Afghanistan's Path to Reconstruction: Obstacles, Challenges, and Issues for Congress
Released: 2002-09-20T00:00:00

The Situation Before September 11, 2001

Even before the current crisis, Afghanistan had suffered twenty-two years of war, which included a long Sovietoccupation,followed by civil war, and, beginning in 1996, harsh Taliban rule in most of the country. (1) With a devastated infrastructureand minimal government and social services, even basic health care and education were almost nonexistent. TheTalibanleadership focused available resources largely on maintaining internal security and seeking to eliminate the lastpockets ofethnic minority opposition in the North and Northeast. During this internal conflict, the Taliban placed restrictionsonwomen working outside the home, further aggravating levels of poverty. These factors, in combination with aseveredrought over the last three years, produced enormous human suffering in Afghanistan.

As of September 10, 2001, according to UNHCR, nearly four million Afghans (out of a total population of about 26million) were refugees - two million in Pakistan, one and a half million in Iran, as well as others in Russia, India,theCentral Asian Republics, Europe, and elsewhere. In addition, as of September 10th, nearly one million otherAfghans wereinternally displaced persons (IDPs) uprooted by drought and conflict. (2) Atthat time U.N. agencies were searching for waysto help five million of the most vulnerable Afghans, i.e., those in critical need of food and shelter. For IDPs thismeantproviding assistance close to where they lived to help them return to their own homes.

United Nations (U.N.) agencies, working in coordination with the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) andU.N. Organization for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), include the U.N. High Commissioner forRefugees(UNHCR), U.N. Development Program (UNDP), U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program (WFP),U.N.Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and U.N. Mine Action Service (UNMAS). International organizationssuch asthe International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and numerous international nongovernmental organizations(NGOs)such as Oxfam and Save the Children have also provided relief inside Afghanistan and in refugee camps inneighboringcountries. (3)

The United States has been the largest provider of humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan through itscontributions to the UNHCR, other agencies, and NGOs. From 1994 until just recently, the United States did nothave aUnited States Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Afghanistan. (4) U.S. aid was provided mainlythrough U.N. agencies and NGOs. Via the WFP, the United States provided more than 80% of all food shipmentstoAfghanistan during the last fiscal year and more than 47% this year. (5)

Key Developments Since September 11, 2001

The humanitarian situation deteriorated even further following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in theUnitedStates. The U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, "Operation Enduring Freedom,"beganon October 7, 2001. Within two months, by early December, many of the Taliban strongholds had collapsed. Fearsofgetting caught up in U.S. attacks against the Taliban triggered Afghan population flights from major cities bothtowardrural areas and the country's borders with Iran and Pakistan, despite the risk posed by land mines and unexplodedmunitions. Although some humanitarian efforts continued during the height of the anti-Taliban war, mostinternationalrelief staff also left, making the provision of assistance more complicated. Still, food relief efforts can be creditedwithpreventing a widely-feared famine last winter.

Political Framework

The Bonn Conference and Interim Government. An interim governmentwas formed on December 22, 2001 following a meeting in Bonn, Germany. Led by Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun leader,thenew Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) presided over the beginnings of transition to recovery and reconstruction.Itruled for nearly six months before the Afghan lloya jirga , or grand assembly, took place in June. TheBonn Agreementalso outlined a basic three-year framework for establishing a functioning government and essential institutions inAfghanistan along with immediate security measures to be taken.

The Lloya Jirga and Transitional Government. Former King Zahir Shahopened the emergency lloya jirga , which was attended by 1,550 delegates and which chose a newgovernment to runAfghanistan over the next two years until a new constitution is drafted and elections are held. The first phase of the lloyajirga process got underway on April 15 when several hundred tribal leaders gathered to select districtrepresentatives. ByJune each of Afghanistan's 381 districts had convened assemblies (shuras) to select district representatives. At the lloyajirga Karzai was chosen to lead the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA). The newcabinet had areduced Northern Alliance representation and established regional leaders as vice presidents. The former King doesnothold a formal position in the government. The lloya jirga concluded on June 19 without establishinga parliament.

Plans for Security

The International Security Assistance Force. As a result of the BonnConference a U.N. mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was installed in Afghanistan inDecemberwith 4,500 peacekeepers drawn from 19 countries. Until June it was led by the British (Operation Fingal). (6) Now underTurkish command, it continues to operate in Kabul and immediate surrounding areas. Its mission is to assist thenew ITGAwith the provision of security and stability in Kabul, dispose of mines and unexploded ordinance, and eventuallytrainsoldiers for an Afghan army. The Kabul airport is open for military flights. Separate from ISAF, the total numberof U.S.military personnel on the ground is roughly 7,000 with a focus on logistics, airlifts, and intelligence. U.S. troopsandpersonnel, along with the British and other coalition troops, are continuing the war effort against Taliban and AlQaedaremnants.

