Post-9/11 National Threat Notification Efforts: Issues, Actions, and Options for Congress
Released: 2005-04-29T00:00:00

Issues Concerning the Nationwide Threat Notification System

A perceived lack of coordination in the federal government's warning notification processand inconsistent messages regarding threats to the homeland have led to an erosion of confidencein the information conveyed to the Nation. Congress is now considering legislation( H.R. 1817 , The Department of Homeland Security Authorization Act for FY2006) toreform the Homeland Security Advisor System to assure greater confidence in the threat informationbeing conveyed to the Nation. A universally understandable, consistent, and reliable national threatnotification system is deemed necessary in today's world of increasing and time-sensitive threats tothe Nation. Many believe that the notification of a threat to the United States should be conveyedby a single entity and the message should be consistent with other communications federalgovernment officials may offer. In times of crisis or national emergency, the federal government'sunity of message and a coordinated delivery of the threat notification are widely seen as crucial tothe effectiveness of the system designed to convey the message. "The System's color-coded warningshave become the primary means by which the federal Government communicates directly to thepublic its bottom-line judgment on the risk of terrorist attack at any given time." (1) However, the circumstancesand explanations surrounding the warnings and changes in the Homeland Security AdvisorySystem's (HSAS) color code to date have called into question the utility and credibility of the system.In particular:

At times it appears the color-code has been raised based on speculation thata terrorist attack may occur rather than receipt of new threat information;

At other times, warnings of heightened threats have been issued withoutchanging the HSAS; and

On numerous occasions agencies have provided different, and sometimescontradictory, information about threats to the homeland.

Threat Notification Responsibility

On March 11, 2002, the President signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3 (HSPD-3) and created the HSAS (See Figure 1). This Directive gave responsibility to the AttorneyGeneral to administer and make public announcements regarding threats to the Nation. (2) Subsequent of the HomelandSecurity Act of 2002, enacted November 25, 2002, provided that the Under Secretary of theInfrastructure Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate, subject to the direction andcontrol of the Secretary (of Homeland Security), shall administer the Homeland Security AdvisorySystem (HSAS), including (1) exercising primary responsibility for public advisories related tothreats to homeland security (2) in coordination with other agencies of the Federal Government,providing specific warning information to State and local government agencies and authorities, theprivate sector, other entities, and the public. (3)

Figure 1. HSAS

Though the Homeland Security Act of 2002 is fairly clear regarding the transition ofresponsibility of administering a national threat notification system from the Attorney General to theSecretary of Homeland Security, there reportedly have been "a few occasions in the past couple ofyears that Secretary Ridge was frustrated when Attorney General Ashcroft announced terrorist threatinformation, despite the fact that the Homeland Security Act of 2002, transferred the responsibilityof management of the HSAS from DOJ to DHS. Also at times, DHS has disagreed with the alarmingtone of Ashcroft's announcements." (4) This paper will discuss examples of uncoordinated national threatannouncements between DHS, DOJ, and other federal government entities. It is possible that recentchanges of Departmental and Agency leadership may assist in resolving future occurrences of uncoordinated and premature threat announcements. However, the issue remains that previous threatannouncements and arguably a lack of discernible processes in determining from whom threatinformation is to be conveyed, has seriously eroded the HSAS's credibility generating congressionalreview and discussion of ways to approach future national threat warning efforts.

Threat Notifications Chronology

September 11 - September 24, 2002

First time the threat-level is raised from Yellow-Elevated (Significant Risk ofTerrorist Attack) to Orange-High (High Risk of Terrorist Attack)

Pursuant to the responsibility given to the Attorney General and delineated in HSPD-3, Attorney General Ashcroft announced on September 11, 2002, that "the U.S. intelligence communityhas received information, based on the debriefing of a senior Al Qaeda operative, of possible terroristattacks timed to coincide with the anniversary of the September 11 attacks on the United States."However, one-week prior to the official notice put forth by the Attorney General, Office ofHomeland Security Chief Tom Ridge reportedly stated that "U.S. officials do not have intelligenceindicating terrorists are plotting another attack on the September 11th anniversary. We do notanticipate raising the threat level for that day." (5) Though it is common in the world of intelligence to receiveinformation that contradicts previous analysis, possibly explaining moving from an elevated (yellow)to a high threat (orange) environment in one-week's time, the concern is that prior to the first use ofthe HSAS, two senior members of the Administration spoke publicly to the status of the threatenvironment. In this case the Director of the Office of Homeland Security seemed to have preemptedthe Attorney General's responsibility to publicly announce information regarding the threatenvironment and the status of the HSAS.

