Military Training: Continued Actions Needed to Guide DOD's Efforts to Improve Language Skills and Regional Proficiency
Released: 2010-06-29T00:00:00

Letter

DOD Has Taken Steps to Transform Language and Regional Proficiency Capabilities, but Still Needs a Comprehensive Strategic Plan to Guide Its Efforts

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has taken a number of steps over the past several years to transform its language and regional proficiency capabilities, including designating Senior Language Authorities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and other DOD components; developing a governance structure; updating policies; and publishing the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap—the primary document that DOD has used to guide its efforts to date. The governance structure consists of a number of components, including the following: Defense Language Steering Committee: comprised of Senior Language Authorities from the military services and other DOD organizations and chaired by the DOD Senior Language Authority, the committee provides senior-level guidance regarding the language transformation effort and the development of DOD’s language capabilities.

Defense Language Action Panel: comprised of less-senior representatives from the same entities represented on the Defense Language Steering Committee, the panel supports the activities, functions, and responsibilities of the Defense Language Steering Committee.

Defense Language Office: provides strategic direction and programmatic oversight to the DOD components on present and future requirements related to language as well as regional and cultural proficiency, and supports the DOD Senior Language Authority in carrying out their assigned responsibilities.

In addition to setting up a governance structure, DOD published the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap in 2005, and in this document established overarching goals and desired outcomes. DOD considered these outcomes to be the same as objectives. Table 1 below shows the roadmap’s goals and selected objectives.

For each roadmap goal, DOD identified several tasks that it planned to complete in support of the objectives, and assigned responsibility to various organizations for initiating efforts to complete the tasks. For example, to support the goal of creating foundational language and regional area expertise, one of the tasks DOD identified was to publish an annual Strategic Language List. This list reflects languages for which DOD has current and projected requirements and for which it intends to allocate resources, such as to provide training and testing, and pay incentives. The Defense Language Office has been responsible for monitoring completion of the roadmap tasks, which totaled 43 tasks. As of June 2010, DOD officials stated that they had completed all of the tasks except one related to developing policy and doctrine, which they consider to be an ongoing effort.

Using the roadmap as guidance or a complementary document, each military service has developed or is in the process of developing a service- specific strategy for language and regional-proficiency transformation. These strategies are intended, in part, to guide service training efforts. The military services provide predeployment training to general purpose forces—the amount of which depends on the unit’s mission and the amount of time available for such training as articulated by the commander of the unit. The services have established centers to assist in coordinating, developing, distributing, and providing basic language and regional proficiency training and have also taken steps to incorporate language and regional proficiency into their professional military education for general purpose forces.

Our prior work has shown that for a strategic plan to be helpful, it should contain certain key elements, such as measurable performance goals and objectives and funding priorities that are linked to goals. Table 2 below further discusses these elements.

While the roadmap did establish goals and desired outcomes, which DOD considered to be objectives, we found they had some limitations, and that other key planning elements were missing. For example: Some goals and objectives in DOD’s roadmap were not measurable or time-bound. For example, one of DOD’s objectives is for the total force to understand and value the tactical, operational, and strategic asset inherent in regional expertise and language. However, we reported that DOD does not define how it intends to measure the total force’s understanding of language and regional expertise or provide a time frame for achieving the objective. In the absence of measurable objectives, DOD officials assessed progress toward goals and objectives by tracking the number of associated roadmap tasks that they consider to be fully operational, meaning DOD’s Senior Language Authority had determined the intent of the task had been met. However, this approach focused solely on the achievement of specific tasks rather than the extent to which the outcome of these tasks reflected progress toward language and regional proficiency transformation goals. We also reported that DOD considered a task fully operational before the task was complete, which further complicated DOD’s ability to measure progress toward goals and objectives. For example, DOD considered the roadmap task that assigned responsibility to the Secretary of the Army to create courses for emerging language needs to be fully operational because a plan to build these courses had been developed. However, at the time, the Army had not yet established the courses and DOD did not continue to formally track the Army’s efforts.

DOD had also not identified the resources required to implement the tasks in the roadmap or linked the roadmap to its funding requests. In short, the roadmap did not contain any funding information; therefore, DOD had not identified the total cost of its transformation effort. In its annual budget requests, DOD had requested funding for 22 major language and regional proficiency programs that it considered to be priorities, as reflected in what it calls the Defense Language Program of Record. However, the two documents were not clearly linked; therefore we were unable to determine how the 22 programs related to the tasks and activities outlined in the roadmap.

