2020 Census: Actions Needed to Mitigate Key Risks Jeopardizing a Cost-Effective Enumeration
Released: 2017-10-31T00:00:00

Letter

Background

The cost of the census has been escalating over the last several decennials. The 2010 decennial was the costliest U.S. Census in history at about $12.3 billion, and was about 31 percent more costly than the $9.4 billion 2000 Census (in 2020 dollars). The average cost for counting a housing unit increased from about $16 in 1970 to around $92 in 2010 (in 2020 dollars). According to the Department of Commerce (Department), the total cost of the 2020 Census is now estimated to be approximately $15.6 billion dollars, more than $3 billion higher than previously reported by the Bureau.

Meanwhile, the return of census questionnaires by mail (the primary mode of data collection) declined over this period from 78 percent in 1970 to 63 percent in 2010 (see figure 1). Declining mail response rates—a key indicator in determining the cost-effectiveness of the census—are significant and lead to higher costs. This is because the Bureau sends temporary workers to each non-responding household to obtain census data. As a result, non-response follow-up is the Bureau’s largest and most costly field operation. In many ways, the Bureau has had to invest substantially more resources each decade to conduct the enumeration.

Achieving a complete and accurate census is becoming an increasingly daunting task, in part, because the nation’s population is growing larger, more diverse, and more reluctant to participate. When the census misses a person who should have been included, it results in an undercount; conversely, an overcount occurs when an individual is counted more than once. Such errors are particularly problematic because of their impact on various subgroups. Minorities, renters, and children, for example, are more likely to be undercounted by the census.

The challenges to an accurate count can be seen, for example, in the difficulties associated with counting people residing in unconventional and hidden housing units, such as converted basements and attics. In figure 2, what appears to be a small, single-family house could contain an apartment, as suggested by its two doorbells. If an address is not in the Bureau’s address file, its residents are less likely to be included in the census.

The Bureau Plans to Rely Heavily on IT for the 2020 Census

The Bureau plans to rely heavily on both new and legacy IT systems and infrastructure to support the 2018 End-to-End Test and the 2020 Census operations. For example, the Bureau plans to deploy and use 43 systems in the 2018 End-to-End Test. Eleven of these systems are being developed or modified as part of an enterprise-wide initiative called Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing (CEDCaP), which is managed within the Bureau’s IT Directorate. This initiative is a large and complex modernization program intended to deliver a system-of-systems to support all of the Bureau’s survey data collection and processing functions, rather than continuing to rely on unique, survey-specific systems with redundant capabilities. According to Bureau officials, the remaining 32 IT systems are being developed or modified by the 2020 Census Directorate or other Bureau divisions.

To support the 2018 End-to-End Test, the Bureau plans to incrementally deploy and use the 43 systems for nine operations from December 2016 through the end of the test in April 2019. These nine operations are: (1) in-office address canvassing, (2) recruiting staff for address canvassing, (3) training for address canvassing, (4) in-field address canvassing, (5) recruiting staff for field enumeration, (6) training for field enumeration, (7) self-response (i.e., Internet, phone, or paper), (8) field enumeration, and (9) tabulation and dissemination.

Key Risks are Jeopardizing a Cost- Effective Enumeration

We added the 2020 Census to our list of high-risk programs in February, 2017, because (1) innovations never before used in prior enumerations will not be fully tested; (2) the Bureau continues to face challenges in implementing and securing IT systems; and (3) the Bureau needs to control any further cost growth and develop reliable cost estimates. Each of these key risks are discussed in greater detail below; if not sufficiently addressed, these risks could adversely impact the cost and/or quality of the enumeration. Moreover, they compound the inherent challenges of conducting a successful census such as the nation’s increasingly diverse population and concerns over personal privacy.

Key Risk #1: Reduced Operational Testing Limits Confidence in 2020 Census Innovation Areas

The basic design of the enumeration—mail out and mail back of the census questionnaire with in-person follow-up for non-respondents—has been in use since 1970. However, a key lesson learned from the 2010 Census and earlier enumerations, is that this “traditional” design is no longer capable of cost-effectively counting the population.

In response to its own assessments, our recommendations, and studies by other organizations, the Bureau has fundamentally re-examined its approach for conducting the 2020 Census. Specifically, its plan for 2020 includes four broad innovation areas: re-engineering field operations, using administrative records, verifying addresses in-office, and developing an Internet self-response option (see table 1).

