Pakistan: Reporting on Visa Delays That Disrupt U.S. Assistance Could Be Improved
Released: 2013-05-07T00:00:00

Letter

Background

U.S. Assistance to Pakistan

Pakistan is central to U.S. efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and deny its resurgence in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The United States has sought to secure these interests through counterterrorism and counterinsurgency cooperation with Pakistan as well as through a long-term partnership anchored, in part, by civilian and military assistance. In fiscal years 2002 through 2012, the U.S. government provided the Pakistani government more than $26 billion in assistance and reimbursements toward these goals.goals, multiple U.S. agencies provide assistance to Pakistan. Table 1 summarizes example activities of key U.S. agencies providing this assistance.

To achieve U.S.

U.S. Officials Experience Delays in Obtaining Pakistani Visas, Which Disrupt Implementation and Oversight of U.S. Assistance to Pakistan

Available agency data show that U.S. officials experience delays in the issuance of both visas for travel to Pakistan and visa extensions, which have affected the implementation and oversight of U.S. assistance to Pakistan. Agencies reported that these delays affect the implementation of U.S. programs in multiple ways—for example, creating staffing gaps for critical embassy positions and necessitating the cancellation of training to assist the Pakistani government in areas such as antiterrorism and counternarcotics.

Data Show Delays in the Issuance of Pakistani Visas to U.S. Officials

Our analysis of available agency data shows that U.S. officials have experienced delays in obtaining Pakistani visas. According to the Pakistani embassy, and as reported by State, the embassy’s policy is to issue visas for U.S. officials within 6 weeks of their application date. We obtained data from components of DOD, DOJ, State, and USAID on processing times for U.S. officials’ applications for official or diplomatic Our analysis of these Pakistani visas in fiscal years 2010 through 2012.data shows that approximately 82 percent of visas for U.S. officials were issued within 6 weeks or less. However, about 18 percent of the visas took longer than 6 weeks to be issued, with approximately 3 percent taking 16 weeks or longer. See figure 3 for more information.

Processing time for issued visas varies depending on the agency or component submitting applications. For instance, for visas issued by the Pakistani embassy, processing took more than 6 weeks for about 4 percent of applications submitted by USAID’s Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, compared with approximately 33 percent of applications submitted by State’s Orientation and In-Processing Center.

Moreover, according to U.S. officials, an analysis of issued visas may underestimate the extent of visa delays. First, it may exclude cases in which a visa was not issued, including cases where (1) an individual withdrew a visa application because the visa was not received prior to the planned departure date or (2) a visa application that had taken longer than 6 weeks to process was still pending at the Pakistani embassy at the time of our analysis. For instance, from November 2009 to June 2012, State’s Special Issuance Agency pulled about 180 passports— representing approximately 10 percent of the Pakistani visa applications that it submitted during this period—from the Pakistani embassy without visa issuance, including approximately 140 passports that the agency pulled after a visa was not issued prior to the individual’s planned departure date. Further, an analysis of visa processing time may not include delays that certain DOD officials face in obtaining non-objection certificates and letters of invitation required for their visa applications. For instance, DOD officials told us that obtaining this documentation takes approximately 6 weeks and that visa applications for DOD personnel are submitted only after a non-objection certificate or letter of invitation has been obtained. Therefore, visa delays that DOD personnel may experience are in addition to the wait time to obtain a non-objection certificate or letter of invitation. For instance, DOD officials told us that in addition to waiting 4 to 6 weeks to obtain a Pakistani visa, some DOD travelers have waited months for the documentation that must accompany the visa application.

U.S. officials also experience delays in obtaining visa extensions after arrival in Pakistan. The U.S. embassy in Islamabad monitors the visa status of U.S. officials accredited to the U.S. mission in Pakistan and processes applications for any required visa extensions for these officials.

According to State, visa extensions are granted by the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Between 2010 and 2012, the U.S. embassy processed applications for approximately 2,200 visa extensions for U.S. officials in Pakistan. Approximately 59 percent of these visa extensions took longer than 6 weeks to be issued, with approximately 5 percent taking 16 weeks or longer. See figure 4 for more information.

