Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program
Released: 2002-11-22T00:00:00

Letter

Background

According to the program’s legislative history, the Visa Waiver Pilot Program was created, in part, to improve U.S. foreign relations and to promote effective use of State Department‘s resources. It was also intended to facilitate international travel, without posing a threat to the welfare or security of the United States, and thereby to increase the number of foreign travelers to the United States. In addition, according to a statement by President Clinton, the program allowed the State Department to reallocate scarce department resources from the issuing of visas in low- risk countries to higher priority needs such as visa screening in high-fraud areas. The law that created the Visa Waiver Pilot Program required that before implementing the program, the Attorney General establish an automated arrival and departure tracking system (see page 15 for a discussion of this system). The law also required that the Attorney General produce a special arrival and departure form for travelers seeking to enter the United States under the program, which was made permanent in 2000. Persons traveling to the United States under the Visa Waiver Program must have a valid passport issued by the participating country and be a national of that country; be seeking entry for 90 days or less as a temporary visitor; have their identity checked at the U.S. port of entry against an automated electronic database containing information about the inadmissibility of aliens, to uncover any grounds on which the alien may be inadmissible to the United States, with no such ground found; have been determined by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) at the U.S. port of entry to represent no threat to the welfare, health, safety, or security of the United States; have complied with conditions of any previous admission under the program (e.g., stayed in the United States for 90 days or less); if entering by air or sea, possess a round-trip transportation ticket issued by a carrier that has signed an agreement with the U.S. government to participate in the program and must have arrived in the United States aboard such a carrier; and if entering by land, have proof of financial solvency and a domicile abroad to which he or she intends to return.

In addition, the applicant must present a completed and signed visa waiver arrival and departure form on which he or she waives the right to a hearing, other than on the basis of an application for asylum, if INS denies the applicant entry into the United States. All foreign visitors, whether they have visas or are seeking to enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program, undergo inspections conducted by INS inspectors at U.S. airports and seaports. These inspections are intended to ensure that only admissible persons enter the United States. The INS inspectors observe the applicant, examine his or her passport, and check his or her name against an automated database that contains information regarding the admissibility of aliens.

Table 1 lists the visa waiver countries, the year each country entered the program, and the numbers of arrivals to the United States under the program in 2000.

Recent Legislative Requirements Could Affect Countries’ Participation in the Visa Waiver Program

The Visa Waiver Program Act includes criteria that a country must fulfill to be eligible for nomination for, and continued participation in, the program. Justice and State have established a draft protocol based on these criteria that spells out the procedures that the agencies must follow in nominating a country and for assessing participating countries to ensure that they continue to pose a low risk to U.S. security. The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may also immediately terminate a country’s participation in the Visa Waiver Program in the event of an emergency that threatens U.S. law enforcement or security interests. Legislation enacted after September 11, 2001, added more requirements for countries to remain eligible to participate in the program, but full, timely implementation of these requirements is uncertain.

Nomination Process Assesses Countries’ Eligibility to Join the Program

To comply with laws intended to ensure that countries’ participation in the Visa Waiver Program does not threaten U.S. security and interests, the Departments of State and Justice have established a draft protocol that spells out procedures to assess countries’ eligibility to be admitted to the program. The procedures are comprehensive and cover a variety of security concerns, including patterns of passport and visa fraud, assessments of terrorism within the country, and assessments of law enforcement practices. An Interagency Working Group comprising representatives from Justice, including the INS, and from State, including the Bureau of Consular Affairs, developed the protocol. Although the protocol is in draft, the agencies have used it to assess some countries’ eligibility. (See fig. 1.)

As shown in figure 1, State initiates the process of adding countries to the program by advising Justice of its intent to nominate a country for inclusion in the program. State may nominate a country only after it has determined that the country has a low nonimmigrant visa refusal rate for its citizens who apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visitor visas (ranging from less than 2 percent to less than 3 percent depending on the years assessed), has the ability to supply machine-readable passports to its citizens or is in the process of developing such passports, and offers visa-free travel for U.S. citizens and nationals.

