United Nations Reform: Background and Issues for Congress
Released: 2015-05-15T00:00:00

Introduction

United Nations (U.N.) reform is an ongoing policy issue for the United States, and may continue to be an area of focus during the 114 th Congress. As the single largest financial contributor to the U.N. system, the U.S. government has an interest in ensuring the United Nations operates as efficiently and effectively as possible. Congress has the responsibility to appropriate U.S. funds to the United Nations and can impose conditions on payments. On several occasions, it has sought to link U.S. funding of the United Nations to specific reform benchmarks.

Since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, U.N. member states and past secretaries-general have repeatedly attempted to reform the organization. These reform efforts tend to be cyclical, with member states considering waves of new reform proposals every 5 to 10 years. The reform attempts are often initiated by a member state, groups of member states, and/or the current Secretary-General. They have generally focused on three areas of concern: (1) perceived inefficiencies and lack of accountability in the U.N. Secretariat; (2) duplication and redundancy of U.N. mandates, missions, and/or programs; and (3) evidence of fraud, waste, abuse, and/or mismanagement of U.N. resources.

Proposed reforms often reflect the political, economic, and cultural climate of the time. In the 1950s and 1960s, member states focused on increasing membership on the U.N. Security Council and the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to account for growing U.N. membership. In the 1970s, as the economic and political gap between developed and developing countries grew more pronounced, the General Assembly examined structural changes that would help the United Nations address "problems of international economic co-operation." Due in part to pressure from the United States, U.N. reform initiatives in the 1980s and early 1990s addressed financial and structural issues, with a particular focus on decision-making processes related to the U.N. regular budget, which funds core U.N. activities. Since the early 2000s, reform efforts have been driven by a combination of U.N. budgetary and financial challenges, controversy over mismanagement of the Iraq Oil-For-Food Program, perceived ineffectiveness of U.N. human rights mechanisms, and allegations of sexual abuse committed by U.N. staff and peacekeepers, among other issues.

This report examines reform priorities from the perspective of several key actors, including Members of Congress, the Obama Administration, selected member states, the U.N. Secretary-General, and a cross-section of groups tasked with addressing U.N. reform during the past 10 to 15 years. It also discusses congressional actions related to U.N. reform and mechanisms for implementing reform, as well as possible challenges facing U.S. policymakers as they consider existing and future U.N. reform efforts.

Selected Reform Efforts: 2005-Present

In 2005, U.N. reform efforts gained momentum as heads of state and government met for a World Summit at U.N. Headquarters in New York. The Summit Outcome Document, which was adopted by consensus, laid the foundation for a series of reforms that included improving U.N. management structures; strengthening the Security Council (see text box ); enhancing U.N. system coordination and coherence; and creating a new Human Rights Council (see text box ). Since the World Summit, U.N. member states have worked toward implementing these reform initiatives with varied results. Some reforms are stalled or have not been addressed, while others are underway or completed. Selected reform activities include the following:

The long-term impact of these and other recent activities remains to be seen. The overall success of these efforts—and any future reform efforts—depends on how effectively the United Nations and its member countries manage and follow through on the implementation of these reforms and how, if at all, they work to correct possible weak nesses or issues that may arise over time.

Congress and U.N. Reform

Generally, Congress supports the United Nations and its overall mission. It authorizes and appropriates U.S. funds to the organization each year and often uses U.N. mechanisms to further U.S. foreign policy objectives. Congress can also be critical of the United Nations—especially when some Members believe that it may not be running as effectively as it could be. In such instances, Congress may use a wide range of legislative tools to influence and direct U.S. policy at the United Nations. Placing financial conditions or limits on U.S. funding to the United Nations, described in more detail below, is a common congressional approach to U.N reform. Other tools may include considering "sense of the Congress" resolutions; holding hearings to investigate U.N. programs or oversee Administration policies; and considering U.S. nominations for U.N. posts.

