Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan
Released: 2005-02-17T00:00:00

Introduction

The September 11, 2001 attacks reinforced the importance of efforts to stop the proliferationof weapons of mass destruction. In particular, many analysts agree that some countries need greaterprotection against terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on their territories. Thereport of the 9/11 Commission called for continued support for threat reduction assistance to keepWMD away from terrorist groups.

Pakistan, because of its location, the nature of its relationship to the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and its weapons of mass destruction programs, has generated particular concern. Repeated assassinationattempts on President Musharraf, AQ Khan's nuclear sales to North Korea, Iran, and Libya, and acontinuous battle with terrorist elements within the country, have made Pakistan the most crucialnode of the nexus of terrorism and WMD proliferation. Moreover, a combination of doctrinalpreference (for first use of nuclear weapons) and conventional force inferiority has given Pakistanstrong incentives to forward-deploy its nuclear forces, leading many observers to conclude thatassistance to secure Pakistan's nuclear warheads could be critical. Analysts inside and outsidegovernment have raised the possibility of U.S. assistance to help reduce the threat of nuclearweapons losses in India and Pakistan. (1) Suggestedmeasures have ranged from "guards and gates"around nuclear sites to permissive action links (which act as locks) on nuclear weapons to preventunauthorized use.

In a speech in December of 2001, Senator Lugar noted that concerns had been raised immediately following September 11, 2001 about the security of Pakistan's nuclear weaponsprogram and that "similar questions will be raised about India's." He then noted uncertainties aboutthe WMD programs of Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya and North Korea. (2) In contrast to those five countries,four of which are on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism, Senator Lugar notedthat "the closer ties that have developed since September 11th with India and Pakistan offer newopportunities to discuss nuclear security with both countries, including safe storage andaccountability. We must attempt to establish programs that respect their sovereignty and go far tohelp insure their security." Lugar also suggested that cooperative programs with Iran, Syria, or Libyashould not be ruled out.

In an article published in July 2002, Senator Lugar explained that

The precise replication of the Nunn-Lugar program will not be possible everywhere, but the experience of Nunn-Lugar in Russia has demonstrated that thethreat of weapons of mass destruction can lead to extraordinary outcomes based on mutualinterest...Nations cooperating on securing instruments of mass destruction might also pledge to workcooperatively on measures to retrieve weapons or materials that are in danger of falling into thewrong hands, and to come to the aid of any victim of nuclear, chemical, or biological terrorism (3)

In the specific case of India and Pakistan, there may be key differences from the FSU that limit the program's applicability. Many of those differences stem from the fact that India and Pakistanare not "legal" nuclear weapon states under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), as Russiawas. The United States is currently prohibited from providing many kinds of assistance to non-nuclear weaponstates, particularly those without full-scope nuclear safeguards. (4) Most types ofassistance the United States can feasibly provide would probably focus on helping secure nuclearmaterials and providing employment for personnel, rather than on security of nuclear weapons. Extreme sensitivity in India and Pakistan about their nuclear weapons and programs will also likelyrestrict access to facilities, which in turn will limit how well assistance can be tailored to potentialproblems. Also, technical measures to make weapons safer from unauthorized use may make thoseweapons more deployable or usable and thus inadvertently undermine the goal of reducing thenuclear threat. Nonetheless, some measures may be useful.

This paper takes CTR programs as a starting point and analyzes their potential application to India and Pakistan. In providing context for assessing U.S. policy options, the paper outlines theproliferation threat in South Asia and U.S. nonproliferation policy. The paper distinguishes betweenassistance oriented toward making nuclear weapons more secure, and assistance oriented towardmaking nuclear material more secure. Given the existing framework of nonproliferation-related lawsand policies, measures focused on nuclear material and personnel may be more feasible in the shortterm.

Congressional Action

Congressional action on expanding the application of CTR began in the 107th Congress, when Senator Lugar introduced a bill ( S. 206 ) to allow DoD to use up to $50M in unspentCTR funds in countries outside the former Soviet Union (FSU). The provision would have allowedDoD to "respond to emergency proliferation risks and less urgent cooperative opportunities to furthernonproliferation goals." The House bill prohibited such uses of CTR funds, and in conference, bothsides agreed to drop the provisions.

The 107th Congress also specifically addressed Indian and Pakistani nonproliferation issues in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2003 ( P.L. 107-228 ), which contained aprovision on nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia . That provision stated that it will bethe policy of the United States to encourage India and Pakistan to "establish a modern, effectivesystem to protect and secure nuclear devices and materiel from unauthorized use, accidentalemployment, or theft." P.L. 107-228 stipulated that any assistance must be consistent with U.S.obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Section 1601 in Title XVI states thatit shall be the policy of the United States, consistent with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons, to encourage and work with India and Pakistan to achieve thefollowing by September 2003:

nuclear test moratorium

commitment not to deploy nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles that couldcarry nuclear weapons and to restrain the ranges and types of missiles developed ordeployed

agreement by both countries to align their export controls with internationalnonproliferation regimes

establishment of export control system for sensitive dual-use items, technology,technical information and material used in the design, development, or production of WMD andballistic missiles

bilateral meetings between senior Indian and Pakistani officials to discusssecurity issues and establish confidence-building measures with respect to nuclear policies and programs.

A separate subsection stated that it shall be the policy of the United States, consistent with its NPT obligations, to encourage, and where appropriate, work with the governments of India andPakistan to achieve not later than September 30, 2003, the establishment of "modern, effectivesystems to protect and secure nuclear devices and materiel from unauthorized use, accidentalemployment, or theft." The conferees noted that "any such dialogue with India or Pakistan wouldnot be represented or considered, nor would it be intended, as granting any recognition to India orPakistan, as appropriate, as a nuclear weapon state." (5) The section required the President to submita report to Congress no later than March 1, 2003 on U.S. efforts to achieve the objectives andlikelihood of success by September 2003.

In the 108th Congress, the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 108-16 , Sec. 1308) authorized the Bush Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from theCooperative Threat Reduction Program in states outside the former Soviet Union. As of January2005, the Administration had spent such $20 million only in Albania for the purpose of eliminatingchemical weapons stockpiles. On November 16, 2004, Senator Lugar introduced S. 2980 , which sought to remove some restrictions associated with using CTR funds outside of theFSU. In brief, the bill would remove CTR program-wide restrictions on spending the money(including certifications), remove the $50-million cap, remove restrictions on spending money forchemical weapons destruction, and provide "notwithstanding" authority. Although the legislationremained in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it is likely to be introduced again in the 109thCongress.

In the 109th Congress, Senator Biden introduced S. 12 , the Targeting Terrorists More Effectively Act of 2005, on January 24, 2005. The bill identifies proliferation of nuclearweapons and promotion of democracy as two of several issues that threaten the United States'relationship with Pakistan and would authorize $10M in the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism,Demining and Related Programs account (State) to be spent in Pakistan. However, the bill wouldbar any military or economic assistance appropriated for the fiscal year unless the President certifiesthat such assistance is not going to individuals that oppose or undermine U.S. nonproliferationefforts.