The Afghan National Army. Part of the current security plan includes setting up an Afghan National Army (ANA) for border control and stability. Under consideration is the size of themulti-ethnic army (the latest numbers being discussed are 60,000-80,000), which armed forces would be involvedintraining, and how the ANA would work with the international forces already in place. As the first units are expectedtofinish training in 18 months, the provision of security in the interim is also under discussion. A Training Task Force(madeup of roughly 150 Special Forces troops plus any troops contributed by allied nations) has completed the initialtraining of600 Afghan enlisted soldiers and officers. It is anticipated that a total of 2,500 Afghans will be trained by the endof 2002. Apart from preparation for combat and border patrols, the Afghan forces would eventually be instructed on a setof morecomplex issues - respect for human rights, loyalty to government, and civilian-military affairs. (7) Meanwhile, UNDP issetting up a Police Trust Fund to begin making plans for a new national police force.

Renewed Diplomatic Ties

In addition to the United States, a number of countries have reopened their embassies in Kabul. Ambassador JamesDobbins was U.S. Envoy to the Northern Alliance from November 2001 to April 2002 and helped coordinatereconstruction efforts. The new U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan is Robert Finn. The current Special Envoy toAfghanistanis NSC Senior Director for the Near East Zalmay Khalilzad. Ryan Crocker has been appointed Charge D'Affaires. TheU.N. Special Envoy is Algeria's former Foreign Minister Lakhadar Brahimi. The new Afghan government hasopened itsembassy in Washington with Ishag Shahryar as Ambassador.

The Tokyo Reconstruction Conference

The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan was held in Tokyo on January 21 and 22, 2002,and brought together the AIA and the international donor community with sixty-one countries and twenty-oneinternationalorganizations represented. This conference provided the means to focus on reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan(morebelow).

Current Operating Environment

The humanitarian needs and support required for a recovery in Afghanistan must be understood in the contextof thecontinuing vast numbers of refugees and IDPs, the variations among the regions in which they are located, and thepoliticaland security situation throughout the country. The collapsed infrastructure, rugged terrain, and extreme weather aresignificant factors with regard to access, food aid, logistics, and plans for reconstruction. With another winterapproaching,the current operating environment is complex with a number of urgent challenges. At a meeting in August, UNHCRCommissioner Lubbers and President Karzai both recognized the need now for stronger links between humanitarianandreconstruction projects so that Afghans can begin to move beyond initial reintegration to more permanentresettlement. Included in the next section are brief references to some recent initiatives under way.

Security Situation

Armed factions are continuing to feud in different parts of the country. The goals of these warlords and other elements areto try to seize local power and territory and maintain profits from drugs and smuggling. (8) Lack of security is a hugeproblem throughout the country. In Kabul, despite the protection of ISAF, there have been recent incidents ofviolencewhich only highlight the precarious atmosphere at this stage of the recovery.

IDPs and refugees caught in this situation, particularly minorities, face dire choices. If they decide to leave, they becomevulnerable and homeless; if they stay, they risk harassment and violence. Reports of human rights abuses, rape,assault, andtheft come from different areas. There is great concern about the security of aid workers delivering food andemergencycare outside Kabul. Similar reports of theft and beatings have made drivers wary and highlighted the fragileenvironmentunder which humanitarian assistance is operating. Stolen food has reportedly been distributed to local residents andmilitary units.

The security of the central government has become of critical concern. On July 6, 2002, assassins killed Haji AbdulQuadir, Vice President and Minister of Public Works in Afghanistan. On September 5, 2002, Afghan PresidentHamidKarzai narrowly escaped an attempted assassination. He had been under the protection of U.S. Special Forces sincethedeath of Haji Abdul Quadir in July.

The Central Government

Clearly related to security are questions concerning the effectiveness of the ITGA in administering the government,facilitating the implementation of recovery initiatives, and addressing broader concerns of security and terrorismthroughout Afghanistan. The ITGA faces threats to security from three potential directions.

