Drug Control: Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries Has Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are Needed
Released: 2008-08-14T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Virtually all the cocaine destined for the United States originates in the Andean countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia and travels through the transit zone. The United States provides significant counternarcotics assistance toward reducing coca cultivation, disrupting cocaine production, and preventing cocaine from reaching the United States. Drug traffickers move cocaine and other drugs to the United States through two main vectors or “corridors.” In recent years, approximately 90 percent of cocaine moving toward the United States has gone through the Central American/Mexican corridor and then over the border to the United States. The remainder, roughly 10 percent, transits the Caribbean and enters the United States through Florida, Puerto Rico, and other eastern locations. (See fig. 1.) More than 25 countries lie within the transit zone. The President has designated eight of these as “major drug transit countries” based on the estimated volume of illicit drugs that pass through their territory each year. These countries are the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Panama, and Venezuela.

Transit Zone Drug Trafficking Tactics

Drug trafficking organizations and associated criminal networks are extremely adaptive. They shift routes and operating methods quickly in response to pressure from law enforcement organizations or rival traffickers. They ship drugs through the transit zone primarily by sea, though their methods have become more evasive in recent years. They typically use go-fast boats and fishing vessels to smuggle cocaine from Colombia to Central America and Mexico en route to the United States. Go-fast boats are capable of traveling at speeds over 40 knots, are difficult to detect in open water, and are often used at night. When drug traffickers travel in daylight, they often use boats painted blue, or that can be quickly covered with a blue tarpaulin, thereby becoming virtually impossible to see. Even when detected, go-fast boats can often outrun conventional ships deployed in the transit zone. Traffickers also use “mother ships” in concert with fishing vessels to transport illicit drugs into open waters and then distribute the load among smaller boats at sea. In addition, traffickers use evasive maritime routes and change them frequently. Some boats travel as far southwest as the Galapagos Islands in the Pacific Ocean before heading north toward Mexico, while others travel through Central America’s littoral waters, close to shore, where they can hide among legitimate maritime traffic. In addition, the Joint Interagency Task Force- South (JIATF-South), under Defense’s U.S. Southern Command, has reported an increase in suspicious flights—particularly departing from Venezuela. In addition, traffickers fly loads of cocaine to remote, ungoverned spaces—such as northern Guatemala, near the Mexican border—and abandon the planes. Planes, however, generally carry much smaller loads than most maritime vessels used for drug trafficking. Traffickers also are using increasingly sophisticated concealment methods. For example, they have built fiberglass semisubmersible craft that can avoid both visual- and sonar-detection, hidden cocaine within the hulls of boats, and transported liquefied cocaine in fuel tanks.

According to Defense’s Office of Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global Threats, these shifts in drug trafficking patterns and methods have likely taken place largely in response to U.S. and international counternarcotics efforts in the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean, although measuring causes and effects is imprecise. In addition, according to Defense, drug trafficking organizations and associated criminal networks commonly enjoy greater financial and material resources (including weapons as well as communication, navigation, and other technologies) than do governments in the transit zone.

U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy

The U.S. National Drug Control Strategy’s goal is to reduce illegal drug usage in the United States. One priority is to disrupt the illegal drug trade abroad—including in the transit zone—by attacking the power structures and finances of international criminal organizations. This involves seizing large quantities of cocaine from transporters, disrupting major drug trafficking organizations, arresting their leaders, and seizing their assets. The strategy also calls for the United States to support democratic institutions and the rule of law in allied nations, strengthen these nations’ prosecutorial efforts, and prosecute foreign traffickers. According to State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the goal of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to other countries is to help their governments become full and self-sustaining partners in the fight against drugs.

ONDCP produces the National Drug Control Strategy, establishes policies, priorities, and objectives for the nation’s drug control program, and evaluates, coordinates, and oversees the counternarcotics efforts of executive branch agencies, including assistance to countries in the transit zone. State/INL manages and funds law enforcement assistance, including programs implemented by a variety of other U.S. agencies, such as DHS’s Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. State also administers security assistance programs generally implemented by Defense, including Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training programs, which are intended to strengthen the overall capacity of foreign forces to address security threats, including violence and instability associated with drug trafficking. Defense, primarily through its Office of Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global Threats, provides guidance and oversight, as well as funds for counternarcotics and related security activities in the transit zone. DEA works to disrupt drug trafficking operations and dismantle criminal organizations, bringing leaders to prosecution either in the United States or in other countries; it maintains offices in countries throughout the transit zone. USAID also supports the U.S. counternarcotics effort indirectly through its rule of law and alternative development programs.

Table 1 shows assistance provided by State, DEA, Defense, and USAID to support counternarcotics-related programs and activities in transit zone countries for fiscal years 2003 through 2007.

As part of the “Merida Initiative,” the President has asked the Congress to provide $1.1 billion in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 to train and equip Mexican and Central American security forces to combat criminal organizations. Of this amount, $950 million would be dedicated to Mexico, and $150 million would be dedicated to Central American countries. This proposal is under consideration by the Congress. The Administration’s proposal is for all programs to be administered by the State Department, although other U.S. agencies may be involved in implementation.

Overall, U.S. Assistance Has Enhanced International Cooperation in Disrupting Illegal Drug Markets

Since 2003, through U.S.-supported international counternarcotics programs, the United States and the eight major drug transit countries we reviewed, except Venezuela, have enhanced their cooperation in combating drug trafficking, primarily through improvements in investigations and intelligence gathering, maritime and land-based operations, and prosecutions of drug traffickers. Measuring the results of a wide variety of assistance programs across many countries over time is difficult as U.S. agencies have compiled limited and inconsistent performance data. Nevertheless, the improvements attained through these programs have contributed to the U.S. strategy of disrupting the illicit drug market through drug seizures, arrests, prosecutions, and drug crop eradication, according to information provided by State and DEA.

Intelligence-Gathering and Investigations

Actionable intelligence is a critical component of interdiction, and the United States often requires access to raw information and sources from partner nations to develop this intelligence. State/INL, DEA, and Defense have helped all eight partner nations we reviewed develop organizations and methods for gathering, analyzing, and sharing intelligence and information that have led to arrests and seizures of drugs and assets. These efforts have included establishing vetted and specialized investigative units; strengthening investigative authority of local law enforcement; and installing data networks within and among countries to compile, analyze, and share information.

