Army Health Care: Progress Made in Staffing and Monitoring Units that Provide Outpatient Case Management, but Additional Steps Needed
Released: 2009-04-20T00:00:00

Letter

Background

In June 2007, the Army began establishing WTUs at United States military installations with MTFs that were providing medical care to 35 or more eligible servicemembers. As of January 2009, the Army was operating 33 of these WTUs. (See fig. 1.) The Army has also established WTUs at locations in Germany—Bavaria, Heidelberg, and Landstuhl. For servicemembers with less complex medical needs, the Army uses its existing network of community-based health care organizations, which it now refers to as community-based WTUs. The community-based WTUs allow servicemembers to live at home and receive medical care while remaining on active duty.

A servicemember was eligible for placement in a WTU if he or she required more than 6 months of medical treatment and required complex case management. Army guidance specifies that the mission of servicemembers assigned to a WTU is to heal and transition—return to duty or to civilian life—and while WTU servicemembers may have work assignments in the unit, this work may not take precedent over the servicemembers’ treatment. WTUs have a defined staffing structure that includes leadership positions of commanders and platoon sergeants, as well as administrative staff, such as human resources and financial management specialists. Within each unit, the servicemember is assigned to a team of three key staff—the Triad of Care—who provide case management services to ensure continuity of care. (See fig. 2.)

Servicemembers in the WTUs vary by the type of medical condition for which they are receiving care and include Army active component, Reserve, and National Guard servicemembers. Active component servicemembers comprise about two-thirds of the WTU population, and active duty Reserve and National Guard servicemembers collectively comprise about one-third. As of December 1, 2008, about 60 percent of servicemembers in WTUs had been wounded in combat or had incurred a noncombat injury or illness during OEF or OIF, which may have resulted in burns, amputations, or other types of conditions. The remaining servicemembers in the units included those who may have been referred to the WTU for completion of the disability evaluation process; those who incurred a noncombat injury, such as during a training exercise; and those who incurred a noncombat illness such as cancer that required complex case management.

The Army Issued Additional WTU Policies to Reduce Staffing Shortfalls, Modify Its Staffing Model, and Revise Servicemember Entry and Exit Criteria

The Army has issued additional WTU policies aimed at reducing staffing shortfalls, modifying the staffing model, and revising servicemember entry and exit criteria. To reduce staffing shortfalls, the Army issued policies designed to ensure that WTUs achieve and maintain staffing at required staff-to-servicemember ratios. The Army also implemented a revised WTU staffing model that includes new staff-to-servicemember ratios for two of the three Triad of Care positions. In addition, the Army issued policies to revise its criteria for servicemembers entering and leaving WTUs—a policy that affects population size and staffing needs.

New WTU Staffing Policies Helped Reduce WTU Triad of Care Staffing Shortfalls

Although the Army had increased the number of staff being assigned to the WTUs, staffing shortfalls continued through June 2008. When we last reported on the Army’s progress in staffing the WTUs in February 2008, the Army had established a goal of having at least 90 percent of Triad of Care staff positions filled to meet the staff-to-servicemember ratios that it had established for its WTUs. These ratios were 1:200 for primary care managers; 1:18 for nurse case managers at Army medical centers that normally see servicemembers with more acute conditions and 1:36 for other types of Army medical treatment facilities; and 1:12 for squad leaders. At that time, the Army had 1,141 Triad of Care staff for its WTUs, and 11 WTUs had less than 90 percent of needed staff for one or more Triad of Care positions—representing a total shortfall of 64 staff. As of June 25, 2008, WTU Triad of Care staff had increased to 1,328, but because the size of the WTU servicemember population continued to grow and increase staffing needs, 21 WTUs were not meeting this goal and had staffing shortfalls in 108 Triad of Care positions. However, it is important to note that WTU staffing shortfalls represent a specific point in time. WTU staffing needs may vary daily based on both the number of servicemembers entering and exiting the WTUs and with fluctuations in the number of Triad of Care staff, who may deploy or otherwise be reassigned or leave.