If they function as planned, the Bureau initially estimated that these innovations could result in savings of over $5 billion (in 2020 dollars) when compared to its estimates of the cost for conducting the census with traditional methods. However, in June 2016, we reported that the Bureau’s life-cycle cost estimate of $12.5 billion, developed in October 2015, was not reliable and did not adequately account for risk. As discussed earlier in this statement, the Department has recently updated this figure and now estimates a life-cycle cost of $15.6 billion. At this higher level, the cost savings would be reduced to around $1.9 billion.

While the planned innovations could help control costs, they also introduce new risks, in part, because they include new procedures and technology that have not been used extensively in earlier decennials, if at all. Our prior work has shown the importance of the Bureau conducting a robust testing program, including the 2018 End-to-End Test. Rigorous testing is a critical risk mitigation strategy because it provides information on the feasibility and performance of individual census-taking activities, their potential for achieving desired results, and the extent to which they are able to function together under full operational conditions. To address some of these challenges we have made several recommendations aimed at improving reengineered field operations, using administrative records, verifying the accuracy of the address list, and securing census responses via the Internet The Bureau has held a series of operational tests since 2012, but according to the Bureau, has scaled back recent tests because of funding uncertainties. For example, the Bureau canceled the field components of the 2017 Census Test including non-response follow-up, a key census operation. In November 2016, we reported that the cancelation of the 2017 field test was a lost opportunity to test, refine, and integrate operations and systems, and that it put more pressure on the 2018 End- to-End Test to demonstrate that enumeration activities will function under census-like conditions as needed for 2020. However, in May 2017, the Bureau scaled back the operational scope of the 2018 End-to-End and, of the three planned test sites; only the Rhode Island site would fully implement the 2018 End-to-End Test. The Washington and West Virginia state test sites would test just one field operation, address canvassing. In addition, due to budgetary concerns, the Bureau decided to remove three coverage measurement operations (and the technology that supports them) from the scope of the test.

Without sufficient testing, operational problems can go undiscovered and the opportunity to improve operations will be lost, in part because the 2018 End-to-End Test is the last opportunity to demonstrate census technology and procedures across a range of geographic locations, housing types, and demographic groups.

Operational Issues Observed in the End-to-End Test Will Need to Be Addressed

On August 28, 2017, temporary census employees known as address listers began implementing the in-field component of address canvassing for the 2018 End-to-End Test. Listers walked the streets of designated census blocks at all three test sites to verify addresses and geographic locations. The operation ended on September 27, 2017. As part of our ongoing work, we visited all three test sites and observed 18 listers conduct address canvassing. Generally, we found that listers were able to conduct address canvassing as planned. However, we also noted several challenges. We shared the following preliminary observations from our site visits with the Bureau: Internet connectivity was problematic at the West Virginia test site. We spoke to four census field supervisors who described certain areas as dead spots where Internet and cell phone service were not available. We also were told by those same supervisors that only certain cell service providers worked in certain areas. In order to access the Internet or cell service in those areas, census workers sometimes needed to drive several miles.

The allocation of lister assignments was not always optimal. Listers were supposed to be provided assignments close to where they live in order to optimize their local knowledge and to limit the numbers of miles being driven by listers to and from their assignment area. Bureau officials told us this was a challenge at all three test sites. Moreover, at one site the area census manager told us that some listers were being assigned work in another county even though blocks were still unassigned closer to where they resided. Relying on local knowledge and limiting the number of miles can increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of address canvassing.

The assignment of some of the large blocks early in the operations was not occurring as planned. At all three 2018 End-to-End Test sites Bureau managers had to manually assign some large blocks (some blocks had hundreds of housing units). It is important to assign large blocks early on because leaving the large blocks to be canvassed until the end of the operation could jeopardize the timely completion of address canvassing.

According to Bureau officials,during the test, completed address and map updates for some blocks did not properly transmit. This happened at all three test sites, and included data on 11 laptops for 25 blocks. The address and map information on seven of the laptops was permanently deleted. However, data on four laptops were still available. The Bureau is examining those laptops to determine what occurred that prevented the data from being transmitted. In Providence, Rhode Island, where the full test will take place, the Bureau recanvassed those blocks where data were lost to ensure that the address and map information going forward was correct. It will be important for the Bureau to understand what happened and ensure all address and map data is properly transmitted for the 2020 Census.

