KC-46 Tanker Aircraft: Acquisition Plans Have Good Features but Contain Schedule Risk
Released: 2012-03-26T00:00:00

Letter

Background

While several types of aircraft provide aerial refueling services, the principal effort is currently carried out by the Air Force fleet of 414 KC-135 aircraft. Originally fielded in the 1950s, KC-135 aircraft are considered the mainstay of the tanker fleet, supporting combat air assets, deployment of airlift aircraft, and nuclear combat refueling missions. With an average age of nearly 51 years and more than 16,000 flight hours on each aircraft, the KC-135s will approach over 80 years of age when the fleet is retired as projected in the 2040 time frame. In 1981, the Air Force began supplementing its fleet of KC-135s with the procurement of 60 KC-10s (of which 59 remain in service today), multi-role aircraft that transport air cargo and provide refueling. Much larger than the KC-135, the KC-10 provides both boom and hose and drogue refueling capabilities on the same flight and can conduct transoceanic missions. The KC-10s now average about 27 years of age with more than 26,000 flight hours on each, and their service life is expected to end around 2045. The Air Force has upgraded and modified both fleets in recent years, providing improved avionics and new engines on the KC-135 along with newer communication systems to comply with international and federal air traffic requirements.

In 1996, GAO reported that the aging KC-135s would eventually need to be replaced. We recommended that DOD consider looking at dual-use aircraft—which could be used as a tanker or a cargo carrier, depending on their missions. In 2001, the Air Force reported that the KC-135 fleet would incur much greater operations and maintenance (O&M) costs between 2001 and 2040, but that it would be structurally sound to 2040.

Air Force officials stated in 2005 that engine strut fatigue caused by long- term heat exposure and corrosion posed the greatest threat to the KC- 135 fleet and O&M costs were increasing. These costs, nearly $2 billion in fiscal year 2010, are expected to grow to $6 billion per year by fiscal year 2018. The 2012 Air Mobility Master Plan also expresses concerns that advanced adversary threats pose greater risk to the current tanker fleet and that the KC-135 fleet lacks defensive capabilities required to operate and succeed against either current or future threats.

Tanker Replacement History

Plans to begin replacing the KC-135 fleet were first developed in 2001 with Congress authorizing a pilot program to lease 100 Boeing 767 aircraft modified for aerial refueling, subsequently called the KC-767A aircraft. This leasing deal was ultimately canceled, however, after a DOD investigation found that a senior Air Force official improperly approved the leasing deal.

The AOA is an important element of the defense acquisition process. An AOA is an analytical comparison of the operational effectiveness, suitability, and life-cycle cost (or total ownership cost, if applicable) of alternatives that satisfy established capability needs. Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 3.3.1.

29, 2008, the Air Force awarded the first contract of a three-phased approach, called the KC-45, to a partnership between Northrop Grumman and the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) to build four aircraft for testing and then manufacture 175 production aircraft. Boeing, the competing bidder, filed a protest with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) protesting the Air Force’s decision. In June 2008, GAO determined that the Air Force had made significant errors, including not assessing the relative merits of the proposals in accordance with the evaluation rules and criteria set out in the RFP, which could have affected the outcome of the competition. As a result, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed the Air Force in September 2008 to terminate the contract and conduct a new competition.

On February 24, 2010, the Air Force released a significantly revised KC-X RFP. One year later, Boeing won the new competition to develop and build 179 new KC-46s at an estimated cost of $51.7 billion. The development portion of the contract to design and build 4 test aircraft, and then bring those aircraft to a final production configuration, is valued at $4.4 billion. The Air Force plans to exercise two contract options for 19 initial production aircraft that are required, in part, for the contractor to meet the requirement to produce and deliver 18 aircraft by 2017. Additional contract options can be exercised to allow for production of the remaining 156 aircraft through year 2027 at a target rate of 15 aircraft per year. Separate competitions are planned for later acquisitions, called the KC-Y and KC-Z phases, to replace the rest of the KC-135 fleet. Figure 1 below depicts a notional schedule of how the Air Force plans to replace its current KC-135s over the next several decades.

