U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy in the Middle East: The Islamist Dilemma
Released: 2006-06-15T00:00:00

Overview

As an ongoing response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and a justification forthe U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Bush Administration has made the promotion of democracy in theMiddle East a national security priority, stating that greater political freedom can undercut the forcesof Islamic radicalism and indoctrination. (1) However, with ongoing sectarian violence in Iraq and Arab regimesfirmly entrenched in power, this policy has come under increasing scrutiny. Many have questionedthe practicality of this approach and the U.S. ability to accelerate the forces of modernization andsocial change across a wide and diverse geographic area. Yet, despite continuing reservations overU.S. sincerity, depth of commitment, and consistency on the democratization issue, the enormousattention that Middle East or Arab democratization has received in the years since the September 11thterrorist attacks is believed by many skeptics and advocates alike to have reverberated across theArab world, for better or for worse, sparking debate, anti-government demonstrations, andregime-manipulated elections to appease internal and external demands for democratization.

At the heart of this upheaval lies a long, vexing dilemma for U.S. policy makers: should theUnited States exert pressure on Arab governments to open their political systems and respect humanrights with the knowledge that Islamists, the most popular opposition force in Arab politics, standto benefit from regional democratization? Many observers assert that Islamist (2) political parties andorganizations are largely opposed, at least rhetorically, to key aspects of U.S. foreign policy in theMiddle East, such as support for Israel, the occupation of Iraq, and the large U.S. military presencein the Persian Gulf. Moreover, some suggest that with the ascent of Shiite Muslim parties in Iraq andfundamentalist Hamas in Palestinian Authority elections, the United States, by encouraging free andfair elections across the region, may have inadvertently strengthened Islamist opposition movements,particularly militant ones.

This dilemma becomes even more problematic when turning to the possible participation ofnon-violent Islamist groups that have chosen or been permitted to participate peacefully in politics.Many of these groups exist in what some experts call a "gray zone," in which their participation inpolitics is permitted but limited. Since these so-called "moderate" Islamist groups have renouncedviolence and terrorism, it would seem logical that U.S. efforts to promote Arab democracy wouldinclude seeking more rights for all legitimate actors, including these Islamists. However,circumstances differ across the Arab world, and democracy promotion in the Middle East is acomplex issue with many outstanding questions, particularly when examining Islamism. This reportexamines how U.S. democracy promotion efforts interact with the political realities on the groundin three Arab countries (Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan) and raises the following questions: Who arethe Islamists? Are such groups legitimate democratic actors or militant fundamentalists in disguise?To what extent are Islamists opposed to U.S. Middle East policy? Should the United States engagewith non-violent Islamist groups, either gradually or immediately? Would such engagement isolatekey Arab regimes whose cooperation is vital to waging the war on terrorism and securing other U.S.national security goals? Do non-violent Islamist groups even welcome or accept dialogue with theUnited States or would such action discredit them among their followers? Should these non-violentIslamist movements be embraced, cautiously accepted, or circumvented? Are U.S. democratizationefforts designed to foster alternatives to Islamists?

Islamism and Identity Politics

At the heart of the democratization issue in the Middle East is the question of nationalidentity. In many countries, questions about the role of Islam in political life, rights for ethnic andreligious minorities, and the role of women remain unresolved. With secular Arab nationalismhaving been largely discredited in the wake of successive Arab defeats at the hand of Israel in 1967and 1973, Islamism and ethnic politics have largely stepped in to fill an identity vacuum in the Arabworld.

Today, a number of competing and overlapping identities vie for primacy in the Middle East."Moderate Islamists" seek to balance the need for political and social reform with the desire to createa society governed by the general principles of Islamic law ( Sharia ). Other, more radical Islamistsmay use elections as a tool to come to power in order to create more rigid Islamic rule. Non-Islamistreformers draw support from both secular intellectuals and minority religious/ethnic communities,who have traditionally been relegated to second-class status. Secular intellectuals, members of someminority groups, and women's rights advocates are frequently accused of collaborating withforeigners because their vision of democracy may closely resemble the liberal democracies ofWestern Europe and the United States. Ruling elites in the military and private sector, who oftenhave manipulated the state system to obtain a minimum of popular support, have created their own"national identities" to reinforce their rule. Some regimes have created secular republics dominatedby one ruling party and the military. Other ruling families have based their legitimacy on theircommon ancestry from the prophet Muhammad.

Many analysts consider Islamism to be the most popular of the identification models in theArab world. According to scholar Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Islamic activism is rooted in thesymbolism, language, and cultural history of Muslim society and as a result has successfullyresonated with increasingly disillusioned populations suffering from political exclusion, economicdeprivation, and a sense of growing impotence at the expense of outside powers and a facelessprocess of globalization." (3) Asserting that "Islam is the solution" (a common Islamist slogan) to the socio-economic problemsposed by modernity and Western consumer culture, Islamists, both radical and non-violent groups,have sought to construct their own institutions in society, ranging from political organizations tohealth clinics and schools. Through their extensive social welfare networks, Islamists have createdalternative state structures that serve to reinforce their appeal among the lower and middle classes.

There are many examples across the Middle East of legal or semi-legal Islamist organizationsthat have been granted either full or limited participation in the political system. Some of thesegroups have renounced violence and peacefully oppose their respective governments. Some regimeshave allowed their participation, in part because Islamist parties may act to bolster the strength ofthe one-party state or royal family. For example, when facing economic recession and large-scalepublic unrest, Arab governments sometimes have granted Islamist organizations more leeway inconducting opposition activities in order to relieve the political system of public pressure. Thus,non-violent Islamist groups have existed in an ambiguous position. On the one hand, regimes mayexaggerate the threat Islamists pose to state stability and therefore maintain that these groups areillegal. On the other hand, they may permit Islamists to conduct limited opposition activity if suchactivity ultimately benefits the regime. Arab dissidents have long maintained that some secularauthoritarian regimes offer Islamists limited participation in politics to prevent secular oppositiongroups or leaders from challenging the ruling party.

U.S. Government Concern Over Islamist Groups

In previous Administrations, when regional democratization was not seen as a U.S. nationalsecurity priority and Islamist extremism was not seen as a significant threat, the Islamist dilemmawas largely an academic question rather than an immediate policy concern. Since the 1979 Iranianrevolution, the U.S. government has increasingly believed that, should Islamist groups come topower, they would pursue a more confrontational approach in their foreign policy toward the UnitedStates and that key U.S. strategic interests would suffer, including access to oil reserves, militarycooperation, and the security of Israel, among others. To the extent that the United States pushed forregional reform, the focus was largely on economic reform and trade liberalization; concern over thelack of democratization and human rights was secondary. Arab regimes largely focused on thesymbolic rather than the substantive elements of democratic change in order to diffuse occasionalinternational attention to their lack of political freedom. Many governments continue to employ thisstrategy by manipulating elections, keeping parliamentary systems weak, and allowing only a tokenopposition to operate openly and legally.

The entry of the Palestinian Hamas and the Lebanese Hezballah movements into the formalpolitical process also has fueled U.S. suspicions of Islamist movements. As U.S.-designated terroristorganizations and combatants in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Hamas and Hezballah have maintainedarmed militias and refused to renounce terrorism or violence as means of achieving their politicalgoals. Though both groups participate in their respective political systems, they are infamous formaintaining armed/terrorist wings that threaten Israel. (4) Some experts argue that non-violent Islamist groups that renounceviolence as a tactic in their own countries but support its use in the Palestinian-Israeli context shouldnot be considered non-violent.

