Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): The U-2 Aircraft and Global Hawk UAV Programs
Released: 2000-12-01T00:00:00

Background

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

The ability to gather accurate and timely information on enemy forces is an essential enabler of modern military operations. Joint Vision 2010 , the Pentagon's "conceptual template...to achievenew levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting" specifically highlights the importance of achievinginformation dominance: "We must have information superiority: the capability to collect, processand disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary'sability to do the same." (1) The growing use ofprecision guided munitions (PGMs) which can destroyspecific targets without extensive collateral damage depends upon the availability of preciseinformation. As the Department of Defense (DOD) transforms itself into the force envisioned inJoint Vision 2010 and organizes its components consistent with "network centric"warfightingconcepts, the importance of accurate and timely information will grow.

There is a consensus among defense policy makers that no single platform or technology can satisfy DOD's need for information at all times in all scenarios. The United States currentlyemploys a variety of satellites that collect information on enemy forces. These systems are valuable,and their effectiveness and role in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) is projectedto grow. However, airborne ISR platforms can be more rapidly and flexibly deployed than currentsatellites, and an aircraft's unpredictable deployment and flight pattern makes it difficult foradversaries to effectively conceal themselves from observation. Thus, airborne platforms will likelycontinue to satisfy a great deal of DOD's ISR requirements over the next several decades.

Both Congress and DOD face important decisions regarding current and future U.S. ISR capabilities. An overarching question is: Over the next 20 to 30 years, what mix of existing andplanned manned and unmanned ISR aircraft most effectively satisfies DOD's requirement for timelyand accurate information on enemy forces? The information they collect will be integrated (or"fused") with information from satellites, ground-based signals intelligence (SIGINT) intercept sites,human agents, and other sources. The particular mix of platforms will depend upon which sensorsthey can utilize, geopolitical conditions, and the nature of planned operations.

Many observers believe that ultimately unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will replace manned aircraft for collecting imagery, radar data, and signals intelligence for operational commanders. Itis not, however, clear that manned airborne reconnaissance is completely obsolete. Some observersbelieve that a pilot can react faster than a distant UAV operator to unexpected targets of opportunityand take evasive actions that might not otherwise be possible. Also, pilots may be less susceptiblethan remote UAV operators to some information warfare techniques. There remain a variety ofmanned reconnaissance aircraft in the inventories of the Air Force and the other services and someattack aircraft can be equipped with reconnaissance "pods" containing sensors of various types toenable them to serve on reconnaissance missions.

The U.S. ISR inventory is comprised of a variety of manned and unmanned aircraft, which have various strengths and weaknesses. (See Table 1 below). Presently, the U-2 Dragon Lady forms thebackbone of this fleet. (2) Although based on a designdeveloped in the 1950s, U-2s have performedadmirably in recent operations. They provided 50% of all imagery during Operation Desert Storm,and 90% of ground forces targeting information. During Operation Allied Force, the U-2 providedmore than 80% of the imagery needed for air strikes. (3) There is, however, only a limited inventoryof U-2s, they are heavily used, and the plane is expected to be retired from the Air Force inventoryat some point during the next two decades.

Global Hawk UAVs are often suggested as a replacement for U-2s and are portrayed as the main airborne reconnaissance platform of the future. The first test version of these planes has beenundergoing test and evaluation and there is an apparent consensus that it should be acquired for theoperating forces. The Global Hawk can operate at altitudes of 65,000 feet and for periods in excessof 30 hours. Although having the important advantage of not putting pilots at risk, Global Hawksdo not now match all the capabilities of U-2. No Global Hawk is currently in the operationalinventory. Furthermore, current acquisition plans do not call for sufficient numbers of Global Hawksto replace the hours-on-station that can be maintained by existing U-2s.

Thus, if Air Force ISR capabilities are to be maintained (and some believe they need to be expanded if current operations tempos are to be maintained in the future), a number of seriousacquisition and budgetary issues need to be addressed.

What are the current and anticipated requirements for airborne surveillance platforms?

Can Global Hawks be designed to have the capabilities now possessed by the U-2? Or, should multiple UAVs be acquired to replace a single U-2?

If a larger or accelerated Global Hawk acquisition effort is approved, where will funding be identified?

Should U-2s or other manned aircraft be maintained in the Air Force inventory even as Global Hawks become operational?

Are additional U-2s needed, regardless of the introduction of the Global Hawk?

What would be the implications for ISR if U-2s were to be decommissioned at a faster rate than planned to free up funds for additional or accelerated Global Hawkacquisition?

These questions, and others, will be discussed in the context of the FY2002 Defense budget which the next administration will forward to Congress early in 2001. Although significantbudgetary issues are involved, there are also important implications for the future effectiveness ofISR and the success of defense planning for achieving military goals while minimizing the loss oflife.