The KC-46 program is planning to turn a Boeing commercial aircraft (the 767-2C) into a militarized KC-46 tanker that is more capable than the KC- 135. Boeing is currently developing the 767-2C, which is based on a Boeing 767 model airframe modified to include a cargo door, new fuel tanks and an advanced flight deck display borrowed from the new Boeing 787 aircraft. Militarization of this airframe includes the addition of the refueling boom, centerline drogue system with wing refueling pods, a remote air refueling operator station that includes panoramic three- dimensional displays and threat detection and avoidance systems using advanced software to automatically re-route the aircraft away from threats. Program officials consider the integration of military hardware and software on a commercial platform to be the primary technical risk. Figure 2 below shows the intended conversion of the 767-2C into the KC-46 aerial refueling tanker.

The new tanker is also planned to have several capabilities that existing KC-135s do not have. For example, the KC-46 is expected to be able to refuel in a variety of night-time settings, including covert (not easily visible) mode which the KC-135 cannot do. In addition, it is intended to have countermeasures which protect large aircraft from infrared missile threats. The KC-46 fleet will also have more aircraft with the capability to refuel two aircraft at the same time, with the entire fleet able to conduct this mission, and the ability to carry more cargo, passengers, and medical patients. Table 1 compares the current capabilities of the KC-135 with the planned capabilities of the new KC-46 tanker. (More detail on the planned capabilities is included in appendix II.)

KC-46 Program Has Established Its Acquisition Strategy

The KC-46 program has established its acquisition strategy for aircraft development and production, which includes a total cost estimate of $51.7 billion, aircraft quantities to be procured, key milestone dates, and test and manufacturing schedules. The KC-46 program is using a fixed- price contract for development, designed to provide a profit incentive for the contractor to control costs, while limiting government liability for increased costs over a certain amount. The program has also identified nine key performance parameters (KPP) critical to enabling the KC-46 to meet mission requirements, but has not yet fully implemented metrics that will be used to track the achievement of these KPPs.

KC-46 Approval of Baseline Cost, Schedule, and Aircraft Quantities

In February 2011, senior defense leaders approved the KC-46 program’s entry into the acquisition process at the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase (called Milestone B). Table 2 summarizes planned quantities, costs, and milestone dates approved at that time.

Defense officials established a total acquisition program baseline cost of $51.7 billion. The development cost estimate of $7.1 billion includes $5.3 billion for the development contract and $1.8 billion for other costs, including air crew and maintenance training systems, operational testing, and program office support. The procurement cost estimate of $40.2 billion is based on projected prices for procuring 175 aircraft in annual quantities of up to 15 aircraft through fiscal year 2027. At this price, aircraft would cost almost $230 million on average. Military construction costs to build hangars, maintenance and supply shops, and other facilities to house and support the KC-46 fleet are estimated at $4.3 billion. Following a successful initial production decision, the Air Force plans to exercise the first two production contract options. After the options are exercised, Boeing will be required to provide the Air Force with a total of 18 operationally ready aircraft 78 months after development contract award, which would be by August 2017.planned to continue through 2027, until a total of 179 aircraft are bought.

Development Contract Includes Features to Control Cost, Schedule, and Performance Risk

In February 2011, the Air Force awarded Boeing a fixed-price contract to develop, test, and manufacture four KC-46 aircraft. The specific contract arrangement used by the KC-46 program is a fixed-price incentive (firm target) (FPIF) contract. Table 3 provides development contract details and the current contract and government estimates to complete development.

The contract is designed to provide a profit incentive for the contractor to control or even reduce costs. It specifies target cost, target price, and ceiling price amounts, with the latter being the maximum amount that may be paid to the contractor. The target price is $4.4 billion and the ceiling price $4.9 billion. The contract specifies a 60/40 incentive ratio for sharing savings in the event of underruns, or sharing cost in the event of overruns. The government’s share is 60 percent while Boeing’s is 40 percent. Cost sharing ends when the contract price reaches the $4.9 billion ceiling. Thereafter, provided the Air Force is not responsible for any of the additional costs associated with the overruns, the contractor would be responsible for all additional costs associated with the overruns and would be obligated to perform the contract. If the Air Force is responsible for any of the cost overruns, they may have to renegotiate the terms and conditions of the contract with Boeing. The KC-46 program’s current government estimate to complete development is $5.3 billion, which is about $900 million more than the contract target price and about $400 million more than the ceiling price. The Air Force believes this additional $400 million may be necessary to cover schedule risk for the remainder of development, and if it is, Boeing must pay these costs.