U.S. Funding as a Mechanism for U.N. Reform

In the past, Congress has used its authority to limit U.S. funds to the United Nations as a mechanism for influencing U.N. policy. In some cases, Congress withheld a proportionate share of funding for U.N. programs and policies of which it did not approve. It has, for instance, withheld funds from regular budget programs, including the U.N. Special Unit on Palestinian Rights and the Preparatory Commission for the Law of the Sea. Currently, the only proportionate U.S. withholding from the regular budget is for some activities and programs related to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or entities associated with it. Since FY2012, the United States withheld funding from the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) due to member states' October 2011 decision to admit "Palestine" as a member (see text box ).

The overall impact of withholding a proportionate share of assessed payments depends on the origin of the program's funding. If a program is funded by the U.N. regular budget and the United States withholds a proportionate share of its normal contributions, the cost of the program will most likely be covered by surplus regular budget funds. Some U.N. programs are funded from several budgets that may include the U.N. regular budget, specialized agency budgets, and separate conference and administrative budgets. Because of this, it may be more difficult for U.S. proportionate withholdings to have a significant impact because the program's funding comes from several sources. In such cases, a U.S. withholding would have little or no immediate impact on the program's operation or funding levels. If the United States withholds funds from a program funded primarily by member state contributions, however, the impact of the United States withholding or suspending contributions could be greater.

In addition to withholding a proportionate share of U.S. funding, Congress may consider enacting legislation decreasing or increasing U.S. assessment levels or linking payment of U.S. arrears to policies it favors. In October 1993, for example, Congress directed that the U.S. payments of peacekeeping assessments be capped at 25% (lower than the assessment level set by the United Nations). Congress has also used this strategy to further its U.N. reform policies. Enacted legislation such as the Helms-Biden Agreement linked U.S. assessment levels and the payment of U.S. arrears to reform benchmarks (see Appendix A for more information on legislation). As noted in the previous text box , some current Members of Congress have proposed shifting U.S. funding from assessed to voluntary contributions.

Perspectives on Linking U.S. Funding to U.N. Reform

Opponents of linking U.S. funding to progress on U.N. reform are concerned that doing so may weaken U.S. influence at the United Nations, thereby undercutting the United States' ability to conduct diplomacy and make foreign policy decisions. Some argue that withholding U.S. assessed payments to the United Nations infringes on U.S. treaty obligations and alienates other U.N. member states. Opponents also note that withholding U.S. funds could have an impact on diplomatic relations outside of the U.N. system. Additionally, some contend that U.N. reform legislation proposals may be unrealistic because the scope and depth of reforms required by the legislation cannot be adequately achieved in the proposed time frames.

Supporters of linking U.S. funding to specific reforms argue that the United States should use its position as the largest U.N. financial contributor to push for the implementation of policies that lead to comprehensive reform. They note that despite diplomatic and political pressures from many countries, the United Nations has been slow to implement substantive reform. Advocates also argue that some previously implemented reforms have proved to be ineffective. They believe that tying U.S. funding to U.N. reform may motivate countries to find common ground on divisive issues. They also emphasize that past legislation that threatened to cut off U.S. funding of the United Nations (such as the Kassebaum-Solomon amendment, described in Appendix A ) was effective, and led to substantive changes in U.N. operations and programs.

Possible Instruments for Furthering U.S. Reform Policy

Congress's influence over U.S. funding of the United Nations is a powerful tool for furthering U.S. reform policy at the United Nations. However, there may be other strategies for Congress to consider when advocating its reform agenda. These strategies have been widely used by many past and current Members of Congress and Administrations, and include, but are not limited to:

Resolutions —Members of Congress may propose and/or enact simple or concurrent resolutions expressing an opinion, fact, or principle in one or both chambers of Congress. Some Members have used these resolutions to voice an opinion about U.S. policy in the United Nations/or the United Nations itself. Working with the U.N. Secretary-General —Some previous and current Members of Congress and Administrations have worked to earn the support of U.N. secretaries-general to help advocate their positions. Developing a relationship with the chief administrative officer of the United Nations can be valuable during some negotiations, when the Secretary-General can act as a bridge among member states that disagree on issues. U.S. citizens have also held key U.N. reform-related posts at the United Nations, which some Members of Congress believe may play a role in furthering U.S. reform policy interests. Collaborating with Other U.N. Member States —The United States may wish to continue to reach out to other U.N. member states to build consensus and form partnerships on reform policies, either within the framework of the United Nations or bilaterally. Observers have noted that U.S. support for certain U.N. reform initiatives can be a liability because some member states may view U.S. support as self-serving. In these cases, the United States may consider encouraging like-minded countries to advocate its reform agenda. Identifying Key Priorities —The United States may wish to focus on a small number of reform priorities and pursue them vigorously in both multilateral and bilateral fora. It may also consider compromising with other member states on U.N. reform issues that it has identified as lesser priorities.

Many experts have emphasized that U.N. reform is an ongoing process rather than a singular event. With this in mind, the 114 th Congress may wish to continue monitoring the implementation and overall progress of ongoing reform initiatives. It may also consider future reforms proposed by member states and the Administration, as well as by Members of Congress or the Secretary-General.

Administration Policies

The United States generally supports the mission and mandate of the United Nations. It played a key role in establishing the United Nations in 1945, and serves as one of five permanent members of the Security Council. Some Administrations have been critical of the United Nations, however, and have advocated sweeping reform of the organization.

Obama Administration

Since President Obama took office, his Administration has focused on "re-engaging" with the United Nations. The Administration elevated the status of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations to a Cabinet-level position that reports directly to the President. It also paid a significant portion of U.S. arrears, and decided to run for a seat on the U.N. Human Rights Council. Many of the Administration's U.N. reform priorities focus on management issues—particularly those related to budget processes and transparency. In various statements and documents, the Administration has highlighted the following areas of priority:

enforcing budget discipline by taking cost-saving measures such as eliminating vacant U.N. posts, freezing U.N. staff salaries, and exploring alternate budget practices; improving transparency and accountability by strengthening the effectiveness of U.N. bodies charged with evaluating performance and investigating abuses, including the Ethics Office, the Independent Audit Advisory Committee, the Board of Auditors, and the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS); reforming human resources practices to create a more mobile and merit-based workforce by further streamlining U.N. staff contracting and conditions of service across the U.N. system; and overhauling day-to-day business practices such as upgrading information technology, and improving procurement procedures, accounting procedures, and budgeting processes.

The Obama Administration has also implemented initiatives within the State Department aimed at evaluating and improving U.N. system transparency and effectiveness. It has continued to support the U.N. Transparency and Accountability Initiative (UNTAI), a Bush Administration program created by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations that tracks the adoption of management reforms by U.N. funds and programs. Additionally, in September 2010, then-Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs (IO) Esther Brimmer announced that the IO Bureau hired an advisor on effectiveness, whose role is to "systematically review the effectiveness of international organizations," including U.N. entities.

The Administration has generally resisted legislation tying U.S. contributions to specific U.N. reforms due to concerns that it may interfere with the President's ability to conduct diplomacy. In an April 2011 statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, then-U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Susan Rice remarked that failing to pay U.N. dues "undermines [U.S.] credibility and influence [in the United Nations]—not just on reform, but on a range of U.S. national security policies."

George W. Bush Administration

The George W. Bush Administration was an active participant in U.N. reform efforts. It identified several key priorities that it believed would help the United Nations improve its effectiveness, including (1) management, budget, and secretariat reform; (2) increased oversight and accountability; (3) review of all U.N. mandates and missions; and (4) fiscal discipline.

Prior to and after the adoption of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the Bush Administration attempted to work with like-minded countries and the U.N. Secretary-General to move a reform agenda forward. Some reform initiatives supported by President Bush, particularly management and oversight reforms, were not approved or considered by the General Assembly. Administration officials expressed dissatisfaction with the overall effectiveness of some previously implemented reforms, as well as the pace of reform efforts. Nevertheless, the Administration did not support mandatory withholding of U.S. payments to the United Nations.