In addition, analysts have long observed how some Arab regimes have played on Westernfears of political Islamism by attempting to paint all Islamist organizations as radical, therebypositioning themselves as the only moderate alternative likely to support U.S. objectives. Some Arabgovernments, such as Egypt, Syria, and Algeria, have a history of violent confrontation with Islamicextremists who have assassinated government officials and launched costly insurgencies againstsecurity forces. In some ways, Arab governments have been engaged in their own "war on terror"for many years, and the experience has made them reluctant to recognize non-revolutionary Islamistgroups. Many Arab human rights advocates have asserted that regimes have harnessed the fear offundamentalist-inspired terrorism and instability in order to justify continued one-party rule andrelieve external pressure for political reform.

U.S. Policy Toward Islamist Organizations: Different Options and Approaches

Bush Administration officials rejected the argument that authoritarian Arab regimes are thebulwark against Islamic radicalism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Theidea that a democratic Middle East would be less vulnerable to the forces of extremism contributedin part to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and, in the months following the active combat phase ofOperation Iraqi Freedom, the President put forth his "Forward Strategy of Freedom in the MiddleEast," asserting that:

"Sixty years of Western nations excusing andaccommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe -- because in thelong run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remainsa place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, andviolence ready for export. And with the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to ourcountry and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the status quo." (5)

With the United States committed, at least rhetorically, to changing "the status quo" ofauthoritarian governance in the broader Middle East, many have speculated about what politicaloutcomes would be preferable for U.S. policy makers should genuine political reform take hold inthe Middle East. Within the U.S. foreign policy establishment, there has been an ongoing, vigorousdebate over the issue of engaging Islamist groups, some of which have renounced the use ofviolence and entered into mainstream politics.

Combating Islamism and Promoting Liberal Alternatives

Some believe that all Islamists, whether they espouse peaceful or violent means to achievepower, are suspect. Dr. Martin Kramer, a Middle East expert at the Washington Institute for NearEast Policy, argues that all Islamists are fundamentalists who are inherently anti-democratic andanti-Western. In his essay, "Islam vs. Democracy," Kramer writes that

Democracy, diversity, accommodation -- thefundamentalists have repudiated them all. In appealing to the masses who fill their mosques, theypromise, instead, to institute a regime of Islamic law, make common cause with like-minded"brethren" everywhere, and struggle against the hegemony of the West and the existence of Israel.Fundamentalists have held to these principles through long periods of oppression, and will notabandon them now, at the moment of their greatest popular resonance. (6)

Other experts have echoed such beliefs, asserting that the idea of non-violent Islamism is a myth,since even non-violent Islamists routinely fail to condemn terrorist acts committed by their moreradical counterparts. According to Daniel Pipes, director of the Philadelphia-based think tank theMiddle East Forum, facilitating the immediate political participation of Islamists is tantamount to"helping the enemy." (7)

Others believe that Islamists would set back regional democratization by restricting the rightsof women and religious minorities and that their ascension to power would be detrimental for U.S.policy in the region. In order to counter Islamist influence, some have suggested that the UnitedStates, if it is going to promote regional democracy, should aggressively work to strengthen the ruleof law, separation of powers, civil society, and alternative, preferably secular, movements. There alsocontinues to be strong sentiment among some foreign policy experts and Arab government officialsthat the United States should refrain from pushing for political liberalization and allow market forcesand globalization to gradually build educated middle classes who can push for change indigenously.

Engaging Mainstream, Non-Violent Islamists

Some scholars assert that the United States should, at the very least, lessen its traditionalsuspicions of non-violent Islamist groups and not oppose their integration into political systems.Many Middle East experts have asserted that if Islamists were able to exercise real political power,considerations of realpolitik would moderate their behavior and consequently improve their relationswith Western governments. (8) Some point to more or less cordial U.S. relations with Turkey,whose government is led by a conservative or center-right Islamist party, although Islamism inTurkey is counter-balanced by Turkey's long tradition of secularism and constitutional provisionssupporting secularism. In addition, some counter-terrorism experts have long suggested that therecognition and integration of non-violent Islamist groups into politics would provide a positiveoutlet for Muslim activists and lessen the allure of more radical groups.

A Pragmatic Approach?

With U.S. democracy promotion policy toward Islamists left somewhat vague, perhaps evendeliberately so, there are many foreign policy practitioners in the U.S. State Department who believethat, at the moment, the United States is taking a pragmatic approach toward Middle Eastdemocratization. Some officials assert that U.S. policy is flexible and applied to specificcircumstances on a country-by-country and case-by-case basis, since political conditions and theorientation and legal status of Islamist movements in one country may be markedly different fromanother. According to one scholar, moderate Islamist parties are mistakenly treated as monolithicentities, when instead, groups "differ among themselves on the question of how much of thehistorical Sharia (Islamic law) -- that is, the corpus of traditional Islamic legal rulings inherited fromthe past -- can and should be revised." (9) Some suggest that the U.S. government, because it is constrainedby its strategic relationships with authoritarian regimes, may only be capable of selective engagementwith some non-violent Islamist groups. In this viewpoint, such an approach, though it would be farless ambitious than the grand rhetoric outlined by the Administration and would leave the U.S.government open to accusations of promoting reform inconsistently, could serve U.S. interests bypromoting reform where it is possible without disrupting relations with other key Arab partners.

Implementing U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy

Though many have criticized U.S. democracy promotion efforts both inside and outside theArab world, there has been widespread recognition that President Bush and his Administration havemade the pursuit of regional reform a high-profile issue and have provided additional resources forits implementation. The United States employs a variety of diplomatic tools and policy instrumentsto promote democracy in the Middle East. Behind the scenes bilateral diplomacy, in which U.S.officials engage Arab governments on the reform issue, is considered by many experts to be one ofthe most effective ways of promoting democracy. (10) Public statements by Administration officials visiting the region,such as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's July 2005 policy speech on democracy at theAmerican University of Cairo in Egypt, is another way for U.S. policy makers to keep reform avisible issue in U.S. dealings with Arab regimes. However, visiting U.S. officials who raise thedemocratization issue are often accused in the Arab media of unfairly meddling in Arab affairs oras patronizing the Arab people. Islamist groups often reiterate such attacks, seizing on opportunitiespresented by visiting U.S. delegations speaking on reform to criticize U.S. policies in the MiddleEast.

U.S. Democracy Programs

Since the September 11, 2001, terroristattacks, the United States has significantlyincreased funding for democracy promotion inthe Arab world. Measuring its effectiveness isdifficult since democracy cannot be quantifiedor measured like traditional U.S. foreignassistance for tangible projects, such as roadconstruction, water resource development, andschool improvement. Further, proponents ofcurrent policy say that the United Statescontinues to spend far more resources onmilitary assistance to the region than on reform. While this statement is factually correct, itfocuses too narrowly on levels of spendingrather than on the substance of U.S.programming. Support for indigenous reformersdoes not necessarily require large amounts offinancial assistance. Rather, it must be properlychanneled to support reformers withoutde-legitimizing them in the process. Providingdemocracy assistance can be problematic sincesome regimes legally restrict foreign assistanceto non-governmental organizations.

Through annual foreign operations andState Department appropriations, Congresscurrently provides funding for the followingreform programs:

the Middle EastPartnership Initiative (MEPI), a StateDepartment program designed to encouragereform in Arab countries by strengthening Arabcivil society, encouraging micro-enterprise,expanding political participation, andpromoting women's rights; (11)

the State Department's Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF), anaccount that funds human rights promotion in Muslim-majority countries; and

the National Endowment for Democracy's (NED) Muslim Democracy Program.