The following two items review instances where threat information of a significant nature wasdiscussed by senior Administration officials in an open forum. These instances did not result in achange of the HSAS.

On October 17, 2002, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Tenet stated before a jointsession of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, "You must make the assumption that AlQaeda is in an execution phase and intends to strike us both here and overseas. That's unambiguousas far as I am concerned." (6)

On November 15, 2002, the FBI stated, "Sources suggest Al Qaeda may favor spectacularattacks that meet several criteria: high symbolic value, mass casualties, severe damage to the U.S.economy and maximum psychological trauma." (7) Despite the tone of the warning, White House spokesman ScottMcClellan said the national alert status would remain unchanged.

Although the previous two examples did not represent official public announcements, theeffect was the same in that both of these events were widely publicized. Both statements may havebeen analytically correct, however a potentially troublesome precedent was being set by seniorofficials offering diverging interpretations of the nation's threat environment in a public forum.

February 7 - February 27, 2003

Second time the threat-level raised to Orange

Prior to the raising of the alert level, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 had been enacted(November 11, 2002). The act provided that the Under Secretary of IAIP subject to the direction andcontrol of the Secretary (of Homeland Security), shall administer the Homeland Security AdvisorySystem (HSAS). On February 7, 2003, Secretary of Homeland Security Ridge announced thatintelligence reports suggested that Al Qaeda was planning attacks on apartment buildings, hotels,and other soft targets. (8)

In the week leading up to the issuance of this threat warning and during the twenty-dayduration of this rise in the alert level, numerous Administration officials provided varyingdescriptions as to the level of specificity and immediacy of the threat. Homeland Security SecretaryRidge said a terrorist attack was unlikely one-week after Attorney General Ashcroft stated that therewas an increased likelihood of an attack on the United States. During this same time-period DCITenet testified before Congress that the information that led to this threat alert was as specific as ithas ever been. (9) SecretaryRidge also stated during this alert level change that the intelligence about a possible attack moreoften than not is vague, whereas Attorney General Ashcroft stated that specific intelligence wascorroborated by multiple intelligence sources. (10)

On February 24, 2003, in the waning days of this increased alert level, Attorney GeneralAshcroft stated that the threat of terrorist attack remained high and there were no plans to downgradethe Nation's alert level. Less than three days later, Secretary Ridge announced that the HSAS wasbeing lowered to Yellow- Elevated.

March 17 - April 11, 2003

Third time threat-level raised to Orange

On March 17, 2003, Secretary of Homeland Security Ridge stated that Intelligence reportsindicated Al Qaeda would probably attempt to launch terrorist attacks against U.S. interests to defendMuslims and the Iraqi people. On the eve of the war in Iraq, Secretary Ridge informed the public thatthe terrorist threat level was being raised, not because of any new threatening intelligence, butbecause the war seemed likely to provoke a terrorist response in the U.S. (11)

Prior to the war in Iraq, numerous Administration officials including some at the CIA andFBI, and lawmakers believed that should the United States commence military operations in Iraq,terrorist attacks in the United States would be an inevitable cost of toppling Saddam Hussein. (12)

In lowering the threat level on April 11, 2003, DHS released a statement that after anassessment of the threats by the intelligence community, the Department of Homeland Security hadmade the decision to lower the threat advisory level. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld later noted that"the Nation must remain vigilant and alert to the possibility Al Qaeda or those sympathetic to theircause; as well as former Iraqi regime state agents, may attempt to conduct attacks against the UnitedStates." (13)

This change of alert level status was accompanied by a continuing pattern of independentofficial announcements regarding possible threats to the Nation, including statements by theSecretary of Defense countering the reasoning used to lower the alert level: threats remain of anattack from al Qaeda or Iraqi sympathizers. (14)

May 20 - May 30, 2003

Fourth time threat-level raised to Orange

On May 20, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security announced that the United Statesintelligence community believed Al Qaeda had entered an operational period worldwide, includingplans to attack the United States

On the morning of May 20, 2003 DHS Secretary Ridge appeared before the HouseCommittee on Homeland Security and stated that "America had the terror networks off-balance andthat we are much safer (as a Nation)". Later that day in a press conference held to announce raisingthe threat alert level, Secretary Ridge reportedly stated "in response to intelligence reports concerninganti-U.S. terrorist group intentions and the recent attacks in Saudi Arabia and Morocco (15) we are raising the HSASto Orange". "While there is not credible, specific information with respect to targets or method ofattack, the use of tactics similar to those seen in recent terrorist attacks overseas include small armsequipped assault teams, large vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and suicidebombers." (16) Simultaneous with this announcement, DHS Under Secretary for Border and Transportation SecurityAsa Hutchinson announced at a press conference on Capitol Hill that the alert level had been raisedbecause "there is increased specificity in what we hear, but not necessarily in terms of thetarget." (17)

