Compact of Free Association: Implementation Activities Have Progressed, but the Marshall Islands Faces Challenges to Achieving Long-Term Compact Goals
Released: 2007-07-24T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Compact of Free Association: 1986-2003

In 1986, the United States, the FSM, and the RMI entered into the original Compact of Free Association. The compact provided a framework for the United States to work toward achieving its three main goals: (1) to secure self-government for the FSM and the RMI, (2) to ensure certain national security rights for all of the parties, and (3) to assist the FSM and the RMI in their efforts to advance economic development and self-sufficiency. Under the original compact, the FSM and RMI also benefited from numerous U.S. federal programs, while citizens of both nations exercised their right under the compact to live and work in the United States as “nonimmigrants” and to stay for long periods of time.

Although the first and second goals of the original compact were met, economic self-sufficiency was not achieved under the first compact. The FSM and the RMI became independent nations in 1978 and 1979, respectively, and the three countries established key defense rights, including securing U.S. access to military facilities on Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI through 2016. The compact’s third goal was to be accomplished primarily through U.S. direct financial assistance to the FSM and the RMI that totaled $2.1 billion from 1987 through 2003. However, estimated FSM and RMI per capita GDP levels at the close of the compact did not exceed, in real terms, those in the early 1990s, although U.S. assistance had maintained income levels that were higher than the two countries could have achieved without support. In addition, we found that the U.S., FSM, and RMI governments provided little accountability over compact expenditures and that many compact-funded projects experienced problems because of poor planning and management, inadequate construction and maintenance, or misuse of funds.

Amended Compacts of Free Association: 2004- 2023

In 2003, the United States approved separate amended compacts with the FSM and RMI that (1) continue the defense relationship, including a new agreement providing U.S. military access to Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI through 2086; (2) strengthen immigration provisions; and (3) provide an estimated $3.6 billion in financial assistance to both nations from 2004 through 2023, including about $1.5 billion to the RMI (see app. I). The amended compacts identify the additional 20 years of grant assistance as intended to assist the FSM and RMI governments in their efforts to promote the economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance of their people. Financial assistance is provided in the form of annual sector grants and contributions to each nation’s trust fund. The amended compacts and their subsidiary agreements, along with the countries’ development plans, target the grant assistance to six sectors—education, health, public infrastructure, the environment, public sector capacity building, and private sector development—prioritizing two sectors, education and health. To provide increasing U.S. contributions to the FSM’s and the RMI’s trust funds, grant funding decreases annually and will likely result in falling per capita grant assistance over the funding period and relative to the original compact (see app. II). For example, in 2004 U.S. dollar terms, FSM per capita grant assistance will fall from around $1,352 in 1987 to around $562 in 2023, and RMI per capita assistance will fall from around $1,170 in 1987 to around $317 in 2023.

Under the amended compacts, annual grant assistance is to be made available in accordance with an implementation framework that has several components (see app. III). For example, prior to the annual awarding of compact funds, the countries must submit development plans that identify goals and performance objectives for each sector. The FSM and RMI governments are also required to monitor day-to-day operations of sector grants and activities, submit periodic financial and performance reports for the tracking of progress against goals and objectives, and ensure annual financial and compliance audits. In addition, the U.S. and FSM Joint Economic Management Committee (JEMCO) and the U.S. and RMI Joint Economic Management and Financial Accountability Committee (JEMFAC) are to approve annual sector grants and evaluate the countries’ management of the grants and their progress toward compact goals. The amended compacts also provide for the formation of FSM and RMI trust fund committees to, among other things, hire money managers, oversee the respective funds’ operation and investment, and provide annual reports on the effectiveness of the funds.

Current Development Prospects Remain Limited for the RMI

The RMI economy shows limited potential for developing sustainable income sources other than foreign assistance to offset the annual decline in U.S. compact grant assistance. In addition, the RMI has not enacted economic policy reforms needed to improve its growth prospects.

The RMI’s economy shows continued dependence on government spending of foreign assistance and limited potential for expanded private sector and remittance income.

Since 2000, the estimated public sector share of GDP has grown, with public sector expenditure in 2005—about two-thirds of which is funded by external grants—accounting for about 60 percent of GDP.

The RMI’s government budget is characterized by limited tax revenue paired with growing government payrolls. For example, RMI taxes have consistently provided less than 30 percent of total government revenue; however, payroll expenditures have roughly doubled, from around $17 million in 2000 to around $30 million in 2005.

The RMI development plan identifies fishing and tourism as key potential private sector growth industries. However, the two industries combined currently provide less than 5 percent of employment, and both industries face significant constraints to growth that stem from structural barriers and a costly business environment. According to economic experts, growth in these industries is limited by factors such as geographic isolation, lack of tourism infrastructure, inadequate interisland shipping, a limited pool of skilled labor, and a growing threat of overfishing.