Beyond U.S.-sponsored programs, the Administration proposed and participates in the "BroaderMiddle East & North Africa Initiative," a G8-led development and reform initiative aimed atfostering economic and political liberalization in Arab and other Muslim-majority countries. (12) USAID also funds anumber of democracy and governance activities through bilateral assistance to Arab recipients suchas Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Yemen.

Congressional Action to Allow Direct Support toNGOs. Congress may also specify how U.S. democracy funds are spent on theground. Traditionally, USAID's Democracy and Governance grants have been awarded to U.S. andinternational subcontractors to carry out specific programs, mainly due to certain Arab governments'reluctance to allow U.S. support for domestic groups. However, the FY2005 ConsolidatedAppropriations Act ( P.L. 108-447 ) stipulates that U.S. funds for democracy and governanceactivities in Egypt are no longer subject to the prior approval of the Egyptian government. Now,USAID can channel funds toward non-governmental organizations in Egypt in coordination with anindependent board of Egyptian political activists and experts. Funds for NGOs are awardedcompetitively, using an Annual Program Statement (APS) method that describes and publiclyadvertises the types of activities USAID is interested in funding and then invites interested NGOsto submit proposals. There are quarterly meetings to review new proposals received as a result of theadvertisement, and awards are made throughout the year following those reviews.

The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). Some analysts believe that MEPI can have a positive impact on the region by promoting democracyand economic development. In 2004, MEPI began issuing small grants directly to NGOs in theMiddle East in order to support political activists and human rights organizations. MEPI grants wereawarded to some NGOs to help train election monitors for the 2005 presidential and parliamentaryelections in Egypt. (13) Critics charge that MEPI, as a State Department-run program, has little credibility in the Arab world,as it awards grants to mostly American-run organizations to implement programs with littlelong-term impact. (14) Some experts have recommended that MEPI be transformed into a private foundation in order topartly disassociate it from direct U.S. government control. U.S. officials have rejected this idea,asserting that the United States needs such policy tools to effect change in the region.

The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative(BMENA). BMENA is a multilateral initiative among G-8 countries and regionalpartners to promote democracy and reform in the "Broader Middle East." The main component ofBMENA is the convening of an annual conference designed to promote dialogue between thereformers and Arab and Western governments. The inaugural "Forum for the Future" was held inRabat, Morocco in December 2004. The following year, the forum was held in Manama, Bahrain.A third meeting is tentatively scheduled to take place in Jordan in late 2006.

At this time, it is unclear what additional resources the international community will devoteto BMENA or how the initiative will be institutionalized beyond its annual convention. By helpingto create BMENA, the Bush Administration has been credited with raising awareness within theinternational community for the need for political and economic reform in Muslim-majority andArab countries. However, some analysts believe that BMENA is too broad to promote reformeffectively and doubt that it can evolve into something more than a forum for inter-governmentaldialogue.

Currently, BMENA countries support two funds. The "Foundation for the Future" is designedto channel financial grants toward non-governmental organizations in the region to help civil societystrengthen the rule of law, to protect basic civil liberties, and ensure greater opportunity for healthand education. The "Fund for the Future" is designed to help businesses in the region, especiallysmall and medium-sized enterprises, gain access to the capital they need to create jobs and economicgrowth. U.S. contributions to both funds come from MEPI-controlled accounts and appropriations.

Islamist Groups in Selected Arab Countries

The following section profiles several non-violent Islamist movements in Morocco, Egypt,and Jordan. This is not a comprehensive assessment of all non-violent Islamist groups in the MiddleEast. Indeed, many groups inside and outside the Arab world would provide additional insights.Groups that have not disarmed their militias or renounced terrorism are not treated in this study.

Morocco(15)

Long before the September 11th terrorist attacks, experts focused their attention on theMoroccan reform process because of its possible implications for democratization elsewhere inNorth Africa and the Middle East. Over the past decade, Morocco has embarked upon a limitedliberalization process that has witnessed a moderate, non-revolutionary Islamist party, the Parti deJustice et DÃ©veloppement (Islamist Justice and Development Party or PJD), gain seats in successiveparliamentary elections in 1997 and 2002. (16) With a history of stable monarchical rule in which the King, as"Commander of the Faithful," derives his religious authority from his dynasty's claimed descent fromthe prophet Muhammad, Morocco has accepted some Islamist political activity so long as Islamistsdo not challenge the king's authority. (17) The PJD has accepted such a bargain, and the relationshipbetween it and the palace, though at times confrontational, has overall been mutually beneficial.Moroccan authorities have sought to avoid the kind of bloody confrontation with Islamists thatplagued neighboring Algeria throughout the 1990s, but concern remains over the proliferation ofJihadist terrorist groups, like Al Qaeda, that seek to recruit Moroccans at home and abroad. Thus,Morocco has chosen a path of inclusion rather than exclusion in order to lure Islamists away frommilitancy and toward more legitimate means of political participation. There also may be aneconomic reason to allow Islamists into the political system. Morocco, which lacks natural resourceslike oil and depends on foreign aid and trade with the West, has an economic incentive to maintainits momentum on the reform front, particularly given the recent focus by Morocco's key tradingpartners in Europe and the United States on democracy and human rights promotion.

The PJD is not the only Islamist group in Morocco. A second group, known in Arabic as Al-Adl wal-Ihsan or Justice and Charity (JCO), is only legally recognized as a charity. The JCOrejects the legitimacy of the Moroccan monarchy. Though no reliable data on the popularity of eithergroup are available, there seems to be a consensus among Morocco experts that the JCO has a widernational base of grassroots support, though the PJD is very active in urban areas.

The PJD. Like many Islamist groups across theglobe, it is difficult to discern what the PJD's true goals and objectives are over the long term. (18) Some believe that,although the party has agreed to work within the current system, it remains committed to establishingan Islamic state in Morocco with Islamic law, or Sharia, as the basis for legislation. Others see thePJD's principles as deliberately ambiguous, with its leadership desiring to strike a balance betweencontinuing its opposition to government corruption and nepotism while possibly participating infuture government coalitions, perhaps after the 2007 parliamentary election. Reportedly, the PJDcovets the Social Affairs and Education ministerial portfolios, where it could pursue an Islamistagenda.

Due to its participation in the Moroccan political system, some have called the PJD the"Islamists of the palace," though observers note that the PJD's aggressive campaigning among lower-and middle-class Moroccans has made the group more popular than many of Morocco's older andmore established parties. (19) Nevertheless, the aspirations of the PJD remain limited, as it hasconsistently sided with the monarchy, even on issues that would appear to contravene a conservativeinterpretation of Islamic law, such as their acceptance of King Muhammad's 2004 groundbreakingrevision of the family code ( Mudawana ), which, among other things, raised the legal age formarriage for women from 15 to18 and allowed women to divorce with a judge's approval. The PJDargued that because the family code revision was democratically enacted, its members should acceptit, since the party is committed to both democratic and Islamic principles. (20) According to PJDVice-Secretary Abdelah Baha, "Islam and democracy can go together as global principles ... our partybases its objectives on religious principles, and then adapts them to political ends. We're like theAmerican evangelicals." (21) Some critics in Morocco believe that the PJD has failed toarticulate original policies, other than general pledges to fight corruption and unemployment. Othersare encouraged by the PJD's campaign to bring more transparency to Moroccan politics. One recentreport noted that the PJD publishes the attendance record of all members at parliamentary sessions in order to highlight chronic absenteeism found in other parties. (22) The PJD's party leadersrequire PJD parliamentarians to attend all legislative sessions and to be more productive thanmembers from other parties.

