U.N. Peacekeeping: Transition Strategies for Post-Conflict Countries Lack Results-Oriented Measures of Progress
Released: 2003-09-26T00:00:00

Letter

Background

The U.N. Security Council authorizes all peacekeeping operations as a means to further international peace and security. The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is responsible for the planning, management, and logistical support of U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide. From 1948 through August 2003, the Security Council authorized 56 peacekeeping operations. Fourteen of these operations were ongoing as of August 2003.

Most current U.N. peacekeeping operations have relatively narrow mandates that authorize peacekeepers to monitor or supervise cease-fires and peace agreements between formerly warring parties. Three ongoing operations—those in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—have broader, multidimensional mandates that address complex emergencies.

Earlier multidimensional peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Cambodia, and Bosnia tried to address governance, human rights, and humanitarian affairs, but they initially lacked long-term transition strategies. For example, the peace operation in Somalia did not clearly link security with efforts to rebuild the country. In Bosnia, a coalition of nations led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization formed an international force to provide security, which was initially planned to last 1 year. But 2 years later, troop withdrawal was linked to the achievement of broad objectives for the overall peace operation. In Cambodia, there was no clear plan for effectively developing the rule of law after the peacekeeping operation left. The Security Council recognized the shortcomings in these operations and began to consider better strategies to plan and manage operations for sustainable peace.

In 1999, the need to address such shortcomings gained greater urgency as the Security Council mandated new U.N. operations to address complex emergencies in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. (App. III describes in more detail the crisis each of these countries faced and the United Nations’ response.) The council debated the need for a new approach to planning, conducting, and concluding multidimensional peacekeeping operations in countries with complex emergencies. The council examined the lessons learned from these past failures and the process for closing a peacekeeping operation. In 2000, the council requested that the Secretary General make recommendations about how to effectively launch, close, or significantly alter a U.N. peacekeeping operation. Figure 1 provides more information on each country and the U.N. operation there.

U.N. Peacekeeping Transition Strategy Consists of Three Elements

Since the late 1990s, the United Nations has developed a general strategy for peacekeeping transitions in complex emergency countries. The U.N. strategy consists of three elements: establishing the conditions for sustainable peace, including security, rule of law, and economic and social reform; coordinating and sustaining the efforts of international organizations and developing objectives and results-oriented measures of progress to manage the peace operation and make troop withdrawal decisions.

The Security Council has stated that it is supportive of this strategy but also notes that it decides whether to authorize the troops and resources needed to carry it out on a case-by-case basis. The U.N. Secretariat, particularly DPKO, has strengthened its planning and management to help implement this strategy.

Strategy Focuses on Achieving Security, Rule of Law, and Economic Reform

In 2001, the U.N. Secretary General stated that the ultimate purpose of peacekeeping is to help countries achieve sustainable peace. To do this, the U.N. transition strategy for complex emergency countries guides the United Nations, other international organizations, and donor countries to (1) establish and maintain security, (2) develop institutions that provide rule of law and participatory governance, and (3) create conditions for economic and social recovery and reform.

Establishing and maintaining security are priorities for U.N. peacekeeping operations. However, when armed interventions have been necessary, the United Nations generally has authorized alliances—such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—or coalitions of nations to undertake military operations to restore security. U.N. peacekeepers then have responsibility for maintaining secure conditions so that other aspects of the peace operation, including humanitarian efforts, can move forward. In the longer term, maintaining security may include demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combatants into society, training a fair and impartial police force, and building a professional army that is accountable to the national government.

The transition strategy emphasizes that sustainable peace is most likely if the country establishes rule of law and participatory governance. To support this, the peacekeeping operation and many other partners undertake programs to reform a country’s justice system so that it is fair, transparent, and equitable. Other activities include strengthening or building government institutions to ensure transparency, equal access, and accountability to all citizens. Other efforts, when authorized by the Security Council, may include supporting broad-based political parties, overseeing or administering free and fair elections, and supporting efforts to combat corruption.

Creating the conditions for economic and social recovery and reform is also important in the transition strategy. Efforts to create these conditions include reconstruction of infrastructure and utilities and activities to promote national reconciliation and human rights, such as supporting war crimes tribunals or truth and reconciliation panels. Other efforts in this area include support for resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.

Several studies have similarly found that the earlier operations did not focus on obtaining comprehensive results needed for sustainable peace. For example, a Department of Defense-sponsored study determined that past failures in restoring peace were highly correlated with the failure to restore public security, political rights, and honest government and with the facilitation of economic reconstruction. A 2002 guide developed as a tool for U.S. policy makers reached similar conclusions. The guide noted that a peacekeeping operation must undertake a range of military and political tasks to achieve a sustainable outcome in a complex emergency situation. These tasks include demobilizing armed groups, reforming the police, establishing rule of law, and rehabilitating the economy. The guide concludes that assessment of progress toward restoring stability in the country should identify measures to be relied upon (such as disarming ex- combatants or holding elections) and/or transforming conditions on the ground (such as reducing the level of violence in the country and increasing confidence in elected officials). Our observations on lessons learned from our survey of 32 previous reports on peacekeeping operations in 16 countries came to similar conclusions about the need for comprehensive transition planning in complex emergency situations. The Security Council recognized the shortcomings in the earlier missions and began to consider better strategies to plan and manage operations for sustainable peace.

In February 2001, the Security Council endorsed this broad approach for effective transitions. The council stated that achieving a sustainable peace requires a comprehensive approach that includes political, humanitarian, and human rights programs to foster sustainable development, eradication of poverty, and transparent and accountable government and rule of law. However, the council qualified this endorsement by noting that it decides on a case-by-case basis the extent to which to authorize the troops, funding, and other resources needed to carry out these activities.

Strategy Emphasizes Coordination with Other Organizations and Donor States

The transition strategy recognizes that U.N. peacekeeping operations cannot undertake all transition activities. Thus, transition efforts must be closely coordinated among U.N. peacekeeping offices; U.N. development, humanitarian, and human rights agencies; international financial institutions; bilateral agencies; host nation governments; and nongovernmental organizations. The Secretary General has observed that peacekeepers should establish close working relationships with these other stakeholders and begin transition planning during the operation’s earliest stages. The Security Council has also strongly encouraged cooperation among all stakeholders to monitor and develop an integrated response to the specific conditions in each country.

As part of the transition strategy, other international organizations and individual donor countries are expected to lead some efforts. For example, the host government; international financial institutions, such as the World Bank; and bilateral development agencies have responsibility for economic recovery. These stakeholders continue efforts after the peace operation ends.

Strategy Focuses on Developing Objectives and Results-Oriented Measures

The U.N. transition strategy also calls for developing objectives, linked to the country conditions sought, and measures of progress toward achieving those conditions. The objectives and results-oriented measures are intended to help manage the peace operation and help make decisions about drawing down the numbers of peacekeepers based on objective data. The emphasis on using objectives and results-oriented measures is part of the U.N. decision to implement results-based budgeting. Approved by the General Assembly in 2000, results-based budgeting links program objectives, outputs (the final product or service delivered to the client or users), outcomes (the results of a program compared with its intended purpose), and measures of impact (the result from achieving the program’s objectives). According to the Secretary General, this approach is intended to ensure that U.N. programs are designed to achieve results and to ensure that the United Nations can measure performance.

U.N. Reforms Support Implementation of Strategy

The U.N. Secretariat has begun to reform its planning and management capabilities to more effectively carry out peacekeeping operations and transitions. These initiatives were adopted based on recommendations made by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, a group of experts convened by the Secretary General in 2000 to assess the shortcomings of the existing system for managing peace operations. Some key initiatives included the following: In 2002, the United Nations consolidated all peacekeeping responsibilities into DPKO. Previously, the Department of Political Affairs was responsible for developing and proposing the mandates of potential peace operations, and DPKO was responsible for planning and logistical support.