The protocol requires State to provide Justice with information on the nominated country, including patterns of passport fraud, visa fraud, and visa abuse over the past 5 assessments of terrorism within or outside the country by the country’s evaluations of the impact of the country’s participation on U.S. national security and law enforcement.

Various Justice components—including the law enforcement agencies (for example, INS and the FBI), Criminal Division, and Office of Intelligence Policy and Review—review the nomination, focusing on the effect that the country’s inclusion would have on U.S. law enforcement and national security. If no clearly disqualifying objections are raised during this review, the Secretary of State submits a formal written nomination to the Attorney General. After a country’s formal nomination, INS leads a team of representatives from interested agencies to visit the nominated country. The team reviews the country’s political, social, and economic conditions; security over its passport and national identity documents; immigration and nationality laws, law enforcement policies and practices, and other matters relevant to law enforcement, immigration, and national security.

On the basis of the review and site visit, the Interagency Working Group submits a recommendation to the Attorney General, who, in consultation with the Secretary of State, then decides whether to admit the country to the program.

Evaluation Process Assesses Country’s Continued Participation

The protocol includes an evaluation process, similar to the nomination process, for periodically assessing the effect on U.S. law enforcement and security interests of each country’s continued participation in the Visa Waiver Program. INS is primarily responsible for these evaluations. It obtains information from a number of other agencies, including State and intelligence agencies, and other components of Justice. These evaluations assess the status of factors reviewed during the nomination process, including whether the rate at which visa waiver applicants are refused entry at U.S. ports of entry exceeds specific numerical targets; demographic, economic, political, and social trends in the program the security of the country’s procedures for issuing passports; and legal issues, including how foreign nationals acquire citizenship, law enforcement considerations, national security (including information on terrorism), and other matters.

The areas evaluated involve more qualitative than quantitative assessments. For example, INS examines the security of processes for issuing passports but uses no quantitative criteria in assessing the process. However, the protocol does allow the Attorney General, in determining a country’s risk level, to consider quantifiable data. Such data may include comparisons between the denial rates of persons presenting passports purported to have been lawfully issued by a particular visa waiver country and the denial rates of individuals traveling from the same country with nonimmigrant visas.

INS has completed the assessments of five countries: Argentina, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Slovenia. The assessment of Uruguay is still pending. INS selected the countries for assessment on the basis of specific security concerns. For example, INS selected Argentina because of the economic crisis and political instability in the country; the Attorney General subsequently removed Argentina from the program because of those problems. INS selected Belgium because of repeated thefts of blank Belgian passports. INS accelerated the scheduling of the evaluations after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. However, although INS completed the field visits to the countries in December 2001, it did not send the finalized reports with recommendations to Justice until September 2002. The next step in the evaluation process is for the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to decide whether each country should remain in the program or its participation should be terminated.

Attorney General May Immediately Terminate a Country’s Participation

The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may also immediately terminate a country’s participation in the Visa Waiver Program in the event of an emergency that threatens U.S. law enforcement or security interests. The law defines emergencies as the overthrow of a democratically elected government; war (including undeclared war, civil war, or other military activity) in a severe breakdown in law and order affecting a significant portion of the program country’s territory; a severe economic collapse in the program country; or any other extraordinary event in the program country that threatens the law enforcement or security interests of the United States.

On February 20, 2002, the Attorney General used this emergency provision to remove Argentina from the Visa Waiver Program because of the country’s economic crisis, which had raised concerns that the number of Argentines illegally immigrating to the United States would increase. INS had reported an increase in the number of Argentine nationals attempting to remain illegally in the United States after their 90-day period of admission had expired.

Recent Laws Affect Process for Assessing Eligibility, but Full, Timely Implementation Uncertain

Laws passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, affect the process for determining countries’ eligibility to participate in the Visa Waiver Program. These laws cover passport requirements for visa waiver countries and reemphasize the requirement for the Attorney General to establish a system to monitor peoples’ entry into and exit from the United States. However, it is unclear whether Justice and State will fully implement these requirements by the deadlines called for under U.S. law.