Justice and Charity. Though the PJD and Justiceand Charity are ideologically similar, the latter group has had a far more contentious relationshipwith the Moroccan government due to its outright rejection of the monarchy. Justice and Charity isled by Shaikh Abdessalem Yassine, a sufi cleric and former employee of the Education Ministry whospent decades under house arrest and remains under surveillance. His daughter and JCOspokesperson, 47-year old Nadia Yassine, was arrested in 2005 after stating in a newspaperinterview that Morocco would be better off as a republic than as a kingdom. Observers suggest thatalthough Nadia Yassine has made similar remarks on more than one occasion, she may have finallypushed the government to its limit. According to Morocco's Minister of Communication, "In certaincountries, you can talk about republican values ... here, we have monarchic values, and she istransgressing these values." (23) The PJD immediately condemned Yassine's remarks, saying thatshe harmed the country's sacred institutions. In an uncertain political climate, in which oppositionfigures like the Yassines have become emboldened and regimes have grown more wary of politicaldissent, the prosecution of Nadia Yassine has drawn widespread international attention. In May2006, the trial was indefinitely postponed, and Yassine remarked in a press interview that "I wantedthe trial to take place -- it's an important battle for us.... But I could feel their trepidation. They (theregime) realized the trial was a big mistake." (24)

Justice and Charity condemns terrorism and the use of violence for political means. Thegovernment has tolerated its social service activities and campus activism, though it is reportedlyclosely monitored and generally treated as a subversive organization. Moreover, many Moroccansquestion its political agenda beyond merely opposing authoritarianism, believing that Justice andCharity would limit social freedoms by imposing restrictions on women's dress and banning alcohol.Although supporters of Nadia Yassine believe she is an Islamic feminist, she opposed the 2004revision of the Moroccan family code, remarking that "it was signed to please foreigners and thefeminist movement in Morocco rather than to change the real situation of women." (25) She also leddemonstrations against an earlier attempt to revise the code. One recent assessment of the JCO'spolitical program stated "The group's leadership has such faith in the moral and spiritual power ofits movement that it assumes that once Moroccans are sufficiently familiar with the group, they willsupport it en masse and will also support the imposition of Islamic law, or Sharia ." (26)

In 2005 and 2006, Nadia Yassine made several visits to the United States to speak on collegecampuses and promote her new book. Full Sails Ahead . (27) During one lecture at Georgetown University in April 2006,Yassine remarked that she "swears on the Koran" that should the JCO come to power, the rights ofall women will be respected and no woman would be forced to wear the veil. She also noted that 30% of the JCO's internal consultative ( Shura ) council is composed of women. Yassine alsoopposes a quota system for women in government or parliament because she believes that suchsystems, found in other parts of the Arab world, are insulting to women. (28) However, when askedabout her group's opposition to the King's changes to the personal status laws, Yassine was carefulnot to criticize the actual reforms and even suggested that her group proposed such changes twodecades ago. Furthermore, Yassine acknowledged that the JCO has no specific economic agenda andwould therefore seek out opinions from all Moroccans. (29)

U.S. Policy vis-Ã -vis Morocco. There are multipledimensions to the U.S.-Moroccan relationship, with democracy and human rights promotion beingone of several pressing priorities for U.S. policy makers. Morocco has long been considered a keyU.S. partner in North Africa and the Arab world and has assisted U.S. efforts to promote Middle Eastpeace and counter terrorism in the Sahara. Since the September 11th terrorist attacks, the UnitedStates has taken a number of concrete steps to further its relationship with Morocco includingincreasing military and economic aid, concluding a free trade agreement, and sponsoring aninternational conference in Rabat on reform as part of the Administration's "Broader Middle East andNorth Africa Initiative." (30) Morocco is eligible for funding under the Bush Administration'snew foreign aid initiative, the Millennium Challenge Account. In addition, Morocco has been usedas a test case for the Administration's other new reform program, the State Department's Middle EastPartnership Initiative (MEPI). All told, concern that deteriorating socio-economic conditions inMorocco could lead to increased radicalism has led to a number of new activities and increased U.S.funding for education, health care, women's rights, job creation, and structural readjustmentprograms, all of which have been welcomed by the Moroccan government.

To a certain extent, U.S. democracy promotion efforts in Morocco are largelyregime-friendly, as policy makers may be reluctant to disrupt strong U.S.-Moroccan relations.Nevertheless, the United States has become more involved in Moroccan domestic politics and hassponsored several programs in which the PJD is an active participant. (31) In fact, U.S. diplomats andPJD party leaders openly acknowledge such participation, though, according to U.S. officials, thereare no special outreach efforts to work with the PJD or any other Islamist group in Morocco. (32) The PJD is simply treatedas one of several organizations whose members attend National Democratic Institute (NDI) andInternational Republican Institute (IRI)-sponsored seminars on strengthening political parties andenhancing campaign skills. Public opinion polls conducted by IRI in Morocco have indicated thatup to 47% of the Moroccan electorate were leaning toward supporting the PJD. (33)

Perhaps as a sign of the PJD's growing activism and grasp of democratic politics, severaldemocracy specialists in Morocco noted that PJD members have seized opportunities for additionaltraining and technical support from a variety of international non-governmental organizations(NGOs) to a far greater extent than older, more established Moroccan parties. Experts also noted thatthe PJD initially rejected participating in U.S. government-sponsored training programs; however,over time, its opposition abated. (34) According to Thomas Carothers, a democracy specialist at theCarnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Morocco's PJD clearly has a legitimate role to playin Morocco's electoral politics. I also think it is normal for the U.S. government to develop andmaintain contacts with a wide variety of legitimate political actors in a country, including those thatmay not like some elements of U.S. foreign policy." (35)

U.S. officials in Morocco state that the United States should pursue a policy of engagementwith the PJD rather than ignore it. In May 2006, the U.S. State Department's International Visitor'sProgram sponsored a visit by the PJD's leader, 50-year old Saad Eddine Othmani. In a sign that thePJD itself may be eager to expand dialogue with the United States, the party sponsored a March 2006conference in Morocco entitled, "American Decision Making and its Impact on theMoroccan-American Relations." When asked about U.S. democracy promotion policy in the MiddleEast, Othmani remarked that "We cannot deny the role of external factors, but the reforms have notbeen simply imposed from outside.... The U.S. administration cannot achieve its goals at ourexpense, and should seek to build trust and identify common interests through a cooperativedialogue." (36)

U.S. engagement is complicated by internal divisions within Islamist organizations such asthe PJD, in which liberal and conservative factions vie for influence. The PJD, while outwardly moremoderate in its political discourse, has its hardliners, many of whom are opposed to better relationswith the West and may be more emboldened following the Hamas victory in the January 2006Palestinian legislative elections. (37) The PJD's leadership must balance its more progressive approachto politics with the needs of conservative Islamist party members. When asked about its relationswith the United States and U.S. policy in Iraq, one PJD leader remarked that, "I'm not in favor ofmeeting Americans who are on official missions. They are killing Muslim people.... I am againstany relation with them. If they say they are going to leave Iraq, I don't have any problem withmeeting them. Our position is very clear. We don't approve their policy." (38)