Cooperative Threat Reduction

Congress enacted the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in 1991,addressing, in Senator Lugar's words, "the dominant international proliferation danger: the massivenuclear, chemical and biological weapons infrastructure of the former Soviet Union." (6) The CTRprogram had four key objectives:

Destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction;

Transport, store, disable, and safeguard these weapons in connection with theirdestruction;

Establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of these weapons, theircomponents, and weapons-usable materials; and

Prevent the diversion of scientific expertise that could contribute to weaponsprograms in other nations.

According to Senator Lugar, the CTR program to date has separated 6,564 Russian nuclear warheads from their missiles and stored fissile material from those weapons. Over 30,000 tacticalnuclear weapons have been stored, and non-weapons employment provided for thousands of Russiannuclear scientists. (7)

CTR programs have encompassed three areas of effort: destruction and dismantlement; chain of custody; and demilitarization. Destruction and dismantlement activities included removingwarheads, deactivating missiles and eliminating launch facilities for strategic weapons under theSTART I agreement. Efforts to improve the safety, security, and control over nuclear weapons andfissile materials have included providing storage containers, bullet-proof blankets, secure rail cars,and building a plutonium storage facility at Mayak. Demilitarization projects have included defenseconversion projects and International Science and Technology Center projects to help WMDscientists pursue work with peaceful objectives and military-to-military contacts.

CTR programs have evolved and expanded over time, adjusting to Russian, NIS, and U.S. priorities, as well as to changing perceptions about which threats posed the greatest risk. Theprograms have also bowed to bureaucratic intransigence and practical considerations upon occasion. In one notable incident, the Department of Energy provided blankets to facility guards, because DoEofficials discovered that they were leaving their posts to collect wood to build fires. As the economyworsened in Russia in the mid-1990s, CTR projects were developed to provide alternativeemployment and sources of income for unpaid or out-of-work WMD scientists. At the same time,more frequent reports of theft of nuclear material highlighted the need to allocate CTR resources tomaterial protection, control and accounting (MPCA) measures for nuclear material, consolidationof nuclear weapons and material; and secure transportation. The United States developed a practicalapproach: "quick-fixes," like bars on windows, blast-proof doors, fences, followed by a second stagethat included more sophisticated security measures like sensors, cameras, and personnel accessmeasures. (8)

CTR as Precedent

The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, at its inception, was a novel approach to a novel problem. The idea that two former adversaries could cooperate on such sensitive matters as nuclearweapons and material security was radical, but so too was the prospect of Russia's WMDinfrastructure unraveling. Although some of the kinds of assistance and measures undertaken in theCTR program are clearly applicable to India and Pakistan, the circumstances that have led to thedevelopment of a similar nuclear terrorist threat are quite different. Among the many factors thathave made CTR successful, one of the key factors was a basic level of agreement about the threatand a willingness to cooperate. Russia had already agreed to strategic nuclear reductions underSTART I -- the only question was how to implement those reductions quickly and who would payfor them. The fact that Soviet nuclear weapons had been targeted at the United States for so manyyears presented a compelling reason for the United States to help.

Obviously, there is no similar agreement between India and Pakistan or with the United States. Moreover, India has long maintained that it will disarm when the other nuclear weapon states reducetheir stockpiles to a similar level. Thus, destruction and dismantlement activities are not nowapplicable. CTR chain of custody programs applied to the weapons and material that were takenout of service and thus did not raise questions about enhancing safety, security and control overRussia's active nuclear weapons stockpile. Doing similar things for India and Pakistan might bedesirable from a security standpoint, but questionable politically.

Establishing verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of existing nuclear weapons,components, and materials is the most applicable of all the CTR objectives for India and Pakistan. However, the situation of Pakistan and India is different from that in Russia and offers one majorcomplication: threat reduction measures aimed at an outside/terrorist threat may conflict with nuclear deterrence. For example, making materials and weapons safe from theft or espionage maylogically lead to consolidating material and weapons at as few sites as possible. However, thatconsolidation could increase one's vulnerability to a preemptive strike by an adversary. In the caseof Russia and the NIS, the risk of a preemptive strike did not weigh into calculations of risk; anyobstacles to consolidation have been primarily those of cost and effort in constructing adequatefacilities (like the Mayak plutonium storage facility). For India and Pakistan, however, the fear ofa preemptive strike is prominent. Rumors of an Indian or even Israeli preemptive attack on Pakistaninuclear weapons capabilities have erupted in Pakistan predictably during crises. (9)

The last objective -- that of preventing diversion of scientific expertise -- is also applicable to India and Pakistan. However, the underlying causes for concern are different, and therefore maycall for different solutions. In the Russian case, the lack of financial security has been a documentedincentive for scientists to offer their services abroad; (10) in Pakistan, the incentive is more likely to beassociated with sympathy for terrorist aims. "Brain drain" projects in the NIS have been predicatedon the assumption that there are more scientists than can be paid or are needed, but there are noindications that Pakistani and Indian scientists are superfluous to their nuclear weapons programs. Both India and Pakistan are probably interested in retaining their nuclear experts. Although it hasbeen politically acceptable to fund former WMD scientists in Russia and the NIS to do non-weapons-related work,it might be politically unacceptable to fund current WMD scientists in Indiaand Pakistan at higher levels simply to keep them "in the program." Brain-drain projects in Indiaand Pakistan, if such projects were implemented, would likely focus on personnel reliability testingand psychological profiling.

CTR's Critics

Some arguments against expanding CTR challenge its effectiveness. Opponents have suggested that assisting Russia has simply created opportunities for the Russians to spend their money in otherdefense-related areas. Some supporters, in contrast, argue that CTR has not done enough quicklyenough. Those that argue that CTR has not done enough have suggested that the programs havefocused misguidedly on nuclear weapons rather than nuclear material security, wherein the greatestthreat lies. (11)

Some analysts believe that any assistance at all sends the wrong message to India and Pakistan (e.g., acceptance of their possession of nuclear weapons), that assistance could be misused ormisappropriated and that, in the end, U.S. assistance may wind up improving Indian and Pakistaninuclear capabilities in ways we had not foreseen. Proponents of the CTR program in the NIS haveargued that the program was implemented with a key principle -- that cooperation would serve theobjective of enhancing physical security and protection of nuclear assets and not enhance anyoperational capabilities. (12) Some argue that thisprinciple, particularly since India and Pakistan havenot joined the NPT and are de jure non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS), must also be adhered toin the case of any assistance to those states.

