Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel: Observations on the Key Attributes and Challenges of Storage and Disposal Options
Released: 2013-04-11T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Since the publication of a 1957 report by the National Academy of Sciences, a geologic repository has been considered the safest and most secure method of isolating spent nuclear fuel and other types of nuclear waste from humans and the environment. During the 1950s and 1960s, managing spent nuclear fuel received relatively little attention from policymakers. The early regulators and developers of nuclear power viewed spent fuel disposal primarily as a technical problem that could be solved when necessary by application of existing technology. Attempts were made to reprocess the spent nuclear fuel, but they were not successful because of economic issues and concerns that reprocessed nuclear materials raised proliferation risks. The Atomic Energy Commission, a predecessor to DOE, attempted to develop high-level waste repositories in Kansas and New Mexico in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but neither succeeded because of local community and state opposition. NWPA established the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste as a federal responsibility. Briefly, NWPA provided for the development of two geologic repositories and directed the Secretary of Energy to recommend three candidate sites and conduct studies to characterize each site. This same process was to be used for a second set of sites for the second repository. Table 1 summarizes some of the key decisions and events just prior to and as a result of NWPA.

In the Secretary of Energy’s February 2002 recommendation to the President that Yucca Mountain be developed as the site for an underground repository for spent fuel and other radioactive wastes, the Secretary described the three criteria to make the determination that Yucca Mountain was the appropriate site. Specifically: Is Yucca Mountain a scientifically and technically suitable site for a repository?

Are there compelling national interests that favor proceeding with the decision to site a repository there?

Are there countervailing considerations that would outweigh those interests?

The Secretary also described the steps DOE had taken to inform residents and others. Specifically, DOE held meetings in the vicinity of the prospective site to inform the residents of the site’s consideration as a repository and receive their comments, as directed by NWPA. The Secretary added that DOE went beyond NWPA’s requirements for providing notice and information prior to the selection of Yucca Mountain. He concluded that the Yucca Mountain site was qualified as the site for the repository and accordingly recommended the site to the President.

Since the Secretary’s recommendation was made, the nation’s inventory of commercial spent nuclear fuel has continued to grow. The nation currently has about 70,000 metric tons of commercial spent nuclear fuel stored at 75 sites in 33 states (see fig. 1). This inventory is expected to more than double by 2055—assuming that the nation’s current reactors continue to produce spent nuclear fuel at the same rate and that no new reactors are brought online, and that some decline in the generation of spent fuel takes place as reactors are retired. Although some elements of spent nuclear fuel cool and decay quickly, becoming less dangerous, others remain dangerous to human health and the environment for tens of thousands of years.

Most commercial spent nuclear fuel is stored at operating reactor sites; it is immersed in pools of water designed to cool and isolate it from the environment. Without a nuclear waste repository to move the spent nuclear fuel to, the racks in the pools holding spent fuel have been rearranged to allow for more dense storage of the spent fuel. Even with this rearrangement, spent nuclear fuel pools are reaching their capacities. As reactor operators have run out of space in their spent nuclear fuel pools, they have turned increasingly to dry cask storage systems that generally consist of stainless steel canisters placed inside larger stainless steel or concrete casks. A dry storage facility typically consists of security and safety mechanisms, such as a defensive perimeter with intrusion detection devices and radiation monitors surrounding a concrete pad with the dry storage casks emplaced on it. Regulatory requirements for radiation exposure for this type of facility are significantly different from those of a repository. For example, spent fuel need only be stored safely for the life of the storage facility, currently 40 years, which is in contrast to the 1 million year period for which safe storage must be demonstrated under the Environmental Protection Agency regulation promulgated for the Yucca Mountain repository. In August 2012, we reported that reactors at nine sites have been retired and that seven of these sites have completely removed spent fuel from their pools, as well as removing all infrastructure except that needed to safeguard the spent fuel. Since then, an eighth site has also emptied its pool, and is in the process of removing associated infrastructure. These sites serve no other purpose than to continue storing this spent fuel. As additional reactors retire, reactor operators will likely move all their spent nuclear fuel to dry storage and remove all other structures. We reported in November 2009 that experts we spoke with stated that dry cask storage systems are expected to be able to safely store spent nuclear fuel for at least 100 years. The experts said that, if these systems degrade over time, the spent nuclear fuel may have to be repackaged, which could require construction of new spent nuclear fuel pools or other structures to safely transfer the spent nuclear fuel to new storage systems. In addition, the experts said that spent fuel in centralized interim storage could present future security risks because, as spent fuel cools, it loses some of its self-protective qualities, potentially making it a more attractive target for sabotage or theft.