In 2001, the U.N. General Assembly approved a 50 percent increase in staff for DPKO, allowing it to better plan and manage operations. By January 2003, DPKO had largely met its recruiting goals in key areas. For example, it had increased the military planning group from 7 to 18 and increased the civilian police division from 2 to 9 staff, which enabled it to provide useful input in planning individual operations.

DPKO revised its overall process and guidance for planning peace operations. This revised guidance requires planners to clarify long-term aims in the country and develop plans that identify objectives, tasks to be undertaken, resources required, expected timetables, and criteria for measuring success.

As recommended by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, DPKO has begun using integrated mission task teams to plan operations. The task force membership varies but should include core military and police planners from DPKO and representatives of all involved U.N. humanitarian and development agencies. Representatives of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund would also be invited to participate as appropriate.

In 2001, DPKO merged two existing analysis units to create a best practices unit and attached it directly to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations. The new unit’s mission is to analyze past experiences and apply the results of that analysis to new operations. The unit is also supposed to help develop guidelines and recommendations for the conduct, management, and support of these operations. Unit officials stated that they are beginning to make recommendations on the implementation of the United Nations’ revised approach to transition planning.

United Nations Is Trying to Apply the Transition Strategy

The United Nations is trying to apply all the elements of the transition strategy to help move countries from conflict to sustainable peace. First, the United Nations and other stakeholders have provided thousands of peacekeeping troops and other international workers to establish and maintain secure environments in East Timor and Sierra Leone and to help develop rule of law. U.N. peacekeepers have also supported efforts by the World Bank and others to begin development planning and to address human rights issues. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. efforts are more limited, but as of July 2003, the Security Council authorized more peacekeepers and approved other efforts. Second, the United Nations and international organizations have tried to coordinate transition efforts with each other, host country governments, and donor countries. Third, each U.N. peacekeeping operation has begun to identify objectives and results- oriented measures of progress and, to a limited extent, uses these to manage drawdowns of operations. The Security Council, however, makes the final decision on the drawdown and withdrawal of a peace operation.

U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Seek to Establish Conditions for Sustainable Peace

In countries with complex emergencies, U.N. peacekeeping operations and other stakeholders seek to establish basic conditions for sustainable peace by (1) providing and maintaining security, (2) developing institutions that provide rule of law and participatory governance, and (3) creating conditions for social and economic reforms. Table 1 illustrates the transition objectives associated with U.N. and other stakeholder efforts to achieve these conditions in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Security Council mandates for the U.N. peace operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Congo made establishing and maintaining security a priority to facilitate other mission objectives, such as reestablishing government authority. For example, to assist in carrying out provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement, the initial mandate for the U.N. Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone authorized 6,000 military personnel to provide security at key locations, government buildings, and disarmament sites. The mission also facilitated the free flow of people, goods, and humanitarian assistance. In May 2000, the Security Council expanded the U.N. mission’s mandate in response to renewed violence and by March 2001 had increased the military force to 17,500 troops. According to the force commander, the operation’s priorities since the election of a new government in May 2002 have shifted from maintaining security to improving the capacity of the local police and government officials. The British government has also played a major role in achieving these objectives. It deployed 4,500 troops to the region in 2000 to support the government and U.N. peacekeepers and is helping to train Sierra Leone’s armed forces and police.

The Security Council applied similar measures in East Timor. In September 1999, the council sanctioned the deployment of an international force led by 5,400 Australian troops to stop the widespread violence perpetrated by pro-Indonesian militias. According to members of the Australian parliament, the government led the coalition because it had a strong national interest in ensuring a stable East Timor. The Security Council subsequently authorized (1) the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor in October 1999, with an authorized force level of 9,150 troops and 1,640 international police, and (2) the U.N. Mission of Support in East Timor in May 2002, with a force level of 5,000 troops plus 1,250 police. According to the deputy force commander and other U.N. officials, these missions have suppressed sporadic violence and have continued to patrol along the boundary with Indonesian West Timor, begun training a local police force, and supported donor nation efforts to train a small East Timor military force (see fig. 2).

The Security Council has not yet applied similar security measures in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As of May 2003, the U.N. force had about 4,600 troops; the mission was mandated to monitor the cease-fire and oversee the disarmament and repatriation of foreign fighters. In May 2003, the council authorized the French government to lead a separate 1,500-strong force on a limited mission to protect U.N. peacekeeping troops and suppress violence between rival militias fighting in and around the city of Bunia in the northeastern district of Ituri. In July 2003, the council increased the strength of the U.N. force to 10,800 and for the first time authorized peacekeepers to use force to protect civilians in selected locations.

U.N. Efforts to Develop Rule of Law and Participatory Governance

U.N. peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and East Timor have undertaken tasks to begin establishing the rule of law and participatory governance. In Sierra Leone, the peacekeepers, in coordination with the U.N. Development Program, the World Bank, and others, have worked with the Sierra Leone government to reestablish the court system, rebuild courtrooms throughout the country, and develop projects to train judges and prosecutors. In 2002, the U.N. operation provided transportation, supplies, and security and monitored the conduct of national elections that observers characterized as “free and fair.” Mission officials also plan to provide security, logistics, and technical assistance for local government elections in 2004. Furthermore, according to U.N. plans and reports, the priority is to improve the work of government officials in structures throughout the country.

In East Timor, U.N. efforts to develop the rule of law and participatory governance have been extensive. For example, in 1999, the Security Council empowered the peacekeeping operation to exercise all legislative and executive authority for the country, including the administration of justice. In this capacity, the operation established a national consultative council to help make decisions about the future government and set up a transitional judicial commission. According to U.N. officials, international staff and advisors also provided on-the-job training to allow the East Timorese to gradually assume more responsibility for running the government. The U.N. mission also supervised East Timor’s first popular election of members to the constituent assembly in 2001 and the presidential elections in 2002. Since East Timor attained independence and the end of the U.N. transitional administration in May 2002, the follow- on peace operation has focused on advising and training government officials and on extending a national system of justice to outlying districts.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the U.N. peacekeeping operation’s support for governance has been largely limited to supporting the intermittent peace negotiations between the warring parties to establish an interim government. A new government of National Unity and Transition was formed in June, and, on July 28, 2003, the Security Council expanded the peacekeeping operation’s mandate to help the government restore stability, including support for security sector reform, elections, and rule of law, in coordination with other international actors.

U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Support Economic and Social Recovery Efforts

U.N. peacekeeping operations assist other stakeholders in working toward conditions for economic and social recovery. For example, in 2002 in East Timor, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the U.N. peacekeeping operation, and the U.N. Development Program helped the government develop a 20-year national development plan. The plan described short- and medium-term strategies for the country’s economic recovery and growth, and was used by the international community to determine their economic support programs. Although the U.N. peacekeeping operation provided funding for some projects, other donors provided major funding for programs to reduce poverty, increase power generation, and support private sector development.

U.N. peacekeeping operations also support efforts to provide social reconciliation in both Sierra Leone and East Timor. In both countries, the government, United Nations, and donor countries decided that leaders of rival factions had to be held accountable for human rights violations. In Sierra Leone, the United States and other donors helped establish and fund an independent Sierra Leone international tribunal to prosecute those bearing “greatest responsibility” for violations of international humanitarian law during that country’s civil war. The U.N. operation assists the tribunal by providing security, transportation, and supplies. In East Timor, the U.N. operation established a unit to assist in the investigation of the most serious atrocities committed in 1999. The United Nations also provides technical support and other assistance to commissions in both countries investigating human rights violations and fostering reconciliation. Similarly, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees coordinates refugee repatriation and return efforts in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Congo. The peace operations assist these efforts by providing security and logistical support.