According to program officials, a change in system requirements, although unlikely, would be a circumstance that could increase the Air Force’s exposure to additional costs. As stated in a memorandum from the OSD Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, the biggest risk to the KC-46 program is the Department’s ability to minimize changes to the contract. The memorandum maintains that on the whole, DOD has demonstrated limited ability to maintain stable requirements and limit changes to program technical baselines on previous complex weapon system programs, and that minimizing such change is essential to the success of the KC-46. In view of these concerns, program officials state it is very unlikely any requirements will be changed, and to help ensure this, they have instituted a process to control changes. Specifically, any engineering or contract changes affecting system requirements or having the potential to impact program cost, schedule, and performance baselines must be approved by the Air Force Service Acquisition Executive in consultation with the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Moreover, the contract contains options for the 175 production aircraft, establishing firm, fixed pricing for two initial production lots and not-to-exceed pricing for subsequent full-rate production lots. Program officials maintain that this pricing will likely stay intact as long as the contract is not opened to negotiate modifications.

The KC-46 contract is one of only a few major weapon system programs in recent years to employ a fixed-price development contract. In the past, DOD has typically used cost-reimbursement contracts in which the government pays all allowable incurred costs to the extent prescribed by the contract. Legislation and defense policy now directs the Milestone Decision Authority for a major defense acquisition program to select the contract type for a development program at the time of a decision on Milestone B that is consistent with the level of program risk for the program. The Milestone Decision Authority may select either a fixed-price type contract (including a fixed-price incentive contract); or a cost type contract. The use of fixed-price contracts, when warranted, limits the government’s exposure to weapon system cost increases. Defense officials believe that a fixed-price development contract is appropriate for this program because KC-46 development is considered to be a relatively low risk effort to integrate mature military technologies onto a well-defined commercial derivative aircraft.

In addition to the type of contract used, there are also provisions in the KC-46 development contract that further limit the government’s liability and are intended to help manage performance risk. For example, Boeing has to correct any deficiencies in the KC-46 discovered during the development program. The correction of deficiencies shall be accomplished on the four development test aircraft and all production aircraft, as appropriate, to bring them to the final configuration at no additional cost to the government. In addition, there is a special contract provision that requires each aircraft to demonstrate a certain fuel usage rate before the government accepts the aircraft. If any aircraft burn fuel above this rate, Boeing is required to propose a corrective action at no cost to the government. Boeing is not allowed to propose a relaxation of contract requirements to resolve any fuel usage issues, but if Boeing cannot meet the required usage rates, there are contract provisions allowing for a decrease in the amount paid to Boeing.

Key Performance Goals Have Been Identified but Metrics for Measuring Achievement Are Not Yet Fully Implemented

The Air Force has identified nine specific KPPs critical to enabling the KC-46 to meet its primary mission of providing worldwide, day and night, adverse weather aerial refueling. Several of these parameters have been established to address performance characteristics that are limited or nonexistent in the current tanker fleet. For example, in 2005 only 8 KC- 135 aircraft (1.5 percent) had the capability to receive fuel from another aerial refueling tanker while airborne. This limited capability can prohibit the extension of aircraft forces and can result in inefficient use of assets. By establishing a KPP to allow for the KC-46 fleet to receive fuel from other tankers, the Air Force hopes to address this shortcoming. Table 4 describes the planned KC-46 KPPs.

Near the end of KC-46 development, a series of independent tests and evaluations are planned to validate whether the aircraft meets these KPPs. However, the Air Force still has to fully implement the specific metrics needed to measure progress against the KPPs. In future reports, we will include an evaluation of metrics established for each of these KPPs as well as whether the program is on track to meet them.

