The Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism Report: Trends, State Sponsors, and Related Issues
Released: 2004-10-05T00:00:00

Overview of 2003 Terrorist Trends

On April 29, 2004, the Department of State released its Patterns of Global Terrorism report(hereafter referred to as Patterns 2003 ). (1) Shortly thereafter it was observed that the original numbersof terrorist attacks and casualties were understated and on June 22, 2004, an updated version wasreleased. (2) Revised data (3) show minimal change in the number of terrorist attacks worldwide in 2003over 2002 levels -- an increase from 205 attacks to 208. In 2003, the overall number of reported anti-U.S. attacks declined visibly, 60 anti-US attacks in 2003 as opposed to 77 attacks in the previousyear.

The report indicates that worldwide deaths from international terrorist activity were down roughly 14% in 2003 (from 725 to 625) and the number of wounded was up roughly 81% from 2,013to 3,646. In 2003, as in 2002, both the highest number of attacks (80) and highest number ofcasualties (159 dead and 1,268 wounded) continued to occur in Asia where the number of attacksdeclined roughly by one-fifth, and the number of casualties increased roughly 11%. The reportemphasizes that most of the attacks in Iraq that occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom do not meetthe U.S. definition of international terrorism employed by Patterns because they were directed atcombatants, that is, "American and coalition forces on duty." (4)

In additional to statistical charts, Patterns includes in its Appendixes a summary chronology of significant terrorist incidents and background information on U.S. designated foreign terroristorganizations and other terrorist groups. (5)

State Sponsors of Terrorism

In addition to data on terrorist trends, groups, and activities worldwide, the report provides adescription as to why countries are on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism that are subject toU.S. sanctions. Thus, included in Patterns are detailed data on the seven countries currently on the"terrorism list": Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. U.S. Administrationofficials maintain that the practice of designating and reporting on the activities of the state sponsorsof terrorism list and concomitant sanctions policy has contributed significantly to a reduction in theovert -- and apparently overall -- activity level of states supporting terrorism in the past decade. Libya and Sudan are frequently cited as examples of such success.

Countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism are subject to severe U.S. export controls -- particularly of dual use technology. The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of1989 ( P.L. 101-222 ) prohibits export of dual use items, as well sales of military items and foreigneconomic assistance to countries on the terrorism list. Also, the Foreign Assistance Act prohibitsproviding foreign aid to these designated countries. Section 6(j) of the 1979 Export AdministrationAct stipulates that Congress must be notified at least 30 days in advance before any licenses areissued for exporting equipment or services that could be used for terrorist or military purposes. Other sanctions include denying foreign tax credits on income earned in those countries.

The degree of support for, or involvement in, terrorist activities typically varies dramatically from nation to nation. In 2003, of the seven on the U.S. terrorism list, Iran continued to becharacterized on one extreme as an active supporter of terrorism: a nation that uses terrorism as aninstrument of policy or warfare beyond its borders. Closer to the middle of the spectrum is Syria. Although not formally detected in an active role since 1986, Patterns reports that the Assad regimereportedly uses groups in Syria and Lebanon to export terror into Israel and allows groups to trainin territory under its control. On the less active end of the spectrum, one might place countriessuchas Cuba or North Korea, which at the height of the Cold War were more active, but in recent yearshave seemed to settle for a more passive role of granting ongoing safe haven to previously admittedterrorists. Also at the less active end of the spectrum, and arguably falling off it, are Libya andnotably Sudan, which reportedly has stepped up counterterrorism cooperation with U.S. lawenforcement and intelligence agencies after the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Country Highlights

Terrorism List Nations

Iran. Patterns 2003 again designates Iran as the"most active" state sponsor of international terrorism. The report, which incorporates data from U.S.and allied intelligence services, notes that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard and Ministry ofIntelligence and Security were "involved in the planning of and support for terrorist acts andcontinued to exhort a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals." (6) Actions citedinclude (1) providing safe haven to members of Al Qaeda; (2) providing money, weapons andtraining to HAMAS, Hizballah, and Arab Palestinian rejectionist groups; and (3) helping membersof the Ansar al Islam group in Iraq transit and find safe haven in Iran. The report notes that Iranianofficials have acknowledged detaining Al Qaeda operatives during 2003, but have resisted calls totransfer them to their countries of origin. On December 19, 2003, Iran announced it will sign anagreement allowing international inspections of nuclear sites. Iran is not considered to be a likelycandidate for removal from the Department of State's Terrorism Sponsors List in the coming year.