South Asia Context

Simply put, there are two basic nuclear risks in South Asia: first, that terrorists will acquirenuclear material or nuclear weapons, and second, that nuclear war will erupt through miscalculation,through preemption, or through sudden escalation. The threat of terrorism calls primarily for greaterphysical security at weapons sites and sites where nuclear material is produced or stored, particularlyweapons-grade material (highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium). The threat of accidentalnuclear war calls for safer nuclear weapons, whereas reducing the risk of preemptive or sudden warwould require enhancing command and control and possibly transparency between the two states. Some observers have suggested that making nuclear weapons safer (through insensitive highexplosives or shaping the cores so that they will not give a nuclear yield if improperly detonated)also makes them more deployable and thus increases the risk of their use. Given the questionabledesirability of measures to enhance Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons capabilities, this paperwill assume that any nuclear threat reduction measures will focus on physical security measures,rather than safety measures.

Nuclear Material Security

Nuclear material security is a concern for all states in the context of a terrorist threat. Physical security has long been considered a subset of international safeguards, but it has never been aprerequisite for placing nuclear material under international safeguards. It can be a requirement ofbilateral nuclear trade, however, and the United States requires physical security measures on someof the nuclear material it exports, mostly in conjunction with military programs. Often, physicalsecurity measures are implemented as a matter of course in implementing safeguards, since stateshave to account for missing material in their physical inventories.

India and Pakistan may provide particularly attractive targets because they have weapons-grade material on their soil, but terrorists' interest in a radiological dispersal device may make any or allradioactive sources potentially attractive to steal. India and Pakistan became parties to theConvention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 2002 and 2000, respectively. ThisConvention, which entered into force in 1987, was designed to protect nuclear material in transitbetween countries. The CPPNM defines a range of nuclear terrorist activities and requires partiesto criminalize those activities. It does not cover physical protection of domestic nuclear materialin storage or use, nor does it cover byproduct material. (13) The United States and other members ofthe Convention have been working for several years to expand the scope of the agreement, andagreed in September 2002 to extend physical protection to domestic use and storage. The IAEA hascirculated proposed amendments to the convention, which may be considered in 2005. Both Indiaand Pakistan have been active in discussions on expanding the Convention.

Since 1995, the International Atomic Energy Agency has conducted (although mostly outsideof the regular budget) physical protection assessment programs, called International PhysicalProtection Advisory Service missions. States must request assistance, and then an international teamconducts a confidential vulnerability assessment and recommends measures to address physicalprotection shortfalls. Neither India nor Pakistan has requested such a mission, and in the opinionof some observers, they are unlikely to do so because of the sensitivity of their facilities. However,in May 2002, the IAEA conducted a joint safety and security workshop in Islamabad. WhilePakistan has participated in IAEA technical cooperation programs, India has not participated sincethe 1980s. In 2002, India requested a regional workshop on physical protection focused on securityawareness and culture. India was among several states in which the IAEA conducted physicalprotection-related seminars in 2003.

Nuclear Material Safeguards: IAEA Safeguards

Most of the material and facilities in India and Pakistan is not subject to international safeguards. In India, there are safeguards on 6 reactors (Tarapur 1 & 2, LEU-fueled power reactors;Rajasthan RAPS-1 and -2, which use natural uranium; and Koodankulam-1 and -2, LEU-fueledpower reactors). In addition, the Tarapur plutonium reprocessing facility (Prefre) is safeguardedwhen safeguarded fuel is used in the facility and the Tarapur MOX fuel fabrication plant hassafeguards when it runs safeguarded material through it. The Hyderabad fuel fabrication plant haspartial safeguards.

Key nuclear weapons-related facilities in India that are not subject to IAEA inspections include the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) in Trombay, which houses the Cirus and Dhruvaresearch reactors for plutonium production, plutonium reprocessing plants and a pilot-scale uraniumenrichment plant. (14) These sites, as well as storagesites for weapons-grade material or for weaponsthemselves could be highly attractive to terrorists because they may contain weapons-usable nuclearmaterial.

Pakistan has IAEA safeguards on a few facilities. The KANUPP power reactor, which uses natural uranium, Chasma-1, LEU-fueled power reactor, and two research reactors at Rawalpindi thathave used HEU in the past are under international safeguards. The following facilities are not undersafeguards: the Khan Research Laboratories at Kahuta, which include a uranium enrichment plantand facilities for fabricating HEU into weapons; centrifuge enrichment plants at Sihala, Golra andWah/Gadwal, the Chasma reprocessing plant, and PINSTECH and SPINSTECH facilities relatedto reprocessing at Rawalpindi. (15) These nuclearmaterial production sites, as well as weaponization,storage and assembly sites (if separate facilities exist), could be high-value targets for terrorists.

Nuclear Weapons Security

Since the 1998 nuclear tests, India and Pakistan appear to have accelerated nuclear weapons development and, possibly, deployments. Most observers still believe that neither Pakistan nor Indiahas deployed warheads mated with delivery systems. Fissile material components (pits) are thoughtto be kept separately from the rest of the warhead. Such a physical separation helps deterunauthorized use and complicates theft. In the early years of the U.S. nuclear weapons program,fissile material components of warheads were physically separated; in the earliest bombs, the twowere mated in the bomb-bay of the aircraft. When nuclear missiles entered the U.S. inventory, thewarheads were physically separated from the missiles. In addition to physical separation, however,there need to be rules and procedures for authorized use; it is not clear what those are for India orPakistan. India and Pakistan have been moving towards more structured nuclear command andcontrol authority, organization, and strategic planning. However, there is no information on whetherthey have implemented two-man rules (a requirement for the concurrent involvement of at least twopeople to be able to fire a weapon) or other procedures for ensuring no unauthorized use.

There is no reliable information on where fissile material is shaped or machined into components for weapons, or where fissile cores are kept if they are separated from other weaponcomponents and delivery systems for India and Pakistan. Some observers believe that nuclearweapons parts are "probably distributed in a number of tightly secured facilities at different locationsthroughout Pakistan." (16) Physical security in thecase of Pakistan is provided by the military. Indiahas kept strong civilian oversight of the weapons program, with the military kept predominantly atarm's length. However, the details of security in both cases are unknown. In April 2000, the Indiangovernment ended independent safety oversight at BARC, the "nerve center" of the Indian nuclearweapons program. Some analysts have interpreted this change as an indication of acceleratednuclear weapons work at BARC. (17)

On October 2, 2001, Pakistan's Foreign Ministry issued a statement that "Our nuclear assets are 100% secure, under multiple custody." Media reported that Pakistan had moved nuclearweapons components to several undisclosed locations. Subsequently, President Musharrafreorganized elements of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and investigated severalnuclear weapons scientists who reportedly had ties to Islamic extremists.