We have discussed these challenges with Bureau officials who stated that overall they are satisfied with the implementation of address canvassing but also agreed that resolving challenges discovered during address canvassing, some of which can affect the operation’s efficiency and effectiveness, will be important before the 2020 Census. We plan to issue a report early in 2018 on address canvassing at the three test sites.

Key Risk #2: The Bureau Continues to Face Challenges Implementing and Securing IT Systems

We have previously reported that the Bureau faced challenges in managing and overseeing IT programs, systems, and contractors supporting the 2020 Census. Specifically, it has been challenged in managing schedules, costs, contracts, governance and internal coordination, and security for its IT systems. As a result of these challenges, the Bureau is at risk of being unable to fully implement key IT systems necessary to support the 2020 Census and conduct a cost- effective enumeration. We have previously recommended that the Bureau take action to improve its implementation and management of IT in areas such as governance and internal coordination. We also have ongoing work reviewing each of these areas.

Our ongoing work has indicated that the Bureau faces significant challenges in managing the schedule for developing and testing systems for the 2018 End-to-End Test that began in August 2017. In this regard, the Bureau still has significant development and testing work that remains to be completed. As of August 2017, of the 43 systems in the test, the Bureau reported that 4 systems had completed development and integration testing, while the remaining 39 systems had not completed these activities.

Of these 39 systems, the Bureau reported that it had deployed a portion of the functionality for 21 systems to support address canvassing for the 2018 End-to-End Test; however, it had not yet deployed any functionality for the remaining 18 systems for the test. Figure 3 summarizes the development and testing status for the 43 systems planned for the 2018 End-to-End Test.

Moreover, due to challenges experienced during systems development, the Bureau has delayed key IT milestone dates (e.g., dates to begin integration testing) by several months for several of the systems in the 2018 End-to-End Test. Figure 4 depicts the delays to the deployment dates for the operations in the 2018 End-to-End Test, as of August 2017.

Our ongoing work also indicates that the Bureau is at risk of not meeting the updated milestone dates. For example, in June 2017 the Bureau reported that at least two of the systems expected to be used in the self- response operation (the Internet self-response system and the call center system) are at risk of not meeting the delayed milestone dates. In addition, in September 2017 the Bureau reported that at least two of the systems expected to be used in the field enumeration operation (the enumeration system and the operational control system) are at risk of not meeting their delayed dates.

Combined, these delays reduce the time available to conduct the security reviews and approvals for the systems being used in the 2018 End-to- End Test. We previously testified in May 2017 that the Bureau faced similar challenges leading up to the 2017 Census Test, including experiencing delays in system development that led to compressed time frames for security reviews and approvals. Specifically, we noted that the Bureau did not have time to thoroughly assess the low-impact components of one system and complete penetration testing for another system prior to the test, but accepted the security risks and uncertainty due to compressed time frames. We concluded that, for the 2018 End-to- End Test, it will be important that these security assessments are completed in a timely manner and that risks are at an acceptable level before the systems are deployed.

The Bureau noted that, if it continues to be behind schedule, key field operations for the 2018 End-to-End Test (such as non-response follow- up) could be delayed or canceled, which may affect the Bureau’s ability to meet the test’s objectives. As we stated earlier, without sufficient testing, operational problems can go undiscovered and the opportunity to improve operations will be lost. Bureau officials are evaluating options to decrease the impact of these delays on integration testing and security review activities by, for example, utilizing additional staff. We have ongoing work reviewing the Bureau’s development and testing delays and the impacts of these delays on systems readiness for the 2018 End-to-End Test.

The Bureau faces challenges in reporting and controlling IT cost growth. In April 2017, the Bureau briefed us on its efforts to estimate the costs for the 2020 Census, during which it presented IT costs of about $2.4 billion from fiscal years 2018 through 2021. Based on this information and other corroborating IT contract information provided by the Bureau, we testified in May 2017 that the Bureau had identified at least $2 billion in IT costs.

However, in June 2017, Bureau officials in the 2020 Census Directorate told us that the data they provided in April 2017 did not reflect all IT costs for the 2020 program. The officials provided us with an analysis of the Bureau’s October 2015 cost estimate that identified $3.4 billion in total IT costs from fiscal years 2012 through 2023. These costs included, among other things, those associated with system engineering, test and evaluation, and infrastructure, as well as a portion of the costs for the CEDCaP program.