U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Attempt to Coordinate and Sustain Assistance

The U.N. peacekeeping operations have undertaken several efforts to try to coordinate with other international organizations and donor nations. These include early planning efforts, donor meetings and conferences, and the establishment of a high-level position in the mission to coordinate security and economic recovery efforts.

In East Timor, attempts to coordinate efforts among donor countries and international organizations occurred before the peacekeeping operation deployed. A joint assessment mission began in the autumn of 1999, 8 months before the start of the peacekeeping operation. The assessment mission included members from five donor countries, four U.N. agencies, the European Commission, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank. The International Monetary Fund also conducted a concurrent mission to assess East Timor’s budgeting capabilities. DPKO used the core plans for reconstruction and budgeting from the joint assessments in its planning. The joint assessment mission was a response to experiences in other post-conflict countries, where lack of coordination had delayed efforts and caused inefficiencies and duplication in the use of external resources.

The U.N. peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and East Timor also coordinated with other international organizations through regular donor meetings and conferences. For example, during 2002, the government of Sierra Leone, the World Bank, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and the peacekeeping mission completed revised strategic plans for that country. U.N. organizations working in Sierra Leone (including the peacekeeping mission and the World Bank) subsequently collaborated in preparing an overall strategy for their national recovery and peace-building efforts. At an international donors conference in November 2002, U.N. organizations and other donors agreed to work together to support the government’s comprehensive national recovery strategy, restructure the government unit responsible for national aid monitoring and coordination, and hold bimonthly coordination meetings.

Several mechanisms are used in the field to increase coordination among U.N. agencies and other international organizations in carrying out peacekeeping transitions. The Secretary General created the position of Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, the second highest ranking position at each mission, to ensure coordination between security and economic reform efforts. According to the deputy representative in East Timor, his dual responsibilities for peacekeeping operations and U.N. development programs allow him to better manage the process of transitioning the mission’s emphasis from peacekeeping to longer term peace building.

United Nations Is Beginning to Use Objectives and Results-Oriented Measures in Peacekeeping Operations

DPKO has specified objectives for its peacekeeping operations and identified some results-oriented measures of progress. The operations in Sierra Leone and East Timor are using the measures to a limited extent to plan the drawdown of troops and other activities, but the Security Council makes the final transition decisions.

Peace Operations Are Making Efforts to Specify Objectives and Measures

The U.N. operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have specified their objectives, based on mandates from the Security Council, and have developed measures of progress, some of which are results oriented. (App. II lists the objectives and measures for the three missions.) For example, in Sierra Leone, one objective is to reduce poverty and encourage economic growth. Measures of progress include increasing (1) the percentage of households with access to safe drinking water, (2) the percentage of women who are AIDS aware, and (3) the growth in gross domestic product (to 6 percent annually). Another objective is to ensure security and freedom of movement. Measures of progress for this objective include minimizing and containing cease-fire violations and opening roads and removing roadblocks. Although some measures for the peacekeeping operations are quantifiable, the United Nations faces challenges in developing results- oriented measures about conditions in the country that the peace operations are supposed to improve. This issue will be discussed in the last section of this report.

Peace Operations Use Measures of Progress to a Limited Extent in Planning Drawdown

The Security Council weighs political and budgetary considerations as well as the conditions in each complex emergency country when making the final decision to draw down and withdraw peacekeeping forces. Nonetheless, the United Nations has to a limited extent used some measures to plan the withdrawal of peacekeepers in Sierra Leone and East Timor. (The operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not at a stage to begin withdrawing.) U.N. officials in Sierra Leone developed and modified plans for withdrawing peacekeepers based on an evaluation of progress in strengthening the police and armed forces, reintegrating ex- combatants, and restoring government control over diamond mining. Mission staff used some of these measures when they reviewed the security risks and capabilities of Sierra Leone security forces in each region to ensure that peacekeeping troops were withdrawn from lower security risk areas first and retained longer in higher risk areas along the Liberian border. U.N. military staff acknowledged, however, that the force was being drawn down more quickly under the current plan because of the council’s budgetary and political pressure to end the peacekeeping mission and not because the mission’s measures pointed to a reduced threat to the country’s security and stability. In March 2003, the council requested that the Secretary General provide faster and slower options for the drawdown based on the security situation and the ability of Sierra Leone security forces to take responsibility for external and internal security functions. Figure 3 illustrates the proposed timetable for withdrawal that the Secretary General presented to the council in September 2002, as well as a revised drawdown option recommended by the Secretary General based on his review of these factors and adopted by the council in July 2003.

In East Timor, the Secretary General and Security Council have used measures to plan the drawdown of its peacekeepers. However, although the United Nations is retaining greater numbers of peacekeepers and international police in response to unexpected security threats and lack of sufficient progress in developing the capabilities of the East Timor police service, the Security Council did not change the final withdrawal date of June 2004. (Fig. 4 illustrates the alterations in the drawdown schedule for the troops and police.) According to U.N., U.S., and Australian officials, this end date is a political compromise developed in consultation with the United States and key council members. Senior military officers in the peacekeeping mission said that the failure to meet objectives, such as having a judicial system in place by mid-2003, will not change the withdrawal date.

Although objectives and measures of progress provide information to help manage the withdrawal of peacekeepers, other factors influence council decisions. According to U.N. officials, U.S. officials, and members of the council, the following factors are involved in these decisions: Peacekeeping missions are intended to provide a limited window for countries to resolve internal differences and take advantage of the opportunity to rebuild their country with broad international support.

The United Nations must set deadlines to maintain pressure on the country’s leaders and political factions to take responsibility for their country and fulfill their commitments.

Each peacekeeping mission must compete for the attention of the Security Council, which often must respond to new crises and emergencies as it devotes resources to ongoing operations.

The cost and resources needed for peacekeeping operations are high.

Security Council members face domestic pressures to limit their support, particularly if an operation is not a priority national interest.

United Nations Confronts Significant Challenges to Implementing Transition Strategy

The United Nations confronts significant challenges to implementing each element of the transition strategy. First, achieving the conditions for sustainable peace establishing the conditions necessary for sustainable peace is a challenge. Maintaining security is difficult because the rival factions in a country may oppose the peacekeepers or continue their internal disputes, regardless of the peacekeepers’ presence. Further, establishing rule of law and democratic governance is problematic in countries with little or no tradition of accountable government and democratic principles. In this regard, peacekeeping transitions have taken longer and have been more costly than initially expected. Second, the United Nations has not been able to coordinate its efforts and priorities with those of other independent international organizations and donor states to the extent necessary to meet transition objectives. Third, developing clear objectives and meaningful results-oriented measures of progress is difficult. DPKO acknowledges that it needs better measures by which to assess the progress that peacekeeping operations are making in attaining sustainable peace. However, the department has not made developing or using these measures a priority.

Achieving Security, Rule of Law, and Economic and Social Reform Is Difficult

Establishing security in war-torn countries is difficult because of uncertain and volatile environments. For example, despite peace agreements among opposing factions in Sierra Leone, peacekeepers were initially threatened by one of the rival groups in the country, which restricted their movements, took more than 400 peacekeepers hostage, and continued to commit human rights atrocities. The armed intervention of 4,500 British troops was needed to help establish security. Through June 2003, 49 peacekeepers had died through accidents or hostile acts. Similarly, in East Timor, despite a free and fair referendum rejecting integration with Indonesia in favor of independence, the pro-integration militia created widespread violence to stop East Timor from becoming independent. A military coalition of 8,000 troops led by Australia was necessary to restore security. Through June 2003, 19 peacekeepers had died.