Table 1. USAF Reconnaissance & Surveillance Aircraft ActiveInventory (May 2000) (4)

U-2 Dragon Lady

The U-2 is a single-seat, single-engine, high-altitude, reconnaissance aircraft. It provides continuous all-weather, day or night, stand-off intelligence through all phases of conflict in directsupport of theater military commanders. Long, wide, straight wings give the U-2 the appearance andcharacteristics of a glider. The U-2 is a reliable aircraft with a high mission completion rate. (5)

U-2s are based at Beale Air Force Base, California and support theater commanders from four operational detachments located throughout the world, which have included in recent years: OsanAir Base, South Korea; RAF Akrotiri Air Base, Cyprus; Sigonella, Sicily; Istres Air Base, France;and Taif and Prince Sultan Air Bases, Saudi Arabia. U-2 detachments can deploy to other operatinglocations if necessary.

Intended to overfly the vast expanses of the Soviet Union at a time when there were no satellites, the U-2 was designed to fly at very high altitudes to avoid detection and attack. (6) Beginningin the 1980s an updated version of the U-2 began to replace the earlier models. (7) From 1994 to 1999,U-2R aircraft were upgraded with the General Electric F-118-10 engine, which burns less fuel,reduces weight and increases power. The upgraded aircraft were re-designated as a U-2S/ST. TheAir Force expects this airframe and engine combination to last until 2050. (9)

The U-2 can carry a variety of sensors and cameras depending on its assigned mission. It is capable of collecting multi-sensor photo, electro-optic, infrared and radar imagery, as well asperforming other types of reconnaissance functions such as SIGINT collection. Photographicsensors include the HR-329 high resolution camera and the Optical Bar camera. Electro-opticsystems include the Intelligence Reconnaissance Imagery System III, and the Senior YearElectro-Optical Reconnaissance System (SYERS), which also collects information in the infra red(IR) wavelength. These systems vary in resolution and aperture, but when combined, can captureimages of territory on the order of 33 x 21 nautical miles. (10) The Advanced Synthetic Aperture RadarSystem (ASARS) gives the U-2 real-time, high resolution -- although not as high as EO systems-- capability at night and in bad weather (when the EO systems cannot function effectively) with animproved capability to detect moving targets. (11)

The U-2's Senior Glass SIGINT capability is composed of the Senior Ruby electronic intelligence (ELINT) sensor and the Senior Spear communications intelligence (COMINT) sensor. These systems can acquire signals and telemetry at 300 nautical miles, downlink data to groundstations 300 nautical miles away, giving the U-2 a real-time "reach of 600 nautical miles (690 statutemiles, 1,110 km). The Senior Span pod, which is attached to the top of the fuselage allows the U-2to transmit SIGINT data via satellites to global ranges." (12) The Senior Spur pod, performs the samefunction for ASARS data. (13)

The U-2 is notoriously difficult to fly. Pilots called the U-2 "Dragon Lady" because of its unforgiving handling characteristics at altitude. (14) Landing the U-2 is a complex ballet that oftenentails intentionally stalling the aircraft, employing runway "chase cars,"and oftentimes deliberatelydragging the plane's wingtip down the runway.

A major challenge for the Air Force is maintaining an adequate supply of U-2 pilots. U-2 pilots face physical rigors that are unique in the aviation world. Flying at extreme altitudes, pilots mustwear pressure suits similar to those worn by astronauts. The pilots have to engage in special trainingand pre-flight preparations (e.g., special diets and inhaling 100% oxygen 1 hour prior to take-off)to help ward off the profuse sweating, fatigue and dizziness caused by 10 hour missions. There areonly some 50 pilots currently qualified to fly U-2s and they have to spend significantly higherpercentages of their tours of duty on temporary flying assignments than other Air Force officers. Some observers believe that extended deployments and the dangers and hardships involved in flyingU-2s may contribute to significant retention problems that could affect overall capabilities. TheGeneral Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that "It is difficult to find pilots with the aptituderequired to master the difficult handling characteristics of the U-2." (15) The Air Force has, however,taken steps to reduce the average temporary additional duty (TAD) rates of U-2 pilots to bring theminto line with other pilots. Improved U-2 pilot morale may have been influenced by the aircraftwinning the Collier Trophy in 1998, awarded by the National Aeronautic Association for the"greatest achievement in aeronautics or astronautics in America...." (16)

U-2s in Post-Cold War Combat Operations.