Additionally, data from the U.S. embassy in Islamabad show that it never received approximately 50 visa extensions for which it had applied. U.S. officials told us that in some of these cases, the applicants experienced such a lengthy delay in receiving their visa extensions that they decided to leave Pakistan rather than overstay their initial visa while waiting for the extension.

In addition to reporting delays related to obtaining visas for U.S. officials, agencies noted challenges in obtaining visas for contractors assisting in implementing programs for U.S. agencies in Pakistan.State’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program and DOJ’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program rely on contractor staff to provide training to Pakistani law enforcement personnel. However, both agencies noted delays in obtaining visas for these instructors. For example, State reported that it applied for approximately 40 instructor visas for its Antiterrorism Assistance Program between October and December 2012 but that no instructors received visas in time to provide instruction as planned. Similarly, officials of DOJ International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program told us that they have experienced delays in obtaining visas for their contractor staff. According to State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Office of Aviation for Pakistan, it has experienced delays in obtaining contractor visas, including one visa that it applied for in October 2010 and that was still pending as of January 2013. In addition, as of February 2013, State told us it had experienced visa wait times of longer than 6 weeks for approximately 30 facilities maintenance contractors overseeing reconstruction of the U.S. embassy in Islamabad.

Reasons for the delays in processing Pakistani visas are not well understood. Officials from DOD, DOJ, State, USAID, and the U.S. embassy in Islamabad said that they receive little specific information from Pakistan on the reasons for visa delays. Officials from those agencies stated that factors in the bilateral relationship between the United States and Pakistan appear to affect the length of visa processing.

Agencies Have Reported Multiple Effects of Visa Delays on Program Implementation and Oversight in Pakistan

Agencies have identified visa delays as a risk to effective implementation of U.S. programs in Pakistan. Agencies noted that visa delays cause staffing gaps, limit opportunities to train Pakistani security personnel, constrain oversight and monitoring of U.S. programs, and complicate program planning and implementation.

First, according to DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, and USAID officials, visa delays cause staffing gaps for positions at the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, including those providing security and law enforcement assistance to Pakistan. For example, DOD officials told us that visas for key positions have been significantly delayed. Specifically, DOD officials noted that the visa for the training officer for the International Military Training and Education program in Pakistan was delayed for several months, during which the position was vacant. Additionally, they told us that two individuals scheduled to staff the Defense Attaché Office waited approximately 8 months for their visas and were ultimately reassigned because of the delays. State officials also noted staffing gaps due to delays in obtaining visas for security staff and staff managing counternarcotics and law enforcement programs. According to State officials, visa delays particularly affect Regional Security Office and Marine Security Guard staff, who provide protection for the U.S. embassy in Islamabad. State noted that visas for approximately 40 Regional Security Officers and Marine Security Guards were significantly delayed, some for as long as 9 months. Officials told us that such delays can lead to staffing gaps and that these gaps cannot always be filled by obtaining personnel on temporary assignment. Moreover, because embassy staffing plans are designed to align the number of staff with U.S. foreign policy priorities, security concerns, and other constraints, staffing gaps can undermine this alignment. See table 3 for additional examples of staffing gaps at the U.S. embassy in Islamabad that have resulted from visa delays.