First, regarding passports, the October 2001 USA PATRIOT Act advanced to October 1, 2003, the deadline for the requirement that travelers from participating countries wishing to enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program must submit a machine-readable passport. Subsequently, the May 2002 Enhanced Border Security Act stated that to remain in the program, a visa waiver country must certify, by October 26, 2004, that it has a program to issue tamper-resistant, machine-readable passports that contain biometric and document authentication identifiers. With the exception of Switzerland and San Marino, all participating countries are issuing machine-readable passports, but none issue passports that have biometric identifiers, according to State. Some State and law enforcement officials in Europe and the United States questioned whether countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program would be able to certify by October 2004 that they can issue passports with acceptable biometric identifiers—particularly since there is not yet an international standard for biometric identifiers. The Act required that the biometric identifiers comply with standards established by the International Civil Aviation Organization. Representatives of several countries, including the United States, Visa Waiver Program participating countries, and members of the European Union (EU), have met to work toward developing recommendations on minimum standards for the application of biometrics in procedures and documents by the spring of 2003. However, responding to a State inquiry to visa waiver countries about their plans to issue passports with biometric identifiers, only 3 of 17 countries had said as of October 2002 that they would meet the deadline. State plans to incorporate this information into a report to the Congress on the status of countries’ efforts to include biometric identifiers in their passports. State officials also told us that in response to the U.S. requirement, European countries might require U.S. passports to have biometric identifiers. For the system to be effective in increasing U.S. national security, INS will need to install machines capable of reading the biometric identifiers at each U.S. port of entry, of which there are about 390. However, until countries decide which biometrics they will include in their passport, INS may have a difficult time ensuring that all ports will have machines that can read the various biometric identifiers by October 2004.

Additionally, the Enhanced Border Security Act conditioned participation in the Visa Waiver Program on a country’s timely reporting of its stolen blank passports to the United States. INS has described problems with countries’ timely reporting of stolen blank passports, and the Justice Inspector General concluded that INS does not have a mechanism to provide systematic, consistent, and timely information about missing passports to its inspectors. A State official testified that although this requirement probably will not apply to countries until they are certified for continued participation in the program, State is discussing this requirement with all countries.

Finally, INS has not yet developed an automated nonimmigrant entry–exit control system to screen and monitor the arrival and departure of foreign visitors entering the United States as temporary visitors. Congress has passed several laws requiring the Attorney General to implement such a system and has extended the implementation deadline several times. For example, the 1986 law creating the Visa Waiver Pilot Program required, as a condition of implementing the program, that an automated nonimmigrant entry–exit control system to monitor aliens using the program be established. The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act reiterated the requirement, directing that the system be implemented no later than 2001. INS decided to use an existing automated border inspections system in conjunction with its arrival–departure system to meet this requirement. The arrival–departure system includes passenger information electronically transmitted by air and sea carriers that have an agreement with INS to transport aliens to the United States. INS began using this system on October 1, 2002. An INS official recently testified that this new initiative implements the requirements that had been set forth in the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act of 2000.

Also, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 required an entry–exit system that covered all nonimmigrant visitors, not solely those traveling under the Visa Waiver Program. This act required the Attorney General to develop an automated entry–exit system within 2 years of the law’s enactment to collect a record of departure for every alien departing the United States and match the record of departure with the record of the alien’s arrival in the United States. Subsequently, Congress extended the deadline to implement the system at all U.S. ports of entry to December 31, 2005. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the effectiveness of monitoring nonimmigrant visitors came under additional scrutiny, as authorities considered how to identify and locate terrorists who might be in the United States. As a result, new laws have again directed the Attorney General to establish an integrated entry–exit system. INS and other agencies, including the U.S. Customs Service, State, and the Transportation Security Agency, are working together to develop the system. According to Justice, INS has established a multiagency task force to coordinate all activity associated with the establishment of the entry–exit system. The systems established as part of the Visa Waiver Program, as well as a system launched on September 11, 2002, to collect fingerprints and a photograph from a specific population, are the first step in the development of the entry–exit system.

Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program Are Uncertain

The implications for U.S. national security of eliminating the program are uncertain; however, eliminating the program could negatively affect U.S. relations with participating country governments, impede tourism to the United States, and increase the need for State personnel and facilities overseas. According to the program’s legislative history, Congress established the program, in part, to facilitate travel by citizens from countries that the Attorney General and Secretary of State determined to pose low risk to U.S. national security. Data showing the extent to which the program has been exploited are limited, and U.S. government officials expressed differing opinions about the effect of the program on U.S. national security.

