VA Health Care: Actions Needed to Ensure Provider Qualifications and Competence
Released: 2019-10-16T00:00:00

Letter

VA Medical Centers Took Action against Some Selected Providers with Disqualifying Information in the NPDB but Overlooked Others

In our review of 57 providers selected for our February 2019 report, we found that the responsible VA medical centers took action against some providers with disqualifying information in the NPDB but overlooked others. We found that VA medical centers took administrative or disciplinary actions against some providers, such as removing them from patient care, after becoming aware of adverse information in the NPDB. However, many of these actions were taken following our review and a VHA-wide licensure review, both of which occurred in 2018, rather than at the time of the NPDB report. Specifically, the responsible VA medical centers removed five providers who they determined did not meet VA licensure requirements following our inquiries. For example, one of these five providers had surrendered a license in 2014, while employed at VA, but was not removed by the VA medical center until after our inquiries in 2018. Additionally, another provider was reported to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) by a VA medical center after we inquired about the provider prescribing controlled substances without appropriate registration.

We also found that VA medical centers hired or retained some of the 57 providers who they acknowledged had disqualifying adverse information in the NPDB, which is inconsistent with VHA policy. Specifically, these providers had licenses that were revoked or surrendered for cause, but VA medical center officials overlooked or were unaware of this information. However, none of these providers still worked at VHA at the time we completed our review. For example, one VA medical center hired a provider who had a state license revoked for patient neglect and substandard care. VA medical center officials stated that they received the NPDB report about the revoked license at the time the provider was hired in 2014 but it was inadvertently overlooked by multiple staff. This provider voluntarily resigned in 2017.

In our February 2019 report, we found that three factors were largely responsible for inconsistent adherence to VHA policies that disqualify providers from employment.

First, some medical center officials are not aware of key VHA policies, such as the requirement that a provider who has had a license revoked or surrendered for cause is ineligible for employment unless the license is reinstated. For example, in the case of the provider who surrendered a license in 2014, documentation shows that the medical center staff became aware of the surrendered license in 2015, but VHA staff stated that the removal was stalled due to confusion about policies. This lack of awareness of key policies may be linked to a lack of mandatory training for credentialing staff.

Second, gaps in VHA policy allow for inconsistent interpretation. For example, VHA has not issued policies pertaining to employing providers who have had their DEA registration for prescribing controlled substances revoked or surrendered for cause. While the DEA requires registrants, like VHA, to obtain a waiver before employing such providers, VHA policy is silent on the requirement to obtain a waiver; we found that VA medical center officials were unclear on the DEA requirement and had hired providers without obtaining the required DEA employment waiver. Further, we found that two providers inappropriately prescribed controlled substances without a DEA waiver.

Third, VHA’s oversight of VA medical centers’ reviews of adverse information is inadequate. Under VHA policy, VISN officials are responsible for reviewing providers with certain adverse licensure actions. However, we found that this review was not always conducted or documented. Further, although VHA-wide reviews of provider licenses have been completed and have identified providers with licensure issues, VHA officials indicated that these types of reviews are not routinely conducted because they are labor intensive.

In our February 2019 report, we also found that some VA medical centers had taken steps to improve the credentialing process and identify providers who do not meet the licensure requirements. For example, one medical center completed a periodic review of all licensed providers to identify providers who may have had an expired licensure issue. Another VA medical center updated its policies to require providers with adverse actions to be reviewed by management. However, we found that VHA does not routinely assemble and disseminate information about initiatives that medical centers have undertaken to improve the oversight of providers.

In our February 2019 report, we concluded that without consistent adherence to VHA employment policies and adequate oversight, VHA lacks assurance that all VA providers have the appropriate professional qualifications and clinical abilities to care for patients. To address these shortcomings, in our February 2019 report we made seven recommendations to VA. VA concurred with these recommendations. Table 1 summarizes these recommendations and the steps VA has taken to address them.

Selected VA Medical Centers’ Reviews of Providers’ Clinical Care Were Not Always Documented or Timely

As we reported in November 2017, we found that from October 2013 through March 2017, the five selected VA medical centers required reviews of a total of 148 providers’ clinical care after concerns were raised about their care. However, for almost half of these reviews, officials at these medical centers could not provide documentation to show that the reviews had been conducted. We found that all five VA medical centers lacked at least some documentation of the reviews they told us they conducted, and in some cases, we found that the required reviews were not conducted at all. For example, we found that the medical centers lacked documentation showing they conducted a prospective review of 26 providers. Additionally, VA medical center officials confirmed that they failed to conduct this required review for an additional 21 providers.