The U-2 was originally designed to fly over the Soviet Union to acquire information about strategic targets such as airfields and missile bases. Information acquired from the U-2 was ofimportance to the U.S. Intelligence Community's ability to provide adequate assessments of Sovietstrategic forces, but the utility of the platform for this purpose was virtually destroyed by thediplomatic embarrassment following the shoot down of a U-2 in May 1960 and the public trial ofits pilot, Francis Gary Powers. Beginning in the 1960s this mission was taken over by surveillancesatellites that presented no danger of captured pilots. U-2s were not especially valuable in Vietnamwhere photography of triple-canopy jungle often provided little useful intelligence on troopmovements along the Ho Chi Minh Trail underneath. It was not until Desert Storm in 1991 thatU-2s demonstrated their value as the platform that could provide the near-real-time intelligence thatallows military commanders to place bombs on the exact targets intended. The greater use of theU-2 derived from improvements in surveillance and communications technologies as well as themuch greater availability of precision guided munitions that benefit from U-2-derived data.

Desert Storm saw the largest U-2 operation in history with nine aircraft and thirty pilots flying some five sorties a day. Primary missions were Iraqi Army field positions, bomb damage assessment(BDA), and searching for SCUD missile launching sites. Photography and other data collected fromU-2s was for the first time rapidly available to tactical commanders. Inevitably, there werearguments about collection priorities, and, especially, demands by operational commanders for largervolumes of photographic coverage (especially wide-area coverage) even though some intelligenceofficials believed that electro-optic and radar collection was a better use of assets. There weredifficulties with developing photography in-theater and with disseminating hard copies. Nonetheless, according to one estimate, U-2s provided 30% of total intelligence, 50% of imageryintelligence, and 90% of all Army targeting intelligence for the entire theater. (17)

Military operations over the former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s saw continued reliance on the U-2 by military commanders. Balkan missions were initially related to gathering information ontreaty verification, troop dispositions, and missile sites. During the NATO attack on Serbian forcesin the spring of 1999, known as Operation Allied Force, U-2s were used to identify Serbian targetsand to conduct BDA to determine the accuracy of Allied strikes. Data collected by an airborne U-2was transmitted back to Beale Air Force Base in California for analysis (18) and then sent back tooperations centers and thence to aircraft which could attack the target. Admiral Daniel Murphy,Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet during Allied Force, recalled having satellite positioning dataon key Serbian early warning radars.

But that was insufficient for targeting a Tomahawk missile, which was the weapon that we intended to employ. So I walked into the intelligence centerand sitting there was a 22-year-old intelligence specialist who was talking to Beale Air Force Basevia secure telephone and Beale Air Force Base was driving a U-2 over the top of this spot. The U-2snapped the picture, fed it back to Beale Air Force base where that young sergeant to my young pettyofficer said, we have got it, we have confirmation. I called Admiral Ellis [Commander, AlliedForces Southern Europe], he called General Clark [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe], and about15 minutes later we had three Tomahawk missiles en route and we destroyed those threeradars. (19)

Another senior Air Force general wrote after the Kosovo campaign, "We never dropped a bomb on a target without having a U-2 take a look at it." (20)

To meet requirements for Allied Force, U-2 pilots and support personnel were transferred from other theaters. As one senior Air Force commander noted, U-2s were "stretched to the limit duringAllied Force." (21) Observers suggest that if the AirForce were required to conduct operations on ascale larger than Allied Force, limits on U-2 availability would have to be faced and could constrainthe effectiveness of precision bombing campaigns.

In addition to missions in the Balkans, U-2s continue to fly collection missions over Iraq and the Korean peninsula. In those regions they supplement collection by satellite and other systems andare intended to provide early warning of attacks. Their chief defense is their ability to operate ataltitudes above 70,000 feet, far higher than most military aircraft and out of the range of most SAMs. U-2s are not, however, by any means invulnerable. Besides the celebrated shootdown of the planecarrying Gary Powers, a number of other U-2s were lost flying classified missions over the Asianmainland in the 1960s and 1970s. In the current environment, U-2s can in many cases collectrequired information by remaining in international airspace. U-2 overflights of Iraqi territory,however, have raised concerns about their vulnerability. Fighter escorts have been assigned to coverthem and stiff warnings have been delivered to Bagdad, threatening dire consequences should effortsbe made to attack U-2 missions. The availabiliy of SAMs to various governments that can reachusual U-2 flying altitude represents a standing threat that air force planners must take intoconsideration.

RQ-4A Global Hawk

The RQ-4A Global Hawk is a high altitude, long endurance, long range un-piloted aerial vehicle designed to perform many of the same functions as the U-2. Global Hawk is the product of anadvanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD), a program designed to quickly transitionemerging technology from the laboratory to the warfighter.

