Inspectors General: Information on Operational and Staffing Issues
Released: 1999-01-04T00:00:00

Letter

Profile of the Offices of the Inspector General

We sent a questionnaire to all 57 IGs to obtain information on IG organization structure, staffing, and workload. The following series of 11 questions and answers provide an overall profile of the 56 IGs who responded. More specifically, information is provided that relates to the IGs’ budget obligations, number and classification of staff by occupational job series, career background and years of experience of the current IGs, and techniques used by IGs to help ensure the quality of the work. 1. What were the IG budget obligations for fiscal year 1997?

For fiscal year 1997, IG reported obligations totaled $957 million. Of the reported amount, about $912 million (95 percent) was for the presidential IGs and $45 million (5 percent) was for the DFE IGs. Figure 1 shows how these funds were distributed among the various types of work performed by the IGs. The largest single use of the funds for the presidential and DFE IGs was for auditing—financial and performance. For the presidential IGs, about 46 percent of the funds was devoted to auditing; similarly, DFE IGs spent about 47 percent of the funding on auditing. 2. How many and what types of staff were employed by the IGs as of September 30, 1997?

In fiscal year 1997, the IGs stated that they had a total of 9,348 staff of which 8,818 staff (94 percent) worked in presidential IG offices and 530 (6 percent) worked in DFE IG offices. As shown in figure 2, these staff are classified in various types of occupational job series. The largest group of the IGs’ staff (45 percent) are auditors, with the next largest group—26 percent—being investigators. Figure 3 provides a breakdown of the occupational job series held by the presidential and DFE IG staff. The reported distribution of the staff among the various occupations is proportionately about the same for both the presidential and DFE IGs.

IGs’ Views on Current Policy Issues

As requested, we sent a questionnaire to all 57 IGs to obtain their views on current policy issues affecting them. These issues include law enforcement authority, the semiannual report, the 7-day letter, independence, and the effectiveness of PCIE, ECIE, and the Integrity Committee. These issues were identified through discussions with congressional staff and review of congressional testimonies and other publications such as those issued by the Congressional Research Service. Since the IGs’ responses were anonymous, we were unable to follow up and obtain additional information or clarification. The following nine questions and answers summarize the views of the 56 IGs who responded to this questionnaire. 1. What type of law enforcement authority do the IGs think they should be granted on a permanent basis?

Currently, law enforcement authorities have not been granted to IGs across-the-board in public law. The IGs that have law enforcement authorities have acquired them through transfers from preexisting offices, specific statutory grants, delegation by the agency head, or special deputation by the Department of Justice. The special deputation can be granted on a case-by-case basis that is limited to the scope and duration of a case or by a blanket authority that covers a broader scope and is renewed after a period of time, as specified in the memorandum of understanding with Justice. In general, the law enforcement authority provided to the IGs in performing investigations include serving arrest warrants, making arrests without warrants, carrying firearms, and serving search warrants. Figure 17 identifies the various types of law enforcement actions that IGs can currently take.

Most presidential IGs (81 percent) indicated that they had blanket authority granted by the Department of Justice. Most DFE IGs (60 percent) indicated that they did not have law enforcement authority but could obtain assistance from other IGs or Justice, if needed. Only three presidential IGs and one DFE IG had statutory law enforcement authority. A few IGs (5) had case-by-case authority granted by Justice.

Figure 18 identifies the type of law enforcement authority the IGs currently desire. Most IGs—81 percent of the presidential and 57 percent of the DFEs—responded that they should have statutory law enforcement authority. In addition, 77 percent of the presidential and 53 percent of the DFEs stated that blanket authority should be indefinite, unless a problem occurs. On a related issue, a majority—58 percent of the presidential and 60 percent of the DFEs—indicated that they should have testimonial subpoena authority. 2. What are IG views on the usefulness of the 7-day letter?

Section 5(d) of the IG Act, as amended, requires IGs to report immediately to the agency head whenever the IG becomes aware of “particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs or operations.” The agency head, in turn, is to transmit the IG report, with the agency head’s comments, to the appropriate committees or subcommittees of the Congress within 7 calendar days. This is referred to as the 7-day letter.