Thus, the party has occasionally boycotted some U.S. embassy-sponsored events, particularlyduring times of regional tension. The PJD has demonstrated against the U.S. presence in Iraq andhas criticized the United States and European Union for ending all direct support for the PalestinianAuthority following the 2006 Hamas victory. Nevertheless, PJD leader Saad Eddine Othmani hasbeen cautious in his remarks on Hamas, stating in a recent interview that the Hamas victory "was amajor event that marked both the victory of democracy and of the strategy of resistance to theoccupation. Hamas in government will be different from the Hamas in the opposition, and I do notrule out the possibility of its moving towards a search for a peaceful solution." (39)

Overall, U.S. policy makers have been careful not to overemphasize U.S. contacts with thePJD, since there continues to be widespread public skepticism in Morocco of all political parties, thePJD included. The United States may welcome more European Union cooperation with Islamistsgroups since EU intentions are far less suspect among Moroccans in general. (40) Observers have focusedintently on the 2007 parliamentary elections, speculating whether the PJD will decide to or bepermitted to run the maximum number of candidates. In past elections, the PJD succumbed togovernment pressure and fielded candidates in just 20%-30% of electoral contests. The PJD, like theUnited States, takes a gradualist approach to political reform in Morocco. Also, it may not want torelinquish its position in the opposition, which according to some officials, allows it to comfortablycriticize government corruption and inefficiency without having the responsibility of running thecountry's day-to-day affairs. (41) Others suggest that the PJD might participate in the next coalitiongovernment to develop experience in governance and improve its electoral chances in the 2012elections.

Some commentators are dismayed by any U.S. government dealings with MoroccanIslamists, asserting that the ultimate goal of all Islamist groups is the establishment of anon-democratic state based on Islamic law (Sharia) . These experts argue that the PJD's non-violentapproach to politics masks its ultimate non-democratic agenda and that non-violence is merely atactic rather than an end goal. According to Dr. Robert Satloff, Executive Director of the WashingtonInstitute for Near East Policy,

The spread of radical Islamism, not U.S. unpopularity,is the most serious challenge to U.S. interests in many Arab and Muslim societies. The solution -- as frequently expressed by liberal Moroccans -- cannot be found in reaching an accommodation withIslamists... Anti-Islamist Moroccans complain that Washington sends the wrong message when itprovides parliamentary training funds that are used by Islamist legislators to become more effectivecritics of the government. (42)

Critics contend that U.S. policy should be exclusively focused on promoting democratic alternativesto Islamists. U.S. government officials insist that they are not favoring groups like the PJD and treatall Moroccan parties equally. Some Moroccan media outlets have reiterated demands that the UnitedStates cease all contacts with Islamists, fearing that U.S. policy may inadvertently empowerorganizations like the PJD and perhaps lead to a Hamas-like outcome. For its part, the Moroccangovernment often warns U.S. observers that non-violent Islamists in Morocco view electoral politicsas a means to come to power and establish a theocracy in the kingdom.

Role of Congress. Congress has been supportiveof the Administration's efforts to strengthen ties to Morocco. Congress approved a free tradeagreement (FTA) with Morocco ( P.L. 108-302 ) on August 17, 2004, and it came into effect onJanuary 1, 2006. Congress has appropriated increasing amounts of foreign aid to Morocco to assistwith countering terrorism, democratization, and the FTA. In FY2006, Morocco is receiving $10.890million in Economic Support Funds (ESF), $12.375 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF),$8.217 million in Development Assistance (DA), and $1.856 million for International MilitaryEducation and Training (IMET). For FY2007, the Administration has requested $18 million in ESF,$12.5 million in FMF, $5.4 million for DA, and $1.975 million for IMET.

Egypt(43)

The potential dilemma that non-violent Islamist movements pose for U.S. democratizationpolicy is of greater strategic importance vis-a-vis U.S. relations with Egypt than with Morocco orpossibly elsewhere in the Arab world. The Egyptian government, led by 78-year old President HosniMubarak, is a strategic Arab partner for U.S. national security interests in the region. Egypt, whichhas been at peace with Israel since 1979, received the largest amount of U.S. foreign assistance toArab countries until U.S. involvement in Iraq. Both countries cooperate closely on military andintelligence issues, and President Mubarak has fashioned himself as a reliable interlocutor in thePalestinian-Israeli conflict. Some analysts believe that Egypt's strategic importance has increasedsince the Hamas 2006 rise to power, as Egypt, Israel, and the United States all share a commoninterest in containing Hamas.

Nevertheless, the Egyptian government has been wary of U.S. calls for political reformbecause authorities do not want to empower the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), by far the mostorganized and effective opposition group in Egypt today. Despite the MB's decades-longcommitment to pursuing political power peacefully, it stands opposed, at least rhetorically, to Egypt'sclose ties to the United States, and many observers are uncertain whether MB leaders would reversethe course of Egyptian foreign policy should they come to power. Furthermore, Egypt, unlikeMorocco, has a long history of violent confrontation with fundamentalist terrorist groups, which hasled the government to discredit all Islamists, militant and non-violent alike. Finally, Egypt is aheterogeneous society. Egyptian Coptic Christians number in the millions and have a strong presencein the private sector. Many Copts fear that an Islamist government would exacerbate sectariantensions, which already are flaring in various parts of Egypt.

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The MuslimBrotherhood has the precarious status of an illegal organization whose treatment by the governmentfluctuates between support, tolerance, and outright suppression. Moreover, despite an almostthree-decade commitment to non-violent opposition, the MB's radical history, its fundamentalistideologues, and younger and perhaps more militant members have prompted differences amongWestern observers over the issue of pursuing engagement with the group. Complicating mattersfurther is the steadfast opposition of the Egyptian government to any Western dealings with the MB.With terrorist activity resurfacing in Egypt, authorities may be even more resistant to furtherlegitimizing political Islamists. Nevertheless, some democracy experts believe that, over the longterm, Egypt and Western governments will ultimately have to engage with the MB since it is by farthe most powerful opposition group in Egypt. Others would rather see the West promote alternativesecular opposition groups. Finally, many observers believe that the issue of Islamist inclusion in thepolitical system is strictly an Egyptian domestic issue and that foreign involvement will only stokethe fires of Egyptian nationalism, further entrenching government opposition to reform.

Since its founding in 1928, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has been the vanguard ofSunni political Islamism in the Arab world, as branches of the MB have spread to countries acrossthe region. Between 1930-1950, the movement grew increasingly militant in pursuit of its political,social, economic, and legal goals. By the late 1940s, the Brotherhood was presenting seriouschallenges to the Egyptian regime. Though it did assist the Egyptian Free Officers in overthrowingthe monarchy in 1952, the MB soon turned against Egypt's new military leaders and was violentlysuppressed and forced to go underground after a failed Brotherhood assassination attempt againstEgypt's second post-monarchical ruler, Prime Minister (and later President) Gamal Abdul Nasser in1954. With many members imprisoned and the organization badly weakened, the MB renouncedviolence in the early 1970s and its members were gradually allowed to reenter politics, though theorganization itself remains outlawed.

Since the mid-1970s, the MB has fielded candidates in parliamentary elections by eitherjoining other opposition parties or, more recently, running as independents. In the 2000parliamentary elections, 17 independent candidates, who were regarded as Brotherhoodsympathizers, were elected. In 2005, Brotherhood-affiliated candidates won 88 seats in parliament(it agreed to contest only a limited number of seats). Though opinions vary on how much masssupport the Brotherhood commands, it is recognized by many Egyptians for its charitable and socialservices work and its support among the professional middle class. The MB controls many of theprofessional syndicates (associations), including those representing engineers, doctors, lawyers, andacademics.