DEA and State/INL have established vetted investigative units, staffed by local law enforcement officers, in all of the major drug transit countries we reviewed. These units have worked closely with U.S. officials to develop successful investigations. The United States provides these units with operational support, from money to pay agents and confidential sources to vehicles and surveillance equipment. For example, in the Dominican Republic, a vetted unit within the counternarcotics police used a U.S.-supported wire intercept program to conduct more than 730 wiretap operations in fiscal year 2007. The program provided daily support to numerous major investigations in the United States and abroad, including the investigation of eight priority target organizations. In Ecuador, DEA estimates that one vetted investigative unit has been responsible for 70 percent of all drug seizures in that country. In Jamaica, according to State, intelligence-driven operations coordinated with DEA and the vetted unit targeted major drug traffickers, and collaboration between Jamaican and international law enforcement agencies have resulted in significant seizures of cocaine and arrests of midlevel and major traffickers— including kingpins—and the dismantling of their organizations, in Jamaica, the United States, the Bahamas, and Colombia. Since late 2004, almost all significant bilateral investigations with Jamaica have included a wire intercept component using DEA-funded facilities. In the Bahamas, according to State, intelligence gathering and surveillance equipment provided by State/INL enabled local law enforcement to dismantle two Bahamas-based drug trafficking organizations in 2006.

DEA has also helped governments draft legislation to broaden the scope of investigative tools available to law enforcement organizations. For example, Guatemala’s Organized Crime Bill, put into effect in 2007, authorizes wire intercepts and undercover operations, and allows drugs to be delivered under controlled circumstances in order to identify the traffickers involved—referred to as controlled delivery. DEA also encouraged legislation in Jamaica to authorize wire intercepts and fingerprinting of suspects. Similarly, legislation in Venezuela enhanced police investigative powers in 2005 by allowing controlled deliveries.

In addition, with U.S. technical and financial assistance, several countries are operating information centers to collect, analyze, and disseminate statistical and case-related data to aid local and foreign law enforcement officials in criminal investigations. In the Dominican Republic, for example, the DEA-sponsored Caribbean Center for Drug Information serves as a clearinghouse for narcotics-related intelligence for countries throughout the Caribbean and Latin America. According to DEA, Caribbean countries are both frequent contributors to and beneficiaries of the center’s intelligence analysis services. In addition, Defense funded the installation of a computer network in countries throughout the transit zone, including in six of the eight countries we reviewed, called the Cooperating Nation Information Exchange System, through which participating countries share information in real time regarding aircraft and vessels suspected of transporting drugs. Defense also posts liaisons throughout the region who facilitate the exchange of actionable intelligence between the United States and host nation counterparts to assist in planning counternarcotics operations.

Maritime and Land-Based Operations

The United States generally cannot intercept shipments of drugs and their precursors and apprehend traffickers in the sovereign territory of another nation without the consent, and often the active participation, of that country’s government. The United States has reached cooperative agreements with several partner nations that expand U.S. authority and U.S. ability to conduct interdiction operations in the transit zone. In addition, assistance provided by State/INL, Defense, and U.S. law enforcement agencies has enabled the countries we reviewed to undertake or participate in land-based police, military, and other counternarcotics operations involving seizures, arrests, and eradication.

Maritime Operations

State/INL, Defense, and the Coast Guard have provided partner countries with equipment, such as new and refurbished boats; infrastructure, such as docks and piers; and training for maritime, littoral, and riverine patrol and interdiction operations. With this support, several countries have participated in short- and long-term maritime interdiction operations with the United States and other countries since 2003. For example, in the Bahamas, State/INL donated several “fast response” boats, which the Bahamian police force has deployed throughout the country for use with U.S. helicopters and personnel under Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos. According to State, these boats have been used in interdiction missions, participating in the seizure of go-fast drug smuggling boats.

Since 2003, the United States has also entered into maritime law enforcement cooperation agreements or procedures with four of the eight major drug transit countries we reviewed, affording U.S. forces improved access to suspect vessels in international and territorial waters. (See app. II for a listing of maritime law enforcement agreements with transit zone countries.) For example, in 2003, the Dominican Republic entered into a bilateral agreement granting the United States permanent over-flight rights for counternarcotics operations. In 2006, the United States and Ecuador negotiated operating procedures to facilitate interdiction of suspect Ecuadorian-flagged vessels. According to State, in fiscal year 2007, these new procedures enabled the United States to board seven Ecuadorian flagged vessels and remove about 26 metric tons of cocaine. In addition, according to State, under the terms of maritime agreements, Guatemala and Panama have provided valuable support for international interdictions by permitting the Coast Guard to fly suspected drug traffickers to the United States. This has allowed U.S. assets to remain on station and continue pursuing drug interdiction and homeland security missions. In Panama, according to State, the Coast Guard’s 2007 seizure of over 32 metric tons of cocaine—including the single largest maritime drug seizure in U.S. history—was directly related to cooperative efforts executed under provisions of the bilateral agreement between Panama and the United States. Bilateral maritime agreements have proven valuable in the other major drug transit countries, as well. Even Venezuela, which has ceased to cooperate with the United States on many counternarcotics initiatives, continues to honor the provisions of its ship-boarding agreement, authorizing the United States to board Venezuelan flagged vessels on the high seas suspected of being engaged in narcotics trafficking.

In addition, in Ecuador, the United States operates a counternarcotics forward operating location to support host nation and interagency drug detection and monitoring efforts in the transit zone. Facilities such as this permit the United States and allied nations to deploy interdiction assets closer to cocaine departure points in the source zone. According to U.S. officials at the forward operating location in Manta, Ecuador, this facility supported over 1,150 counternarcotics missions in 2007 by providing logistical support for U.S. aircraft that detect and monitor narcotics trafficking.

Land-Based Operations

In several countries, State/INL, in collaboration with DEA and DHS agencies, has helped finance the operations of special law enforcement units to target drug traffickers at airports, seaports, and other transit checkpoints using X-ray equipment, canines, and other methods and technologies. For example, since 2003, Jamaican authorities have arrested thousands of departing passengers at the country’s two international airports on drug charges, aided by the use of drug detection equipment provided by the United States and Great Britain. With funding from State and USAID, DHS has deployed advisors and specialized teams for both short- and long-term details to provide training and technical assistance in such areas as customs documentation, airport/border/seaport interdiction operations, mail processing, container examination, security, firearms, and officer safety.