The survey responses indicated that none of the IGs had used the 7-day letter during the period January 1, 1990, to April 30, 1998. Earlier surveys have shown that the 7-day letter had been used on occasion by some IGs. For example, a survey conducted by the Inspections and Special Reviews Committee of PCIE in June 1986, and updated in 1989, showed that the 7-day letter had been used on 10 occasions, by seven IGs.

Although a 7-day letter has not been issued in recent years, the IGs noted that it is a useful mechanism to encourage agencies to comply with the IGs’ requests. A 10-year review of the IG Act by the House Committee on Government Operations found that the IGs viewed the use of the 7-day letter as a last resort to attempt to force appropriate action by the agency. Our survey responses indicated that the IGs continue to view the 7-day letter useful as a tool. Twelve of the 22 presidential IGs and 20 of the 24 DFE IGs that responded to the question find it useful to a great or very great extent. Three IGs specifically stated that the threat of a 7-day letter gets immediate results. Another IG responded that it had threatened the use of the letter twice and in each instance the agency responded to the IG’s request. Figure 19 provides the IGs’ views on the usefulness of the 7-day letter. 3. In the opinion of the IGs, should the current requirement for the preparation of a semiannual report be modified, replaced, or eliminated?

Section 5(a) of the IG Act requires that each IG issue a semiannual report to the Congress and agency management. The IG Act outlines 12 specific areas that are to be covered by each semiannual report, which are listed in appendix V. Overall, the IGs responded that most of the reporting requirements should remain. However, the following three requirements were the most frequently cited as needing change. The percent of IGs favoring each change is shown parenthetically.

Audits identifying questioned costs and funds to be put to better use(39 percent)

Statistical tables of questioned costs (55 percent)

Statistical tables of funds to be put to better use (57 percent)

While there was support for some changes to the reporting requirements, only one IG supported elimination of the report and eight IGs suggested substituting another document for the semiannual report, such as the agency’s accountability report or an annual performance report.

Thirty-five IGs stated that the reporting requirement should be changed from semiannual to annual. Further, the presidential IGs indicated that the semiannual report is at least moderately useful to the Congress, OMB, agency heads, and program managers. The DFE IGs noted that the report is of great use to the Congress, OMB, and agency heads and of moderate use to program managers. 4. Do the IGs generally believe that they have sufficient independence in the performance of their work?

The independence of the IGs is central to the success of the IG concept. Each IG reports to and is under the general supervision of the agency head or in the case of a presidential IG, the official next in rank, to the extent delegated. However, these individuals, with a few specified exceptions, cannot prevent or prohibit the IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation or from issuing any subpoena during the course of any audit or investigation. Under the IG Act, as amended, the heads of three Departments—Defense, Justice, and Treasury—may prevent the IG in his or her department from initiating or proceeding with an audit or investigation in order to prevent disclosure of information relating to national security, on-going criminal investigations, and other matters outlined in the IG Act. If the department heads take this action, the IG Act provides for written notification to the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and other specified committees and subcommittees. Similar exceptions are provided for the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Reserve Board. In addition, the IGs are required to follow GAGAS, which require IGs and individual auditors to be free from personal and external impairments to independence.

As shown in figure 20, the survey results indicated that 81 percent of the presidential IGs and 73 percent of the DFE IGs responded that they have the level of independence needed to accomplish their mission. On the other hand, 15 percent of the presidential and 27 percent of the DFE IGs indicated that they do not have sufficient independence, but they did not identify specific areas in which they felt their independence was being compromised. The IGs did suggest some options for enhancing independence. The most frequently cited option was to allow IGs to submit their budget request directly to OMB and the Congress rather than going through the agency review process. Other suggestions included ensuring that the removal of an IG is only for cause, clarifying the general supervision clause of the IG Act, and establishing term limits. Since these responses were part of the anonymous questionnaire, we were unable to obtain more specific information. 5. What are IG views regarding term limits and the process for identifying potential IG candidates?

In recent hearings questions have been raised as to whether or not the IGs should have term limits. Term limits would mandate that IGs have a fixed period of time that they could serve as IG at their respective agency. The IGs’ survey responses indicate that while the IGs had varying views on this issue, neither the presidential IGs nor the DFE IGs favored term limits for their particular group. Their perception of the impact of term limits also varies. Some view it as enhancing independence, while others view it as inhibiting independence. The following provides a breakdown of the responses.