NWPA also authorized DOE to contract with commercial nuclear reactor operators to take custody of their spent nuclear fuel for disposal at the repository beginning in January 1998. Ultimately, DOE was unable to meet this 1998 date. As we reported in August 2012, because DOE did not take custody of the spent fuel starting in 1998, as required under NWPA, DOE reported that, as of September 2011, 76 lawsuits had been filed against it by utilities to recover claimed damages resulting from the delay. In August 2012, we reported that these lawsuits have resulted in a cost to taxpayers of about $1.6 billion from the U.S. Treasury’s judgment fund. We also reported that DOE estimated that future liabilities would In November 2012, total about an additional $21 billion through 2020.DOE reported that the cost to taxpayers is now $2.6 billion and that future liabilities are now approximately $19.7 billion for a total of about $22.3 billion. DOE has also estimated that future liabilities may cost about $500 million each year after 2020.

Attributes and Challenges of the Yucca Mountain Repository

In November 2009, we reported on the attributes and challenges of a Yucca Mountain repository. We reported that DOE had spent billions of dollars for design, engineering, and testing activities for the Yucca Mountain site and had submitted a license to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. If the repository had been built as planned, we stated that it would have provided a permanent solution for the nation’s nuclear waste, including commercial nuclear fuel, and would have minimized the uncertainty of future waste safety. Based on a review of key documents and interviews with DOE, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and numerous other officials, we also reported in November 2009 that the construction of a repository at Yucca Mountain could have allowed the government to begin taking possession of the nuclear waste in about 10 to 30 years. DOE had reported in July 2008 that its best achievable date for opening the repository, if it had received Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval, would have been 2020. If the Yucca Mountain repository was completed and operational sooner than one or more temporary storage facilities or an alternative repository, it could have helped address the federal liabilities resulting from industry lawsuits related to continued storage of spent nuclear fuel at reactor sites. We also reported in August 2012 that states and community groups had raised concerns that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was extending the licenses of current reactors or approving licenses for new reactors without a long-term solution for the disposition of spent nuclear fuel. If Yucca Mountain was licensed and constructed and began accepting spent nuclear fuel for disposal by 2027, which was the earliest likely opening date we estimated in our August 2012 report, some of these concerns could have been addressed.

GAO-11-229. face challenges in reconstituting its work force. According to DOE, contractor, and former DOE officials we spoke with, it could take years for DOE to assemble the right mix of experts to restart work on the license application. When DOE terminated its licensing efforts, many of the federal and contractor staff working on the program retired or moved on to other jobs. Third, project funding could continue to be a challenge. As we reported, DOE’s budget for the Yucca Mountain repository program was not predictable because annual appropriations varied by as much as 20 percent from year to year. We recommended that Congress consider a more predictable funding mechanism for the project, which the Blue Ribbon Commission also recommended in its January 2012 report.

Attributes and Challenges of Centralized Interim Storage

We reported in November 2009 on several positive attributes of centralized interim storage—a near-term temporary storage alternative for managing the spent fuel that has accumulated and will continue to accumulate. First, centralized interim storage could allow DOE to consolidate the nation’s nuclear waste after reactors are decommissioned, thereby decreasing the complexity of securing and overseeing the waste located at reactor sites around the nation and increasing the efficiency of waste storage operations. Second, by moving spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned reactor sites to DOE’s centralized interim storage facility and taking custody of the spent fuel, DOE would begin to address the taxpayer financial liabilities stemming from industry lawsuits. Third, centralized interim storage could prevent utilities from having to build additional dry storage to store nuclear waste at operating reactor sites. Fourth, centralized interim storage could also provide the nation with some flexibility to consider alternative policies or new technologies by giving more time to consider alternatives and implement them. For example, centralized interim storage would keep spent fuel in a safe, easily accessible configuration for future recycling, if the nation decided to pursue recycling as a management option in the future.