In addition, due to Ecuador’s close proximity to drug-producing regions of Colombia, Defense, State/INL, and DEA have provided extensive support for police and military counternarcotics operations there. According to State/INL, it and DEA have provided nearly all the logistical support for Ecuador’s counternarcotics police, including construction or refurbishment of facilities and the provision of vehicles and equipment. State reported in 2007 that U.S.-supported canine units, which were deployed at airports and checkpoints, were involved in nearly all of Ecuador’s drug interdictions. During 2007, the counternarcotics police conducted a series of interdiction operations throughout the country, which resulted in the largest amount of land-based seizures in the country’s history. With logistical support from Defense and State/INL, the Ecuadorian armed forces conducted nine operations in 2006 and 17 in 2007, which led to the discovery and destruction of 47 camps used by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, 36 hectares of coca plants, as well as a number of cocaine producing laboratories.

In Guatemala, which has recently experienced a growth in illicit opium poppy cultivation, State/INL and Defense have provided aerial reconnaissance, transportation, and other logistical support for several large-scale, manual eradication missions. In 2007, Guatemalan authorities destroyed nearly 450 hectares of poppy—over half of the estimated area of cultivation.

Prosecution

Dismantling drug trafficking organizations requires the criminal prosecution of key traffickers. State/INL and USAID have supported judicial reforms within some partner nations intended to make judicial systems more fair, impartial, and efficient, and have strengthened the capacity of prosecutors to work effectively within those systems on drug- related cases. For example, in Ecuador and the Dominican Republic, State/INL and USAID sponsored training of police, prosecutors, and judges on the application of new criminal procedure codes.

State/INL has also supported national task forces in several countries to prosecute drug-related crimes. In Guatemala, State/INL has worked with the country’s Attorney General to support three task forces dealing with narcotics, corruption, and money-laundering cases. In 2004, the anticorruption prosecutor in Guatemala brought cases against over 380 individuals, including many high-ranking former public officials, army officers, and police. In Venezuela, until 2005, State/INL provided extensive logistical support, and DEA provided advice and supervision, to help develop the professional investigative and operational capability of the Prosecutors’ Drug Task Force, which was composed of three dozen vetted prosecutors and investigators from three agencies. According to State and DEA, the work of this task force resulted in multiton seizures of drugs, the arrest of numerous traffickers (including at least one kingpin), and asset seizures.

In many cases where prosecution in the United States is warranted and legal, partner nations have also transferred or extradited drug-related defendants. For example, in 2007, Haiti’s President authorized the narcotics police to cooperate with DEA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel in locating, arresting, and removing nine high- level drug trafficking defendants. Also, according to State, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica have been particularly cooperative with the U.S. Marshals Service in locating, extraditing, and deporting defendants.

Measuring Results Is Difficult, but Cocaine Interdiction in the Transit Zone Reflects International Cooperation

While State/INL, DEA, and others have reported the results of their assistance programs, they have not done so in a comprehensive and consistent manner among partner nations and over time. Reports we reviewed showed that some programs have helped disrupt drug markets through seizures and arrests. Other programs, such as alternative development, justice reform, and security service capacity building, are less directly related to drug interdiction operations but are designed to have longer-term and more systemic results, which are more difficult to measure.

Assistance Programs Are Diffuse, and Results Are Not Reported Comprehensively and Consistently

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federal agencies to develop performance measures to assess progress in achieving their goals and to communicate their results to the Congress. The act requires agencies to set multiyear strategic goals in their strategic plans and corresponding annual goals in their performance plans, measure performance toward the achievement of those goals, and report on their progress in their annual performance reports. These reports are intended to provide important information to agency managers, policymakers, and the public on what each agency accomplished with the resources it was given. Moreover, the act calls for agencies to develop performance goals that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable, and to establish performance measures that adequately indicate progress toward achieving those goals. Our previous work has noted that the lack of clear, measurable goals makes it difficult for program managers and staff to link their day-to-day efforts to achieving the agency’s intended mission.

U.S.-funded transit zone counternarcotics assistance encompasses a wide variety of initiatives across many countries, but State/INL and other agencies have collected limited information on results. Records we obtained from State/INL and DEA, including State’s annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports and End Use Monitoring Reports, provide information on the outcomes of these initiatives but do not do so comprehensively. For example, in our review of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports for 2003 to 2007, we identified over 120 counternarcotics initiatives in the countries we reviewed, but for over half of these initiatives, the outcomes were unclear or not addressed at all in the reports. Table 2 depicts the range of U.S.-supported counternarcotics efforts in the countries we reviewed, including those described in State or DEA records as having negligible or unsatisfactory outcomes.

State has attempted to measure the outcomes of counternarcotics programs in its annual mission performance reports, which report on a set of performance indicators for each country. However, these indicators have not been consistent over time or among countries. In our review of mission performance reports for four major drug transit countries covering fiscal years 2002 through 2006, we identified 86 performance indicators directly and indirectly related to counternarcotics efforts; however, over 60 percent of these indicators were used in only one or two annual reporting cycles, making it difficult to discern performance trends over time. Moreover, nearly 80 percent of these performance indicators were used for only one country, making it difficult to compare program results among countries.

Cocaine Seizures and Disruptions Reflect Cooperation with Partner Nations

Program specific information we reviewed indicates that these U.S. counternarcotics assistance programs, along with other efforts, have contributed to an active international interdiction effort in the transit zone. Data reported by the U.S. interagency counternarcotics community indicate that, since 2002, the United States and its partner nations have removed, through seizures and disruptions, between 22 and 38 percent of the estimated amount of cocaine flowing through the transit zone, excluding Mexico (see table 3).

U.S. agencies have supported a wide variety of programs that relate to the counternarcotics effort indirectly, and results are therefore difficult to assess. These programs generally focus on root causes of drug-related crime, as well as strengthening the overall rule of law and security of partner nations. Since these programs are not directly associated with interdiction efforts and outcomes, and some are long-term efforts, their results and effect on the overall success of counternarcotics efforts are even more difficult to assess.