First, the country's lack of resources have encouraged a thriving drug trade. Before the Taliban, Afghanistan's majorexport was opium. It produced 75% of the world supply. Under the Taliban, which enforced a ban on opiumcultivation in1999, according to some estimates, opium poppy cultivation dropped from 3,000 tons to 200 tons. However, thesenumbers are deceiving. It is believed that drugs continued to be a lucrative source of income both for the Talibanand theiropponents because large stockpiles built up under Taliban rule, which may well have been intended for the worldmarket,were held back as supply exceeded demand and caused a depression in price. Indeed, this spring may see the largestpoppycrop in recent years. Controlling the drug trade is a huge challenge in a country with few other resources and thepotentialfor profits from heroin on the world market. While the Karzai-led interim government has ordered a ban on theproduction,use, and trafficking of all drugs, the government has little or no power of enforcement. Sources report a recent increase incultivation linked to lawlessness and banditry on the one hand, and the great need among farmers for some formoflivelihood on the other.

Second, former combatants can have a direct impact on humanitarian assistance and recovery efforts. If local struggles forpower prevent, delay, or interrupt refugee and IDP returns, this will severely hamper any recovery efforts. Third,Afghanistan's neighbors - Pakistan, Iran, and Uzbekistan - can also play key roles, depending on whether or not theyprovide support to these local contenders for power.

Population Movements

Population movements continue in and out of and within Afghanistan. It is estimated that there are still 3 million refugees,mostly in Iran and Pakistan. The approximate number of IDPs remaining to date is roughly 750,000. The totalnumber ofpeople requiring relocation assistance is therefore still considerable. In coordination with government initiatives,UNHCR set up voluntary return programs for refugees. Tripartite Agreements on repatriation between UNHCR,Afghanistan, and the governments of Pakistan and Iran, respectively, outline the framework for the voluntary returnofAfghan refugees. UNHCR reports that since March 1, more than 1.8 million Afghan refugees have repatriatedmainly fromPakistan with some refugees (185,000) returning from Iran. Approximately 10,000 refugees from Tajikistan andTurkmenistan have also been assisted in their return. This is double the number expected by UNHCR and expectedtoclimb to 2 million by year's end. Another 230,000 IDPs have returned to their homes with the assistance of theInternational Organization for Migration (IOM).

The numbers of remaining refugees and IDPs is approximate because there is no formal registration process until they seekassistance for their return Some date back to previous wars; others are part of the latest wave. There is some"recycling" ofrefugees-those who repeatedly cross borders for economic and family reasons, flee because of crime and fighting,ormigrate because of lack of food. With no sustainable livelihood, many of these refugees are forced to seekassistance eitherwithin Afghanistan or outside its borders. There is some concern that the budget constraints UNHCR is facing(already ithas had to reduce its welcome home package) may mean inadequate levels of assistance followed by an increasein refugeescrossing back into Pakistan and Iran, repeat migration of former IDPs, or an increase in urban refugees. There isparticularconcern about the conditions within Kabul for recent arrivals choosing to resettle there and the impact on overallstabilityand security. (9)

Although the rate of return is much higher than expected, it will probably take several years for resettlement to becompleted, security permitting. Depending upon what takes place in Afghanistan, the organizations coordinatingaid toAfghanistan and the international community may be forced to further accelerate the timetable for repatriation ofrefugeesand return of IDPs or face a reduced return rate. Longer-term care in refugee camps and other measures may berequired toallow for recovery to take hold while providing life-saving measures in the form of food, security, shelter, and basicmedical care.

Winter Preparation

According to USAID, the ITGA Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA) and the ITGA Ministry for RuralReconstruction and Development (MRRD) in coordination with the U.N. Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC), U.N.agencies,and NGOs, is putting together a humanitarian assistance strategy in preparation for winter. The two-prongedapproach isdesigned to address urban issues as they affect refugees and IDPs and rural winter access issues. These discussionshaveincluded prepositioning of food and non-food supplies in inaccessible areas and a road clearance strategy. In Kabul,U.N.Habitat is conducting a survey of damaged homes to determine approximately how many families might needwinterizationassistance.

Food Security

Afghanistan has had three years of drought, although there have been periods of precipitation in different parts of thecountry. A USAID-funded assessment indicates that the drought can be expected to last another 12-18 months.Shiftingweather patterns cause mini natural disasters and reduce access to certain areas, caused housing problems at somesheltersand camps, and increase assistance and protection needs. The weather, like the terrain, is varied and harsh andcreates"pockets of need" which are difficult to reach by relief agencies.

Food insecurity is likely to continue in many parts of Afghanistan. This in turn may contribute to existing ethnic tensionsand encourage further population movements within Afghanistan or across its borders.