In addition, according to agency officials, visa delays and related staffing gaps have limited their opportunities to train Pakistani security personnel. The officials said that the delays in obtaining visas for instructors scheduled to train Pakistani officials have caused agencies to postpone or cancel training in a variety of areas, including antiterrorism, counternarcotics and law enforcement, use and maintenance of military equipment, and countering improvised explosive devices. For example, in the first quarter of fiscal year 2013, State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program canceled 14 of 31 classes on critical management topics, such as tactical, negotiation, and investigation skills in combating terrorism, because of delays in obtaining visas for instructors. In addition, State continued to operate and maintain its training facility in Pakistan for the Antiterrorism Assistance program, although the classrooms were empty because of canceled trainings. Moreover, officials at State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs told us that visa delays have disrupted the delivery of law enforcement and rule-of-law assistance to Pakistan’s criminal justice sector. According to these officials, the bureau has provided Pakistan with 17 aircraft for counternarcotics assistance at a value of $50 million. However, officials at the bureau’s Office of Aviation for Pakistan told us that in June 2010 and November 2012, respectively, the office placed three C-208 aircraft and six Huey-II helicopters in storage owing to a shortage of personnel in Pakistan that had resulted from visa delays. According to these officials, this personnel shortage limited the office’s ability to train Pakistanis and perform aircraft inspections and repairs necessary for the proper use of the equipment. In addition, State officials noted that they had canceled police and rule-of-law training because of visa delays. DOD officials noted similar cancellations of counternarcotics training, and several agencies noted cancellation of training on countering improvised explosive devices. DOJ International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program officials told us that delays in obtaining visas for instructors were so pervasive that the program would be forced to reduce training after March 2013, unless it receives new visas for its instructor staff.

Moreover, visa delays have reportedly constrained oversight and monitoring of U.S. programs in Pakistan. Officials from Inspectors General for USAID, State, and DOD’s U.S. Central Command stated that visa delays have disrupted inspections and audits. State and USAID officials also noted that visa delays create challenges for conducting monitoring and evaluation of program assistance, including monitoring and evaluation of antiterrorism and development programs. For instance, according to State officials, an assessment and evaluation of the Pakistan Antiterrorism Assistance program in June 2012 was delayed when several team members were unable to participate in the trip because their visas were not issued in a timely manner. DHS officials also told us that because of visa delays, DHS cannot conduct an audit of the inventory of supplies or replace outdated nonintrusive inspection technology used for the Secure Freight Initiative in Pakistan, which captures data on containers bound for the United States and alerts U.S. and Pakistani officials of security risks.

Further, even when visa delays do not lead to staffing gaps, the delays complicate program planning and implementation, according to agency officials. Regarding planning, DOD, State, and USAID officials noted that visa delays create challenges planning travel to Pakistan, as it is not unusual for U.S. officials to receive visas very close to the day of their planned departure. Visa delays also slow program implementation. USAID officials stated that visa delays can affect programs in Pakistan by slowing the arrival of technical experts needed to assist with project design and implementation. Similarly, DOJ International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program officials told us that visa delays make it very challenging for them to plan courses and training schedules.

Additionally, officials told us that the issuance of visas with travel restrictions can also create challenges and increase project costs. For instance, according to officials from USAID, various types of visas received by U.S. officials create challenges for staff once they are in Pakistan, as they must constantly monitor their visa status and may have to leave Pakistan to reset their visas in compliance with Pakistani immigration regulation. For example, U.S. officials in Pakistan with visas that allow multiple entries for 1 year, with a maximum stay of 90 days at a time, must exit Pakistan every 90 days to reset their visas. USAID’s Office of Inspector General estimated that it has spent approximately $25,000 in additional travel costs due to delays in receiving visa extensions for staff traveling on visas that require a reset every 90 days. In addition, State officials told us that they have experienced challenges in obtaining 1-year multi-entry visas for staff providing oversight of construction on the U.S. embassy compound in Islamabad. According to State, the need for staff to reset their short-term visas limits the efficiency of embassy construction and adds to the cost of the project. For instance, State reported in May 2012 that these disruptions added approximately $2 million to the project’s overall cost.

Agencies Have Taken Various Steps to Address Pakistani Visa Delays, but Reporting on These Delays Could Be Improved

Agencies have taken various steps to address Pakistani visa delays, but reporting to Congress does not provide comprehensive information on the risk of visa delays government-wide. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 requires State, in consultation with DOD, to identify and report to Congress about risks to effective use and oversight of U.S. funds, including any shortfall in U.S. human resources, among other things. In addition, according to federal standards for internal control, analyzing information on identified risks could help agencies better manage such risks. According to officials, agencies have taken various steps to manage visa delays and their effects. For instance, State has conducted high-level discussions with the Pakistani government regarding visa delays, and agencies affected by Pakistani visa delays have shifted training to other countries. However, State’s reporting to Congress does not provide comprehensive information on the risk of visa delays government-wide. State has reported visa delays as a challenge to the implementation of its programs. However, State’s reports do not include information regarding the risks of visa delays to the human resources of other agencies, although components of DOD, DOJ, and USAID told us that they had experienced staffing gaps caused by visa delays. Reporting comprehensive information about the risks of visa delays could provide a more complete picture of the challenges to implementing U.S. assistance and better inform any potential diplomatic discussions between the United States and Pakistan regarding delays.