State/INL has funded programs, including training and public awareness campaigns, which address some of the underlying causes of drug trafficking, such as local drug consumption and corruption. Some programs are also aimed at strengthening institutions, such as public health, educational, and financial accountability organizations, which can help prevent drug-related crime by fostering a culture that does not tolerate drug consumption and corruption. Very limited data were available in State reports to discern trends in either corruption or drug consumption that could be attributable to these programs. However, in several countries, State/INL has reported an increased willingness among local law enforcement entities to prosecute public officials.

Several USAID programs combat narcotics trafficking indirectly in vulnerable populations by addressing underlying social problems, such as crime, inadequate public services, and lack of economic opportunities. In Jamaica, according to State/INL, anticrime and community policing programs contributed to a 16 percent reduction in crime in 2006, but the crime rate rose again in 2007. Development programs in Ecuador have helped stabilize communities along the border with Colombia most likely to become involved in drug trafficking by providing social services and productive infrastructure, including water and sanitation systems, bridges, roads, and irrigation canals. These programs have also helped strengthen local governments and promote citizen participation in a number of municipalities and parishes. While these programs have focused national and international development assistance on these vulnerable communities, their effect on the drug trade in the Colombian border region of Ecuador has not been evaluated.

Defense and DHS have implemented many programs aimed at building the overall capacity and professionalism of military and security organizations through international cooperation. Defense officials in both Ecuador and Panama told us they considered all U.S. cooperative programs with the security forces of those countries to be counternarcotics-related because they help counter the threats posed by trafficking organizations, including incursions by the irregular armed forces of neighboring Colombia. However, because many defense assistance programs in partner nations do not have specific goals related to interdiction, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the programs for counternarcotics. Similarly, State/INL has funded training programs through DHS agencies to help improve overall immigration, customs, and coast guard operations.

Several Factors Impede the Effectiveness of the Counternarcotics Efforts

Several factors relating to U.S. assistance programs have impeded international counternarcotics efforts in the transit zone. Partner nations have limited resources to devote to counternarcotics efforts, and many U.S.-supported counternarcotics initiatives are not self-sustaining but, rather, are dependent on continued U.S. funding. Limited political support of U.S.-funded initiatives, as well as corruption, have also kept these nations from becoming full partners in the international counternarcotics effort—a goal of U.S. assistance, according to State. In addition, the effect of U.S. cargo container security assistance for the counternarcotics effort has been limited.

Many Partner Nations Cannot Sustain U.S. Supported Initiatives

The inability of transit zone countries to patrol their shores effectively and conduct other maritime operations presents a major gap in drug interdiction. In many of the countries we reviewed, State has reported that partner nations cannot operate U.S.-provided maritime assets for counternarcotics missions due to a lack of operations and of maintenance resources. Some examples are as follows: In the Dominican Republic, the United States has provided a wide range of new and refurbished boats, including interceptor and patrol craft, that the Dominican Navy has been unable to employ due to a lack of fuel, fuel filters, and other routine maintenance supplies. Also, several U.S. vessels that were transferred to the Dominican Navy as excess defense articles are in poor condition due to a lack of preventive maintenance and funds for repairs. State reported in 2006 that the Navy’s maintenance command lacked necessary equipment, parts, and training.

In Haiti, State/INL and the U.S. Coast Guard provided substantial support to the Haitian coast guard, including interceptor boats, vessel overhauls and retrofitting, infrastructure improvements, and training and equipment. However, according to State, a lack of necessary equipment, maintenance, fuel, and logistical support has continued to impair the Haitian coast guard’s ability to conduct maritime operations and combat drug trafficking effectively.

In Guatemala, State/INL provided the counternarcotics police force with two fiberglass boats—one located on the Caribbean Coast and the other on the Pacific Coast—for limited counternarcotics operations. In 2007, State reported that both boats were inoperable because the police had not maintained the engines.

In Jamaica, the United States donated several patrol vessels capable of intercepting go-fast boats. State reported in 2006 that the vessels had only limited operational capability because they were not in good working order.

In Panama, the U.S. Coast Guard donated a 180-foot cutter. However, Panama’s National Maritime Service, which is highly dependent on U.S. support for operations and maintenance resources, has been unable to keep the vessel seaworthy.

U.S. agencies have not always planned for the sustainability of the counternarcotics-related assets they provided to partner nations. According to State officials we spoke to, when receiving these assets, country officials have typically signed agreements accepting the long-term responsibility of operating and maintaining them, including providing the necessary staff, as well as fuel, parts, and other maintenance resources, unless these are provided for by the United States. However, the long-term cost of operating and maintaining the assets and the source of funding are not typically included in such agreements, according to these officials.

In 2007, Defense began providing additional boats to partner nations, including Panama, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and the Bahamas, under its Enduring Friendship program, for use in maritime security operations. However, Defense has not developed plans to address long- term sustainability of these assets over their expected 10-year operating life. These interceptor boats were accompanied by support equipment such as trucks and trailers for on-land mobility; radios; infrared cameras; as well as training and a limited maintenance program, at a cost of between $6 million and $11 million for each country. However, Defense did not make provisions to ensure that the partner countries can fuel the donated boats and maintain them beyond an initial short-term maintenance contract period. For the boats provided to the Dominican Republic, for example, the agreement between Defense and the Dominican Republic did not specify the estimated costs or funding source of operating the boats and related equipment. The agreement indicated the United States may provide some additional support for repair parts, contingent upon the availability of funds. The ability to provide the necessary resources to operate these assets over the long-term is a concern, according to the U.S. and partner nation officials we spoke to in the Dominican Republic and Panama. According to the Coast Guard attaché in the Dominican Republic, although the Dominican Navy has added these and other boats to its fleet in recent years, it has not increased its budget for fuel since 2002, and the cost of fuel has since doubled. Similarly, according to a senior official of the Panamanian National Maritime Service, it has been operating under a static budget and fuel allotment, even as the number of assets and staff under its control has increased. State/INL officials in both Panama and the Dominican Republic told us that these countries have not effectively used the interceptor boats for counternarcotics purposes.

In addition, the personnel operating the interceptor boats have limited maritime interdiction skills. Training included in the assistance package focused on operation and maintenance of boats and included some training in first aid, navigation, and communications but only limited training on interdiction tactics. The memorandum of understanding between Defense and the Dominican Republic for this program indicated that Defense may provide some additional training, contingent upon the availability of funds, but did not specify the training likely to be needed for conducting counternarcotics operations or its cost.