To address challenges in fully staffing the WTUs, including Triad of Care positions, the Army issued new policies in July 2008 for staffing the WTUs. The Army’s new policies included a requirement that local leadership— WTU commanders, MTF commanders, and senior installation commanders—fill 100 percent of WTU staff shortages, including those related to the Triad of Care, by July 14, 2008. For example, commanders were directed to fill the positions using personnel present on the installation, such as physicians and nurses who work in the MTFs, and to ensure continued 100 percent staffing from July 14, 2008, forward.

As of August 2008, after the implementation of these new staffing policies, Army data indicated that Triad of Care staffing shortfalls had been reduced considerably, and the Army had generally met its goal of 100 percent staffing of its WTUs, with only a few exceptions. As of August 25, 2008, four WTUs had staffing shortfalls in four Triad of Care positions total—Balboa was missing one nurse case manager, Fort Belvoir was missing one squad leader, and Fort Drum and Fort Irwin were each missing one primary care manager.

The Army Implemented a New WTU Staffing Model in Response to Study Findings, but Walter Reed Was Excluded from This Study

On October 16, 2008, the Army implemented revisions to its WTU staffing model, including changes to two of its Triad of Care staff-to- servicemember ratios. (See fig. 3.) These policy changes were based on a study initiated by the Army in February 2008 that found that some of the existing staff-to-servicemember ratios were not adequate for providing an appropriate level of care to servicemembers in WTUs. The study team recommended changes to the Triad of Care staffing ratios for nurse case managers and squad leaders. The team also recommended realigning existing medical and administrative support staff in the WTU to provide direct assistance to the nurse case manager and hiring new staff to support the primary care manager.

The Army applied the revised ratios to all the WTUs except Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Army officials told us that the study team excluded Walter Reed from its review because the population receiving care at Walter Reed has more complex medical needs than the population at other WTUs. As a result, Walter Reed is continuing to operate under its original staff-to-servicemember ratios—1:200 for primary care managers, 1:18 for nurse case managers, and 1:12 for squad leaders. Despite the servicemember population at Walter Reed having more complex medical needs, these ratios are not much different than the revised ratios established for other WTUs. According to WTU officials from Walter Reed, Triad of Care staff who work with servicemembers with more complex medical needs generally require higher staff-to-servicemember ratios, but an assessment of acuity—the complexity of servicemembers’ needs—is necessary for determining the exact ratios that would be appropriate for Triad of Care positions at this location. Army officials told us that the Army currently does not have a plan for conducting a study of Walter Reed’s staffing model because this facility is scheduled to close in 2011 under Base Realignment and Closure 2005. According to Army officials, the WTU at Walter Reed will be moved to the newly established Walter Reed National Military Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland. The WTU servicemember population from Walter Reed will be dispersed among the WTU at the new medical center and the WTUs at Fort Belvoir and Fort Meade.

Nonetheless, the Army had made considerable progress in meeting the new WTU staff-to-servicemember ratios for the Triad of Care positions. On January 12, 2009, 4 of the 32 WTUs in the United States (excluding Walter Reed Army Medical Center) had a total shortfall of seven Triad of Care positions—three primary care managers and four squad leaders. Walter Reed, which continued to operate under its original Triad of Care staff-to- servicemember ratios, did not have any shortfalls.

Revised WTU Servicemember Entry and Exit Criteria Have Decreased WTU Population Growth, Which Determines Staffing Needs

In July 2008, the Army also implemented policies revising WTU servicemember entry and exit criteria to increase emphasis on servicemembers needing complex case management. The revised policies stated that feedback from WTU officials, MTF commanders, and other senior officials indicated that many servicemembers in WTUs did not need the complex case management that the units provided. For example, officials from one WTU we visited told us that the WTUs included servicemembers who had conditions that were not complex, such as a broken leg, or who were waiting to finish the Army’s disability evaluation process and no longer had medical appointments. Army officials indicated that the growth of the WTU population—partially due to the inclusion of servicemembers who did not need complex case management—had impeded its ability to achieve and maintain staff for its Triad of Care positions in accordance with its staff-to-servicemember ratios.