Establishing security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has proven extremely difficult. Despite numerous cease-fire agreements, the two large rebel groups; five foreign governments with armed forces within the country; and numerous foreign and domestic armed groups, many aligned with neighboring states, did not cooperate with the U.N. peace operation. The operation has not maintained a secure environment, and cease-fires frequently have been violated. The government’s forces only have control over half of the country’s territory. After violations of several cease-fire agreements, France led a coalition force to help U.N. peacekeepers control large-scale violence in the northeastern city of Bunia in the Ituri region (see fig. 5).

Maintaining security in war-torn countries is also a problem. In East Timor, pro-Indonesian militia groups conducted armed attacks from Indonesian West Timor in January and February 2003, even after U.N. military officials stated that the militia no longer posed a threat to East Timor. The Secretary General concluded that U.N. peacekeeping troops should be maintained along the border. In April 2003, Sierra Leone peacekeepers expressed concern about ongoing violence in Liberia, a state that recently supported Sierra Leone rebels. (Fig. 6 illustrates Sierra Leone soldiers on duty near the border with Liberia.) U.N. officials also noted that large concentrations of ex-combatants, unemployed youths, corruption, and illegal mining in Sierra Leone’s diamond mining areas continue to be ongoing threats to security.

Developing rule of law and participatory governance is difficult because countries with complex emergencies may have little or no experience with transparent accountable governments or democratic traditions and institutions. For example, the U.N. strategy for restoring local government to Sierra Leone included reestablishing both hereditary chieftaincies and elected district councils. According to a British government analysis, however, Sierra Leone’s reliance on hereditary chieftains has always compromised transparency and accountability and provided a means for the central government to control local affairs. Moreover, this reliance limits democratic participation because only candidates meeting hereditary lineage requirements were eligible to run in recent elections to fill 61 tribal chieftaincies left vacant during the war. Additionally, local civic leaders in one district stated that the Speaker of the National Parliament arbitrarily replaced the locally selected candidate for chief. A 2002 U.K. study characterized the Sierra Leone justice system as unresponsive, unaccountable, and corrupt. Furthermore, the Anti- Corruption Commission, a body specifically created in 2000 to investigate corrupt practices among government officials, has been ineffective, according to U.S. and U.K. officials. In light of these serious deficiencies, the World Bank and the U.K. government are planning a 5-year effort to improve the justice system beginning in late 2003.

In East Timor, U.N. and other international officials told us that years of mistrust of the Indonesian-imposed court system and the rural population’s isolation have created reliance on traditional laws and informal courts. These courts show little regard for the rights of women, according to U.N. and other international officials. These issues present a significant obstacle to applying Western norms of judicial conduct and respect for human rights. In addition, the East Timor government has not passed laws identifying the number of locations or the villages that will serve as political jurisdictions, nor has it extended authority and services beyond the capital. We saw limited evidence of government services or representation in villages beyond Dili, the national capital.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, government and rule of law have almost completely collapsed after years of warfare, according to U.S. government and U.N. officials. In 1999, the Secretary General noted that the substitution of armed force for the rule of law in much of the territory was a key factor in making the Democratic Republic of the Congo a difficult environment for peacekeeping. In June 2003, the parties to the peace agreement formed a national unity government with the assistance of the U.N. peacekeeping operation.

Economic Recovery Is a Long- Term Effort

U.N., international agency, and host and donor government officials have noted that the time frames for peacekeeping operations are shorter than those for economic recovery programs. Australian officials estimated that developing the economy of East Timor and redressing its serious poverty will take 20 to 50 years. As of December 2002, a study by the U.N. Children’s Fund estimated that 25 percent of the East Timorese population is below the poverty level. The most recent U.N. health survey indicated that 30 percent of children below age 5 were malnourished.

Economic stabilization objectives can be difficult to achieve. In Sierra Leone, for example, the government has made limited progress in regaining legal and regulatory control over the diamond trade, a vital sector in its economy. The value of legal exports of diamonds (as opposed to smuggling) has increased from just over $1 million in 1999 to $41 million in 2002. A January 2003 analysis commissioned by the British government estimated that the annual value of diamond exports could rise to as much as $180 million by 2006 if the industry was properly regulated and effective anticorruption measures were implemented. However, Sierra Leone government, U.N., and other international officials agree that government systems for regulating the diamond industry remain weak and impractical.

Implementing Overall Transition Takes Longer and Is More Costly than Originally Planned

Because of the difficulties in achieving conditions for sustainable peace, overall peace efforts in countries with complex emergencies take more time and are more costly than originally planned. In Sierra Leone, international efforts to restore stability have been under way since the early 1990s. Recent efforts have also taken longer than originally planned. Although signatories of the Sierra Leone peace accord (July 1999) anticipated holding an election in 2001, conditions for a free and fair election were not achieved until May 2002, and peacekeepers will not exit until the end of 2004. In East Timor, the United Nations approved a limited operation in June 1999 to oversee a referendum to determine whether the nation would become an autonomous but integrated part of Indonesia or an independent country. The U.N. mission of 325 civilian police and military observers was expected to last about 4 months, but following violence over the results of the vote in favor of independence, the United Nations sanctioned intervention by a multinational force and later deployed thousands of U.N. peacekeeping troops to oversee the transition to independence. The peace operation is now scheduled to end in 2004. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a U.N. observer and peace mission has been ongoing since 1999, but numerous cease-fire violations have occurred. Congolese parties to the conflict did not form the interim government called for in the 1999 peace agreement until June 2003. In July 2003, the Security Council expanded the mandate to support the new government and increased the authorized force level to 10,800 troops.

Because of the difficulties in achieving conditions for sustainable peace, implementing the transition strategies in these countries has cost over $6 billion: The estimated total cost of the operations in Sierra Leone is over $2.6 billion through June 2004. Annual costs have risen from $263 million for the U.N. fiscal year ending June 2000 to $670 million for the U.N. fiscal year ending June 2003. This increase reflects the Security Council’s decision to almost triple the size of the peacekeeping force in response to continued fighting and other problems. The estimated cost for the current fiscal year is about $544 million.

The estimated total cost of the operations in East Timor is about $1.8 billion through June 2004. The initial U.N. observer mission sent to organize and conduct the referendum in East Timor in 1999 was expected to cost about $53 million. The current operation’s annual cost is $292 million for the U.N. fiscal year ending June 2003, and the estimated cost for the current fiscal year is $193 million.

The estimated annual cost for the operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is about $1.9 billion through June 2004. Annual costs have risen from $55 million for the U.N. fiscal year ending June 2000 to an estimated $608 million for the current fiscal year. However, the latter estimate does not include costs associated with the Security Council’s recent decision to expand the operation’s mandate and authorize a larger U.N. force.

There are also costs above and beyond the peacekeeping operation that are needed to fund overall transition efforts. These costs are often not funded. For example, in 2002, the United Nations requested about $69 million for humanitarian assistance in Sierra Leone, including the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced people and improved access to health, water, and education services. International donors funded less than 50 percent of this request. Similarly, the peacekeeping operation in East Timor faced a significant shortfall in additional donor resources. In 2002, the East Timor government and the U.N. Development Program identified the need for 228 donor-funded international advisers to begin to help manage government and economic development programs once the U.N. operation withdraws. As of April 2003, donors had provided 48 advisers and promised another 83, leaving a shortfall of nearly 100 positions.