Reform Perspectives and Priorities

A significant challenge for advocates of U.N. reform is finding common ground among the disparate definitions of reform held by various stakeholders. There is no common definition of U.N. reform and, as a result, there is often debate over the scope, appropriateness, and effectiveness of past and current reform initiatives. One method for determining how a stakeholder defines U.N. reform may be to identify policy priorities in the U.N. reform debate. In some cases, common objectives among stakeholders have translated into substantive reform policy, though shared goals do not always guarantee successful outcomes.

The Secretary-General

On December 14, 2006, Ban Ki-moon of South Korea took the oath of office to succeed outgoing U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan. He was appointed to a second five-year term on June 21, 2011, and since his first term has stated that U.N. reform is one of his top priorities. He maintains that progress needs to be made in three areas: (1) improving what and how the United Nations delivers on the ground, (2) doing more with what the United Nations has, and (3) increasing accountability. During his tenure, Ban's reform efforts have included restructuring the Department of Field Support and the Department of Disarmament Affairs; establishing a "Change Management Team" to address management issues and future reform efforts; and proposals to improve staff mobility.

The extent and effectiveness of Ban's reform efforts remain to be seen. On the one hand, some experts and policymakers argue that Ban is not doing enough to press member states for comprehensive reform or to institute reforms in the Secretariat. On the other hand, some emphasize that like previous Secretaries-General, Ban's success in achieving reform is limited by the responsibilities of his office. Although the Secretary-General—as the "chief administrative officer" of the United Nations—can facilitate and advocate reform, the power to implement wide-ranging and comprehensive change lies primarily with U.N. member states. Many of these states are concerned that reform activities initiated by the Secretary-General may undermine their authority. For example, the Secretary-General's aforementioned Change Management Team, which was supported by the United States, has faced opposition from many developing countries due to such concerns.

Developed and Developing Countries

Past reform debates in the U.N. General Assembly and its committees have drawn attention to fundamental differences that exist among some member states, particularly developing countries (represented primarily by the Group of 77), and developed countries (particularly the United States, Japan, and members of the European Union). Developed countries, which account for the majority of assessed contributions to the U.N. regular budget, tend to focus on the United Nations' role in maintaining international peace and security and the overall efficiency of the organization. They would like the Secretary-General to have greater flexibility and authority to implement reforms, specifically those related to oversight and human resources. Generally, they make significantly larger financial contributions to the U.N. system than developing countries and therefore want to ensure that their funds are used in ways they perceive as most effective. Conversely, developing countries, which constitute the largest U.N. voting bloc, often focus on development-oriented policies. They generally object to reforms that would enhance the power of the Secretary-General and decrease the power of the General Assembly and its Fifth Committee (which addresses budget and administrative issues). In the past, some developing countries have expressed concern that reform initiatives might drain resources from development programs. They have also suggested that reforms proposed by the Secretary-General tend to be influenced by countries that are the largest financial contributors to the United Nations.

Many observers are concerned that the aforementioned difference in reform philosophy has created deadlocks in the General Assembly and significantly delayed the implementation of management and budget reforms. Such differences were highlighted in December 2005 when a group of U.N. member states, led primarily by developed countries such as the United States and Japan, sought to link the U.N. budget to progress on management reforms. The countries placed a spending cap of $950 million (about six months of U.N. spending) on the two-year, $3.6 billion budget in hopes that the General Assembly would adopt a series of management and budget reform measures proposed by then-Secretary-General Annan. On May 8, 2006, the General Assembly's Fifth Committee bypassed the traditional practice of budget-by-consensus and voted on a resolution, supported by the G-77, which approved some reforms but delayed the consideration of several others. The developed nations that imposed the budget cap were disappointed with the outcome. They eventually lifted the budget cap in June 2006 because they were unwilling to cause a shutdown of the United Nations.