The Army’s July 2008 policies modified WTU entry and exit criteria specifically for active component servicemembers. These revised criteria do not apply to Reserve and National Guard servicemembers, who comprise about one-third of the WTU population. Army policy indicates that Reserve and National Guard servicemembers are generally eligible for placement in a WTU if they need health care for conditions identified, incurred, or aggravated while on active duty, and they will remain in the WTU until their medical condition is resolved and they are eligible to be released from active duty or they complete the Army’s disability evaluation process. According to an Army official, the Army is also exploring ways to apply the revised entry and exit criteria to Reserve and National Guard servicemembers and is planning to issue a corresponding policy in March 2009.

The Army’s revised WTU entry criteria for active component servicemembers are intended to help ensure that only those who need complex case management are placed in the WTU. For example, according to the original criteria, a servicemember was eligible for placement in a WTU if he or she had complex medical needs requiring more than 6 months of treatment and did not include an assessment of the servicemember’s ability to perform his or her duties. The revised criteria state that an active component servicemember is eligible for placement in a WTU if he or she has complex medical conditions that require case management and will not be able to train for or contribute to the mission of a unit for more than 6 months.

The WTU exit criteria, which had not been explicitly articulated in the original WTU policy, now allow local leadership greater flexibility in reassigning active component servicemembers to other units on the installation. Previously, an active component servicemember would remain in a WTU until he or she was able to return to duty and completed his or her medical treatment or was discharged from the Army, even if the servicemember’s medical care could be managed outside a WTU. The exit criteria state that an active component servicemember who is expected to return to duty may be reassigned to a unit on the installation before being found medically fit to return to duty if certain conditions are met. In particular, the servicemember may be reassigned if the servicemember’s remaining medical needs can be managed outside a WTU and if the servicemember’s reassignment has been approved by the Triad of Care and by leadership of the WTU, MTF, and installation.

Along with its policies establishing the revised entry and exit criteria, the Army required the Warrior Care and Transition Office to assess the effectiveness of the revised entry and exit criteria in ensuring that only those servicemembers needing complex case management are in the WTUs and to monitor the effects of the revised criteria. Specifically, the Warrior Care and Transition Office was tasked with developing measures for assessing the criteria’s effectiveness. According to Army officials, the Warrior Care and Transition Office has not developed any additional measures to determine the effectiveness of the revised entry and exit criteria, but instead is relying on existing measures. For example, the number of servicemembers in WTUs decreased after implementation of the criteria, as the Army anticipated. Specifically, Army data show that the active component population of the WTUs has declined each month since the new entry and exit criteria went into effect, from about 8,400 in July 2008 to about 6,900 in November 2008. Army officials also said that length of stay can be used to assess the entry and exit criteria because servicemembers requiring complex care would be expected to have longer lengths of stay in the WTU.

The policy with the revised entry and exit criteria also includes a provision for the Army Inspector General to assess the criteria as part of a broader provision to conduct a follow-up inspection of the Army’s disability evaluation process and WTUs. An official within the Army’s Office of the Inspector General told us that this inspection is included in its proposed long-range inspection plan for fiscal years 2009 and 2010, which is pending approval by the Secretary of the Army.

The Army Uses Various Mechanisms to Monitor WTU Servicemembers’ Recovery, but Its Feedback Mechanisms May Not Provide Complete Information

To monitor the recovery process of WTU servicemembers, the Army uses individual transition plans and various upward feedback mechanisms, but its feedback mechanisms may not provide complete information on the performance of WTUs. The Army’s feedback mechanisms, which include a telephone hotline and a satisfaction survey, provide a way for servicemembers and their families to raise concerns about WTU-related issues. However, while this may provide helpful and important information to Army leadership, the concerns raised through these mechanisms are not necessarily representative of the concerns of all WTU servicemembers and their families.