Yet, our ongoing work determined the Bureau’s $3.4 billion cost estimate from October 2015 did not reflect its current plans for acquiring IT to be used during the 2020 Census and that the related costs are likely to increase: In August 2016, the Bureau awarded a technical integration contract for about $886 million, a cost that was not reflected in the $3.4 billion expected IT costs. More recently, in May 2017, we testified that the scope of work for this contract had increased since the contract was awarded; thus, the corresponding contract costs were likely to rise above $886 million, as well.

In March 2017, the Bureau reported that the contract associated with the call center and IT system to support the collection of census data over the phone was projected to overrun its initial estimated cost by at least $40 million.

In May 2017, the Bureau reported that the CEDCaP program’s cost estimate was increasing by more than $400 million—from its original estimate of $548 million in 2013 to a revised estimate of $965 million in May 2017.

In June 2017, the Bureau awarded a contract for mobile devices and associated services for about $283 million, an amount that is about $137 million higher than the cost for these devices and services identified in its October 2015 estimate.

As a result of these factors, the Bureau’s $3.4 billion estimate of IT costs is likely to be at least $1.4 billion higher, thus increasing the total costs to at least $4.8 billion. Figure 5 identifies the Bureau estimate of total IT costs associated with the 2020 program as of October 2015, as well as anticipated cost increases as of August 2017.

IT cost information that is accurately reported and clearly communicated is necessary so that Congress and the public have confidence that taxpayer funds are being spent in an appropriate manner. However, changes in the Bureau’s reporting of these total costs, combined with cost growth since the October 2015 estimate, raise questions as to whether the Bureau has a complete understanding of the IT costs associated with the 2020 program. In early October 2017, the Secretary of Commerce testified that he expected the total IT costs for the 2020 Census to be about $4.96 billion. This estimate of IT costs is approximately $1.6 billion higher than the Bureau’s October 2015 estimate and further confirms our analysis of expected IT cost increases discussed above. As of late October 2017, the Bureau and Department were still finalizing the documentation used to develop the new cost estimate. After these documents are complete and made available for inspection, as part of our ongoing work, we plan to evaluate whether this updated IT cost estimate includes the cost increases, discussed above, that were not included in the October 2015 estimate.

Our ongoing work also determined that the Bureau faces challenges in managing its significant contractor support. The Bureau is relying on contractor support in many key areas of the 2020 Census. For example, it is relying on contractors to develop a number of key systems and components of the IT infrastructure. These activities include (1) developing the IT platform that is intended to be used to collect data from those responding via the Internet, telephone, and non-response follow-up activities; (2) procuring the mobile devices and cellular service to be used for non-response follow-up; and (3) developing the infrastructure in the field offices. According to Bureau officials, contractors are also providing support in areas such as fraud detection, cloud computing services, and disaster recovery.

In addition to the development of key technology, the Bureau is relying on contractor support for integrating all of the key systems and infrastructure. The Bureau awarded a contract to integrate the 2020 Census systems and infrastructure in August 2016. The contractor’s work was to include evaluating the systems and infrastructure and acquiring the infrastructure (e.g., cloud or data center) to meet the Bureau’s scalability and performance needs. It was also to include integrating all of the systems, supporting technical testing activities, and developing plans for ensuring the continuity of operations. Since the contract was awarded, the Bureau has modified the scope to also include assisting with operational testing activities, conducting performance testing for two Internet self-response systems, and technical support for the implementation of the paper data capture system.

However, our ongoing work has indicated that the Bureau is facing staffing challenges that could impact its ability to manage and oversee the technical integration contractor. Specifically, the Bureau is managing the integration contractor through a government program management office, but this office is still filling vacancies. As of October 2017, the Bureau reported that 35 of the office’s 58 federal employee positions were vacant. As a result, this program management office may not be able to provide adequate oversight of contractor cost, schedule, and performance.

The delays during the 2017 Test and preparations for the 2018 End-to- End Test raises concerns regarding the Bureau’s ability to effectively perform contractor management. As we reported in November 2016, a greater reliance on contractors for these key components of the 2020 Census requires the Bureau to focus on sound management and oversight of the key contracts, projects, and systems. As part of our ongoing work, we plan to monitor the Bureau’s progress in managing its contractor support.