Agencies Have Taken Steps to Address Visa Delays

Agencies have taken steps to address the effects of delays on their operations, including reprogramming funds for other priority initiatives, shifting training to other countries, and tracking information on the status of obtaining Pakistani visas and visa extensions. According to federal standards for internal control, analyzing information on identified risks could help agencies better manage such risks. See table 4 for more examples of steps that agencies reported having taken to address the effects of visa delays on their operations.

In addition to taking steps to address the effects of visa delays, officials at State—the agency responsible for conducting diplomatic discussions with Pakistan—told us that they had engaged in high-level discussions with Pakistani officials in an attempt to expedite visa processing times for U.S. officials. State officials noted that mission leadership in Pakistan have raised the issue of visa delays, and particular staffing gaps at the U.S. embassy that have resulted from delays, with Pakistani ministerial personnel. The U.S. Secretary of State has also discussed visa delays with the Pakistani Foreign Minister to try to resolve the issue. State officials told us State will continue to discuss these issues with Pakistan as warranted by events.

While operations generally continue, agencies noted that their mitigation actions do not fully resolve the effects of visa delays and that they cannot implement programs as effectively or efficiently. Staff from the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs said that although they take steps to deliver assistance despite visa delays, the difficulty in maintaining the continuous presence of in-country staff reduces readily available subject matter expertise, slows interaction with Pakistani officials, and lessens the ability to quickly increase staff to address emerging needs. Regarding efficiency, DOD staff said that shifting training to third-country locations raises costs significantly, including costs for airlifting Pakistani personnel and providing funds for insurance and other incidental needs, and results in the training of fewer Pakistani personnel. DOJ’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training staff similarly noted that although relocating training has had a positive outcome, it has incurred higher costs for the U.S. government.

Reporting to Congress Does Not Provide Comprehensive Information on the Risks of Pakistani Visa Delays Government-wide

In reporting to Congress, State has not provided comprehensive information on the risks of Pakistani visa delays government-wide. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 requires State, in consultation with DOD, to identify and report on a semiannual basis to Congress about risks to effective use and oversight of U.S funds to Pakistan, including any shortfall in U.S. human resources, among other things. In compliance with the act, State has produced semiannual monitoring reports describing the assistance provided to Pakistan during the preceding 180-day period. State’s report for the period of March 2010 to December 2010 did not cite visa delays as a risk to its programs. In its reports covering January 2011 to November 2011 and December 2011 to June 2012, State broadly cited challenges to program implementation due to visa delays, and in the latter report, State included the example of disruptions to its antiterrorism training efforts in Pakistan caused by visa delays. However, State’s reports do not include information regarding the risks of Pakistani visa delays affecting U.S. human resources for other State programs and for agencies other than State, although officials from components of DOD, USAID, and DOJ reported to us that such delays had caused staffing gaps during this time period. For instance, DOD experienced visa delays that created staffing gaps affecting its security assistance office, including a vacancy in the position of the officer responsible for coordinating military exchange programs, while DOJ experienced a staffing gap for its Resident Legal Advisor. Information from DOD, USAID, and DOJ components could be included in State’s reports, given that officials from these agencies told us that they track information related to visa delays. Officials of other agency components, such as DOJ’s Drug Enforcement Administration and DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, told us that they do not retain data about visa processing times although they maintain information on their staff’s ability to travel to Pakistan.