The program started in May 1994 when the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) solicited industry for submissions for a competitive procurement effort. Phase 2 of theprogram began in May 1995, when Teledyne Ryan/E-Systems was selected as the sole contractor(Ryan Aeronautical was subsequently acquired by Northrop Grumman). (22) The Global Hawkundertook its first flight on February 28, 1998. It flew a second and third time in May 1998. OnMarch 29, 1999, Global Hawk #2 crashed during a flight at China Lake Naval Weapons Center,when it "inadvertently received a test signal for flight termination from a test range on Nellis AirForce Base, Nev." (23) Global Hawk completedits ACTD phase in June 2000 and moved into a"normal" acquisition program in engineering, manufacturing and development (EMD). (24) As ofOctober 2000, the Global Hawk has logged 62 flights for a total of 737 flight hours, 301 of whichhave been in airspace controlled by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The Global Hawkhas flown as high as 66,000 feet and for as long as 31 hours at one time. (25)

The Global Hawk's ground-based support is composed of a Mission Control Element (MCE) and a Launch and Recovery Element (LRE). These elements are composed of people (4 in the MCE,2 in the LRE), computers, communications gear and shelters. (26) Together, the MCE and LRE canoperate up to three aerial vehicles simultaneously. The LRE needs to be deployed to the GlobalHawk's operating base, but the MCEs could theoretically be based anywhere. It takes two C-17Globemaster aircraft to deploy the two ground elements. The Global Hawk, as evidenced by a recentflight from the United States to Portugal, can self deploy.

As currently designed, the Global Hawk can carry electro-optical, IR, and synthetic aperture radar sensors. It is not designed to carry SIGINT sensors. While the Global Hawk's EO and IRcapabilities are on-par with the U-2s, its SAR capabilities are not. Due to greater power and a largerantenna, the U-2 can more effectively use its SAR to detect moving targets than can the GlobalHawk. If used to find static targets however, the U-2 and Global Hawk SAR capabilities are morecomparable.

DOD's current plan is to manufacture twelve Global Hawk air vehicles between FY2003 and FY2009. These UAVs would carry the EO/IR/SAR sensor payload, and are described by the AirForce as a complement to the U-2. In FY2009, the Air Force wants to produce four of the nextgeneration Global Hawks, which could carry SIGINT sensors, instead of either the EO/IR or theSAR payload. The Air Force describes the capabilities of this next generation as being on par withthe U-2 and asserts that they could replace the U-2. (27)

Summary: Platform Comparisons

A review of Table 2 below highlights the key similarities and differences between the U-2 and Global Hawk. On a one-to-one basis, a comparison of these characteristics is important for policymakers to consider when making decisions on the overall size and composition of the U.S. airborneISR force structure. There are significant similarities. The platforms are of similar physicaldimension. They fly at approximately the same altitude and at similar speeds. Yet, there areimportant differences between the platforms that stand out when comparing the U-2 and GlobalHawk on a platform-to-platform basis. These differences include (1) pilot requirements, (2) rangeand endurance, and (3) mission payload.

The first difference between the platforms is the Global Hawk's lack of a pilot. While not putting a pilot in danger appears obviously beneficial, there are a number of associated issues thatmerit discussion. One potential downside to being pilotless is that the platform is not as responsiveto changing circumstances as a piloted aircraft. Remotely located mission control personnel cannot,in theory, make decisions and take action as quickly as a pilot on the scene. However, during amission, U-2 pilots infrequently take action based on what they personally observe from the cockpit. Rather, they typically make adjustments to their pre-planned mission profile based on warnings andorders from mission control elements. Thus, unmanned aircraft may not suffer from a lack ofresponsiveness in the high altitude ISR mission as they would if performing other missions.

The lack of a pilot may be more of a hindrance when flying through civil-controlled U.S. and foreign-country airspace than it is when overflying a combat area. Civil authorities are concernedthat in the event of an unforeseen emergency, such as an engine burnout, or malfunction, a pilotlessaircraft would be less able to take corrective action, such as making a controlled landing at a localairfield. Instead, they fear that a pilotless aircraft would be more likely to crash into inhabited areas.Therefore, civil authorities currently impose very demanding mission planning requirements onunmanned systems; if they allow them to overfly at all. This exhaustive mission planning takes time,manpower and money.

Finally, the Global Hawk's lack of a pilot doesn't necessarily confer increased operational utility. The Global Hawk's size, flight profile and lack of stealth features suggest it is approximatelyas survivable as the U-2. It will likely be employed as the U-2 is: outside of high threatenvironments such as long-range SAMs. At approximately $50 million each, the Global Hawk istoo expensive to be considered expendable.

