico. According to CBP officials, these reconnaissance missions were for monitoring, detection, and reporting of any suspicious border activity observed. New Mexico CAP officials stated that they had not performed any specific border-related missions in recent years, but that they were interested in doing so and in the process of conducting outreach to potential federal, state, and local customers to offer their services in this area.

For example, as shown in figure 3, the Arizona CAP wing As part of efforts to ensure resilience to disasters, officials from 7 of the 10 CAP wings stated they had engaged in disaster assistance operations for a variety of federal, state, and local customers. CAP wings provided imaging technology for post storm damage assessments for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, FEMA, and state and local emergency management officials. Two of the 7 CAP wings that indicated involvement in disaster assistance also stated that they had engaged in reconnaissance for wildfires in response to requests from both federal and state officials.

Officials from all 10 of the wings we contacted also told us they have provided support to local governments (i.e., counties and municipalities), including search and rescue missions. While search and rescue does not strictly fit within the QHSR homeland security mission areas, DHS has noted that search and rescue activities are often intertwined with and mutually supporting of homeland security activities.

Key Factors Affect CAP’s Ability to Support Homeland Security Missions; Assessment of CAP Capabilities and Resources Could Inform Decision- Making

There are several factors that may affect CAP’s ability to support existing and emerging homeland security missions, including legal parameters, mission funding and reimbursement, existing capabilities, and capacity. While some of these factors were cited by the DHS components we contacted as issues that could affect CAP’s suitability for additional homeland security missions, neither DHS nor the components have assessed how CAP could be used to perform certain homeland security missions.

Several Factors May Affect CAP’s Ability to Support Homeland Security Missions

Legal Parameters Guide CAP’s Mission Involvement

As a volunteer auxiliary of the Air Force, CAP is subject to laws and regulations governing the use of the military in support of law enforcement and is thus limited in the types of support it can provide. Specifically, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the Air Force and Army from playing an active and direct role in civilian law enforcement except where authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. However, federal law authorizes the military—and by extension, CAP—to provide limited support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. For example, Department of Defense and CAP personnel made available to a civilian law enforcement agency may conduct aerial reconnaissance, and detect, monitor, and communicate on the movement of certain air, sea, and surface traffic.

In providing support to civilian law enforcement agencies, CAP is precluded from participating in the interdiction of vehicles, vessels, or aircraft, or in search, seizure, arrest, apprehension, surveillance, pursuit, or similar activity. and law enforcement officers in direct support of an ongoing mission, or when hostilities are imminent. CBP officials told us that because of these restrictions, CAP is unable to provide the type of support that is necessary for some law enforcement activities. In addition, officials from the Coast Guard noted concerns with CAP’s access to classified information that may further limit the range of missions CAP can support. According to Air Force officials, the approval process for law enforcement support activities involving the monitoring of air, sea, or surface traffic is lengthy, requiring consent from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.standing agreements with law enforcement agencies could help enable CAP to support such requests on shorter notice.

U.S. Air Force, Air Force Instruction 10-2701, Organization and Function of the Civil Air Patrol (Jul. 2005, Incorporating Change 1, September 2006).

Additional Homeland Security Missions May Require Reimbursement

CAP’s ability to provide support is often contingent on its customers’ ability and willingness to pay CAP for its services—making the availability of mission funding a key consideration in determining whether CAP can support additional homeland security missions. Per Air Force guidance, CAP ordinarily conducts missions on a cost-reimbursable basis. Typically, any federal agency requesting CAP assistance through the Air Force must certify that its request complies with the Economy Act, which requires that requesting agencies have available the monies necessary to cover the expense of the service being requested, among other things. CAP’s reimbursement rate as of October 2012 was $160 per flying hour, covering fuel and maintenance. According to CAP and Air Force officials, formal agreements between CAP and requesting organizations—such as those that exist between some CAP wings and state-level entities—can expedite the approval process by identifying funding mechanisms prior to CAP support.

While CAP typically requires reimbursement for its support activities, some of CAP’s missions are financed through federally appropriated funds. Some of these missions were identified by officials from CAP or DHS components as areas in which CAP could provide further support. For example, CAP has received since 2004 in its annual operations and maintenance budget an allotment for counterdrug activities, and therefore conducts many of its counterdrug missions at no expense to the customer. Additionally, the Air Force funds through the CAP appropriation a range of activities deemed to be of interest to the Air Force, including inland search and rescue. According to CAP officials, CAP’s current funding levels are sufficient to support these activities. However, an increase in such unreimbursed activities could affect CAP’s ability to respond to other missions supported by appropriated funds. For example, CAP officials told us that, because of the counterdrug nexus, border reconnaissance missions in support of CBP are also typically funded by the CAP operations budget instead of reimbursed by the customer. Consequently, an increase in such unreimbursed border reconnaissance missions—which relate to the homeland security area of securing and managing our borders—could diminish CAP’s ability to support other unreimbursed activities, such as counterdrug activities for the Drug Enforcement Administration and others.