At the time of our work, DOD recognized that the roadmap was not a true strategic plan, and that the department had reached a point with its transformation efforts where such a plan was needed.

In the absence of a comprehensive strategic plan that includes measurable performance goals and objectives, funding priorities linked to goals, and accountability for achieving results, we concluded it would be difficult for DOD to guide the military services as they develop and implement their strategies, and supporting programs and activities, and also to ensure these efforts were synchronized and consistent with departmentwide goals. Furthermore, for both the department and Congress, the lack of a comprehensive plan would make it difficult to develop or evaluate funding requests, respectively, and assess progress towards achieving successful transformation of language and regional proficiency capabilities. Therefore, we recommended that DOD develop a strategic plan with all the key elements I have mentioned. In its comments, DOD agreed and stated that it planned to complete a strategic plan by September 2009, which it referred to as the Defense Language and Regional Program Strategic Plan for 2010-2015. Our latest information from DOD officials, as of this month, is that the plan has been drafted and is undergoing final review and approval. They expect to publish the plan later this year and told us it will include elements such as performance goals, objectives, and funding priorities linked to goals. They stated that an implementation plan with metrics to measure progress will be published at a later date. While a specific milestone has not been established, it will be important that DOD complete this action quickly.

DOD Has Not Fully Developed the Information It Needs to Identify Gaps in Language and Regional Proficiency and Assess Risk

In addition to a comprehensive strategic plan, it is important for DOD to have complete information on the current level of language and regional proficiency within its forces as well as the requirements for these capabilities. With this knowledge, the department can identify gaps and assess risks. Risk assessment helps decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that alternatives can be designed and implemented to mitigate that risk. It also allows them to prioritize needs and allocate resources based on such factors as strategic, operational, and financial considerations. At the time of our June 2009 report, DOD had efforts underway to gather inventory data and define requirements, but did not yet have complete information. Since then, DOD has made some progress in each of these areas.

Availability of Inventory Data on Language and Regional Proficiency within DOD

At the time of our June 2009 report, DOD was in the process of developing a strategic management tool called the Language Readiness Index. Once fully operational, DOD expects this tool to contain inventory and requirements data on the language and regional proficiency capabilities of military, civilian, and contractor personnel. By matching the inventory and requirements data, DOD intends to be able to determine potential gaps in capabilities and assess risk to its ability to conduct current military operations as well as potential future military operations. At the time of our prior report, DOD had obtained information on military personnel language skills through a combination of testing, referred to as the Defense Language Proficiency Test, and through service members voluntarily sharing or “self reporting” information in personnel records. This information, which includes the name of the foreign language and the skill level—as measured on a scale from 0 (no proficiency) to 5 (educated native proficiency)—with respect to speaking, listening, and reading, had been incorporated into the Language Readiness Index. However, DOD had not yet incorporated information about the language skills of DOD civilians and contract linguists in the Language Readiness Index, but planned to do so.

We also reported that DOD did not yet have a complete inventory of the regional proficiency skills of all service members or DOD civilians. Instead, DOD only identified and tracked those military members serving in specific occupations requiring a high level of regional proficiency, such as Foreign Area Officers. DOD guidance provided regional proficiency skill level guidelines—measured on a scale from 0 (prenovice) to 5 (expert)—intended to provide DOD components with benchmarks for assessing regional proficiency needs, developing regional proficiency curricula, and assessing DOD-wide regional proficiency capabilities. However, these guidelines did not provide measurable definitions that would allow for testing of particular regional proficiency levels. Unlike language proficiency skill levels, which have been defined and can be measured, DOD had found it difficult to define the elements needed to assess regional proficiency levels because such a definition must take into account knowledge and experience of historical, political, cultural, sociological, economic, and geographic factors across many global regions or specific foreign countries. Thus, DOD did not have a way to test or otherwise evaluate the skills of service members or DOD civilians in accordance with the regional proficiency guidelines in order to develop an inventory of regional proficiency skills. Furthermore, DOD had not established milestones for developing the ability to evaluate regional proficiency skills.

Because DOD did not have complete information on the regional proficiency capabilities of its military and civilian workforce or a method to evaluate proficiency levels, we concluded it could not determine capability gaps and assess risk effectively. Furthermore, DOD did not have the information it needed to inform its strategic planning for language and regional proficiency transformation. Therefore, we recommended that DOD establish a mechanism to assess and validate the full range of regional proficiency capabilities of service members and DOD civilians— including the development of measurable definitions and milestones to achieve an assessment—and incorporate the information into the Language Readiness Index.