The second difference between the Global Hawk and U-2 that bears discussion is that of range and endurance. The Global Hawk has superior range and endurance to the U-2. Global Hawk canfly approximately twice as far as the U-2, and its loiter time is three times that of the U-2. Thissuggests important ramifications for the number of platforms required in the overall ISR inventory.All other things being equal, fewer platforms with long endurance can do the same job as moreplatforms with less endurance.

The third noteworthy difference between the platforms is payload. The U-2 enjoys an advantage in payload over the Global Hawk of more than two-to one. This allows it to carry more and differentpayloads. A larger payload capability also provides more potential for unforseen upgrades andtradeoffs. Generically speaking, a larger volume on an aircraft presents engineers with more choicesand opportunities than a smaller volume. Additionally, the U-2's large engine provides moreelectrical power than the Global Hawk's, which in turn increases the capabilities of some of itssensor payloads. All things being equal, fewer platforms with more sensors can do the same job asmore platforms with fewer sensors.

Table 2. Comparison of Key Characteristics

Congressional Action

Overview

Congress has long taken a special interest in U-2 programs. In the past decade, the planes have been re-engined to enable them to fly at higher altitudes for longer periods. A variety of improvedsensors and communications data-links have been acquired or funded and necessary steps are beingtaken to install them on aircraft. A cockpit upgrade is underway that will bring control systems inthe U-2 up to current Air Force standards. The U-2 has been declared a "congressional interest item."

The need of the regional military commanders (CINCs) for tactical airborne intelligence capabilities is universally acknowledged within DOD. U-2s and UAVs are both in high demand andthe inventories ("density") of both types of platforms are low. Although, according to someobservers, the Clinton Administration may have been somewhat more inclined to deploy forces in"peacekeeping" missions than either of its likely successors, most analysts believe that U.S. militaryforces will not escape the types of missions in disparate countries that will require preciseintelligence of potential targets. These missions are as likely to occur in the next few years as theyare in 2010 or 2020.

DOD's current plans aim to provide today's and future warfighting CINCs with adequate ISR. Planning envisions the continued upgrading of the U-2, possibly augmenting it, and eventuallyreplacing it with the Global Hawk UAV. ISR for the foreseeable future will inevitably be limited byavailability of airborne platforms. At present there are only some 35 U-2s, the number of pilots andground crew is limited; and there no operational Global Hawks. Many observers believe that, evenif UAVs can ultimately replace the entire U-2 force, many more units than currently envisioned willbe required as well as an extensive period of operational familiarization and training.

DOD Budget FY 2001

In considering the FY2001 Defense budget, the four major oversight committees -- House Armed Services, Senate Armed Services, House Appropriations, and Senate Appropriations --expressed concern regarding U-2 procurement issues such as the Senior Year Electro OpticalReconnaissance System (SYERS), the Joint Signals Intelligence Avionics Family (JSAF), and theacquisition of a two-seat training aircraft.

Some oversight committees expressed concern that the administration's budget request underfunded initial deployment spares for the SYERS upgrade by at least $3.0 million. Authorization conferees recommended a $3 million increase to remedy this concern, whileappropriations conferees did not. Also, there was consensus among the defense oversightcommittees that the Air Force required additional RDT&E funds to adequately support continueddevelopment of the U-2 SYERS. A polarization technique that would provide the SYERS withincreased ability to penetrate foliage and camouflage was expressly supported in congressionallanguage.

The JSAF would provide an upgraded information collection capability for the U-2s. Yet, the administration's request was insufficient to procure an entire JSAF suite and required spares andcabling. Therefore, appropriations and authorizations conferees recommended an increase to theDefense Airborne Reconnaissance Program (DARP) of $8 million for an additional JSAF unit forthe U-2.

There are currently four two-seat U-2 training aircraft in DOD's inventory, and, as discussed earlier, producing sufficient numbers of U-2 pilots is a constant concern. To remedy this, Houseauthorizers recommended making available an additional $10 million and $14 million respectivelyto procure a fifth two-seat U-2 trainer; and House appropriators supported that authorization. Appropriations and authorization conferees noted that $111.6 million and $14 million had alreadybeen made available for U-2 sensor improvements and a U-2 trainer respectively in the FY2000Supplemental Appropriations Act ( P.L. 106-246 ) enacted on July 13, 2000. ( H.R. 4425 , P.L. 106-710 .) Appropriations and authorization conferees therefore reduced funding for U-2 relatedprocurement below the administration's request.

While supporting the Administration's request for $373.1 million in U-2 (and RC-135) operations and maintenance funding, House authorizers expressed concern that "funding for manyIntelligence Community programs, including intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)aircraft are regularly transferred from the pro-grams for which funds were authorized andappropriated to fund shortfalls in other programs, often not related to ISR requirements." (30) Notingtestimony by regional CINCS that shortfalls in ISR aircraft and systems were a top priority, theHouse Armed Services Committee directed that the RC-135 and U-2 programs be designated ascongressional interest items.