Implications for National Security Are Unclear

The implications for U.S. national security of eliminating the Visa Waiver Program are not clear. While Justice has not systematically collected data on how frequently potential terrorists and other criminals have entered the United States, anecdotal information indicates that such individuals have entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with valid U.S. visas. State Department and U.S. law enforcement officials’ opinions varied on the effect of the Visa Waiver Program on U.S. national security. Some law enforcement agency officials said that the Visa Waiver Program negatively affects U.S. national security and that eliminating the program and requiring visas from current visa waiver travelers would increase national security. Other officials from Justice and State asserted that unless the current visa-screening process is improved, for example, by increased information sharing among U.S. agencies, the effect of the program on U.S. national security is not certain.

Limited Data Available to Show Extent to Which the Program Is Exploited

Justice has not systematically collected data on the extent to which terrorists and other criminals have entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program or committed crimes while in the country. The FBI operates a nationwide information system dedicated to serving and supporting local, state, and federal criminal justice agencies. This system contains 17 databases with information on, among other things, stolen articles, foreign fugitives, gangs and terrorist members, and wanted persons. However, crime statistics collected by the FBI do not capture the criminals’ immigration status. Also, the data that INS collects on aliens it has removed from the United States for committing crimes include some information on aliens’ immigration status. According to INS data, 204 (about 0.3 percent) of the 69,580 criminals removed from the United States during fiscal year 2002 entered under the Visa Waiver Program. The Drug Enforcement Agency maintains information on domestic drug arrests by country that shows the arrestees’ country of nationality but not their immigration status.

While Justice has not systematically collected data on how frequently potential terrorists and other criminals have entered the United States, anecdotal information indicates that such persons have entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with a valid U.S. visa. For example, Zacarias Moussaoui, a French national whom the United States indicted as a co-conspirator in the attacks of September 11, 2001, entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program, and the 19 individuals who carried out the attacks entered with valid U.S. visas.

U.S. law enforcement and State officials in Washington, D.C., and at posts overseas expressed different opinions about the effect of the Visa Waiver Program on U.S. national security. Some INS and other law enforcement agency officials said that the Visa Waiver Program can facilitate illegal entry into the United States by inadmissible aliens, including terrorists and other criminals, because under the program such individuals avoid the screening that consular officers usually perform on visa applicants abroad. The lack of consular screening makes the program attractive to inadmissible aliens, according to INS officials. Aliens traveling to the United States under the Visa Waiver Program are first screened when INS inspectors interview them for admission at the U.S. port of entry. These inspectors have little time to screen each person entering the United States, according to a report by the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General. INS inspectors reported that terrorists and criminals who were intercepted had attempted to enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program—rather than applying for a U.S. visa abroad—because they believed it would give them a greater chance of entering the country. Some officials in Washington, D.C., and at the U.S. embassies in Argentina and Uruguay said that eliminating the Visa Waiver Program would increase national security, because the visa-screening process is an additional tool to deter terrorists from entering the United States. One Justice official stated that the Visa Waiver Program is clearly a vulnerability and that eliminating the program would increase national security, but at a high cost in terms of the effect on State resources and U.S. tourism.

Other law enforcement and State officials in Washington, D.C., and at the U.S. embassies in Belgium, Italy, and Spain questioned whether eliminating the Visa Waiver Program and requiring visas would increase national security. They agreed that the visa-screening process could serve as an additional tool to screen out terrorists but only to the extent that State had the necessary overseas resources, including relevant information on potential terrorists and sufficient staff and facilities to interview all or most visa applicants. They said that if current visa waiver travelers were required to apply for visas and State’s current resource levels were not increased, consular officers would be inundated with paperwork for routine and low-risk cases and would become less effective and alert in dealing with cases needing additional scrutiny. The officials emphasized that better, timely information and improved data sharing on inadmissible aliens among U.S. law enforcement, border control, and intelligence agencies are essential to improving U.S. national security.