Although remittances from emigrants could provide increasing monetary support to the RMI, evidence suggests that RMI emigrants are currently limited in their income-earning opportunities abroad owing to inadequate education and vocational skills. For example, the 2003 U.S. census of RMI migrants in Hawaii, Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands reveals that only 7 percent of those 25 years and older had a college degree and almost half of RMI emigrants lived below the poverty line.

Although the RMI has undertaken efforts aimed at economic policy reform, it has made limited progress in implementing key tax, land, foreign investment, and public sector reforms that are needed to improve its growth prospects. For example: The RMI government and economic experts have recognized for several years that the RMI tax system is complex and regressive, taxing on a gross rather than net basis and having weak collection and administrative capacity. Although the RMI has focused on improving tax administration and has raised some penalties and tax levels, legislation for income tax reform has failed and needed changes in government import tax exemptions have not been addressed. In attempts to modernize a complex land tenure system, the RMI has established land registration offices. However, such offices have lacked a systematic method for registering parcels, instead waiting for landowners to voluntarily initiate the process. For example, only five parcels of land in the RMI had been, or were currently being, registered as of June 2006. Continued uncertainties over land ownership and land values create costly disputes, disincentives for investment, and problems regarding the use of land as an asset.

Economic experts and private sector representatives describe the overall climate for foreign investment in the RMI as complex and nontransparent. Despite attempts to streamline the process, foreign investment regulations remain relatively burdensome, with reported administrative delays and difficulties in obtaining permits for foreign workers.

The RMI government has endorsed public sector reform; however, efforts to reduce public sector employment have generally failed, and the government continues to conduct a wide array of commercial enterprises that require subsidies and compete with private enterprises. As of June 2006, the RMI had not prepared a comprehensive policy for public sector enterprise reform.

Although the RMI development plan includes objectives for economic reform, until August 2006—2 years into the amended compact—JEMFAC did not address the country’s slow progress in implementing these reforms.

The RMI Faces Challenges to Effectively Implementing Compact Assistance for Its Long-Term Development Goals

The RMI has allocated funds to priority sectors, although several factors have hindered its use of the funds to meet long-term development needs. Further, despite actions taken to effectively implement compact grants, administrative challenges have limited its ability to ensure use of the grants for its long-term goals. In addition, although OIA has monitored early compact activities, it has also faced capacity constraints.

The RMI allocated compact funds largely to priority sectors for 2004-2006. The RMI allocated about 33 percent, 40 percent, and 20 percent of funds to education, infrastructure, and health, respectively (see app. IV). The education allocation included funding for nine new school construction projects, initiated in October 2003 through July 2006. However, various factors, such as land use issues and inadequate needs assessments, have limited the government’s use of compact funds to meet long-term development needs. For example: Management and land use issues. The RMI government and Kwajalein landowners have been disputing the management of public entities and government use of leased land on the atoll. Such tensions have negatively affected the construction of schools and other community development initiatives. For example, the government and landowners disagreed about the management of the entity designated to use the compact funds set aside for Ebeye special needs; consequently, about $3.3 million of the $5.8 million allocated for this purpose had not been released for the community’s benefit until after September 2006. In addition, although the RMI has completed some infrastructure projects where land titles were clear and long-term leases were available, continuing uncertainty regarding land titles may delay future projects.

Lack of planning for declining U.S. assistance. Despite the goal of budgetary self-reliance, the RMI lacks concrete plans for addressing the annual decrement in compact funding, which could limit its ability to sustain current levels of government services in the future. RMI officials told us that they can compensate for the decrement in various ways, such as through the yearly partial adjustment for inflation provided for in the amended compacts or through improved tax collection. However, the partial nature of the adjustment causes the value of the grant to fall in real terms, independent of the decrement, thereby reducing the government’s ability to pay over time for imports, such as energy, pharmaceutical products, and medical equipment. Additionally, the RMI’s slow progress in implementing tax reform will limit its ability to augment tax revenues.

The RMI has taken steps to effectively implement compact assistance, but administrative challenges have hindered its ability to ensure use of the funds for its long-term development goals. The RMI established development plans that include strategic goals and objectives for the sectors receiving compact funds. Further, in addition to establishing JEMFAC, the RMI designated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as its official contact point for compact policy and grant implementation issues. However, data deficiencies, report shortcomings, capacity constraints, and inadequate communication have limited the RMI and U.S. governments’ ability to consistently ensure the effective use of grant funds to measure progress, and monitor day-to-day activities.