Although the MB has long renounced the use of violence, opinions differ whether thiscriterion alone should allow it to enter into mainstream politics. According to one scholar, "Forsome, the movement is a reaffirmation of moral idealism, for others an outlet for frustration andresentment [in which] good and bad factors apparently are working together ... real religion andneurotic fanaticism, honest idealism and destructive frenzy. It would be wrong to deny the formerand perhaps dangerous to ignore the potentiality of the latter." (44)

The MB claims that it is in favor of Egyptian democratization. According to one of itsleaders, "Since the early 1970s, in the context of [President Anwar]Sadat's liberalization, openingand dialogue, the Society adopted a new strategy, which relies on democracy as a means of changeand as an objective. Democracy is not incompatible with Islam; shura [consultation] is likedemocracy, it forces respect for basic liberties and the rights of women. We don't disagree with theWest on this, except that the West has left democracy behind." (45) In 2004, the MuslimBrotherhood published a 50-page declaration endorsing elections, reform, accountability, andnon-violence. Nevertheless, some doubt the MB's democratic credentials. Internally, the group istraditionally led by a septuagenarian or octogenarian "Supreme Leader," who, in the past, was tiedto the movement's early leaders, including its founder, Hassan al Banna. Much of the inner workingsof the MB remain unknown to outsiders, fueling suspicions.

Due to Egypt's proximity to and involvement in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, MBanti-Israeli rhetoric is particularly pronounced and anti-Semitic (although Egyptian state-ownedmedia outlets also fuel anti-Israeli incitement). In December 2005, MB leader Mohammed MahdiAkef said that the Nazi holocaust was a myth, reiterating comments made earlier by Iran's president,Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (46) The Israeli-financed Middle East Media Research Institute(MEMRI) regularly translates Brotherhood statements on Israel and Judaism. In one dispatch fromApril 2006, MEMRI translated excerpts from a Brotherhood website for children, in which therereportedly were anti-Semitic passages that accuse Jews of murdering Muslim prophets. (47)

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is one of the most vocal organizations rejecting thenormalization of Arab relations with Israel. Although the organization itself may not commit actsof terrorism against Israel, its leaders call for continued resistance to Israel's occupation ofPalestinian lands (and U.S. occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan). After the Hamas 2006 legislativevictory, the MB launched a fund-raising campaign on behalf of the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority.Despite Brotherhood condemnations of terrorist bombings aimed at tourist resorts in the EgyptianSinai Peninsula, MB leaders do not extend such condemnations to Palestinian terrorist attacksagainst Israeli civilians. According to MB leader Akef, "Israel is an occupier, and it's the right of thepeople of the country to resist occupation by all means." (48) Whether such rhetoric would lead the MB, if it came to power,to abrogate Egypt's nearly three-decade long peace with Israel is an open question. Some expertsbelieve that, in a scenario in which the MB ascend to power, the Egyptian military would interveneto preserve the status quo. Others assert that, under the same scenario, economic realities would forcethe MB, despite its harsh rhetoric toward Israel, to be pragmatic and maintain Egypt's "cold peace"with Israel.

Hizb Al Wasat (The Middle or Center Party). Although not a legally recognized party, the Al Wasat organization has received attention amongWestern observers for its commitment to pluralism, religious toleration, and acceptance of secularpolitical principles. (49) Established in 1996 by former Brotherhood members, Al Wasat is made up of a cadre of youngerpolitical activists and encourages participation by women and by Coptic Christians. According toparty leader Abu-al-Ila Madi, the Al Wasat Party is not a religious party. "We affirmed on manyoccasions that we are against religious parties that are based on a religious basis, and adopt thetheocratic thinking of clergymen, which we totally reject." (50) However, its applicationfor legal recognition as a political party has been rejected on three separate occasions by thegovernment's Political Parties Committee on the grounds that it illegally sought to establish a partywith an Islamic basis (Egyptian law prohibits political parties based on religion). Overall, theorganization appears relatively weak in terms of popular support.

U.S. Policy in Egypt. Although the United Stateshas long advocated the promotion of human rights and political freedom in Egypt, most experts agreethat, prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, economic reform superseded politicalreform in the West's relations with Egypt, as well as other Middle Eastern countries. However, withthe recent push for democracy in the Middle East seen as a counterweight to Islamic militancy andintellectual and social stagnation, U.S. policy regarding Egypt has been reinvigorated, as policymakers seek to balance U.S. security and economic interests with U.S. democracy promotionpolicies.

U.S. officials have employed a variety of diplomatic tools to push for reform in Egypt. U.S.Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has made visits to Egypt and has spoken about the need forreform at the American University in Cairo and held meetings with political activists. The UnitedStates also has expanded its foreign aid and democracy programming activities in Egypt. In 2005,the State Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) began distributing small grantsdirectly to NGOs in Egypt to support secular political activists and human rights groups, particularlyduring the presidential and parliamentary election seasons. (51) The United States has beenless willing to overtly pressure Egypt; though when Egyptian authorities arrested, tried, andimprisoned Ayman Nour, an opposition leader and runner-up in the 2005 presidential election, theUnited States protested and reportedly withheld announcing its intention to negotiate a long soughtafter U.S.-Egyptian free trade agreement. Although some have labeled Nour as an opportunist andminor political figure, he represented a secular alternative to the ruling National Democratic Party(NDP), a tenuous position that the authorities may have deemed unacceptable.

Nevertheless, some analysts have questioned the depth of the U.S. commitment todemocratization in Egypt, particularly after the recent Hamas victory in Palestinian parliamentaryelections earlier this year. With the Hamas takeover of most of the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, theUnited States, and Israel have a shared purpose in containing Hamas and the spread of its violentIslamist influence into neighboring states. In this changed atmosphere, in which Egyptian securitycooperation on the Gaza-Egyptian border also is valued, some observers have speculated that U.S.policy makers may tone down their rhetoric on reform in Egypt. For example when the Egyptianparliament voted to approve the two-year extension the nation's 25-year old Emergency laws in April2006, a move long opposed by the United States, the Administration was careful not to overlycondemn the maneuver, particularly as it came only days after several deadly terrorist attacks in theSinai Peninsula. (52)

At present, the Islamist dilemma in Egypt appears to perplex U.S. policy makers and outsideobservers alike. Should the United States aggressively push for reform and run the risk of anationalist backlash or of empowering radical groups? Or should the United States patiently pursuelong-term modernization and institution-building programs that are largely regime-friendly andthereby run the risk of deflating the hopes of Egypt's liberals? Are there other paths to pursue?

