Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003 Supplemental and FY2004 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors
Released: 2004-01-31T00:00:00

President Bush's Andean Regional Initiative

Past Requests and Congressional Action

FY2002 Request. The Andean Regional Initiative(ARI) was launched in April 2001, when the Bush Administration requested $882.29 million inFY2002 economic and counternarcotics assistance, as well as an extension of trade preferences andother measures, for Colombia and six regional neighbors (Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Panama,and Venezuela). Of this amount, $731 million was designated as International Narcotics Control andLaw Enforcement (INCLE) assistance in a line item in the budget request known as the AndeanCounterdrug Initiative (ACI). A central element of the program was the training and equipping ofcounternarcotics battalions in Colombia.

According to the Administration, the distinctive features of the program, compared to PlanColombia assistance approved in 2000, (3) were that a larger portion of the assistance was directed at economicand social programs, and that more than half of the assistance was directed at regional countriesexperiencing the spill-over effects of illicit drug and insurgency activities.

In a mid-May 2001 briefing on the Andean Regional Initiative, Administration spokesmenset out three overarching goals for the region that could be called the three D's -- democracy,development, and drugs. The first goal was to promote democracy and democratic institutions bysupporting judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, human rights improvement, and the peaceprocess in Colombia. The second was to foster sustainable economic development and tradeliberalization through alternative economic development, environmental protection, and renewal ofthe Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). The third was to significantly reduce the supply ofillegal drugs to the United States from the source through eradication, interdiction and otherefforts. (4) Underconsideration by the Congress in 2001, critics of the initiative argued that it overemphasized militaryand counter-drug assistance, and provided inadequate support for human rights and the peace processin Colombia. Supporters argued that it continued needed assistance to Colombia, while providingmore support for regional neighbors and social and economic programs.

By the end of 2001, the FY2002 Foreign Operations Appropriation Act ( H.R. 2506 / P.L. 107-115 ) provided a total of $782.82 million for the ARI of which $625 million wasdesignated for the ACI, a reduction of $106 million from the President's request. It further allowedfor the transfer of an additional $35 million from the State Department's International NarcoticsControl and Law Enforcement account to the ACI. (5)

FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Request. OnMarch 21, 2002, the Administration proposed an Emergency FY2002 Supplemental forcounter-terrorism purposes that included a request for $4 million of State Department internationalnarcotics control (INCLE) funding for Colombia police post support, $6 million of FMF funding forColombia and $3 million for Ecuador for counter-terrorism equipment and training, and $25 millionfor counter-kidnapping training in Colombia. Also included in the submission were requests tobroaden the authorities of the Defense and State Departments to utilize FY2002 and FY2003assistance and unexpended Plan Colombia assistance to support the Colombian government's"unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to its nationalsecurity." Congress fully funded the President's request for Colombia, with various human rightsconditions, and it granted broader authority to pursue new activities in Colombia, but withmodifications that blended the House and Senate provisions. The measure provided identicalauthority for the use of INCLE and Department of Defense (DOD) funds, including prior year funds,to support "a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, against activities by organizationsdesignated as terrorist organizations" such as the FARC, ELN, and AUC, "and to take actions toprotect human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, including undertaking rescueoperations." Legislators approved the FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act( H.R. 4775 ) in late July 2002, and the President signed it into law ( P.L. 107-206 ) onAugust 2, 2002. (6)

Extension of Andean Trade Preference Act. InApril 2001, President Bush requested the extension and broadening of the Andean TradePreferences Act (ATPA) expiring in December 2001, that would give duty free or reduced-ratetreatment to the products of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia. Following committee action inlate 2001 in both houses, and extensive negotiations in mid-2002, Congress completed action on thePresident's request. Following lengthy debate in July 2002, the Trade Act of 2002 was signed intolaw ( P.L. 107-210 ) on August 6, 2002. Title XXXI of the act, entitled the Andean Trade Promotionand Drug Eradication Act, extended preferential tariff treatment to designated Andean countriesthrough December 31, 2006, and broadened coverage to include products previously excluded. (7)

FY2003 Request. On February 4, 2002, PresidentBush submitted a FY2003 budget request of $979.8 million for the Andean Regional Initiative(ARI), with $731 million in counternarcotics assistance under the Andean Counterdrug Initiative(ACI). This request included $537 million in ARI funding for Colombia, with $439 million in ACIfunding and $98 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to train and equip a Colombian armybrigade to protect an oil pipeline in northeastern Colombia.

By the end of 2002, both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported theirversions of an FY2003 Foreign Operations Appropriation bill, but this and other appropriations billshad not been enacted. Congress incorporated the 11 unfinished bills into an omnibus spendingpackage, H.J.Res. 2 (for continuing appropriations). The House passed H.J.Res 2 onJanuary 8, 2003, and the Senate followed suit on January 28, 2003. Both chambers approved theconference report ( H.Rept. 108-10 ) on February 13, 2003, and the measure was signed into law ( P.L.108-7 ) on February 20, 2003. (8)

Provisions relating to the Andean Regional Initiative and Colombia included both fundingand reporting requirements. Overall ARI funding totaled $835.5 million. Of that amount, Congress provided $700 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, a reduction of $31 million from thePresident's request. However, the conference agreement allowed for the authority to transfer up to$31 million from the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcementaccount to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative. The conference agreement provided that up to $93million in Foreign Military Financing funds may be transferred to the Andean Counterdrug Initiativefor helicopters, training and other assistance for the Colombian Armed Forces for security of theCaÃ±o LimÃ³n CoveÃ±as pipeline, a reduction of $5 million from the President's request. Theagreement also included a number of conditions and reporting requirements.

Expanded Authorities. Following the pattern of the FY2002 supplemental,Congress provided authority for a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terroristorganizations and to take actions to protect health and human welfare. This was done, theConference Report notes, in recognition that "the narcotics industry is linked to the terrorist groups,including the paramilitary organizations in Colombia." However, the Conference Report alsowarned that this authority "is not a signal...for the United States to become more deeply involved inassisting the Colombian Armed Forces in fighting the terrorist groups, especially not at the expenseof the counternarcotics program, but to provide the means for more effective intelligence gatheringand fusion, and to provide the flexibility to the Department of State when the distinction betweencounternarcotics and counterterrorism is not clear cut." Expanded authorities would end if theSecretary of State has credible evidence that the Colombian military is not "conducting vigorousoperations to restore government authority and human rights in areas under the effective control ofparamilitary and guerrilla organizations." The Report also calls for the Secretary of State to report,within 90 days of enactment, the changes in policy, including new procedures and operations, as aresult of implementing expanded authorities.

Caps on Personnel. Congress maintained the existing caps on militarypersonnel and civilian contractors that can be assigned to duty in Colombia at 400 each, withexceptions for search and rescue operations. This cap applies to U.S. personnel in Colombia "insupport of Plan Colombia," but does not include U.S. personnel assigned as part of their regularduties to the U.S. Embassy. As of late November, there were 278 temporary and permanent U.S.military personnel and 373 U.S. citizen civilian contractors in Colombia in support of PlanColombia. These numbers vary as programs are begun, expanded, or completed. During 2003, theyhave varied between 208 and 396 military personnel and 247 to 400 civilian contractors. The U.S.civilian contractor number was 400 on November 18 but was reduced to 373 the following day dueto departures. During November, there were about 600 foreign national contractors present inColombia who are not covered by the personnel caps, most of whom were Colombiannationals.

Human Rights. Section 564 allows for the distribution of 75% of the fundsfor Colombia's military, after which the Secretary of State must certify that Colombian members ofthe armed forces alleged to have committed human rights violations are being suspended,prosecuted, and punished, and that the Colombian military is severing ties with and apprehendingleaders of paramilitary organizations. Such a certification by the Secretary would release 12.5% ofassistance to the Colombian military. The remaining 12.5% would be available after July 31, 2003,if the Secretary certifies that the Colombian military is continuing to meet its obligations requiredin the first certification and trying to gain authority and protect human rights in areas under controlof paramilitary and guerrilla organizations. On July 8, 2003, the Secretary issued the firstcertification which released approximately $30 million. As of November, the second certificationwas reported to be near completion. Congress also maintained a prohibition on the issuance of visasto any alien who the Secretary of State determines has willfully provided support to the FARC, ELN,or AUC, or has participated or ordered the commission of gross violations of humanrights.

Aerial Fumigation. The Secretary of State is required to certify that aerialfumigation of drug crops is occurring within a series of guidelines for health, environment,compensation for those unjustly sprayed, and availability of alternative development programs "where security permits." Until such a report is issued, 80% of funding for herbicides is withheld.The conference report ( H.Rept. 108-10 ) states that Congress expects that "every reasonableprecaution will be taken in the aerial fumigation program to ensure that the exposure to humans andthe environment in Colombia meets Environmental Protection Agency standards for comparable usein the United States." According to the State Department, this report will be issuedsoon.

Helicopters. Language is also maintained from previous legislation whichrequires the return of any helicopters procured with ACI funds that are used to aid or abet theoperations of any illegal self-defense organizations.

Air-Bridge Denial Program. Following the shooting down of an airplane inPeru on April 20, 2001, which was found not to be associated with drug trafficking and whichresulted in the deaths of several individuals, including two American missionaries, Congressmaintained language prohibiting the resumption of U.S. support for a Peruvian air interdictionprogram. In order to resume U.S. support, the Secretary of State and the Director of CentralIntelligence must certify to Congress, 30 days prior to any resumption of U.S. involvement, that theability of the Peruvian Air Force to shoot down aircraft will include enhanced safeguards andprocedures to prevent similar accidents. The United States and Colombia announced the resumptionof the program in August of this year after an agreement was reached on protocols to ensure againstaccidental shootdowns.

Administration Requests in 2003

FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Aid. On March 25, 2003, the Bush Administration requested some $75 billion to provide funds to "covermilitary operations, relief and reconstruction activities in Iraq, ongoing operations in the global waron terrorism, enhancements to the safety of U.S. diplomats and citizens abroad, support for U.S.allies in the war, and homeland security protection and response measures." Of the total amount, theAdministration requested $34 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, $34 million inDepartment of Defense Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug Activities in Colombia, and anunspecified portion of $2.059 billion in Foreign Military Financing for 19 countries, one beingColombia.

FY2004 Funding Request. On February 3, 2003,President Bush requested $990.7 million for the Andean Regional Initiative countries in the accountscomprising ARI funding, including military funding for Colombia. The Administration made itsrequest under the title of "Andean Counterdrug Initiative" (ACI) with no reference to AndeanRegional Initiative (ARI). ACI funding forms part of the State Department's International NarcoticsControl and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account while ARI has included ACI plus development aid,child survival and health aid, and foreign military financing. For comparative purposes, adistinction between ACI and ARI is maintained in this report. For ACI, $731 million was requested,to be distributed as follows in descending order:

Colombia: $463 million, consisting of $150 million for alternativedevelopment, humanitarian assistance and institution building, and $313 million for narcoticsinterdiction and eradication programs. The overall request also includes $110 million in FMFfunding, and $1.6 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET)funds.

Peru: $116 million, consisting of $50 million for alternative development,humanitarian assistance and institution building, and $66 million for narcotics interdiction anderadication programs. The overall request also includes $2.5 million in FMF funding, and $700,000in IMET funds.

Bolivia: $91 million, consisting of $42 million for alternative development,humanitarian assistance and institution building, and $49 million for narcotics interdiction anderadication programs. The overall request also includes $4 million in FMF funding, and $900,000in IMET funds.

Ecuador: $35 million, consisting of $15 million for alternative development,humanitarian assistance and institution building, and $20 million for narcotics interdiction anderadication programs. The overall request also includes $15 million in FMF funding, and $650,000in IMET funds.

