Space Acquisitions: DOD Is Overcoming Long-Standing Problems, but Faces Challenges to Ensuring Its Investments Are Optimized
Released: 2013-04-24T00:00:00

Letter

Background

DOD has a long history of troubled space systems acquisitions. Over the past decade, most of the large DOD space systems acquisition programs collectively experienced billions of dollars in cost increases and delayed schedules. In particular, a long-standing problem in DOD space systems acquisitions is that program costs have tended to go up significantly from initial cost estimates. As shown in figure 1, estimated costs for selected major space systems acquisition programs have increased by about $22.6 billion—nearly 230 percent—from fiscal years 2012 through 2017.

The gap between original and current estimates shows that DOD has fewer dollars available to invest in new programs or add to existing ones. DOD’s overall level of investment over the five year period decreases until fiscal year 2014, at which point it levels off. The declining investment in the later years is the result of mature programs that have planned lower out-year funding, cancellation of a major space system acquisition program and several development efforts, and the exclusion of several space systems acquisition efforts for which total cost data were unavailable. These efforts include the Joint Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS), Space Fence, Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Follow-on, Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS), and Weather Satellite Follow-on.

We have previously reported that programs have experienced cost increases and schedule delays that have resulted in potential capability gaps in missile warning, military communications, and weather monitoring. For instance, unit costs for one of the most troubled programs, the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) have climbed about 230 percent to over $3 billion per satellite, with the launch of the first satellite about 9 years later than predicted. Similarly, 8 years after a development contract for the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program was awarded in 2002, the cost estimate had more than doubled—to about $15 billion, launch dates had been delayed by over 5 years, significant functionality had been removed from the program, and the program’s tri-agency management structure had proven to be ineffective. In February 2010, it was announced that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) and DOD would no longer jointly procure the NPOESS satellite system and, instead, each agency would undertake separate acquisitions. Consequently, the risks of gaps in weather satellite monitoring data have increased. Other programs, such as the Transformational Satellite Communications System, were canceled several years earlier because they were found to be too ambitious and not affordable at a time when the DOD was struggling to address critical acquisition problems elsewhere in the space systems portfolio.

Our past work has identified a number of causes of acquisition problems, but several consistently stand out. At a higher level, DOD tended to start more weapon programs than was affordable, creating a competition for funding that focused on advocacy at the expense of realism and sound management. DOD also tended to start its space systems programs before it had the assurance that the capabilities it was pursuing could be achieved within available resources and time constraints. For example, when critical technologies planned for a satellite system are still in relatively early stages of discovery and invention, there is no way to accurately estimate how long it would take to design, develop, and build the system. Finally, programs typically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenges or the maturity of the technologies necessary to achieve the full capability. DOD’s preference to make larger, complex satellites that perform a multitude of missions stretched technology challenges beyond current capabilities in some cases. In the past, funding instability, poor contractor oversight, and relaxed quality standards have also contributed to acquisition problems.

We have also reported that fragmented leadership and lack of a single authority in overseeing the acquisition of space programs have created challenges for optimally acquiring, developing, and deploying new space systems. Past studies and reviews have found that responsibilities for acquiring space systems are diffused across various DOD organizations, even though many of the larger programs, such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) and those to acquire imagery and environmental satellites, are integral to the execution of multiple agencies’ missions. We reported that with multiagency space programs, success is often only possible with cooperation and coordination; however, successful and productive coordination appears to be the exception and not the rule. This fragmentation is problematic not only because of a lack of coordination that has led to delays in fielding systems, but also because no one person or organization is held accountable for balancing governmentwide needs against wants, resolving conflicts and ensuring coordination among the many organizations involved with space systems acquisitions, and ensuring that resources are directed where they are most needed.

Over the past 5 years, our work has recommended numerous actions that can be taken to address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended that DOD separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. We have also identified practices related to cost estimating, program manager tenure, quality assurance, technology transition, and an array of other aspects of acquisition program management that could benefit space programs.