The U.S. strategy is to move as much food as possible into villages where people reside. In order to avoid diversion andtheft of commodities, most food has been stored in bordering countries and moved into Afghanistan by variousmeans,including trucks, pack animals, and airdrops. Free distribution and food-for-work programs direct the efforts ofable-bodied recipients into community development projects. The WFP has conducted rapid helicopter deliveriesin highlyinaccessible areas. Over six million people will continue to require targeted food assistance. The WFP says it isexpectingbreaks in its cereal pipeline this autumn and based on the current level of donor contributions, cereals may beunavailableafter December. Prepositioning food stocks is a critical part of preparing for winter.

USAID reports that there is enough improved wheat seed for the fall planting season. Lack of water is the most formidableobstacle to food production; lack of fertilizer is also a contributing factor. The FAO and WFP report that 2002 cropyieldswere increased by 82 percent over last year. The impact of drought and loss of productive assets combined withhuge debtand no source of livelihood continue to make food security a high priority.

Environment and Infrastructure

Afghanistan's environment has also been severely compromised by the war and drought, which has had direct bearing notonly on the planting season, livestock production, and agricultural recovery, but more short-term concerns as well. Aninadequate supply of water has an impact on basic human needs, such as health, consumption, and shelter (buildingbrickhouses requires water). Dried-up wells, poor irrigation practices, and lack of overall water management systemsare criticalfactors. Water shortages are a huge problem as there is not enough water for returnees. Deforestation, lack ofenergy, andpoor infrastructure, including roads and bridges, are also significant factors that present formidable obstacles toreconstruction. The rebuilding of roads, so critical to reconstruction, is now underway. Other projects such as thedrillingof wells, the constructing and repairing of irrigation and water-supply systems, and the repair and maintenance ofwaterpumping systems are also being initiated.

The U.N. Environment Program (UNEP) recently began a survey of environmental damage throughout Afghanistan. TheUNEP Afghanistan Task Force has put together five teams of scientists and experts who will conduct a fact-findingmissionover the next several months. Their mission is to assess the impact of 30 years of conflict on the environment. Thenews isnot encouraging. It is estimated that Afghanistan has lost 30 percent of its forests since 1979 and that its rangelands,watershed, and agricultural areas have also been seriously compromised by "military activities, refugee movements,theoverexploitation of natural resources, and a lack of management and institutional capacity." (10) Less than 1 percent of theland is protected. Three years of drought have only further exacerbated these problems.

The rebuilding of Afghanistan will have to include the clean up of contaminated sites, sustainable rural development andmanagement of natural resources, and the revival of wildlife and ecosystems. Protection of the environment willimproveliving conditions for the Afghan people and enhance job creation. In the longer term, the UNEP Afghanistan TaskForceplans to determine management strategies, build local capacity through projects and training, develop an institutionalframework, and improve compliance with international environmental agreements.

Almost every basic humanitarian need has an environmental component that will continue to be important for theforeseeable future and will require careful planning in the transition to reconstruction. For example, the restorationofelectric power either could involve rebuilding conventional, dirty diesel and oil power plants or constructingdistributed,clean micro turbines to provide electricity and heat, and the development of wind and solar energy. The provisionof cleanwater could be improved with the reconstruction of wells, development of efficient irrigation systems, andmonitoring ofwater quality. Innovative sanitation and waste treatment facilities could be designed to reduce risks to human healthandultimately destruction to the environment.

Land Mines

Land mines remain a huge problem throughout Afghanistan. Afghanistan is believed to have one of the worst mine andunexploded ordnance problems in the world, with 5-7 million still littered about the country. The Land MineMonitorestimates that of 724 million square meters of contaminated land, over half, 344 million square meters is classifiedashigh-priority land for agriculture. With over 80% of the Afghan population relying on agriculture for its livelihood,this isa substantial obstacle not only to refugee and IDP returns, but to the basic recovery and reconstruction plans as well.

The ITGA acceded to the Ottawa Convention, which bans landmines, on July 29. As part of the effort to bring attention tothe issue, mine awareness sessions are being added to the education curriculum and being conducted within IDPcamps atborder crossing points.