According to CAP and DHS officials, CAP’s existing operational capabilities—aircraft and vehicles, personnel, and technology—have been sufficient to support certain homeland security missions, yet they may not be suitable for other types of missions. Recognizing this, officials from CAP headquarters told us that if DHS identified additional homeland security missions for CAP, it might be necessary to pursue additional resources or technologies.

According to CAP officials, the number and locations of CAP’s assets— which include 550 aircraft and 960 vehicles across 52 wings—could be conducive to conducting additional homeland security missions, which can originate at the local, state, and federal levels. CAP’s aircraft, primarily consisting of Cessna 172s and 182s, are capable of performing aerial reconnaissance and damage assessment, search and rescue missions, and air intercept exercises. FEMA officials told us that because CAP’s assets are geographically dispersed across the country, it has proven to be a flexible and timely resource to capture imagery in the first hours or days of an event. As an example, FEMA officials cited CAP’s support of the agency’s operations in response to Hurricane Isaac in 2012, specifically stating that CAP’s imagery helped to establish situational awareness. CAP’s vehicles are capable of light transport of personnel and equipment, mobile communications, and ground damage assessment. Many vehicles are also equipped with radios that are able to communicate with CAP aircraft, which could enable a coordinated approach to air and land missions. CAP and Air Force officials stated that they would be open to repositioning aircraft and vehicles in order to meet demands associated with an increased homeland security workload and the needs of their customers.

CAP’s standardized fleet does have functional limitations. For example, CAP’s single-engine aircraft have limited transport capacity. Additionally, CAP guidance prohibits sustained flight at an altitude of less than 1,000 feet during the day or 2,000 feet at night. This limitation was also cited by Coast Guard officials, who specifically stated that during the Deepwater Horizon incident, CAP was unable to fly certain oil tracking missions because of altitude restrictions. A Coast Guard official further noted that the range of CAP’s aircraft was limited over water—with aircraft being required to stay within gliding distance of shore. CAP officials told us, however, that CAP aircraft are able to operate up to 50 nautical miles from shore under normal conditions, and that this range can be extended for special missions.

CAP officials stated that, since CAP is a volunteer organization, its membership—consisting of 61,000 volunteers, including approximately 35,000 senior members and 11,000 crew members—constitutes its most critical asset. According to CAP officials, CAP has standards and qualifications for its member pilots and maintains online systems that train, test, and track all aspects of crew qualifications. For example, CAP’s mission pilots must possess a private pilot’s license with 200 flight hours, and are required to complete training courses specific to search and rescue and disaster response. Those performing specialized missions are also subject to more stringent requirements. For example, counterdrug mission pilots must (1) be qualified for emergency services flights; (2) be current in a skill that has application to the counterdrug program; (3) complete a national counterdrug orientation course and, biennially, a refresher course; and (4) maintain a minimum of 20 hours of participation in the program yearly. Many of CAP’s members have also completed training in the National Incident Management System in order to allow CAP personnel to integrate operationally with local, state, and federal incident command structures. Officials from some of the customer organizations we spoke with cited the professionalism of CAP’s personnel as a factor contributing to their success during past operations. For example, the Coast Guard Director of Air Operations during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill told us that CAP personnel conducting high profile shoreline and oil boom patrols were well-organized.

However, limitations in the quantity and expertise of mission pilots exist that may hinder CAP’s ability to support some activities. For example, CAP’s membership includes 3,000 mission pilots, representing approximately 5 percent of total membership. Although CAP has in the past demonstrated its ability to temporarily transfer pilots to support surge missions—such as during the Deepwater Horizon incident—it could face challenges in increasing its support to sustained, long-term homeland security missions, particularly if those missions were to occur in areas with few mission pilots. Officials from CAP headquarters pointed towards their past successes in supporting surge missions, but they also recognized that there could be challenges associated with frequently moving pilots to meet mission demands since the pilots are volunteers. Coast Guard officials we spoke with questioned whether CAP, because of its volunteer status, would consistently have pilots available to respond when needed and raised concerns that CAP pilots have limited expertise in maritime situations and do not have water survival training—both of which could be important requirements for many Coast Guard missions. According to CAP officials, however, 521 CAP crew members have completed water survival training consisting of classroom instruction and a swim test.