DOD has generally concurred with our recommendations, and has undertaken a number of actions to establish a better foundation for acquisition success. For newer satellite acquisition efforts, DOD has attempted to incorporate lessons learned from its experiences with earlier efforts. For example, the GPS III program, which began product development in 2008, is using a “back to basics” approach, emphasizing rigorous systems engineering, use of military specifications and standards, and an incremental approach to providing capability. Thus far, the work performed on the development of the first two satellites is costing more than expected—but not on the scale of earlier programs— and its schedule remains on track.

Our prior testimonies have cited an array of actions as well. the Office of the Secretary of Defense created a new office under the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to oversee all major DOD space and intelligence related acquisitions and it began applying its broader weapon system acquisition policy (DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008)) to space systems, instead of allowing a tailored policy for space that enabled DOD to commit to major investments before knowing what resources will be required to deliver promised capability. Among other initiatives, the Air Force undertook efforts to improve cost estimating and revitalize its acquisition workforce and program management assistance programs. Further, in 2009, for major weapons programs, Congress enacted the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, which required greater emphasis on front-end planning and, for example, refining concepts through early systems engineering, strengthening cost estimating, building prototypes, holding early milestone reviews, and developing preliminary designs before starting system development.

The Current Status and Cost of Space Systems Acquisitions

Most of DOD’s major satellite programs are in mature phases of acquisition and cost and schedule growth is not as widespread as it was in prior years. However, the satellites, ground systems, and user terminals are not optimally aligned and the cost of launching satellites continues to be expensive.

GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Fully Realizing Benefits of Satellite Acquisition Improvements, GAO-12-563T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 21, 2012); and Space Acquisitions: DOD Delivering New Generations of Satellites, but Space System Acquisition Challenges Remain, GAO-11-590T (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2011).

Most of DOD’s major satellite programs are in mature phases of acquisition, that is, the initial satellites have been designed, fabricated and launched into orbit while additional satellites of the same design are being produced. Only two major satellite programs are in earlier phases of acquisition—the GPS III program and the PTSS program. For the portfolio of major satellite programs, new cost and schedule growth is not as widespread as it was in prior years, but DOD is still experiencing problems in these programs. For example, though the first two SBIRS satellites have launched, program officials are predicting a 14 month delay on the production of the third and fourth geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites due in part to technical challenges, parts obsolescence, and test failures. As we reported in March 2013, program officials are predicting about a $440 million cost overrun for these satellites. Also, the work performed to date for development of the first two GPS III satellites continues to cost more than DOD expected. Since the program entered system development, total program costs have increased approximately $180 million. The GPS III program office has attributed this to a variety of factors, such as inefficiencies in the development of the satellite bus and the navigation payload. Program officials stated that the cost growth was partially due to the program’s use of a back to basics approach, which they stated shifted costs to earlier in the acquisition as a result of more stringent parts and materials requirements. They anticipate these requirements will result in fewer problems later in the acquisition.

Table 1 describes the status of the satellite programs we have been tracking in more detail.

Though satellite programs are not experiencing cost and schedule problems as widespread as in years past, we have reported that ground control systems and user terminals in most of DOD’s major space systems acquisitions are not optimally aligned, leading to underutilized on-orbit satellite resources and limited capability provided to the warfighter. For example:

Over 90 percent of the MUOS’s planned capability is dependent on the development of compatible user terminals. Although the first MUOS satellite was launched over a year ago, operational testing of MUOS with production-representative user terminals is not expected to occur until the second quarter of fiscal year 2014.

The SBIRS program revised its delivery schedule of ground capabilities to add increments that will provide the warfighter some capabilities sooner than 2018, but complete and usable data from a critical sensor will not be available until about 7 years after the satellite is on orbit.

The Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) program, which is developing user terminals intended to communicate with AEHF satellites, has experienced numerous cost and schedule delays and is currently not synchronized with the AEHF program, which launched its second satellite last year while the FAB-T program has yet to deliver any capabilities. Current estimates show that FAB-T will reach initial operational capability for some requirements in 2019, about 5 years after AEHF is scheduled to reach its initial operational capability.