Health Sector

The WHO, UNICEF, regional health officials, health-related U.N. agencies, and key NGOs are assisting the AfghanMinistry of Health and discussing ways to rebuild the almost non-existent public health services. According toUSAID,Afghanistan's public health facilities cover roughly 12% of what is needed. The system ranks 173rdworldwide. (11) Issuesto be covered range from the provision of quality health care, increasing the supply of pharmaceuticals, to healthcareaccess for millions of Afghans. A meeting in March outlined an agenda for reconstruction of the health sector. There havebeen reports of outbreaks of influenza, scurvy, and malaria in several parts of Afghanistan. Tuberculosis is alsoconsideredto be a growing problem. Significant health impacts which are symptoms of much larger problems include heroinaddiction and landmine injuries. The Afghan Ministry of Public Health, WHO, and UNICEF conducted a polioimmunization campaign in early September for nearly six million children under the age of five. In preparation forwinter,WHO plans to provide supplies to government clinics in the Central area that are not receiving NGO support. WHOwillalso initiate mobile health services. For children and infants, particular attention will be paid to Acute RespiratoryInfection.

Education and Community Development

The education system, particularly for women and girls, requires a great deal of assistance if schools are to function witheven the most basic infrastructure and tools in the upcoming school year. The University of Nebraska-Omaha (UNO)Center for Afghan Studies, working with USAID, published over 10.6 million textbooks for Afghan students bymid-April2002. Children have returned to school, despite very poor conditions in many of the schools. The emphasis onrevampingthe educational system paid particular attention to the role of women and girls, as teachers and students respectively.

UNO's project, America's Rapid Response to Education needs in Afghanistan (ARRENA) project supports educationalcapacity-building, teacher training, primary, secondary and vocational education in Afghanistan. (12) Other projects areunderway to rebuild schools. An assessment is being conducted by USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)todesign a strategy for building political stability, particularly through community-based programming. Income generationthrough "food for work" and "cash for work" programs are viewed as important mechanisms for Afghans to increasetheirincome and meet daily food requirements, while making a start on reestablishing themselves within the community.

In addition, through the International Organization for Migration (IOM) the Afghanistan Emergency Information Projectprovides a daily humanitarian information bulletin for radio broadcast. Up to 30,000 radios were distributed in thespringto vulnerable segments of the Afghan population. An agreement with Voice of America expanded the project'sregionalcapacity and increased its special broadcasts on important information pertaining to the relief effort.

The International Response

U.S. Humanitarian Assistance

According to USAID, during FY2001 the U.S. government provided $184.3 million in humanitarian assistance toAfghanistan ranging from airlifts of tents and blankets to assistance with polio eradication, from tons of wheat tocropsubstitution assistance for poppy growers. On October 4, 2001, President Bush announced that the United Stateswouldprovide $320 million for FY2002 in U.S. humanitarian assistance to Afghans both inside and outside Afghanistan'sborders. Multiple U.S. agencies are providing some form of humanitarian assistance, including USAID/Office ofForeignDisaster Assistance (OFDA), USAID/Food For Peace (FFP), Democracy & Governance (USAID/DG), UnitedStatesDepartment of Agriculture (USDA), Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration(State/PRM),Department of State's Demining Program, the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and LawEnforcement Affairs (State/INL), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Department ofDefense(DOD).

U.S. humanitarian assistance covers a wide variety of aid, services, and projects. As of mid-September, the United Stateshas provided over $509 million in FY2002 Afghan humanitarian assistance directly through government agenciesor as a result of grants to international organizations and NGOs, which goes well beyond the original commitment of $320million. (13)

Through the Afghan Interim Authority Fund coordinated by UNDP, donor support is being provided directly to theoperations and activities of the ITGA. Humanitarian assistance from other countries has also been forthcomingsinceOctober 2001. In May 2002 the World Bank resumed its operations in Afghanistan. While exact figures are difficulttoascertain, both bilateral and multilateral donors have made contributions toward immediate and transitionalassistanceprograms. (14)

Transitional Assistance and Reconstruction

International Conference on Reconstruction. UNDP and World Bankofficials estimate that the reconstruction of Afghanistan will require $1.7 billion in the first year, $10 billion over5 years,and $15 billion in the next decade. Others argue these numbers may be low, and put the overall cost at closer to $30billion.

The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan held in Tokyo on January 21 and 22, 2002 (15) gave the then AIA a chance to demonstrate its commitment to the next phase of Afghanistan's recovery and theinternational donor community an opportunity to come together and formally demonstrate support for this initiative. Thesixty-one countries and twenty-one international organizations represented pledged $1.8 billion for 2002. The U.S.government alone pledged $297 million. The cumulative total was $4.5 billion, with some states making pledgesover multiple years and commitments of different time frames. Some countries offered support in kind but with nomonetaryvalue. See table below.