U.N. Reform-Related Commissions, Task Forces, and Groups

Since the United Nations was established in 1945, many commissions, panels, committees, and task forces (hereinafter referred to collectively as "groups") have been created to examine ways to improve the United Nations. These groups were established by a variety of stakeholders, including past secretaries-general, individual member states, groups of member states, non-governmental organizations, academic institutions, and others. The following sections address the findings of a cross-section of these groups during the past 15 years—the Volcker Commission, the U.S. Institute of Peace U.N. Reform Task Force, and then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan's 2005 report, In Larger Freedom: Toward Development, Security, and Human Rights for All.

Though the circumstances and mandates for each group are different, they made similar recommendations for improving the United Nations. Notably, each group highlighted the need for enhanced internal oversight and Secretariat reform, including staff buyouts and enhanced financial disclosure requirements. The groups also emphasized the need for overall streamlining and consolidation of the U.N. system (see 0 for a side-by-side comparison of the recommendations).

The Volcker Commission

In April 2004, then-Secretary-General Annan, with the endorsement of the U.N. Security Council, appointed an independent high-level commission to inquire into corruption in the U.N.-led Iraq Oil-for-Food Program. The commission, led by former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, concluded that the failures of the Oil-For-Food Program were evidence of a greater need for "fundamental and wide-ranging administrative reform" in the United Nations. The commission recommended establishing an Independent Oversight Board to review U.N. auditing, accounting, and budgeting activities; creating the position of Chief Operating Officer to oversee administrative matters such as personnel and planning practices; providing fair compensation to third parties involved in U.N. programs (while ensuring that the compensation does not lead to inappropriate profit); and expanding financial disclosure requirements to cover a variety of U.N. staff, including those working on procurement.

U.S. Institute of Peace U.N. Reform Task Force

In December 2004, Congress directed the U.S. Institute of Peace to create a bipartisan task force to examine ways to improve the United Nations so that it is better equipped to meet modern-day security and human rights challenges. Congress appropriated $1.5 million to the task force and required that it submit a report on its findings to the House Committee on Appropriations. The task force identified improving internal oversight as its single most important reform recommendation. It supported the creation of an independent oversight board to direct the budget and activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). It also recommended several management reforms, including establishing the position of Chief Operating Officer, creating a U.N. Ethics Office, and enhancing whistle-blower protection. It supported broadening the U.N. staff financial disclosure policy, and recommended the review of all U.N. mandates five years or older, as well as the incorporation of sunset clauses into all new mandates. The task force supported incorporating results-based budgeting into the U.N. system, and a one-time buyout for all unwanted or unneeded staff. It recommended the creation of a new U.N. Human Rights Council to replace the discredited Commission on Human Rights, but was unable to come to consensus on Security Council reform.

Secretary-General Annan's Report, In Larger Freedom

On March 21, 2005, then-Secretary-General Annan released his report, In Larger Freedom , in response to the findings of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The report was presented to member states as a starting point for discussion at the 2005 U.N. World Summit, and included the following management reform recommendations:

the review of all U.N. mandates over five years old; a one-time staff-buyout to ensure U.N. Secretariat staff meets current needs; the establishment of a Cabinet-style decision-making body in the Secretariat to improve management and policy activities; the review of all budget and human resource operations; and a comprehensive review of Office of Internal Oversight Services to examine ways to enhance its authority and effectiveness.

In addition, Secretary-General Annan proposed a broad range of institutional and programmatic reforms, including modifying the composition of the U.N. Security Council so that it more adequately reflects current political realities, and replacing the Commission on Human Rights with a new Human Rights Council. Annan also recommended streamlining the General Assembly agenda and committee structure so that the Assembly can increase the speed of its decision-making and react more swiftly and efficiently to events as they occur.