In some cases, however, State/INL has recognized the long-term sustainability challenges associated with providing capital assets and has planned and budgeted for operations and maintenance costs, thus helping to ensure the assets will be used effectively for counternarcotics operations. For example, State reported that it has funded maintenance contracts in the Bahamas that provide a means for keeping U.S.-provided boats operational for drug interdiction missions. Also, State/INL helps sustain U.S.-funded initiatives along the Ecuador-Colombian border by funding a large spare parts program, as well as maintenance training for the heavy trucks and other vehicles it has provided, and by budgeting for gas and maintenance costs over the long term. State/INL has also funded contractors to maintain the electrical and plumbing systems in the police buildings constructed for the police in Ecuador.

According to State, the counternarcotics police of several partner nations are dependent on logistical and operational support of State/INL and DEA, as the following examples show: In the Dominican Republic, the police force’s effectiveness in counternarcotics affairs is almost completely attributable to equipment, training, and close support provided by DEA and State/INL over several years. State also reported that the financial intelligence unit, begun with U.S. support in 2003, lacks the resources and institutional support to perform effectively and has reported no real successes in implementing its money-laundering legislation since the unit was established.

In Ecuador, State/INL and DEA provide almost all logistical and operational support to the Ecuadorian National Police Anti-Drug Division.

In Haiti, the lack of government resources makes the national police largely dependent upon DEA and State/INL for logistical and advisory support.

Some Countries’ Limited Political Support Impairs U.S. Counternarcotics Initiatives

According to State, a few governments in the region have demonstrated limited political support for U.S. counternarcotics efforts. In particular, Venezuelan cooperation has declined dramatically in recent years, and in 2006 and 2007 State reported that Venezuela had failed “demonstrably” to make substantial efforts in the war on drugs. In 2005, the Venezuelan President accused DEA of espionage and planning a coup, and the government eventually withdrew from both U.S.-supported vetted units and has refused counternarcotics cooperation with the United States.

State has also reported that Jamaica has shown limited political support for some U.S. counternarcotics-related initiatives. For example, the United States helped develop a corporate reform strategy for the Jamaican constabulary forces, but it was never implemented due to a combination of internal resistance to change and a lack of power to ensure implementation of the strategy’s recommendations. In addition, the government of Jamaica has not enacted an initiative to permit extended data-sharing between U.S. and Jamaican law enforcement agencies concerning money-laundering cases.

In Ecuador, even though the government has generally supported U.S.- funded counternarcotics initiatives, political developments may threaten future international cooperation in maritime operations. Ecuador’s President has stated that he no longer supports a U.S. military presence in Ecuador and that his government will not renew the agreement allowing the United States to operate its forward operating location there when the agreement expires in November 2009.

Corruption Undermines Interdiction Efforts

The United States relies on the cooperation of partner nations’ law enforcement and security agencies in the transit zone to conduct successful counternarcotics operations. But, corruption in these agencies limits the extent to which U.S. law enforcement agencies can involve their counterparts in investigations. According to data compiled by Transparency International, a civil society organization that monitors corruption issues worldwide, corruption is a major problem in transit zone countries. Its Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranks countries from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean) based on a series of indicators. Seven of the eight countries in our review received a score of 3.3 or lower (compared with a score of 7.2 for the United States and 8.7 for Canada). The eighth country, the Bahamas, was not reviewed. (See table 4.)

In addition, U.S. officials have noted instances of official corruption— particularly among military and police units—that have limited the opportunities for and scope of cooperation with the United States and, in some cases, undermined specific interdiction operations. Some examples of this official corruption are as follows: Guatemala disbanded its antinarcotics police unit in 2002 in response to reports of widespread corruption within the agency and its general lack of effectiveness in combating the country’s drug problem. The government reassigned most of the unit’s law enforcement agents to the national civilian police, and the U.S. government suspended major joint operations in light of these circumstances. With U.S. assistance, Guatemala established a successor antinarcotics police force but, in 2005, in a joint operation with DEA, the Chief and Deputy of this agency were arrested in the United States for corruption. Later that year, DEA suspected that members of the antinarcotics force stole 475 kilograms of cocaine from an evidence storage facility. Further, according to DEA, Guatemalan antinarcotics agents misused intelligence leads provided by DEA to extort investigative targets.

In Haiti, in 2003, State reported strong evidence of Haitian law enforcement officials leaking information on planned operations and trafficking drugs. DEA reported that planes under surveillance for drug shipments were met and off-loaded by heavily armed uniformed police officials with vehicles that transported the drugs. In 2007, the Haitian government removed both the National Police Director of Administration and Director of Logistics for suspected corruption.

In the Dominican Republic, the government removed 24 judges from office for improperly handing out favorable sentences to known traffickers in 2006. Corruption has also hampered Dominican-based, money-laundering investigations, according to DEA.

In Panama, in 2005, the head of a police counternarcotics unit was arrested and charged with corruption. In 2007, after years of lackluster counternarcotics cooperation from the National Maritime Service, the former head of this organization was also arrested on corruption charges.

In the Bahamas, State reported in 2003 that it was reluctant to include Bahamian defense personnel in Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos and to share sensitive law enforcement information with them due to corruption concerns.

In Ecuador, in 2002, the Deputy Chief of Operations of the Ecuadorian Army was arrested for facilitating the transshipment of drugs through cargo containers by providing trafficking organizations with false security seals.

Cargo Container Security Programs Have Had Limited Effect on the Counternarcotics Effort

According to DEA, drug smuggling on containerized cargo ships poses a significant threat to U.S. counternarcotics efforts. Both State/INL and DHS have provided cargo security assistance to countries in the transit zone. However, most of State/INL’s initiatives have not been effective, and DHS has not routinely used its program of targeting and scanning cargo containers overseas to detect illicit drugs.

State/INL has supported counternarcotics initiatives at cargo container ports in four of the eight countries we reviewed, and in three of those countries State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports indicate that these initiatives were largely ineffective. For example, in Guatemala, although State/INL has provided technical assistance, logistical support, and training for the country’s port security program for several years, State reported in 2006 that the program had little interdiction success, and seizures were very low. In the Bahamas, State/INL supported a canine unit of the Bahamian Customs Department to help detect drugs shipments at the Freeport container port but discontinued the assistance in 2004 due to high maintenance costs and its failure to produce expected results. In Venezuela, the United States funded a sophisticated container inspection facility at a large port known to be an embarkation point for multiton shipments of cocaine, but the Venezuelan government has not put it into operation.