CAP’s current technological capabilities in terms of imagery and communications may both enable and limit its ability to support additional homeland security operations. CAP currently has a variety of imagery and communications technologies that can be used during some homeland security operations to provide ground and airborne communications relay and to capture geographically identifiable still-frame aerial imagery, and, in some cases, full-motion video. CAP’s nationwide communications capability includes high frequency and very high frequency AM and FM fixed, mobile, and repeater systems capable of providing connectivity during local, regional, and national events. CAP officials told us that these capabilities have in the past proved essential in maintaining communications during geographically dispersed operations. Table 2 depicts CAP’s imagery platforms.

According to officials at the DHS components with whom we spoke, CAP’s existing technologies are sufficient to support some of the homeland security activities we have previously discussed, such as disaster assessment. Additionally, officials from CBP told us that CAP technologies could help further with detection and monitoring along the borders, providing radio relay in remote areas, and gaining situational awareness in areas not currently supported by other air platforms. However, officials from CBP and the Coast Guard also commented on CAP’s limitations in the border and marine environments, citing inadequate imagery capabilities, incompatible communications, and insufficient detection technology. Specifically, officials from CBP commented that CAP is incapable of providing a live video feed to its customers, capturing nighttime imagery, providing a video downlink of reconnaissance events, and transmitting information securely. These same officials emphasized that other technologies not possessed by CAP nationwide, including radar, forward-looking infrared cameras, and change detection capabilities, are critical in the border environment.Coast Guard officials cited CAP’s inability to relay imagery in near-real time and stated that its systems are not compatible with the Coast Guard’s imagery or communications systems. As a result, the Coast Guard has not coordinated with CAP regarding the expansion of CAP’s role. Air Force and CAP officials recognized that CAP’s current technology may not be suitable for certain missions and told us that if new capabilities are needed to support additional homeland security missions, requirements would be needed from DHS. CAP officials also noted that 1st Air Force has developed a requirement to modify or purchase 20 aircraft with capabilities including near-real time communications; video and imagery transfer that is interoperable with federal, state, and local responders; and sensors useful for locating distressed persons day or night.

CAP’s daily operational tempo is the percentage of total possible missions being flown based on the number of available aircraft and pilot availability. CAP’s goal is to have five mission pilots per each available aircraft. CAP has not determined what level constitutes its maximum operating capacity. enabled cell phones and locator beacons—to receive other assistance. This shift has freed up additional time for CAP to conduct other missions.

Officials we spoke with from the Coast Guard expressed some concern over relying on a volunteer organization like CAP because it does not have the same readiness posture and response standards as the Coast Guard. However, our discussions with these officials and the CAP wings identified no instances in which CAP was unable to respond to a request, or in which CAP was delayed in responding to a request because of a shortage of pilots or other personnel. According to CAP officials, CAP has also demonstrated an ability to surge in support of other agencies and to perform continuous operations for a sustained period of time. For example, CAP provided continuous support over 118 days during the Deepwater Horizon incident. A Coast Guard official involved in this operation corroborated CAP’s account of this operation, speaking highly of its organization and ability to conduct missions. Also, while the Drug Enforcement Administration is not a DHS component, officials from this agency told us that they rely on CAP aerial communications and imagery for approximately 2,500 counterdrug sorties per year and that they have received positive feedback regarding CAP’s ability to conduct these operations from their field agents. CAP officials stated that large operations such as Deepwater Horizon do not necessarily affect CAP’s ability to provide support in other areas throughout the year, but do significantly reduce their operations and maintenance funds because reimbursement does not cover these expenses. Further, while many of CAP’s missions are preplanned, CAP and Air Force officials stated that wings are tested biennially in a no-notice exercise, such as the Department of Defense’s Ardent Sentry, to ensure that personnel can assemble and deploy quickly to no-notice events.