Data deficiencies. Although the RMI established performance measurement indicators, a lack of complete and reliable data has prevented the use of these indicators to assess progress. For example, the RMI submitted data to JEMFAC for only 15 of the 20 required education performance indicators in 2005, repeating the submission in 2006 without updating the data. Also, in 2005, the RMI government reported difficulty in comparing the health ministry’s 2004 and 2005 performance owing to gaps in reported data—for instance, limited data were available in 2004 for the outer island health care system.

Report shortcomings. The usefulness of the RMI’s quarterly performance reports has also been limited by incomplete and inaccurate information. For example, the RMI Ministry of Health’s 2005 fourth-quarter report contained incorrect outpatient numbers for the first three quarters, according to a hospital administrator. Additionally, we found several errors in basic statistics in the RMI quarterly reports for education and RMI Ministry of Education officials and officials in other sectors told us that they had not been given the opportunity to review the final performance reports compiled by the statistics office prior to submission.

Capacity constraints. Staff and skill limitations have constrained the RMI’s ability to provide day-to-day monitoring of sector grant operations. However, the RMI has submitted its single audits on time. In addition, although the single audit reports for 2004 and 2005 indicated weaknesses in the RMI’s financial statements and compliance with requirements of major federal programs, the government has developed corrective action plans to address the 2005 findings related to such compliance.

Lack of communication. Our interviews with U.S. and RMI department officials, private sector representatives, NGOs, and economic experts revealed a lack of communication and dissemination of information by the U.S. and RMI governments on issues such as JEMFAC decisions, departmental budgets, economic reforms, legislative decisions, and fiscal positions of public enterprises. Such lack of information about government activities creates uncertainty for public, private, and community leaders, which can inhibit grant performance and improvement of social and economic conditions.

As administrator of the amended compact grants, OIA monitored sector grant and fiscal performance, assessed RMI compliance with compact conditions, and took action to correct persistent shortcomings. For example, since 2004, OIA has provided technical advice and assistance to help the RMI improve the quality of its financial statements and develop controls to resolve audit findings and prevent recurrences. However, OIA has been constrained in its oversight role owing to staffing challenges and time-consuming demands associated with early compact implementation challenges in the FSM.

RMI Trust Fund May Not Provide Sustainable Income After Compact Grants End

Market volatility and choice of investment strategy could lead to a wide range of RMI trust fund balances in 2023 and potentially prevent trust fund disbursements in some years. Although the RMI has supplemented its trust fund balance with additional contributions, other sources of income are uncertain or entail risks. Furthermore, the RMI’s trust fund committee has faced challenges in effectively managing the fund’s investment.

Market volatility and investment strategy could have a considerable impact on projected trust fund balances in 2023. Our analysis indicates that, under various scenarios, the RMI’s trust fund could fall short of the maximum allowed disbursement level—an amount equal to the inflation- adjusted compact grants in 2023—after compact grants end, with the probability of shortfalls increasing over time (see app. V). For example, under a moderate investment strategy, the fund’s income is only around 10 percent likely to fall short of the maximum distribution by 2031. However, this probability rises to almost 40 percent by 2050. Additionally, our analysis indicates a positive probability that the fund will yield no disbursement in some years; under a moderate investment strategy the probability is around 10 percent by 2050. Despite the impact of market volatility and investment strategy, the trust fund committee’s reports have not yet assessed the fund’s potential adequacy for meeting the RMI’s long- term economic goals.

RMI trust fund income could be supplemented from several sources, although this potential is uncertain. For example, the RMI received a commitment from Taiwan to contribute $40 million over 20 years to the RMI trust fund, which improved the RMI fund’s likely capacity for disbursements after 2023. However, the RMI’s limited development prospects constrain its ability to raise tax revenues to supplement the fund’s income. Securitization—issuing bonds against future U.S. contributions—could increase the fund’s earning potential by raising its balances through bond sales. However, securitization could also lead to lower balances and reduced fund income if interest owed on the bonds exceeds investment returns.

The RMI trust fund committee has experienced management challenges in establishing the trust fund to maximize earnings. Contributions to the trust fund were initially placed in a low-interest savings account and were not invested until 16 months after the initial contribution. As of June 2007, the RMI trust fund committee had not appointed an independent auditor or a money manager to invest the fund according to the proposed investment strategy. U.S. government officials suggested that contractual delays and committee processes for reaching consensus and obtaining administrative support contributed to the time taken to establish and invest funds. As of May 2007, the committee had not yet taken steps to improve these processes.