DHS, through CBP, has implemented the Container Security Initiative (CSI) overseas, which may have potential for greater use in counternarcotics operations. CBP initiated CSI under its existing authority in January 2002 to assist selected overseas ports in targeting suspicious containers and scanning their contents. The program subsequently received specific congressional authorization in 2006. By 2007, CSI operated in 58 ports, including seven in the transit zone. CBP officers stationed at foreign ports collaborating with host-country partners use intelligence and automated risk assessment information to target shipments and identify those that may contain weapons of mass destruction or other terrorist contraband. DHS has generally not used the technology to detect and interdict illicit drug shipments, though CSI technology can help detect illicit drugs. In fact, the automated targeting system that CSI uses to help target containers for inspection was originally designed for this purpose. The first time the CSI scanning equipment was used in the port of Caucedo in the Dominican Republic, operators detected a shipment of cocaine that was packed amidst canned fruit.

Ultimately, several metric tons of cocaine were seized, and suspected traffickers were arrested.

CBP officials we spoke with noted that including routine container screening for drugs in CSI’s scope of operations would be difficult and could conflict with achievement of CBP’s counterterrorism objectives. They indicated that CSI’s budget and staffing are based on its counterterrorism-related workload, and targeting drugs would require additional research and analysis resources. They said that, without more funding, DHS would have to shift its priorities away from counterterrorism activities. Furthermore, they said that expanding existing agreements with CSI participating countries would entail difficult and sensitive negotiations. According to these officials, proposing that CSI should search for illicit drugs could undermine the international political support for CSI and other CBP counterterrorism initiatives because additional container screening could cause transshipment delays and related economic costs and involve other concessions that participating countries may not be willing to accept.

However, CBP officials acknowledged that they have not formally assessed the feasibility of conducting additional container targeting and inspection in selected major drug transit countries. In particular, CBP has neither calculated the related costs, including human resource requirements, nor has it consulted with State and Justice on the related diplomatic and security risks or the potential law enforcement benefits. Senior officials we spoke to at State/INL, DEA, and ONDCP indicated that it would be useful to examine the feasibility of a limited expansion of CSI on an interagency basis.

Conclusions

U.S. agencies, primarily State, DEA, Defense, DHS, and USAID, have supported initiatives that have fostered cooperation with partner nations in the transit zone, enabling these nations to engage in the counternarcotics effort in ways that the United States alone could not. Through these initiatives, U.S. law enforcement has been able to extend the scope and effectiveness of its drug interdiction activities by (1) gaining access to critical information and intelligence, (2) participating in seizure and eradication operations within the territory or jurisdiction of partner nations, and (3) bringing suspected drug traffickers to justice.

The absence of comprehensive and consistent reporting on the results of these initiatives makes it difficult to monitor their outcomes over time, assess their relative effectiveness, and make resource allocation decisions based on results. However, available information concerning results indicates that the United States has not made significant progress toward its goal of assisting governments to become full and self-sustaining partners in the international counternarcotics effort. Partner nations are dependent on U.S. logistical, financial, and advisory support, and without this support many U.S. initiatives are not sustainable. U.S. agencies have funded initiatives and invested in assets, particularly for maritime operations, without planning for the long-term operations and maintenance of these assets, and partner nations have not utilized many of them to their maximum capacity.

U.S. assistance in cargo container security has been largely ineffective for the international counternarcotics effort. However, DHS has invested in cargo container security programs overseas that in at least one instance helped detect illicit drugs being shipped in the transit zone. DHS has raised a number of concerns about using CSI routinely for this purpose, but has not assessed the feasibility of this program as another tool in the U.S. counternarcotics strategy.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To link U.S.-funded initiatives in transit zone countries to the priority of disrupting illicit drug markets and the goal of assisting nations to become full and self-sustaining partners in the international counternarcotics effort, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of ONDCP, the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Administrator of USAID, report the results of U.S.-funded counternarcotics initiatives more comprehensively and consistently for each country in the annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.

We recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of ONDCP, the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, (1) develop a plan to ensure that partner nations in the transit zone can effectively operate and maintain all counternarcotics assets that the United States has provided, including boats and other vehicles and equipment, for their remaining useful life and report this plan to the Congress for the fiscal year 2010 appropriations cycle and (2) ensure that, before providing a counternarcotics asset to a partner nation, agencies determine the total operations and maintenance cost over its useful life and, with the recipient nation, develop a plan for funding this cost.

To help maximize cargo container security assistance, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, determine the feasibility of expanding the Container Security Initiative to include routine targeting and scanning of containers for illicit drugs in major drug transit countries in the transit zone, and report the results to the Congress. Factors to be assessed should include the cost, workload and staffing ramifications, the potential benefits to international counternarcotics law enforcement efforts, the political support of CSI participating countries, statutory authority, and any risks associated with such an expansion.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to Defense, DHS, Justice/DEA, ONDCP, State, and USAID for their comment. DHS, Justice/DEA, ONDCP, and State provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendixes III through VI. All agencies provided technical corrections, which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate.

State generally agreed with the report’s conclusions, but disagreed with our recommendation on results reporting. State noted that it has already developed performance measures to reflect progress in achieving broad counternarcotics goals and development goals in general, though they do not necessarily capture program-specific results. We modified our recommendation to emphasize the need for more systematic reporting of program-specific results that would link U.S. counternarcotics efforts to State’s broader performance goals and measures. State also noted that there is substantial variation in assistance programs in particular countries in terms of program types and funding levels. However, we observed that many programs in several countries are similar in nature and lend themselves to the comparison of results among countries. Developing a method of reporting these results more comprehensively and consistently across years and among country programs in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report would address our concern.