The Army Is Implementing Plans for Monitoring the Recovery of Individual Servicemembers

To facilitate servicemembers’ recovery, the Army has developed a process for coordinating and monitoring the care that servicemembers receive while in a WTU. In January 2008, the Army issued a policy establishing Comprehensive Transition Plans for WTU servicemembers. A plan includes a servicemember’s medical conditions and vocational training needs, as well as his or her expectations and goals for the recovery process. The Army requires that a servicemember’s transition plan be developed within 30 days of his or her placement into the WTU by WTU leadership and Triad of Care staff with input from the servicemember and his or her family. The WTU and MTF commanders are responsible for ensuring that the transition plan is developed.

Army policy requires that the Triad of Care monitor the servicemember’s transition plan weekly. For example, officials told us that meetings, which may include staff in addition to the Triad of Care, are held to determine whether the goals documented in the servicemember’s transition plan are being met and to modify the plan as necessary. Additionally, according to an Army official, conducting periodic formal evaluations of the transition plan is required to determine whether the servicemember should (1) return to duty, (2) continue rehabilitation, or (3) be referred to the Army disability evaluation process. An official said that these formal evaluations occur at least every 3 months, but can occur more often based on the servicemember’s transition plan.

In addition to actions already underway, the Army is developing additional policy to assist WTUs in developing the Comprehensive Transition Plans, which could help ensure that the plans are implemented consistently across WTUs and that the transition needs of all servicemembers in the WTUs are regularly assessed. According to the Army, this additional policy will include guidance on setting goals with servicemembers and their families. It will also include performance measures that will allow the Army to more systematically monitor the extent to which WTUs have developed transition plans for its servicemembers. For example, according to the Army, the performance measures will include the number of servicemembers in WTUs for more than 30 days who do not have a transition plan. The policy will require that the performance measures be reported at least monthly. During a 6-month period over the course of our review, Army officials had provided us with various dates for which they had expected that this policy would be finalized, but this had not yet occurred as of February 27, 2009.

Related to one of these performance measures, the Army has begun reporting data on the number of servicemembers in WTUs for more than 30 days who had a transition plan. Our analysis of these data shows that as of January 6, 2009, 94 percent of all servicemembers in WTUs across the United States had transition plans. Specifically, between 84 and 100 percent of servicemembers at 32 of 33 WTUs had transition plans. At the remaining WTU, 73 percent of servicemembers had transition plans. Officials from this WTU said that, because of the rapid growth in the WTU servicemember population, there were insufficient staff in some positions involved in developing the transition plan, such as social workers. As a result, officials were first developing transition plans for servicemembers who had the greatest need. Additionally, officials said that some servicemembers did not need transition plans because they were in the process of leaving the WTU.

The Army Obtains Information on Servicemembers’ Concerns through Various Upward Feedback Mechanisms, but This Information May Not Be Representative of All WTU Servicemembers

Using various upward feedback mechanisms, the Army has obtained information about different aspects of its WTUs, including the Triad of Care. (See table 1.) For example, the Army requires each of its WTUs to hold monthly Town Hall meetings to serve as a forum for WTU servicemembers and their family members to voice their concerns directly to WTU and installation leadership. Additionally, after the media reported deficiencies at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, the Army established two other feedback mechanisms—the Wounded Soldier and Family Hotline and the Ombudsman Program—which are also available to servicemembers receiving care at the MTF who are not part of the WTU and their families. Through both of these mechanisms, Army personnel are available to address servicemembers’ concerns about medical and nonmedical issues, including transportation, financial, legal, and housing concerns. The Army collects and analyzes data from these feedback mechanisms to identify trends and potential problem areas. While this may provide helpful and important information to Army leadership about the performance of the WTUs, the concerns raised through these mechanisms are not necessarily representative of all concerns of WTU servicemembers and their families because they are dependent upon the initiative taken by individuals and because they may include concerns from servicemembers not in WTUs.