Mechanics of Implementing Reform

Previous and current U.N. reform initiatives encompass an array of organizational issues that may require different processes for implementation. These reforms might be achieved by amending the U.N. Charter or through various non-Charter reforms. Charter amendment is a rarely used practice and has only occurred on three occasions. Non-Charter reforms are more common and comparatively easier to achieve.

Amending the U.N. Charter

Articles 108 and 109 of the U.N. Charter provide for potential changes to the document. Article 108 states that a proposed Charter amendment must be approved by two-thirds of the full General Assembly, and be ratified "according to the constitutional processes" of two-thirds of U.N. member states, including all permanent members of the Security Council. The Charter was first amended in 1963 to increase U.N. Security Council membership from 11 to 15 members, and to increase the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) membership from 18 to 27. It was last amended in 1973, when ECOSOC membership increased from 27 to 54. Examples of possible reform initiatives that might involve amending the U.N. Charter include, but are not limited to, increasing permanent and/or non-permanent Security Council membership; increasing membership on ECOSOC; and adding or removing a principal organ.

Article 109 of the Charter allows for a convening of a General Conference of U.N. members with the purpose of "reviewing the present Charter." The date and place of the conference would be determined by a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly, and an affirmative vote from any nine Security Council members. Potential revisions to the Charter would be adopted at the conference by a two-thirds vote (with each country having one vote), and take effect when ratified by the governments of two-thirds of U.N. member states. A Charter review conference has never been held.

Non-Charter Reform Process

Since 1945, the General Assembly has authorized reforms of its own processes and procedures—as well as those of the Secretariat—without Charter amendment. The General Assembly has established various fora for discussing reform issues, including a Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and a Working Group on the Security Council. The General Assembly has also implemented reforms on its own by adopting proposals introduced by member states or the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General may also institute reform in his capacity as chief administrative officer, as well as make administrative decisions regarding the organization of some U.N. departments. Secretary-General Ban, for example, restructured the Departments of Field Support and Disarmament Affairs and established a Change Management Team to consider possible future reform efforts. Other non-Charter reforms have included the establishment of consensus-based budgeting in 1986; the creation of an Office of Strategic Planning in the Secretariat authorized by Secretary-General Annan in 1997; and the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission by the Security Council and General Assembly in 2006.

Looking Ahead: Possible Challenges to Reform

Achieving meaningful and comprehensive U.N. reform is a significant and ongoing challenge for U.N. member states. The 114 th Congress may wish to take possible reform obstacles into account when considering legislation that exercises oversight or supports a reform agenda.

National Self-Interest and Differing Reform Perspectives

Each U.N. member state has its own political agenda and foreign policy goals, and may also have its own definition of U.N. reform. As a result, member states often hold differing views on when reform is necessary, how best to implement reform, and how to measure the success or failure of a given reform initiative. In some cases, failure to reach consensus can lead to significant delay, or failure, of certain reform initiatives. Some member states package their policy priorities as U.N. reform to further their own policy goals. This can cause distrust among member states as countries question whether reform proposals by other member states are based on self-interest or a genuine desire to improve the U.N. system.

Competing Priorities

Some observers cite the inability of U.N. member states or secretaries-general to effectively prioritize reform initiatives as an obstacle to U.N. reform. When Secretary-General Annan presented reform proposals in 2005, for example, he requested that they be adopted by the General Assembly not in increments, but as a package of reforms. Instead of considering a large series of reform proposals, some observers argue that member states should select only a few reform priorities and work toward their adoption and implementation. Others contend that the most efficient way to achieve reform may be for member states first to adopt reform initiatives they can agree to and then gradually work toward tackling the more divisive and complicated reform issues.

Organizational Structure and Bureaucracy

The United Nations is a highly complex and decentralized organization, and therefore may be slow to consider or implement potential reforms. Some argue that there is a "culture of inaction" in the United Nations, and that U.N. managers and staff are resistant to the implementation of new programs, changes to existing programs, and modifications to staffing and personnel policies. Many contend that prospective and agreed-to reforms lack clear plans for implementation, including deadlines and cost estimates. They stress that this overall lack of planning may affect the progress and ultimate success of reforms already implemented, as well as those reforms currently being considered by the General Assembly. Some also emphasize that without proper implementation plans and follow-up, U.N. member states may be unable to adequately gauge the overall effectiveness of reforms.