The United States respects the Egyptian government's desires not to allow illegal Islamistorganizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to officially participate in U.S.-sponsored reformactivities in Egypt or have extensive contacts with U.S. diplomats in Cairo. Reportedly, U.S.non-governmental democracy organizations must ensure that no Brotherhood participants attendU.S.-funded seminars or training programs. Moreover, Egyptian law prohibits even legalorganizations or parties from accepting financial support from "foreign entities." Nevertheless, theUnited States has not outrightly rejected having any contact with Brotherhood members. Accordingto the U.S. State Department, the United States will not deal directly with the Brotherhood since itis banned under Egyptian law, but Brotherhood members will not be barred from meetings betweenU.S. officials and parliament members. According to J. Scott Carpenter, Deputy Assistant Secretaryof State for Near East Affairs at the U.S. State Department, "There is recognition that there are anumber of folks who have been elected to Parliament, and they are there. This is an issue forEgyptian society to deal with it, it's not something for us necessarily to involve ourselves with." (53)

Given these barriers, U.S. officials must be cautious in broaching the Islamist issue in Egypt.Still, according to some observers, the possibility for informal dialogue between the United Statesand some Egyptian Islamists exists. The Al Wasat organization, whose legal status is precarioussince it is an aspirant political party that has been unsuccessful in its registration attempts (rather thanan outright illegal organization like the Muslim Brotherhood), could be more amenable to futureparticipation in U.S.-government sponsored democracy training programs. However, U.S. policymakers would need to be careful about appearing to favor any one group in Egyptian politics. In June2006, the Egyptian government accused the local head of the International Republican Institute's(IRI) Egypt program of meddling in Egypt's internal affairs and demanded that the organizationtemporarily halt its activities there.

U.S. officials are continually pressing Islamists on their views on issues of importance to U.S.policy in the region. With 88 independent members of parliament sympathetic to the MuslimBrotherhood, MB politicians operate openly and are readily accessible. According to J. ScottCarpenter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs at the U.S. State Department,"On specific things like protection of minorities and protection of women's rights, that is somethingthat in our discussions with Islamists parties we have to continue asking them: What is yourposition? Do you protect women's rights? What about the Coptic (Christian) community in Egypt?It is important that we retain our clarity even as these groups struggle to come to a conclusion withinthe gray zones." (54)

Some analysts question whether Islamists in Egypt would welcome U.S. dialogue in the firstplace due to their deep suspicion of Western intentions and foreign meddling. Observers note thatmany Muslim Brotherhood members are opposed to U.S. policy in the Middle East and might wantto steer clear of any appearance of cooperation in politics. Although there are always individualmembers who may not be as resistant as most party members to participating in U.S. programs, forthe most part, only a few Brotherhood members interact with Western observers.

Overall, while many experts recommend that U.S. policy reinforce, rather than initiate, localdemands for accelerated political liberalization in Egypt, there is lack of consensus over whichreformers the United States should bolster. By limiting the realm of political space to either theruling National Democratic Party or the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian authorities have forced theWest to choose to support the regime or the MB with little else in between. Though many U.S.programs are designed to foster what some call a "Third Way," i.e., non-Islamist or secular liberalmovements, regime action has succeeded in stymying such attempts.

Some experts believe that U.S. support for reform in Egypt does not necessarily have toresemble a zero-sum game. Some suggest that the United States should refrain from openlysupporting any opposition movement and instead promote openness and provide resources that willenable Egyptians to address these problems themselves. According to Michele Dunn of the CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, " The principal role of foreign governments is not to negotiatewith oppositionists but to deal with the Egyptian government. Thus, what the United States andEurope can and should do is press the Egyptian government to keep open the political space neededfor productive dialogue between Islamists and secularists. Such a dialogue among Egyptiansthemselves is where solutions to the problem of Islamist inclusion in the political sphere canemerge." (55) Otherobservers have stated that the Egyptian government, by limiting political space, has stoked the West'simpatience with the pace of change in Egypt.

Role of Congress. Through annual foreignoperations and State Department appropriations legislation, Congress provides funding for reformin Egypt through the following programs: the United States Agency for International Development's(USAID) Egypt Office; the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), a State Department programdesigned to encourage reform in Arab countries by strengthening Arab civil society, encouragingmicro-enterprise, expanding political participation, and promoting women's rights; the StateDepartment's Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF), an account that funds human rightspromotion in Muslim-majority countries; and the National Endowment for Democracy's (NED)Muslim Democracy Program.

Congress also seeks to ensure that U.S. foreign assistance for Egypt is being appropriatelyused to promote reform. In conference report language accompanying P.L. 108-447 , the FY2005Consolidated Appropriations Act, conferees specified that "democracy and governance activitiesshall not be subject to the prior approval of the GoE [government of Egypt]. The managers intendthis language to include NGOs and other segments of civil society that may not be registered with,or officially recognized by, the GoE. However, the managers understand that the GoE should be keptinformed of funding provided pursuant to these activities." (56)

P.L. 109-102 ( H.R. 3057 ), the FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act,designates $100 million in economic aid (out of a total $495 million) for USAID education anddemocracy and governance programming. In addition, report language accompanying the billstipulated that "not less than 50 percent of the funds for democracy, governance and human rightsbe provided through non-governmental organizations for the purpose of strengthening Egyptian civilsociety organizations, enhancing their participation in the political process and their ability topromote and monitor human rights." (57)

In June 2006, the House narrowly defeated an amendment (198-225) to H.R. 5522 , the FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill, which would have reallocated $100million in economic aid to Egypt and used it instead to fight AIDS worldwide and to assist theDarfur region of Sudan. Many supporters of the amendment were dismayed by the Egyptiangovernment's spring 2006 crackdown on pro-democracy activists in Cairo.

Jordan(58)

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a valuable but vulnerable U.S. partner in the war onterror, may be the Arab country most affected by the electoral gains of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and former Jordanian-controlled West Bank. With perhaps over half the population of Palestinian origin,there are potentially thousands of Hamas sympathizers in Jordan, whose government has triedvigorously to construct a unique Jordanian identity in order to lessen the appeal of Palestiniannationalism and Islamism. Jordanian Islamists, many of whom claim Palestinian descent, could betempted to forge closer ties to Hamas in the West Bank. With municipal elections scheduled for thisyear and parliamentary elections in Jordan tentatively scheduled for 2007, many observers arecarefully monitoring Jordanian politics in order to assess the prospects of non-violent Islamists.

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (The Islamic ActionFront). The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has long been integrated into thepolitical mainstream due to its acceptance of the legitimacy of Hashemite monarchy, althoughrelations between the Brotherhood and the Palace have fluctuated over the years. The Brotherhoodpresence in Jordan dates back to the 1930s, as it has been tacitly recognized first as a charitableorganization and later as a quasi-political organization, which has openly fielded candidates inparliamentary elections albeit under a different name (Islamic Action Front - IAF). The relationshipbetween the Brotherhood and the Palace has been mutually beneficial over the years. SuccessiveJordanian monarchs have found that the Brotherhood has been more useful politically as an ally thanas an opponent (as opposed to the Brotherhood in Egypt), as it secured Islamist support in counteringArab nationalist interference during the 1950's and 1960's and secular Palestinian nationalism in the1970s.

Jordanian Islamists have been most effective at gaining control of Jordan's educationalsystem. After the Brotherhood sided with King Hussein during the Black September crisis of 1970,in which the Palestinian Liberation Organization openly clashed with the Jordanian armed forces,King Hussein granted the Brotherhood control over the Education Ministry. Through its extensivecharitable networks, the Brotherhood also established a number of Sunni Muslim schools( Madhaheb ), in addition to institutions of higher education. The Brotherhood's educational, social,and health services have grown so extensive over the years that some experts believe that theBrotherhood's budget for services rivals that of the Jordanian government.