We also found that the five selected VA medical centers did not always conduct reviews of providers’ clinical care in a timely manner. Specifically, of the 148 providers, the VA medical centers did not initiate reviews of 16 providers for 3 or more months, and in some cases, for multiple years, after concerns had been raised about the providers’ care. For three of these 16 providers, additional concerns about the providers’ clinical care were raised before the reviews began.

In our November 2017 report, we found that two factors were largely responsible for the inadequate documentation and untimely provider reviews.

First, VHA policy does not require VA medical centers to document all types of reviews of providers’ clinical care, including retrospective reviews, and VHA has not established a timeliness requirement for initiating reviews of providers’ clinical care.

Second, VHA’s oversight of the reviews of providers’ clinical care is inadequate. Under VHA policy, VISN officials are responsible for overseeing the credentialing and privileging processes at their respective VA medical centers. While reviews of providers’ clinical care after concerns are raised are a component of credentialing and privileging, we found that none of the VISN officials we spoke with described any routine oversight of such reviews. This may be in part because the standardized tool that VHA requires the VISNs to use during their routine audits does not direct VISN officials to ensure that all reviews of providers’ clinical care have been conducted and documented. Further, some of the VISN officials we interviewed told us they were not using the standardized audit tool as required.

In our November 2017 report, we concluded that without adequate documentation and timely completion of reviews of providers’ clinical care, VA medical center officials lack the information they need to make decisions about providers’ privileges, including whether or not to take adverse privileging actions against providers. Furthermore, because of its inadequate oversight, VHA lacks reasonable assurance that VA medical center officials are reviewing all providers about whom clinical care concerns have been raised and are taking adverse privileging actions against the providers when appropriate. To address these shortcomings and improve VA medical center reviews of provider quality and safety concerns, we made three recommendations to VA in our November 2017 report. VA concurred with these recommendations. Table 2 summarizes these recommendations and the steps VA has taken to address them.

Selected VA Medical Centers Did Not Report All Providers to the NPDB or to State Licensing Boards as Required

In our November 2017 report, we found that from October 2013 through March 2017, the five VA medical centers we reviewed had only reported one of nine providers that should have been reported to the NPDB as required by VHA policy. Furthermore, none of these nine providers were reported to state licensing boards as required by VHA policy. These nine providers either had adverse privileging actions taken against them or resigned or retired while under investigation before an adverse privileging action could be taken.

The VA medical centers documented that these nine providers had significant clinical deficiencies that sometimes resulted in adverse outcomes for veterans. For example, the documentation shows that one provider’s surgical incompetence resulted in numerous repeat surgeries for veterans. Similarly, the documentation shows that another provider’s opportunity to improve had to be halted and the provider was removed from providing care after only a week due to concerns that continuing the review would potentially harm patients.

In addition to these nine providers, one VA medical center terminated the services of four contract providers based on deficiencies in the providers’ clinical performance, but the facility did not follow any of the required steps for reporting providers to the NPDB or relevant state licensing boards. This is concerning, given that the VA medical center documented that one of these providers was terminated for cause related to patient abuse after only 2 weeks of work at the facility.

At the time of our review, two of the five VA medical centers we reviewed each reported one provider to the state licensing boards for failing to meet generally accepted standards of clinical practice to the point that it raised concerns for the safety of veterans. However, we found that the medical centers’ reporting to the state licensing boards took over 500 days to complete in both cases, which was significantly longer than the 100 days suggested in VHA policy.

Across the five VA medical centers, we found that providers were not reported to the NPDB and state licensing boards as required for two reasons.

First, VA medical center officials were generally not familiar with or misinterpreted VHA policies related to NPDB and state licensing board reporting. For example, at one VA medical center, we found that officials failed to report six providers to the NPDB because they were unaware that they were responsible for NPDB reporting. Officials at two other VA medical centers incorrectly told us that VHA cannot report contract providers to the NPDB.

Second, VHA policy does not require the VISNs to oversee whether VA medical centers are reporting providers to the NPDB or state licensing boards when warranted. We found, for example, that VISN officials were unaware of situations in which VA medical center officials failed to report providers to the NPDB.