Coordination among Multiple Organizations Is Sometimes Ineffective

Despite the numerous efforts at coordination—early planning, donor conferences, and other field representation—the United Nations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and donor nations face difficulties in effectively working together on the ground. Part of the problem results from the multiple independent agencies in the country, each with its own mandates, funding, and priorities. This can create a variety of problems on the ground.

In Sierra Leone, for example, officials of several agencies commented that efforts to coordinate the work of numerous development and humanitarian agencies were not effective. One donor agency official described donor efforts to work together as chaotic. Donor officials and Sierra Leone government representatives stated that neither the government nor the United Nations has an adequate system to track the amount and the impact of external aid, especially aid provided through nongovernmental organizations. Nor did any organization have the overall authority to direct the work of donors and thereby avoid duplication or overlap in specific locations.

In East Timor, early efforts to coordinate U.N. peacekeeping operations with donors did not address critical needs in the governance and security areas. According to World Bank officials and assessments, U.N. officials planned activities to rebuild East Timor’s governance and security sectors largely outside of the coordinated needs assessments conducted by the international community in 1999. This situation contributed to some conflicts and hindered overall efforts. For example, one of the first World Bank projects was to help villagers in outlying regions establish local governing councils using traditional law. However, according to the Deputy Special Representative, this effort complicated outreach efforts by the peace operation, as it began establishing central government authority and providing consistent regulations throughout East Timor.

Developing Meaningful Results-Oriented Measures Poses Difficulties

The United Nations has had difficulty in developing results-oriented measures to help manage and make decisions about its peacekeeping transitions. In addition, the United Nations has not fully staffed DPKO’s Best Practices Unit, which is charged with developing tools for peacekeeping transitions, such as meaningful and quantifiable results- oriented measures of progress.

Measures of Progress Often Focus on Tasks Rather than Conditions

Although U.N. missions are using measures of progress for their operations, most measures are tasks and outputs rather than measures of underlying conditions in the country that the peace operation is to improve. For example, a U.K.-led coalition of donor nations in Sierra Leone is working to strengthen the armed forces. Some measures of progress in this area are the number of troops trained, reorganization of the armed forces, and restructuring the Ministry of Defense. (Table 2 shows some objectives and measures for security in Sierra Leone.)

According to U.K. military trainers in Sierra Leone, other measures, such as ensuring the sustainability of army deployments, are not clearly defined or taken into account. These military trainers also said that measures for this area do not provide meaningful indications of the capability of the Sierra Leone armed forces. For example, military trainers noted that while the U.N. operation focuses on such performance measures as the speed at which units can deploy, it overlooks such measures as troop discipline, loyalty to the government, and the effectiveness of unit leadership. Subsequent events revealed problems in troop discipline, loyalty, and effectiveness. The Secretary General reported in December 2002 that the armed forces were “much improved” and were effectively patrolling the country’s border. He also stated that U.N. troops were supporting army units deployed along the Liberian border. However, the Secretary General reported in March 2003 two incidents that took place in January 2003 that lowered public confidence in the security forces and exposed shortcomings in their capability and training. First, Sierra Leone army troops retreated and left behind some of their equipment when about 70 Liberian raiders attacked a village near the border. Second, a police investigation into an attack by former soldiers and civilians on an armory implicated several active-duty soldiers in a plan to destabilize the government and prevent the operation of the international tribunal.

A key objective of the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the increased capacity of the national police force to provide internal security. However, these missions use output-oriented measures. For example, in East Timor, the peace operation originally intended to train 2,830 police by 2004. However, the operation established this target using a standard European police-to-population ratio and relied on outdated population estimates. Moreover, the number of police does not measure the quality of their training and whether they are improving security in the country. In December 2002, riots occurred in the capital city, Dili, but the fully staffed police force could not restore order. In the aftermath of the riots, the United Nations resumed direct control over crowd control units, lengthened and revised its training program to incorporate more human rights and crowd control training, and increased the number of East Timor police officers by 500.

The missions also use output measures to measure progress in creating governance and restoring the economies. In Sierra Leone, the number of district officials and magistrates placed in office is a measure of progress toward consolidating state authority. In addition, U.N. analysts in Sierra Leone reported that the reestablishment of courts in many areas was having a positive impact on public attitudes toward the rule of law. However, these analysts did not indicate that evaluations of the operations of these institutions had applied any systematic measures or criteria, such as the ability of those filing suit to obtain satisfactory resolution of their cases within a reasonable period of time.

In 2002, DPKO tried to use the missions’ objectives and measures to develop results-based budgets for peacekeeping but was unable to do so. U.N. officials said that the missions’ measures were process-oriented and did not measure changes in country conditions that the peacekeeping operations were working to improve. A U.N. report in late 2002 acknowledged that it was difficult to shift from inputs and outputs to objectives and measures. Our past reports have also noted the difficulties in developing results-oriented measures.

An example drawn from a Department of Justice international assistance program could be useful, however. Justice’s framework for overseas prosecutorial training and development identifies an overall objective of strengthening judicial independence, lists several subobjectives such as decreasing corruption, lists tasks such as getting legislative approval for an anticorruption task force, and then identifies several measurable measures of progress. The measures include an output, funding for the corruption task force. They also include measures of actual results, including the percentage increases in convictions for corruption and percentage increases in public confidence in judicial honesty. Such measures help demonstrate that program objectives are being met (see table 3).

Increased regard for human rights courses on corruption and surveillance in corruption complaints filed, investigated, and leading to convictions Output measure: A tabulation, calculation, or recording of activity or effort that can be expressed in a quantitative or qualitative manner.

Outcome measure: An assessment of the results of a program compared with its objective.

Impact measure: Measures of the net effect or consequences of achieving program objectives.

United Nations Has Not Yet Developed Results-Oriented Measures of Progress

U.N. officials stated that identifying measures of progress useful in past missions would be helpful in developing results-oriented measures for future missions. Moreover, the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations stated that to develop and apply the transition strategy, his department needed to develop better measures by which to assess the progress peacekeeping operations are making in attaining sustainable peace. He also stated that developing systematic measures of results was an important task.

Despite the importance of developing results-based measures, the peacekeeping operations in East Timor; the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and, to a lesser extent, Sierra Leone have not developed these measures. Although DPKO’s revised planning process for peace operations would require mission planners to clarify long-term aims in the country and identify criteria for measuring success, the head of the DPKO military planning group stated that it would be up to the individual missions to develop results-oriented measures. Mission staff and DPKO desk officers for each of the three operations noted that they have received only general guidance on developing results-oriented measures. Moreover, they stated they lacked the staff resources necessary to develop such measures and collect the data. Status reports from the missions that we reviewed were largely narrative accounts of daily or weekly events and did not use results-oriented measures. Beginning in late 2002, DPKO and mission staff attempted to implement results-based budgeting for peacekeeping operations for fiscal year 2003-04. According to one DPKO official, however, this effort to did not succeed because peacekeeping operations staff had not made it a priority to develop results-oriented measures linked to their peacekeeping mission strategies. U.N. officials noted that DPKO and mission staff are working to develop results-oriented measures in order to implement results-based budgets for most peacekeeping operations by fiscal year 2004-05. They also indicated that the lessons learned and best practices from this planning and budget preparation process will be reflected in the 2005-06 budget. Nevertheless, DPKO has only recently begun to provide the resources necessary to develop these measures. In 2001, DPKO combined its units for policy and analysis and peacekeeping lessons learned and to create a best practices unit to systematically review the results of past U.N. peacekeeping operations and develop guidelines and general measures of progress to better plan and conduct future operations. DPKO did not provide a director for the unit until April 2003, however, nor had it fully staffed the unit as of August 2003.