State partially agreed with our recommendation on sustainability planning and indicated that its project designs, agreements with recipient countries, and monitoring mechanisms are appropriate for addressing sustainability concerns, given the unpredictability of recipient countries’ long-term priorities and budgetary resources. Furthermore, State commented that it has limited ability to influence the coordinated sustainability planning of other agencies and has no influence over Defense’s Enduring Friendship program. Given past experience, we question whether providing assets is justifiable without more specific and detailed plans that give better assurances that the recipient country and participating agencies are committed to funding specified operations and maintenance costs. State is in a unique position as the lead foreign affairs agency to ensure that all participating U.S. agencies involved in providing counternarcotics assets agree on a discrete sustainability plan. State, in particular, can influence Defense’s sustainability planning when it approves security assistance programs, such as Enduring Friendship. Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, under which Enduring Friendship was authorized, requires State and Defense to jointly approve all projects and coordinate their implementation.

State fully supports any consultation needed to determine the feasibility of expanding DHS’s container security assistance program.

DHS did not concur with our recommendation to study the feasibility of expanding the CSI program. According to DHS, expanding CSI to include narcotics interdiction would unnecessarily broaden the program’s strategic goals and is inconsistent with its mandate to secure the international supply chain from high-risk shipments with a potential risk of terrorism and acts of terrorism. CSI’s mandate does not prohibit leveraging the program’s resources for other agency missions. In addition, the CSI Strategic Plan for 2006-2011 states that, “at some point in the future, consideration should be given to potential expansion of the program from focusing on terrorism alone to encompassing other activities known to support terrorism, such as smuggling narcotics, violations of intellectual property rights and currency violations.” A logical first step would be for relevant stakeholders to study the feasibility of enlisting CSI as a counternarcotics tool, formally assessing the program’s statutory authority, among other factors. DHS also noted that 90 percent of cocaine moves through Mexico, but that no CSI ports are located in Mexico. However, as we reported, approximately 90 percent of the cocaine flowing toward the United States has gone through the Central American/Mexican corridor, in which four CSI ports are located.

ONDCP accepted our recommendation that it assist other agencies in developing performance measures and sustainability plans for U.S.- provided counternarcotics assets. In addition, ONDCP strongly concurred with the recommendation to determine the feasibility of expanding CSI.

DEA said that, while it is difficult to measure the outcome of all U.S. counternarcotics efforts, it has tracked statistical data to ensure that it is achieving its strategic goals and assists State and ONDCP in developing overall performance measures for U.S. counternarcotics programs.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and State; the Attorney General; the Administrator of USAID; the Director of ONDCP; and interested congressional committees. We also will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff members who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Our review encompassed U.S.-funded counternarcotics initiatives during 2003 through 2007, in countries in the Caribbean Sea and Central America, as well as Ecuador and Venezuela. We specifically focused our efforts on eight countries designated by the President as “major drug transit countries.” Those countries include the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Panama, and Venezuela. Although Mexico is also a major transit country, we excluded it from our review because we reviewed U.S. counternarcotics assistance to that country in 2007.

To identify U.S.-funded assistance programs and initiatives, we reviewed the Department of State’s (State) International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports (INCSR), Mission Performance Plans for fiscal years 2003 through 2007, and end use monitoring reports, as well as work plans, activity reports, and country summaries provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). We also met with Washington, D.C.- based representatives of the White House’s Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP); the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (State/INL); the Department of Justice’s Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Criminal Division; the Departments of Defense’s (Defense) Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation and Global Threats; the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We also met with cognizant officials at the U.S. Southern Command in Miami, Florida, and the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South in Key West, Florida. We included among the initiatives we reviewed those cooperative endeavors that may not have had any identifiable costs associated with them, including support for legislative reform in partner nations and efforts to reach agreements that enhance international cooperation in interdiction, including bilateral maritime law enforcement agreements and agreements to establish forward operating locations.

To document the cost of U.S. counternarcotics support, we focused on fiscal years 2003 through 2007 by reviewing and analyzing program funding data from the various departments and agencies in Washington, D.C., including State and Defense, USAID, and DEA for background purposes. While we performed some checks on the data, we did not perform a full reliability assessment of them. We believe the data provide a reasonable indication of spending on counternarcotics-related activities, but we recognize that the data the agencies gave us included funding for some activities that go beyond counternarcotics assistance and may include some U.S. interdiction-related activities.

To assess program results and factors that have impeded counternarcotics efforts, we reviewed State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports and Mission Strategic Plans for fiscal years 2002 through 2007, End Use Monitoring reports, and other relevant State documents. At DEA, we reviewed Significant Action Reports and “blue notes”—reports to the agency’s Administrator on selected significant drug interdiction and other activities—as well as all available “rightsizing reports” and all country and work plans for the eight major drug transit countries in our review. We also reviewed evaluations, midterm and final reports, and other program documents for those activities which USAID officials and State/INL documents had identified as related to the international counternarcotics effort. In addition, we reviewed Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index to evaluate the level of corruption in these countries. The index is based on the results of surveys of business people and citizens and analysis by country experts. It ranks countries by the degree of corruption perceived to exist in each country rather than by actual corruption, which is difficult to measure directly. In a previous GAO report, we determined that Transparency International’s data were sufficiently reliable to provide a broad gauge of corruption and demonstrate that levels of corruption vary among countries.

To obtain more detailed information on program results and impediments, we traveled to four of the eight major drug trafficking countries in our review: the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama. We chose these four countries based on: (1) the size of the U.S. assistance program; (2) the location within the various geographic regions of the transit zone, including Central America, South America, and the Caribbean Islands; (3) designation as a major money-laundering country; (4) posting of senior embassy officials representing State/INL, DEA, DHS, ICE, and CBP, and Defense; and (5) implementation of major USAID rule of law and alternative development initiatives. During our visits we obtained information from U.S. embassy officials, host government officials, and local program beneficiaries. While in country, we visited a number of project sites relating to maritime operations, port security, intelligence gathering, drug crop eradication, alternative development, and other activities.

To identify trends in cocaine flow, seizures, and disruptions, we reviewed data from the Interagency Assessment on Cocaine Movement from 2002 through 2007, with limited updated data provided by ONDCP. In the course of previous work, we discussed how cocaine flow data were developed with officials from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency, Crime and Narcotics Center. In addition, we discussed how seizure and disruption data were developed with officials from ONDCP. Overall, the data have limitations, due in part to the illegal nature of the drug trade and the time lag inherent in collecting meaningful data. Notwithstanding the limitations of the drug production and seizure data, we determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to provide an overall indication of the magnitude and nature of the illicit drug trade since 2003. We supplemented this data with information about trends in drug trafficking, interdiction, and cooperation with transit zone countries obtained from officials at JIATF-South.