Eliminating the Program Could Affect U.S. Relations with Participating Country Governments

U.S. officials, including those from State as well as from some law enforcement agencies, said that eliminating the Visa Waiver Program could have negative implications for U.S. relations with governments of participating countries and could impair their cooperation in efforts to combat terrorism.

Some allies are cooperating significantly in matters ranging from providing military personnel and access to air bases to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan to freezing terrorists’ financial assets. Examples are as follows: Visa waiver countries have provided political and military support to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and to the International Security Assistance Force, which is to help the new Afghan Interim Authority provide security and stability in Kabul. The United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, Australia, Japan, and other visa waiver countries partnered with the United States in military operations to expel the Taliban and al Qaeda from Afghanistan, according to government reports.

EU member states vigorously supported U.S. efforts in the United Nations to adopt strong resolutions against terrorism and U.S. efforts to persuade third countries to resist terrorism.

Visa waiver countries have also increased their law enforcement efforts.

The EU strengthened member states’ ability to take action against terrorists and their supporters—including freezing their assets. The EU reported that between September 11, 2001, and June 3, 2002, about $100 million of assets belonging to persons and entities sponsoring terrorist actions was frozen throughout the EU. Since September 11, 2001, authorities in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom have arrested supporters of al Qaeda and other extremist groups. Also, according to State, Italian authorities arrested the leader of the group suspected of plotting to bomb the U.S. embassy in Rome. The government of Singapore detained 13 members of a terrorist group in December 2001, thereby disrupting a plot to bomb the U.S. embassy there.

Some U.S. embassy and law enforcement agency officials expressed concern that eliminating the Visa Waiver Program could lessen countries’ cooperation in military and law enforcement operations related to the global coalition against terrorism. Participating countries may see their loss of visa waiver status as a sign that the United States views them as untrustworthy—more as security risks than as allies.

If the United States decides to eliminate visa waiver status for participating countries, those countries’ governments could begin requiring Americans to obtain visas before visiting their countries. For example, if the United States requires a national from an EU member country to obtain a visa before entering the United States for 90 days or less, the EU may institute a provisional requirement that U.S. citizens obtain a visa before entering any of the EU member countries. Thereafter, if the U.S. visa policy continues, the EU Council may amend regulations to make the visa requirement permanent.

Eliminating the Program Could Affect U.S. Tourism

As previously mentioned, Congress created the Visa Waiver Program, in part, to facilitate international travel and thereby increase the number of foreign travelers to the United States. A large proportion of international tourists to the United States comes from Visa Waiver Program countries. From 1991 to 2000, in terms of both the number of travelers and dollars spent, tourism from visa waiver countries accounted for more than half of the overseas visitor market. Visa waiver travelers generally spend more than other international travelers, and their spending helps to balance the U.S. trade accounts. Because of direct and indirect economic contributions from visa waiver travel, elimination of the Visa Waiver Program is a concern for the travel and tourism industry. One study commissioned by the Department of Commerce in 2002 estimated that discontinuation of the Visa Waiver Program will cost the U.S. economy more than $28 billion in tourism exports from 2003 to 2007.

Travelers from visa waiver countries to the United States totaled approximately 17.6 million in 2000 and 14.7 million in 2001, according to the Commerce Department. As a share of total international arrivals, travelers from visa waiver countries grew from 25 percent in 1992 to 35 percent in 2000 (see fig. 2). Excluding arrivals from Canada and Mexico, the share of overseas arrivals from visa waiver countries has averaged 68 percent in the last 5 years.

Using data from Commerce and the Travel Industry Association of America, we calculated that in 2000, travelers from visa waiver countries spent an estimated $39.6 billion in the United States, accounting for 57 percent of overseas tourist spending. Average spending per traveler from visa waiver countries in 2000 was $2,253, compared with $1,274 per traveler for other international tourists to the United States. A range of estimates from Commerce, the Travel Industry Association of America, and the World Travel and Tourism Council indicate that visa waiver travelers’ direct and indirect spending within the United States added between $75 billion and $102 billion to the U.S. gross domestic product in 2000. According to the Travel Industry Association of America, international tourism provides more than one million U.S. jobs, of which more than 60 percent are located in Florida, California, New York, and Hawaii. The association also estimates that in 2001, U.S. spending generated from international tourism contributed $16 billion in tax revenues.