Key Events in Program Schedule Are Concurrent and Technical Challenges Exist

Schedule risk on the KC-46 program is a concern and technical challenges will need to be overcome. The program has an accelerated schedule with significant overlap, or concurrency, among the development, testing, and production of initial aircraft. Also, while designing a new tanker that uses a modified commercial platform may not be as technically challenging as an all new weapon system, the program still faces some technical risks, including three critical technologies that have not yet been tested in a realistic environment.

Significant Concurrency Poses Risks to KC-46 Development and Production Schedule

The significant amount of concurrency in the KC-46 schedule among planned development, testing, and production activities are highlighted by the shaded area in figure 3.

The decision to begin low-rate initial production is scheduled for August 2015, before significant development and testing activities are completed. While about 6 months of 767-2C flight testing is planned to be conducted prior to KC-46 flight testing to help prove the aircraft’s design and flying qualities, only about 60 percent of the dedicated KC-46 development flight testing is planned to be completed by the start of low-rate initial production, when the Air Force estimates $1.38 billion will be needed for seven aircraft. Funding commitments will be required even sooner; DOD will present the budget request for KC-46 initial production to Congress in February 2014.

The intent of development flight testing is to demonstrate the maturity of the design and to discover and fix design and performance problems while the aircraft is being developed. Beginning production before testing has successfully demonstrated that the design is mature and that aircraft will work as intended increases the likelihood of discovering deficiencies during production, when it is most expensive to correct them. Similarly, systems already built and fielded may require substantial modifications, resulting in additional program costs.

The Air Force and Boeing are both concerned about the risks in the KC- 46 development and test schedule. In August 2011, a joint Boeing and Air Force team completed a detailed review to identify risk associated with the program’s technology, cost, and schedule. As a result of that review, the Air Force determined that the schedule, culminating with the delivery of 18 aircraft by August 2017, contained moderate risk. Other major areas examined during this review were assessed as low risk.

According to the KC-46 program office, schedule risk stems from four primary factors:

Flight testing. Completing the flight test program on time will require efficient, synchronized use of DOD, Air Force, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) test facilities and resources. The KC-46 program office is concerned that Boeing will not be able to achieve planned flight test flying hour rates for military certifications and military testing, currently set at 50 hours per aircraft per month, given the amount of coordination and synchronization of test resources required. Boeing is also continuing to evaluate plans for the flight test program due to concerns it may contribute to program schedule risk. For these and other reasons, DOD’s Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, has determined that the development test program is not executable as planned. In-line provisioning. Boeing typically uses one facility as its commercial aircraft production line and another to install military modifications on commercial aircraft. However, on the KC-46 program, Boeing will do extra preparatory work—provisioning—at its commercial facility to accommodate the military modifications planned at its other facility. This represents an additional requirement to prepare the aircraft for military modifications while still on the commercial production line. According to the program office, this increases the level of risk for accomplishing the work on time.

Federal Aviation Administration certification. According to the program office, two FAA certifications, one for the commercial 767-2C aircraft and a supplemental one for the military modifications planned for the commercial aircraft, are required for the KC-46 before it is deemed airworthy. Boeing intends to accomplish a portion of both of these certifications concurrently, rather than one at a time, which is more typical. According to the program office, if problems arise during this concurrency, not much time will be left in the schedule for Boeing to recover.

Software. The program office told us that modifications to commercial software to separate classified from unclassified information and enable other military capabilities will increase risk associated with software development. However, they also stated that they are focusing on software early in the program to ensure Boeing puts the proper emphasis on this area and keeps the program schedule on track.

Boeing has also identified risks in the program’s software development effort that could delay the program’s schedule or drive increased cost if realized. Software development growth can occur because of bad estimates, poor requirements, and poor execution of the software development plan. If the amount of software being developed grows, more staff and more time will be needed. There can also be delays in the integration of hardware and software if software deliveries from suppliers are late. Late delivery can result in hardware and software not being integrated in time to support flight testing, which in turn can mean flight test schedule delays.

A further complication to the KC-46 schedule was Boeing’s January 2012 announcement that it was closing its Wichita, Kansas finishing facility at the end of 2013. When the contract was awarded, Boeing had planned to militarize the KC-46 at the Wichita facility. Now, that work will be moving to the Puget Sound facility in Seattle, Washington to be co-located with the 767-2C development effort. KC-46 program officials stated that they are working closely with Boeing to understand the impact of this decision on the KC-46 program but will hold Boeing to its contractual delivery date of August 2017.