GPS OCX is required for the launch of the first GPS III satellite because the existing ground control software is not compatible with the new GPS satellites. Realizing that the new ground control system would not be delivered in time to launch the first GPS III satellite, the Air Force added funding to the contract to accelerate development of the software that can launch and checkout the GPS III satellite, leaving the other capabilities—like the ability to command and control the satellite—to be delivered in late 2016. Subsequently, the launch of the first GPS III satellite has been delayed to May 2015 to better synchronize with the availability of the launch software.

Though there are inherent difficulties in aligning delivery of satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals, we reported in 2009 that the lack of synchronization between segments of space acquisition programs is largely the result of the same core issues that hamper acquisitions in general—requirements instability, funding instability, insufficient technology maturity, underestimation of complexity, and poor contractor oversight, among other issues. In addition, user terminals are not optimally aligned because of a lack of coordination and effective oversight over the many military organizations that either develop user terminals or have some hand in development. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense take a variety of actions to help ensure that DOD space systems provide more capability to the warfighter through better alignment and increased commonality, and to provide increased insight into ground asset costs. DOD generally agreed with these recommendations.

Another acquisition challenge facing DOD is the cost of launching satellites into space. DOD has benefited from a long string of successful launches, including three military and four intelligence community satellites this year. However, each launch can range from $100 million to over $200 million. Additional money is spent to support launch infrastructure. An analysis we performed this year showed that from fiscal years 2013 through 2017, the government can expect to spend approximately $46 billion on launch activities. Meanwhile, we reported in prior years that too little was known about the factors that were behind cost and price increases. The Air Force has developed a new launch acquisition strategy which includes a block buy approach for future launches. At the same time, it is implementing an effort to introduce new launch providers. Both efforts are designed to help lower costs for launch, but they face challenges, which are discussed further in the next section.

Recent GAO Findings Related to Space Systems Acquisitions

Over the past year, we have reported on DOD’s progress in closing knowledge gaps in its new Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) acquisition strategy, DOD’s efforts to introduce new launch providers, opportunities to help reduce satellite program costs, and the Air Force’s satellite control operations and modernization efforts with comparisons to commercial practices. These reports further highlight the successes and challenges that have faced the space community as it has sought to mitigate rising costs and deliver modernized capabilities.

EELV Acquisition Strategy

We reported in September 2011 that DOD needed to ensure the new acquisition strategy was based on sufficient information, as there were significant uncertainties relating to the health of the launch industrial base, contractor cost or pricing data, mission assurance costs and activities, numbers of launch vehicles needed, and future engine prices which were expected to double or triple in the near term. As a result, DOD was at risk of committing to an acquisition strategy—including an expensive, multi-billion dollar block buy of launch vehicle booster cores— before it had information essential to ensuring business decisions contained in the strategy were sound. Among other things, we recommended DOD assess engine costs and mission assurance activities, reassess the length of the proposed block buy, and consider how to address broader launch acquisition and technology development issues. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations. The Air Force issued its new EELV acquisition strategy in November 2011. Following our review, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 required that DOD report to congressional committees a description of how it implemented the recommendations contained in our report and for GAO to assess that information.

We reported in July 2012 that DOD had numerous efforts in progress to address the knowledge gaps and data deficiencies identified in our September 2011 report, such as completing or obtaining independent cost estimates for two EELV engines and completing a study of the liquid rocket engine industrial base. We reported that officials from DOD, NASA, and NRO had initiated several assessments to obtain needed information, and had worked closely to finalize new launch provider certification criteria for national security space launches. However, we found that more action was needed to ensure that launch mission assurance activities were not excessive, to identify opportunities to leverage the government’s buying power through increased efficiencies in launch acquisitions, and to strategically address longer-term technology investments. We reported that some information DOD was gathering could set the stage for longer-term strategic planning for the program, especially in critical launch technology research and development decisions and that investing in a longer-term perspective for launch acquisitions was important to fully leverage the government’s buying power and maintain a healthy industrial base.

Launch Services New Entrant Certification Guide

In 2011, the Air Force, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) began implementing a coordinated strategy—called the Air Force Launch Services New Entrant Certification Guide (Guide)—to certify new entrants to provide launch capability on EELV-class launch vehicles. New entrants are launch companies that are working toward certifying their launch vehicle capabilities so that they may be allowed to compete with the current sole- source contractor for government launches. Launch vehicle certification is necessary to ensure that only proven, reliable launch vehicles will be used to launch government satellites. The House Armed Services Committee Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 directed GAO to review and analyze the implementation of the Guide.