Personnel Security

In terms of personnel security, concerns have focused mostly on Pakistan, and most recently, on the activities of Pakistani nuclear freelancer Dr. A.Q. Khan. (18) At the end of 2003, evidence fromLibya revealed that Khan had sold a variety of nuclear materials, technology, equipment, and evena bomb design, to Libya, Iran, and North Korea over two decades. Although there were reports thatPresident Musharraf knew of improprieties regarding Khan in 1999, Musharraf took no steps to reinin Khan until 2001. At that time, Khan was "forced" to retire as director of Khan ResearchLaboratories and given a job as special advisor to President Musharraf. (19) Before that, however, hehad amassed millions of dollars in selling nuclear technology to rogue states. Pakistani officialsclaimed that they tightened controls on their nuclear weapons program with the creation of theNational Command Authority (NCA) in February 2000. One of the features of those controls is thescreening of key people in the Pakistani nuclear weapons program every two years by the InterServices Intelligence Agency, Military Intelligence, the Intelligence Bureau, and the Strategic PlanDivision of the NCA. However, "top-level people (including scientists) are controlled by theirorganizations and not psychologically screened." (20) Much less is known about Indian personnelsecurity. Although India set up a Nuclear Command Authority similar to Pakistan's in January 2003,there is little information on whether associated personnel screening measures have beenimplemented.

Nonproliferation Context

Until North Korea's February 2005 declaration of a nuclear weapons capability, India andPakistan were the only states outside the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)to declare, openly, their nuclear weapons status. (21) When India and Pakistan tested nuclear weaponsin 1998, a curious dilemma emerged for the international community -- was it possible toacknowledge a nuclear weapons capability without conferring nuclear weapons status? Severalmonths after the test, then Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott stated in Foreign Affairs that theUnited States "cannot concede, even by implication, that India and Pakistan have by their testsestablished themselves as nuclear-weapons states... To relent would break faith with those states thathave forsworn a capability they could have acquired. Moreover, it might inadvertently provide anincentive for other countries to blast their way into the ranks of the nuclear-weapons states." (22) Theinternational community so far has sidestepped questions of nuclear weapons status, but some havesuggested that India and Pakistan have become a model for new nuclear weapon states. (23)

On the question of nuclear assistance to non-nuclear weapon states, however, consensus in the international community is strong, well-established, and embodied in the NPT. Before the NuclearNonproliferation Treaty entered into force in 1970, views on sharing nuclear technology and evennuclear weapons swung wildly between sharing everything and sharing nothing. According to onesource, the United States contemplated giving India some nuclear weapons to counter the Chinesenuclear arsenal, shortly after China's first nuclear test in 1964. (24) Nuclear weapon states havevoluntarily shared technology among themselves and some have spied on each other. China initiallyadvocated nuclear proliferation as an inevitable and possibly stabilizing factor in world relations(although it joined the NPT in 1992). Nuclear weapon states have also shared technology with thosestates outside the NPT, the most notable example being China's reported sharing of nuclear weaponsblueprints with Pakistan. And, reportedly, Pakistan shared that design with Libya. (25)

Negotiators of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in the mid-1960s realized that almost any kind of international nuclear assistance is potentially useful to a nuclear weapons program. (26) Nuclear weapons -- more than biological or chemical weapons, or missiles -- require such precisionin design and construction that any assistance, from technical information, to hints about solvingtechnical problems (for example, how to shape the fissile core), to equipment or components --can be valuable to an aspiring nuclear weapons state. Therefore, nuclear weapon states, underArticle I of the NPT, commit "not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or nuclearexplosive devices or control over such weapons or devices, directly or indirectly; and not in any wayto assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquirenuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices." (27) In contrast to the obligation of the non-nuclear-weapon states under Article II not to receive nuclear weapons orrelated assistance, this commitmentincurred no verification measures. In part, this omission may have rested on the assumption thatholders of nuclear weapons technology would not impart the most sophisticated and directlyweapons-relevant information to non-nuclear weapons states. Clearly, however, negotiators feltcomfortable with focusing verification on the recipient states. All states are obliged under ArticleIII, paragraph 2 of the treaty not to provide source or special fissionable material or equipment to anynon-nuclear-weapon state unless the material is subject to IAEA safeguards.

Nuclear safeguards are the primary means "to establish and clarify the peaceful purpose of most international nuclear assistance." (28) Not simplyan invention of the NPT, safeguards existed inbilateral arrangements since the earliest nuclear trade as a way of preventing the misuse of materialwith obvious military applications. Beyond their technical importance in ensuring that states cannotdevelop nuclear weapons "the quick way," safeguards have become the acid test for a state'snonproliferation-worthiness. U.S. export control laws, arms export control laws and nonproliferationpolicies have incorporated the distinction between those states with full-scope safeguards (on allmaterial in their state) and those without. Moreover, the international nuclear nonproliferationregime has taken its cues from laws and policies developed by the United States. When, forexample, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group adopted full-scope safeguards as a prerequisite for nuclearsupply, it was adopting a policy that the United States had implemented a decade earlier. Since thediscovery of the Khan network, efforts have accelerated to make the new nonproliferation acid testthe adoption of the Additional Protocol.

At the same time, efforts to prevent proliferation have not blinded states to concerns about the safety and security of proliferant states' nuclear weapons. To some observers, however, proposalsto provide security and safety measures seem to be tainted by a certain hubris -- that is, nuclearweapon states have considered themselves to be responsible with their nuclear weapons, whereaslesser industrialized states could not be as responsible. (29) Until China's nuclear test, the only nuclearweapon states were those with large, industrial economies. To some extent, global concern aboutterrorism might lessen sensitivities about whether or not India or Pakistan "need" help. Nonetheless,repeated Pakistani officials' statements to the press about the security of their arsenal appear toreflect a"hands-off" attitude, implying that Pakistan is quite able to protect and secure its ownweapons. (30) India, for its part, has remained silenton the subject. More importantly, however, thesensitivity surrounding nuclear weapons is such that even between the closest of allies -- forexample, the United States and the United Kingdom -- proposals to share permissive action links(PALs, which only allow authorized parties to arm the warhead) reportedly have been met withdisinterest. (31)

U.S. Nonproliferation Laws

In the years following the first Indian nuclear test in 1974, it became clear that Pakistan was seeking to attain a nuclear weapons capability to counter what it perceived as the Indian threat. A1976 cooperation agreement with China and nuclear shopping expeditions in Western Europe in the1980s helped Pakistan's program to forge ahead. Congress enacted the Glenn-Symingtonamendments in 1977 (amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Sec 669 and 670), whichcut off aid to countries that imported enrichment or reprocessing capabilities. The Carter, Reaganand Bush (George Herbert Walker) administrations waived sanctions required by sections 669 and670 because of Pakistan's support to Afghan refugees and guerillas. In 1985, Congress passed thePressler amendment (Section 620(e)), which conditioned aid to Pakistan on a Presidentialdetermination that Pakistan did not "possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed U.S.assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosivedevice." In 1990, shortly after the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan, President Bush did not makethat certification and aid to Pakistan was terminated.

Between 1990 and 1995, Pakistan and India were subject to the following restrictions: no U.S. assistance other than humanitarian or food aid, no military sales or financing, no US-government-backed credit orfinancial assistance, no U.S. support for international financial institutions' loans,no U.S.-backed loans, no licenses for exports, and no assistance from the Export-Import Bank. In1995, the Pressler amendment was modified to apply just to military assistance.

In 1998, with the nuclear tests, however, sanctions were tightened. President Clinton was required by law (Section 102b of Arms Export Control Act, or Glenn-Symington and Pressleramendments) to place sanctions on India and Pakistan as a direct result of their 1998 nuclear tests. Other countries also responded to the tests by imposing economic sanctions. Many of those states,including the United States, lifted sanctions quickly thereafter. Nonetheless, prohibitions regardingnuclear trade with countries are still in place. (32) These prohibitions can be grouped into threecategories: those related to cooperation on nuclear weapons themselves; those related to nucleartrade cooperation (for peaceful uses); and, those related to dual-use trade. These are discussed indetail in the section below on Constraints on U.S. Assistance.

Current U.S. Nonproliferation Policy

U.S. policy on South Asian nuclear proliferation presently is in limbo. The five nonproliferation benchmarks of behavior that were promulgated after the 1998 tests have not beenarticulated publicly since the end of 2000. These benchmarks, briefly, included

1. halting further nuclear testing and signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban;

2. halting fissile material production and engaging in negotiations in Geneva on a multilateral treatyto stop fissile material production for use in nuclear weapons;

3. refraining from deploying or testing missiles or nuclear weapons;

4. maintaining and formalizing export controls;

5. reducing bilateral tensions, including Kashmir. (33)

Although India and Pakistan have not tested nuclear weapons since 1998, they are unlikely to sign and ratify the CTBT, particularly in the absence of U.S. ratification of the treaty. The BushAdministration will not pursue a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and although it has stated that itsupports a fissile material production cutoff treaty, which has been on and off the Conference onDisarmament's agenda since 1993, statements in the summer of 2004 that such a treaty is inherentlyunverifiable are unlikely to move the process forward in Geneva. According to Assistant Secretaryof State Christine Rocca, the administration is "working to prevent an open ended nuclear andmissile arms race in the region, discourage nuclear testing, and prevent onward proliferation to othercountries." (34)

Currently, there may be more opportunities for the United States to exert leverage than in the past. New military cooperation and sharing of information on terrorism and in other areas may buildtrust between the United States and Pakistan and between the United States and India. However, itis not clear that that trust will extend to issues related to nuclear weapons, given the long U.S. historyof trying to keep India and Pakistan from acquiring such weapons. On the other hand, Bushadministration statements have tended toward a certain fatalism in the case of India's and Pakistan'snuclear weapons. For example, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolfremarked in 2002:

South Asia is a special case. They have weapons. We won't be successful in pressing them to beat them into plowshares, but we need to be more inventivein getting them to understand much better how to manage the dangers that the weapons pose. Thereare a variety of confidence building measures they could take bilaterally andunilaterally. (35)

Constraints on U.S. Assistance

Constraints on U.S. assistance can be grouped into three categories. The first categoryencompasses legal prohibitions, embodied in international treaties and U.S. domestic law. Whiledomestic laws can be changed, or provisions can be waived, international treaties are more difficultto amend. The second category includes technical limitations, given what little we know aboutIndian and Pakistani nuclear weapons and their secret nuclear facilities. In addition, assistanceshould be guided by the impact it would have on the technical capabilities of the Indian and Pakistaninuclear arsenals -- that is, assistance should not advance the nuclear weapon programs of India andPakistan, nor should it encourage testing, deployment or increased operational readiness. The thirdcategory covers political limitations, including Indian and Pakistani willingness to engage incooperation and the impact of assistance on the nonproliferation regimes.

International Legal Constraints

The primary treaty constraint on the United States is found in Article I of the NPT. Article I requires nuclear weapon states to commit:

not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or devices, directly or indirectly;and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture orotherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weaponsor explosive devices.

Under Article I, the United States is prohibited from transferring to any state (nuclear weapon state, non-nuclear weapon state, party or non-party to the Treaty) nuclear weapons, nuclear explosivedevices or control over such weapons or devices, directly or indirectly. It is not readily apparentwhat is meant by "control" over such weapons; a narrow interpretation would focus on the abilityof another state to use such a weapon. The history of NPT negotiations reveals that concerns overtransferring "control" over such weapons focused primarily on allies (e.g. NATO) being able to makecommand and control decisions for U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. (36)

The second part of the obligation lies in not assisting, encouraging or inducing non-nuclear weapon states to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosivedevices or control over such weapons or explosive devices. The negotiating history reveals thatnegotiators intended to interpret "manufacture" broadly, from the beginning of the acquisition cycleto the end. (37) Non-nuclear-weapon states partyto the NPT are obligated not to seek or receive anyassistance in the manufacture of such weapons under Article II. (38) Presumably, this would coverassistance that enhanced command and control of weapons, including permissive action link (PAL)technology. However, India and Pakistan, while they are legally non-nuclear weapon states, are notparty to the NPT, and so are not bound by such an obligation.

As defined by paragraph 3, Article IX of the NPT, India and Pakistan are considered to be non-nuclear weapon states because they did not explode a nuclear device before 1967. (39) In the case ofproviding assistance to Russia, there was no parallel concern because Russia is a nuclear weaponstate under the NPT.

It is difficult to interpret what might constitute a violation of Article I under the NPT. In the ratification hearings before Congress in 1968, U.S. administration officials noted that the treaty doesnot specify what can be done, but rather what cannot be done. There is no currently publiclyavailable legal view from the State Department on what might constitute a violation of Article I, butlegal advisors have considered this question by examining precedents in the application of U.S.domestic law. In general, the closer assistance is attached to the nuclear weapons programs, themore likely that it could run afoul of U.S. legal obligations, both under international treatyobligations and domestic law. Thus, some kinds of aid (e.g., food or humanitarian aid) could beconsidered, in the extreme, to be assisting or encouraging a nuclear weapons program because theyfree up resources that the target government can put towards a nuclear weapons program but arepermitted in practice because they do not have a close association with a nuclear weapons program. If assistance took the form of transferrable funds, however, the possibility of linkage to a nuclearweapons program might be considered to be greater.

Domestic Legal Constraints

As noted earlier, U.S. domestic law covers restrictions in the following areas: nuclear weapons cooperation, nuclear material trade, and dual-use exports. U.S. domestic laws have incorporatedsignificant nonproliferation requirements over the years, which complicate cooperation with Indiaand Pakistan.

The Atomic Energy Act. (as amended; 42 U.S.C. 2011 and following) governs the military and civil uses of nuclear energy, including those relatedto international cooperation. Prior to the development of international safeguards, U.S. law requiredthat states receiving U.S.-origin nuclear material or equipment not retransfer it and place it underadequate physical security. The 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act amended the AEA to requirethat significant cooperation, regardless of the purpose, requires an Agreement for Cooperation. TheUnited States does not currently have an Agreement for Cooperation with India or with Pakistan.

Releasing Sensitive Information. Section 144 of the AEA covers the release of sensitive nuclear information. The Secretary of Energy may releaseRestricted Data on various aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle except those related to the design orfabrication of atomic weapons. The Secretary of Defense may exchange Restricted Data if it isnecessary to a) develop defense plans; b) train personnel in employing and defending against nuclearweapons; c) evaluate the capabilities of potential enemies in employing nuclear weapons; d) developcompatible delivery systems for nuclear weapons. It is unlikely that any of these circumstanceswould develop in the case of cooperation with India or Pakistan.

The President can authorize the Secretary of Energy, with the assistance of the Department of Defense, to exchange Restricted Data on atomic weapons with another country provided that a)communication of Restricted Data is necessary to improve that nation's nuclear weapon design,development, or fabrication capability; AND b) that nation has made "substantial progress in thedevelopment of atomic weapons." When the language on "substantial progress" was added in 1954,the only nation that met the qualification was the United Kingdom. In general, most weapons-relateddata, including some on safety, security, fuze and firing, are classified as restricted data or formerlyrestricted data. Since it is not in the U.S. interest to improve India or Pakistan's nuclear weaponscapability, and neither could be considered to have made "substantial progress in the developmentof atomic weapons" according to the intent of the Atomic Energy Act, it is unlikely that the Presidentwould authorize such an exchange of Restricted Data under this provision of the Atomic Energy Act.

Agreements for Cooperation. The Atomic Energy Act was amended in 1978 by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA). Section 123 of the NNPArequires states with which the United States conducts significant nuclear trade to sign an Agreementfor Cooperation. Examples of significant nuclear trade include provision of nuclear reactors, nuclearmaterial or major reactor components. (40) TheNuclear Regulatory Commission regulates significantnuclear trade; the Department of Energy regulates the transfer of know-how, technology andtechnical services.

Section 123 of the NNPA requires recipient states that are "non-nuclear-weapon states" to maintain IAEA safeguards on "all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities on theirterritory." Unless cooperation falls under the category of sale, lease or loan of non-nuclear parts ofatomic weapons (which would require that the recipient nation has made "substantial progress in thedevelopment of atomic weapons" and that the transfer would not contribute significantly to thatnation's atomic weapon design, development, or fabrication capability), the recipient state mustguarantee that "no nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology transferred underthe agreement will be used for any nuclear explosive device, or for research on or development ofany nuclear explosive device or for any other military purpose. In addition, the Secretary of State,who negotiates the Agreements for Cooperation, must provide a nuclear proliferation assessmentstatement (NPAS) to the President. The NPAS must analyze whether the proposed agreement isconsistent with each of the criteria contained in Section 123 of the AEA and whether safeguards andother control mechanisms and the peaceful use assurances in the agreement for cooperation areadequate to ensure that any assistance furnished will not be used to further any military or nuclearexplosive purpose.

The President may exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation from any of the specified requirements if he determines that including such requirements would be seriously prejudicial toachieving U.S. nonproliferation objectives or otherwise "jeopardize the common defense andsecurity." There is no precedent for exempting an agreement from the full-scope safeguardsrequirement.

Section 128 of the NNPA describes the conditions for terminating U.S. cooperation. It states that

No nuclear material and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology shall be exported to: (1) any non-nuclear-weapon state that is found by the President tohave, at any time after March 10, 1978 a) detonated a nuclear explosive device; or b) terminated orabrogated IAEA safeguards; or c) materially violated an IAEA safeguards agreement; or d) engagedin activities involving source or special nuclear material and having direct significance for themanufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take steps which, in thePresident's judgment, represent sufficient progress toward terminating suchactivities...

Export Regulations. Transfers of nuclear-related equipment or nuclear material that do not meet the requirement for an agreement of cooperationcould possibly still require full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply under the NuclearSuppliers' Group (NSG) guidelines. Since 1992, NSG member states have required full-scopesafeguards as a condition for supplying items on the NSG "trigger list." (41) In addition, theDepartment of Commerce requires a license for exporting items on the NSG's dual-use list (thosewith nuclear and other applications) to states outside the NSG. Neither India nor Pakistan is amember of the NSG.

U.S. export regulations function in several tiers. The Commerce Control List specifies what items are regulated and why, but an equally important consideration is the question of the end-user. One technique for streamlining the export control system and making it more understandable forexporters was the development of the entities lists. The Department of Commerce maintains a listof entities subject to license requirements (see Supplement 4 to Part 744 of the ExportAdministration Regulations). At present, the entities of proliferation concern are located in China,India, Israel, Pakistan, and Russia.

In response to the sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan after the 1998 nuclear tests, the number of Indian and Pakistani organizations listed on the entities list grew dramatically. At thetime, the Department of Commerce policy was to deny licenses for exports to India and Pakistan ofitems controlled for nuclear nonproliferation or missile technology reasons, and presume to denyitems on the Commodity Control List to Indian and Pakistani military entities. In 2001, theserestrictions were lifted when the President determined that sanctions were not in the national securityinterest of the United States. (42) Exports of itemscontrolled for nuclear proliferation and missiletechnology reasons are reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

Currently, Indian nuclear-related facilities on the entities list include:

Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC)

Indira Gandhi Atomic Research Center

Indian Rare Earths

Nuclear reactors, fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, heavy waterproduction facilities and their co-located ammonia plants

The Pakistani nuclear-related facilities that currently appear on the entities list include:

AQ Khan Research Laboratories

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and subordinate entities,including National Development Complex, nuclear reactors, fuel reprocessing and enrichmentfacilities, all uranium processing, conversion and enrichment facilities, heavy water productionfacilities and any co-located ammonia plants, Pakistan Institute for Nuclear Science and Technology(PINSTECH)

It appears that equipment, material or information exported for the purposes of cooperative nuclear threat reduction would need to be licensed if it was destined for the facilities listed above. All of the facilities are unsafeguarded and all are sensitive sites. On the other hand, such sites mayhave good security already, since they are associated with the nuclear weapons programs.

A potentially greater concern is how the United States' unwritten policy of not supplying any items to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities would fit with exports to India and Pakistan under a CTR-like program. Under the 1990 Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), the Department ofCommerce can impose licensing requirements on exports and reexports of goods and technology thatwould normally be uncontrolled where there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to activities relatedto nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or missile proliferation. U.S. exporters are required toapply for a license if they have knowledge of or have reason to know that such exports will be useddirectly or indirectly in any one of the following activities: nuclear explosive activities,unsafeguarded nuclear activities, or safeguarded and unsafeguarded activities to produce specialnuclear material (through reprocessing or enrichment), produce heavy water or fabricate nuclear fuelthat uses plutonium. Section 744.2 of the Export Administration Regulations provides eight criteriafor assessing license applications. Potentially, the most significant of these criteria is thenonproliferation credentials of the importing country, which include whether the state adheres to theNPT, has full-scope safeguards, and has an agreement for cooperation with the United States andwhether the actions, statements, and policies of the state support nuclear nonproliferation. (43)

Technical Constraints

Descriptions of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs are incomplete and their accuracy is not reliable. Although the two states have exchanged lists of nuclear facilities since 1991as part of a confidence-building effort, critics charged that the lists initially were incomplete. Moreis known about fissile material production sites than weapons machining or assembly sites, butoverall there is a high level of secrecy attached to both nuclear weapons programs. Withoutknowledge of where vulnerabilities lie, it will be difficult to target even the most rudimentaryassistance. In the case of Russia and the NIS, U.S. government officials have complained for yearsthat Russia has not provided the kinds of access necessary for the United States to ensure that itsgoals are being met. With respect to the material protection, control and accounting programs, mostof the material, according to one report, remains outside of the program because the United Statescannot gain access to sensitive facilities. (44)

A significant concern is whether U.S. assistance, if it is targeted at making nuclear weapons more secure from unauthorized use, would improve Indian or Pakistani nuclear weapon capabilities. Permissive action links, which were developed by the United States in the 1960s, were designed sothat unauthorized users would not be able to produce a nuclear yield from the weapon. As oneobserver has remarked, however, another intended consequence is that weapons with PALs on themare more deployable. One of the goals of U.S. nonproliferation policy presently is to keep India andPakistan from deploying their weapons.

Political Constraints

U.S. assistance is likely to be a sensitive issue for the Indian and Pakistani governments. Neither state will want to be seen as needing assistance. India has refused to participate in technicalcooperation programs with the IAEA except on a regional basis precisely for this reason. On theother hand, India has welcomed talks with the United States on reactor safety and a U.S. delegationtraveled to India in 2003 for meetings on that topic. It may be possible to make such assistance lesssensitive if it is focused on physical security of the nuclear fuel cycle and not linked to nuclearweapon capabilities. Pakistani officials have been quite vocal in insisting that their nuclear assetsare safe and secure and that U.S. assistance is not required. However, one Indian report noted thatthe Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson Aziz Ahmed Khan admitted that the U.S. had offered totrain Pakistani personnel on safety and security of nuclear assets. (45) A Pakistani report in earlyFebruary 2003 stated that"General Musharraf's decision to assume control of the Nuclear CommandAuthority has prompted the Bush Administration to ask Islamabad for installation of U.S. nuclearweapon command and control." (46) According tosome government officials, U.S. assistance needsto have a low profile in order to succeed.

Another constraint is the current level of cooperation between the United States and India and Pakistan. Although Pakistan has been cooperating closely with the United States in the war onterrorism, the United States has been pushing for both nations to give up their nuclear programs foralmost thirty years. Perceptions of mistrust may be difficult to overcome, impeding the level ofcooperation that may be needed. Following Operation Enduring Freedom in Iraq, some in Pakistanapparently are wondering whether Pakistan could be the next target of U.S. counterproliferationefforts. Qazi Hussain Ahmed, leader of Pakistan's largest Islamist party, told Reuters in April 2003that "Thinking that our turn will not come is like closing your eyes to the truth." (47) On the other hand,the Bush Administration did not impose sanctions on Pakistan for aiding North Korea's clandestineuranium enrichment program, and has not pressed the Pakistani government for direct access to A.Q.Khan, both of which could be interpreted by Pakistan as reluctance by the Bush Administration toupset relations. (48) In addition, the designation ofPakistan in 2004 as a major non-NATO ally hasprobably also bolstered Pakistan's confidence in the United States.

On the whole, despite some progress in Kashmir, there are still few indications that India or Pakistan would want to enhance transparency to build confidence, either with each other or with theUnited States. Between the two states, there appears to be more interest in threat enhancement thanthreat reduction. In addition, Pakistan's reliance on foreign procurement sources could also maketransparency measures difficult. A culture of secrecy for India and Pakistan, not easily overcomein the case of Russia, may be difficult to transcend. On the other hand, professional pride in theiraccomplishments may provide some leverage for scientists' or military officials' cooperation.

Policy Options

The legal, technical, and political constraints described above appear to foreclose assistance thatwould directly involve a) access to nuclear weapons; b) measures that would enhance operationalcapabilities of nuclear weapons; c) direct access to sensitive nuclear facilities. Senator Lugarsuggested in November 2004 that "We can promote exchanges between Pakistani and Indian securityexperts, and offer assistance on export controls, border security, and the protection, control andaccounting of nuclear arsenals. This will require some diplomatic and administrative skill to staywithin our NPT obligations." (49) The measuresoutlined below are limited but feasible and could helpmitigate some aspects of the nuclear threat in India and Pakistan.

Site Security

Improving site security would help guard against the threat of weapons or materials or components leaving a sensitive site either through theft by someone within the facility (a worker)or from outside theft. Perimeter security measures, such as gates and other barriers like barbed wireand personnel identification systems, can help minimize the threat of unauthorized entry. Sensorsto detect unauthorized actions (movement, tampering) can help against both insider and outsiderthreats. Measures to protect against inside theft include checks on personnel leaving facilities(typically onerous without technical detection measures for material or components), cameras insensitive areas and accounting and access procedures. Armed guards could help, as wouldoperational and administrative controls.

In the Russian case, U.S. officials toured sites and conducted vulnerability assessments. Even perimeter visits would likely be viewed as too sensitive by India and Pakistan. However, the UnitedStates could offer information or briefings on how security is conducted at sensitive (not necessarilynuclear) facilities in the United States. Ideally, assistance could cover types of requirements forpersonnel vetting and training and development of a security culture. As noted above, assistance ofthis kind has been provided under IAEA auspices. If materials, such as cameras or sensors, wereintended to be installed at unsafeguarded facilities, they would likely require licenses. It is likely,however, that commercial versions of security systems would be cheaper and more palatable forIndia and Pakistan to install themselves if they are not already present.

Material Security

Measures to enhance material security generally fall into the category of material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A). In some cases, securing material in a storage site with tamper-proof seals,cameras, and other monitoring techniques is adequate, but most often the material isintended to be used in processes (like enrichment or reprocessing, or fuel fabrication). This requiresa system of accounting and control that can follow material flows. International safeguards relyheavily on state systems of accounting and control (SSACs) in measuring physical inventories ofmaterials. Some technical exchanges in these areas may be possible. Some new techniques forsecuring material in place could be shared (one innovative approach used in Russia was placingheavy cement blocks over plutonium containers). Pakistan's and India's participation in multilateralprograms on physical protection of material could be encouraged as well as their participation inexperts' training sessions conducted by Sandia National Laboratory on physical protection (Indianexperts attended one in May 2002). It is also possible to provide equipment for physical protection(cameras, seals, locks, or barriers) under license.

Nuclear Weapons Security

Assistance on nuclear weapons security would be extremely limited if it were considered desirable. The objective of such measures would be to ensure that weapons could not be stolen ordetonated by an unauthorized person. Again, the simplest measures are armed guards; undoubtedlyboth India and Pakistan are aware of the advantages of protecting their nuclear weapons. Advice orequipment to ensure no unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, such as PALs, would require accessto nuclear weapons. General information on permissive action links, such as concepts or approaches,is publicly available and would not require access to weapons. In all likelihood, however, both Indiaand Pakistan have probably exhausted public sources of information on that topic. Beyond thewarheads themselves, measures to ensure that command and control systems work would also helpensure no unauthorized use, but could possibly enhance operational capabilities.

Personnel Security

The types of measures for personnel security that could be implemented absent Pakistani and Indian disarmament are limited. Obviously, if there are ongoing nuclear weapons programs, the twogovernments are unlikely to welcome proposals to divert their scientific expertise into civilianenterprises. However, there are clearly training programs in physical security and personnel vettingthat could provide more security to those nuclear programs without enhancing their nucleardeterrents in a way that would contravene the NPT. Strictly civilian cooperation could have apositive spillover effect. On January 12, 2004, President Bush announced a new strategicpartnership with India, to cooperate in three areas: civilian nuclear technology, space technology andhigh-technology trade. (50) U.S. officials reportedlystated that any civilian nuclear technology mustnot be used in India's nuclear weapons program, although it is unclear how that would be achieved. (51) Reportedly, cooperation has allowed for exports to safeguarded nuclear facilities. (52) This programmight have the potential to develop relationships with Indian scientists that would benefit any future,more intrusive cooperative threat reduction program.

With respect to Pakistan, assistance may be more difficult. Pakistan has denied U.S. officials direct access to AQ Khan, and although this might be an exception because of Khan's unique status,it could also become the rule. Pakistani officials, both with respect to the nuclear arsenal and nuclearscientists, appear to have taken a "hands-off" attitude. (53)

Issues for Congress

Costs

India's and Pakistan's nuclear programs are far smaller than Russia's and unlikely to incur the kinds of costs that the CTR program has thus far incurred. On the other hand, data are scarce on thestate of nuclear materials in India and Pakistan, so it is difficult to determine the scope and timeframe of any such program. At a minimum, however, such a program is likely to be incrementallyimplemented. Costs could be minimal if a quick-fix, low-technology, information-oriented approachis taken or they could be more substantial if a sophisticated, high-technology approach is taken thatwould incorporate cameras, encryption, remote monitoring, and other means.

Certifications

In 1991, the legislation that created the Nunn-Lugar program stipulated that U.S. assistance in destroying nuclear and other weapons may not be provided to the Soviet Union, any of its republicsor successor entities unless the President certifies to the Congress that the proposed recipient iscommitted to:

making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or destroying such weapons;

forgo any military modernization that exceeds legitimate defense requirementsor is designed to replace destroyed WMD;

forgo the use of fissile materials and other components from destroyed nuclearweapons in new nuclear weapons;

facilitate U.S. verification of weapons destruction that uses U.S.money;

comply with all relevant arms control agreements; and

observe internationally recognized human rights, including the protection ofminorities.

Initially, Presidents George H. W. Bush and Clinton certified that the recipient nations --Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan -- met those conditions. The Clinton Administrationwithdrew its certification of Belarus for human rights abuses in FY1998 and the George W. Bushadministration withdrew its certification of Russia in 2002 for its failure to comply with armscontrol agreements, namely, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological WeaponsConvention. The Bush Administration subsequently requested a waiver from Congress for thecertification.

It is not clear whether Congress would opt to apply the same certification requirements to recipient states outside the former Soviet Union. However, S. 2980 , which wasintroduced by Senator Lugar in the 108th Congress, sought to remove the need for certifications, aswell as other restrictions. The 109th Congress may consider this issue more fully if legislation is oncemore introduced.

Other Considerations

U.S. nonproliferation laws have been strengthened over the years, first to account for states that were not parties to the NPT, then to target critical capabilities like enrichment and reprocessing, andfinally, to target the transfer of nuclear weapons or actual detonation of a nuclear explosive device. Once a state has exceeded the maximum prohibition (i.e., possession or detonation of a nucleardevice), a logical question to ask is whether lesser restraints (for example, in providing nucleartechnology not directly related to nuclear weapons) are necessary or useful. Applied more broadlyto overall nonproliferation policy, some observers have argued that the nuclear weapons "cat" is outof the bag and U.S. policy should reorient itself to "manage" the nuclear situation in South Asia. Atits extreme, this approach would include accepting the nuclear weapons status of India and Pakistanand relaxing all restrictions. Other observers have argued that the purpose of restraints was to inhibitproliferation and that relaxing the rules for "successful" states would set a bad precedent and resultin the collapse of the nonproliferation regime.

A broader issue is whether the United States should strive for consistency in the treatment of states' WMD programs. Although India, Pakistan, and Israel are not parties to the NPT and thereforehave not violated any treaties, their nuclear weapons programs conflict with U.S. nonproliferationobjectives and policies. Assistance to countries outside the NPT may be viewed as a "wink and anod" to nuclear weapons development. At the same time, the use of military force to disarm Iraq ofits weapons of mass destruction provides a strong counterpoint to such assistance. As such, thiscould threaten international consensus to combat nuclear proliferation. Should the United Statesmove in the direction of accepting Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons status, say some observers,would there be pressure to do the same for Israel? If so, such action could have a significant impacton security and stability in the Middle East.

Other considerations include tradeoffs between nonproliferation policy and counterterrorism cooperation, as well as the promotion of democracy. On January 24, 2005, Senator Biden introduced S. 12 , the Targeting Terrorists More Effectively Act of 2005. The bill identifiesproliferation of nuclear weapons and promotion of democracy as two of several issues that threatenthe United States' relationship with Pakistan. The bill would authorize $10M in theNonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs account (State) to be spent inPakistan, but would bar any military or economic assistance appropriated for the fiscal year "unlessthe President submits to Congress for such fiscal year a certification that no military or economicassistance provided by the United States to the Government of Pakistan will be provided, eitherdirectly or indirectly, to a person that is opposing or undermining the efforts of the United StatesGovernment to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons."

S. 12 does not contain similar prohibitions for the lack of progress in thepromotion of democracy. Although the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (PL 108-458),signed on December 17, 2004, extended the President's authority to waive coup-related sanctionsfor Pakistan through FY2006, it may be necessary for the 109th Congress to revisit this issue forFY2007. On the same day PL 108-458 was signed, President Musharraf announced he would remainchief of the army beyond the end of 2004. Although the 9/11 Commission Report specifically notedthat keeping nuclear capabilities out of the hands of terrorists depends critically on supportingMusharraf's vision of a moderate, modernizing Islamic state, President Musharraf has done verylittle to move his country toward more democratic rule.