Conclusions

Since enactment of the amended compacts, the U.S. and RMI governments have made efforts to meet new requirements for implementation, performance measurement, and oversight. However, the RMI faces significant challenges in working toward the compact goals of economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance as the compact grants decrease. Largely dependent on government spending of foreign aid, the RMI has limited potential for private sector growth, and its government has made little progress in implementing reforms needed to increase investment opportunities and tax income. In addition, JEMFAC did not address the pace of reform during the first 2 years of compact implementation. Further, both the U.S. and RMI governments have faced significant capacity constraints in ensuring effective implementation of grant funding. The RMI government and JEMFAC have also shown limited commitment to strategically planning for the long-term, effective use of grant assistance or for the budgetary pressure the government will face as compact grants decline. Because the trust fund’s earnings are intended as a main source of U.S. assistance to the RMI after compact grants end, the fund’s potential inadequacy to provide sustainable income in some years could impact the RMI’s ability to provide government services. However, the RMI trust fund committee has not assessed the potential status of the fund as an ongoing source of revenue after compact grants end in 2023.

Prior Recommendations

Our prior reports on the amended compacts include recommendations that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Insular Affairs, as chair of the RMI management and trust fund committees, to, among other things, ensure that JEMFAC address the lack of RMI progress in implementing reforms to increase investment and tax income; coordinate with other U.S. agencies on JEMFAC to work with the the RMI to establish plans to minimize the impact of declining assistance; coordinate with other U.S. agencies on JEMFAC to work with the RMI to fully develop a reliable mechanism for measuring progress toward compact goals; and ensure the RMI trust fund committee’s assessment and timely reporting of the fund’s likely status as a source of revenue after 2023.

Interior generally concurred with our recommendations and has taken actions in response to several of them. For example, in August 2006, JEMFAC discussed the RMI’s slow progress in implementing economic reforms. Additionally, the trust fund committee decided in June 2007 to create a position for handling the administrative duties of the fund. Regarding planning for declining assistance and measuring progress toward compact goals, JEMFAC has not held an annual meeting since the December 2006 publication of the report containing those recommendations.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

Contacts and Acknowledgements

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Emil Friberg, Jr., Ming Chen, Tracy Guerrero, Julie Hirshen, Leslie Holen, Reid Lowe, Mary Moutsos, Kendall Schaefer, and Eddie Uyekawa.

Appendix I: U.S. Assistance to Be Provided to the FSM and the RMI under the Amended Compacts, 2004 through 2023

FSM grants (Section 211) (Section 215) (Section 211) (Section 216) (Section 212)

For both the FSM and the RMI, annual grant amounts include $200,000 to be provided directly by the Secretary of the Interior to the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, for disaster and emergency assistance purposes. The grant amounts do not include the annual audit grant, capped at $500,000, that will be provided to both countries.

These dollar amounts shall be adjusted each fiscal year for inflation by the percentage that equals two-thirds of the percentage change in the U.S. gross domestic product implicit price deflator, or 5 percent, whichever is less in any one year, using the beginning of 2004 as a base. Grant funding can be fully adjusted for inflation after 2014, under certain U.S. inflation conditions.

Appendix II: Estimated FSM and RMI per Capita Compact Grant Assistance for Fiscal Years 1987 – 2023

Appendix III: Amended Compact Implementation Framework

Annual sector grant budget

FSM/RMI propoe grnt budget for ech ector tht inclde proviion report to used to: – Monitor gener – Expenditre, performnce go, nd pecific performnce indictor – Brekdown of peronnel expenditre nd other co – Informtion on U.S. federl progr nd other donor United Ste evuate the propoed ector grnt budget for: – Contency with fnding requirement in the compct nd relted – Identify poitive event thccelerte performnce otcome nd prolem encontered nd their impct on grnt ctivitie nd performnce measureopertion to ensure complince with grnt condition Submit nnual report to the U.S.

Joint management and accountability committees

Appendix IV: RMI Sector Grant Allocation, 2004 through 2006

Appendix V: Probability of RMI Trust Fund Income Not Reaching the Maximum Disbursement Levels Allowed

Market volatility and choice of investment strategy could result in the RMI trust fund’s inability to disburse the maximum level of income allowed in the trust fund agreement, or any income, in some years. Trust fund income levels will depend on the investment strategy chosen, with a more conservative strategy carrying a lower level of market volatility and a lower level of expected returns over time than an aggressive investment strategy. Figure 1 illustrates projected RMI trust fund balances under the conservative, moderate, and aggressive investment strategies that we projected. As shown in figure 2, under all three strategies, the RMI trust fund’s annual income will likely not reach the maximum disbursement allowed, with the probability of shortfall increasing with time. For example, our analysis of the moderate investment strategy shows probability of about 10 percent that the RMI trust fund’s income will not reach the maximum allowed disbursement after 2031, with the probability rising to around 40 percent by 2050.