Personnel Security Clearances: Further Actions Needed to Improve the Process and Realize Efficiencies
Released: 2013-06-20T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Multiple executive-branch agencies are responsible for different phases in the federal government’s personnel security clearance process. In 2008, the Director of National Intelligence, for example, was designated Security Executive Agent by Executive Order 13467 and, in this capacity, is responsible for developing uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of background investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position. In turn, requesting executive branch agencies determine which positions—military, civilian, or private-industry contractors—require access to classified information and, therefore, which people must apply for and undergo a security clearance investigation. Investigators—often contractors—from Federal Investigative Services within the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conduct these investigations for most of the federal government using federal investigative standards and OPM internal guidance as criteria for collecting background information on applicants. Adjudicators from requesting agencies, such as DOD, use the information contained in the resulting OPM investigative reports and consider federal adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a personnel security clearance.

DOD is OPM’s largest customer, and its Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) is responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of DOD policy, programs, and guidance for personnel, physical, industrial, information, operations, chemical/biological, and DOD Special Access Program security. Additionally, the Defense Security Service, under the authority and direction and control of USD(I), manages and administers the DOD portion of the National Industrial Security Program for the DOD components and other federal services by agreement, as well as providing security education and training, among other things.

Pub. L. No. 108-458 (2004) (relevant sections codified at 50 U.S.C. § 435b).

Council. Under the executive order, this council is accountable to the President for driving implementation of the reform effort, including ensuring the alignment of security and suitability processes, holding agencies accountable for implementation, and establishing goals and metrics for progress. The order also appointed the Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and Budget as the chair of the council and designated the Director of National Intelligence as the Security Executive Agent and the Director of OPM as the Suitability Executive Agent.

Improvements Needed to the Personnel Security Clearance Process

Sound Requirements Determination Process

We have previously reported that, to safeguard classified data and manage costs, agencies need an effective process to determine whether positions require a clearance and, if so, at what level. Last year we found, however, that the Director of National Intelligence, as Security Executive Agent, has not provided agencies clearly defined policies and procedures to consistently determine if a civilian position requires a security clearance.for, among other things, developing uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of background investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position, and gives the Director authority to issue guidance to agency heads to ensure uniformity in processes relating to those determinations. Further, the Director also has not established guidance to require agencies to review and revise or validate existing federal civilian Executive Order 13467 assigns the Director responsibility position designations. Executive Order 12968certain exceptions, eligibility for access to classified information shall only be requested and granted on the basis of a demonstrated, foreseeable need for access, and the number of employees that each agency determines is eligible for access to classified information shall be kept to the minimum required. The order also states that access to classified information shall be terminated when an employee no longer has a need for access, and prohibits requesting or approving eligibility for access in excess of the actual requirements. Without such requirements, executive branch agencies may be hiring and budgeting for initial and periodic security clearance investigations using position descriptions and security clearance requirements that no longer reflect national security needs. says that, subject to In our July 2012 report, we found that Department of Homeland Security and DOD components’ officials were aware of the need to keep the number of security clearances to a minimum, but were not always required to conduct periodic reviews and validations of the security clearance needs of existing positions. Overdesignating positions results in significant cost implications, given that the fiscal year 2012 base price for a top secret clearance investigation conducted by OPM was $4,005, while the base price of a secret clearance was $260. Conversely, underdesignating positions could lead to security risks.

In the absence of guidance to determine if a position requires a security clearance, agencies are using a tool that OPM designed to determine the sensitivity and risk levels of civilian positions which, in turn, inform the type of investigation needed. OPM audits, however, found inconsistency in these position designations, and some agencies described problems in implementing OPM’s tool. In an April 2012 audit, OPM reviewed the sensitivity levels of 39 positions in an agency within DOD and reached different conclusions than the agency for 26 of them. Problems exist, in part, because OPM and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence did not collaborate on the development of the position designation tool, and because their roles for suitability—consideration of character and conduct for federal employment—and security clearance reform are still evolving. In our July 2012 report, we concluded that without guidance from the Director of National Intelligence, and without collaboration between the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and OPM in future revisions to the tool, executive branch agencies will continue to risk making security clearance determinations that are inconsistent or at improper levels.