In 1992, the Brotherhood's political wing, the Islamist Action Front (IAF) was legallyrecognized as a political party in Jordan under a new political parties law. Three years before that,Jordanian Islamists running as independents gained almost 40% of the seats in parliament. Thegovernment responded by altering the electoral law, changing the system from a multiple/transferablevote system in which voters could cast as many ballots as there were seats in their constituency, toa one-person, one vote system, which led most voters to choose candidates from their extendedfamilies or tribes over ideological parties, such as the IAF. (59) Those Jordanians who didvote for the IAF hailed predominately from urban areas dominated by middle-class Jordanians ofPalestinian origin. Government-IAF relations have not always been smooth, however, and the IAFboycotted the 1997 elections. The most recent parliamentary elections, held on June 17, 2003, gave62 seats in the 110-member lower house to conservative, independent, and tribal allies of KingAbdullah. However, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) won 22% of the vote, thereby gaining 18 seatsin the lower house, plus 6 sympathizers. When asked about the IAF's prospects in future elections,one member reportedly remarked that "I am not optimistic that we can win a majority now, becausethe laws have still not been changed.... But we are not trying to take everything away. We just wantto take part in a fair process." (60)

In 2006, there has been much speculation about the IAF's ties to Hamas. In a recent interviewon Al Arabiya , Zaki Sa'd Bani-Irshayd, the new secretary general of the IAF, was careful toemphasize that the IAF and Hamas have agreed to avoid any inter-organizational relations,emphasizing that each movement has its own financial, administrative, and organizationalsystem. (61) On February16, 2006, Jordanian Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit congratulated Hamas on winning the January2006 Palestinian Authority legislative elections and said Jordan would welcome a visit by a Hamasdelegation. However, on April 20, 2006, the press reported that Jordan cancelled a planned visit bythe Palestinian Foreign Minister Mahmoud al-Zahar, who is also a high-level Hamas official, on thegrounds that Hamas had hidden weapons and explosives in a cache in Jordan. Hamas denied thecharge and claimed that Jordan was using this allegation to justify cancelling the visit. Hamas hadbeen expelled from Jordan in 1999, shortly after the ascension of King Abdullah II to the throne.

The IAF has questioned the Jordanian government's accusations against Hamas, believingthat security officials fabricated the story in order to discredit Islamists. Some experts believe thatthe IAF's new leadership is more closely tied to Hamas than in the past. According to one recentassessment, "While East Bank Jordanians still control a majority of the seats in the IAF,Bani-Irshayd's election represents a trend toward a growing Palestinian presence in the organization'sleadership and suggests a potential "Hamasization" of the group." (62)

Like other Islamist groups, the IAF's attitude toward the United States combines pragmatismwith a general opposition to U.S. policy in the region. With a growing population and a severe lackof natural resources (Jordan is one of the most water deprived countries in the world), observersremain doubtful that non-violent Islamists groups in Jordan could afford to cut ties with the UnitedStates should they ascend to power. However, if such a situation were to occur, Jordan's nearly12-year old peace treaty with Israel could be at risk, as Islamists in Jordan are at the forefront of theanti-normalization campaign which calls on the Jordanian government to cut all relations with Israel.According to IAF leader Bani-Irshayd, "We are clear....We reject this treaty because it is againstJordan's national interest. But we will move cautiously. We will ask for a referendum on it." (63)

In June 2006, just days after the death of the terrorist mastermind Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi,four IAF parliamentarians were arrested after making statements praising the Al Qaeda leader. OneIAF deputy reportedly remarked that Zarqawi was a martyr and a holy warrior.

U.S. Policy in Jordan. Given Jordan's dependenceon foreign assistance from the United States and Europe, its government continually touts its reformcredentials, as the Jordanian government has sought to position itself as the regional model of amodernizing Arab state, particularly in the economic sphere. Observers note that the pursuit ofreform-minded programs allows Jordan to conform to the policy priorities of the United States,which provides large amounts of economic and military aid to Jordan. Jordanian leaders also areanxious to develop opportunities for the country's largely young population, which facesunemployment rates that may be as high as 30% unofficially. U.S. policymakers have welcomedJordan's initiative, emphasizing that encouraging development in the region is part of a U.S. nationalsecurity strategy, especially after the September 11, 2001, attacks. On October 24, 2000, the UnitedStates and Jordan signed a free trade agreement, leading to a dramatic increase in Jordanian exportsto U.S. markets.

One sector which has already been targeted for reform is Jordan's educational system. In July2003, the Education Ministry, in conjunction with USAID, the World Bank, and other internationallenders, developed a program called the Educational Reform for a Knowledge-based Economy -- a$380 million, five-year comprehensive educational reform plan. Under this plan, Jordan, with helpfrom Microsoft and Cisco Systems, has built computer labs in several public schools and developeda modern curriculum which incorporates information technology.

However, this initiative has drawn much criticism from Islamist deputies in Jordan's lowerhouse of parliament. Many Jordanian lawmakers were upset that 10th grade teachers were teachinga curriculum that drew distinctions between terrorism (specifically suicide bombing) and "legitimateresistance." According to IAF deputy Moussa Wahsh, "the United States has pressured several Araband Muslim countries to change their school curriculum under the slogan of modernization." (64) In early 2004, theJordanian parliament held a special session in which several deputies expressed similar sentiments.The government must try to balance the need to improve institutions while avoiding Islamist chargesthat the government was beholden to outside or secular interests.

U.S. democracy assistance to Jordan has focused on female participation in politics. In 2003,King Abdullah established a six-seat quota for women parliamentarians in Jordan's NationalAssembly, the 110-seat lower house of Parliament. In 2003, the National Democratic Institute (NDI)launched a women candidates' training program for women wanting to run in local and parliamentaryelections. NDI has trained four of the current six women in parliament. The International RepublicanInstitute also runs programs in Jordan focused on overcoming political apathy and increasing citizenparticipation in politics.

Jordan has become a major target of Jihadist terrorist groups, particularly organizationsoperating from Iraq led by the terrorist mastermind Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi -- himself a Jordaniancitizen now in exile. On November 9, 2005, near simultaneous explosions at three western-ownedhotels in Amman (the Radisson, Grand Hyatt, and Days Inn) killed 58 persons and seriouslywounded approximately 100 others. The terrorist organization Al-Qaeda in Iraq headed by Zarqawiclaimed responsibility for the act.

Consequently, U.S. officials may be hesitant to push the monarchy too hard on the issue ofpolitical reform. While some IAF members, particularly women, may participate in U.S.-sponsoredworkshops, there is no concerted effort among U.S. diplomats in Amman to engage the IAF, thoughoccasional dialogue may take place. King Abdullah and other senior Jordanian officials haverepeatedly emphasized that change is necessary for Jordan's survival but that a reform process shouldbe internally driven. On March 11, 2004, then Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher told a Washingtonaudience at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars that "We do not differ over the content of thisreform," but he went on to say that such a program should not be "imposed, or perceived to beimposed, in any way, from the outside." With Jordan facing a terrorist threat emanating from Iraqin the east, and with Hamas in control of parts of the bordering West Bank, the United States seemswilling to accept whatever pace the government sets for the political reform process.

Role of Congress. Congress has supportedAdministration efforts to bolster Jordan's economy and military in recent years. Jordan has seen asteady increase in its aid since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The war in Iraq also has ledCongress to provide Jordan with additional assistance in appreciation of its efforts to train Iraqipolice and army units. Between FY2002 and FY2005, Jordan received an annual average of $780million in economic and military aid (including supplemental funding), up from an average of $246million per year between FY1996 and FY2001. The Senate version of H.R. 4939 , theFY2006 Emergency Supplemental Bill, contains $100 million in economic aid for Jordan to continueand accelerate economic reforms.