Brazil: $12 million, all in narcotics interdiction and law enforcement programs,and $500,000 in IMET funds.

Panama: $9 million, all in narcotics interdiction and law enforcementprograms. The overall request also includes $2.5 million in FMF funding, and $200,000 in IMETfunds.

Venezuela: $5 million, all in narcotics interdiction and law enforcementprograms, and $700,000 in IMET funds.

FMF for Colombia is intended to "support counter-terrorism operations and protect keyinfrastructure such as the oil pipeline," according to the request. The funding is proposed to providetraining, weapons, and night vision goggles and communications equipment to the Army's elitemobile brigades and the Special Forces brigade, as well as to support the Colombian Navy and AirForce, including the provision of interdiction boats, training and infrastructure improvements, thepurchase of two additional AC-47 gunships and a C-130 support plan that will procure four C-130eaircraft and maintenance support. The request also noted that FY2004 FMF funding will continueto provide munitions, equipment, and training for the 5th and 18th Colombian Army Brigades, taskedwith protecting the CaÃ±o-LimÃ³n CoveÃ±as oil pipeline.

Other requested assistance included $47.8 million in Development Aid for Bolivia, Brazil,Ecuador, Panama, and Peru, $43.4 million in Child Survival and Health programs for Bolivia, Brazil,Ecuador, and Peru, and $35 million in Economic Support funds for democratic institution buildingand economic growth programs in, Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. The requestalso included $21 million for Migration and Refugee Assistance for the Western Hemisphere, anunspecified portion of which is assistance for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in Colombia. Further, the State Department estimates that it will spend some $45 million in Colombia from thecentral State Department Air Wing Account.

In addition to International Affairs accounts, the Administration requested $817.4 millionin Department of Defense (DOD) counternarcotics funds for worldwide programs. The DefenseDepartment does not provide country breakdowns of the requested amount. As in previous years,it requested a lump sum for all counternarcotic programs worldwide under Sections 1004 and 1033,and under Section 124, which provides DOD with the lead role in detection and monitoringprograms. The Defense Department can reallocate these funds throughout the year in accordancewith changing needs. In FY2000, DOD allocated $128.5 million in addition to the $300 millionappropriated under Plan Colombia legislation ( P.L. 106-246 ). In FY2001, DOD allocated 190.2million, $119.1 million in FY2002, $165 million in FY2003, and is proposing to spend $122 millionin FY2004.

Situation in Colombia and Neighboring Countries

The Andean Regional Initiative was designed to provide assistance to seven countries in thebroadly defined Andean region (9) : Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.The ARI built on the Clinton Administration's 2000 "Plan Colombia" legislation, which sought toaddress the increasing cultivation of coca and heroin crops in Colombia through the creation of aColombian Army counternarcotics brigade, and sharply increased assistance for eradication andalternative development programs in the country's two southern provinces of Putumayo and CaquetÃ¡,the region where illegal coca production and a leftist guerrilla presence was expanding most rapidly. The ARI expanded assistance to help counter possible spill-over effects in six nearby countries: Peruand Bolivia, where past successes in reducing cocaine production could be threatened by expectedprogress in eradicating crops in Colombia; Ecuador, the most exposed neighbor because of its borderwith Colombia's Putumayo province; and Brazil, Venezuela and Panama, where the threat isprimarily confined to common border areas with Colombia.

The region is important to the United States because it includes the three major drugproducing countries (Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru) where virtually all the world's cocaine and 60%of the heroin seized in the United States are produced. It also includes two major oil producingcountries (Venezuela and Ecuador), members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC), which supply significant quantities of oil to the United States. While the designatedcountries have diverse trading relationships, the United States is the major trading partner by far forall of them. For the five traditional Andean countries (Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, andBolivia), the Andes mountain range that runs through South America poses geographical obstaclesto intra-state and inter-state integration, but the countries are linked together in the AndeanCommunity economic integration pact. The ARI countries are some of the most heavily populatedin Latin America, including the first (Brazil), third (Colombia), fifth (Peru), sixth (Venezuela), andeighth (Ecuador) most populous. Although Colombia and Venezuela have largely European-Indianmixed race (mestizo) populations, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador have significant Amerindianindigenous populations.

Colombia

Colombia's spacious and rugged territory, whose western half is transversed by three parallel mountain ranges, provides ample isolated terrain for drug cultivation and processing, and contributesto the government's difficulty in exerting control throughout the nation. With a population of 41million, Colombia is the third most populous country in Latin America after Brazil and Mexico. Itis known for a long tradition of democracy, but also for continuing violence, including a guerrillainsurgency dating back to the 1960s, and persistent drug trafficking activity. Recent

administrations have had to deal with a complicated mix of leftist guerrillas, rightist paramilitary (or"self-defense" forces), both associated with many groups of independent drug traffickers. The twomain leftist guerrilla groups are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and theNational Liberation Army (ELN) both of whom regularly kidnap individuals for ransoms, and reapprofit from their participation in the drug trade. The rightist paramilitaries are coordinated by theUnited Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) which has been accused of gross human rightsabuses and collusion with the Colombian Armed Forces in fighting the FARC and ELN. The AUChas also been accused of participating in narcotics trafficking. There are additional paramilitariesnot under the AUC umbrella, such as Metro Block, a former AUC faction that withdrew from peacenegotiations with the government in late 2002.

Pastrana Administration. During the presidencyof Andres Pastrana (August 1998-2002), U.S. involvement in Colombia deepened. Pastrana waselected largely on the basis of pledges to bring peace to the country by negotiating with the guerrillas,strengthening the Colombian military and counternarcotics forces, and seeking international supportfor these efforts and other reforms to address the country's unusually serious economic difficulties. Months after Pastrana's inauguration, he initiated peace talks with the country's largest guerrillagroup, the FARC, and later with representatives from the smaller ELN. In 1999, in cooperation withthe United States, Pastrana developed a $7.5 billion plan called "Plan Colombia," with $4 billion tocome from Colombia and $3.5 billion from international donors, although funding from Colombiaand the international community has fallen far short of these goals.

To support Plan Colombia (10) , the Clinton Administration developed, and the U.S. Congressapproved, a $1.3 billion package of assistance in 2000. Most of the funding was to support programsin Colombia, with $416.9 million for helicopters, training, and other assistance to three ColombianArmy counternarcotics battalions. The focus of most of the funding, while incorporating alternativedevelopment and governance programs, was to support counternarcotics objectives.

Pastrana's efforts were largely frustrated by a variety of factors, including, according to avariety of analysts, the lack of a consistent negotiation strategy, the poor implementation of elementsof Plan Colombia, and a lack of interest by the guerrillas in negotiating peace. An early Pastranaconcession to the FARC was the creation of a sanctuary area ("despaje") for the FARC as anincentive to enter into negotiations. The outcome, however, was the consolidation of FARC forcesin the area after the withdrawal of government security forces. Prompted by an intensification ofguerrilla activities, President Pastrana decided in February 2002 to terminate peace talks with theFARC, and ordered the military to retake the despaje. Days later, the FARC kidnaped Senator IngridBetancourt, a presidential candidate with a small following. She remains a captive to this day. Bythe end of Pastrana's term, there was a strong perception that peace talks had failed, guerrilla activity(fed by the drug trade) had increased, and the security situation in major cities had deteriorated.

Uribe Administration. (11) Alvaro Uribe ran for thepresidency on a platform focusing on defeating the guerrilla insurgents, eliminating theparamilitaries, and ending narcotics trafficking. He won 53% of the vote in an eleven-candidate fieldin the May 26, 2002 presidential elections. He is the first president since the 1991 Constitution towin by an outright majority, thus avoiding a run-off election. Upon taking office on August 7, 2002,he announced a hard-line approach to negotiations, declaring that the government would onlynegotiate with those groups who are willing to "give up terrorism and agree to a cease-fire,"including paramilitary groups, with whom President Pastrana had refused to negotiate. The FARCincreased its armed activities by threatening with death all mayors who did not resign their posts, andconducting relatively large armed confrontations with rightist paramilitary groups, resulting inmassacres of civilians in several locations. FARC also was responsible for bombings in urban areasof MedellÃ­n and Cartegena, as well as a deadly mortar attack in BogotÃ¡ close to the Congressbuilding where Uribe was being sworn in. These attacks signaled FARC's new-found, andlong-threatened, ability to take their fight to the cities.

In order to address the complex problems facing Colombia, Uribe took a number of steps,some of which have proven to be controversial. He promulgated a decree invoking emergencypowers, allowing the security forces to make arrests without warrants and imposing controls onmovements in war-torn parts of the country. Under Colombia's 1991 Constitution, states ofemergency may be declared for 90 days, and then can be renewed for two additional 90-day periods. The country's constitutional court has, on several occasions, ruled components of the state ofemergency unconstitutional that give security forces increased powers. In response, the UribeAdministration introduced legislation in April of 2003 to change the Constitution to give securityforces permanent powers to tap phones and to search homes without warrants in all parts of thecountry.

President Uribe also announced plans to increase the size of the military and police, largelythrough a one-time 1.2% war tax on wealthy individuals and businesses, and to create of a "civilianinformers" program. This effort also entails the augmentation of Colombia's regular armed forceswith "peasant soldiers" who receive less training than regular troops, and are based near their ownhometowns. The Uribe Administration has inducted 10,000 peasant soldiers, each serving for twoyears, with plans to have a total force of 20,000. Further, Uribe authorized the widespread aerialfumigation of coca crops, that under the Pastrana administration, had been limited to small plots ofgrowers who had signed eradication pledges. On June 26, 2003, a Colombian court ruled that theColombian government should immediately suspend its aerial fumigation program until theEnvironment Ministry charts an Environment Management Plan. Officials of the UribeAdministration have stated that fumigation will continue while it appeals the decision. Two previousappeals have been won by the government.

Uribe has also received approval from the Constitutional Court for a referendum to cutgovernment spending and pension payments, to prohibit the re-election of corrupt officials, and torestructure the Colombian Congress by reducing the number of representatives, restricting itsbudgetary powers, and allowing it to be dissolved by popular vote. The referendum was scheduledfor October 25, 2003, to coincide with mayoral and gubernatorial elections slated for the followingday. In the weeks leading up to the elections, the FARC threatened to kill all candidates and theirfamilies for the October 26 municipal elections. In total, 25 candidates were killed and 160withdrew their names from the balloting. (12) In order for the referendum to succeed, the law required 25%(6.3 million) of Colombian voters to participate. Not having received sufficient turnout, thereferendum items failed even though all received majority support by those voting. President Uribehas since taken some of the same issues to the Colombian Congress for support, especially thoserelating to the budget.

In late December 2002, Uribe appointed a commission to explore the possibility of a dialoguewith the AUC. This initiative grew out of an October 2002 meeting of Colombia's HighCommissioner for Peace and five Roman Catholic bishops with the AUC leadership, after which theAUC declared an indefinite cessation of hostilities, in part because of Uribe's more forceful stanceagainst the guerrillas. The Bush Administration, which on September 25, 2002, requested theextradition of two top AUC leaders, Carlos CastaÃ±o and Salvador Mancuso, announced on January8, 2003, that it would not withdraw the request. On July 15, 2003, the Uribe Administrationannounced that an agreement had been reached with leaders of the AUC that would result in theirdemobilization by the end of 2005. It is estimated that there are between 10,000 and 13,000members of the AUC operating in the country. Formed in the 1980s by wealthy cattle ranchers tofight leftist guerrilla groups, the AUC is a loose coordinating body, leading some observers toquestion whether negotiations with the AUC will result in the demobilization of self-defense groupsnot under the AUC umbrella. It is estimated that as many as 6,500 fighters operate outside of theAUC, (13) some of whomare negotiating separately with the government, and others who are not participating at all. Relatedto this effort is a controversial legislative proposal by the Uribe administration to grant conditionalamnesties to illegal combatants in exchange for their demobilization and reparations to victims.