DOD agreed with this recommendation, stating that it would provide definitions and other guidance by March 2010 that would enable the services and defense agencies to measure and determine appropriate regional proficiency levels. As of June 2010, DOD officials told us they had incorporated additional information about the language skills of DOD civilians in the Language Readiness Index and are examining the legal considerations of gathering information for contract linguists. However, DOD has not yet established a mechanism to assess and validate regional proficiency skills. DOD officials stated that they had recently commissioned a study and established an internal working group to address this issue, but they noted that defining and measuring regional proficiency is a difficult undertaking that has taken longer than originally estimated. DOD anticipates completing its study on regional proficiency by September 2011.

Status of DOD’s Efforts to Determine Language and Regional Proficiency Requirements

Having complete inventory data is important, but equally important is the need to match this inventory to valid requirements. In June 2009, we reported that DOD had developed a process to enable combatant commanders, the military services, and other organizations to submit their language and regional proficiency requirements. They were to identify information such as the level of the language proficiency needed, level of the regional proficiency needed, the occupational specialty needed, the desired number, and the desired source for filling the need. Although DOD outlined this process, it did not require the organizations to use a particular methodology for identifying this information, instead leaving it to the discretion of the organizations as to how they determined their requirements. In the absence of a validated methodology, estimates of requirements differed widely, especially by the combatant commands. For example, as of February 2008, the requirements of U.S. Pacific Command outnumbered the requirements of all other combatant commands combined. This variance occurred primarily because U.S. Pacific Command had included low-level language and regional proficiency requirements associated with general purpose forces, such as language or regional proficiency skills at proficiency levels 0 or 1, while others did not.

Without a validated methodology that was consistently applied by all organizations, DOD did not have a reliable means to identify language and regional proficiency requirements. Therefore, we recommended that DOD develop a transparent, validated methodology to aid in the identification of language and regional proficiency requirements and that its scope should include all communities, such as general purpose forces, human- intelligence collectors, signal-intelligence analysis, Foreign Area Officers, and DOD civilians, and all proficiency levels from the lowest levels to the highest levels. DOD agreed with this recommendation, noting that it planned to complete two assessments by November 2009 that would identify a validated process to prioritize and refine DOD’s foreign language and regional expertise requirements and produce a standardized methodology to measure risk of identified gaps and shortfalls. At that time, DOD noted that given the 90-day window it had established to conduct these assessments, the scope of the assessment would be narrower than what our recommendation called for. As of June 2010, DOD officials told us these assessments were completed and that the results were used to develop a validated methodology for determining language and regional proficiency requirements. Once approved by senior leaders—estimated to occur later this year—officials stated the methodology will be codified in DOD guidance and that the Joint Staff would provide training to the combatant commands on how to apply it. Officials stated that it would then take an additional several months for the combatant commands to determine the language and regional proficiency capability requirements. Because it is not yet approved, we have been unable to review or assess the methodology.

Concluding Observations

To respond to the evolving security environment, DOD conducts a set of complex and wide-ranging missions, such as irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, stability operations, and nonwarfighting activities. DOD has acknowledged the need to build and maintain certain fundamental capabilities, such as language and regional proficiency capabilities, which the department has deemed critical to success in these operations. Accordingly, DOD and the military services have undertaken various initiatives aimed at transforming language and regional proficiency capabilities. However, DOD has not yet produced a comprehensive strategic plan to guide and synchronize these efforts, including aligning service-level strategies with departmentwide goals, and it does not yet have complete inventory and requirements data needed to properly assess gaps and risks. As a result, DOD is not in a sound position to determine the appropriate scope and nature of its efforts to achieve desired goals, measure progress, and make informed investment decisions. As DOD completes its efforts to develop a strategic plan and capture complete language and regional proficiency and inventory and requirements data, it is essential that the department and the military services review and make necessary adjustments to their approaches and ensure that future funding requests are aligned accordingly.

Mr. Chairman this concludes my statement. I look forward to answering any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time.

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

For further information on this testimony, please contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or at pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Patricia Lentini, Assistant Director; Edward Anderson; Gabrielle Carrington; Nicole Harms; Susan Langley; Terry Richardson; Rebecca Rygg; Matthew Ullengren; and Chris Watson.

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