Table 1. Pledges from the Tokyo Reconstruction Conference (U.S. $ - millions)

Source: The New York Times , January 22, 2002.

The U.S. contribution is just under 25%, about on par with the U.S. share of funding in the United Nations and the WorldBank. (16) The United States hopes that other nations will carry a greaterportion of the costs for reconstruction andpeacekeeping since it has paid for most of the military campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. By comparison,the EUpledged the euro equivalent of $495 million for 2002, which comes to nearly 30% of the assessed need and amountpledgedat the conference. Within this pledge the European Commission also approved an Initial Recovery Program forAfghanistan.

There have been some reports that Afghanistan officials have complained about the slow pace at which pledged funds werebeing paid. In a similar vein, the United States has been critical of some its allies, in particular the Europeans, fornotmeeting their "fair share" of the cost of recovery and for not doing enough on a multilateral level. On the one hand,determining the "fair share" of the costs of reconstruction for any one country or group of countries varies fromconflict toconflict and depends in part on the resources being spent on conflicts elsewhere. On the other hand, the way inwhichfunds are distributed - be it multilaterally through U.N. agencies or bilaterally with funds supporting internationalorganizations and NGOs directly - appears to be at issue in Afghanistan. One argument is that since greaterprotection isgiven to refugees and IDPs under the mandate of the UNHCR (as opposed to a specific NGO) donors should givemultilaterally.

U.S. Reconstruction Assistance. The U.S. pledge to assist the people ofAfghanistan in 2002 is broken down as follows:

Table 2. U.S. Programs to Assist the People of Afghanistan (U.S.$ - millions)

Source: The U.S. Department of State, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, January 28, 2002

All funds for the U.S. pledge of $297 were drawn from existing sources-either from the $40 billion Emergency TerrorismResponse supplemental ( P.L. 107-38 ) that was passed shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks or from regularFY2002appropriations. The FY2002 supplemental provided additional funds. The U.S. allocation covers humanitarianneeds(food relief, refugee assistance) and transition-to-reconstruction initiatives (development assistance, communityprograms,quick impact projects). Assistance requirements cover a wide range of tasks due to the extreme conditions andcomplexityof the operating environment in Afghanistan. As such, these initiatives can be viewed along parallel, but integrated,tracksrather than the more usual progression over time from one stage to another.

The new Afghan government has access to funds from other sources as well. According to the State Department, inJanuary 2002, a $50 million line of credit to finance U.S. projects was granted by the Overseas Private InvestmentCorporation. The Department of Labor will also make available $3 million to implement job programs.

In addition to the $297 million in U.S. government funds, the United States has freed up assets frozen when the Talibanregime was in power, including $193 million of gold in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and $24.9 millionin cash. The Afghan government also has access to an additional $49.3 million, including $25 million in other AfghanCentral Bankaccounts; $23 million held by the International Transport Association (for overflights of Afghanistan); and $1.3millionfrom Ariana Afghan Airlines. (18) In May 2002, President Bush grantedAfghanistan "Most Favored Nation" status.

U.S. Legislation

FY2002 Emergency Supplemental. Both the House and the Senateproposed higher aid levels for Afghanistan reconstruction and security funding than the President's $250 millionrequest. (19) The FY2002 Supplemental ( P.L. 107-206 , H.R. 4775 ) did not set a specific amount for Afghanistan, but itappears that amounts for economic and refugee aid are likely to be at least $54 million more than proposed, notincludingfunding for narcotics programs or military assistance. The legislation directs the executive branch to report onAfghanistansecurity and delivery of assistance within 30 days of enactment. The FY2002 supplemental assistance is in additionto the$297 million in FY2002 funding previously allocated.

Appropriations for FY2003. No figures were provided in theAdministration's request for Afghanistan for FY2003, although the Administration has told Congress that its requestincluded about $140 million, $98 million of which would come from Foreign Operations appropriations accounts.TheSenate version of the FY2003 foreign aid appropriations ( S. 2779 , S.Rept. 107-219 ) recommends a slightlyhigher level, $157 million for Afghanistan, and the House version ( H.R. 5410 ) recommends almost doubletherequest, $295.5 million.

On September 12, 2002, the Administration pledged an additional $80 million for road reconstruction, but did not identifywhere the funds would be found.