North Korea. North Korea, designated a member of the "axis of evil" by President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union Address, is not known to havesponsored any terrorist acts since 1987 according to the report. However, it continued to givesanctuary to hijackers affiliated with the Japanese Red Army. Patterns 2003 stresses that NorthKorea announced it planned to sign several antiterrorism conventions, but did not take anysubstantive steps to cooperate in efforts to combat terrorism. Although Patterns notes that NorthKorea's support for international terrorism appears limited at present, its efforts to restart its nuclearprogram and its role in proliferation of ballistic missiles and missile technology suggest that itsremoval from the terrorism list will not occur anytime soon.

Iraq. Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, had been cited in the 2002 Patterns report for a longstanding policy of providing safe haven and bases for terroristgroups and as having laid the groundwork for possible attacks against civilian and military targetsin the United States and other Western nations throughout 2002. However, in the event of asubstantive regime change, a nation may be removed from the terrorism list. Under U.S. law,(Paragraph 6 (j) (4) of the Export Administration Act, the President must first report to Congress thatthe government of the country concerned: (1) does not support terrorism and (2) has providedassurances that it will not support terrorism in the future. On May 7, 2003, President Bushsuspended all sanctions against Iraq applicable to state sponsors of terrorism, which had the practicaleffect of putting Iraq on a par with non terrorist states. Iraq is expected to be removed from theterrorism list as soon as it has its own government in place that pledges not to support terrorist actsin the future, a requirement expected to be met shortly after June 30, 2004. The report notes that theline between insurgency and terrorism has become "increasingly blurred" in Iraq, as attacks oncivilian targets have become more common. By the end of 2003, coalition forces had detained morethan 300 suspected foreign fighters in Iraq (7) .

Libya. In 2003 Libya reiterated assurances to the U.N. Security Council that it had renounced terrorism, had shared intelligence with Westernintelligence agencies, had taken steps to resolve matters related to its past support of terrorism, andon December 19, 2003 announced it would rid itself of weapons of mass destruction and allowinspections of its nuclear facilities. (8) The report statesthat in 2003, Libya held to its pattern in recentyears of curtailing support for international terrorists, although Tripoli continued in 2003 to maintaincontact with "some past terrorist clients." President Bush lifted sanctions against Libya on April 23,2004, after successful intelligence cooperation on WMD issues and efforts by Libya to resolvecompensation for Pam Am flight 103 survivors.

Syria. Syria, according to Patterns 2003, continued to provide political and material support to Palestinian rejectionist groups and continuedto permit Iran to use Damascus as a transhipment point for resupplying Hizballah in Lebanon. Ona positive note, the report notes that Damascus has cooperated with other governments "against alQaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations and individuals," has discouraged signs ofpublic support for Al Qaeda, including in the media and mosques, and has made efforts to tightenits borders with Iraq to limit the movement of anti-Coalition foreign fighters. On May 11, 2004,President Bush imposed economic and trade sanctions against Syria under the Syrian Accountability Act, (9) but also waived some of the provisions,notably provisions applying to the export of selectitems. (10)

Cuba. Cuba, a terrorism list carryover from the cold war has, according to Patterns 2003 , "remained opposed to the U.S.- led Coalition prosecutingthe global war on terrorism" (11) and continued toprovide support to designated terrorist organizations. It is considered unlikely that Cuba will be removed from the terrorism list, absent a regime change. (12)

Sudan. Sudan is generally considered by observers to be a strong candidate for removal from the terrorism list. Patterns 2003 claims that thenation has "deepened its cooperation with the U.S. Government," producing significant progress incombating terrorist activity, but "areas of concern" remain, notably the active presence in Sudan ofHamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ). In 2004, Sudan was removed from the list of countriesdesignated by the Secretary of State as not fully cooperating with the United States in the war onterrorism.