If the provisions in the current contract remain intact, the government’s cost liability will be safeguarded should any of the foregoing risks materialize into problems. However, these provisions cannot prevent delays in delivering aircraft should problems be discovered late in development or while production is underway.

KC-46 Will Have Some Risk Stemming from New Technical Content

While a tanker largely based on a commercial platform and subsystems may not be as technically challenging as developing a wholly new weapon system like the Joint Strike Fighter, DOD regulations still require requisite critical technologies to be sufficiently mature prior to starting system development in order to minimize technology risk down the road. As required by DOD policy, a technology readiness assessment was conducted by an independent team of subject matter experts. Overall, the team reviewed and assessed 36 technologies and determined that three are new or novel and are needed for the KC-46 tanker to meet performance and mission capabilities. These three technologies—3- Dimensional Display, Airborne ESTAR, and Threat Correlation Software—have been demonstrated in a relevant environment in accordance with DOD and statutory requirements.

Three-Dimensional Display. The display screens at boom operator stations inside the KC-46 aircraft provide the visual cues needed for the operator to monitor the aircraft being refueled before and after contact with the refueling boom or drogue. The images of the aircraft on the screens are captured by a pair of cameras outside that aircraft that are meant to replicate the binocular aspect of human vision by supplying an image from two separate points of view, replicating how humans see two points of view, one for each eye. The resulting image separation provides the boom operator with greater fidelity and a more realistic impression of depth, or a third dimension. Similar technology has been used on two foreign-operated refueling aircraft and a representative model in tests with other Boeing tankers.

Airborne ESTAR. This software module is planned to have an algorithm that allows for automatically re-routing and constructing new flight paths for the aircraft that are safe, flyable, and avoid potential threats. The algorithm is new and novel technology, critical to meeting operational requirements. Airborne ESTAR has been tested in a simulation that provided data on its performance, interfaces, and functionality.

Threat Correlation Software. Somewhat similar to Airborne ESTAR, this new software module serves to correlate tracks from multiple potential threats and automatically help re-route the tanker’s flight path to avoid them.

These technologies have not yet been demonstrated in a realistic environment, a higher level of maturity that is a best practice. We have previously reported that programs that began development with technologies demonstrated to this level experienced less cost growth than programs with less mature technologies. To the extent that alternatives or workarounds are available for any of the KC-46’s technologies, these risks would be mitigated.

In addition to the critical technologies identified, the KC-46 program office identified other integration and technical areas where management will need to focus efforts to mitigate risk. The program office identified the following three areas as being among the more significant:

Radar Warning Receiver integration. A radar warning receiver warns a pilot that a threat aircraft’s radar is tracking the KC-46, but integrating such a receiver on a large commercial airframe can be challenging. Integration requires a unique antenna design and certain provisions for installation to maximize performance. Any late changes to the location of the receiver’s antennae or software could drive cost and schedule impacts to the program.

Wing Aerial Refueling Pod instability. Based on lessons learned from another Boeing refueling aircraft, a new aerial refueling pod design was introduced for the KC-46 to reduce buffeting, or instability, of the aircraft’s wing. The new design also made changes to the way the refueling hose exits the pod, so now there is concern about the hose not being stable. If the new wing pod design has technical shortcomings and introduces hose stability issues, this would not meet program requirements.

Aircraft Weight. The current aircraft weight forecast is near the aircraft’s weight limit and, historically, weight continues to increase during a weapon system program development phase. Not achieving the target weight will make the aircraft unable to carry the required amount of fuel for its aerial refueling mission.

With Some Exceptions, the Program’s Development Strategy Generally Adheres to Best Practices, Acquisition Reform Legislation, and DOD Policy

The KC-46 program’s acquisition strategy and business case generally meet GAO’s knowledge-based acquisition approach and best acquisition practices, including those in legislation to improve the weapon system acquisition process. Also, the contents of the program’s requirements documentation generally comply with DOD guidance. However, the program did not conform to best practices in a few instances. The program did not conduct a technology development phase and instead proceeded directly to the system development phase, and our prior work has shown that programs proceeding directly to a development phase typically have more problems. The program also received a waiver from having to conduct a preliminary design review, considered important to initially solidifying the aircraft’s design, before beginning development. Instead, the design review is planned for March 2012, about a year after the start of development.