The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002. In December 2001, H.R. 3427 , to provide assistance for the relief and reconstruction of Afghanistan, and for other purposes, wasreferred to the House International Relations Committee. The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002( H.R. 3994 ) would provide reconstruction aid to Afghanistan over four years. The bill focuses on creatingastable environment for Afghanistan, addressing such issues as counternarcotics, terrorism, and enforcement, thecoordination of U.S. efforts (given its multiple-agency involvement) and humanitarian and relief assistance. Thebill wasintroduced on March 14 by House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry Hyde and later co-sponsoredwithRanking Member Tom Lantos, and Middle East Subcommittee Chairman Benjamin Gilman and Ranking DemocratGaryAckerman. The Committee adopted three amendments and approved the bill by voice vote following markup onMarch 20,2002. On April 25, it was reported (Amended) by the Committee on International Relations ( H.Rept. 107-420 ) andplacedon the House Calendar (No. 250). On May 15, the Rules Committee resolution ( H.Res. 419 ) was agreed tointhe House. On May 21, the House passed H.R. 3994 by a vote of 407 to 4. The bill authorizes $1.15 billionfor the period FY2002-05 for reconstruction and military assistance for Afghanistan.

A Senate version of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, S. 2712 , was introduced by Senator Chuck Hagelon July 9, 2002, and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Hagel offered a substituteamendment to S. 2712 . Three amendments were offered to the substitute. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee agreedby unanimous voice vote to order the bill reported, as amended on August 1. The amended bill includes a Sense ofCongress that calls for an expanded ISAF with an authorization of an additional $1 billion over two years. It also increasesthe authorization for recovery assistance to $2.5 billion over four years ($2 billion for humanitarian and economicassistance from FY2002-FY2005 and $500 million for an enterprise fund to encourage private sector developmentand jobcreation.) As with H.R. 3994 , the bill authorize $300 million in drawdown authority for military and securityassistance to Afghanistan and to certain other countries. "The intent of Congress is to authorize up to $3.8 billion[overfour years] in new money and not to draw money from a static pool of international aid." (20)

The main differences between the two versions appear to be in the amount and time frame of funds authorized; issues ofstatutory authority and congressional notification; specific programmatic difference in matters such as militarydrawdownauthority, funds for an enterprise fund, and eligibility for assistance (foreign countries and internationalorganizations);scope and size of U.S. participation in the ISAF; and

requirements with respect to U.S. personnel involvement in poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.

Issues and Questions for Congress

Security

If reconstruction is to be a success, most observers believe it must occur in a secure environment without threat to the newgovernment and initiatives on the ground. As U.S. troops make headway on finishing the Afghan phase of the war,thereare many questions about ensuring a secure environment for reconstruction. Extending past Kabul for reasons ofsecurity,aid distribution, and reconstruction initiatives, and the credibility of the ITGA is critical. Can peace occur withoutU.S.involvement in the peacekeeping effort? How involved will the U.S. troops be in assembling and training an Afghanarmy? What role should the United States play in drug enforcement and the war on terrorism inside Afghanistan?

Many believe a peacekeeping force is essential and the United States must be part of such a force. Until recently, the BushAdministration has been adamant that it will not take part in a peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. However, theU.N. hascalled for more foreign troops to disarm various groups and control warlords. The recent upsurge in conflictsuggests thepossibility that the U.S. decision may be reconsidered. Under the current mandate, peacekeepers are in Kabul andhave noimpact outside the capital. Some argue that the ISAF is too small and too limited to be effective. Amid discussionaboutthe type of peacekeeping force required has been the question of how long peacekeepers will be required to stay.

There remain the twin evils of drugs and terrorism, inextricably linked, but requiring different forms of intervention andenforcement. Moreover, in addition to cracking down on the problem itself, alternative forms of livelihood arecritical,such as crop substitution, community projects, and other programs to benefit those directly involved in theseactivities.

Central Government

Critical to Afghanistan's recovery in the short term and stability in the long term is the credibility and effective functioningof its government. Moreover, the ITGA is facing the critical need for economic revitalization, accounting andbankingmechanisms, and debt relief for the average Afghan. It must be able to pay regularly the salaries of its police, armyofficers,and public employees. It is crucial that it be able to extend its governmental institutions outside Kabul. What rolewill theUnited States continue to play in helping to build administrative capacity in the form of a national government andinstitutional development? What is the United States currently doing to help the Afghan government function andpreparefor its next phase?

Oversight and Coordination of Aid Projects

In order to keep the support of the international community, reconstruction efforts need to demonstrate the effective use offunds and their distribution. What is the United States doing to make sure aid is being spent wisely? What role istheUnited States playing to facilitate international collaboration on oversight and coordination of aid projects? Howis theUnited States coordinating its various agencies participating in reconstruction efforts?