In addition, the Army obtains feedback on WTUs through its Warrior Transition Unit Program Satisfaction Survey, which solicits feedback on the performance of WTUs, including the WTUs in Germany and the community-based WTUs. This survey is designed to assess servicemembers’ satisfaction with various aspects of WTUs, including the primary care manager and nurse case manager. The Army began administering this survey in June 2007 to servicemembers who had been placed in WTUs. The Army mails the survey to WTU servicemembers on the 30-, 120-, 280-, and 410-day anniversaries of their placement into the WTU. In February 2008, the Army began following up by telephone with servicemembers who did not respond 30 days after the surveys were mailed.

Although the Army has used this survey to report relatively high satisfaction rates among WTU servicemembers, including servicemembers at WTUs in Germany and community-based WTUs, the survey results may not be representative of all WTU servicemembers. During the period July 2007 through September 2008, the Army’s data showed that for WTUs at military installations, the percentage of servicemembers satisfied ranged between approximately 60 and 80 percent, and for the community-based WTUs, between approximately 80 and 90 percent. However, the overall monthly response rates for WTU respondents ranged between 13 and 35 percent for the period June 2007 through September 2008, which was the most current data available at the time of our review. Such a low response rate decreases the likelihood that the survey results accurately reflect the views and characteristics of the target population.

Despite low response rates, the Army has not conducted additional analyses to determine whether its survey results are representative of the entire WTU servicemember population. According to Office of Management and Budget guidelines, best practices to ensure that survey results are representative of the target population include conducting a nonresponse analysis for surveys with a response rate lower than 80 percent. Although the Army was not required to seek the Office of Management and Budget’s approval for the Warrior Transition Unit Program Satisfaction Survey, these are generally accepted best practices and are relevant for the purposes of assessing whether the survey results are representative of all WTU servicemembers. A nonresponse analysis may be completed on more than one occasion, depending on how frequently the survey is administered. A nonresponse analysis can be used to determine if the responses from nonresponding servicemembers would be the same as the responses from responding servicemembers. Therefore, this analysis could help the Army determine whether its WTU satisfaction survey results are representative of all WTU servicemembers. An Army official told us that the Army does not plan to conduct nonresponse analyses because it is satisfied with the response rates that it has been receiving since it began following up with servicemembers by telephone in February 2008. For the period February 2008 through September 2008, WTU response rates for both mail and telephone respondents, including WTUs in Germany and community-based WTUs, have ranged between 26 and 35 percent. In addition, this official told us that beginning in Spring 2009 the Army no longer plans to conduct this survey by mail, but will conduct this survey solely by telephone, and expects response rates to further increase once this occurs.

Nonetheless, the Army has used its survey results to monitor trends and identify areas for improvement. For example, the Army conducted additional analyses of nine WTUs, which are among the largest WTUs. For one of these WTUs, the Army reported that additional analyses indicated that factors contributing to low satisfaction included decreased satisfaction about pain control and financial issues. The analyses also showed that servicemembers in this WTU for more than 280 days were the most dissatisfied.

While Army leadership may use the Warrior Transition Unit Program Satisfaction Survey results to identify areas for improvement, Army officials at some locations we visited said that low response rates and lack of specific information limits the usefulness of the survey at the local level. Consequently, some WTUs have undertaken local efforts to collect information about servicemembers’ satisfaction. Army officials at three of the WTUs we visited told us that they have independently conducted local satisfaction surveys to obtain specific information from their servicemembers. These local efforts have focused on gauging satisfaction in several areas, including, for example, satisfaction with nurse case managers, primary care managers, and squad leaders. The local surveys do not replace the Army-wide satisfaction survey, and Army officials reported that they have been able to use them to improve services at individual WTUs. For example, at one location we visited, officials administered a satisfaction survey in January 2008 and August 2008 that focused on the nurse case managers. These results showed that, while servicemembers were generally satisfied with their nurse case managers, a few servicemembers commented that their nurse case manager’s caseload was too large. In response to the survey results, the WTU has worked to balance the caseload among the nurse case managers so that no case manager has an excessive number of WTU servicemembers.