Of the Presidential IGs,

39 percent favored term limits for presidential IGs,

35 percent favored term limits for DFE IGs,

58 percent did not favor term limits for presidential IGs, and

31 percent did not favor term limits for DFE IGs.

Of the DFE IGs,

40 percent favored term limits for presidential IGs,

37 percent favored term limits for DFE IGs,

47 percent did not favor term limits for presidential IGs, and

57 percent did not favor term limits for DFE IGs.

Another key IG issue is the process for identifying potential IG candidates. We asked the IGs for their views on establishing a list of potential candidates that could be used as a source when vacancies occur. The survey responses showed that the presidential and DFE IGs have different views on establishing a list of potential IG candidates. Fifty percent of the presidential IGs were of the opinion that a list should be established for all IGs, while 35 percent were not in favor of establishing any type of list, and 8 percent believed a list should be developed for only presidential IGs. In regard to the DFE IGs, 50 percent did not want any list established, while 33 percent favored the establishment of a list for all IGs, and 10 percent indicated other ways of identifying candidates, such as open competition, establishment of an IG candidate development program, and the creation of a board. However, when asked who should develop the list, there was general agreement that, if such a list was established, it should be developed by PCIE, ECIE, and OMB. 6. In the opinion of the IGs, are changes needed in the organizational structure of the DFE IGs?

The Congress enacted the Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988 to establish statutory IGs at 33 DFEs. The amendments provided for the entity heads to appoint their inspectors general. The powers and duties extended to the DFE IGs are essentially the same as those provided to presidentially appointed IGs.

As shown in figure 21, the majority of the DFE IGs—approximately 53 percent—expressed satisfaction with the current organization structure and operating environment, and therefore, did not favor any change. Fifteen percent of the presidential IGs were of the same opinion. However, some respondents—both presidential and DFE—expressed the opinion that some change was warranted. For example, 30 percent of the DFE IGs and 23 percent of the presidential IGs believed that consideration should be given to cross-servicing among the presidential and DFE IGs. Similarly, 23 percent of the DFE IGs and 15 percent of the presidential IGs favored cross-servicing among the DFE IGs. Additionally, the topic of reorganizing some of the DFE IGs offices has been discussed within the IG community and at congressional hearings. Therefore, we asked the IGs their opinion on this matter. From an overall perspective, the presidential IGs were more in favor of combining the DFEs. Specifically, 27 percent of the presidential IGs favored combining the smaller DFE IGs under several DFE IGs, whereas, only 7 percent of the DFE IGs supported this alternative. Similarly, 15 percent of the presidential IGs supported the idea of combining all of the DFEs under a new presidentially appointed IG; 10 percent of the DFEs supported this approach. 7. Do the presidential IGs view PCIE as an effective organization?

PCIE is an interagency council established in March of 1981 by Executive Order No. 12301. PCIE is primarily comprised of the presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed IGs and chaired by OMB’s Deputy Director for Management. An IG member serves as the Vice Chair. Members of PCIE are identified in appendix VI.

The purpose of PCIE is to identify, review, and discuss areas of weakness in federal programs and to develop plans for coordinated governmentwide activities to address problems and promote economy and efficiency in federal programs. According to PCIE’s annual report for fiscal year 1996, A Progress Report to the President, PCIE works to address integrity, economy, and effectiveness issues that transcend individual agencies and to increase the professionalism and effectiveness of IG personnel throughout government.

As shown in figure 22, 46 percent of the presidential IGs responded that PCIE was a moderately effective organization. However, about 35 percent responded that PCIE was moderately to very ineffective. Both sides presented pros and cons of PCIE’s effectiveness. The presidential IGs noted that PCIE is a good forum for the exchange of information and discussion of common issues among IGs. It is also viewed as useful in providing professional training to its personnel—both audit and investigative. However, some presidential IGs stated that it is difficult to reach agreement or consensus in PCIE meetings because of the diversity of its membership with representatives bringing to meetings different agendas based on their respective agency’s missions. Further, according to some IGs, PCIE needs to better address governmentwide issues and projects.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the presidential IGs noted that PCIE has provided valuable service to the IG community. They noted that PCIE has developed governmentwide standards for audits, investigations, and inspections. In addition, PCIE maintains two training centers that are used for the benefit of all IGs. Additionally, the IGs commented that PCIE has worked collectively on various projects and governmentwide issues. For example, representatives from nine IGs conducted an assessment of the Internal Revenue Service’s inspection service. Further, the IGs noted that PCIE has developed forums for the discussion and exchange of information related to the Year 2000 problem and the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.8. Do the DFE IGs view ECIE as an effective organization?