State Department officials in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations are responsible for providing oversight of peacekeeping operations and budgets. For example, they monitor the progress of the 14 U.N. peacekeeping missions and track the budgetary costs, of which the United States contributes 27 percent. They also brief Congress monthly on these peacekeeping missions. According to these State officials, they have not focused on U.N. efforts to develop results-based measures. However, they follow the progress of the missions through U.N. reports and U.S. intelligence. Nonetheless, they said more systematic measures of results would be useful to monitor the progress of peacekeeping operations and would help in deciding whether they were helping a country move toward sustainable peace. They cautioned, however, that results were difficult to quantify and that the United Nations was not responsible for all aspects of rebuilding a country and helping it move toward sustainable peace.

Conclusions

The United Nations and other international stakeholders face an enormous challenge in helping countries that have been recently involved in internal conflicts and that have no rule of law or experience of accountable government transition to sustainable peace. The development of a general transition strategy for U.N. peacekeeping operations is a positive step in overcoming this challenge. The strategy takes a comprehensive and long- term view and focuses on addressing the causes of the conflict. The strategy further recognizes that the peacekeeping operation must specify results-oriented measures of progress to effectively manage operations and the withdrawal of peacekeepers.

However, the United Nations has not yet developed quantifiable results- oriented measures of progress to help the Security Council make peacekeeping transition decisions. Although the United Nations uses output measures to manage the drawdown of peacekeepers, these measures did not provide useful information about results, such as progress in improving security in Sierra Leone and East Timor. The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations has not yet developed results- oriented measures. It created a best practices unit to systematically review the results of past U.N. peacekeeping operations and develop measures of progress to plan and conduct future operations, but the unit did not have the resources necessary to begin these tasks until recently.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State; the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the United Nations. We received verbal comments from the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and written comments from the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (see app. IV). The remaining agencies did not provide comments.

The State Department generally agreed with our findings and provided technical comments and clarifications, which we incorporated where appropriate. The U.S. Agency for International Development provided technical comments, which we also incorporated where appropriate.

The United Nations also generally agreed that the report identified key issues facing peacekeeping operations. The United Nations was concerned, however, that the report (1) did not fully recognize its efforts to apply results-oriented performance measures for its operations, (2) did not acknowledge numerical measures of progress included in routine peacekeeping operations reports to headquarters, (3) did not fully explain the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in the Congo, and (4) did not reflect progress made in the Congo over the past year and a half. We have added information to the report about recent and proposed U.N. efforts to develop results-oriented performance measures. We describe in the report a number of instances where the peacekeeping operations have used numerical measures in their reporting, but these are largely measures of tasks or outputs rather than the measures of outcomes called for by the United Nations’ results-based budgeting system. The report provides an accurate portrayal of the comparatively narrow focus of mandate of the peacekeeping operation in the Congo as it pertains to U.N. efforts to develop rule of law and participatory governance. Nonetheless, the report fully explains the mandate for the operation in the Congo in table 1 and appendix II. The report also notes that in July 2003 the Security Council voted to expand the operation's mandate. However, this operation's limited focus is especially clear compared with the other two operations we examined in detail for this report. Our report discusses the progress attained in the Congo to date, but notes that it is very recent. The Congolese parties to the conflict only formed a government in late June 2003, for example, and as of September 2003, the United Nations had yet to fully execute its plans to disarm, demobilize, and repatriate Rwandan ex- combatants.

We are sending this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of State, the Administrator for the Agency for International Development, and the U.N. Secretary General. We will also make copies available to other parties on request. In addition, this report will be made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8979, or at christoffj@gao.gov. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To identify the elements of the U.N. transition strategy, we obtained and examined documentation on Security Council deliberations on peacekeeping policies and reform initiatives, including relevant reports to the council from the United Nations’ Secretary General. To obtain additional detail, we interviewed and obtained documents on planning and operational management from officials of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as well as officials in the Department of Political Affairs who are responsible for contributing to planning peace operations. We also interviewed and obtained documents from officials from other U.N. bodies, such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the U.N. Development Program, that contribute to overall U.N. efforts to restore stability in complex emergency countries. To obtain other perspectives on U.N. policies and initiatives and peacekeeping operations in general, we interviewed and/or obtained critical evaluations and analyses from government and nongovernment analysts, including officials from the U.S. mission to the United Nations; the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense; the U.S. Agency for International Development; the World Bank; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; the Henry L. Stimson Center; and others.

To assess the extent to which the United Nations is attempting to apply the strategy in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we obtained information from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the substance and status of initiatives to strengthen its operations in these countries. We reviewed efforts by this department to implement the United Nations’ commitment to applying results-based budgeting principles as a management tool. We performed fieldwork in Sierra Leone and East Timor to examine peacekeeping operations in those countries. These trips included visits to U.N. and national government military and police posts, ex-combatant reintegration centers, justice institutions, and reconstruction projects. We interviewed and obtained documentation from U.N. and host government officials, bilateral and multilateral agencies and nongovernmental organizations supporting U.N. peace efforts, and local citizens participating in or observing internationally supported programs. In conjunction with these trips, we visited and interviewed government officials in the United Kingdom and Australia, the major bilateral supporters of the peace operations in Sierra Leone and East Timor, respectively. Our work in these two countries allowed us to assess overall transition planning and actual execution of initial troop reductions, since the operations in these countries have completed substantial portions of their work and are beginning to withdraw. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we interviewed U.N. peacekeeping officials about the demobilization and reintegration programs and their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance. However, due to unsettled security conditions and the early stage of the United Nations’ activities, our fieldwork in the Congo was not as extensive as it was in Sierra Leone and East Timor.

To assess challenges faced in applying the U.N. strategy in these countries, we reviewed our own substantial body of work on peacekeeping operations over the last decade (including reviews of U.N. operations in Cambodia and the Balkans) and included discussion about relevant issues in our interviews with U.N. headquarters and field-level staff, U.S. government officials, and other experts in the United States and abroad, as previously described. Our findings regarding U.N. efforts to develop meaningful measures and criteria for assessing progress were informed by our prior work on U.S. government efforts to develop and apply similar frameworks, including efforts to apply the principles advanced by the Government Performance and Results Act. To examine whether consistent and quantifiable measures were used to assess progress, we examined progress reports sent from the U.N. missions in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations headquarters in New York between November 2002 and May 2003.

We conducted our work from October 2002 through August 2003, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: U.N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by Mission

Support the development of the East Timor Police Service (ETPS)

Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Sierra Leone

From 1991 through 2000, Sierra Leone experienced a devastating series of armed conflicts between the government and rebel groups, brought on by decades of poor governance, economic mismanagement, and corruption. The conflict was exacerbated by external support for the rebels, primarily from Liberia. The international community attempted unsuccessfully to restore peace for nearly a decade. In 1999, the government and primary rebel groups signed a peace agreement, and the United Nations deployed a peacekeeping operation to support efforts to create a sustainable peace. In 2000, international efforts to restore the peace intensified after rebels took about 500 peacekeepers hostage. The United Kingdom intervened and ultimately deployed about 5,500 troops to protect and evacuate U.K. and other nationals and to support the government and international peacekeepers. The United Nations strengthened its mandate and by 2001 had nearly tripled the size of its military force to 17,500 troops. After the rebel leader was captured in May 2000, the hostages were released or rescued, and the rebel groups were largely disarmed and demobilized. In May 2002, the former rebels participated in national elections conducted with U.N. support and characterized by observers as free and fair. The U.N. peacekeeping force currently assists the government of Sierra Leone in its efforts to maintain security and restore law and order throughout the country.