In July 2012, we recommended, among other things, that the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of OPM and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue clearly defined policy and procedures for federal agencies to follow when determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance. We also recommended that the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of OPM and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue guidance to require executive branch agencies to periodically review and revise or validate the designation of all federal civilian positions. The Director of National Intelligence concurred with our recommendation and has taken steps to implement them.

Performance Metrics to Measure Quality

We have emphasized—since the late 1990s—a need to build quality and quality monitoring throughout the clearance process to promote oversight and positive outcomes, such as honoring reciprocity. Executive branch efforts have emphasized timeliness, but efforts to develop and implement metrics for measuring the quality of investigations have not included goals with related outcome focused measures to show progress or identify obstacles to progress and possible remedies. Furthermore, our recent reviews of OPM’s investigations show reasons for continuing concern. For example, in May 2009 we reported that, with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports. We independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance decision were missing required documentation. We recommended that the Director of OPM direct the Associate Director of OPM’s Federal Investigative Services Division to measure the frequency with which its investigative reports meet federal investigative standards in order to improve the completeness—that is, quality—of future investigation documentation. As of March 2013, however, OPM had not implemented our recommendation to measure how frequently investigative reports meet federal investigative standards. Instead, OPM continues to assess the quality of investigations based on voluntary reporting from customer agencies. Specifically, OPM tracks investigations that are (1) returned for rework from the requesting agency, (2) identified as deficient using a web-based survey, and (3) identified as deficient through adjudicator calls to OPM’s quality hotline. In our past work, we have noted that the number of investigations returned for rework is not by itself a valid indicator of the quality of investigative work because adjudication officials have been reluctant to return incomplete investigations in anticipation of delays that would impact timeliness. Further, relying on agencies to voluntarily provide information on investigation quality may not reflect the quality of OPM’s total investigation workload.

In February 2011, we noted that one of OPM’s customer agencies, DOD, had developed and implemented a tool known as Rapid Assessment of Incomplete Security Evaluations to monitor the quality of investigations completed by OPM. In that report, we noted that leaders of the reform effort had provided congressional members and executive branch agencies with metrics assessing quality and other aspects of the clearance process. Although the Rapid Assessment of Incomplete Security Evaluations was one tool the reform team members planned to use for measuring quality, according to an OPM official, OPM chose not to use this tool. Instead, OPM opted to develop another tool but has not provided details on the tool including estimated timeframes for its development and implementation.

Guidance to Enhance Efficiencies

Since 2008, we have highlighted the importance of the executive branch enhancing efficiency and managing costs related to security clearance reform efforts. Government-wide suitability and personnel security clearance reform efforts have not yet focused on identifying potential cost savings, even though the stated mission of these efforts includes improving cost savings. For example, in 2008, we noted that one of the key factors to consider in current and future reform efforts was the long- term funding requirements. Further, in 2009, we found that reform-related reports issued in 2008 did not detail which reform objectives require funding, how much they will cost, or where funding will come from.Finally, the reports did not estimate potential cost savings resulting from these reform efforts. While the Performance Accountability Council has a stated goal regarding cost savings, it has not provided the executive branch with guidance on opportunities for achieving efficiencies in managing personnel security clearances.

For example, OPM’s investigation process—which represents just a portion of the security clearance process and had significant costs—has not been studied for process efficiencies or cost savings. In February 2012, we reported that OPM received over $1 billion to conduct more than 2 million background investigations (suitability determinations and personnel security clearances) for government employees in fiscal year 2011. OPM officials explained that, to date, they have chosen to address investigation timeliness and investigation backlogs rather than the identification of process and workforce efficiencies. To its credit, OPM helped reduce the backlog of ongoing background investigations that it inherited from DOD at the time of the 2005 transfer. However, only recently has OPM started to look at its internal processes for efficiencies. Further, while OPM invested in an electronic case-management program, it continues to convert submitted electronic files to paper. In November 2010, the Deputy Director for Management of the Office of Management and Budget testified that OPM receives 98 percent of investigation applications electronically, yet we observed that it was continuing to use a paper-based investigation processing system and convert electronically submitted applications to paper. OPM officials stated that the paper- based process is required because a small portion of their customer agencies do not have electronic capabilities. As a result, OPM may be simultaneously investing in process streamlining technology while maintaining a less efficient and duplicative paper-based process. In 2012, we recommended that, to improve transparency of costs and the efficiency of suitability and personnel security clearance background investigation processes that could lead to cost savings, the Director of OPM direct the Associate Director of Federal Investigative Services to take actions to identify process efficiencies that could lead to cost savings within its background investigation process. OPM agreed with this recommendation and we are working with OPM to assess any progress it has made in this area.