Report Issues

Politicization of Report

Some critics of Patterns and its designation of state sponsors of terrorism charge that the Patterns 2003 report generally, and specifically its reporting of activities of nations, is undulyinfluenced by a complex web of overlapping and sometimes competing political and economicagendas and concerns. As cases in point, they refer to activity cited in Patterns reports used tojustify retaining Cuba and North Korea on the state sponsors list. (13) Others suggest that Patterns' heavy focus on state sponsors of terror make such reports less useful in a world where terroristactivity is increasingly neither state supported nor state countenanced. Still others ask whether, andto what degree, Patterns supports a sanctions policy that is unrealistically achievable and toounilateral when imposing sanctions on nations in which U.S. and allied economic and strategicgeopolitical interests run high.

However, Patterns in its current form is not intended to set policy. Thus, one potential shortcoming of the criticisms cited above is that they are either policy oriented or revolve arounddisagreement with policy issues instead of centering on disagreement with the data and analysispresented in Patterns reports. Moreover, such criticisms, they maintain, arguably place too muchemphasis on the state sponsors section of P atterns, with little or no emphasis on the plethora ofuseful data provided in the report on trends in terrorist activity and background on terroristorganizations. Another issue related to politicization not addressed in Patterns 2003 is that ofconfronting incitement to terrorism when promoted, countenanced, or facilitated by the action, orinaction, of nation states.

Over- or Under-Emphasizing Levels of Cooperation

Particularly strong have been suggestions by some that Patterns plays down undesirable levels of counterterrorism cooperation and progress in the case of nations seen as vital to the globalcampaign against terror. Patterns 2003 , in contrast to pre "9/11" report versions, is silent aboutPakistan's alleged ongoing support for Kashmiri militants and their attacks against the populationof India. Some critics argue that Patterns 2003 also falls far short of criticizing Saudi Arabia,perceived by many analysts as a slow, unwilling, or halfhearted ally in curbing or cracking downon activities which support or spawn terrorism activities outside its borders. In contrast, Patterns2003 cites Saudi Arabia as "an excellent example of a nation increasingly focusing its political willto fight terrorism." Some suggest, however, that often at play here is simply a desire to put the bestface on terrorist related relationships in the hopes of obtaining better cooperation in the future.

On the flip side of the coin is an issue, yet to be resolved, of how to inform Congress and give countries credit in Patterns for cooperation in such matters as intelligence or renditions when, fordomestic political concerns, they do not want this made public. One option might be to producemore frequently a classified annex to the Patterns report which has been done in the past. A downside, however, is that preparation of a classified version is much more time consuming forthose tasked with simultaneously preparing the public document.

Review and Restructuring of Patterns

Some also suggest that Pattern s reports could be stronger in their coverage of the ideological and economic impact of terrorism on individual nations and the global economy. One issue here,as raised by some observers, is whether Patterns places too much emphasis on quantifying andmeasuring terrorist success in terms of physical damage to persons and property when terror groupsmay increasingly be measuring mid-and long term success by economic and political criteria.

Going beyond the question, raised by some, of any perceived shortcomings in data, which may or may not be found in Patterns 2003 , is the question of the quality of strategic analysis of the dataprovided. To what degree might such analysis be enhanced? Some observers suggest the issue hereis the degree to which Patterns is designed to reflect, or might be construed to reflect, a "body count"reporting mentality. (14) Would there be benefitsto Congress and the counterterrorism policycommunity if the focus of Patterns reports was less on presenting statistics and facts, and more ongaining meaning from the data? And if so, how might Congress effect such a change in policyfocus? Admittedly, overall numbers by themselves may not always present a complete picture. Forexample, each small pipeline bombing in Colombia is cited as one incident in Patterns as would bea major terrorist incident as the multiple train bombings in Madrid in March 2004. Another possibleshortcoming, some note, is that Patterns sometimes may not include, or adequately note, incidentsthat are not international in nature but which may have a major political or economic impact on thetarget nation and well beyond it.