On the following day FBI Director Mueller stated that there was no specific informationregarding potential targets or the timing of an attack. DOD Secretary Rumsfeld reportedly stated thatsame day that some Al Qaeda leaders in Iran were plotting attacks. (18)

In this instance, a number of senior members of the Administration discussed the informationconsidered in the raising of the alert level, and one of the Secretary of Homeland Security's principaldeputies offered conflicting information regarding the specificity of that information.

December 21, 2003 - January 9, 2004

Fifth time threat-level raised to Orange

On December 21, 2003, Secretary of Homeland Security Ridge stated that the United Statesintelligence community had received a substantial increase in threat-related intelligence reports andthat credible sources suggested the possibility of attacks against the homeland around the holidayseason and beyond. "The information we have indicates that extremists abroad are anticipatingnear-term attacks that they believe will either rival or exceed the attacks that occurred in New Yorkand the Pentagon and the fields of Pennsylvania nearly two years ago." (19)

On numerous occasions since the inception of the HSAS a variety of senior governmentofficials have been quoted saying that it may never be known if raising the alert level stopped aterrorist act from occurring. However, two days after the alert level was raised for the fifth timesince its creation, the Secretary of Defense stated that "there's no question that there are any numberof terrorist acts that were stopped prior to their actually occurring." (20) Also, six days after thisHSAS threat level was lowered, the FBI Director stated that he did not foresee a time when thecountry could drop its guard and that "we probably will at some point in time have anotherattack." (21)

There were two public discussions in 2004 of threat information of a significant nature thatproduced some anxiety among U.S. citizens and frustration on the part of the Congress. Neither ofthe following instances resulted in a change of the HSAS.

On March 24, 2004, the FBI issued a threat advisory indicating that the Texas oil industrymay have been targeted by terrorists. While DHS is statutorily responsible for public advisoriesrelating to the announcement of homeland security threats, specifically as they pertain to alertinginfrastructure owners and operators of threat related information, the advisory came solely from theFBI. As House Committee for Homeland Security Chairman Christopher Cox stated two-weeksafter this occurrence, "Clearly this is a very troubling development. Was it simply a one-time glitchor has there been a breakdown in communications between some of our key federal agencies?"Chairman Cox added, "Congress and the American people need to know, given the dangerous,uncertain times we live in today, cooperation among all authorities is more important than ever. Wesimply can't afford to be sending confusing messages to a nervous public." (22)

May 26, 2004 , On May 26, 2004, Secretary Ridge appeared on five television news showsstating that although the prospect of a terrorist attack is significant, Americans should "go aboutliving their lives and enjoying living in this country." At 3 p.m. that same day Attorney GeneralAshcroft and Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Mueller held a press conference and gave awarning to the American public. The Attorney General announced that based on "credibleintelligence from multiple sources, Al Qaeda intends to attack the United States in the next fewmonths. This disturbing intelligence indicates Al Qaeda's specific intention to hit the United Stateshard." Ashcroft said the intelligence -- along with recent public statements attributed to Al Qaeda-- "suggest that it is almost ready to attack the United States." He further stated that after the March11 train bombings in Madrid, Spain, an Al Qaeda spokesman said the network had completed "90percent of preparations" to attack the United States. (23)

During this press conference a reporter asked if there was credible intelligence suggestingthe United States is going to be attacked between now and the election, why the threat level had notbeen raised. Attorney General Ashcroft responded that "the Homeland Security Council, led bySecretary Ridge, would make such a decision, and for me to try to speak for them at this time wouldbe inappropriate." (24) After Mr. Ashcroft's announcement, Mr. Ridge seemed surprised by the Attorney General's warning.Asked why the National Color-code alert had not been raised, Mr. Ridge replied "there is nothingspecific enough (to raise the alert level)."

This seemingly uncoordinated effort was followed by a response from RepresentativeChristopher Cox, Chairman of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security. "Disseminationby our government of sensitive terrorism warnings must be closely coordinated across ourintelligence and law enforcement communities," Cox said. "In the Homeland Security Act, DHS wasassigned the central coordinating role in this process. The absence of Secretary Ridge fromyesterday's news conference held by the attorney general and the FBI director, and the conflictingpublic messages their separate public appearances delivered to the nation, suggests that the broadand close interagency consultation we expect, and which the law requires, did not take place in thiscase." (25)

These last two examples are cited by many observers as suggesting a general lack ofcoordination and unity in message of warnings to the nation of threats, and also reflecting a lack ofoverall collaboration between DHS and other federal intelligence community and law enforcementorganizations. Homeland Security employees have complained that their CIA and FBI colleaguesshow them little respect. Intelligence agents reportedly counter saying that DHS has been known togo public with terror alerts based on information that other agencies found to be sketchy. (26) This latter contention doesnot seem to be supported by the pattern of Administration officials, other than the DHS Secretary,openly discussing threats to the Nation.

August 1 - November 10, 2004

Sixth time threat-level raised to Orange

On August 1st, 2004, Secretary of Homeland Security Ridge stated that the HSAS was beingraised to Orange based on threat intelligence that indicated Al Qaeda was planning attacks againstfinancial institutions in New York, Washington, D.C., and New Jersey prior to September 11, 2001.In announcing this threat level change, the DHS Secretary Ridge stated that the United States hadnew and unusually specific information about where al Qaeda would like to attack.

The following day, Monday, August 2, 2004 White House Homeland Security Advisor FranTownsend similarly stated that the increase in threat level was based on information showing thatAl Qaeda had been surveilling financial targets in 2000 and 2001. However, she also added that themost recent intelligence included mention of threats to the U.S. Capital and Members of Congress. This prompted Washington, D.C. Capitol Police Chief to remark that the briefings he had receivedon the recent intelligence did not speak to specific, credible, direct threats against Congress as aninstitution, or its Members. (27) Secretary Ridge did not mention the Capital or Congress in hisstatement announcing the increase in the threat level. However, one month later, Secretary Ridgereportedly admitted that though the Administration viewed the threat as "credible," the informationwas "sketchy and incomplete." (28)

On October 12, 2004, in view of the uncertainty of the intelligence that was presented andthe subsequent announcements regarding the threat environment, Senator Mark Dayton temporarilyclosed his Washington, D.C. Office, " based upon that information, I have decided to close my officeuntil after the upcoming election. I do so out of extreme, but necessary, precaution to protect thelives and safety of my Senate staff and my Minnesota constituents, who might otherwise visit myoffice in the next few weeks. I feel compelled to do so, because I will not be here in Washington toshare in what I consider to be an unacceptably greater risk to their safety." (29)

During this threat level change, a senior member of the White House proffered additionalinformation as to the reason the threat level was raised in Washington, D.C. The additionalinformation led to further confusion, producing follow-on statements and actions by the WashingtonD.C. Police Chief and a Member of Congress that further called into question the credibility of theoriginally announced information that led to the raising of the HSAS.

Effects of Uncoordinated or Inconsistent Threat Warnings

Homeland Security Advisory System

Given the history of these seemingly uncoordinated threat notifications, local governmentsand the public have complained about being confused by the varying details supporting the decisionto raise the alert level. Many have lost confidence in the system.

In February 2003, the Governor of Hawaii decided to keep Hawaii at the blue (guarded) levelwhen the federal government raised its level to orange (high risk). Monetary cost of increasedsecurity and the public's psyche were figured into the decision as well as the potential loss of life. Ed Teixeira, vice director of the civil defense division of the Hawaii's Department of Defensereportedly commented that, "just because [Secretary of Homeland Security Tom] Ridge and[Attorney General John] Ashcroft go on TV and say we are on orange, it doesn't mean states andcounties have to be at orange." (30) Though a lack of information regarding place and timing of anattack was noted as the reason to not follow the federal government's recommendation regardingraising the alert level, it is equally telling that the Hawaii State Homeland Security advisor pointedto the Secretary of Homeland Security and the the Attorney General as the individuals Hawaii Stateofficials listen to regarding threat warnings.

Business leaders argued for better threat information from law enforcement, as well as bettercoordination among agencies providing threat information. Specifically, they said that they did notreceive sufficient specific threat information, and frequently received threat information frommultiple government agencies. (31) Some federal agencies, as well as state and local officialsreported hearing about notification of national threat level changes from other entities, such as theFBI and media sources, before being notified by DHS. (32)

Other Warning Advisory Problems

There have been examples and findings that speak to the issue of coordinated warnings andunity of message. A significant finding of the USS Cole Commission acknowledged thatcontradictory threat levels played a role in the level of protection of the ship on the day of theattack. (33) Similarly, theCommission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of MassDestruction reported on the confusion associated with threat warning products destined for thePresident and senior decision makers. (34)

Discussion and Options for the 109th Congress

"The American public, state and local law enforcement,governors and mayors, and private sector officials with responsibility for critical infrastructure alldeserve crystal clarity when it comes to terrorism threat advisories." (Representative ChristopherCox (R-Calif.), Chairman of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security)

A number of options exist that include clarifying DHS's primacy in alerting the Nation ofimpending threats, eliminating the Homeland Security Advisory System, or transferring the nationalthreat notification responsibility to the National Counter Terrorism Center.

Option: Clarify DHS's Primacy in Alerting the Nation of Impending Threats

One issue is whether the intent of Section 201d7 (35) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was to give DHS explicitauthority and responsibility to be the sole federal entity charged with conveying homeland securitythreat information to the American people. In delivering to Congress the proposed legislation tocreate the Department of Homeland Security, President Bush recommended that "one departmentcoordinate communication with State and local governments, private industry, and the Americanpeople about threats and preparedness." (36) Section102(c)(3) of the Homeland Security Act also states thatthe Secretary of Homeland Security has the authority and responsibility for "distributing or, asappropriate, coordinating the distribution of warnings and information to State and local governmentpersonnel, agencies, and authorities and to the public." Congress could reemphasize DHS' primacyin alerting the Nation of impending threats. This might put other Agency officials on notice as towhom is authorized to be the public face of national threat notifications. Another option would beto allow other Departments to disseminate threat information regarding the security of the homelandwhen such information is deemed credible and extremely time-sensitive (exigent circumstances).

Option: Eliminate the Homeland Security Advisory System

Given the short history of the HSAS, uncoordinated warning efforts, lack of uniformity inthe type of information conveyed, and an increasingly wary populace as to the credibility of themessage, Congress could choose to eliminate the system. The natural question that follows is whatwould the replacement system be and would it be an improvement on the current system.

One could argue that, given the uniqueness of each threat situation requiring acommunication to the public, threat notifications may not allow for a system per se. According tothis line of reasoning, each "warning-notice" should be handled as its own entity. Threat information,geographic location, target location, timing of perceived attack, defensive measures, and the likeshould be addressed individually and not formulated to fit into a neat category of threat-levels. Thismight be problematic for a number of reasons. First, many federal and state programs are tied to thecurrent color-code with numerous actions and funding decisions tied to a raising or lowering of thealert. Secondly, though cumbersome and non-specific, the current HSAS allows for an assessment,by federal and state governments, the private sector, and the public as to a general threat level thatcomes with certain expectations regarding the federal response. Lastly, if a warning-notice typesystem were introduced, the inevitable question would arise regarding how one compares today'sthreat warning to past color-coded warnings and other warning-notices.

Option: Transfer the Threat Notification Responsibility to the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC)

As stated in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, a mission of theNational Counter Terrorism Center is to serve as the primary organization for analyzing andintegrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining toterrorism and counter terrorism (except intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists anddomestic counter terrorism) and to serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on known andsuspected terrorists and international terror groups, as well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, andnetworks of contacts and support. (37)

Since the relevant Departments concerned with terrorism are represented at the NCTC andlegislatively NCTC is the focal point of all federal analytical and strategic operational planningterrorism efforts, this entity may be well positioned to review all applicable information regardingthe terrorist threat and also coordinate the warning message to be conveyed to the public. One optionwould be to designate the NCTC the federal government's communicator of threat information tothe Nation. Precedence exists for this option as Secretary Ridge and the Director of the NCTC(formerly the Terrorist Threat Integration Center) held a joint press conference discussing the threatenvironment and suggested protective measures. (38) Formalizing the NCTC as the national threat messenger wouldallow Congress to hold one organization (NCTC) responsible for terrorism analysis and the warningsthat are derived therein. DHS could continue to provide specific advice regarding protectivemeasures to the private sector, state and local governments, and the public. However, the advice andcollaborative efforts would be based on threat information compiled and communicated by theNCTC. Congress could include language to allow for other Departments to disseminate threatinformation under exigent circumstances.

Whether the threat notification process continues in the current form of the HSAS, iseliminated and replaced by situation specific warning-notices, or is transferred to the NCTC or someother entity, the issue remains one of coordination and unity of message, rather than in what formthe threat information should be conveyed. Undoubtedly, numerous government agencies willcontinue to comment on various aspects of a given threat condition. However, critics argue thatfuture national threat announcements should occur in a coordinated manner that allows for anunambiguous message. Due to a lack of coordination and unity in message it appears that the generalpublic and affected localities are becoming desensitized or disinterested in the information containedin national threat warning notification messages. The lack of confidence brought on by confusionin the current notification process could be a severe liability in an actual emergency.