In February 2013, we reported that the Air Force based its Guide on existing NASA policy and procedures with respect to payload risk classification and launch vehicle certification.Force, NASA, and NRO were working to coordinate and share information to facilitate launch vehicle certification efforts, but that each agency would determine for itself when certification had been achieved. As a result, some duplication and overlap of efforts could occur. We also found that the Air Force had added other prerequisites to certification for new entrants that were not captured within the Guide.

Opportunities to Help Reduce Government Satellite Program Costs

In our April 2013 report on reducing duplication, overlap, and fragmentation within the federal government, we found that government agencies, including DOD, could achieve considerable cost savings on some missions by leveraging commercial spacecraft through innovative mechanisms. These mechanisms include hosted payload arrangements where government instruments are placed on commercial satellites, and ride sharing arrangements where multiple satellites share the same launch vehicle.

We reported that DOD is among the agencies that are actively using or beginning to look at these approaches in order to save costs. For instance, DOD has two ongoing hosted payload pilot missions and has taken preliminary steps to develop a follow-on effort.that the Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload Flight Demonstration Program answered the majority of the government’s technical questions through its commercial partnership, while saving it over $200 million over a dedicated technical demonstration mission. In addition, DOD is investigating ride sharing to launch GPS satellites beginning in fiscal year 2017, which could save well over $60 million per launch.

While hosted payloads and ride sharing hold promise for providing lower- cost access to space in the future, we found that there are a variety of challenges. For instance, government agencies that have traditionally managed their own space missions face cultural challenges in using hosted payload arrangements and in November 2010, we found that the DOD space community is highly risk averse to adopting technologies from commercial providers that are new to DOD. expressed concerns about using a commercial host for their payloads, noting that they would lose some control over their missions. DOD officials noted that their security and mission assurance requirements and processes may make integrating hosted payloads on commercial satellites more complicated to manage. Further, agency officials expressed concerns about scheduling launches and noted that commercial providers may not be flexible about changing launch dates if the instruments or satellites experience delays.

See GAO, Space Acquisitions: Challenges in Commercializing Technologies Developed under the Small Business Innovation Research Program, GAO-11-21 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2010). hosted payloads, actual data on cost savings and cost avoidances should be more readily available.

Satellite Control Operations

DOD manages the nation’s defense satellites, which are worth at least $13.7 billion, via ground stations located around the world. These ground stations and supporting infrastructure perform, in part, the function of maintaining the health of the satellite and ensuring it stays in its proper orbit (activities collectively known as satellite control operations). Some of DOD’s ground stations are linked together to form networks. The Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) is the largest of these networks. Based on the direction in a House Armed Services Committee Report for our review and discussions with defense committee staff, we reviewed the Air Force’s satellite control operations and modernization efforts.

We reported this month that DOD’s satellite control networks are fragmented and potentially duplicative. increasingly deployed standalone satellite control operations networks, which are designed to operate a single satellite system, as opposed to shared systems that can operate multiple kinds of satellites. Dedicated networks can offer many benefits to programs, including possible lower risks and customization for a particular program’s needs. However, they can also be more costly and have led to a fragmented, and potentially duplicative, approach which requires more infrastructure and personnel than shared operations. We reported that, according to Air Force officials, DOD has not worked to move its current dedicated operations towards a shared satellite control network, which could better leverage DOD investments. We also reported that the AFSCN was undergoing modernization efforts, but these would not increase the network’s capabilities. The efforts—budgeted at about $400 million over the next 5 years—primarily focus on sustaining the network at its current level of capability and do not apply a decade of research recommending more significant improvements to the AFSCN that would increase its capabilities.

GAO, Satellite Control: Long-Term Planning and Adoption of Commercial Practices Could Improve DOD’s Operations, GAO-13-315 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 18, 2013).

Additionally, we found that commercial practices like network interoperability, automation, and use of commercial off-the-shelf products have the potential to increase the efficiency and decrease costs of DOD satellite control operations. Both DOD and commercial officials we spoke to agreed that there were opportunities for DOD to increase efficiencies and lower costs through these practices. Numerous studies by DOD and other government groups have recommended implementing or considering these practices, but DOD has generally not incorporated them into DOD satellite control operations networks.

Finally, we found that DOD faced barriers that complicate its ability to make improvements to its satellite control networks and adopt commercial practices. For example, DOD did not have a long-term plan for satellite control operations; DOD lacked reliable data on the costs of its current control networks and was unable to isolate satellite control costs from other expenses; there was no requirement for satellite programs to establish a business case for their chosen satellite control operations approach; and even if program managers wanted to make satellite control operations improvements, they did not have the autonomy to implement changes at the program level. We concluded that until DOD begins addressing these barriers, the department’s ability to achieve significant improvements in satellite control operations capabilities would be hindered. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct future DOD satellite acquisition programs to determine a business case for proceeding with either a dedicated or shared network for that program’s satellite control operations and develop a department-wide long-term plan for modernizing its AFSCN and any future shared networks and implementing commercial practices to improve DOD satellite control networks. DOD agreed with our recommendations.

Recent Actions Taken to Address Space Systems Acquisition Problems

Congress and DOD continue to take steps towards reforming the defense acquisition system to increase the likelihood that acquisition programs will succeed in meeting planned cost and schedule objectives. For example, in December 2012, we reported that the DOD had taken steps to implement fundamental Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (the Reform Act) provisions, including those for approving acquisition strategies and better monitoring weapon acquisition programs., The offices established by the Reform Act are in the process of developing, issuing, and implementing policies in response to the Reform Act’s provisions. We reported that DOD has taken steps to: develop policy and guidance to the military services for conducting work in their respective areas, approve acquisition documents prior to milestone reviews, monitor and assess weapon acquisition program activities on a develop performance measures to assess acquisition program activities.

Fundamentally, these Reform Act provisions should help (1) programs replace cost and schedule risk with knowledge and (2) set up more executable programs. Additionally, as part of its Better Buying Power initiative, DOD in November 2012 issued descriptions of 36 initiatives aimed at increasing productivity and efficiency in DOD acquisitions.

DOD plans to solicit industry and stakeholder comments on these initiatives and plans to ultimately provide detailed requirements on implementing these initiatives to the acquisition workforce.

Further, in January 2013, the Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013, which required that DOD’s Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics submit a report on schedule integration and funding for each major satellite acquisition program. The report must include information on the segments of the programs; the amount of funding approved for the program and for each segment that is necessary for full operational capability of the program; and the dates by which the program and each segment are anticipated to reach initial and full operational capability, among other items. If the program is considered to be non-integrated, DOD must submit the required report to Congress annually. Tracking the schedules of major satellite programs and the ground systems and user equipment necessary to utilize the satellites may help DOD synchronize its systems.

Additionally, officials from the Space and Intelligence Office, within the Office of Secretary of Defense, told us that DOD has undertaken additional actions to improve space systems acquisitions since we last reported on its efforts in March 2012. These actions include chartering Defense Space Council architecture reviews in key space mission areas that are ongoing or completed, such as resilient protected, narrowband, and wideband satellite communications; environmental monitoring; overhead persistent infrared; and space control, according to these officials. The architecture reviews are to inform DOD’s programming, budgeting, and prioritization for the space mission area. According to the officials, the Defense Space Council has brought a high-level focus on space issues through active senior-level participation in monthly meetings. DOD also participates in the newly re-formed Space Industrial Base Council, which is made up of senior level personnel at agencies across the federal government that develop space systems. The purpose of the council is to understand how DOD’s and other agencies’ acquisition strategies impact the space industrial base. Additionally, according to the officials, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics completed a major study on space acquisition reform to assess the root causes of poor performance in the space acquisition enterprise, focusing on the largest areas of cost growth. Furthermore, the officials stated that they are continuing efforts to buy blocks of AEHF and SBIRS satellites to realize savings that will be reinvested in high-priority research and development for space programs to mitigate the challenges associated with planned use of critical technologies when a satellite system is in the early stages of development. The officials stated that these block buys will also encourage stable production and help to achieve affordability targets DOD has set for the majority of the large, critical space programs. While these actions are encouraging, we have not evaluated their effectiveness.

The changes DOD has been making to leadership and oversight appear to be increasing senior management attention on space programs, but it is unclear whether the changes will be enough to overcome the problems we identified with fragmented leadership in the past. We have consistently found that the lack of a single authority for cross cutting missions, such as GPS or space situational awareness, has contributed to disconnects in the delivery of related systems as well as delays in the development of architectures and other tools important to balancing wants versus needs. Fragmented leadership has also been a contributing factor to other challenges we have noted in this statement—increasing launch service costs, synchronizing ground and satellite systems, and improving satellite operations. This condition persists. As part of our April 2013 annual report on reducing duplication, overlap, and fragmentation within the federal government, we reported that the administration has taken an initial step to improve interagency coordination, but has not fully addressed the issues of fragmented leadership and a lack of a single authority in overseeing the acquisition of space programs.

Lastly, the Air Force and other offices within DOD are also considering different acquisition models for the future, including the use of hosted payloads as well as developing larger constellations of smaller, less- complex satellites that would require small, less-costly launch vehicles and offer more resilience in the face of growing threats to space assets. However, such a transition could also have risk and require significant changes in acquisition processes, requirements setting, organizational structures, and culture. The long-standing condition of fragmented leadership and the risk-averse culture of space could stand in the way of making such a change.

In conclusion, DOD has made credible progress in stabilizing space programs. However, there are challenges still to be dealt with, such as disconnects between the delivery of satellites and their corresponding ground control systems and user equipment and the rising cost of launch. The ultimate challenge, however, will be preparing for the future, as budget constraints will require DOD to make tough tradeoff decisions in an environment where leadership is fragmented. We look forward to continuing to work with the Congress and DOD in assessing both today and tomorrow’s challenges in space acquisition and identifying actions that can be taken to help meet these challenges.

Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you and Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.

Contacts and Acknowledgments

For further information about this statement, please contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this statement include Art Gallegos, Assistant Director; Erin Cohen; Rich Horiuchi; Jeff Sanders; Roxanna Sun; Bob Swierczek; and Marie Ahearn.

Related GAO Products

Satellite Control: Long-Term Planning and Adoption of Commercial Practices Could Improve DOD’s Operations. GAO-13-315. (Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2013). 2013 Annual Report: Actions Needed to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits. GAO-13-279SP. (Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2013).

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO-13-294SP. (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2013).

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-13-283. (Washington, D.C.: February 2013).

Launch Services New Entrant Certification Guide. GAO-13-317R. (Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2013).

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing Knowledge Gaps in Its New Acquisition Strategy. GAO-12-822. (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2012).

Environmental Satellites: Focused Attention Needed to Mitigate Program Risks. GAO-12-841T. (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2012).

Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Changing Requirements, Technical Issues, and Looming Data Gaps Require Focused Attention. GAO-12-604. (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2012).

Missile Defense: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency and Improving Parts Quality. GAO-12-600T. (Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2012).

Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency. GAO-12-486. (Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2012).

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO-12-400SP. (Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2012).

Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Fully Realizing Benefits of Satellite Acquisition Improvements. GAO-12-563T. (Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2012). 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue. GAO-12-342SP. (Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012).

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Needs to Ensure New Acquisition Strategy Is Based on Sufficient Information. GAO-11-641. (Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2011).

Space Research: Content and Coordination of Space Science and Technology Strategy Need to Be More Robust. GAO-11-722. (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2011).

Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed to Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs. GAO-11-404. (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2011).

Space Acquisitions: DOD Delivering New Generations of Satellites, but Space System Acquisition Challenges Remain. GAO-11-590T. (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2011).

Space Acquisitions: Challenges in Commercializing Technologies Developed under the Small Business Innovation Research Program. GAO-11-21. (Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2010).

Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading Capabilities Persist. GAO-10-636. (Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2010).

Space Acquisitions: DOD Poised to Enhance Space Capabilities but, Persistent Challenges Remain in Developing Space Systems. GAO-10-447T. (Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2010).

Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System Components. GAO-10-55. (Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2009).

Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight Challenges. GAO-08-1039. (Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2008).

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