The Department of Commerce commissioned a study in 2002 on the economic effect of the Visa Waiver Program and estimated that, over a 5-year period, eliminating the program could result in a loss of 3 million visitors, $28 billion in tourism exports, and 475,000 jobs. The estimates of this study, together with anecdotal information, support the likelihood of a negative effect on tourism. According to the Travel Industry Association of America, the Visa Waiver Program enhances the competitiveness of the U.S. market as an international destination and elimination of the program could divert tourists to other destinations that do not require a visa for entry. Foreign Commercial Service Officers in Belgium and Spain reported visas to be a significant impediment to travel demand. State officials agreed that visas are an impediment to both tourist and business travel and added that any additional requirements, such as the collection of biometric indicators, could further discourage travel to the United States. The World Travel and Tourism Council and the World Tourism Organization also view visa requirements as an important factor in determining levels of tourism.

Eliminating the Program Would Increase the Need for State Department Resources

Should the Congress decide to require visas from current visa waiver travelers, State would require more resources, such as personnel and facilities overseas, to handle the resulting increased visa processing and biometric collection workload. State estimates that if the individuals now traveling under the Visa Waiver Program were required to obtain visas, the number of applications would rise by 14 million. We estimated that State’s initial costs to process the additional workload would likely range between $739 million and $1.28 billion, and annual recurring costs would likely range between $522 million and $810 million. The ranges of our cost estimates are large because they reflect the uncertainty of key variables in our cost estimating model, such as costs for consular personnel, space, and supplies; the percentage of visa applicants that State interviews; and the method by which State collects biometrics. Given this uncertainty, actual costs could vary significantly.

To estimate the costs of eliminating the Visa Waiver Program, we created a cost model that included information on a number of variables such as workload and staffing data (e.g., personnel and facility costs) from State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs and the time and costs involved in collecting biometrics. We used our model to forecast a range for both additional initial and recurring costs. Consistent with State assumptions, we assumed a “low” interview rate of 10 percent (about 1.4 million applicants) and a “high” interview rate of 95 percent (about 13.3 million applicants). (See app. I for more details of our methodology and assumptions.)

Figure 3 shows estimated initial costs to State if the Visa Waiver Program were eliminated. These costs include elements such as hiring, training, and moving new consular personnel; installing additional equipment to collect and store biometrics; and building or renovating facilities in all visa waiver posts.

We estimated that if State were to interview 10 percent of all visa applicants, initial costs would likely range from $739 million to $821 million. If State were to interview 95 percent of all visa applicants, initial costs would likely range from $1.12 billion to $1.28 billion.

Figure 4 shows annual recurring costs, which include elements such as consular personnel salaries, biometric hardware and software maintenance, facility leasing and maintenance, and supplies.

If State were to interview 10 percent of all visa applicants, recurring costs would likely range from $522 million to $587 million. If State were to interview 95 percent of all visa applicants, recurring costs would likely range from $723 million to $810 million. For fiscal year 2003, State requested $3.36 billion for ongoing operations related to diplomatic and consular programs, including the operation of all overseas facilities.

It could take at least 2 to 4 years to put the necessary people and facilities in place to handle the increased workload, according to State officials. Using State’s staffing and workload assumptions, we estimated that the department would need, in addition to the approximately 840 Foreign Service officers who are currently overseas, more than 350 additional Foreign Service officers to handle the extra nonimmigrant visa workload if required to interview 10 percent of all applicants and more than 800 additional officers if required to interview 95 percent of all applicants. According to consular officials, hiring Foreign Service officers and training them for general Foreign Service and languages could take a year or more. It could take several months to hire Foreign Service nationals, depending on the availability of qualified candidates and their ability to pass the security background check. In cases where a significant number of new consular staff were added and new facilities were acquired, posts might also need to employ administrative staff such as human resource managers, post security guards, and additional facilities management and maintenance staff.