DHS Has Not Assessed CAP’s Ability to Support Additional Homeland Security Missions

DHS has not assessed CAP’s capabilities and resources or determined the extent to which CAP could be used to support future homeland security activities. The DHS concept of homeland security, as articulated in the QHSR, is that of a national enterprise, requiring the collective efforts and shared responsibilities of federal, state, local, nongovernmental, and private sector partners, among others. As we have reported in the past, ensuring that capabilities are available for such efforts requires effective planning and coordination in which capabilities are realistically tested in order to identify and subsequently address problems in partnership with relevant stakeholders. Additionally, we have also reported that achieving results for the nation increasingly requires collaboration among many different entities, and that because of the nation’s long-range fiscal challenges, the federal government must identify ways to deliver results more efficiently and in a way that is consistent with its multiple demands and limited resources. However, according to an official in the DHS Office of Policy, DHS has not conducted a review to determine how CAP might be used by DHS or its components, and DHS does not have a position on the use of CAP for homeland security operations. Additionally, of the three DHS components we contacted, only FEMA had taken steps to consider CAP’s suitability for future homeland security activities and incorporate CAP in its operational planning. Specifically, FEMA officials told us that they are working with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to develop requirements for CAP imagery and that they have included CAP in several of their disaster planning annexes. According to these officials, simple technological upgrades could improve FEMA’s ability to integrate CAP’s imagery into its operations. The other two components we contacted—CBP and the Coast Guard—had not assessed CAP’s ability to support their operations, but expressed reservations about using CAP for certain activities, as previously discussed.

Officials we spoke with from CAP and the Air Force expressed support for FEMA’s efforts to develop imagery requirements for CAP. CAP officials told us that they were optimistic that this effort would provide insight into how CAP could better support its DHS customers. Similarly, Air Force officials stated that, in order to determine whether CAP could support additional DHS missions, DHS would first need to provide them with requirements for missions and also obtain a good understanding of CAP’s limitations—particularly in the area of support to law enforcement. To that end, CAP and Air Force officials told us that they have performed outreach to DHS, CBP, and FEMA in an effort to inform these potential partners of their capabilities and establish formal agreements that would define CAP’s role in providing support to such entities. By establishing such relationships and assessing the ability of CAP to provide additional homeland security capabilities, DHS, in coordination with the Air Force, could position itself to better understand, and potentially utilize, another resource to accomplish its homeland security missions.

Conclusions

DHS faces the difficult challenge of securing our homeland through a wide range of missions from preventing terrorism, to securing our large borders and shorelines, and planning for and responding to natural and man-made disasters. Recognizing this challenge, DHS has emphasized the importance of partnering with other federal, state, local, and private entities to achieve its homeland security missions. Moreover, recent fiscal constraints may compel federal agencies, such as DHS, to partner with other organizations in order to accomplish their missions and achieve their goals. CAP is one such potential partner, having performed various missions since its inception in support of homeland security missions and components. Several factors affect CAP’s ability to conduct these and additional homeland security missions, including legal parameters, mission funding and reimbursement, existing capabilities, and capacity. At the same time, while some concerns exist among DHS components about partnering with CAP, a cost-effective assessment of CAP’s capabilities and resources, in coordination with the Air Force, could help DHS to better identify whether CAP can assist with its future homeland security missions.

Recommendation for Executive Action

To determine the extent to which CAP might be able to further assist DHS and its components in conducting homeland security missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force, cost-effectively assess how CAP could be used to accomplish certain homeland security missions based on the factors described in this report, including legal parameters, mission funding and reimbursement, capabilities, and operating capacity.

Agency Comments, Third-Party Views, and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, CAP, and the Department of Defense for review and comment. DHS concurred with our recommendation, citing some challenges and constraints to the expanded use of CAP for DHS missions as well as describing its plan to address our recommendation. Specifically, DHS stated that its Office of the Chief Financial Officer (Program Analysis and Evaluation Division), along with components such as the Coast Guard will consider how DHS can make efficient and effective use of CAP and other aviation capabilities. In implementing our recommendation, it will be important for DHS to consider all of the factors described in our report, including legal parameters, mission funding and reimbursement, capabilities, and operating capacity, as we recommended. This action would then address the intent of our recommendation. DHS’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix I.

CAP also concurred with our recommendation, noting that it is prepared to assist both DHS and the Air Force in assessing how it could be used to support certain homeland security missions. CAP’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. The Department of Defense elected to not provide written comments, but did—along with DHS and CAP—provide technical comments that we incorporated into the report, as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, CAP, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. This report is also available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact either Carol Cha at (202) 512-4456 or chac@gao.gov or Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix II: Comments from the Civil Air Patrol

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contacts named above, key contributors to this report were Chris Currie, Assistant Director; Kimberly Seay, Assistant Director; Chuck Bausell; Ryan D’Amore; Michele Fejfar; Mike Harmond; Tracey King; and Dan Klabunde.