Sierra Leone, a small West African country with an estimated population in 2001 of approximately 6 million was founded as a refuge for freed slaves by the United Kingdom in the late 1800s. It has been an independent country since 1961 (see fig. 7). Although endowed with substantial mineral resources, most notably diamonds mined in the eastern portion of the country, over 80 percent of Sierra Leone’s prewar population lived in poverty.

The conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991 with a relatively small-scale revolt against the government by a group known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). With the help of Liberian faction leader (and later president) Charles Taylor, the rebels gained control of Sierra Leone’s diamond mining areas, enabling them to sustain prolonged and destructive struggle against relatively weak and divided government opposition. Independent militias and elements of the armed forces fought each other, the RUF, and West African forces deployed as peacekeepers in a series of conflicts. By the late 1990s, damage and disruption from the ongoing conflict had reduced Sierra Leone to the extent that the United Nations’ global Human Development Index ranked it last place in the world. Much of the nation’s infrastructure was destroyed, and about half of the population was displaced from their homes. Approximately 500,000 people fled the country, including an estimated 80 percent of Sierra Leone’s professionals.

Throughout the 1990s, the United Nations and other elements of the international community made a number of unsuccessful attempts to end the conflict in Sierra Leone. The Economic Community of West African States, with the support of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, attempted to achieve settlements through negotiated agreements, sponsorship of democratic elections, and military intervention. These attempts failed because of weaknesses in Sierra Leone’s civilian and military institutions, continuing rebel resistance, limitations of the international military forces operating in the country, and competing international commitments to the region. The government was overthrown by a military coup in 1992. The military relinquished power to a new president and parliament elected in February 1996, but the RUF did not participate in the elections and did not recognize the results. In November 1996, the United Nations helped negotiate a peace agreement (known as the Abidjan Accord) between the government and the RUF. This agreement was derailed when the government was overthrown in 1997 by another military coup, and the army and the RUF formed a ruling junta. The government was restored in 1998 after West African forces drove the junta from power. In January 1999, an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the government by the RUF resulted in massive loss of life and destruction in Freetown and the surrounding area.

In July 1999, the parties to the conflict signed a peace agreement (known as the Lomé Agreement because it was signed in Lomé, Togo) negotiated with the assistance of the United Nations. Under the agreement, the RUF agreed to maintain a cease-fire, transform itself into a political party, and join a government of national unity. In return, the agreement granted pardon and amnesty to all combatants, including those from the RUF, for actions before the agreement was signed. In October 1999, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone to, among other things, assist in the implementation of the Lomé Agreement, assist in the disarmament demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and monitor the cease-fire. The council’s resolution authorized the deployment of up to 6,000 military peacekeepers. Despite having signed the Lomé Agreement, RUF forces attacked population centers and engaged in a series of armed confrontations with African peacekeeping forces and, subsequently, with U.N. troops. In May 2000, the RUF took about 500 U.N. peacekeepers hostage. U.N. and other assessments concluded that insufficient military strength and other shortcomings contributed to the peacekeeping force’s inability to deter and repel RUF attacks and stabilize the country.

The hostage-taking and other incidents prompted a significant change in the United Nations’ and the international community’s approach to the crisis in Sierra Leone. The international community applied greater military and diplomatic pressure, which succeeded in overcoming RUF resistance and restoring the peace. Beginning in May 2000, the United Kingdom deployed troops to protect and evacuate U.K. and other nationals and secure the area around Freetown and the airport. This deployment boosted confidence in the government and allowed the United Nations to redeploy peacekeepers to other areas. At the same time, the United Nations began increasing the strength of its peacekeeping force in a series of steps from 6,000 to 17,500 troops. The Security Council augmented the mission’s mandate to clarify its right to self-defense and tasked it to help extend government authority throughout the country, including areas controlled by the RUF and other armed groups. In addition, Guinean armed forces defeated RUF incursions into that country, and the United Nations imposed sanctions on Liberia to reduce that country’s support for the RUF. The arrest and imprisonment of RUF leader Foday Sankoh in mid-2000 enhanced RUF cooperation.

The United Nations reported that, through May 2002, the U.N. peacekeeping operation supported the extension of government authority throughout the country, the disarmament and reintegration of ex- combatants, and the conduct of free and fair national elections. According to U.N. reports, by December 2001, U.N. troops had been deployed to all districts of Sierra Leone, and, by June 2002, government administrators and police had also been deployed to all districts with the support of the U.N. forces, the U.N. Development Program, and international groups. In January 2002, the Government of Sierra Leone, the RUF, and the United Nations declared the disarmament process complete. Having disarmed, the RUF participated as a political party in national presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2002. The U.N. operation played an important role in supporting these elections, which international and local observers characterized as free, transparent, and generally free of violence.

In the spring and summer of 2002, having achieved these basic milestones, U.N. officials began to develop plans to gradually reduce the size of the mission. In accordance with Security Council guidance, U.N. officials identified and articulated strategic goals for key areas where progress would affect the security threat facing Sierra Leone and its ability to maintain security and stability without substantial assistance from U.N. peacekeepers.

East Timor

A former Portuguese colony, East Timor experienced years of intermittent conflict following its 1975 occupation by Indonesia. Low-level international efforts to resolve this conflict were unsuccessful until 1998, when Indonesian-Portuguese negotiations finally produced agreement on a referendum to decide the territory’s political future. The ensuing vote for independence in August 1999 provoked a violent response from militias favoring integration with Indonesia. The international community intervened to end the fighting and established a U.N. transitional administration in 2000 to run the country and oversee international assistance efforts until a new national authority was elected and independence declared in May 2002. A U.N. peacekeeping operation remains in East Timor in support of the government and ongoing international efforts to create sustainable peace in the new country.

East Timor is a small country with a population ranging between 800,000 and about 1 million occupying the eastern portion of the island of Timor (see fig. 8). First colonized by Portugal in the 1500s, Timor was divided between the Netherlands and Portugal in 1859. While the Dutch side became part of Indonesia after World War II, East Timor remained under Portuguese rule. In 1975, Portugal finally withdrew and East Timor declared independence. However, armed conflict among domestic factions provided Indonesia with a pretext for occupation. For the ensuing quarter century, Indonesia conducted an unsuccessful campaign to incorporate East Timor, with intermittent warfare claiming 100,000 to 250,000 lives. By 1999, years of violence and disruption had reduced East Timor to last place among Asian countries on the United Nations’ Human Development Index.

Although the United Nations refused to recognize Indonesia’s annexation and called for self-determination for East Timor, these calls did not achieve results until the government of Indonesia changed hands in 1998 and the new administration decided to enter U.N.-mediated discussions with Portugal about the territory’s political future.

In 1999, these talks resulted in agreement to hold a popular vote on whether East Timor would accept or reject a proposal to remain affiliated with Indonesia as an autonomous entity. To ensure a free and fair referendum, the Security Council created a small observer mission, the U.N. Mission in East Timor, to monitor campaigning and voting and to oversee the result of the vote. However, Indonesia retained responsibility for maintaining peace and security. On August 30, 1999, the population voted overwhelmingly against the proposal, voting in effect for U.N. administration and eventual transition to full independence. In response, militias favoring integration with Indonesia went on a rampage with the support of elements of the Indonesian security forces, killing hundreds of people, displacing 500,000 more—many of whom fled or were forcibly removed to West Timor—and destroying much of the country’s already damaged infrastructure and housing. Those leaving included most of the country’s professional class, who were predominantly Indonesian in origin.

