U.S. Civilian Space Policy Priorities: Reflections 50 Years After Sputnik
Released: 2009-05-27T00:00:00

Current U.S. space policy is based on a set of fundamental factors which, according to an Eisenhower presidential committee, "give importance, urgency, and inevitability to the advancement of space technology." These factors were developed fifty years ago as a direct result of the Soviet Union's (USSR) launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik. This launch began the "space age" and a "space race" between the United States and USSR.

The four factors are the compelling need to explore and discover; national defense; prestige and confidence in the U.S. scientific, technological, industrial, and military systems; and scientific observation and experimentation to add to our knowledge and understanding of the Earth, solar system, and universe. They are still part of current policy discussions and influence the nation's civilian space policy priorities—both in terms of what actions NASA is authorized to undertake and the appropriations each activity within NASA receives.

NASA has active programs that address all four factors, but many believe that it is being asked to accomplish too much for the available resources. An understanding of how policy decisions made during the Sputnik era influence U.S. space policy today may be useful as Congress considers changing that policy. The response of Congress to the fundamental question, "Why go to space?," may influence NASA's programs, such as its earth-observing satellites, human exploration of the Moon and Mars, and robotic investigation of the solar system and wider universe as well as its policies on related activities, including spinoff technological development, science and mathematics education, international relations, and commercial space transportation.

This report describes Sputnik and its influence on today's U.S. civilian space policy, the actions other nations and commercial organizations are taking in space exploration, and why the nation invests in space exploration and the public's attitude toward it. The report concludes with a discussion of possible options for future U.S. civilian space policy priorities and the implication of those priorities.

Sputnik and America's "Sputnik Moment"

On October 4, 1957, the USSR launched Sputnik, the world's first artificial satellite. Sputnik (Russian for "traveling companion") was the size of a basketball and weighed 183 pounds (see Figure 1 ). Sputnik's launch and orbit still influences policy decisions 50 years later.

The USSR's ability to launch a satellite ahead of the United States led to a national concern that the United States was falling behind the USSR in its science and technology capabilities and thus might be vulnerable to a nuclear missile attack. The resulting competition for scientific and technological superiority came to represent a competition between capitalism and communism.

Both the 85 th Congress and President Eisenhower undertook an immediate set of policy actions in response to the launch of Sputnik. Congress established the Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics on February 6, 1958, and the House Select Committee on Science and Astronautics on March 5, 1958—the first time since 1892 that both the House and Senate took action to create standing committees on an entirely new subject. Each committee was chaired by the Majority Leader. The Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee was also active in analyzing the nation's satellite and missile programs.

Multiple congressional hearings were held in the three months following Sputnik, and President Eisenhower addressed the nation to assure the public that the United States was scientifically strong and able to compete in space. Within 10 months after Sputnik's launch, the Eisenhower Administration and Congress took actions that

established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) through the National Aeronautics and Space Act (P.L. 85-568), established the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) within the Department of Defense through DOD Directive 5105.15 and National Security - Military Installations and Facilities (P.L. 85-325), increased its appropriation for the National Science Foundation to $134 million, nearly $100 million higher than the previous year, and reformed elementary, secondary, and postsecondary science and mathematics education (including gifted education) and provided incentives for American students to pursue science, technology, engineering, and mathematics postsecondary degrees via fellowships and loans through the National Defense Education Act (P.L. 85-864).

Figure 2 provides a timeline of the some of the major policy events in the year following the Sputnik launch.

When people today speak of a "Sputnik moment," they often refer to a rapid national response that quickly mobilizes major policy change as opposed to a response of inaction or incremental policy change. The term is also used to question inaction—as in whether or not the nation is prepared to respond to a challenge without an initiating Sputnik moment.

Why Was Sputnik So Influential?

The Sputnik launch captured the public's attention at a time of heightened U.S. tension regarding the threat posed by the USSR and communism. Societal focus on civil defense, including "duck and cover" drills and the establishment of some personal bomb shelters, predisposed the nation towards identifying the potential threat posed by the Sputnik launch. In this climate, many Americans became concerned that if the USSR could launch a satellite into space, it could also launch a nuclear missile capable of reaching the United States.

The Sputnik launch was immediately viewed as a challenge to U.S. scientific and technological prowess. The Soviet Union launched both Sputnik and Sputnik 2 before the United States was able to attempt a satellite launch. Additionally, the Soviet launch was of a far heavier satellite than the U.S. had planned. The net result of the Sputnik launch was called a "Pearl Harbor for American Science"—a sign that the United States was falling behind the USSR in science and technology. The ensuing competition in scientific and technological skills came to represent a competition to determine the political superiority of capitalism versus communism.

The Senate Majority Leader at the time, future President Lyndon B. Johnson, illustrated the concern of many Americans in his own observations of the night sky: "Now, somehow, in some new way, the sky seemed almost alien. I also remember the profound shock of realizing that it might be possible for another nation to achieve technological superiority over this great country of ours."

Why Is Sputnik Important to Today's Policies?

The Sputnik launch prompted rapid development of new federal policies and programs. In particular, federal investment in NASA is still influenced by the Sputnik-era principles as illustrated in the Space Act, both in terms of what actions NASA is authorized to undertake and the extent to which each activity is funded.

In 2008, NASA was reauthorized for FY2009. As Congress considers future reauthorization of NASA, the status of the nation's space policy, and the relative importance of the various objectives underlying this policy may become topics of debate.

The United States faces a far different world today than 50 years ago. No Sputnik moment, Cold War, or space race exists to help policymakers clarify the goals of the nation's civilian space program. The Hubble telescope, Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters, and Mars exploration rovers frame the experience of current generations, in contrast to the Sputnik launch and the U.S. Moon landings that form the experience of older generations.

What Are the Activities of Other Nations and the Commercial Sector in Space Exploration?

According to an analysis conducted by the Space Foundation, the global space industry in 2007 generated $251.16 billion in revenues. (See Figure 3 .) The United States faces a possible new set of competitors or collaborators in civilian space exploration. China, India, Japan, Russia, and Europe are taking an active role in space exploration as are commercial companies. If China is the first to land humans on the Moon and establish a Moon base in the 21 st century or the European Space Agency is the first to land humans on Mars, will policymakers and the public view these activities as a loss in United States status and leadership? If so, what are the policy implications? Would such activities become this century's "Sputnik moment" that would spur further investment in U.S. space exploration activities? If not, how might this affect U.S. space policy priorities?

Future spacecraft are being developed. For example, the X-Prize Foundation Google Lunar X Prize ($30 million) invites private teams from around the world to build a robotic rover capable of landing on the Moon. Virgin Galactic, currently based in California with a spaceport under construction in New Mexico, has plans for SpaceShipTwo, a six-passenger spaceliner. In Europe, EADS-Astrium is developing a four-person spacecraft to make suborbital trips. According to press reports, a number of venture capitalists are also planning to build spaceships or develop private space programs. Should these efforts prove successful, what implications might this have for U.S. space policy priorities?

What Is the Nation's Current Civilian Space Policy?

The Obama Administration has stated the following regarding its proposed civilian space policy:

The United States must maintain and take full advantage of its technical and strategic superiority in space, which can simultaneously enhance our national security and provide crucial information about environmental and climatologic trends. The administration and OSTP will develop policies that will:

• Close the gap between retirement of the Space Shuttle and launch of the next generation of space vehicles to minimize any interruption in access to low-earth orbit, and take full advantage of the research opportunities provided by the International Space Station.

• Strengthen NASA's missions in space science, weather, climate research, and aeronautical research.

• Help establish a robust and balanced civilian space program, and engage international partners and the private sector to amplify NASA's reach.

• Re-establish the National Aeronautics and Space Council, which will report to the President and oversee and coordinate civilian, military, commercial and national security space activities.

• Ensure Freedom of Space by assessing possible threats to U.S. space assets and identifying the best options, military and diplomatic, for countering them; accelerating programs to harden U.S. satellites against attack; and establishing contingency plans to ensure that U.S. forces can maintain or duplicate access to information from space assets if necessary.

On May 7, 2009, John Holdren, Director of the President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), sent a letter to the Acting NASA Administrator requesting that an independent review of planned U.S. human space flight activities. The blue-ribbon panel, chaired by Norman Augustine, the former CEO of Lockheed Martin, is to work closely with NASA and seek input from Congress, the White House, the public, industry, and international partners. According to OSTP,

The review panel will assess a number of architecture options, taking into account such objectives as: 1) expediting a new U.S. capability to support use of the International Space Station; 2) supporting missions to the Moon and other destinations beyond low Earth orbit; 3) stimulating commercial space flight capabilities; and 4) fitting within the current budget profile for NASA exploration activities. Among the parameters to be considered in the course of its review are crew and mission safety, life-cycle costs, development time, national space industrial base impacts, potential to spur innovation and encourage competition, and the implications and impacts of transitioning from current human space flight systems. The review will consider the appropriate amounts of R&D and complementary robotic activity necessary to support various human space flight activities, as well as the capabilities that are likely to be enabled by each of the potential architectures under consideration. It will also explore options for extending International Space Station operations beyond 2016.

The results of the review are to be completed in sufficient time so that the Administration decision may consider the results of the panel's deliberations in deciding what action to take regarding human space flight by August 2009.

On May 23, 2009, President Obama nominated General Charles Bolden to be NASA Administrator and Lori Garver to be Deputy Administrator. Both positions require Senate confirmation.

Bush Administration Civilian Space Policy

During the Bush Administration, a U.S. National Space Policy defined the key objectives of defense and civilian space policy. This policy incorporated key elements of the Vision for Space Exploration ("Vision"), often referred to as the Moon/Mars program. In the Vision, the President directed NASA to focus its efforts on returning humans to the Moon by 2020 and eventually sending them to Mars and "worlds beyond." The President further directed NASA to fulfill commitments made to the 13 countries that are its partners in the International Space Station (ISS). In the 2005 NASA authorization act ( P.L. 109 - 155 ), Congress directed NASA to establish a program to accomplish the goals outlined in the Vision, which are that the United States

Implement a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond; Extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations; Develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations for human exploration; and Promote international and commercial participation in exploration to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests.

More specifically, the Vision included plans, via a strategy based on "long-term affordability," to

return the Space Shuttle safely to flight (which has been accomplished), complete the International Space Station (ISS) by 2010 but discontinue its use by 2017, phase out the Space Shuttle when the ISS is complete by 2010, send a robotic orbiter and lander to the Moon, send a human expedition to the Moon (sometime between 2015-2020), send a robotic mission to Mars in preparation for a future human expedition, and conduct robotic exploration across the solar system.

NASA Activities

NASA is developing a new spacecraft called Orion (formerly the Crew Exploration Vehicle) and a new launch vehicle for it called Ares I (formerly the Crew Launch Vehicle). An Earth-orbit capability is planned by 2014 (although NASA now considers early 2015 more likely) with the ability to take astronauts to and from the Moon following no later than 2020.

The Vision had broad implications for NASA, especially since almost all the funds to implement the initiative are expected to come from other NASA activities. Among the issues Congress is debating are the balance between NASA's exploration activities and its other programs, such as science and aeronautics research; the impact of the Vision on NASA's workforce needs; whether the space shuttle program might be ended in 2010; and if the United States might discontinue using the International Space Station.

During the Bush Administration, NASA stated that its strategy is to "go as we can afford to pay," with the pace of the program set, in part, by the available funding. Affording such a program is challenging, however, with a 2006 National Research Council report finding "NASA is being asked to accomplish too much with too little." The report recommended that "both the executive and the legislative branches of the federal government need to seriously examine the mismatch between the tasks assigned to NASA and the resources that the agency has been provided to accomplish them and should identify actions that will make the agency's portfolio of responsibilities sustainable."

Why Invest in Space Exploration?

The Table A-1 compares The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 as amended ("Space Act"), the oldest and most recent Presidential commission reports (Killian and Aldridge ), the U.S. National Space Policy ("Space Policy"), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-422 ). The analyses identify the following reasons why the United States might explore space:

knowledge and understanding, discovery, economic growth—job creation and new markets, national prestige, and defense.

Some also include the following reasons:

international relations, and education and workforce development.

Although there is broad agreement on the reasons for space exploration, there is a great deal of variation in the details. Among the chief differences in these documents are the degree to which

discovery is the major reason for space exploration as opposed to meeting needs here on Earth; creation of jobs and new markets should be a major focus of NASA activities as opposed to a side effect; science and mathematics education and workforce development should be a goal of NASA in addition to other federal agencies; and relationships with other countries should be competitive or cooperative regarding space exploration.

Comparing the Aldridge Commission themes, the Space Policy goals, and the Space Act objectives on the issue of the relationship of the space program to economic growth provides some insights. While the Aldridge committee has a much broader view of the industries related to space exploration, focusing on the potential role of space exploration in job generation and new market development, the Space Act and Space Policy focus on only one sector, the aeronautical and space vehicle industry.

The two Presidential commissions have two key differences. One is the first theme outlined in the Sputnik-era Killian Committee report: "the compelling urge of man to explore and discover." This is quite different from the recent Aldridge Commission report, which, although indicating exploration and discovery should be among NASA goals, states that "exploration and discovery will perhaps not be sufficient drivers to sustain what will be a long, and at times risky, journey." The implication is that, today, solely responding to the challenge of going to the Moon or Mars is not sufficient to energize public support for space exploration.

The second key difference is the focus of the Aldridge Commission on economic growth as a proposed space exploration theme. The Aldridge Commission identifies the ability of investments in civilian space programs to generate new jobs within current industries and spawn new markets. The contribution that federal space investments make to the nation's economy was not a key factor identified by the Killian Committee.

As a result of its focus on economic growth as a key theme of space exploration, the Aldridge Commission recommended that "NASA's relationship to the private sector, its organizational structure, business culture, and management processes—all largely inherited from the Apollo era—must be decisively transformed to implement the new, multi-decadal space exploration vision." Two of its specific recommendations were that NASA recognize and implement a far larger private industry presence in space operations, with the specific goal of allowing private industry to assume the primary role of providing services to NASA, and that NASA's centers be reconfigured as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) to enable innovation, work effectively with the private sector, and stimulate economic development.

FFRDCs are not-for-profit organizations which are financed on a sole-source basis, exclusively or substantially by an agency of the federal government, and not subject to Office of Personnel Management regulations. They operate as private non-profit corporations, although they are subject to certain personnel and budgetary controls imposed by Congress and/or their sponsoring agency. Each FFRDC is administered by either an industrial firm, a university, or a nonprofit institution through a contract with the sponsoring federal agency. FFRDC personnel are not considered federal employees, but rather employees of the organization that manages and operates the center. NASA has not fully adopted the Aldridge Commission recommendations. NASA has 10 centers (see Table 1 ). One, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), is already an FFRDC and is managed by the California Institute of Technology.

What Is the Public's Attitude Toward Space Exploration?

Some editorialists question whether investing in space exploration is relevant today. Others question if NASA has the right priorities. Would the public care if the country's investment in space exploration ended? Does the public believe it would be better to invest in social needs here on Earth rather than space exploration? Does the public support the current prioritization of the nation's space exploration activities?

According to poll data, Americans do not rank space exploration as a high priority for federal government spending. For example, in an April 10, 2007 Harris poll, respondents were given a list of twelve federal government programs and asked to pick two which should be cut "if spending had to be cut." Space programs led the list (51%), followed by welfare programs (28%), defense spending (28%), and farm subsidies (24%). Space exploration was also near the bottom of a University of Chicago National Opinion Research Center survey reported in January 2007 that asked Americans about how they would prioritize federal spending.

On the other hand, Americans are interested in space exploration. According to a May 2008 Gallup Poll, sponsored by the Coalition for Space Exploration, most Americans (69%) believe that the space program benefits the nation's economy by inspiring young people to consider STEM education, and believe that the benefits of space exploration outweigh the risks of human space flight (68%). The poll also found that most Americans (67%) indicated that they would not be concerned if the United States loses its leadership in space exploration to China, while almost half (47%) of the public surveyed expressed concern regarding the five-year gap between the end of the space shuttle program and the first scheduled launch of the Constellation program. Just over half (52%) of those surveyed in the Gallup Poll said they would support increasing NASA's budget from 0.6% to 1.0% of the federal budget; however, when the public was asked how willing they would be to support an increase in taxes if the money was to go to NASA to help close the budget deficit, more than half (57%) reported they would not be willing.

NASA's Office of Strategic Communication funded several analyses of the public's attitude toward space exploration based on focus groups and a survey, the results of which were presented in June 2007. According to an analysis conducted for NASA, the focus group participants were ambivalent about going to the Moon and Mars and wanted to know why these missions were important. Reasons such as leadership, legacy, and public inspiration were found to be less persuasive, especially for future Moon exploration, than NASA-influenced technologies. Most participants agreed that partnership with other countries would be beneficial, but doubted whether it can be achieved realistically.

In addition, one of the analysis conducted for NASA found that most survey respondents rated NASA-influenced technologies as somewhat or extremely relevant to them. Over 52% of participants said such technologies were a "very strong" reason to go to space. In contrast, the public's response to a mission to send humans to the Moon by the year 2020 was less strong with 15% of respondents very excited and 31% somewhat excited. Results for a mission to send humans to the Mars were similar to those for the Moon.

The public opinion analysis has found that there are generational differences in regard to NASA's proposed activities. For example, NASA's base support came from those who encompass "The Apollo Generation" (45-64 year olds), the majority (79%) of whom support NASA's new space exploration mission, particularly the return to the Moon. By contrast, the majority (64%) of those between 18-24 years of age are uninterested or neutral about a human Moon mission. Those between 25 and 44 years of age are approximately evenly split between those who are interested/excited and those who are either uninterested or neutral. Those over 65 were more likely to be neutral or disinterested in a Moon mission, with those over 75 years of age the least interested of all age groups.

What Are the Nation's Priorities for Civilian Space Exploration and Its Implications for Future Space Policy?

Current U.S. civilian space policy is based on a set of fundamental objectives in the Space Act, based on policy discussions that occurred following the launch of Sputnik over 50 years ago. Those objectives are still part of current policy discussions and influence the nation's civilian space policy priorities—both in terms of what actions NASA is authorized to undertake and the degree of appropriations each activity within NASA receives. NASA has active programs that address all its objectives, but many believe that it is being asked to accomplish too much for the available resources.

NASA was last reauthorized in 2008 for FY2009. Thus, the reauthorization of NASA for FY2010 and beyond, along with a new Presidential Administration, may provide an opportunity for Congress to rethink the nation's space policy. The goals of the nation's investment in space exploration may be a key factor in determining the focus of NASA's activities and the degree of funding appropriated for its programs. Congress and outside experts have concerns as to whether the United States can afford to implement President Bush's Vision for Space Exploration without adversely influencing NASA's other programs. Congress may need to make challenging decisions to determine how to reap the most benefit from the nation's civilian space program investment. These decisions might answer questions such as

What are the priorities among the many reasons for U.S. space exploration? For example, what might be the priority ranking among the previously identified reasons as to why the United States might explore space—knowledge and understanding, discovery, economic growth, national prestige, defense, international relations, and education and workforce development? What implications would this prioritization have for NASA's current and future budgets and the balance among its programs? For example, what is the proper balance between human and robotic space activities? What influence might the timing of other countries' space exploration activities have on U.S. policy? For example, what would be the impact of the United States, China, or another country, or a commercial organization, establishing the first Moon base or landing on Mars?

New objectives and priorities might help determine NASA's goals. This, in turn, might potentially help Congress determine the most appropriate balance of funding available among NASA's programs during its authorization and appropriation process. For example, if Congress believes that national prestige should be the highest priority, they may choose to emphasize NASA's human exploration activities, such as establishing a Moon base and landing a human on Mars. If they consider scientific knowledge the highest priority, Congress may emphasize unmanned missions and other science-related activities as NASA's major goal. If international relations are a high priority, Congress might encourage other nations to become equal partners in actions related to the International Space Station. If spinoff effects, including the creation of new jobs and markets and its catalytic effect on math and science education, are Congress' priorities, then they may focus NASA's activities on technological development and linking to the needs of business and industry, and expanding its role in science and mathematics education.

Congressional Activities

On October 15, 2008, the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-422 ) was signed into law. This act authorized appropriations for FY2009, and prohibited NASA from taking any steps prior to April 30, 2009, that would preclude the President and Congress from being able to continue to fly the Space Shuttle past 2010. When the law was passed, the Chair of the House Science and Technology Committee stated

The [Space Shuttle] provision should not be construed as a congressional endorsement of extending the life of the Shuttle program beyond the additional flight added by this bill to deliver the AMS [Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer] to the International Space Station. Rather, it reflects our common belief that the decision of whether or not to extend the Shuttle past its planned 2010 retirement date should be left to the next President and Congress, especially since both of the Presidential candidates have asked for the flexibility to make that decision.

During the 111 th Congress, policymakers may discuss another authorization bill for future years, and identify new priorities for civil space exploration.

Appendix. Possible U.S. Civilian Space Policy Objectives