Table 3: Summary of U-2 & Global Hawk Funding FY2001 (in millions $)

The Air Force FY2001 budget requested $22.3 million in procurement funding and $109.2 million in RDT&E funding for the HAE UAVs. The $22.3 million would be used for procurementof long lead items for the first two production Global Hawk UAVs and one common ground station.Continued development of the Global Hawk would be supported by $103.2 of the $109.3 milliontotal for this line item. All defense oversight committees except the Senate Armed ServicesCommittee supported the procurement request. The SASC concurred with a recent GAO report thatfound it premature to enter into production in FY2001 and zeroed out the request. (31)

The House Armed Services and Senate Appropriations committees matched the administration's request for RDT&E funding. Expressing interest in the potential of Global Hawkto support counter-drug activities, the Senate Armed Services committee increased the RDT&Erequest by $18 million so Global Hawk engineers could explore the integration and use of an AESA(advanced electronically steered array) radar. (32) The Senate Appropriations Committee andAppropriations conferees also supported an $18 million increase; but the House did not. Authorization conferees adopted the AESA provision language but did not increase fundingaccordingly.

Intelligence Budget FY 2001

Some information on actions taken by the Congress on intelligence programs associated with the U-2 and the Global Hawk is available from committee reports on intelligence authorization bills. The published reports are, however, accompanied by classified annexes that provide greater detailand have legal authority. The reports also provide a sense of congressional opinion. In May 2000,the House Intelligence Committee concluded:

In the area of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, we continue to see extensive over-utilization of very limited, butcritical airborne assets, with little relief in sight. While planning for deployment of new ISR airbornecapabilities into the theaters, the Department of Defense has taken money from existing, supposedlycomplementary, platforms to pay for future capabilities. The result: our overall ISR capabilities andresources are decreasing at a time when our military forces are relying on them more andmore. (33)

The House Committee approved the Administration's total request of $373.1 for operations and maintenance of the U-2 and RC-135 while designating them as congressional interest items. It alsorecommended increased funding for various U-2 modifications, including $3 million for initialdeployment spares for the SYERS upgrade and $8 million for JSAF as well as the conversion of oneU-2 into a trainer. Taken together the House Intelligence Committee recommended $132.6 million,an increase of $34.2 million for U-2 modifications. The Senate Intelligence Committee did notprovide similar details on its views on the U-2 or the Global Hawk nor were these actions reflectedin the intelligence authorization conference report. (34) It is likely, however, that House IntelligenceCommittee actions were consistent with those taken by the House Armed Services Committee.

The budgeting and funding of airborne reconnaissance programs are complicated by overlapping roles of intelligence agencies and congressional intelligence oversight committees onone hand and, on the other, by the military departments (in this case the Air Force) and theircongressional overseers in the armed services and appropriations committees. There is coordinationbetween intelligence and defense programs both within the executive branch and amongcongressional committees, but some observers believe that the ISR platforms inevitably come outsecond best in competition with bombers and fighter aircraft. In May 2000 the House IntelligenceCommittee stated that it "is concerned that funding from many intelligence Community programs,including intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance ISR) aircraft are regularly transferred fromthe programs for which funds were authorized and appropriated to fund shortfalls in other programs,often not related to ISR requirements." (35) In thisas in other areas, current pressures on defensespending inevitably complicate efforts to provide adequate resources for U-2s, Global Hawk UAVs,and other ISR programs.

There are also longstanding concerns that the relationships between space-based and airborne surveillance platforms, and between "national" and tactical systems are not always well balanced. Some observers question the extent to which systems have been designed to maximize the usefulnessof systems to both national and tactical consumers, suggesting that bureaucratic obstacles more thantechnological limitations may inhibit use by multiple consumers.

Issues and Options

The Air Force, persuaded that Global Hawk will meet many, if not all, its airborne surveillancerequirements, is inclined to accelerate the acquisition effort beyond the twelve Global Hawksplanned for FY03-FY09. To supply the $960 million required in additional funding, Secretary of theAir Force Whitten Peters has said that he is considering reductions in the U-2 program beginningin FY2006 and retirement of all U-2s by FY2011. (36) This will inevitably be a controversial decision. The U-2 is one of the most heavily deployed aircraft in the Air Force's inventory, widely acclaimedby the CINCs, and the beneficiary of a series of expensive upgrades in recent years that haveelongated its service life. A "congressional interest item," the U-2 is the "bird in the hand" whereasthe Global Hawk has yet to be fielded. A formal decision to retire the U-2 early to free up funds foradditional UAVs will likely be given close scrutiny by Congress and the public.