ECIE was established in 1992 by Executive Order No. 12805. ECIE membership consists primarily of the DFE IGs and is chaired by OMB’s Deputy Director for Management. An IG member serves as the Vice Chair. The entire ECIE membership is identified in appendix VII. The purpose of ECIE is the same as PCIE, that is, to identify, review, and discuss areas of weakness in federal programs; and develop plans for coordinated governmentwide activities to address problems and promote economy and efficiency in federal programs.

As shown in figure 23, the vast majority of DFE IGs—80 percent—indicated that ECIE is an effective organization, with 10 percent responding very effective and 70 percent responding moderately effective. The DFE IGs noted that ECIE facilitates communication and sharing of common community issues among IGs as well as provides a forum to discuss and keep abreast of current issues. A few DFE IGs stated that ECIE facilitates coordination and information sharing between ECIE and OMB. In addition, some DFE IGs stated that their size often precludes them from having the necessary resources to undertake common projects. Since all of these responses were part of the anonymous questionnaire, we were unable to follow up with the DFE IGs to obtain more details on the specific concerns they raised. 9. What are the presidential IGs views on the effectiveness of PCIE Integrity Committee?

The Integrity Committee was established by PCIE in January 1995 for the purpose of receiving, reviewing, and referring for investigation, allegations of wrongdoing against certain staff members of the IG offices. The committee replaced a working group that reviewed allegations against IGs and their principal deputies. In March 1996, Executive Order No. 12993 formalized the process and established the membership of the Integrity Committee.

The Integrity Committee is chaired by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) representative to PCIE. Other members include the Special Counsel, Office of the Special Counsel; the Director, Office of Government Ethics; and three or more IGs, representing both PCIE and ECIE. In addition, the Chief of the Public Integrity Section, Department of Justice Criminal Division, serves as an advisor.

Allegations received by PCIE are assigned to the Integrity Committee for processing and review. Allegations that the Integrity Committee deems to be worthy of further review are referred to the Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section, to determine if the allegation, if proved, would constitute a violation of federal criminal law. If it is determined that a criminal investigation is warranted, the Public Integrity Section can investigate the allegation or refer it to the FBI. If it is determined that a criminal investigation is not warranted or that the investigation substantiated misconduct but prosecution is declined, the allegation is returned to the Integrity Committee for an administrative review.

If a noncriminal allegation is determined to warrant referral, the Integrity Committee can (1) refer the allegation to the head of the affected agency for a response, (2) request an uninvolved IG, or its staff on detail, to conduct an investigation, or (3) refer the allegation to an appropriate governmentwide agency for review. For example, the Special Counsel, Office of Special Counsel, who as a member of the Integrity Committee participates in the review of all allegations, can ask that particular allegations be referred to that office for investigation.

Upon completion of the agency’s follow-up, investigation, or review, the agency head notifies the Integrity Committee of the results and what action, if any, should be taken against the subject of the allegation. If the committee concurs with the agency’s findings, the matter is closed with a letter to PCIE Chair and others as appropriate. If the Integrity Committee does not concur with the investigation, the matter is to be referred back to the agency head, or to another agency, for appropriate action. The matter is not to be closed until the committee concurs with the agency’s investigative findings.

The majority of the presidential IGs—58 percent—stated that the Integrity Committee was effective in handling allegations of wrongdoing against an IG or an IG staff member. However, about 31 percent of the presidential IGs responded that the Integrity Committee was ineffective. Some IGs raised concern that the process of handling allegations took too long and did not adequately address noncriminal or administrative allegations.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Chairman of the Integrity Committee noted that although the number of cases has doubled since 1990, the time required to process cases has declined. According to the Chairman, it took approximately 28 months to process cases in 1990, but in 1998 it took only about 4 months to process cases. Additionally, the Chairman stated that about 93 percent of the allegations the Integrity Committee receives are determined to be unsubstantiated, insufficiently supported, or frivolous or to fall outside of the Committee’s purview.