Despite diplomatic pressure from the Secretary General and others, Indonesian authorities did little to end the violence; Indonesian security forces in fact provided considerable support to pro-union militias. In 1999, the Secretary General noted that the potential for post-vote discord was widely acknowledged and Indonesian authorities had not done an effective job of quelling prereferendum violence. The U.N. mission then in the country, however, had not been provided with the means for taking effective action to restore stability.

In the aftermath of the violence, the United Nations authorized a series of interventions in East Timor that were intended to end the violence, create a national government, and consolidate a stable environment that would permit devolution of all responsibilities to the new national government and withdrawal of U.N. forces. In September 1999, the Security Council authorized an Australian-led international force of approximately 8,000 military personnel to intervene in East Timor, end the violence, and facilitate humanitarian operations. With Indonesian consent, this force quickly entered East Timor and restored order. About 500,000 East Timorese were displaced from their homes. About half of the displaced went to West Timor, in some cases forced to go by fleeing pro-Indonesia militiamen. The following month, the council authorized creation of the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor that would assume responsibility for maintaining security from the Australian-led force, administer an interim government, and work to develop East Timor’s capacity for self-government. In the ensuing months, the mission oversaw development of a national consultative council, began training a police force, assisted with the return of most of the refugees, helped other international organizations create the conditions for economic development, and patrolled the boundary with Indonesia. Between August 2001 and April 2002, the people of East Timor elected a constituent assembly, adopted a constitution, and elected a president.

On May 20, 2002, East Timor became an independent country, and the U.N. transitional administration turned over responsibility for governance to Timorese authorities. Recognizing this change in circumstances, the Security Council created a U.N. Mission in Support of East Timor to pursue a mandate that supports the new government as it works to establish stability and security in the country. The mission has developed implementation plans for its activities, identified security and governance “milestones” to be achieved, and developed a proposed timetable for reducing its presence in East Timor over a 2-year period, with the final withdrawal of the peacekeepers to be completed by mid-2004.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Since suffering foreign invasion and overthrow of the government in 1996- 97 and again in 1998-99, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been divided by conflict among shifting alliances of foreign and domestic armed groups, including troops from seven other countries sent to support or oppose the government. International initiatives aimed at restoring peace, including a U.N. peacekeeping operation, have made some progress since 1999, but violence continues to occur. The Security Council established a peacekeeping operation, the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in support of a 1999 peace agreement signed in Lusaka, Zambia. The parties to the agreement largely failed to meet their commitments until late 2002, making it difficult for the U.N. mission to plan a comprehensive approach to restoring stability. Foreign troops were withdrawn by May 2003, and the Congolese factions formed a transitional government in June 2003. In July 2003, the council expanded the peacekeeping operation’s mandate to assist the new government’s efforts to provide security and rule of law. In addition, the council authorized a substantial increase in the size of the peacekeeping force.

The DRC occupies the core of central Africa. Approximately equivalent in size to the United States east of the Mississippi River, the country shares borders with nine other nations and has a population of about 55 million. The country is rich in natural resources, with substantial deposits of gold, diamonds, coltan, and other minerals; ample timber; and enormous potential for hydroelectric power generation. A colony of Belgium until 1960, the new country dissolved into a multisided war shortly after declaring independence. The government of dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, in power from 1965 to 1997, eventually restored order but failed to channel the country’s considerable wealth into economic and social development. Corrupt government officials became wealthy while the population remained poor, politically disenfranchised, and willing to support opposition groups and coup attempts. The economy suffered a near-total collapse during the early 1990s. By 1997, the central government could do little to resist rebels and outside forces.

The political and economic tensions in the DRC were exacerbated by the 1994 conflict and associated genocide in neighboring Rwanda. More than 1 million ethnic Hutus fleeing Tutsi reprisals inside Rwanda became refugees in eastern DRC. Ethnic tension and fighting involving Congolese Tutsis, the army, and exiled Rwandan Hutu militias ensued, leading eventually to a 1997 uprising by domestic rebel groups that succeeded in deposing Mobutu with support from Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola. The successor government under rebel leader Laurent Kabila was challenged in 1998 by a new coalition of internal rebels and Rwandan and Ugandan troops. With support from Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sudan, and Chad, the Kabila government pushed its challengers back to eastern DRC before losing the initiative. Rwandan and Ugandan troops and their respective rebel client groups remained in control of large portions of the country (see fig. 9). According to International Rescue Committee estimates, the continuing conflict has cost more than 3 million lives since 1998.

In July 1999, the main parties to the DRC conflict agreed to honor a cease- fire and begin a national dialogue to lead to the creation of a transitional government and national elections. The Security Council authorized a U.N. peacekeeping operation to support the cessation of hostilities, oversee the withdrawal of foreign forces, and encourage talks sponsored by the United Nations and the African Union to create a new national government that included the current government and foreign-supported rebel groups in eastern DRC. The peacekeeping operation would then support the new government’s efforts to restore peace, including a timetable calling for agreement on the formation of a unified transitional government within 3 months, withdrawal of all foreign forces within 6 months, and reestablishment of state administration throughout the DRC within 9 months, that is, by April 2000.

The parties were slow to meet their commitments and were unable to implement a comprehensive plan to restore peace. The formation of a national government was also substantially delayed. The parties committed numerous violations of the cease-fire, and it was not until December 2002 that the Kinshasa government and major rebel groups from eastern Congo signed a power-sharing agreement that would permit the creation of the transitional government. Foreign troops have been slow to withdraw in part because they want to retain control of mineral resources. Rwanda withdrew its troops in late 2002, while Uganda removed the last of its units in May 2003. As of August 2003, fighting has continued among rebel militias seeking to control Ituri and other northeastern regions. In Ituri, local, ethnic militias began fighting after foreign troops vacated the area.

Since 1999, the Security Council has gradually increased the strength and mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping operation that supported the peace process. In 2001, the council authorized the mission to train police for the eastern rebel-occupied city of Kisangani and help reopen the Congo River to commercial traffic. In 2002, it inaugurated a program to disarm and repatriate ethnic Hutu militiamen and their families from the DRC to Rwanda. The council approved a number of increases in the size of the peacekeeping force, raising its authorized strength from 90 military liaisons in August 1999 to 8,700 troops by December 2002. The actual forces provided by member states to the operation have been significantly below the ceiling because the country’s unstable political environment, great size, and poor transportation network make it costly to deploy troops. Consequently, the number of U.N. troops actually deployed to the DRC totaled about 6,200 soldiers and 76 police as of June 2003. In May 2003, the council also authorized the deployment of a separate French-led force of about 1,500 international troops to the Ituri region to end fighting and restore order in the city of Bunia.

The Congolese parties to the peace agreement formed the National Unity and Transition government in June 2003. On July 28, 2003, the Security Council expanded the peacekeeping operation’s mandate to assist the government in developing a more comprehensive approach to restoring stability, including efforts to support security sector reform, elections, and the establishment of the rule of law, in coordination with other international actors. The council also authorized the mission to use force to stabilize Ituri and other northeastern regions and expanded its force level to 10,800 troops. The U.N. operation will also assume control over international forces in the Ituri region in September 2003. The new resolution extended the mission for 1 year but did not set a date for elections. However, the Secretary General suggested in May 2003 that the holding of free and fair national elections might serve as an appropriate time to end the current peacekeeping operation.

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to those named above, Ann Baker, Lynn Cothern, Martin De Alteriis, Michael McAtee, and Claire van der Lee made major contributions to this report.