Coca Cultivation and Eradication. Colombia isthe source for 80% of the world's cocaine hydrochloride (HCI), and significant quantities of highquality heroin entering the United States. While noting the ill effects of the drug trade on the livesof Colombians, President Uribe linked the drug trade and the guerrilla insurgency as intertwinedproblems that must be addressed in a coordinated fashion. Reflecting this sentiment, the UnitedStates began, in 2002, providing Colombia with the flexibility to use U.S. counterdrug funds for aunified campaign to fight drug trafficking and terrorist organizations. (The State Department hasdesignated the FARC, ELN, and AUC as terrorist organizations.)

Upon taking office, Uribe announced that aerial eradication and alternative developmentwould form a significant basis of the government's efforts. The Plan Colombia eradication sprayingprogram began in December 2000 with operations by the U.S. funded counternarcotics brigade inPutumayo. (14) Despiteearly indications that coca cultivation had increased by 25% in 2001 even though a reported 22,200acres had been sprayed, Colombian and U.S. officials have reported decreases of 15% in 2002. During 2002, acres devoted to coca cultivation decreased from nearly 420,000 acres in 2001 to357,000 acres in 2002. Colombia reported that an additional 160,000 acres had been sprayed in thefirst five months of 2003. Similarly, cultivation of opium poppy declined by 24% in 2002, with anadditional 4,000 acres sprayed in the first five months of 2003.

Aerial fumigation has been controversial. (15) Critics charge that it has unknown environmental and healtheffects, and that it deprives farmers of their livelihood, particularly in light of a lack of coordinationwith alternative development programs. The alternative development program, in which farmers canget assistance to grow substitute crops after agreeing to the eradication of their illicit crops, has beenplagued with delays. A U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report attributed the program'sobstacles to inadequate security in coca-growing areas, where the Colombian governments lackscontrol, and to the government's limited ability to carry out sustained interdiction operations. TheState Department's annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2002 claims that sincethe inception of the Alternative Development program in December 2000, 20,128 families havebenefitted and nearly 39,000 acres of licit crops have been planted in previous coca and poppy areas.The Colombian government reported that 38,000 families in 33 municipalities signed voluntaryeradication pacts. As of early 2002, media reports noted that less than a third of those families havereceived any compensation and many were still growing coca. (16)

Proponents argue that both eradication and alternative development programs need time towork. In its response to the GAO report, AID argued that alternative development programs do notachieve drug crop reduction on their own, and that the Colombia program was designed to supportthe aerial eradication program and to build "the political support needed for aerial eradication effortsto take place." At the start of his Administration, Uribe announced that increased Colombianresources would be devoted to alternative development.

With regard to environmental and health consequences, the Secretary of State certified in2002, as required by Congress, that the herbicide, glyphosate, is not considered to pose unreasonablehealth or safety risks to humans or the environment. In the certification, the U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency confirmed that application rates of the aerial fumigation program in Colombiaare within the parameters listed on U.S. glyphosate labels. (A certification required under theFY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Bill has not yet been released.) However, press reportsindicate that many Colombians believe the health consequences of aerial fumigation are grave. (17) Furthermore, Ecuador,neighboring Colombia, has complained that the fumigation program is damaging Ecuadorean crops,rivers, soil and people's health, according to its Foreign Minister, Nina Pacari. (18)

U.S. Policy Debate. The U.S. policy debate hasfocused on a number of related issues, such as the effectiveness and implementation of the programin general, respect for human rights, the expansion of U.S. support to address what many considerto be a purely civil conflict, and the level of resources that Colombia, and other countries are willingto contribute. Supporters argue that Colombia is a friendly democracy under siege by powerfularmed forces of the left and right fueled by drug money. In the context of the global war onterrorism, and with the growing recognition of the relationship between drug trafficking and theguerrilla insurgency, proponents argue that Colombia and its neighbors should be supported withcounterterrorism assistance before the situation deteriorates further. They favored expanding thescope of military assistance to strengthen the ability of Colombian security forces to combat theleftist guerrillas and to expand their control throughout rural areas, thereby undercutting the rationaleand support for paramilitary groups.

Opponents of U.S. policy argue that the counterdrug program uses a repressive and militaryapproach to curbing drug production. They argue for halting aerial fumigation of coca crops and aidto the Colombian military, believing that coca farmers cannot be expected to abandon coca farmingvoluntarily until adequate economic alternatives are in place. They fear that forcing such farmersto give up coca growing will only drive many to the ranks of the armed groups, or to becomedisplaced persons dependent on the state. (19) Instead, they support a policy that focuses largely on economicand social aid to combat the conflict's root causes, curbs the still rampant human rights abuses byparamilitary groups, provides vigorous support for a negotiated end to the fighting, and emphasizesillicit drug demand reduction in the United States. They also argue that assisting Colombia to fightits leftist guerrillas will involve the United States in a major guerrilla conflict of indeterminateduration.

Others, some of whom support current U.S. policy, argue for a "Colombianization" of theprogram in that they believe that Colombians should be conducting the aerial spraying and othercounternarcotics activities, not U.S. government contractors, and for Colombia itself to do more tofight its own war against terrorism and drug trafficking. They have argued that any expansion ofU.S. involvement should await a greater commitment by Colombia's government and elites to thewar effort, including a larger budget for the Colombian military. Still others argue that assistanceto Colombia should have the effect of improving its economy and providing employment forColombians, maintaining that the current implementation in which U.S. contractors are hired doesnot contribute to the economy or employment.

Debate in the United States has also focused on allegations of human rights abuses by theColombian Armed Forces, the FARC and ELN, and the paramilitary groups. The Colombiansecurity forces have often turned a blind eye to paramilitary activities, considering these groups asaugmenting their fight against the FARC and ELN, despite a record of human rights abuses. Manypolicymakers, both supporters and opponents of U.S. policy, have worked to break the ties betweenthe Colombian military and the AUC, and President Uribe has vowed that paramilitary activities willnot be tolerated. U.S. policy has supported the creation and assistance for a Human Rights Unitwithin the Attorney General's office. Some non-governmental groups have claimed that the unit isineffective and has poor leadership. (20) They argue for full enforcement of legislative conditions thatrequire concrete steps to prosecute members of the armed forces who commit human rightsviolations, or who tolerate activities of paramilitary organizations. Requirements for the U.S.Secretary of State to certify that the Colombian military is prosecuting human rights violators, andbreaking ties with the paramilitaries, are longstanding provisions in legislation. These certifications,one issued on July 8, 2003, and the latest issued on January 21, 2004, are criticized by human rightsorganizations as not adequately reflecting the human rights situation. (21)

Concerns in the United States have also been fueled by several incidents in which U.S.citizens have been killed or kidnaped in the region. On April 20, 2001, a private aircraft flying overPeru and carrying American missionaries was shot down, killing two, after the Peruvian military,working with U.S. support, identified it as a possible drug trafficking flight. As a result, theso-called "Air-Bridge Denial Program" was halted in both Peru and Colombia, until the Secretaryof State certified that a renewed program would incorporate safety enhancements. Thisdetermination was made on August 18, 2003. Having reached an agreement with Colombianauthorities on operational aspects that would provide greater safeguards against accidentalshootdowns, the program was operationally capable of resuming as of August 22. Concern alsoheightened that greater U.S. involvement will result in a protracted commitment in a civil conflictoccurred in response to the loss of five U.S. civilian contractors and aircraft operating in Colombiasince February 2003. In the first incident, in February, a Cessna 208 aircraft carrying both U.S. andColombian personnel crashed in a FARC controlled region. One American and a Colombian werekilled, and three are being held by the FARC. Another Cessna 208, with U.S. civilian contractors,crash landed in March during a subsequent search and rescue operation, killing three Americans. Afifth American contractor was killed on April 7 when his T-65 air tractor crashed during a sprayingoperation. While these flights were considered crashes, fumigation flights have been fired on, andsince August 2003, two planes have been downed by hostile fire. On August 25, a spray aircraftpiloted by a U.S. citizen was shot down, injuring the pilot. An OV Bronco aircraft was downed onSeptember 21, reportedly by hostile fire, killing its pilot which in some press reports was identifiedas a naturalized American citizen from Costa Rica.

A further concern of policymakers has centered on current U.S. policy opposing theapplication of jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to U.S. citizens. Countries who hadnot agreed to sign so-called "article 98 agreements" referring to Article 98 of the Rome Treaty onthe International Criminal Court, preventing the ICC from proceeding with a request for surrenderof U.S. personnel present in the country, are subject to a cutoff of U.S. military assistance. OnAugust 8, 2003, an article 98 agreement was signed with Colombia. This action was required underthe American Service Members Protection Act of 2002, which was incorporated as Title II of H.R. 4775 , the FY2002 Supplemental Appropriations Bill ( P.L. 107-206 ).

Funding and Requests for Colombia.

Under the P.L. 106-246 Plan Colombia funding, Colombia received $860.3million. Of that, $424.9 was State Department funding and $91.8 was Department of Defensefunding to assist Colombian military anti-drug efforts through interdiction support and the trainingand equipping of the Colombian counternarcotics battalions. The remaining $435.4 was StateDepartment funding for assistance to the Colombian police, economic and alternative developmentassistance, assistance for displaced persons, human rights, administration of justice and othergovernance programs.

Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Colombia received $379.9 million in ACIfunding, with $243.50 million in counternarcotics assistance, and $137 million in economic andsocial programs.

Under the Emergency FY2002 Supplemental, the Administration requested $4million of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding for police postsupport in areas of weak government control, $6 million of FMF funding (which Congress directedto be transferred to the INCLE account) for counter-terrorism equipment and training, and $25million of Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism and Demining (NATD) funding for counter-kidnappingtraining. The enacted legislation specifically provided $6 million for infrastructure protection forthe Cano-LimÃ³n CoveÃ±as oil pipeline, and fully funded the other accounts.

For FY2003, the Administration requested $537 million in ARI funding forColombia, including $439 million in ACI funding, and $98 million in FMF funding to train andequip a Colombian army brigade to protect an oil pipeline in the country. Congress reduced thisrequest by $5 million, providing $93 million in FMF funds for the oil pipeline, as well as $433million in ACI funding.

In the FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental, the President requestedadditional funding for Colombia. Congress approved $105.1 million, consisting of $34 million ofState Department for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, $34 million of DOD funds for DrugInterdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, and fully funded the Foreign Military Financing Program,out of which it provided that $20 million could be transferred to the ACI account. TheAdministration advised Congress that it had designated another $17.1 million in FMF funds forColombia.

For FY2004, the Administration requested a total of $573 million of which$463 million is for the ACI, consisting of $150 million for alternative development, humanitarianassistance and institution building, and $313 million for narcotics interdiction and eradicationprograms. The overall request also included $110 million in FMF funding. In addition, theAdministration proposed $1.6 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET)funds. Congress provided $731 million for the ACI in the FY2004 Consolidated Appropriations Bill( H.R. 2673 / H.Rept. 108-401 ), passed by the House on December 8, 2003, and stillpending in the Senate.

Peru

Peru, which shares its northern border with Colombia, is the fifth most populous country inLatin America, with 27.5 million inhabitants. President Alejandro Toledo was elected on June 3,2001, with 53% of the vote, against former left-leaning President Alan Garcia with 47%. A longtime opposition leader to previous President Alberto Fujimori who fled the country on corruption charges,Toledo was inaugurated as President on July 28, 2001. (22) President Toledo promised to end corruption and to stabilize theeconomy through orthodox policies, but observers have worried that tangible results will not meetthe expectations of the populace, especially poor, indigenous groups. The President has had to dealwith many strikes and protests, his party fared poorly in the November 2002 elections for newregional governments, and his popularity reached new lows in 2003. (23) President Toledo labeleddrug trafficking a national security problem for Peru and established a drug czar for the country tobetter coordinate counternarcotics initiatives. When President Bush visited Peru on March 23, 2002,the two Presidents agreed to enhance cooperation on counternarcotics and counter-terrorism issues. However, U.S. military aid to Peru was suspended on July 1, 2003, because Peru had not signed anagreement exempting U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, whichwould result in the loss of $2.7 million in military equipment and training requested forFY2004. (24)

Representatives of Peru and the United States launched an investigation into thecircumstances and procedures leading to an incident on April 20, 2001, in which a Peruvian militaryplane shot down a small plane, killing an American missionary woman and her infant daughter, aftera CIA surveillance plane had indicated that the small craft might be involved in drug traffickingactivities. As a result of this accident, U.S. surveillance of drug-related flights in Peru and Colombiawas suspended pending clarification of procedures. The State Department released a report of theU.S.-Peruvian investigative team on August 2, 2001, concluding that "communications systemsoverload" and "cumbersome procedures" played a role in the accident. President Bush indicatedduring his March 2002 trip to Peru that talks were continuing between the countries on appropriateprocedures before the renewal of the anti-drug surveillance flights. Current U.S. law requires theSecretary of State to notify Congress 30 days prior to resuming U.S. support for the air interdictionprogram and to provide assurances that greater safety enhancements are in place. When the WhiteHouse announced the resumption of the aerial interdiction program with Colombia on August 19,2003, Administration spokesmen stated that arrangements with Peru had not been completed and thatthe proposed program with Peru would be more limited. (25)

Peru is the second largest cocaine producer in the world and exports high purity cocaine andcocaine base to markets in South America, Mexico, Europe, and the United States. Nevertheless,it has been viewed as a success story in counternarcotics efforts because six years of joint U.S.-Peruair and riverine interdiction operations, aggressive eradication efforts, and alternative developmentprograms have significantly reduced coca production. However, while coca production remainedconstant in 2001, the State Department's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report noted an8% increase in production during 2002, although this level is still 36,000 hectares (88,956 acres)below 1995 levels. Facing mounting protests, the Peruvian government temporarily suspended thedrug eradication program in the Upper Huallaga Valley in early July 2002, but resumed the programin September 2002 once concerns were addressed, in part to be eligible for Andean Trade PreferenceAct benefits.

Peruvian spokesmen have worried about spillover effects of illicit drug activities fromColombia into Peru, and the increase in coca production. They have denounced illicit plantings ofcoca and poppies in Peru, and international trafficking of arms through Peru to FARC guerrillas inColombia. Responding to press reports that FARC forces have penetrated into Peruvian territory,Peruvian officials stated in early 2002 that there are no permanent FARC forces in Peru, but theyconceded that they may cross temporarily into border areas. Because of these threats, Peru hasmoved military bases from its border with traditional rival Ecuador, where tensions have diminished,to the border with Colombia. The March 20, 2002 bombing of a shopping center near the U.S.Embassy in Lima, three days before President Bush's visit to Peru, raised fears of a resurgence ofguerrilla groups.

Funding and Requests for Peru.

As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental funding, Perureceived $25 million for KMAX helicopters for the Peruvian National Police, and benefitted fromregional interdiction funding.

Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Peru received $142.5 million in ACI funds,with $75 million in counternarcotics aid and $67.5 million for alternative development. In addition,Peru received $23.7 million in Child Survival and Health funds, $15 million in DevelopmentAssistance, and $14.5 million in Economic Security Funds. No funds were requested for Peru in theFY2002 supplemental.

Under the ARI allocation for FY2003, Peru is to receive $128.1 million in ACIfunds, with $59.5 million in counternarcotics aid and $68.6 million for alternative development. In addition, it would receive nearly $22 million in Child Survival and Health funds, $16.3 millionin Development Assistance, and $9 million in Economic Support Funds.

For FY2004, the Administration requested $116 million in ACI funds, with$66 million in counternarcotics aid and $50 million for alternative development. In addition, theAdministration proposed $16.7 million in Child Survival and Health funds, $15.3 million inDevelopment Assistance, and $9 million in Economic Security Funds.

Bolivia

Landlocked Bolivia shares no border with Colombia, but Bolivia's significant gains inreducing illegal coca production could be threatened by any successes in controlling production inColombia. Once the world's foremost producer of coca leaf, Bolivia made great strides in reducingcoca cultivation under the Banzer-Quiroga administration (1997-2002). (26) However, forcibleeradication of coca has become a source of social discontent, exacerbating tensions over class andethnicity that may foment political instability in Latin America's poorest country.

With a population of 8.3 million, Bolivia is the eleventh most populous country in LatinAmerica. Despite a long past history of instability, Bolivia has, since the mid-1980s, experienceda period of unprecedented political stability as a series of elected governments institutedextraordinary political changes and economic liberalization, and peacefully transferred power to theirsuccessors. Beginning in the mid-1990s, governments have carried out major privatization programsand reforms that were heralded as putting the country on a sound macroeconomic footing, but havealso led to significant social dislocations. Economically, it is tied to the region through twoorganizations: the Andean Community and as an associate member of the Southern CommonMarket (Mercosur) formed by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.

President Gonzalo SÃ¡nchez de Losada, of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) a72-year old wealthy businessman who had served once before as president (1993-1997), began hisfive-year term on August 6, 2002, with only 22% of the vote in an eleven candidate field. EvoMorales, a 42-year old Aymara, who is head of the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) party andleader of the Bolivian coca growers union, ran a close second. Under the Bolivian constitution, thelack of a majority victory sent the election to the Bolivian Congress, where Members of the upperand lower chambers (27 senators and 130 representatives) selected between the two top vote getters.To secure the presidency, the MNR formed a coalition with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left(MIR), led by fourth place winner Jaime Paz Zamora, SÃ¡nchez de Lozada's traditional adversary andalso a former president (1989-1993). During his first year in office, President Losada had to dealwith numerous protests and demonstrations.

Shortly after SÃ¡nchez de Lozada's inauguration, his Interior Minister announced thegovernment would resume the eradication efforts of the previous government. Perhapsforeshadowing challenges to come, both domestically and in relations with the United States,confrontations erupted the next day between peasants and police in the coca-growing Chapare andYungas regions. More recent political unrest led to the resignation of SÃ¡nchez de Lozada on October17, 2003, just fifteen months after he was elected. Succeeding him as President is his former VicePresident, Carlos Mesa, a popular former television journalist, historian, and political independent. This change in leadership came about after months of protests led by indigenous and workers groupswho carried out strikes and road blockages that paralyzed most of the country and resulted in up to80 deaths. The focus of the protests was the continued economic marginalization of the poorersegments of society especially in response to government plans to export natural gas via a port inChile, an historic adversary of Bolivia. The new President faces many difficulties in governing apolitically fractured society, one of the poorest nations in the hemisphere, within the context of ahighly mobilized indigenous community, and the uncertainty of obtaining consensus on natural gasexports as a basis for the country's future economic development.

For some 20 years, U.S. relations with Bolivia have centered largely on controlling theproduction of coca leaf and coca paste, which was usually shipped to Colombia to be processed intococaine. In support of Bolivia's counternarcotics efforts, the United States has provided significantinterdiction and alternative development assistance, and it has forgiven all of Bolivia's debt fordevelopment assistance projects, and most of the debt for food assistance. Not until President HugoBanzer set a goal in his "Dignity Plan" of eliminating illegal coca cultivation and narco-traffickingby the end of his five-year term in 2002 was there much success. Bolivia, like Peru, has been viewedby many as a counternarcotics success story, with joint air and riverine interdiction operations,successful eradication efforts, and effective alternative development programs reducing illegal cocacultivation to the lowest level in five years, with a net reduction of approximately 70% between 1996and 2001. Others, however, view the forced eradication as a social and political disaster: in placesit was implemented regardless of the availability of alternative development programs funding, andin some places the Dignity Plan's mandated use of the military to carry out the eradications hasgenerated charges of human rights abuses. (27)

According to the State Department's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, cocacultivation increased 23% in 2002. Nearly 12,000 hectares (29,652 acres) was eradicated, but theauthorities have had little success in preventing replantings. Yet, Bolivia's coca cultivation is abouthalf of its 1995 levels. It should also be noted that Bolivian law allows up to 12,000 hectares of cocacultivation for traditional use. Although President Jorge Quiroga had promised to carry out theDignity Plan program, he relented after violent protests by coca growers in the Yungas and theChapare regions. The latter was once the country's primary illegal coca-growing region. Much of theillegal commercial crop had been eliminated there, but some has been replanted.

Bolivia has signed an article 98 agreement exempting U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction ofthe International Criminal Court. The agreement is pending consideration before the BolivianCongress. In July 2003, and previous to an agreement being signed, the Bush Administration hadwaived the withholding of U.S. military aid from the country.

Funding and Requests for Bolivia.

As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental funding,Bolivia received $25 million for regional interdiction assistance and $85 million in alternativedevelopment assistance.

Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Bolivia received $87.6 million in ACIfunds, consisting of $52 million in drug interdiction and eradication, and $35.6 million in alternativedevelopment. In addition, Bolivia received $19.7 million in Child Survival and Health funds, $12.9million in Development Assistance, $10 million in Economic Support Funds, and $500,000 inForeign Military Financing.

Under the FY2003 ARI allocation, Bolivia is to receive nearly $91 million inACI funding, consisting of $49 million in interdiction and eradication, and $41.7 million inalternative development. In addition, Bolivia would receive $18.5 million in Child Survival andHealth funds, $12.2 million in Development Assistance, $10 million in Economic Support Funds,and $2 million in Foreign Military Financing.

For FY2004, the Administration requested $91 million in ACI funds,consisting of $52.5 million in interdiction and eradication, and $38.5 million in alternativedevelopment. In addition, the Administration proposed $14.4 million in Child Survival and Healthfunds, $11.4 million in Development Assistance, $8 million in Economic Support Funds, and $4million in Foreign Military Financing.

Ecuador

On Colombia's southern border, Ecuador is the most exposed of Colombia's neighborsbecause it is situated adjacent to areas in southern Colombian that are guerrilla strongholds andheavy drug producing areas. With a population of 13.2 million, Ecuador is the eighth most populouscountry in Latin America. President Lucio Gutierrez, a retired colonel and a leader of the January2000 uprising which toppled the previously elected President, Gustavo Noboa, was elected onNovember 20, 2002, and inaugurated on January 15, 2003. He has embarked upon a very ambitiousprogram to cut government expenditures, and in March 2003, he obtained a $205 million stand-byarrangement from the International Monetary Fund and the extension of repayments on pastobligations to help the country deal with its debt problems.

According to press reports, Colombian guerrillas pass into Ecuadoran territory for rest,recuperation, and medical treatment, and there are reports that Colombians are buying ranches andfarms in the Ecuadoran border region, possibly for drug cultivation. Ecuadoran officials say theyhave uncovered and destroyed several small cocaine processing labs in the area. The Ecuadoranborder region is experiencing a constant flow of Colombian refugees into the poor areas, and fighterswith Colombian paramilitary organizations have been arrested for running extortion rings inEcuadorian border regions. The FARC has been accused of kidnaping people in Ecuador, althoughthe FARC denies the allegations. Ecuador reinforced its northern border with Colombia in early2002 as Colombian anti-guerrilla operations intensified following the breakdown of the peace talks,and Ecuador was said to be seeking additional international assistance. (28) President Gutierrez hassaid that the armed conflict in Colombia is having an adverse affect on Ecuadoran peasants in borderareas, and he has claimed that the aerial fumigation in Colombia is harming the Ecuadoranenvironment and negatively affecting Ecuadorans' health. (29) Colombian President Uribe thanked Ecuadoran for taking inColombians fleeing violence when he visited Ecuador, on August 22, 2003, and he promised toeradicate terrorism in Colombia so that it would not spread to Ecuador. (30)

As a major transit country for cocaine and heroin from Colombia and Peru, Ecuadorcooperates extensively with the United States in counternarcotics efforts. In November 1999, theUnited States signed a 10-year agreement with Ecuador for a forward operating location (FOL) inManta, on the Pacific Coast, for U.S. aerial counterdrug detection and monitoring operations. Although the agreement is solely for the detection of drug trafficking flights in the region, somehuman rights groups and politicians in Ecuador fear that the facility could be used to supportoperations against guerrillas in neighboring Colombia.

Ecuador has not signed an agreement to exempt U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of theInternational Criminal Court, and it became subject to U.S. sanctions on July 1, 2003, with thepossible loss of $15.7 million in FMF funding and IMET education in FY2004. Press reports at thetime of the announcement of the cutoff of military aid quoted some Ecuadoran officials as sayingthey might reexamine the military relationship with the United States, including the Manta facility.

Funding and Requests for Ecuador.

As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental fundingEcuador received $20 million in U.S. assistance, of which $12 million was to support druginterdiction efforts, and $8 million was for alternative development assistance. Another $61.3million has been allocated for the construction of a Forward Operating Location in Manta, Ecuadorfor counternarcotics aerial surveillance.

Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Ecuador received $25 million in ACIfunding, consisting of $15 million in interdiction and law enforcement programs, and $10 millionin alternative development. In addition, Ecuador received $6.9 million in Development Assistance,$15 million in Economic Support Funds.

Under the Emergency FY2002 Supplemental request, Ecuador received $3million in FMF funding.

Under the FY2003 ARI allocations, Ecuador is to receive nearly $30.9 millionin ACI funding, consisting of $15 million for interdiction and law enforcement programs, and $15.9million for alternative development. In addition, Ecuador would receive $7.1 million inDevelopment Assistance, $15.5 million in Economic Support Funds, and $1 million in ForeignMilitary Financing.

For FY2004, the Administration requested $35 million in ACI funding,consisting of $20 million for interdiction and law enforcement, and $15 million for alternativedevelopment. In addition, Ecuador would receive $300,000 in Child Survival and Health funds, $7.1million in Development Assistance, $14 million in Economic Support Funds, and $15 million inForeign Military Financing.

Brazil

Brazil's isolated Amazon region, populated largely by indigenous groups, forms Colombia'ssoutheastern border. With a population of 174.5 million, Brazil is the largest and most populouscountry in Latin America, with most of its inhabitants concentrated in the more developedsoutheastern areas of the country and along the Atlantic coast. Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of the leftistWorkers Party was inaugurated as President on January 1, 2003, after decisively winning the secondround presidential election in October 2002, with support from a wide range of parties. He haspromised to follow sound economic policies, while putting priority on the elimination of hunger inthe country. He is seeking to create a strong South American bloc that would merge the SouthernCommon Market (Mercosur), composed of Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay (with Bolivia andChile as associate members) with the Andean Community, composed of Venezuela, Colombia,Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. President Lula da Silva visited Peru on August 25, 2003, and PeruvianPresident Toledo signed a free trade agreement between Peru and Mercosur, and talks for a broaderfree trade agreement between Mercosur and the Andean Community are scheduled to conclude byDecember 2003. Brazil views these integration efforts as facilitating more advantageousnegotiations with the United States in the talks to conclude a Free Trade Area of the Americas(FTAA) by January 2005.

In efforts to strengthen ties with the United States, on June 20, 2003, President Lula da Silvamade an official visit to Washington, D.C. and he and President Bush resolved "to create a closerand qualitatively stronger [bilateral] relationship." Leaders agreed on a framework for regularhigh-level discussions on a wide range of issues, including agreements to enhance cooperation inscience and nuclear energy; to jointly promote HIV/AIDS treatment in the Portuguese-speakingAfrican countries of Mozambique and Angola; and to establish an energy partnership for cooperationon alternative energy sources. Brazil has not agreed to exempt U.S. citizens from the jurisdictionof the International Criminal Court, and in July 2003 it became subject to sanctions that could resultin the loss of $500,000 in IMET military education and training funds in FY2004.

Brazil is not a significant drug-producing country, but it is a conduit for the transit of cocainebase and cocaine HC1 from Colombia to Europe and the United States. With increasing drug usewithin the country, a major action in 2002 was the passage of an omnibus Brazilian federalcounter-narcotics law.

Brazilians have long been concerned about the sparsely populated territory in the hugeAmazon region, and they have been fearful historically of foreign designs and intervention in thisterritory. In an effort to exercise control over this vast territory Brazil has constructed a $1.4 billionsensor and radar project called the Amazon Vigilance System, or SIVAM from its acronym inPortuguese, and it has offered to share data from this system with neighbors and the United States. It has established a military base at Tabatinga, with 25,000 soldiers and policemen, with air forceand navy support, and has launched Operation Cobra with heightened vigilance to deal with spillovereffects from Colombia.

Press accounts suggest evidence of Colombian drug traffickers encouraging indigenouscommunities in Brazil to plant coca, Brazilian drug traffickers linked to Colombian traffickers, andFARC incursions along the border. In one example in late 1998, the FARC captured a city on theColombian border, forcing Colombian troops to withdraw into Brazilian territory, before recapturingthe city. In another example, a plane from Suriname with arms for FARC guerrillas was discoveredwhen it was forced to make an emergency landing in Brazil. In another more recent example, FARCforces crossed into Brazil in early March 2002 and exchanged gunfire with Brazilian militaryforces. (31) In late June2003, Brazil announced that it would increase the number of troops in states that share a border withColombia. In another strange incident, it was reported in August 2003 that French officials landeda C-130 plane in Brazilian territory in mid-July 2003, without informing Brazilian authorities, in aneffort to rescue Ingrid Betancourt, a former Colombian presidential candidate who is also a Frenchcitizen, who has been held captive by FARC guerrillas. (32)

Funding and Requests for Brazil.

Brazil received only a small amount of Plan Colombia assistance, but under ARI allocations for FY2002 Brazil received $6 million in ACI funds, nearly all in law enforcementfunding. Brazil also received $9.2 million in Child Survival and Health funds, and $4.8 million inDevelopment Assistance.

Under the FY2003 ARI allocation, Brazil is to receive $6 million in ACI funds,nearly all in law enforcement funding. In addition, Brazil is to receive $9.8 million in Child Survivaland Health funds, and $6.4 million in Development Assistance.

FY2004, the Administration requested $12 million in ACI funding, nearly allin law enforcement funding. In addition, the Administration proposed $12 million in Child Survivaland Health funds, and $8.2 million in Development Assistance.

Venezuela

Venezuela, Colombia's eastern neighbor, is now the fourth largest supplier of crude oil to theUnited States. With a population of 24 million, Venezuela is the sixth most populous country inLatin America. The country is presently led by President Hugo Chavez, a populist and leader of anunsuccessful military coup in the early 1990s, who was initially elected in 1998 on a campaign torewrite the constitution, rid the country of corruption, and more adequately meet the needs of thepeople. Under President Chavez, Venezuela has undergone enormous political changes, with a newconstitution and revamped political institutions.

Although Chavez remained widely popular until mid-2001, his popularity subsequentlyeroded significantly after that, especially among the middle class, because of his perceivedineffectiveness in improving living conditions and concerns that he was imposing a leftist agendaon the country. Following massive anti-Chavez protests in April 2002, the Venezuelan military tookChavez into custody and business leader Pedro Carmona declared himself interim President, butChavez was restored to power in days with the support of the military. From December 2002 untilFebruary 2003, the opposition orchestrated a general strike that disrupted the economy but wasunsuccessful in getting President Chavez to agree to early elections or a non-binding referendum onhis rule. After months of negotiations facilitated by OAS Secretary General Cesar Gaviria, PresidentChavez and the opposition signed an agreement on May 29, 2003, to resolve the political crisis.Implementation of the accord, which could lead to a recall referendum for President Chavez, willnot necessarily be easy, but observers emphasize that it is an important first step for achievingpolitical stability. (33)

Under the Chavez government, there has been friction at times in U.S.-Venezuelan relations,and Chavez has at times used anti-U.S. rhetoric. He denounced Plan Colombia as a U.S.-dominatedmilitary strategy, and denied the United States overflight rights over Venezuela territory for druginterdiction. Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Chavez criticizedU.S. military action in Afghanistan, and he visited Libya, Iran, and Iraq, prompting President Bushto exclude him from his March 2002 meeting with Andean leaders in Peru. (34) Venezuelan officials haverefused to exempt U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and in July2003, the country became subject to sanctions that could lead to the loss of $700,000 in militaryeducation and training funds in FY2004.

There has been increasing concern about the guerrilla conflict in Colombia spreading toVenezuela. At times, Colombian guerrillas and paramilitaries have entered Venezuela territorycausing frictions in Colombian-Venezuelan relations. In April 2003, Venezuela's military exchangedfire with Colombian paramilitaries that had crossed the border pursuing FARC guerrillas; asubsequent meeting between Chavez and Colombian President Alvaro Uribe eased tensions and ledto Venezuelan promises to increase border patrols in order to prevent incursions by armedColombian groups. There also have been long-held suspicions that President Chavez has supportedthe Colombian guerrillas, but President Chavez denies such support. The Senate Foreign OperationsBill for FY2004 contains a provision denying Venezuela assistance if the Secretary of State certifiesthat Venezuela is assisting, harboring, or providing sanctuary to Colombian terrorist organizations.

Venezuela is a major transit route for cocaine and heroin from neighboring Colombia to theUnited States and Europe. In 2001, some coca fields were located and eradicated, and processinglabs were detected and destroyed. There were no eradication efforts in 2002. Despite various policydisagreements with the United States, the Chavez government has cooperated with the United Statesin counternarcotics efforts.

Funding and Requests for Venezuela.

While Venezuela received only a small amount of Plan Colombia assistance,under the final ARI allocations for FY2002, Venezuela received $5 million in ACI funding,consisting of law enforcement and administration of justice programs. Venezuela also received$500,000 in Economic Support Funds.

Under FY2003 ARI allocations, Venezuela would receive $2.1 million in ACIfunding, consisting of law enforcement and administration of justice programs. Venezuela wouldalso receive $500,000 in Economic Support Funds.

For FY2004, the Administration requested $5 million in ACI funding,consisting of law enforcement and administration of justice programs. The Administration alsoproposed $500,000 in Economic Support Funds.

Panama

Panama is separated from Colombia along its southern border by the difficult andenvironmentally sensitive wetlands and rain forest of the "Darien Gap." Here, the 16,000 mile PanAmerican highway (stretching from Alaska to the tip of southern Chile) is interrupted for a 60 milestretch. A part of Colombia until 1903, Panama is now the twentieth most populous country in LatinAmerica, with a population of 2.8 million.

Panama's history has been heavily influenced by its strategic location and the transit ofcommerce through the Panama Canal in the center of the country, where the major cities are located. It is led by President Mireya Moscoso, elected and inaugurated in 1999, who has been dealing witheconomic difficulties in Panama, and with Panama's new responsibilities for the Panama Canal sincethe U.S. withdrawal on the last day of 1999. Despite considerable effort in the period leading up tothe U.S. withdrawal, Panama was unwilling to allow the United States to retain a formal militarypresence in Panama for counternarcotics surveillance purposes. (35) This forced the UnitedStates to develop the Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in El Salvador, Aruba/Curacao andEcuador as substitute locations for such activities. U.S.-Panama relations have been very friendly,however, and Panama did agree to exempt U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the InternationalCriminal Court shortly before President Moscoso's late June 2003 official visit to Washington, D.C.

Panama has been the scene of cross-border incursions by Colombian guerrillas and paramilitary groups. There is some evidence that paramilitary groups are being founded in Panama,with support from Colombian groups, because of the perception that the Panamanian governmenthas left some areas unprotected. Shipments of small arms for the Colombian guerrillas have beenseized in Panamanian territory as well.

Panama is not an illicit drug producing country, but it is a major transshipment point forillicit drugs, especially cocaine, smuggled from South America, and it is a major site formoney-laundering activity. In recent years, Panama has cooperated with the United States inbilateral counternarcotics efforts, seizing significant amounts of illicit drugs and enforcing recentlypassed anti-money laundering legislation. In early 2002, a comprehensive U.S.-Panama maritimeanti-drug agreement entered into force.

Funding and Requests for Panama.

While Panama received only a small amount of Plan Colombia assistance,under allocations for FY2002, Panama received $5 million in ACI funding, consisting largely ofborder control and law enforcement funds. Panama also received $4.5 million in DevelopmentAssistance and $4.2 million in Economic Support Funds.

For FY2003, Panama is to receive $4.5 million in ACI funds, consistinglargely of border control and law enforcement funds. In addition, Panama is to receive $4.9 millionin Development Assistance, $3 million in Economic Support Funds, and $1 million in ForeignMilitary Financing.

For FY2004, the Administration requested $9 million in ACI funds, consistinglargely of border control and law enforcement funds. In addition, the Administration proposed $5.7million in Development Assistance, $3.5 million in Economic Support Funds, and $2.5 million inForeign Military Financing.

Major Legislative Activity in 2003 on Andean Regional Initiative Issues

In 2003, Congress has acted on a variety of appropriation and authorization measures relatedto the Andean region that are cited below. In April 2003, the Congress passed an FY2003Emergency Wartime Supplemental, to fund continuing operations in Iraq, that also included fundingfor the Andean Counterdrug Initiative. On December 8, 2003, the House passed the FY2004Consolidated Appropriations Bill ( H.R. 2673 / H.Rept. 108-401 ), which combined anumber of individual appropriations measures that had not yet been approved. The bill passed theSenate on Janaury 22, 2004, and was signed into law the next day ( P.L. 108-199 ).

FY2003 Foreign Operations Appropriations

By the end of 2002, both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees had reported theirversions of an FY2003 Foreign Operations Appropriation bill, but this and other appropriations billshad not been enacted. As a result, Congress incorporated the 11 unfinished bills into an omnibusspending package, H.J.Res. 2 (for continuing appropriations). The House passed H.J.Res. 2 on January 8, 2003, and the Senate followed suit on January 28, 2003. Bothchambers approved the conference report ( H.Rept. 108-10 ) on February 13, 2003, and the measurewas signed into law ( P.L. 108-7 ) on February 20, 2003. (36) In the omnibus bill, Congress provided $835.5 million for theAndean Regional Initiative, of which $700 million was provided for the Andean CounterdrugInitiative. It further allowed the transfer of $31 million from the State Department's InternationalNarcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account to the ACI.

FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental

On March 25, 2003, President Bush requested $74.7 billion in additional funding for militaryoperations and reconstruction activities in Iraq, and for ongoing operations in the global war onterrorism. It also included requests for counterdrug and military funding for Colombia.

House Action. The House AppropriationsCommittee marked up H.R. 1559 on April 2, 2003, providing the President with mostof his request. The House passed the measure on April 3, 2003, by a vote of 414-12. During floorconsideration, an amendment offered by Representative Jim McGovern was defeated by a vote of209-216. The amendment would have decreased by $61 million funding for Interdiction andCounterdrug Activities and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative for Colombia, and would haveincreased funding for the Office of Domestic Preparedness by $34 million.

Senate Action. The Senate passed H.R. 1559 on April 7, 2003, by a vote of 93-0, after it struck all after the enacting clauseand inserted the text of S. 762 , the Emergency Wartime Supplemental, reported out bythe Senate Appropriations Committee on April 1.

Conference Report. The conference agreementpassed both the House and the Senate on April 12, 2003, and was signed into law on April 16, 2003( P.L. 108-11 ). With regard to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative and Colombia, it provided $34million for the ACI of which $5 million is to assist persons who have been displaced as a result ofthe armed conflict in Colombia. Further, it provided that up to $20 million in Foreign MilitaryFinancing (FMF) funds could be transferred to the ACI for aircraft, training, and other assistance forthe Colombian Armed Forces. Overall FMF funding totaled $2.059 billion, of which theAdministration subsequently allocated an additional $17.1 million for Colombia. The Departmentof Defense was provided with an additional $34 million for its Drug Interdiction and Counter-DrugActivities to fund "increased operational tempo in Colombia's unified campaign against narcoticstrafficking and terrorist activities." Report language directed the Secretary of Defense to submit areport to Congress within 30 days of enactment detailing how these funds are to be obligated insupport of the U.S. Southern Command's Colombia initiative.

FY2004 Foreign Operations Appropriations

House Action. The House Foreign OperationsAppropriations Subcommittee marked up the FY2004 bill ( H.R. 2800 / H.Rept. 108-222 )on July 10, 2003, which was followed by full committee consideration on July 16, 2003. TheCommittee approved the President's request of $731 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative,and included a number of conditions and reporting requirements. The Committee does not earmarkfunds by country from the Child Survival and Health programs, Development Assistance, ForeignMilitary Financing, and Economic Security Funds (with some exceptions), which comprisecomponents of the Andean Regional Initiative. However, the Committee provided additionalfunding over FY2003 levels for the Child Survival and Health Program, and moderate increases forthe Economic Support Fund, and Foreign Military Financing programs. Development Assistancewas cut slightly.

As in previous years, the Committee included a number of funding conditions and reportingrequirements. These provisions include the following:

Expanded authority for a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking,activities of terrorist organizations, and to take actions to protect human health and welfare inemergency situations, including rescue operations. The Committee Report notes, as it has inprevious years, that this authority is not a signal for the United States to become more deeplyinvolved in assisting the Colombian military in fighting its terrorist groups, and especially not at theexpense of counternarcotics programs. Expanded authority is meant to provide "more effectiveintelligence gathering and fusion, and to provide the flexibility to the Department of State when thedistinction between counternarcotics and counterterrorism are [sic] not clearcut."

Expanded authority shall cease if the Secretary of State determines that theColombian Armed Forces are not conducting vigorous operations to restore government authorityand respect for human rights in areas under the effective control of paramilitary and guerrillaorganizations. This is similar language to previous years.

If any helicopters procured with ACI funds are used to aid or abet theoperations of paramilitaries, the helicopters shall be immediately returned to the United States. Thisis similar language to previous years.

Support for a Peruvian air interdiction program is denied until the Secretaryof State and Director of Central Intelligence certify to Congress, 30 days prior to any resumption,that such a program will include enhanced safeguards and procedures to prevent any similaroccurrence to the April 20, 2001 incident in which two American missionaries were killed after aplane in which they were flying was shot down.

It requires a report from the State Department and Agency for InternationalDevelopment within 45 days of the bill's enactment on the proposed uses of all ACI funds on acountry-by-country basis for each proposed program, project, or activity.

It allows for the obligation of 75% of ACI funds without prior certificationfrom the Secretary of State with regard to human rights. To release the remaining 25%, theSecretary must certify that 1) the Colombian Armed Forces are suspending those who have beencredibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights, or to have aided paramilitaryorganizations; 2) the Colombian government is prosecuting military personnel accused of humanrights abuses; 3) the Colombian military is cooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicialauthorities in such cases; 4) the Colombian military is severing links with paramilitary organizations;and 5) the Colombian military is executing orders for the capture of paramilitary leaders. TheCommittee directs the Secretary to meet with internationally recognized human rights organizationsprior to making the certification.

It directs the Secretary of State to deny visas to any alien who has providedsupport to the FARC, ELN, or AUC or has committed or abetted the commission of gross violationsof human rights.

The report recommends $1 million for the Naval Post Graduate School (N.S.)to strengthen public engagement and democratic control of national security inColombia.

The report states the Committee's support for USAID's continuing alternativedevelopment strategy, and for the so-called "carabineros" police program to establish a lawenforcement presence in rural and remote areas.

The report states the Committee's concern that U.S. assistance is not adequatelyreaching the substantial Afro-Colombian population, which has been significantly affected by theconflict.

The report states the Committee's concern with the increase in Colombianheroin and directs the State Department to consult with the Committee on its strategy for heroineradication.

During full committee consideration, Chairman Jim Kolbe accepted an amendment proposedby Representative Sam Farr to require the State Department to submit a report no later than 60 daysfrom enactment that describes detailed plans and programs to train Colombian nationals for thepurpose of assuming responsibilities for programs currently being executed by U.S. contractors withfunds provided in the bill.

H.R. 2800 passed the House on July 23, 2003. During its consideration, theHouse defeated by a 195-226 margin an amendment by Representative Jim McGovern andRepresentative Ike Skeleton to cut $40 million from the Andean Counterdrug Initiative and $35million from Foreign Military Financing funds, and to transfer this $75 million to Child Survival andHealth programs.

Senate Action. The Senate Committee onAppropriations reported out their bill ( S. 1426 / S.Rept. 108-106 ) on July 17, 2003,providing $660 million of the President's ACI request, with the authority to transfer an additional$37 million from the State Department's INCLE account to ACI. Of this total of $697 million, theCommittee directed that not less than $250 million be allocated directly to USAID for alternativedevelopment and institution building programs, including judicial reform. Of the $250 million, $165million is directed to these types of programs in Colombia. In addition, the Committee earmarkedfunding for certain programs in Colombia: $2.5 million to protect human rights defenders; $2.5million for the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia; $10million for assistance to the Colombian Attorney General's Human Rights Unit; and $2.5 million forassistance to the human rights office of the Colombian Procuraduria. (During Senate floorconsideration, this amount was increased to $3.5 million by an amendment offered by SenatorLeahy.) The Senate took up H.R. 2800 on October 24, substituting the text of S. 1426 , passing the bill on October 30 by voice vote.

Like the House bill, it includes a number of reporting requirements.

It provides expanded authority for a unified campaign against narcoticstrafficking, activities of terrorist organizations, and to take actions to protect human health andwelfare in emergency situations, including rescue operations.

Expanded authority shall cease if the Secretary of State determines that theColombian Armed Forces are not conducting vigorous operations to restore government authorityand respect for human rights in areas under the effective control of the paramilitary and guerrillaorganizations.

If any helicopters procured with ACI funds are used to aid or abet theoperations of any illegal self-defense group or illegal security cooperative, the helicopters shall beimmediately returned to the United States.

It requires a report from the State Department, in consultation with USAID,within 45 days of the bill's enactment, on the proposed uses of all ACI funds on a country-by-countrybasis for each proposed program, project or activity.

Section 664 allows for the obligation of 50% of ACI funds prior to acertification from the Secretary of State with regard to human rights. The release of the remaining50% would be in two installments: the first after such a certification; the second after July 31, 2004,with an additional certification. Specifically, the Secretary must certify that (1) the ColombianArmed Forces are suspending personnel who have been credibly alleged to have committed grossviolations of human rights, including extra-judicial killings, or to have aided or abetted paramilitaryorganizations; (2) the Colombian government is investigating and prosecuting members of theColombian Armed Forces who have been credibly alleged to have committed gross violations ofhuman rights; (3) the Colombian Armed Forces are cooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicialauthorities in such cases; (4) the Colombian Armed Forces are severing links with paramilitaryorganizations; and 5) the Colombian Armed Forces are dismantling paramilitary leadership andfinancial networks by arresting commanders and financial backers. The Committee directs theSecretary of State to meet with internationally recognized human rights organizations at least 10 daysprior to making these certifications.

Section 665 directs the Secretary of State to deny visas to any alien who hasprovided support to the FARC, ELN, or AUC, or has committed or abetted the commission of grossviolations of human rights.

It continues previously enacted provisions that would prohibit not more than20% of funds to be used for the procurement of chemicals for aerial coca and poppy fumigationunless the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental ProtectionAgency, certifies that (1) the herbicide mixture is being used in accordance with EPA labelrequirements for comparable use in the United States and with the Colombian EnvironmentalManagement Plan; (2) the herbicide mixture, in the manner it is being used, does not poseunreasonable risks or adverse effects to humans or the environment; and (3) complaints of harm tohealth or licit crops caused by fumigation are evaluated and fair compensation is being paid formeritorious claims. It also states that these funds may not be used unless programs are beingimplemented by USAID, the government of Colombia, or other organizations, to provide alternativesources of income in areas where security permits for small-acreage farmers whose illicit crops aretargeted for fumigation.

It prohibits any U.S. Armed Forces personnel or U.S. civilian contractorsemployed by the United States from participating in any combat operation inColombia.

It commends the commitment of Colombian President Uribe in tackling thethreats of terrorism and narcotics in Colombia.

It includes language maintaining the existing caps on U.S. personnel inColombia at 400 for military and 400 for civilian contractors in support of PlanColombia.

It commends the Colombian National Police for reasserting its presencethroughout the country and provides $17 million in FMF funds for three DC-3 aircraft to increasetheir mobility. The Committee report notes that it sees "the Colombian military as a particularlyweak link in the fight against terrorism and narcotics."

It requires a report from the Secretary of State, not less than 90 days fromenactment, that describes (1) the budgetary impact for fiscal years 2004 through 2007 of StateDepartment and other relevant agencies of Plan Colombia and Andean Counterdrug Initiativeactivities, including the projected cost per year of maintaining and operating equipment, includingaircraft, that the United States has provided to Colombia; (2) the progress, to date, that the UnitedStates has made in turning over management and implementation of Plan Colombia and the AndeanCounterdrug Initiative programs from U.S. personnel to the Colombian government; and (3) the exitstrategy that would transfer such programs and activities to the Colombiangovernment.

It continues the so-called "Leahy Amendment" that prohibits funding for anyunits of security forces if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committedgross violations of human rights.

It makes U.S. assistance to the Bolivian police or military contingent on areport from the Secretary of State that (1) the Bolivian government is vigorously investigating andprosecuting members of the military and police who have been credibly alleged to have committedgross violations of human rights and is punishing those found to have committed such violations;and (2) the Bolivian military and police are cooperating with such investigations andprosecutions.

It prohibits assistance to Venezuela if the Secretary of State certifies that thegovernment of Venezuela is assisting, harboring, or providing sanctuary to Colombian terroristorganizations. It exempts $5 million in Economic Support Funds for democracy and rule of lawprograms.

Conference Report. The House and SenateForeign Operations Appropriations Bills were included in the FY2004 Consolidated AppropriationsBill ( H.R. 2673 / H.Rept. 108-401 ). The measure passed the House on December 8,2003, and the Senate on January 22, 2004 ( P.L. 108-199 ). The conference report provides $731million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, the same as the President's request. It also providesa total of $4.294 billion in Foreign Military Financing, of which the Administration proposedspending $133.5 million in the Andean nations. The conference report included a number ofprovisions relating to the Andean Region.

It maintains language authorizing support for a unified campaignagainst narcotics trafficking and activities by organizations designated as terrorist organizations. Report language notes that counternarcotics, alternative development, and judicial reform shouldremain the principal focus of U.S. policy in Colombia.

This authority shall cease if the Secretary of State has credible evidencethat the Colombian Armed Forces are not vigorously attempting to restore government authority andrespect for human rights in areas under the effective control of paramilitary and guerrillaorganizations.

It maintains the current cap on the number of U.S. military and U.S.civilian contractors at 400 each, in support of Plan Colombia.

It maintains language requiring that if any helicopter procured with ACIfunds is used to aid or abet the operations of any illegal self-defense group or illegal securitycooperative, the helicopter shall be immediately returned to the United States.

It requires that the Secretary of State, in consultation with theAdministrator of USAID, provide to the Committees on Appropriations a report within 45 days ofenactment and prior to the initial obligation of funds on the proposed uses of all ACI funds on acountry-by-country basis for each proposed program, project, or activity.

It requires that not less than $257 million of ACI funds be madeavailable for alternative development and institution building, of which $229.2 million shall beallocated to USAID.

It requires that not less than $25 million be made available for justiceand rule of law programs in Colombia.

It requires that not less than $13 million, in addition to the $25 millionreferred to above, be made available for organizations and programs to protect human rights. Accompanying report language states that these funds are to be allocated as follows: $2.5 millionfor protecting human rights defenders in Colombia; $2.5 million for the U.N. Office of the HighCommissioner for Human Rights in Colombia; $6.5 million for the Colombian Attorney General'sHuman Rights Unit; and $1.5 million for the human rights unit of the ColombianProcuraduria.

It requires that not more than 20% of funds used for the procurementof chemicals for aerial coca and poppy fumigation be made available unless the Secretary of State,in consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) certifies that1) the herbicide mixture is in accordance with EPA label requirements for comparable use in theUnited States and any additional controls recommended by the EPA; and 2) the herbicide mixturedoes not pose unreasonable risks or adverse effects to humans or the environment. Further, theSecretary of State must certify that complaints of harm to health or licit crops caused by fumigationare evaluated and fair compensation is being paid for meritorious claims. These funds may not bemade available unless programs are being implemented by USAID, the Colombian government, orother organizations, and in consultation with local communities, to provide alternative sources ofincome in areas where security permits for small-acreage growers whose illicit crops are targeted forfumigation.

It requires that not less than $2.5 million be made available for training,equipment, and other assistance for the Colombian National Park Service. It also provides that fundsmay be used for aerial fumigation in Colombia's national parks or reserves if the Secretary of Statedetermines that it is in accordance with Colombian laws and that there are no effective alternativesto reduce drug cultivation in these areas.

It prohibits any U.S. military personnel or U.S. civilian contractors fromparticipating in any combat operations in Colombia.

It allows the obligation of 75% of assistance to the Colombian ArmedForces without a determination and certification from the Secretary of State regarding respect forhuman rights and severing ties with paramilitary groups. The remaining 25% can be released in twoinstallments of 12.5% each. The first installment can be made provided that the Secretary of Statecertifies that 1) the Commander General of the Colombian Armed Forces is suspending memberswho have been credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights or to have aidedor abetted paramilitary organizations; 2) the Colombian government is vigorously investigating andprosecuting members of the military who have been credibly alleged to have committed grossviolations of human rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitary organizations; 3) the ColombianArmed Forces have made substantial progress in cooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicialauthorities in such cases; 4) the Colombian Armed Forces have made substantial progress in severinglinks to paramilitary organizations; and 5) the Colombian Armed Forces are dismantling paramilitaryleadership and financial networks by arresting commanders and financial backers. The lastinstallment can be made after July 31, 2004, if the Secretary of State certifies that the ColombianArmed Forces are continuing to meet the above conditions and are conducting vigorous operationsto restore government authority and respect for human rights in areas under the effective control ofparamilitary and guerrilla organizations. It also requires that not later than 60 days after enactment,and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult with internationally recognizedhuman rights organizations regarding progress in meeting these conditions.

It denies visas to anyone who the Secretary of State determines willfullyprovided any support to the FARC, ELN, or AUC, or has participated in the commission of grossviolations of human rights in Colombia.

None of the funds can be used to support a Peruvian air interdictionprogram until the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence certify to Congress 30days prior to resuming the program that enhanced safeguards and procedures have beendeveloped.

It requires a report by the Secretary of State that the Bolivian militaryand police are respecting human rights and cooperating with investigations and prosecutions ofalleged violations of human rights before ACI funding for Bolivia can bespent.

It provides that $17 million in FMF funds may be transferred to andmerged with ACI funds, and made available for aircraft and related assistance for the ColombianNational Police.

FY2004-FY2005 Foreign Relations Authorization

House Action. Reflecting continuing concernwith the persistent and complex conflict in Colombia, the spill-over of guerrilla and drug traffickingactivities into neighboring countries, and the ongoing involvement of the United States (includingthe kidnaping and killing of American citizens), the House International Relations Committeereported out H.R. 1950 , ( H.Rept. 108-105 , Part 1) on May 16, 2003, with threereporting requirements similar to provisions in the Foreign Relations Authorization for FY2003( H.R. 1646 / P.L. 107-228 ), and with the provision of additional authority related to theinterdiction of illicit arms trafficking.

Section 703 of the bill as reported by the House International Relations Committee wouldrequire the Secretary of State, after consulting with internationally recognized human rightsorganizations, to make a very detailed report to Congress, not later than 30 days after enactment andevery 180 days thereafter, on the specific measures that the Colombian authorities are taking toapprehend and prosecute leaders of paramilitary organizations and other terrorist organizations. TheCommittee report expressed concern about the illegal activities not only of two leftist guerrillagroups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army(ELN), but also of the rightist paramilitary groups, specifically the United Self Defense Forces ofColombia (AUC), that are reported to be responsible for at least half of all non-combatant killings,torture, and disappearances. Noting that the State Department's March 2003 human rights reportfound some continuing collusion with the AUC by members of the Colombian security forces, theCommittee report stated that Colombia's government has not committed at every level to confrontthe paramilitaries and to protect civilians from paramilitary abuses.

Section 709 would require the Secretary of State to submit a report on the impact of the U.S.assistance plan known as Plan Colombia on Ecuador and Colombia's neighboring countries toappropriate congressional committees not later than 30 days after enactment. This report is to setforth a comprehensive strategy for United States activities in Colombia, with specific reference tothe impact of U.S. assistance on Ecuador and other adjacent countries, and it is to provide thereasons for the failure to submit a report on this subject as required by the Foreign RelationsAuthorization Act for FY2003. Stating that a State Department report of March 4, 2003, wasinadequate, the Committee report expressed the expectation that a new report "will address in detailnot only the counter-drug repercussions of Plan Colombia and its successor programs on Ecuadorand other adjacent countries, but also the humanitarian and economic development implications ofincreased eradication efforts for these countries."

Section 1801 would provide specific authority for U.S. counter-drug assistance which isbeing used to support the interdiction of aerial trafficking of illicit narcotics to be used to supportthe interdiction of illicit arms in connection with illicit drug trafficking. The Committee reportnotes that "this provision ensures that any and all illegal arms brought into Colombia by aerial meansthat are in any way trafficked in connection with the illicit drug trade, are also clearly eligible forU.S. assistance in interdicting."

Section 1802 would require the Secretary of State, acting through the Department of State'sNarcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in BogotÃ¡, Colombia, to ensure, not later than 180 days afterenactment, "that all pilots participating in the United States opium eradication program in Colombiaare Colombians and are fully trained, qualified and experienced pilots, with preference provided toindividuals who are members of the Colombian National Police." The Committee report states thatlocal Colombian police anti-drug pilots are more familiar with the terrain and can be more effectivein locating crops, thereby enhancing efforts to eradicate the small but potent opium crop that makesup nearly two-thirds of U.S. heroin use, according to recent United States estimates, while promotingthe Colombianization of the programs and reducing the involvement of U.S. private contractors.

On July 16, 2003, the House passed H.R. 1950 by a vote of 382-42.

Senate Action. On April 24, 2003, the SenateForeign Relations Committee reported out S. 925 ( S.Rept. 108-39 ), the ForeignRelations Authorization Act of 2004, with one provision related to Colombia and the Andean region. Responding to a request from the Executive Branch, Section 801 of the bill would repeal therequirement in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act for FY2000 ( P.L. 106-246 ) that theState Department report semi-annually on the extradition of narcotics traffickers from Andeancountries. In floor action on S. 925 on July 10, 2003, the Senate approved twoamendments related to Colombia and Andean region assistance, both by voice vote.

Amendment 1162, proposed by Chairman Luger, added Section 815, which would modifythe reporting requirements on U.S. personnel involved in the anti-narcotics campaign in Colombiaby changing the frequency of the reports from bimonthly to quarterly, and by clarifying that thereports were to be provided to appropriate committees of Congress.

Amendment 1194, proposed by Majority Leader Frist, added Section 2522, which wouldcommend the leadership and people of Colombia for the progress made against illicit drug traffickersand terrorists, and which supported the efforts of President Uribe and the government and the peopleof Colombia to preserve and strengthen democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity inColombia.

FY2004 Foreign Assistance Authorization

Senate Action. On May 29, 2003, the SenateForeign Relations Committee reported out S. 1161 , the Foreign AssistanceAuthorization Act of 2004 ( S.Rept. 108-56 ), with several provisions on assistance to Colombia andthe Andean region.

Section 122 would authorize $700 million (rather than the $731 million requested) for theAndean Counterdrug Initiative. It provides that assistance for Colombia for FY2004 and previousyears may be used to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities;and to take actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, includingundertaking rescue operations. It further provides that U.S. personnel providing such assistance shallbe subject to the personnel caps in the Emergency Supplemental Act for 2000, shall not participatein any combat operation in connection with such assistance; and shall be subject to the condition that Colombia is fulfilling its commitment to the United States with respect to its human rights practices,including specific conditions set forth in the Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2003.

Section 502 provides that information on the extent of involvement of U.S. businesses incounter-narcotics activities under State or Defense Department contracts, required by the previousForeign Relations Authorization, may be reported in the annual report detailing the counter-narcoticsperformance of drug producing and drug transit countries.

FY2004 National Defense Authorization

House Action. On April 4, 2003, RepresentativeDuncan Hunter introduced H.R. 1588 , authorizing appropriations for FY2004 for theDepartment of Defense. The Committee on Armed Services reported the bill on May 16, 2003, withprovisions relating to Colombia ( H.Rept. 108-106 ). The House considered H.R. 1588 on May 20, and 21, with final passage on May 22. With regard to Colombia, Section 1208 of thebill would increase the cap on the number of U.S. military personnel in Colombia to 500, from 400in existing law. It would provide an exemption from the limitation for any members of the armedforces in Colombia to rescue or retrieve U.S. military or civilian personnel. This limitation couldnot be exceeded for a period longer than 30 days. The provision also exempts from the cap (1)military personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Colombia as attaches, as part of the securityassistance office, with the Marine Corps security contingent, (2) personnel participating in naturaldisaster relief operations, and (3) those involved in non-operational transit through Colombia. TheSecretary of Defense is provided with authority to waive these limitations if he deems it in thenational security interests of the United States, and with notification to congressional defensecommittees within 15 days.

Section 1047 of the bill would provide authorization for drug interdiction and counterdrugactivities to provide assistance to Colombia to support a unified campaign against drug traffickingand activities by organizations designated as terrorist organizations.

Senate Action. On May 13, 2003, Senator JohnWarner introduced S. 1050 , the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2004. OnJune 4, 2003, the Senate took up H.R. 1588 , striking all after the enacting clause andinserting the text of S. 1050 . The measure passed the Senate by voice vote the same dayand conference committee consideration is pending. With regard to Colombia and the Andeanregion, Section 1207 of the bill extends the authority of Section 1033 of the National DefenseAuthorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 ( P.L. 105-84 ) which authorizes DOD counternarcoticsprograms. It also would renew authority to support counterdrug activities in Peru which had expiredat the end of FY2002. The section also authorizes counternarcotics support through the end ofFY2006 for seven additional countries, including Bolivia and Ecuador, among others, with $40million for each authorized in any fiscal year. The bill directs the Secretary of Defense to providea comprehensive report on how counterdrug funds are spent in each of these nine countries within60 days following the end of each fiscal year for which the program is authorized.

Section 1208 of the bill would extend for two additional years the expanded authority to useDOD funds to support a unified campaign against narcotics cultivation and trafficking, and againstterrorist organizations in Colombia.

Conference Report. The conference report( H.Rept. 108-354 ) was agreed to by the House on November 7 and by the Senate on November 12,2003, and signed by President Bush on November 24, 2003 ( P.L. 108-136 ). Section 1021 providesauthority for the Defense Department to provide support for counterdrug activities by extendingauthority in Section 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1998 ( P.L. 105-84 ) forcounterdrug support to Colombia and Peru. Section 1022 authorizes the Department of Defensejoint task forces to provide for counterterrorism activities to law enforcement agencies, as it does forcounterdrug activities. Section 1023 extends for an additional two years expanded authority to useDefense Department counterdrug funds to support a unified campaign against narcotics cultivationand trafficking and against associated terrorist organizations in Colombia.

FY2004 Intelligence Authorization

House Action. On June 11, 2003, RepresentativePorter Goss introduced H.R. 2417 , the Intelligence Authorization Bill for FY2004. Itwas reported ( H.Rept. 108-163 ) from the Committee on Intelligence on June 17, 2003, and approvedby the House on June 27, 2003, by a vote of 410-9. In regard to Colombia, Section 501 authorizesfunds for counterdrug and counterterrorism activities, with provisions similar to the Senate billregarding a unified campaign, a prohibition on participation of U.S. military and contract employees,and caps on U.S. military and contract personnel. (See below.) The report accompanying the billnotes the Committee's concern with regard to the level of resources and personnel allocated tonarcotics trafficking, transnational organized crime, and terrorist activity in Colombia, as well asAfghanistan, and North Korea. It states the expectation that the FY2005 budget request will include"a reinvigorated strategy to combat narcotics trafficking and other transnational organized crime --with appropriate funding and personnel levels for the Director of Central Intelligence's Crime andNarcotics Center (CEC)."

Senate Action. On May 8, 2003, Senator PatRoberts introduced S. 1025 , to authorize appropriations for FY2004 for intelligence andintelligence-related activities, including provisions relating to Colombia. The Committee onIntelligence reported the bill the same day ( S.Rept. 108-44 ) while the Committee on Armed Servicesreported the bill ( S.Rept. 108-80 ) on June 26, 2003. Section 313 of the bill authorizes the use offunds for a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and activities of designated terroristorganizations such as the FARC, ELN, and AUC. This authority shall cease "if the Secretary ofDefense has credible evidence that the Colombian military is not conducting vigorous operations torestore government authority and respect for human rights in areas under the effective control ofparamilitary and guerrilla organizations." Section 313 also maintains caps of 400 each on U.S.military and contractor personnel stationed in Colombia, and prohibits the participation of U.S.military personnel or civilian contractors in any combat operations except for the purposes of selfdefense or search and rescue operations of U.S. Armed Forces personnel, U.S. civilian employees,or civilian contractors employed by the United States. On July 31, 2003, the Senate took up H.R. 2417 , inserting the text of S. 1025 , and passing it the same day.

Conference Report. The conference report( H.Rept. 108-381 ) passed the House on November 20, 2003, and the Senate the following day. Itwas signed into law on December 13, 2003 ( P.L. 108-177 ). Section 502 of the agreement authorizesthe use of intelligence funds for a unified campaign against drug trafficking and terrorism inColombia. It also maintains the prohibition on U.S. military or civilian contractors fromparticipating in combat operations in Colombia.

Temporary Protected Status Legislation

Several bills were introduced to designate Colombian and Peruvian citizens under section244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act as eligible for temporary protected status (TPS). H.R. 2843 , introduced on July 24, 2003, would grant TPS to both Colombians andPeruvians. H.R. 2853 , introduced the same day, would grant TPS to just Colombians. Both bills have been referred to the House Judiciary Committee. In the Senate, S. 986 would designate Colombians as eligible for TPS. The bill has been referred to the Senate JudiciaryCommittee. (37)

Appendix A. Map Showing Andean Regional Initiative Countries

Appendix B. FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative

FY2002 Request and FY2002 Allocations by Purpose and by FunctionalAccounts

($ millions)

Source: Office of the Secretary of State. International Affairs Function 150 Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request Summary andHighlights. These data include funding from accounts that comprise the Andean Regional Initiative: International Narcotics Controland Law Enforcement (INCLE.), Andean Counterdrug Initiative, development aid, child survival and health aid, and foreign militaryfinancing. The ARI has not included (and consequently these figures do not include) International Military Education and Trainingfunds, food aid, peace corps funds, or Department of Defense counternarcotics funds. Prepared by [author name scrubbed] and ConnieVeillette, Updated July 17, 2003. Totals may not add due to rounding.

The ARI for FY2002 also did not include Foreign Military Finance Funding (FMF). The small amount for Bolivia is included here,even though it was not specifically for counternarcotics purposes, in order to facilitate comparisons with the FY2003 request, whichincludes FMF for Andean Regional Initiative countries. Amounts for Colombia do not include funds from the FY2002 Supplemental:$4 million for ACI; $25 million in counter-kidnaping training; and $6 million to protect the Cano-Limon oil pipeline. Similarly,amounts for Ecuador do not include $3 million in FMF funds.

Appendix C. FY2003 Andean Regional Initiative

FY2003 Request and FY2003 Allocations by Purpose and by FunctionalAccounts

($ millions)

Source: Office of the Secretary of State. International Affairs Function 150 Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request Summary andHighlights. February 2003. Estimates for FY2003 were provided to CRS by the Department of State. These data include fundingfrom accounts that comprise the Andean Regional Initiative: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), AndeanCounterdrug Initiative, development aid, child survival and health aid, and foreign military financing. The ARI has not included (andconsequently these figures do not include) International Military Education and Training funds, food aid, peace corps funds, orDepartment of Defense counternarcotics funds. Totals may not add due to rounding.

Note: Amounts for Colombia include the FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental. Not included here, because it is not part ofthe ARI, is $34 million from DOD's counternarcotics program. Prepared by [author name scrubbed], Analyst in Latin American Affairs, July17, 2003.

Appendix D. FY2004 Andean Regional Initiative

FY2004 Request by Purpose and Functional Accounts

($ millions)

Source: Office of the Secretary of State, Resources, Plans and Policy. International Affairs Function 150 Summary and Highlights,Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request. Prepared by [author name scrubbed], Specialist in International Security Affairs, and [author name scrubbed],Analyst in Latin American Affairs, updated July 17, 2003.

Note: The Budget documents submitted by the Administration make reference to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative only. It does notreference the Andean Regional Initiative, which has since its inception, included funding for development assistance, children survivaland health, and economic support fund programs. For purposes of this report, both are included for comparative purposes withprevious years' funding levels.