Indeed, Patterns 2003 has been subject to criticism on the issue of data completeness or accuracy, as well as on the issue of data relevance. (15) In a May 17, 2004 letter to Secretary of StateColin L. Powell, Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee onGovernment Reform, suggests that data in Patterns 2003 which indicate that non-significant terroristattacks have declined in the last two years is in sharp contrast to independent analysis of the samedata which concludes that significant terrorist attacks (acts causing, or reasonably expected to cause:death, serious personal injury or major property damage) actually reached a 20-year high in 2003. (16) Also questioned is completeness, if not factual accuracy, of the data relied upon in the Patterns 2003 report. The list of significant incidents in Patterns 2003, as originally disseminated , concludesabruptly on November 11, 2003, presumably therefore, not counting major multiple terrorists attacksthat occurred later in the year. (17)

The statistical data which forms the basis for Patterns have traditionally been provided to the State Department by the CIA. More recently this function has been transferred to the newlyoperational Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). (18) TTIC is providing an errata sheet to correctincomplete data. (19)

The final report of the 9/11 Commission, issued on June 22, 2004, recommends the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center. Subsequently on August 2, 2004, President Bush announcedsimilar plans to establish such a center. The new center is envisioned as serving as a centralknowledge bank for information about known and suspected terrorists and would be charged withcoordinating and monitoring counterterrorism plans and activities of all government agencies, andpreparing the daily terrorism report for the President and senior officials. (20) Presumably the functionof compiling the data for Patterns will be performed by the new National Counterterrorism Center, if and when it is established.

Conclusion

In the wake of discrepancies contained in the Patterns 2003 as originally released, the Chairmenof three House Committees (International Relations, Judiciary, Government Reform) forwarded aletter to Secretary of State, Colin Powell, dated July 15, 2004. The letter cites discussions betweenState Department and other officials with committee staff and reiterates "that there will be acomprehensive review of the definitions of terrorist acts as compared to (1) the language in thestatute; and (2) the current experiences with multinational terrorist organizations that sponsor orotherwise promote terrorist acts perpetrated by 'local' terrorist organizations." Moreover, it reaffirmsan understanding that the executive branch has assigned an appropriate level of staff to provide fulltime attention to the contents of the report. The results of this executive branch internal review arerequested by October 1, 2004.

It has been some fifteen years since Congress mandated the first Patterns report. At the time the report was originally conceived as a reference document, the primary threat from terrorism wasstate sponsored. Since then, the threat has evolved, with Al Qaeda affiliated groups and non-statesponsors increasingly posing a major threat. Over the years, the report has increased in length andexpanded in scope. It has been disseminated on the internet, translated into five additionallanguages, and is widely recognized as a primary resource on terrorist activities and groups. However, in view of the earlier- noted data issues, the report may be subject to increased criticismand scrutiny. In light of the high level of international attention attached to the report and theincreased complexity and danger posed by the terrorist threat, some observers have suggested thata thorough Executive/Congressional review of Patterns , its structure and content, may be timely andwarranted.

Patterns of Global Terrorism Data, 2002-2003

Note: Based on revised data published in Patterns 2003. Traditionally, this data hadbeen providedto the State Department by the Central Intelligence Agency. More recently this function has beentransferred to the newly operational Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Periodic requestsfrom analysts at the Department of State and from analysts at the Congressional Research Servicein April 2004 for quarterly access to an unclassified version of the data base of terrorist incidentshave, to date, not resulted in access to the data desired.

a. Compared with 487 attacks in 1982.

b. In 2003 the highest percent of targets were businesses (40%); the most common method of attackwas bombing (67%).

c. Casualties include dead and wounded.

d. 2002 figures include relatively high casualties in a number of anti-Russian attacks, such as theOctober 2002 Moscow theater attack.

e. Note that the reason for this dramatic increase is not apparent.