As a result of VHA staff misinterpretation of VHA policy and insufficient oversight, we concluded that VHA lacks reasonable assurance that all providers who should be reported to the NPDB and state licensing boards are reported. Consequently, the NPDB and state licensing boards in other states where the providers we identified held licenses were not alerted to concerns about the providers’ clinical practice. We reported that this could allow a provider who delivered substandard care at one VA medical center to obtain privileges at another VA medical center or at hospitals outside of VA’s health care system. In our November 2017 report, we noted several cases of this occurring among the providers who were not reported to the NPDB or state licensing boards by the five VA medical centers we reviewed. For example,

We found that two of the four contract providers whose contracts were terminated for clinical deficiencies remained eligible to provide care to veterans outside of that VA medical center. At the time of our review, one of these providers held privileges at another VA medical center, and another participated in the network of providers that can provide care for veterans in the community.

We also found that a provider who was not reported as required to the NPDB during the period we reviewed had their privileges revoked 2 years later by a non-VA hospital in the same city for the same reason the provider was under investigation at the VA medical center.

Officials at this VA medical center did not report this provider following a settlement agreement under which the provider agreed to resign. A committee within the VA medical center had recommended that the provider’s privileges be revoked prior to the agreement. There was no documentation of the reasons why this provider was not reported to the NPDB.

To improve VA medical centers’ reporting of providers to the NPDB and state licensing boards and VHA oversight of these processes, we made one recommendation in our November 2017 report. VA concurred with this recommendation. Table 3 summarizes the recommendation and the steps VA has taken to address it.

Chairman Pappas, Ranking Member Bergman, and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

If you or your staff members have any questions concerning this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 (silass@gao.gov). Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Other individuals who made key contributions to this testimony include Marcia A. Mann (Assistant Director), Kaitlin M. McConnell (Analyst-in-Charge), Summar C. Corley, Cathy Hamann, Jacquelyn Hamilton, and Vikki Porter. Other contributors include David Bruno, Julia DiPonio, Ranya Elias, Kathryn A. Larin, and Joy Myers.

Appendix I: Veterans Health Administration Credentialing, Privileging, and Monitoring Processes

According to Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) policies, all licensed health care providers must be credentialed before they are permitted to work. Credentialing is the process of screening and evaluating qualifications and other credentials— including licensure, education, and relevant training—that is the first step in the process of determining whether the provider has appropriate clinical abilities and qualifications to provide medical services. Credentialing processes and requirements differ for independent licensed providers, such as doctors—who are permitted by law and the facility to deliver patient care services independently, without supervision—and dependent providers, such as nurses—who deliver patient care under the supervision or direction of an independent provider. Additionally, VHA policy states that only licensed independent providers may be granted clinical privileges. Privileging is a process through which a provider is permitted by a facility to independently provide medical or patient care that is in alignment with the provider’s clinical competence. Figure 1 provides a summary of the VHA credentialing and privileging processes for independent and dependent providers.

VHA facilities are also required to monitor providers’ licenses after they are hired to ensure the licenses are current and review any licensure actions, in accordance with VHA policy. Figure 2 provides a summary of VHA’s processes for monitoring independent and dependent providers’ licenses.

Related GAO Reports

Veterans Health Administration: Greater Focus on Credentialing Needed to Prevent Disqualified Providers from Delivering Patient Care. GAO-19-6. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2019.

Department of Veterans Affairs: Actions Needed to Address Employee Misconduct Process and Ensure Accountability. GAO-18-137. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2018.

VA Health Care: Improved Oversight Needed for Reviewing and Reporting Providers for Quality and Safety Concerns. GAO-18-260T. Washington, D.C.: November 29, 2017.

VA Health Care: Improved Policies and Oversight Needed for Reviewing and Reporting Providers for Quality and Safety Concerns. GAO-18-63. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2017.

Veterans Health Care: Improved Oversight of Community Care Physicians’ Credentials Needed. GAO-16-795. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2016.

VA Health Care: Improvements Needed in Processes Used to Address Providers’ Actions That Contribute to Adverse Events. GAO-14-55. Washington, D.C.: December 3, 2013.

Veterans Health Care: Veterans Health Administration Processes for Responding to Reported Adverse Events, GAO-12-827R. Washington, D.C.: August 24, 2012.

VA Health Care: Improved Oversight and Compliance Needed for Physician Credentialing and Privileging Processes. GAO-10-26. Washington, D.C.: January 6, 2010.

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