Further, agencies have made potentially duplicative investments in case- management and adjudication systems without considering opportunities for leveraging existing technologies. In February 2012, as part of our annual report on opportunities to reduce duplication, overlap and fragmentation, we reported that multiple agencies have invested in or are beginning to invest in potentially duplicative, electronic case management and adjudication systems despite government-wide reform effort goals that agencies leverage existing technologies to reduce duplication and enhance reciprocity. development of its Case Adjudication Tracking System in 2006 and, as of 2011, had invested a total of $32 million to deploy the system. The system helped DOD achieve efficiencies with case management and an electronic adjudication module for secret level cases that did not contain issues, given the volume and types of adjudications performed. According to DOD officials, after it observed that the Case Adjudication Tracking System could easily be deployed to other agencies at a low cost, the department intended to share the technology with interested entities across the federal government. However, at that time, five other agencies were also developing or seeking funds to develop individual systems with With multiple agencies developing capabilities similar to DOD’s system.

GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012). individual case-management systems, these agencies may be at risk of duplicating efforts and may fail to realize cost savings.

In 2012, we recommended that the Deputy Director for Management at OMB, in his capacity as the Chair of the Performance Accountability Council, expand and specify reform-related guidance to help ensure that reform stakeholders identify opportunities for efficiencies and cost savings, such as preventing duplication in the development of electronic case management. OMB concurred with our recommendation. As of March of this year, however, OMB has not expanded and specified reform-related guidance to help ensure that reform stakeholders identify opportunities for cost savings. According to OMB officials, they are exploring whether and how to develop and implement guidance on information technology spending that is minimally disruptive, will not compromise agencies’ ability to adjudicate cases, and is implementable within budget constraints. While these specific efforts may be notable steps in clearance reform, they do not meet the intent of our recommendation for OMB to develop overarching guidance that reform stakeholders can use to identify opportunities for cost savings.

In conclusion, while the executive branch has made strides in improving the timeliness of the personnel security clearance process, now is the time to focus on making the improvements GAO has recommended. Failing to do so increases the risk of damaging unauthorized disclosures of classified information. This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this time.

For further information on this testimony, please contact Brenda S. Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, who may be reached at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony include David Moser (Assistant Director), Sara Cradic, Mae Jones, Erin Preston, Leigh Ann Sennette, and Michael Willems.

Related GAO Products

Managing for Results: Agencies Should More Fully Develop Priority Goals under the GPRA Modernization Act. GAO-13-174. Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2013.

Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for Determining Civilian Position Requirements. GAO-12-800. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2012. 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue. GAO-12-342SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

Background Investigations: Office of Personnel Management Needs to Improve Transparency of Its Pricing and Seek Cost Savings. GAO-12-197. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington, D.C.: February 17, 2011.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2011.

Personnel Security Clearances: Overall Progress Has Been Made to Reform the Governmentwide Security Clearance Process. GAO-11-232T. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 2010.

Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Improve Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum. GAO-11-65. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2010.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s Progress on Addressing Timeliness and Quality Issues. GAO-11-185T. Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2010.

Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process. GAO-10-117T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce Delays but Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain Reform Efforts. GAO-09-684T. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process. GAO-09-488. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting, Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January 2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008.

Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.

Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement. GAO-08-551T. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008.

Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. GAO-08-470T. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found for Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January 2007.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to Improve the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain. GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January 2005.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.

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