Program Is Generally Implementing Acquisition Best Practices

For the most part, the KC-46 program’s acquisition framework and plans compare favorably with the standards and requirements in GAO’s best practices work on weapon system acquisition development. The program’s Acquisition Strategy establishes the decision points and acquisition phases planned for the program. It also covers development, testing, production, and life-cycle support and establishes the requirements for each phase, and also identifies critical management events and risks including integration of military hardware and software on the KC-46 airframe. The program’s Integrated Baseline Review (IBR)resulted in a mutual understanding between the KC-46 program office and Boeing ensuring all system capabilities are understood and program requirements are flowed down to the contractor and suppliers. A comprehensive risk assessment also identified all program risks, and assigned moderate risk to the program’s development schedule.

The program is also starting to establish a knowledge-based acquisition approach, in which knowledge of various components of the process is acquired at key decision points before proceeding. Our best practices model helps decision makers to be reasonably certain about their products at critical junctures during development and to make informed investment decisions. This knowledge-based process can be broken down into three cumulative knowledge points.

Knowledge point 1: A match must be made between the customer’s needs and the developer’s available resources—technology, engineering knowledge, time, and funding—before a program starts.

Knowledge point 2: The product’s design must be stable and must meet performance requirements before initial manufacturing begins.

Knowledge point 3: The product must be able to be produced within cost, schedule, and quality targets and demonstrated to be reliable before production begins.

Figure 4 depicts how the KC-46 program office is incorporating a best practices approach into its acquisition framework including the planned dates key events are scheduled and how the plan compares to GAO’s knowledge-based process for development. As the program progresses, we will continue to assess its performance against acquisition best practices, using figure 4 as a template.

Although the program is implementing many acquisition best practices, the program office did not conduct a technology development phase and instead proceeded directly to the engineering and manufacturing development phase. As discussed earlier, the program’s three critical technologies were assessed as approaching maturity and meeting internal defense policy, but below the fully mature level in best practices. Our prior work consistently shows that programs going directly into development before fully maturing all critical technologies typically incur additional costs and take longer to complete. Additionally, DOD granted a waiver to the program from having to conduct a preliminary design review—a major step initially solidifying the aircraft’s design—before starting system development. Instead, the program office has plans to conduct this review over a year after the start of development in March 2012 due to their assessment that integrating KC-46 unique military requirements onto a commercial aircraft is low to moderate risk. We have previously reported that holding a preliminary design review prior to development start can help ensure requirements are well-defined and feasible. Nonetheless, the program did complete its system functional review in November 2011 and made no significant changes to program requirements. The program plans to demonstrate the system’s design is stable and have 90 percent of KC-46 design drawings released by its projected July 2013 critical design review.

KC-46 Program is Incorporating Recent Acquisition Reform Legislation in Development

The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Reform Act)requires DOD and the military services to place more emphasis on activities that should occur early in weapon systems development, including those related to systems engineering and developmental testing, to establish a solid program foundation when development begins. To comply with this legislation, the KC-46 program office is tracking key program events to the relevant section of the Reform Act. For example, the program office held an independent Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) which reviewed 36 technologies, identified 3 as critical technologies, and assessed the maturity of all the technologies. In addition, the KC-46 program is using a time-defined acquisition strategy based on cost, schedule, and performance trades with a 78-month development cycle and is using an incremental strategy to replace the tanker fleet of KC-135s and KC-10s with the KC-46, and potentially the KC-Y and KC-Z programs. The Reform Act requires DOD to periodically review and assess the technology maturity and the risk of integrating critical technologies of weapon system programs, and requires officials responsible for acquisition, budget, and cost estimating functions to develop estimates and raise cost and schedule matters before performance objectives are established. Appendix III provides a comparison of the Reform Act requirements and program compliance.