Limited Resources

Many observers note that a significant challenge for U.N. reform efforts may be the effective implementation of reforms within the current U.N. budget. Some reform initiatives are established by member states to operate "within existing resources." Many argue that the existing U.N. budget limits may not be able to support all of the reform initiatives currently being considered. Some member states, including the United States, however, contend that money saved from other reforms could create a funding source for further reforms and/or the creation of new U.N. programs or bodies.

External Influences

The complex relationships that exist among member states outside of the U.N. system may be another challenge affecting U.N. reform efforts. These relationships are entirely independent of the United Nations but can affect how countries work together within the U.N. framework to achieve reform objectives. Military conflict, religious and ethnic differences, political conflict, trade and economic issues, and geography can all potentially impact reform priorities and cooperation among U.N. member states.

Appendix A. Selected Reform Legislation

When considering U.N. reform issues, Congress may wish to explore the nature and effectiveness of past legislative approaches and the extent to which they may have influenced the adoption of reform measures at the United Nations. There is some evidence that legislation such as the Kassebaum-Solomon Amendment and the Helms-Biden Agreement may have led, either directly or indirectly, to substantive changes in U.N. policies. The following sections highlight selected reform legislation from 1986 to the present and note any subsequent changes to internal U.N. policy.

Kassebaum-Solomon Amendment (1986-1987)

In the mid-1980s, some Members of Congress expressed concern that U.S. influence over the U.N. budget was not proportionate to its rate of assessment. In 1986 Congress passed legislation, popularly known as the "Kassebaum-Solomon amendment," which required that the U.S. assessed contribution to the U.N. regular budget be reduced to 20% unless the United Nations gave major U.N. financial contributors a greater say in the budget process. Subsequently, in 1986 the General Assembly adopted a new budget and planning process that incorporated consensus-based budgeting as a decision-making mechanism, thus giving member states with higher assessment levels a potentially greater voice in the budget process.

U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services (1993)

In the early 1990s, some Members of Congress and the Administration were concerned with the apparent lack of oversight and accountability within the U.N. system. In 1993, as part of the FY1994 State Department Appropriations Act, Congress directed that 10% of U.S. assessed contributions to the U.N. regular budget be withheld until the Secretary of State certified to Congress that "the United Nations has established an independent office with responsibilities and powers substantially similar to offices of Inspectors General Act of 1978." On July 29, 1994, the U.N. General Assembly established the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) which reports directly to the Secretary-General and provides "internal auditing, investigation, inspection, programme monitoring, evaluation and consulting services to all U.N. activities under the Secretary-General's authority."

Helms-Biden Agreement (1999)

In the late 1990s, Congress and the Administration negotiated and agreed to legislation that would further U.S. reform policy at the United Nations. The Helms-Biden bill authorized payment of some U.S. arrears if specific reform benchmarks were met and certified to Congress by the Secretary of State. Under the terms of Helms-Biden, the United States agreed to (1) pay $819 million in arrearages over fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000; and (2) forgive $107 million owed to the United States by the United Nations in peacekeeping costs if the United Nations applied the $107 million to U.S. peacekeeping arrears. For arrearage payments to occur, Congress required that the U.S. assessment for contributions to the U.N. regular budget be reduced from 25% to 22% and that the peacekeeping contribution be reduced from 30% to 25%. In December 2000, the U.N. General Assembly reduced the regular budget assessment level to from 25% to 22%, and the Peacekeeping share from approximately 30.4% to 28%. In subsequent years, the U.S. peacekeeping assessment continued to fall and is now close to 26.5%.

Appendix B. Key U.N. Reform Recommendations and Proposals by Independent and U.N. Affiliated Groups

Appendix C. Organizational Chart of the U.N. System