Advocates of the proposal note that Global Hawks have performed well in tests. They argue that the Global Hawk's long endurance gives it the ability to perform the U-2's imagery collectionmissions with fewer platforms. Furthermore, future upgrades and reconfigurations will give GlobalHawk the U-2's SIGINT collection capability. To lay the groundwork for future airborne surveillancecapabilities, it is reasonable, according to this view, to retire the U-2s beginning in 2006 rather thangradually phasing them out by attrition and make instead the investment in the next generation ofairborne reconnaissance platforms.

Air Force options on Global Hawks and U-2s appear to be based on the assumption that funding must be adjusted within overall limits on spending for ISR programs. Apparently an earlytermination of the U-2 effort is the most acceptable way for the Air Force to identify funding for atrade-off to fund accelerated acquisition of the Global Hawk within its budgetary constraints. Someobservers suggest that Air Force officials may anticipate that, at some point, funding might beidentified elsewhere within the defense budget or that Congress might provide funding specificallyfor additional Global Hawks. One report noted, "some service sources say it is unlikely the AirForce will be able to come up with the money without significant help from OSD [Office of theSecretary of Defense] or Congress." (37)

Opponents of the proposal believe that the two systems should operate simultaneously. They argue that, considering the very high demand for today's innumerous airborne ISR assets, it isessential that the Air Force increase today's ISR capabilities, not just replace them on a one-to-onebasis. Opponents of Secretary Peters's proposal also argue that the U-2 should not be phased outuntil the Global Hawk is produced and employed in large numbers, and its operational capabilitiesand limitations are well understood. This, they say, would ensure a smooth transition from today'sISR fleet to tomorrow's, and would ensure that the replacement of U-2s does not result in a loss ofan essential capability.

Opponents also argue that decommissioning all U-2s which, as a result of extensive investment in upgrades have an expected service life of up to 50 more years, would be wasteful of an importantcapability. They note that whereas fewer UAVs than U-2s might be needed for the same missionif they were identically equipped, the actual number of Global Hawks required might vary since theycannot (at least at present) carry the same set of collection systems as the U-2. Furthermore, theycontend, it is unclear when Air Force scientists will be able to overcome the technologicalimpediments that currently limit the Global Hawk's payload.

There may be other options that could be pursued to maintain or improve DOD's aerial ISR capability until the Global Hawk is optimally configured, and produced in sufficient quantities, toreplace the U-2. These options include (1) increasing the number of operational U-2s; (2) moreeffectively managing the existing U-2 inventory; (3) attracting and retaining more U-2 pilots; or (4)returning the SR-71 aircraft to active service.

There are currently 31 operational U-2s with another four used as trainers. At any one time, three of the 31 operational U-2s are in depot for maintenance. Since it takes five U-2s to maintaina 24 hour orbit (38) , these 28 U-2s can theoreticallyoperate in five to six different spots on the globeat the same time. Given the limited inventory of U-2s, a key concern is the foreseeable loss ofaircraft through accidents and attrition. In recent years, one U-2 has been lost through attrition everytwo years. If this rate persists, by 2008 the Air Force would only have enough U-2s to provide 24hour coverage of four to five different spots at any one time.

Some urge the procurement of additional U-2s by reopening the production line. This idea has received some congressional attention. (39) Someobservers believe that this may be a cost-effectiveway to make additional platforms available in a relatively short period of time. The technology iswell-proven under operational conditions and acquiring new platforms would not require longlead-times for research and development and costs would be relatively manageable.

Others argue that such a step would be counterproductive in that the Air Force would have a fleet of U-2s of varying ages which would present maintenance problems at some point.Furthermore, they suggest that the U-2 is representative of decades-old technology and is difficultto fly. Also, the U-2 production line has lain fallow for approximately 20 years. Is re-opening thisline feasible? If so, at what cost? Another key consideration is manning; the U-2 requires speciallytrained pilots whose employability in other Air Force positions becomes limited. Most importantly,it places pilots at risk of death or capture. Proponents of re-opening the U-2 line counter, however,that it should be possible to manufacture future U-2s that don't require a pilot. The additional costsof re-designing the U-2 to fly without a pilot are unclear, but advances and technologies developedunder the Global Hawk and other UAV programs could probably be exploited.

Another important action that could be taken to relieve the high operational tempo felt by the U-2 force would be to attract more pilots to the program and better retain the ones already qualifiedto fly the Dragon Lady . U-2 proponents suggest that Congress may wish to enquire about steps theAir Force has or has not undertaken to attract more pilots into the U-2 program. What, for example,would be the impact on overall recruitment and retention if the Air Force were to dictate that agreater percentage of its pilots enter the U-2 program?

