Compact of Free Association: An Assessment of Current U.S. Proposals to Extend Assistance
Released: 2002-07-17T00:00:00

Letter

Background

In 1986, the United States and the FSM and the RMI entered into the Compact of Free Association. This Compact represented a new phase of the unique and special relationship that has existed between the United States and these island areas since World War II. It also represented a continuation of U.S. rights and obligations first embodied in a U.N. trusteeship agreement that made the United States the Administering Authority of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The Compact provided a framework for the United States to work toward achieving its three main goals—(1) to secure self-government for the FSM and the RMI, (2) to assure certain national security rights for all the parties, and (3) to assist the FSM and the RMI in their efforts to advance economic development and self-sufficiency. The first two goals have been met through the Compact and its related agreements. The third goal, advancing economic development and self-sufficiency, was to be accomplished primarily through U.S. direct financial payments (to be disbursed and monitored by the U.S. Department of the Interior) to the FSM and the RMI. However, economic self-sufficiency has not been achieved. Although total U.S. assistance (Compact direct funding as well as U.S. programs and services) as a percentage of total government revenue has fallen in both countries (particularly in the FSM), the two nations remain highly dependent on U.S. assistance. In 1998, U.S. funding accounted for 54 percent and 68 percent of FSM and RMI total government revenues, respectively, according to our analysis. This assistance has maintained standards of living that are artificially higher than could be achieved in the absence of U.S. support.

Another aspect of the special relationship between the FSM and the RMI and the United States involves the unique immigration rights that the Compact grants. Through the Compact, citizens of both nations are allowed to live and work in the United States as “nonimmigrants” and can stay for long periods of time, with few restrictions. Further, the Compact exempts FSM and RMI migrating citizens from meeting U.S. passport, visa, and labor certification requirements. Unlike economic assistance provisions, the Compact’s migration provisions are not scheduled to expire in 2003. In recognition of the potential adverse impacts that Hawaii and nearby U.S. commonwealths and territories could face as a result of an influx in migrants, the Congress authorized Compact impact payments to address the financial impact of migrants on Guam, Hawaii, and the CNMI.

Finally, the Compact served as the vehicle to reach a full settlement of all compensation claims related to U.S. nuclear tests conducted on Marshallese atolls between 1946 and 1958. In a Compact-related agreement, the U.S. government agreed to provide $150 million to create a trust fund. While the Compact and its related agreements represented the full settlement of all nuclear claims, it provided the RMI the right to submit a petition of “changed circumstance” to the U.S. Congress requesting additional compensation. The RMI government submitted such a petition in September 2000.

Current U.S. Compact Proposals Would Cost Billions and Create Trust Funds

Under the most recent (May 2002) U.S. proposals to the FSM and the RMI, new congressional authorizations of approximately $3.4 billion would be required for U.S. assistance over a period of 20 years (fiscal years 2004 through 2023). The share of new authorizations to the FSM would be about $2.3 billion, while the RMI would receive about $1.1 billion (see table 1). This new assistance would be provided to each country in the form of annual grant funds, extended federal services (that have been provided under the original Compact but are due to expire in 2003), and contributions to a trust fund for each country. (Trust fund earnings would become available to the FSM and the RMI in fiscal year 2024 to replace expiring annual grants.) For the RMI, the U.S. proposal also includes funding to extend U.S. access to Kwajalein Atoll for U.S. military use from 2017 through 2023. In addition to new authorized funding, the U.S. government will provide (1) continuing program assistance amounting to an estimated $1.1 billion to the two countries over 20 years and (2) payments previously authorized of about $189 million for U.S. access to Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI through 2016. If new and previous authorizations are combined, the total U.S. cost for all Compact-related assistance under the current U.S. proposals would amount to about $4.7 billion over 20 years, not including costs for administration and oversight that are currently unknown.

Under the U.S. proposals, annual grant amounts to each country would be reduced over time, while annual U.S. contributions to the trust funds would increase by the grant reduction amount. Annual grant assistance to the FSM would fall from a real value of $76 million in fiscal year 2004 to a real value of $53.2 million in fiscal year 2023. Annual grant assistance to the RMI would fall from a real value of $33.9 million to a real value of $17.3 million over the same period. This decrease in grant funding, combined with FSM and RMI population growth, would also result in falling per capita grant assistance over the funding period – particularly for the RMI (see fig. 1). The real value of grants per capita to the FSM would decrease from an estimated $684 in fiscal year 2004 to an estimated $396 in fiscal year 2023. The real value of grants per capita to the RMI would fall from an estimated $623 in fiscal year 2004 to an estimated $242 in fiscal year 2023. In addition to grants, however, both countries would receive federal programs and services, and the RMI would receive funding related to U.S. access to Kwajalein Atoll.