From coordination mechanisms to a system of accountability, future donations in Afghanistan depend on the way in whichcurrent funds are used and whether they reach those for whom they are intended. Although the work of the U.N.,international organizations, NGOs, and governments will be critical, the sheer number of actors on the ground createsomeconcerns about aid assistance and how projects will be managed and coordinated.

Few rules exist about how donor money is to be spent. Moreover, the lack of experience by the ITGA coupled with itsmany competing priorities (not least of which is that a financial infrastructure is not yet in place), mean thatassistance andguidance on monetary matters (including agreements with lenders and contributions by donors) by the internationalcommunity remain critical.

Recently, a new structure to manage the international assistance effort was put in place. The Program Secretariat Structure(PSS) is designed to replace the "Lead Agency" approach seen in other complex humanitarian emergencies. It ismeant tohold U.N. agencies and international organizations accountable within their sectors of responsibility. It is also partof abroader effort to include Afghan organizations in the recovery and reconstruction effort which will be important forthetransfer of responsibilities and capabilities in the future.

A number of U.S. agencies are involved in the relief and recovery effort in Afghanistan. Important to the overall understanding of the U.S. role in Afghanistan are the coordination mechanisms in place for this wide range ofagencies inits day-to-day activities on the ground and in Washington and the ability to track overall spending by the USG.

Evaluating Aid Priorities

As nine months have passed since many of the Taliban stongholds collapsed and the international community began therelief and recovery effort in earnest, what does a report card on Afghanistan reveal? What are the most criticalobstacles tofurthering the goals of assistance and reconstruction? Has the international community's assessment of what it willtake forAfghanistan's recovery changed in terms of time and funding required?

So far, there is little development-type aid in the U.S. pledge, although some is focused on quick impact programs,long-term agriculture, women and children, and education. Is it any clearer where the United States shouldconcentrate itsaid priorities and efforts? With what level and mix of assistance?

Burdensharing

There have been reports that the United States is providing more than its share of the multilateral relief and reconstructioneffort. The European allies, in particular, have been sited as not providing enough support, and even then, spendingtheirmoney directly through European NGOs. These organizations are usually outside the protection regime availablethroughmultilateral agencies such as the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Why have foreign donors been slow tocome upwith the necessary funds? Is the problem related to bureaucracy in Europe or are there impediments in Afghanistanitselfthat make donors reluctant to give immediately?

Women and Children

The Taliban treatment of women and restrictions it imposed not only severely curtailed the work force, but reducedwomen's basic rights, education, and access to health. On December 12, 2001 Congress passed the Afghan WomenandChildren Relief Act of 2001 ( S. 1573 , P.L. 107-81 ) to address some of these concerns. A Ministry ofWomen's Affairs has been established within the ITGA. Schools reopened in Afghanistan in March 2002 and girlsreturnedto the classroom for the first time since the Taliban came to power. How much impact will this legislation have onreconstruction initiatives specifically focused on women and children? To what extent will their needs be a primarypointof focus in aid distribution and the recovery effort? What are the barriers to the implementation of women'sprojects?

Collateral Damage

Extensive press coverage from the bombing campaign in Afghanistan revealed that there have been a number of innocentvictims of erroneous U.S. bombings. While the hunt for the Taliban and Al Qaeda continues, the potential formistakentargets remains a risk. In recent months claims of erroneous bombing targets have raised the question of victimcompensation and U.S. responsibility and also highlighted the difficulty of intelligence gathering and securityproblems onthe ground. Although statutes and legislation exist to protect victims of war, these are typically worked out on acase-by-case basis. The issue is blurred by the recognition that the end result may not be a matter of simple humanerror,but rather a complex combination of factors for which it is more difficult to determine responsibility. Collateraldamage includes civilian losses, considered to be a by-product of war, despite efforts to minimize innocent civiliancasualties. Language in the FY2003 Senate Foreign Operations bill refers to Afghan civilians suffering injury from militaryoperationsand recommends assistance that is available under the Patrick Leahy War Victims Fund be used to provide"rehabilitationand related assistance." Should legislation be developed specifically for Afghan citizens who are victims ofcollateraldamage? How should individuals be compensated either for injury or death of a family member? Under whatcircumstances? Should a separate fund be made available to these victims and who should administer it?

Table 3. International Security Assistance Force ParticipatingCountries as of July 31,2002

Source: UN Security Council, Monthly Report on the Operations of the ISAF, August 16, 2002.