However, centralized interim storage also presents challenges. First, as we reported in November 2009 and August 2012, a key challenge confronting centralized interim storage is the uncertainty of DOE’s statutory authority to provide centralized storage. Provisions in NWPA that allow DOE to arrange for centralized storage have either expired or are unusable because they are tied to milestones in repository development that have not been met. It is not clear what other authority DOE or an independent entity might use for providing centralized interim storage of spent nuclear fuel. A second, equally important, challenge is the likelihood of opposition during site selection for a centralized interim storage facility. As we reported in November 2009, even if a community might be willing to host such a facility, finding a state that would be willing to host it could be extremely challenging, particularly since some states have voiced concerns that a centralized interim facility could become a de facto permanent disposal site. In 2011, the Western Governors Association passed a resolution stating that no centralized interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel can be established in a western state without the expressed written consent of the governors. Third, centralized interim storage may also present transportation challenges. As we reported in August 2012, it is likely that the spent fuel would have to be transported twice—once to the centralized interim storage site and once to a permanent disposal site. The total distance over which the spent fuel would have to be transported would likely be greater than with other alternatives. The Nuclear Energy Institute has reported that of all the spent fuel currently in dry storage, only about 30 percent is directly transportable because of its current heat load, particularly since the nuclear industry packaged some spent nuclear fuel in dry storage containers to maximize storage capacity. We also reported in August 2012 that officials from a state regional organization that we spoke with said that transportation planning could be a complex endeavor, potentially taking 10 years to reach agreement on transportation routes and safety and security procedures. Fourth, although DOE had previously estimated that it could site, license, construct, and begin operations of a centralized interim storage facility within 6 years, it could take considerably longer depending on how long it takes to find a willing state and community, as well as license and construct the facility. Finally, as we reported in November 2009, developing centralized interim storage would not ultimately preclude the need for final disposal of the spent nuclear fuel.

Attributes and Challenges of a Permanent Repository at a Location Other Than Yucca Mountain

As we reported in November 2009, siting, licensing, and developing a permanent repository at a location other than Yucca Mountain could provide the opportunity to find a location that might achieve broader acceptance than the Yucca Mountain repository program. If a more widely accepted approach or site is identified, it carries the potential for avoiding costly delays experienced by the Yucca Mountain repository program. In addition, a new approach that involves a new entity for spent fuel management, as we concluded in our April 2011 report and the Blue Ribbon Commission recommended in January 2012, could add to transparency and consensus building.

However, there are also key challenges to developing an alternative repository. First, as we reported in April 2011, developing a repository other than Yucca Mountain will restart the likely time-consuming and costly process of siting, licensing, and developing a repository. We reported that DOE had spent nearly $15 billion on the Yucca Mountain It is not yet clear how much it will ultimately cost to begin the project.process again and develop a repository at another location. Moreover, it is uncertain what legislative changes might be needed, if any, in part because the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended, directs DOE to terminate all site specific activities at candidate sites other than Yucca Mountain. Second, it is unclear whether the Nuclear Waste Fund will be sufficient to fund a repository at another site. The fund was established under NWPA to pay industry’s share of the cost for the Yucca Mountain repository and was funded by a fee of one-tenth of a cent per kilowatt- hour of nuclear-generated electricity. The fund paid about 65 percent, or about $9.5 billion, of the expenditure for Yucca Mountain. According to DOE’s fiscal year 2012 financial report, the Nuclear Waste Fund currently has about $29 billion and grows by over $1 billion each year from accumulated fees and interest. However, utilities only pay into the fund for as long as their reactors are operating, and it is not clear how much longer reactor operators will be paying into the fund. For example, two utilities have announced plans—one in 2010 and the other in 2013—to shut down two reactor sites prior to their license expiration. As reactors are retired, they will need to be replaced by new reactors paying into the fund, or according to DOE officials, the fund might be drawn down faster than it can be replenished when developing a new repository.

When more comprehensive information becomes available both about the process that DOE, or another agency, will be using to select a site and possible locations for a permanent repository, additional positive attributes as well as challenges may also come to light.

Chairman Frelinghuysen, Ranking Member Kaptur, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Janet Frisch, Assistant Director, and Kevin Bray, Robert Sánchez, and Kiki Theodoropoulos made key contributions to this testimony.

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