Key Program Documentation Complies with DOD Policy

The KC-46 key program documentation completed prior to development start compares favorably with requirements in DOD policy for defining program capabilities and system requirements as outlined in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)Appendix IV provides a detailed assessment of this compliance, but some examples include: manual.

The ICD defines a capability gap or other deficiency in terms of the functional area, the relevant range of military operations, and the timeframe. It also describes the evaluation of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) approaches.

The CDD is a document that captures the information necessary to develop a proposed program(s), normally using an evolutionary acquisition strategy. It outlines an affordable increment of militarily useful, logistically supportable, and technically mature capability.

KPPs, system characteristics that are considered to be critical to delivering a military capability, and Key System Attributes, lower priority characteristics which are nevertheless essential for effective military capability. The KC-46 CDD defines how each KPP will be addressed in areas including aerial refueling and threats, and how classified information is to be collected and stored.

The KC-46 System Requirements Document (SRD) discusses the scope of program requirements and presents the technical performance required for the replacement tanker. The SRD also defines how some minimum performance requirements are mandatory, and how other requirements identified as non-mandatory are part of the Air Force’s trade space. System requirements discussed in the KC-46 SRD included aerial refueling, airlift, information management, and survivability.

Conclusions

The KC-46 acquisition is a high-priority/high-profile program essential to ensuring continued delivery of aerial refueling capabilities to future U.S. military operations. Its fixed-price incentive (firm target) development contract is designed to limit the government’s liability for increased costs. Because senior defense officials are encouraging acquisition programs across the department to adopt similar arrangements, when appropriate, it will be both illustrative for the policy and important for future programs to monitor the KC-46’s progress and its degree of success. Some would argue that a degree of program success has already been demonstrated because the government’s cost liability, assuming no system requirements changes, has been capped and the contractor is still required to provide full performance of the contract. However, even with these safeguards, it is important to note that 1 year into development, Air Force and contractor development cost estimates exceed the development contract amount and significant schedule risks have been identified. Although the KC-46 program is still in its early stages, similar cost and schedule pressures have dogged many past and present defense acquisition programs. With 5 years of development remaining on an aggressive schedule with substantial concurrency among development, test, and production activities, prudence and strong management attention is warranted. Should costs continue to increase, or schedule or performance measurement lag, there could be increased pressure to reopen or renegotiate aspects of the contract. This would probably not be advantageous to the Air Force.

Recommendations for Executive Action

As one of only a few major acquisition programs to award a fixed-price incentive (firm target) development contract in recent years, evaluating performance and identifying lessons learned will be very illustrative and important to inform decision-makers and help guide and improve future defense acquisition programs. Therefore, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics closely monitor the cost, schedule, and performance outcomes of the KC-46 program to identify positive or negative lessons learned.

To help ensure that progress toward achievement of the program’s key performance parameters can be appropriately measured as development progresses toward production, we recommend the KC-46 program manager, as soon as possible, fully implement sound metrics for each parameter.

Agency Comments

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report which are reprinted in appendix V. DOD concurred with our two recommendations. In written comments, DOD provided additional information on its plans to manage schedule risk and mature technologies. We also incorporated technical comments as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Air Force; and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff has any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff contributing to this report are listed in appendix VI.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

We interviewed officials from the KC-46 program, Air Force, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to obtain their views on progress, ongoing concerns and actions taken to address them, and future plans to complete KC-46 development. We also reviewed key program documentation for compliance with current Department of Defense (DOD) policy, acquisition reform legislation, and GAO best practices for weapon system development.

To determine the program’s acquisition strategy, including its contracting approach, we reviewed briefings by program and contractor officials, budget documents, the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), monthly activity reports, performance indicators, risk assessments and other data. We identified changes in cost and schedule, and obtained officials’ reasons for these changes, and reviewed the KC-46 acquisition strategy in order to identify the program’s Key Performance Parameters and what measures the program office has taken to develop metrics and track contractor performance in these areas. We also examined the acquisition strategy for aircraft development and production, but we could not assess the contractor’s manufacturing processes because the program is only one year into development and it is too early for this assessment. To assess the development contract structure, we reviewed and analyzed the factors used to determine the contract geometry: target cost, target profit, ceiling amount, and profit adjustment formula for the current contract and also compared this against current DOD policy for contract geometry, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and the Fiscal Year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act. To determine program costs, we reviewed the OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Independent Cost Estimate and the Air Force’s Service Cost Position, the estimate which is used by the KC-46 program to plan its expected costs. We reviewed each estimate’s underlying assumptions including how the estimate was developed and the confidence level used. We also requested information from the program office on whether the SCP cost estimate followed guidelines in GAO’s 2009 Cost Estimating Guide.

In order to evaluate the major schedule and technical risks faced by the program, we reviewed the KC-46 Integrated Master Schedule and compared it to the program’s APB and SAR in order to identify potential concurrency in the program’s design reviews, flight testing, and low rate production. We also asked program officials how they are monitoring planned schedule events. To identify potential program risks, we reviewed the program’s Technology Readiness Assessment which identifies critical technology elements and the plan for maturation of these technologies. During interviews with program officials we discussed what actions are currently being taken in the areas of earned value management and contractor performance in order to identify problems early in the engineering and manufacturing development phase and ways they planned to mitigate these risks.

To assess the extent the program is complying with acquisition policy, legislation, and best practices, we also compared key program documentation and execution with current DOD policy, GAO best practices, and recent acquisition reform legislation to determine areas of compliance and areas for further review as the program continues forward. We compared the KC-46 Initial Capabilities Document, the Capability Development Document, and the System Requirements Document against DOD policy and guidance. We also reviewed program office documentation pertaining to implementing relevant portions of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 and compared program actions back to the legislation to determine whether requirements in the Reform Act are being incorporated into program decisions. We also examined and compared program office schedule documentation, such as the Integrated Baseline Review against GAO’s best practices acquisition framework to identify areas in which the program office is utilizing a knowledge-based approach in KC-46 development.

In performing our work, we obtained information or interviewed officials from Air Mobility Command and the KC-46 program office, Wright- Patterson Air Force Base, OH; Defense Contract Management Agency, Seattle, WA; and Federal Aviation Administration, Wichita, KS. We also met with and obtained information from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in Washington, D.C.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2011 to March 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: KC-135 Fleet Capabilities Compared to KC-46 Planned Capabilities for Aerial Refueling

Appendix III: DOD and KC-46 Program Office Implementation of Applicable Sections of the 2009 WSARA

Requirement

Requires Director, Defense Research & Engineering (DDR&E) to periodically review and assess the technology maturity and integration risk of critical technologies of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP). Requires DDR&E to develop knowledge-based standards to measure technology maturity and integration risk.

The Secretary of Defense shall ensure consideration of trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives as part of the process for developing requirements for DOD acquisition programs. DOD officials responsible for acquisition, budget, and cost estimating functions shall provide appropriate opportunity to develop estimates and raise cost and schedule matters before performance objectives are established. The process for developing requirements is structured to enable incremental, evolutionary, or spiral acquisition approaches.

Requires DOD to implement recommendations to ensure competition at the MDAP contract and subcontract level. Highlights several measures to ensure competition, where cost-effective.

Requires the acquisition strategy for each MDAP provide for competitive prototypes before Milestone B approval, unless the milestone decision authority (MDA) for that MDAP waives such requirement. Allows the MDA to waive the requirement only on the basis that: (1) the cost of producing competitive prototypes exceeds the expected life-cycle benefits of producing the prototypes; or (2) but for such waiver, DOD would be unable to meet critical national security objectives.

Title III: Additional Acquisition Provisions Section 302: Earned Value Management

Modifies the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 887, requires report to Congress on implementation of Earned Valued Management (EVM) in DOD.

Requirement Requires reports on growth in operating and support (O&S) costs and requires review of weaknesses in operations affecting the reliability of financial information for MDAPs.

Appendix IV: KC-46 Program Compliance with Key Requirements Documents

Appendix V: Comment from the Department of Defense

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact name above, the following staff members made key contributions to this report: Bruce Fairbairn, Assistant Director; Keith Hudson; John Krump; Mary Jo Lewnard; Don Springman; Roxanna Sun; and Robert Swierczek.