Effective IT governance can drive change, provide oversight, and ensure accountability for results. Further, effective IT governance was envisioned in the provisions referred to as the 2014 Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA), which strengthened and reinforced the role of the departmental CIO. The component CIO also plays a role in effective IT governance as subject to the oversight and policies of the parent department or agency implementing FITARA.

To ensure executive-level oversight of the key systems and technology, the Bureau’s CIO (or a representative) is a member of the governance boards that oversee all of the operations and technology for the 2020 Census. However, in August 2016 we reported on challenges the Bureau has had with IT governance and internal coordination, including weaknesses in its ability to monitor and control IT project costs, schedules, and performance. We made several recommendations to the Department of Commerce to direct the Bureau to, among other things, better ensure that risks are adequately identified and schedules are aligned. The Department agreed with our recommendations. However, as of October 2017, the Bureau had only fully implemented one recommendation and had taken initial steps toward implementing others.

Further, given the schedule delays and cost increases previously mentioned, and the vast amount of development, testing, and security assessments left to be completed, we remain concerned about executive- level oversight of systems and security. Moving forward, it will be important that the CIO and other Bureau executives continue to use a collaborative governance approach to effectively manage risks and ensure that the IT solutions meet the needs of the agency within cost and schedule. As part of our ongoing work, we plan to monitor the steps the Bureau is taking to effectively oversee and manage the development and acquisition of its IT systems.

In November 2016, we described the significant challenges that the Bureau faced in securing systems and data for the 2020 Census, and we noted that tight time frames could exacerbate these challenges. Two such challenges were (1) ensuring that individuals gain only limited and appropriate access to the 2020 Census data, including personally identifiable information (PII) (e.g., name, personal address, and date of birth), and (2) making certain that security assessments were completed in a timely manner and that risks were at an acceptable level. Protecting PII, for example, is especially important because a majority of the 43 systems to be used in the 2018 End-to-End Test contain PII, as reflected in figure 6.

To address these and other challenges, federal law and guidance specify requirements for protecting federal information and information systems, such as those to be used in the 2020 Census. Specifically, the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 and the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) require executive branch agencies to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide program to provide security for the information and information systems that support operations and assets of the agency.

Accordingly, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed risk management framework guidance for agencies to follow in developing information security programs. Additionally, the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) revised Circular A-130 on managing federal information resources required agencies to implement the NIST risk management framework to integrate information security and risk management activities into the system development life cycle.

In accordance with FISMA, NIST guidance, and OMB guidance, the Office of the CIO established a risk management framework. This framework requires that system developers ensure that each of the systems undergoes a full security assessment, and that system developers remediate critical deficiencies. In addition, according to the Bureau’s framework, system developers must ensure that each component of a system has its own system security plan, which documents how the Bureau plans to implement security controls. As a result, system developers for a single system might develop multiple system security plans which all have to be approved as part of the system’s complete security documentation. We have ongoing work that is reviewing the extent to which the Bureau’s framework meets the specific requirements of the NIST guidance.

According to the Bureau’s framework, each of the 43 systems in the 2018 End-to-End Test will need to have complete security documentation (such as system security plans) and an approved authorization to operate prior to their use in the 2018 End-to-End Test. However, our ongoing work indicates that, while the Bureau is completing these steps for the 43 systems to be used in the 2018 End-to-End Test, significant work remains. Specifically, as we reported in October 2017:

None of the 43 systems are fully authorized to operate through the completion of the 2018 End-to-End Test. Bureau officials from the CIO’s Office of Information Security stated that these systems will need to be reauthorized because, among other things, they have additional development work planned that may require the systems to be reauthorized; are being moved to a different infrastructure environment (e.g., from a data center to a cloud-based environment); or have a current authorization that expires before the completion of the 2018 End-to-End Test. The amount of work remaining is concerning because the test has already begun and the delays experienced in system development and testing mentioned earlier reduce the time available for performing the security assessments needed to fully authorize these systems before the completion of the 2018 End-to-End test.

Thirty-seven systems have a current authorization to operate, but the Bureau will need to reauthorize these systems before the completion of the 2018 End-to-End Test. This is due to the reasons mentioned previously, such as additional development work planned and changes to the infrastructure environments.