In addition, since passage of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act in October 2009, Congress has expressed continued interest in receiving information on visa delays. For instance, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Congress required State to certify requested information about the timeliness of issuance of Pakistani visas to U.S. officials before certain funding for Pakistan could be provided. State waived the certification requirements for fiscal year 2012 as allowed in the act. DOD’s fiscal year 2013 appropriation requires a similar certification from the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, before funds may be reimbursed to Pakistan for support provided to U.S. military operations. Without comprehensive reporting about the risks of visa delays and related staffing gaps, State’s reporting to Congress may not provide a complete picture of the challenges the United States faces in managing and overseeing U.S. assistance to Pakistan, and agencies may lack information that could help them manage such risks.

Conclusions

Although the United States invested more than $26 billion in fiscal years 2002 through 2012 to assist the government of Pakistan, U.S. officials applying for Pakistani visas continue to face delays that they have identified as disrupting their efforts to provide assistance. Despite identifying these disruptions as a risk, State does not report comprehensive information on the extent of visa delays across the U.S. government. Complete and consistent reporting of such information could help the United States diagnose problems related to visa delays, enhance planning, and improve decision making to address the effects of such delays. In addition, tracking information on the risks of visa delays could help State provide more complete information in response to congressional reporting requirements and may help to inform future diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Pakistan to resolve this issue.

Recommendation for Executive Action

To improve the information provided to Congress and to inform potential diplomatic discussions, we recommend that the Secretary of State consult with U.S. agencies engaged in providing assistance to Pakistan to obtain information on Pakistani visa delays and include this information in State’s future reporting to Congress.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to State, DOD, DHS, DOJ, and USAID for their review and comment. State and DOD provided written comments, which we have reprinted in appendixes II and III, respectively. State and DOJ also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS and USAID had no comments.

In commenting on our report, State partially concurred with our recommendation that it should consult with U.S. agencies engaged in providing assistance to Pakistan to obtain information on visa delays and include this information in its future reporting to Congress. State noted that interagency coordination regarding Pakistani visa applications can be difficult and additional staff would be required for State to coordinate all U.S. government Pakistani visa applications. In addition, according to State, it is important to note that certain visa applicants, such as U.S. officials traveling to Pakistan on short-term assignments and military or security personnel, experience longer wait times than other applicants. State noted that reporting to Congress that differentiates between these applicants would be more effective. However, State stated that our report prompted State and Embassy Islamabad to improve coordination procedures to better track visa applications within State and, to the extent possible, throughout the interagency.

We maintain that reporting of more comprehensive information by State on the risks of visa delays could better inform Congress regarding the challenges of implementing U.S. assistance in Pakistan. While we acknowledge that interagency coordination can be challenging, officials from various agencies—including DOD, DHS, DOJ, and USAID—told us they track or maintain information related to visa delays, which could facilitate State’s efforts to obtain and report such information. Moreover, our recommendation would not require State to “coordinate all U.S. government visa applications for Pakistan,” but rather recommends that State consult with other agencies to obtain information these agencies already collect regarding visa delays to Pakistan. In addition, we are encouraged that our report prompted State to develop new procedures to enhance its tracking of visa applications government-wide. We agree with State that certain visa applicants may experience longer wait times than other applicants, including, as we note in our report, those providing security and law enforcement assistance to Pakistan. We believe that our recommendation is consistent with State identifying and reporting on which visa applicants experience longer wait times, and that such reporting could better inform Congress.

In commenting on our report, DOD agreed with the report’s findings and observations. DOD also noted that Pakistani officials experience delays obtaining visas to travel to the United States, which “feed the narrative that the Pakistanis treat us no differently than we treat them,” undermining requests for process improvements. While DOD notes that visa delays experienced by Pakistani officials may affect processing of visas for U.S. officials, we could not verify whether this has been a contributing cause because the government of Pakistan did not respond to our requests to discuss visa delays.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of State, and officials at DOD, DHS, DOJ, and USAID. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report reviews issues related to visa delays, including their extent and implications. Specifically, we examined (1) the extent to which U.S. officials experience delays obtaining Pakistani visas and the effects of these delays and (2) steps U.S. agencies have taken to address Pakistani visa delays.

Our work focused on Pakistani visa applications of the Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We met with officials from relevant components of these agencies, including DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan, U.S. Central Command, and DOD Passport Matters; DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; DOJ’s Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, and Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training; State’s Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and Office of Inspector General; and USAID’s Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs and Office of Inspector General. We focused on these agencies and components because personnel of these agencies constituted 99 percent of U.S. officials stationed in Pakistan as of May 2012.

To evaluate the extent to which U.S. officials experience delays obtaining Pakistani visas, and the effects of these delays, we collected available data on processing times for official and diplomatic visa applications to Pakistan in fiscal years 2010 through 2012 from DOD’s Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan, DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation, State’s Special Issuance Agency and Orientation and In-Processing Center, and USAID’s Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs. Not all components had data available for the entire period of fiscal years 2010 through 2012. Although DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation provided data for the entire period, DOD’s Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan provided data for December 2009 through September 2012, State’s Special Issuance Agency provided data for November 2009 through September 2012, State’s Orientation and In-Processing Center provided data for March 2010 through September 2012, and USAID’s Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs provided data for December 2010 through September 2012. We also obtained data for January 2010 through December 2012 from the U.S. embassy in Islamabad on processing times for visa extensions for U.S. officials in Pakistan. We determined visa processing times by examining the date of a visa application and the date the visa was received by the agency. We defined a delay as a processing time exceeding 6 weeks, because, according to the embassy of Pakistan, the stated processing time for visas for U.S. officials is within 6 weeks of their application date. To determine the extent of delays, we grouped processing times into categories by week. The category “1 week” includes processing times of 0 to 7 days, the category “2 weeks” includes processing times of 8 to 14 days, and the category “3 weeks” includes processing times of 15 to 21 days. Categories continue sequentially in this manner until the “16+ week” category, which includes processing times of 106 to 440 days. Additionally, we obtained data on visa processing times for contractors from DOJ’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program and State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. However, because contractors are not U.S. officials, we did not combine these data with the data on visa processing times for U.S. officials. Further, to discuss the effects of Pakistani visa delays on the delivery and oversight of U.S. assistance in Pakistan, including the implementation of such assistance by contractors, we examined agency planning, budget, and oversight documents discussing visa delays, including mission strategic resource plans and quarterly progress and oversight reports on the civilian assistance program in Pakistan from 2010 to 2012. Additionally, we interviewed officials from DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, and USAID to discuss the effects of visa delays on program delivery and oversight. The government of Pakistan did not respond to our requests to discuss visa delays for U.S. officials.

To examine the steps U.S. agencies have taken to address Pakistani visa delays, including steps to address associated risks that they had identified, we reviewed relevant agency documents, including planning and budget documents and available data on visa processing times, and conducted interviews with knowledgeable officials. We compared these steps with risk assessment standards in our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. We also examined semiannual monitoring reports that State had provided to Congress in compliance with the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009.

To assess the reliability of visa processing data, we (1) interviewed agency officials responsible for compiling these data and (2) performed basic reasonableness checks of the data for obvious inconsistency errors and completeness. When we found discrepancies, we brought them to the attention of relevant agency officials and worked with officials to correct the discrepancies before conducting our analyses. According to agency officials, these data may not include all visa applications to Pakistan, because U.S. officials may not always involve agency travel offices in processing their applications. Furthermore, as we report, our analysis of issued visas may understate processing time because it excludes cases in which a visa was not issued, such as cases in which (1) an individual withdrew a visa application because the visa was not received prior to the individual’s planned departure date or (2) a visa application that had taken longer than 6 weeks to process was still pending at the Pakistani embassy at the time of our analysis. In addition, our analysis covers only visa processing time and does not include wait times to obtain non-objection certificates or letters of invitation. Despite these limitations, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of making broad statements about processing times for completed visas. We also make a recommendation to address existing limitations in reporting of visa delays across agencies.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to May 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant Director), Lina Khan, Lisa Reijula, and Biza Repko made key contributions to this report. Ashley Alley, Jenny Chanley, Karen Deans, Carol E. Finkler, Rebecca Gambler, and Mary Moutsos provided additional support.

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