Conclusions

After problems at Walter Reed Army Medical Center were disclosed in early 2007, the Army dedicated significant resources and attention to improving outpatient care for servicemembers through the establishment of the WTUs. Initially, the Army faced challenges fully staffing the units to serve an increasing population, but revisions to WTU policies substantially reduced staffing shortfalls and appeared to manage population growth for active component servicemembers. As of January 2009, almost all of the Triad of Care positions in the WTUs were fully staffed. In addition, the number of active component servicemembers in WTUs decreased within the first 4 months of implementing the revised entry and exit criteria. Sustained attention to staffing levels and the implementation of the revised WTU entry and exit criteria will be important for maintaining these gains and helping to ensure that servicemembers are getting the care that they need.

The Army demonstrated its dedication to caring for its WTU servicemembers by studying and revising its staffing model, including staff-to-servicemember ratios for selected positions, to help ensure the WTUs were providing an appropriate level of care. However, a lingering concern—in light of the study’s findings not applying to the WTU at Walter Reed Army Medical Center—is that the Army does not have a plan to conduct a similar study for this WTU. The population receiving care at Walter Reed has more complex health care needs than the population at other WTUs, and might also require, for example, higher staff-to- servicemember ratios. Without an assessment of the current staffing model that considers this complexity, the Army cannot be assured that it is providing an appropriate level of care to servicemembers at Walter Reed. This evaluation could help the Army determine the appropriate staffing model for the population at Walter Reed and ensure that previously reported problems with coordination of care and treatment for this population do not recur. Furthermore, an assessment of Walter Reed’s staffing model could help the Army make staffing decisions in preparation for the transfer of seriously injured servicemembers to other facilities once Walter Reed closes in 2011.

Continued monitoring of the Army’s WTUs, including servicemembers’ recovery process, will be important for ensuring that these units are meeting servicemembers’ needs. The Army’s Comprehensive Transition Plans appear to be a significant step towards ensuring that servicemembers are receiving the care they need by regularly assessing their progress. However, the Army has not finalized policy that would allow it to systematically determine whether WTUs are consistently developing these plans. The Army has also established various upward feedback mechanisms that help inform Army leadership about issues WTU servicemembers are facing, but they do not provide information on the overall effectiveness of the WTUs. The Army’s Warrior Transition Unit Program Satisfaction Survey could potentially be used to collect information representative of the WTU population. However, the survey has had low response rates, and the Army has not performed additional analysis to determine whether these results are representative of all WTU servicemembers. Although the Army’s plan to conduct the satisfaction survey solely by telephone may increase response rates, nonresponse analyses may still be warranted because the response rates may remain well below 80 percent—the level where generally accepted best practices call for nonresponse analyses to ensure that survey results are representative. Without representative information, the Army cannot reliably report servicemembers’ satisfaction with the WTUs, and without such data Army officials could potentially be unaware of serious deficiencies like those that were identified at Walter Reed in 2007.

Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take the following three actions: To help ensure that the WTU at Walter Reed Army Medical Center is providing an appropriate level of care to servicemembers and help the Army make future staffing decisions for the WTUs that will be caring for this population once Walter Reed closes, the Army should examine Walter Reed’s WTU staffing model, including its Triad of Care staff-to- servicemember ratios, in light of the complexity of the health care needs of servicemembers placed in this WTU.

To help ensure that the Comprehensive Transition Plans are implemented consistently across WTUs and that the Army has performance data for monitoring the implementation of the transition plans, the Army should expedite efforts to finalize and implement its policy for guiding the development of the Comprehensive Transition Plans.

To determine whether the results of the Warrior Transition Unit Program Satisfaction Survey can be used to assess the effectiveness of the WTUs, the Army should take steps to determine whether the results are representative of all servicemembers in WTUs, such as by conducting nonresponse analyses, and should take additional steps if necessary to obtain results that are representative.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it concurred with our findings and recommendations. (DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II.) However, DOD’s description of the actions that it has taken and those that it plans to take to respond to the recommendations did not fully address two of the recommendations.

In response to our recommendation to examine the WTU staffing model at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, DOD indicated that the Army has multiple planning efforts and studies underway to prepare for the closing of Walter Reed. For example, it indicated that the Center for Army Analysis is determining the capacity and capabilities of Fort Meade, Fort Belvoir, and the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center to determine how best to provide the appropriate level of care and services to these WTU servicemembers. DOD also indicated that Walter Reed has sufficient resources to provide appropriate care until the new Walter Reed is completed. Specifically, DOD commented that Walter Reed’s staffing has met or in certain areas exceeded that of other WTUs—for example, nurse case managers have dedicated supervisory assistance available to them at all times and the Walter Reed nurse case manager staff-to- servicemember ratio is 1:18, compared to 1:20 at other WTUs. In describing the Army’s efforts and studies, however, DOD did not indicate how, if at all, they would be examining the WTU staffing model at Walter Reed, including the Triad of Care staff-to-servicemember ratios. Furthermore, although Walter Reed may have additional resources and its nurse case managers may operate under a slightly higher ratio, the population receiving care at Walter Reed has more complex health care needs than the population at other WTUs. We continue to believe that without an assessment of the current staffing model that considers this complexity, the Army cannot be assured that it is providing an appropriate level of care to servicemembers at Walter Reed. Furthermore, we continue to believe that such an assessment can help the Army make future staffing decisions for the WTUs that will be caring for this WTU population once Walter Reed closes. As such, it is imperative that DOD take all actions necessary to examine the WTU staffing model at Walter Reed.

With respect to our recommendation for the Army to take steps to determine whether the results of the Warrior Transition Unit Program Satisfaction Survey are representative of all servicemembers in WTUs, DOD’s response does not indicate that the Army will be taking the actions that we recommended. DOD indicated that the Army’s change to telephone surveys has greatly increased response rates and a nonresponse analysis is currently not required. However, DOD did not indicate its most recent response rates. Although DOD indicated that the Army would reevaluate the need for a nonresponse analysis by September 1, 2009, unless the change to telephone surveys has resulted in a response rate that is 80 percent or higher, we believe that taking steps to determine whether the results are representative of all servicemembers in WTUs is warranted. Without such data, we continue to believe that the Army cannot reliably report servicemembers’ satisfaction with the WTUs and that Army leadership could potentially be unaware of serious deficiencies in some of its WTUs.

With regard to our recommendation for the Army to finalize and implement its policy for guiding the development of Comprehensive Transition Plans, DOD responded that the policy was signed on March 10, 2009. DOD also indicated that staff associated with the Army’s Organizational Inspection Program are assisting with the implementation of the plans and will validate compliance with the new policy.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, relevant congressional committees, and other interested parties. The report also is available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or williamsonr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Overall, to evaluate the Army’s efforts to staff and monitor its Warrior Transition Units (WTU), we obtained documentation from and interviewed officials with the Army’s Office of the Surgeon General, Medical Command, Warrior Care and Transition Office, Manpower Analysis Agency, and Office of the Inspector General. To gain an understanding of staffing and monitoring activities at individual WTUs, we visited five WTU locations—Forts Benning and Gordon (Georgia), Fort Lewis (Washington), Fort Sam Houston (Texas), and Walter Reed Army Medical Center (Washington, D.C.). We selected these locations because they represent different Army regional Medical Commands and they vary in the number of servicemembers placed in the WTU. Because we did not visit a representative sample of WTUs, the results from these visits cannot be generalized to other WTUs. At each location, we met with WTU command staff, nurse case managers or primary care managers, and servicemembers placed in the WTU to gain their perspectives on case management services being provided through the WTU. We also met with officials representing the Army’s regional Medical Command to discuss case management services, including staffing and monitoring. Lastly, we met with officials representing the Case Management Society of America to obtain their perspectives on the Army’s WTUs and efforts to monitor healthcare provided to servicemembers.

More specifically, to assess the Army’s ongoing efforts to staff its WTU Triad of Care positions—primary care managers, nurse case managers, and squad leaders—we obtained and reviewed the Army Warrior Care & Transition Program, which established policies for implementing the WTUs. We also reviewed additional staffing policies that the Army established in July 2008. These policies included additional requirements for staffing the WTUs and a new WTU staffing model that included revised WTU staff-to-servicemember ratios. To determine the extent to which the Army was meeting its staff-to-servicemember ratios for its Triad of Care positions, we analyzed Army staffing and servicemember population data for the 33 WTUs that were established at MTFs located at Army installations within the United States. We did not verify the accuracy of these data. We did, however, speak with Army officials regarding the reliability of the data and determined them to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. We also did not evaluate the appropriateness of the Triad of Care ratios for meeting the staffing needs of the WTUs.

To determine how the Army is monitoring the recovery process of servicemembers in WTUs, we reviewed the Army’s policy and guidance regarding the implementation of its Comprehensive Transition Plans. We also spoke with an Army official about a draft policy related to the documentation of the transition plans that would include performance measures to track compliance. To determine the extent to which the 33 WTUs within the United States had plans for individual servicemembers, we analyzed the Army’s biweekly data on the number of servicemembers who had been in the WTU for at least 30 days who had a transition plan. We did not verify the accuracy of these data. We did, however, speak with an Army official regarding the reliability of the data and determined them to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. We also reviewed protocols and procedures for selected upward feedback mechanisms. The Army uses a number of mechanisms for obtaining feedback from servicemembers and their families to address WTU-related issues, but we did not review every mechanism. We focused on the Town Hall Meeting, Wounded Soldier and Family Hotline, the Ombudsman Program, and the Warrior Transition Unit Program Satisfaction Survey. We focused on these mechanisms because they were implemented shortly after the media reported deficiencies at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and because they provide WTU servicemembers and their families with methods for sharing their experiences and concerns about health care and case management with Army leadership. For the Army’s Warrior Transition Unit Program Satisfaction Survey, which is used to assess servicemembers’ satisfaction across all WTUs, we reviewed the survey questionnaire, protocol, and results for the period July 2007 through September 2008, which were the most recent data available at the time of our review. We reviewed and analyzed Army data on the number of surveys mailed monthly and corresponding response rates for all of the WTUs, including the overseas and community-based WTUs. We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing related documentation and speaking with knowledgeable agency officials and determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also reviewed the Office of Management and Budget Standards and Guidelines for Statistical Surveys (September 2006) to identify standards for statistical surveys conducted by federal agencies, including best practices for ensuring that survey results are representative of the target population. Although the Army is not required to seek Office of Management and Budget approval to conduct its satisfaction survey, these guidelines are relevant for assessing whether survey results are representative. Lastly, three WTUs we visited administered local surveys and we obtained and reviewed their survey questionnaires and corresponding results, when available. However, we did not review the survey methodology for those WTUs that administered a local survey. Further, because these local surveys collected data that were specific to these WTUs, the survey results cannot be generalized to all WTUs.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 to April 2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Bonnie Anderson, Assistant Director; Janina Austin; Susannah Bloch; Christopher Langford; Lisa Motley; Jessica C. Smith; C. Jenna Sondhelm; and Suzanne Worth made major contributions to this report.