Two systems have not yet obtained an authorization to operate.

For the remaining four systems, the Bureau has not yet provided us with documentation about the current authorization status.

Figure 7 depicts the authorization to operate status for the systems being used in the 2018 End-to-End Test, as reported by the Bureau.

Because many of the systems that will be a part of the 2018 End-to-End Test are not yet fully developed, the Bureau has not finalized all of the security controls to be implemented; assessed those controls; developed plans to remediate control weaknesses; and determined whether there is time to fully remediate any deficiencies before the systems are needed for the test. In addition, as discussed earlier, the Bureau is facing system development challenges that are delaying the completion of milestones and compressing the time available for security testing activities.

While the large-scale technological changes (such as Internet self- response) increase the likelihood of efficiency and effectiveness gains, they also introduce many information security challenges. The 2018 End- to-End Test also involves collecting PII on hundreds of thousands of households across the country, which further increases the need to properly secure these systems. Thus, it will be important that the Bureau provides adequate time to perform these security assessments, completes them in a timely manner, and ensures that risks are at an acceptable level before the systems are deployed. We plan to continue monitoring the Bureau’s progress in securing its IT systems and data as part of our ongoing work.

Key Risk #3: Lack of Reliable Costs Estimates Limits Support for 2020 Census Funding

Earlier this month, the Department announced that it had updated the October 2015 life-cycle cost estimate and now projects the life-cycle cost of the 2020 Census will be $15.6 billion, more than a $3 billion (27 percent) increase over the Bureau’s earlier estimate. The higher estimated life-cycle cost is due, in part, as we reported in June 2016, to the Bureau’s failure to meet best practices for a quality cost-estimate. Specifically, we reported that, although the Bureau had taken steps to improve its capacity to carry out an effective cost estimate, such as establishing an independent cost estimation office, its October 2015 version of the estimate for the 2020 Census only partially met the characteristics of two best practices (comprehensive and accurate) and minimally met the other two (well-documented and credible). We also reported that risks were not properly accounted for in the cost estimate.

We recommended that the Bureau take action to ensure its 2020 Census cost estimate meets all four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate, as well as properly account for risk to ensure there are appropriate levels for budgeted contingencies. The Bureau agreed with our recommendations. In response, the Department of Commerce reported that in May 2017, a multidisciplinary team was created to evaluate the 2020 Census program and to produce an independent cost estimate. Factors driving the increased cost-estimate include changes to assumptions relating to self- response rates, wage levels for temporary census workers, as well as the fact that major contracts and IT scale-up plans and procedures were not effectively planned, managed, and executed. The new estimate also includes a contingency of 10 percent of estimated costs per year as insurance against “unknown-unknowns”, such as a major cybersecurity event.

The Bureau and Department are still finalizing the documentation used to develop the $15.6 billion cost-estimate. Until these documents are complete and made available for inspection, we cannot determine the reliability of the estimate. We will review the documentation when it is available. In order for the estimate to be deemed high quality, and thus the basis for any 2020 Census annual budgetary figures, the new cost- estimate will need to address the following four best practices, and do so as quickly as possible given the expected ramp-up in spending:

Comprehensive. To be comprehensive an estimate should have enough detail to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor double-counted, and all cost-influencing assumptions are detailed in the estimate’s documentation, among other things, according to best practices. In June 2016, we reported that, while Bureau officials were able to provide us with several documents that included projections and assumptions that were used in the cost estimate, we found the estimate to be partially comprehensive because it was unclear if all life-cycle costs were included in the estimate or if the cost estimate completely defined the program.

Accurate. Accurate estimates are unbiased and contain few mathematical mistakes. We reported in June 2016 that the estimate partially met best practices for this characteristic, in part because we could not independently verify the calculations the Bureau used within its cost model, which the Bureau did not have documented or explained.

Well-documented. Cost estimates are considered valid if they are well-documented to the point they can be easily repeated or updated and can be traced to original sources through auditing, according to best practices. In June 2016, we reported that, while the Bureau provided some documentation of supporting data, it did not describe how the source data were incorporated.

Credible. Credible cost estimates must clearly identify limitations due to uncertainty or bias surrounding the data or assumptions, according to best practices. In June 2016, we reported that the estimate minimally met best practices for this characteristic in part because the Bureau carried out its risk and uncertainty analysis only for about $4.6 billion (37 percent) of the $12.5 billion total estimated life-cycle cost, excluding, for example, consideration of uncertainty over what the decennial census’s estimated part will be of the total cost of CEDCaP.

Continued Management Attention Needed to Keep Preparations on Track and Help Ensure a Cost- Effective Enumeration

2020 Challenges Are Symptomatic of Deeper Long-Term Organizational Issues

The difficulties facing the Bureau’s preparation for the decennial in such areas as planning and testing; managing and overseeing IT programs, systems, and contractors supporting the enumeration; developing reliable cost estimates; prioritizing decisions; managing schedules; and other challenges, are symptomatic of deeper organizational issues.

Following the 2010 Census, a key lesson learned for 2020 we identified was ensuring that the Bureau’s organizational culture and structure, as well as its approach to strategic planning, human capital management, internal collaboration, knowledge sharing, capital decision-making, risk and change management, and other internal functions are aligned toward delivering more cost-effective outcomes.

The Bureau has made improvements over the last decade, and continued progress will depend in part on sustaining efforts to strengthen risk management activities, enhancing systems testing, bringing in experienced personnel to key positions, implementing our recommendations, and meeting regularly with officials from its parent agency, the Department of Commerce. Going forward, our experience has shown that the key elements needed to make progress in high-risk areas are top-level attention by the administration and agency officials to (1) leadership commitment, (2) ensuring capacity, (3) developing a corrective action plan, (4) regular monitoring, and (5) demonstrated progress. Although important steps have been taken in at least some of these areas, overall, far more work is needed.

On the one hand, the Secretary of Commerce has taken several actions towards demonstrating leadership commitment. For example, the previously noted multidisciplinary review team included members with Bureau leadership experience, as well as members with private sector technology management experience. Additional program evaluation and the independent cost estimate was produced by a team from the Commerce Secretary’s Office of Acquisition Management that included a member detailed from OMB. Commerce also reports senior officials are now actively involved in the management and oversight of the decennial. Likewise, with respect to monitoring, the Commerce Secretary reports having weekly 2020 Census oversight reviews with senior Bureau staff and will require metric tracking and program execution status on a real- time basis.

On the other hand, demonstrating the capacity to address high risk concerns remains a challenge. For example, our ongoing work has indicated that the Bureau is facing staffing challenges that could impact its ability to manage and oversee the technical integration contractor. Specifically, the Bureau is managing the integration contractor through a government program management office, but this office is still filling vacancies. As of October 2017, the Bureau reported that 35 of 58, or 60 percent, of the office’s federal employee positions were vacant. As a result, this program management office may not be able to provide adequate oversight of contractor cost, schedule, and performance.

In the months ahead, we will continue to monitor the Bureau’s progress in addressing in each of the 5 elements essential for reducing the risk to a cost-effective enumeration.

Leadership Continuity Will Be Critical For Keeping Efforts on Track

At a time when strong Bureau management is needed, vacancies in the agency’s two top positions—Director and Deputy Director—are not helpful for keeping 2020 preparations on-track. These vacancies are due to the previous director’s retirement on June 30, 2017, and the previous deputy director’s appointment to be the Chief Statistician of the United States within the Office of Management and Budget in January 2017. Although interim leadership has since been named, in our prior work we have noted how openings in the Bureau’s top position makes it difficult to ensure accountability and continuity, as well as to develop and sustain efforts that foster change, produce results, mitigate risks, and control costs over the long term.

The census director is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, without regard to political affiliation. The director’s term is a fixed 5-year term of office, and runs in 5-year increments. An individual may be reappointed and serve 2 full terms as director. The director’s position was first filled this way beginning on January 1, 2012, and cycles every fifth year thereafter. Because the new term began on January 1, 2017, the time that elapses until a new director is confirmed counts against the 5-year term of office. As a result, the next director’s tenure will be less than 5 years.

Going forward, filling these top two slots should be an important priority. On the basis of our prior work, key attributes of a census director, in addition to the obvious ones of technical expertise and the ability to lead large, long-term, and high risk programs, could include abilities in the following areas:

Strategic Vision. The Director needs to build a long-term vision for the Bureau that extends beyond the current decennial census. Strategic planning, human-capital succession planning, and life-cycle cost estimates for the Bureau all span the decade.

Sustaining Stakeholder Relationships. The Director needs to continually expand and develop working relationships and partnerships with governmental, political, and other professional officials in both the public and private sectors to obtain their input, support, and participation in the Bureau’s activities.

Accountability. The life-cycle cost for a decennial census spans a decade, and decisions made early in the decade about the next decennial census guide the research, investments, and tests carried out throughout the decennial census. Institutionalizing accountability over an extended period may help long-term decennial initiatives provide meaningful and sustainable results.

Further Actions Needed on Our Recommendations

Over the past several years we have issued numerous reports that underscored the fact that if the Bureau was to successfully meet its cost savings goal for the 2020 Census, the Bureau needs to take significant actions to improve its research, testing, planning, scheduling, cost estimation, system development, and IT security practices. Over the past decade, we have made 84 recommendations specific to the 2020 Census to help address these and other issues. The Bureau has generally agreed with those recommendations; however 36 of them had not been implemented as of October 2017. We have designated 20 of these recommendations as a priority for the Department of Commerce and 5 have been implemented. In August 2017, we sent the Secretary of Commerce a letter that identified our open priority recommendations at the Department, 15 of which concern the 2020 Census. We believe that attention to these recommendations is essential for a cost-effective enumeration. The recommendations included implementing reliable cost estimation and scheduling practices in order to establish better control over program costs, as well as taking steps to better position the Bureau to develop an Internet response option for the 2020 Census. Appendix I summarizes our priority recommendations related to the 2020 Census and the actions the Department has taken to address them.

On October 3, 2017, in response to our August 2017 letter, the Commerce Secretary noted that he shared our concerns about the 2020 Census and acknowledged that some of the programs had not worked as planned, and are not delivering the savings that were promised. The Commerce Secretary also stated that he intends to improve the timeliness for implementing our recommendations.

We meet quarterly with Bureau officials to discuss the progress and status of open recommendations related to the 2020 Census. We are encouraged by the actions taken by the Department and the Bureau in addressing our recommendations. Implementing our recommendations in a complete and timely manner is important because it would improve the management of the 2020 Census and help to mitigate continued risks.

In conclusion, while the Bureau has made progress in revamping its approach to the census, it faces considerable challenges and uncertainties in (1) implementing key cost-saving innovations and ensuring they function under operational conditions; (2) managing the development and security of key IT systems; and (3) developing a quality cost estimate for the 2020 Census and preventing further cost increases. Without timely and appropriate actions, these challenges could adversely affect the cost, accuracy, and schedule of the enumeration.

For these reasons, the 2020 Census is a GAO high risk area. Going forward, continued management and Congressional attention—such as hearings like this one—will be vital for ensuring risks are managed, preparations stay on-track, and the Bureau is held accountable for implementing the enumeration as planned.

We will continue to assess the Bureau’s efforts to conduct a cost-effective enumeration and look forward to keeping Congress informed of the Bureau’s progress. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, and Members of the Committee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

If you have any questions about this statement, please contact Robert Goldenkoff at (202) 512-2757 or by e-mail at goldenkoffr@gao.gov or David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Other key contributors to this testimony include Lisa Pearson (Assistant Director); Jon Ticehurst (Assistant Director); Katherine Wulff (Analyst in Charge); Mark Abraham; Brian Bothwell; Jeffrey DeMarco; Hoyt Lacy; Jason Lee; Ty Mitchell; LaSonya Roberts; Kate Sharkey; Andrea Starosciak; Umesh Thakkar; and Timothy Wexler.

Appendix I: Priority Recommendations from GAO’s Work Related to the 2020 Census

The Department of Commerce and Census Bureau have taken some actions to address our recommendations related to implementation of the 2020 Census; however, a large number of recommendations remain open. Since just prior to the 2010 Census, we have made 84 recommendations in 23 reports to the Department of Commerce and Census Bureau aimed at helping the Bureau prepare for and implement a successful 2020 Census (table 1). Of those 84, the Department of Commerce and the Census Bureau have implemented 48 recommendations. Thirty-six recommendations require additional action.

Of these 84 recommendations, we have designated 20 as priorities for Commerce to address. The Census Bureau has taken some action on our priority recommendations, implementing 5 of the 20 priority recommendations we have made.

The following table presents each of the 20 priority recommendations along with a summary of actions taken to address it.