Agency Comments

The IGs and OMB generally agreed with the contents of the report, and OMB generally agreed with the comments provided by PCIE and ECIE. Additionally, ECIE noted that the report presents the survey results in a clear and objective manner. ECIE provided technical comments that we have incorporated where appropriate. The Chairman of the Integrity Committee commented only on the IGs’ responses related to the Committee. We have incorporated these comments as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Vice Chairs and Ranking Minority Members of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and its Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology; the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Special Committee on Aging; the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, House and Senate Committees on the Budget; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the 57 IGs. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

The major contributors to this letter are listed in appendix X. If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6240.

Establishment of the Inspectors General and the Work They Perform

The importance of legislative underpinnings for auditing in the federal government dates back almost half a century to the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950, which held federal agency heads responsible for internal controls, including appropriate internal audit. The need to strengthen this requirement became evident when, in 1976, GAO began to issue a series of reports on reviews at 157 fiscal offices in 11 major federal organizations. These reports indicated widespread and serious internal control weaknesses that resulted in the waste of government money through fraud and mismanagement.

We reported that federal agencies did not use their internal auditors to examine their financial operations and when they did, no action was taken on the auditors’ recommendations. We also found that internal audit groups were not independent, they were underfunded and understaffed, audit efforts were fragmented among several offices, and problems found by the audits were not communicated to the agency heads. With rare exceptions, the executive agencies had not adequately monitored, assessed or reviewed their own operations and programs. As a result, the Congress passed the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act), Public Law 95-452, as amended. The IG Act established Inspector General offices in federal departments and agencies to create independent and objective units responsible for (1) conducting and supervising audits and investigations, (2) providing leadership and coordination and recommending policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, and (3) detecting and preventing fraud and abuse in their agencies’ programs and operations.

Subsequently, two interagency councils were established to provide a coordinating mechanism for the IGs. Through these councils, IGs are to identify, review, and discuss areas of weakness in federal programs; and develop plans for coordinated governmentwide activities to address problems and promote economy and efficiency in federal programs. The President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) was established in March of 1981 by Executive Order No. 12301 and is primarily comprised of presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed IGs. The Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE) was established in May 1992 by Executive Order No. 12805 and consists primarily of the DFE IGs. The Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Deputy Director for Management chairs both of these councils. An IG member of each council serves as the vice chair. Appendix IV and V contain complete lists of PCIE and ECIE membership.

To carry out their mandate, IGs perform various types of work including financial and performance audits, investigations, and inspections. The types of work performed by the IGs are highlighted below.

Financial statement audit provides reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements of an audited entity represent fairly the financial position, results of operations, and cash flows in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles based on audits conducted in accordance with GAGAS.

Financial related audits include determining whether (1) financial information is presented in accordance with established or stated criteria, (2) the entity has adhered to specific financial compliance requirements, or (3) the entity’s internal control structure over financial reporting and/or safeguarding assets is suitably designed and implemented to achieve the control objectives.

Investigation is a planned systematic search for relevant, objective, and sufficient facts and evidence derived through interviews, record examinations, and the application of other approved professional investigative techniques. Investigations may be administrative, civil, or criminal in nature.

Inspection is a process, other than an audit or an investigation, that is aimed at evaluating, reviewing, studying, and analyzing the programs and activities of a department or agency for the purposes of providing information to managers for decision-making, for making recommendations for improvements to programs, policies, or procedures, and for administrative action. Inspections include providing factual and analytical information, monitoring compliance, measuring performance, assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of operations, and conducting inquiries into allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

Performance audit is an objective and systematic examination of evidence for the purpose of providing an independent assessment of the performance of a government organization, program, activity, or function in order to provide information to improve public accountability and facilitate decision-making by parties with responsibility to oversee or initiate corrective action. Performance audits include economy and efficiency audits, program audits, and program evaluations, which are highlighted below.