Options may also exist to more effectively manage DOD's current U-2 inventory. For instance, only four U-2 training aircraft exist. This lack of trainers could slow the pace of preparing new U-2pilots for their missions. It is feasible that two-seat training aircraft could be used to fly operationalmissions if required, though with diminished capabilities. However, the 31 single-seat aircraft usedto fly operations can't be used to train new pilots. Therefore, the reduction in ISR capability causedby converting a handful of single-seat U-2s to two-seat trainers may be outweighed by theimprovement in training capabilities.

Another inventory management issue that might be examined is the U-2's foreign basing arrangements. In addition to bases in the United States, U-2s currently operate from five air baseslocated in France, Cyprus, Spain, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia. The Air Force is currentlywithdrawing the U-2 from the French and Cypriot locations. Fewer forward bases may mean thatU-2s could spend a greater percentage of their 10 hour missions transiting to and from the theaterto be observed, and less time collecting intelligence. Additional U-2s would be required to overflythe theater to maintain the same amount of coverage. Base consolidation has been justified by thedissolution of the Soviet Union. Yet there has also been a proliferation of smaller scalecontingencies in which the United States has an interest. This raises questions about the efficacy ofreducing the U-2's operational basing by two fifths at a time of high operational tempo. Someobservers have suggested that examining the utility of opening additional U-2 bases in differenttheaters may be in order.

Another inventory management issue pertains to the Expeditionary Air Force concept. To increase deployment predictability and more evenly distribute the deployment burden, the Air Forceis dividing its people and forces into 10 Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs). These AEFs are looseamalgams of resources that will rotate through set training and deployment cycles. Currently, the AirForce does not have a similar strategy for its "high demand, low density" (HD/LD) assets such asthe U-2. Instead, U-2s are sent to a given theater as demand rises. Some within DOD have suggestedthat the U-2 and other ISR assets could be included in the current AEF concept and thus increase U-2deployment predictability. This idea may help distribute the deployment burden throughout the U-2force, but may not reduce the deployment tempo, due to low numbers of operational platforms. Another suggested option is to devise an AEF-like inventory management scheme specifically forthe U-2.

Different variants of the Global Hawk may have to be developed and other UAVs or manned aircraft may be acquired. The Global Hawk is not the only UAV potentially available, but it hasbeen designed to meet certain DOD requirements for range and endurance. Configuring smallerUAVs, such as the Predator, to accomplish at least some of Global Hawk's mission capabilitiesmight be feasible, but would entail considerable delays and could come at the cost of otheroperational capabilities. Yet, this idea may merit further investigation.

A final option that may bear investigation is to "un-retire" a handful of SR-71 Black Bird aircraft. Proponents of this approach point out that the SR-71 was a very capable ISR asset. Its veryhigh speed contributed to the SR-71's survivability, and increased the potential volume of territorythat could be surveilled. Also, several SR-71 airframes still exist. They have been preserved at theAir Force facility in Palmdale, California. Also, SR-71 aircraft have been "un-retired" in the past.Opponents of this idea point out that the SR-71 was a very expensive aircraft to fly and maintain,and that flying just a handful would not be cost effective. Also, the airframes may exist, but whatabout pilots? Are there any pilots qualified to fly the aircraft? Are there any pilots qualified to teachand train pilots? Opponents of this idea argue that un-retiring the SR-71 would be too expensive ameasure to simply bridge the gap between the U-2 and Global Hawk.

Conclusion

It is likely that Congress will play a key role in dealing with the futures of the Global Hawk andthe U-2. Direct congressional interest in UAVs is longstanding and funding and policy direction forthe Global Hawk has been reflected in a series of appropriations and authorization acts. Similarly,Congress has also monitored the U-2 program closely in recent years, identifying funding forupgrades to the aircraft and for additional surveillance and communications equipment. Plans forthe early retirement of the U-2 force will undoubtedly be viewed with care and there will be interestin the progress of Global Hawk acquisition and its integration into the operating forces.

Appendix 1: Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration

AEF Air Expeditionary Force

ASARS Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System

BDA Battle Damage Assessment

CINC Commander In Chief (of a U.S. Unified or Specified Command)

COMINT Communications Intelligence

DARP Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program

DOD Department of Defense

ELINT Electronic Intelligence

EMD Engineering, Manufacturing and Development

EO Electro Optical

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

GAO General Accounting Office

HD/LD High Demand, Low Density

IOC Initial Operational Capability

IR Infra Red

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

LRE Launch, Recovery Unit

JSAF Joint Signals Intelligence Avionics Family

MCE Mission Control Element

PGM Precision Guided Munition

RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SLAR Side Looking Airborne Radar

SYERS Senior Year Electro Optical Reconnaissance System

TAD Temporary Additional Duty

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle