Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Affecting the Fleet
Released: 2017-09-19T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Since January 2017, the Navy has suffered four significant mishaps at sea that have resulted in serious damage to Navy ships and the loss of 17 sailors (see figure 1). Three of the four at sea mishaps that have occurred—two collisions and one grounding—have involved ships homeported overseas in Yokosuka, Japan. Appendix II provides a summary of major mishaps for Navy ships at sea in fiscal years 2009 through 2017.

The Navy currently has 277 ships, a 17 percent reduction from the 333 ships it had in 1998. Over the past two decades, as the number of Navy ships has decreased, the number of ships deployed overseas has remained roughly constant at about 100 ships; consequently, each ship is being deployed more to maintain the same level of presence. We reported in September 2016 that the Navy, along with the other military services, had been reporting persistently low readiness levels. The Navy attributes these, in part, to the increased deployment lengths needed to meet the continuing high demand for its aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious ships. For example, the deployment lengths for carrier strike groups had increased from an average of 6.4 months during the period of 2008 through 2011 to a less sustainable 9 months for three carrier strike groups that were deployed in 2015. In 2016, the Navy extended the deployments of the Harry S Truman and Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Groups to 8 and 8.5 months, respectively. In addition, the Navy has had to shorten, eliminate, or defer training and maintenance periods to support these high deployment rates. These decisions have resulted in declining ship conditions across the fleet and have increased the amount of time required for the shipyards to complete maintenance on these ships. Lengthened maintenance periods, in turn, compress the time that ships are available for training and operations.

Ships Homeported Overseas Provide Increased Forward Presence but Train Less, Defer More Maintenance, Degrade Faster, and Cost More to Operate

As we previously reported, to help meet the operational demands using its existing inventory of ships, the Navy has assigned more of its surface combatants and amphibious ships to overseas homeports. Since 2006, the Navy has doubled the percentage of the fleet assigned to overseas homeports. In 2006, 20 ships were homeported overseas (7 percent of the fleet); today, 40 ships are homeported overseas (14 percent of the fleet) in Japan, Spain, Bahrain, and Italy; and an additional destroyer will be homeported in Yokosuka, Japan in 2018 (see figure 2).

According to the Navy, homeporting ships overseas is an efficient method for providing forward presence and rapid crisis response. Our prior work confirms that having ships homeported overseas provides additional presence, but it comes at a cost. For example, we found in May 2015 that homeporting ships overseas results in higher operations and support costs than homeporting ships in the United States. In addition, the operational schedules the Navy uses for overseas-homeported ships limit dedicated training and maintenance periods, resulting in difficulty keeping crews fully trained and ships maintained. In fact, the primary reason that Navy ships homeported overseas provide more deployed time than ships homeported in the United States is that the Navy reduces their training and maintenance periods in order to maximize their operational availability. Ships homeported overseas do not operate within the traditional fleet response plan cycles that apply to U.S.-based ships. Since the ships are in permanent deployment status during their time homeported overseas, they do not have designated ramp-up and ramp- down maintenance and training periods built into their operational schedules (see figure 3). Navy officials told us that because the Navy expects these ships to be operationally available for the maximum amount of time, their intermediate and depot-level maintenance are executed through more frequent, shorter maintenance periods or deferred until after they return to a U.S. homeport—generally after 7 to 10 years overseas.

In May 2015, we also found that high operational tempo for ships homeported overseas limits the time for crew training when compared with training time for ships homeported in the United States. Navy officials told us that U.S.-based crews are completely qualified and certified prior to deploying from their U.S. homeports, with few exceptions. In contrast, the high operational tempo of ships homeported overseas had resulted in what Navy personnel called a “train on the margins” approach, a shorthand way to say there was no dedicated training time set aside for the ships so crews trained while underway or in the limited time between underway periods. We found that, at the time of our 2015 review, there were no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of the cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious ships homeported in Yokosuka and Sasebo, Japan. As a result, these crews did not have all of their needed training and certifications. We recommended that the Navy develop and implement a sustainable operational schedule for all ships homeported overseas. DOD concurred with this recommendation and reported in 2015 that it had developed revised operational schedules for all ships homeported overseas. However, when we contacted DOD to obtain updated information in August 2017, U.S. Pacific Fleet officials stated that the revised operational schedules for the cruisers and destroyers homeported in Japan were still under review and had not been employed. As of June 2017, 37 percent of the warfare certifications for cruiser and destroyer crews homeported in Japan had expired, and over two-thirds of the expired certifications—including mobility-seamanship and air warfare—had been expired for 5 months or more. This represents more than a fivefold increase in the percentage of expired warfare certifications for these ships since our May 2015 report. The Navy’s Surface Force Readiness Manual states that the high operational tempo and frequent tasking of ships homeported overseas requires that these ships always be prepared to execute complex operations and notes that this demand for continuous readiness also means that ships homeported overseas should maintain maximum training, material condition, and manning readiness.

With respect to the material condition of the ships, we found in May 2015 that casualty reports—incidents of degraded or out-of-service equipment—nearly doubled over the 2009 through 2014 time frame, and the condition of overseas-homeported ships decreased even faster than that of U.S.-based ships (see figure 4). The Navy uses casualty reports to provide information on the material condition of ships in order to determine current readiness. For example, casualty report data provide information on equipment or systems that are degraded or out of service, the lack of which will affect a ship’s ability to support required mission areas. In 2015, Navy officials acknowledged an increasing number of casualty reports on Navy ships and a worsening trend in material ship condition. They stated that equipment casualties require unscheduled maintenance and have a negative effect on fleet operations, because there is an associated capability or capacity loss.

In our May 2015 report, we recommended that the Navy develop a comprehensive assessment of the long-term costs and risks to its fleet associated with the Navy’s increasing reliance on overseas homeporting to meet presence requirements; make any necessary adjustments to its overseas presence based on this assessment; and reassess these risks when making future overseas homeporting decisions. DOD concurred with this recommendation, but, as of August 2017, it has not conducted an assessment, even though it has continued to increase the number of ships homeported overseas.

Size and Composition of Ship Crews May Contribute to Sailor Overwork and Create Readiness and Safety Risks

In the early 2000s, the Navy made several changes to its process for determining the size and composition of ship crews that may contribute to sailor overwork and create readiness and safety risks. These changes were intended to drive down crew sizes in order to save on personnel costs. However, as we reported in May 2017, these changes were not substantiated with analysis and may be creating readiness and safety risks. With fewer sailors operating and maintaining surface ships, the material condition of the ships declined, and we found that this decline ultimately contributed to an increase in operating and support costs that outweighed any savings on personnel (see figure 5). The Navy eventually reassessed and reversed some of the changes it had made during this period—known as “optimal manning”—but it continued to use a workweek standard that does not reflect the actual time sailors spend working and does not account for in-port workload—both of which may be leading to sailors being overworked. Additionally, we found that heavy workload does not end after ships return to port. Crews typically operate with fewer sailors while in port, so those crew members remaining must cover the workload of multiple sailors, causing additional strain and potential overwork.

In 2014, the Navy conducted a study of the standard workweek and identified significant issues that could negatively affect a crew’s capabilities to accomplish tasks and maintain the material readiness of ships, as well as crew safety issues that might result if crews slept less to accommodate workload that was not accounted for. The Navy study found that sailors were on duty 108 hours a week, exceeding their weekly on-duty allocation of 81 hours. This on-duty time included 90 hours of productive work—20 hours per week more than the 70 hours that are allotted in the standard workweek. This, in turn, reduced the time available for rest and resulted in sailors spending less time sleeping than was allotted, a situation that the study noted could encourage a poor safety culture. Moving forward, the Navy will likely face manning challenges, especially given its current difficulty in filling authorized positions, as it seeks to increase the size of its fleet by as much as 30 percent over its current size. Navy officials stated that even with manpower requirements that accurately capture all workload, the Navy will be challenged to fund these positions and fill them with adequately trained sailors at current personnel levels. Figure 6 shows the Navy’s projected end strength and fleet size.

In our May 2017 report, we found that the Navy’s guidance does not require that the factors it uses to calculate manpower requirements be reassessed periodically or when conditions change, to ensure that these factors remain valid and that crews are appropriately sized. We made several recommendations to address this issue, including that the Navy should (1) reassess the standard workweek, (2) require examination of in- port workload, (3) develop criteria to reassess the factors used in its manpower requirements process, and (4) update its ship manpower requirements. DOD concurred with our recommendations, stating that it is committed to ensuring that the Navy’s manpower requirements are current and analytically based and will meet the needs of the existing and future surface fleet. As of August 2017, DOD had not yet taken any actions to implement these recommendations. We believe that, until the Navy makes the needed changes, its ships may not have the right number and skill mix of sailors to maintain readiness and prevent overworking its sailors.

The Navy’s Inability to Complete Ship Maintenance on Time Hampers Its Efforts to Rebuild Readiness

To address its persistently low readiness levels, the Navy began implementing a revised operational schedule in November 2014, which it referred to as the optimized fleet response plan. This plan seeks to maximize the employability of the existing fleet while preserving adequate time for maintenance and training, providing continuity in ship leadership and carrier strike group assignments, and restoring operational and personnel tempos to acceptable levels. The Navy’s implementation of the optimized fleet response plan—and readiness recovery more broadly—is premised on adherence to deployment, training, and maintenance schedules.

However, in May 2016, we found that the Navy was having difficulty in implementing its new schedule as intended. Both the public and private shipyards were having difficulty completing maintenance on time, owing primarily to the poor condition of the ships after more than a decade of heavy use, deferred maintenance, and the Navy’s inability to accurately predict how much maintenance they would need. We reported that in 2011 through 2014 only 28 percent of scheduled maintenance for surface combatants was completed on time and just 11 percent was completed on time for aircraft carriers. We updated these data as of August 2017 to include maintenance availabilities completed through the end of fiscal year 2016 and found continued difficulty completing maintenance on time for key portions of the Navy fleet (see figure 7):

Aircraft Carriers (CVNs): In fiscal years 2011 through 2016, maintenance overruns on 18 of 21 (86 percent) aircraft carriers resulted in a total of 1,103 lost operational days—days that ships were not available for operations—the equivalent of losing the use of 0.5 aircraft carriers each year.

Surface Combatants (DDGs and CGs): In fiscal years 2011 through 2016, maintenance overruns on 107 of 169 (63 percent) surface combatants resulted in a total of 6,603 lost operational days—the equivalent of losing the use of 3.0 surface combatants each year.

Submarines (SSNs, SSBNs, and SSGNs): In fiscal years 2011 through 2016, maintenance overruns on 39 of 47 (83 percent) submarines resulted in a total of 6,220 lost operational days—the equivalent of losing the use of 2.8 submarines each year.

Navy officials are aware of the challenges faced by both the public and private shipyards and have taken steps to address the risks these pose to maintenance schedules, including hiring additional shipyard workers and improving their maintenance planning processes. However, Navy officials have told us that it will take time for these changes to bring about a positive effect. For example, as of May 2016, data on the public shipyards’ workforce showed that 32 percent of all employees had fewer than 5 years of experience. According to Navy officials, this workforce inexperience negatively affects the productivity of the shipyards, and it will take several years for them to attain full productivity.

Just last week, we issued another report, prepared in response to direction from this committee, examining the ability of the Navy’s public shipyards to support the Navy’s readiness needs. We found that capacity limitations as well as the poor condition of the shipyards’ facilities and equipment contributed to the maintenance delays we discussed earlier and were hindering the shipyards’ ability to support the Navy. Specifically, we found that the shipyards will be unable to support 73—or about one-third—of 218 maintenance periods planned over the next 23 years. In addition, this estimate did not factor in planned increases to the fleet. We made three recommendations, with which the Navy agreed to take steps to improve its management of capital investment in the shipyards. However, we noted that at current average funding levels it would take at least 19 years and a Navy-estimated $4.86 billion to clear the backlog of restoration and modernization projects at the shipyards. Furthermore, this estimate does not include the $9 billion that the Navy estimates it will need for capacity and capability upgrades over the next 12 years to support maintenance operations for the current fleet.

Navy Readiness Rebuilding is Part of a Broader DOD Effort

In September 2016, we found that although DOD has stated that readiness rebuilding is a priority, implementation and oversight of department-wide readiness rebuilding efforts did not fully include key elements of sound planning, and the lack of these elements puts the overall rebuilding efforts at risk. The Navy states that its overall goal for readiness recovery is to reach a predictable and sustainable level of global presence and surge capacity from year to year. The Navy identified carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups as key force elements in its plan for readiness recovery and had set 2020 for reaching a predictable and sustainable level of global presence and surge capacity by implementing the optimized fleet response plan. However, we found in 2016 that the Navy faced significant challenges, such as delays in completing maintenance and emerging demands, in achieving its readiness recovery goals for carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups, and projections show that the Navy will not meet its time frames for achieving readiness recovery.

As a result, we recommended that DOD and the services establish comprehensive readiness goals, strategies for implementing them, and associated metrics that can be used to evaluate whether readiness recovery efforts are achieving intended outcomes. DOD generally concurred with our recommendations and, in November 2016, issued limited guidance to the military services on rebuilding readiness; it has also started to design a framework to guide the military services in achieving readiness recovery but has not yet implemented our recommendations. The Navy has since extended its time frame for readiness recovery to at least 2021, but it still has not developed specific benchmarks or interim goals for tracking and reporting on readiness recovery. Navy officials cited several challenges to rebuilding readiness, chief among them the continued high demand for its forces, the unpredictability of funding, and the current difficulty with beginning and completing ship maintenance on time.

In January 2017, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct a readiness review and identify actions that can be implemented in fiscal year 2017 to improve readiness. DOD and Navy officials told us that, as part of this readiness review, the Navy prioritized immediate readiness gaps and shortfalls. These officials added that this review would guide the Navy’s investment decisions in future budget cycles, with the intention to rebuild readiness and prepare the force for future conflicts. However, high demand for naval presence will continue to put pressure on a fleet that is already stretched thin across the globe. Looking to the future, the Navy has plans to grow its fleet by as much as 30 percent, but it has not yet shown the ability to adequately man, maintain, and operate the current fleet. These readiness problems need to be addressed and will require the Navy to implement our recommendations—particularly in the areas of assessing the risks associated with overseas basing, reassessing sailor workload and the factors used to size ship crews, managing investments in its shipyards, and applying sound planning and sustained management attention to its readiness rebuilding efforts. In addition, continued congressional oversight will be needed to ensure that the Navy demonstrates progress in addressing its maintenance, training, and other challenges.

Chairmen McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements

If you or your staff have questions about this testimony, please contact John Pendleton, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.

Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Suzanne Wren, Assistant Director; Steven Banovac, Chris Cronin, Kerri Eisenbach, Joanne Landesman, Amie Lesser, Felicia Lopez, Tobin McMurdie, Shari Nikoo, Cody Raysinger, Michael Silver, Grant Sutton, and Chris Watson.

Appendix I: Implementation Status of Prior GAO Recommendations Cited in this Testimony

Over the past three years, we issued several reports related to Navy readiness cited in this statement. Table 1 summarizes the status of recommendations made in these reports, which contained a total of 14 recommendations. The Department of Defense generally concurred with all of these recommendations but has implemented only one of them to date. For each of the reports, the specific recommendations and their implementation status are summarized in tables 2 through 5.

Appendix II: Summary of Major Mishaps for Navy Ships at Sea for Fiscal Years 2009 Through 2017, as of August 2017

The Navy defines a class A mishap as one that results in $2 million or more in damages to government or other property, or a mishap that resulted in a fatality or permanent total disability. We analyzed data compiled by the Naval Safety Center for fiscal years 2009 through 2017 to provide a summary of major Navy mishaps at sea (see table 6).

Appendix III: Related GAO Products

Report numbers with a C or RC suffix are Classified. Classified reports are available to personnel with the proper clearances and need to know, upon request.

Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions that Affect Operation. GAO-17-548. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2017.

Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet. GAO-17-798T. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2017.

Department of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission Challenges. GAO-17-369. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2017.

Military Readiness: Coastal Riverine Force Challenges. GAO-17-462C. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2017. (SECRET)

Navy Force Structure: Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Size and Composition of Ship Crews. GAO-17-413. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2017.

Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan. GAO-16-841. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2016.

Navy and Marine Corps: Services Face Challenges to Rebuilding Readiness. GAO-16-481RC. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2016. (SECRET//NOFORN)

Military Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan. GAO-16-466R. Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2016.

Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports. GAO-15-329. Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2015.

Military Readiness: Navy Needs to Assess Risks to Its Strategy to Improve Ship Readiness. GAO-12-887. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2012.

Force Structure: Improved Cost Information and Analysis Needed to Guide Overseas Military Posture Decisions. GAO-12-711. Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2012.

Military Readiness: Navy Needs to Reassess Its Metrics and Assumptions for Ship Crewing Requirements and Training. GAO-10-592. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2010.

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