The U.S. proposals are designed to build trust funds that earn a rate of return such that trust fund yields can replace grant funding in fiscal year 2024 once annual grant assistance expires. The current U.S. proposals do not address whether trust fund earnings should be sufficient to cover expiring federal services or create a surplus to act as a buffer against years with low or negative trust fund returns. At a 6 percent rate of return (the Department of State’s assumed rate) the U.S. proposal to the RMI would meet its goal of creating a trust fund that yields earnings sufficient to replace expiring annual grants, while the U.S. proposal to the FSM would not cover expiring annual grant funding, according to our analysis. Moreover, at 6 percent, the U.S. proposal to the RMI would cover the estimated value of expiring federal services, while the U.S. proposal to the FSM clearly would not. At a 6 percent return, neither proposed trust fund would generate buffer funds. If an 8.2 percent average rate of return were realized, then the RMI trust fund would yield earnings sufficient to create a buffer, while the FSM trust fund would yield earnings sufficient to replace grants and expiring federal services.

Current U.S. Proposals Contain Stronger Accountability Measures and Address GAO Recommendations, Some Key Details Remain Unknown

I now turn my attention to provisions in the current U.S. proposals designed to provide improved accountability over, and effectiveness of, U.S. assistance. This is an area where we have offered several recommendations in the past 2 years. As I discuss key proposed accountability measures, I will note whether our past recommendations have been addressed where relevant. In sum, many of our recommendations regarding future Compact assistance have been addressed with the introduction of strengthened accountability measures in the current U.S. proposals. However, specific details regarding how some key accountability provisions would be carried out will be contained in separate agreements that remain in draft form or have not yet been released.

The following summary describes key accountability measures included in the U.S. proposals that address past GAO recommendations: The proposals require that grants would be targeted to priority areas such as health, education, and infrastructure. Further, grant conditions normally applicable to U.S. state and local governments would apply to each grant. Such conditions could address areas such as procurement and financial management standards. U.S. proposals also state that the United States may withhold funds for violation of grant terms and conditions. We recommended in a 2000 report that the U.S. government negotiate provisions that would provide future Compact funding through specific grants with grant requirements attached and allow funds to be withheld for noncompliance with spending and oversight requirements. However, identification of specific grant terms and conditions, as well as procedures for implementing and monitoring grants and grant requirements and withholding funds, will be addressed in a separate agreement that has not yet been released.

The U.S. proposals to the FSM and the RMI list numerous items for discussion at the annual consultations between the United States and the two countries. Specifically, the proposals require that consultations address single audits and annual reports; evaluate progress made for each grant; discuss the coming fiscal year’s grant; discuss any management problems associated with each grant; and discuss ways to respond to problems and otherwise increase the effectiveness of future U.S. assistance. In the previously cited report, we recommended that the U.S. government negotiate an expanded agenda for future annual consultations. Further, the proposals give the United States control over the annual review process: The United States would appoint three members to the economic review board, including the chairman, while the FSM or the RMI would appoint two members.

Recommendations from our 2000 report are being addressed regarding other issues. The U.S. proposals require U.S. approval before either country can pledge or issue future Compact funds as a source for repaying debt. The proposals also exclude a “full faith and credit” pledge that made it impracticable to withhold funds under the original Compact. In addition, the U.S. proposals provide specific uses for infrastructure projects and require that some funds be used for capital project maintenance.

We also recommended that Interior ensure that appropriate resources are dedicated to monitoring future assistance. While the U.S. proposals to the two countries do not address this issue, an official from the Department of the Interior’s Office of Insular Affairs has informed us that his office has tentative plans to post five staff in a new Honolulu office. Further, Interior plans to bring two new staff on board in Washington, D.C., to handle Compact issues, and to post one person to work in the RMI (one staff is already resident in the FSM). A Department of State official stated that the department intends to increase its Washington, D.C., staff and overseas contractor staff but does not have specific plans at this point.

Trust fund management is an area where we have made no recommendations, but we have reported that well-designed trust funds can provide a sustainable source of assistance and reduce long-term aid dependence. The U.S. proposals would grant the U.S. government control over trust fund management: The United States would appoint three trustees, including the chairman, to a board of trustees, while the FSM or the RMI would appoint two trustees. The U.S. Compact Negotiator has stated that U.S. control would continue even after grants have expired and trust fund earnings become available to the two countries; in his view, “the only thing that changes in 20 years is the bank,” and U.S. control should continue. He has also noted that it may be possible for the FSM and the RMI to assume control over trust fund management at some as yet undetermined point in the future.

Finally, while the departments of State and the Interior have addressed many of our recommendations, they have not implemented our accountability and effectiveness recommendations in some areas. For example, our recommendation that annual consultations include a discussion of the role of U.S. program assistance in economic development is not included in the U.S. proposals. Further, the departments of State and the Interior, in consultation with the relevant government agencies, have not reported on what program assistance should be continued and how the effectiveness and accountability of such assistance could be improved. Finally, U.S. proposals for future assistance do not address our recommendation that consideration should be given to targeting future health and education funds in ways that effectively address specific adverse migration impact problems, such as communicable diseases, identified by Guam, Hawaii, and the CNMI.

Current U.S. Proposals Also Amend Nonexpiring Immigration Provisions

I would also like to take just a moment to cite proposed U.S. changes to the Compact’s immigration provisions. These provisions are not expiring but have been targeted by the Department of State as requiring changes. I believe it is worth noting these proposed changes because, to the extent that they could decrease migration rates (a shift whose likelihood is unclear at this point), our current per capita grant assistance figures are overstated. This is because our calculations assume migration rates that are similar to past history and so use lower population estimates than would be the case if migration slowed.