Economy and efficiency audits include determining (1) whether the entity is acquiring, protecting, and using its resources economically and efficiently, (2) the causes of inefficiencies or uneconomical practices, and (3) whether the entity has complied with laws and regulations on matters of economy and efficiency.

Program audits include determining (1) the extent to which the desired results or benefits established by the legislature or other authorizing body are being achieved, (2) the effectiveness of organizations, programs, activities, or functions, and (3) whether the entity has complied with significant law and regulations applicable to the program.

Program evaluations are systematic studies conducted periodically to assess how well a program is working. Program evaluations include (1) assessing the extent to which a program is operating as it was intended, (2) assessing the extent to which a program achieves its outcome-oriented objectives, (3) assessing the net effect of a program by comparing program outcomes with an estimate of what would have happened in the absence of the program, and (4) comparing a program’s outputs or outcomes with the costs to produce them.

Clinger-Cohen Act implementation encourages federal agencies to evaluate and adopt best management and acquisition practices used by both private and public sector organizations and requires agencies to base decisions about information technology investments on quantitative and qualitative factors such as costs, benefits, and risks of those investments and to use performance data to demonstrate how well the information technology expenditures support improvements to agency programs.

Year 2000 computer system problem results from the inability of computer programs at the year 2000 to interpret the correct century from a recorded or calculated date having only two digits to indicate the year. Unless corrected, computer systems could malfunction or produce incorrect information when the year 2000 is encountered during automated data processing.

Oversight of Nonfederal Audits ensures that audit work performed by nonfederal auditors complies with applicable federal standards.

Operation of Hotlines receives and analyzes allegations of waste, fraud, or abuse in connection with the programs and operations of their respective agencies.

In commenting on a draft of this report, one IG responded that the office performs administrative enforcement activities which are authorized by the Fraud Civil Remedies Act and similar legislation.

List of Presidentially Appointed Inspectors General

List of Designated Federal Entity Inspectors General

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to obtain (1) information on IG organization, staffing, workload, and operational issues and (2) the views of the IGs on policy issues affecting them such as term limits, law enforcement authority, semiannual reporting, and the IG selection process. To accomplish our objectives, we developed and administered two questionnaires to obtain information from the IGs. One questionnaire was for attribution and requested information regarding the IGs’ organizational structure, staffing, and workload. At your request, the other questionnaire was anonymous and requested the IGs’ views on current policy issues. Because this questionnaire was anonymous, we were unable to contact the IGs and obtain clarification, additional details, or missing responses. Prior to sending out the questionnaires, we pretested them with the IGs from the Smithsonian Institution and the Office of Personnel Management and revised them as necessary.

The questionnaires were sent to all 57 IGs—27 presidentially appointed and 30 DFE IGs. We received responses for each questionnaire from 56 IGs. We did not independently verify the information provided by the IGs. In addition, we reviewed the testimony presented at the April 21, 1998, hearing held by the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology, House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, and the September 9, 1998, hearing held by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs to ascertain the current IG policy issues.

We performed our review between April 1998 and December 1998 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Acting Deputy Director for Management, the Chairman of the Integrity Committee, and all 57 IGs. On December 10, 1998, and December 14, 1998, respectively, we received oral comments from the Integrity Committee and OMB that are discussed in the “Agency Comments” section. The Vice Chair of the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) and the Vice Chair of the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE) provided written comments consolidating the comments of presidential and DFE IGs, respectively. These comments are discussed in the “Agency Comments” section and are reprinted in appendixes VIII and IX, respectively.

Semiannual Reporting Requirements of the Inspector General Act, as Amended

Membership of the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency

Membership of the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency

Comments From the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency

The following are GAO’s comments regarding the presidential IG views contained in the December 10, 1998, letter from PCIE.

GAO Comments

1. The report has been revised accordingly. 2. In responding to the anonymous questionnaire, the presidential IGs were provided an opportunity to give their views and opinions on the effectiveness of PCIE. Of the 26 presidential IGs, 21 (or approximately 81 percent) provided written comments, which are summarized in the report. The written comments from 16 of the 21 IGs did not fully reflect the information discussed in the December 10, 1998, letter. However, we have revised the report to include the additional views presented in the letter.

Comments From the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency

Major Contributors to This Report

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