Finally, the information and observations on foreign law in this report do not reflect our independent legal analysis but are based on interviews with cognizant officials and secondary sources.

Appendix II: Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements

The United States has signed Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement agreements with 25 countries in the transit and source zones. According to Coast Guard officials, these agreements have improved cooperation with nations in the region and increased the United States’ and, in particular, the Coast Guard’s capability to board suspect vessels and detain suspected drug traffickers. These bilateral agreements typically have six provisions to them. The United States and the other countries negotiate each provision separately, which means that some countries may agree to some provisions and not others. The six parts provide for the following: Ship-boarding provisions establish an expedited process for U.S. law enforcement agencies to obtain authorization from the competent authority of a designated country to board and search a vessel flying its flag and suspected of being engaged in illicit traffic outside the territorial waters of any nation. In certain limited circumstances, U.S. vessels may stop, board, and search suspicious vessels flying the flag of a designated country without having specific permission.

Ship-rider provisions permit countries to place law enforcement officials on each other’s vessels.

Pursuit provisions allow U.S. law enforcement agencies, under very limited circumstances, to pursue aircraft and vessels in a country’s airspace and territorial waters. In particular, the provisions permit U.S. law enforcement agencies to stop, board, and search a suspect vessel if the country does not have a vessel or aircraft available to respond immediately.

Entry-to-investigate provisions allow the U.S. law enforcement agencies, under very limited circumstances, to enter a country’s airspace or territorial waters to investigate aircraft or vessels suspected of illicit drug trafficking. Specifically, the provisions permit U.S. law enforcement agencies to board and search a suspect vessel if the country does not have a vessel or aircraft available to respond immediately.

Over-flight provisions permit the U.S. law enforcement aircraft to fly over the country’s territorial waters, with appropriate notice to the country’s coastal authorities.

Relay order-to-land provisions allow U.S. law enforcement agencies to relay an order to land from the host country to the suspect aircraft. Moreover, an additional International Maritime Interdiction Support clause permits U.S. law enforcement agencies, principally the Coast Guard, to transport suspected drug traffickers through that country to the United States for prosecution and provides for expedited access to that country’s dockside facility to search suspect vessels. Since 2003 the United States has entered into support clauses with five countries.

Table 5 lists the law enforcement agreements, including the international maritime interdiction support clause, that the United States has negotiated with countries in the transit and source zones.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Homeland Security’s letter dated June 27, 2008.

GAO Comments

1. A decision on whether to enlist CSI as a counternarcotics tool should be based on a reasoned study of its feasibility by relevant stakeholders, formally assessing the program’s statutory authority among other factors. ONDCP and State support this recommendation. 2. CSI’s mandate does not prohibit leveraging the program’s resources for other agency missions. In addition, DHS/CBP notes in the CSI Strategic Plan for 2006-2011 that, “at some point in the future, consideration should be given to potential expansion of the program from focusing on terrorism alone to encompassing other activities known to support terrorism, such as smuggling narcotics, violations of intellectual property rights and currency violations.” 3. As noted in our report, seven CSI ports are located the Caribbean and Central America. Four of those ports (Balboa, Colon, and Manzanillo in Panama and Puerto Cortes in Honduras), are located on the central American isthmus and, as such, are included in the “Central American/Mexican Corridor,” through which nearly 90 percent of cocaine destined for the United States moves. (See fig. 1.) 4. As DHS notes in its letter, the United States has “unique and unparalleled cooperation and information sharing between the CBP officers at the foreign seaports and the host government customs personnel.” CSI’s way of working with host country partners may serve as a model for combating corruption and gaining the political support necessary to make U.S. efforts successful. 5. We are not recommending that CSI target maritime containers destined for other countries. Rather, we are recommending that, in addition to the factors CSI currently uses to target containers for inspection, DHS study the feasibility of using potential narcotics trafficking as one of the targeting factors. 6. We added information on CBP’s advisory program. 7. The focus of our review was on U.S. initiatives to assist selected major drug transit zone countries and we intentionally did not address many U.S. interdiction operations DHS described. We have reported previously on CBP’s activities. See GAO, Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations, GAO-06- 200 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2005); and GAO, Drug Control: Difficulties in Measuring Costs and Results of Transit Zone Interdiction Efforts, GAO-02-13 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2002).

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter dated June 25, 2008.

GAO Comments

1. We modified our recommendation to emphasize the need for State to report the results of U.S.-funded counternarcotics initiatives more comprehensively and consistently for each country in its annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Such information would complement and aid interpretation of the broad performance measures State includes in its performance plan. 2. While the broad performance measures State has developed are important, they do not capture results of specific assistance programs, and, without other information, their usefulness in managing counternarcotics programs is limited. Reviewing program-specific results in a particular country over time or comparing results among countries with similar programs can help identify patterns and lessons learned that may be useful in evaluating and managing these programs more effectively. Furthermore, without consistently reported program- specific results information, State cannot assess the extent to which the results of specific programs have contributed to overall progress reflected in State overall performance measures. 3. While we agree that assistance programs vary, we observed that many programs in several countries are similar and comparable. 4. Past experience with U.S.-provided assets has shown that State’s monitoring of nation’s commitment alone has not been sufficient to ensure that such assets are utilized effectively. We question whether such U.S. investments are justifiable without stronger up-front assurances, beyond an agreement, that recipient countries or sponsoring U.S. agencies can afford the long-term operations and maintenance costs and are committed to providing those resources. We continue to believe that explicit sustainability plans are needed that include a projection of total asset ownership costs that have been considered and agreed upon by all relevant parties with adequate contingency plans in case assumptions change about sustainability and commitment. 5. State is in a unique position as the lead foreign affairs agency to ensure that all participating U.S. agencies involved in providing counternarcotics assets agree on a discreet sustainability plan. State, in particular, can influence Defense’s sustainability planning when it approves security assistance programs, such as Enduring Friendship.

Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, under which Enduring Friendship was authorized, requires State and Defense to jointly approve all projects and coordinate their implementation.

Appendix VI: Comments from the Office of National Drug Control Policy

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, A. H. Huntington, III, Assistant Director; Joseph Carney; Miriam A. Carroll; and James Michels made key contributions to this report.