A portion of the initial and recurring costs shown in figures 3 and 4 would be used for new or renovated facilities that the post would need in order to process an increased number of nonimmigrant visa applications. In some countries, including but not limited to Belgium, France, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom, State would need additional work and waiting room space to process applications; this could involve acquiring new facilities or reopening and renovating additional posts for the nonimmigrant visa workload. For example, in Italy, State officials said that they would need to renovate or reopen facilities in Naples, Sicily, Rome, Milan, and Florence. In some U.S. embassies, such as those in Slovenia and Uruguay, available space would have to be adapted for processing the additional workload. Identifying, procuring, and fitting out lease space can take 24 to 48 months, on average, according to State officials.

State officials in most countries we visited and analysts in Washington said that until they acquired additional space for handling nonimmigrant visas, there would be long lines of visa applicants waiting outside the current posts, posing a potential security threat for both the applicants and U.S. embassy officials. Also, if additional space was acquired in unsecured buildings separate from the embassy, personnel working in such buildings would be put at risk until the space was upgraded for security. A U.S. ambassador pointed out that acquiring additional space for visas would conflict with the department’s efforts to consolidate Americans into joint space to improve their security and protect them.

Although revenues from the surcharge for machine-readable visas would not cover the additional initial costs related to the elimination of the Visa Waiver Program, State could cover additional recurring costs over time. To pay for the costs associated with the processing and issuing of machine- readable visas and with State’s Border Security Program, State currently charges applicants a $65 fee each time they apply for a machine-readable visa. On November 1, 2002, State increased the fee to $100 to compensate for increases in the actual cost of providing visa service. State officials have not determined how they will fund the costs of collecting biometrics. The options they have discussed include requesting an appropriation from the Congress, passing the cost to the visa applicant, or a combination of the two.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

The Justice Department and the State Department provided written comments on a draft of our report. These comments, along with our responses to specific points, are reprinted in appendixes II and III.

Justice expressed optimism that the requirements of recent border security laws will be met. Specifically, Justice stated that it does not anticipate significant delays in the incorporation of standardized, machine-verifiable biometrics in the national passports of most Visa Waiver Program countries. We continue to believe, however, that some countries may be unable to add biometrics to their passports by the 2004 deadline. Our assessment is based on the statements of U.S. State Department and law enforcement officials as well as the responses from several Visa Waiver Program countries concerning their ability to issue passports with biometrics.

Justice also stated that our discussion of the entry–exit system leaves the impression that implementation of the system is not moving forward. We acknowledge that INS is taking steps to implement the system, and we have added information on INS’s progress to the report. However, the report points also out that an entry–exit system covering all nonimmigrant travelers to the United States has been required since 1996.

State generally concurred with the report and stated that our comments on the Visa Waiver Program are in keeping with its assessment of the implications and costs resulting from a blanket suspension of the program. However, State expressed concern that the report did not discuss the border inspection process at the U.S. port of entry as an alternative solution to the visa application process to address perceived weaknesses in the program. We acknowledge the importance of the inspection process for aliens seeking to enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with visas. We have added a discussion of the inspection process to the report. The Justice Department Inspector General and GAO have work under way that will provide a more thorough assessment of the border inspection process.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Commissioner of the INS, and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. We will make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128. Additional GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix IV.

Scope and Methodology

To describe the process for assessing countries’ eligibility to participate in the Visa Waiver Program, we examined laws establishing the program, relevant congressional reports, regulations and agency protocols governing the program, Department of Justice Office of Inspector General reports, and other relevant documents. To assess steps being taken to increase the requirements for the program and enhance U.S. border security, we reviewed recent laws such as the USA PATRIOT Act and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Departments of State and Justice reports, and recent GAO reports.

To describe U.S. national security issues related to the Visa Waiver Program, we reviewed Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) data on terrorists who entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with valid visas. We reviewed State, INS, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) data and databases on inadmissible aliens, the immigration status of criminals, the number of aliens refused entry to the United States, and the reasons aliens were refused entry. We also examined Justice officials’ testimony before Congress, the President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security, and GAO’s report Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool. Given the limited amount of data addressing this issue, we interviewed officials from State, including the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security, and Justice, including the INS, FBI, and DEA in the United States and in Argentina, Belgium, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and Uruguay. We selected five of these countries because they were the first countries whose participation in the program was being evaluated by the Departments of Justice and State. We selected the sixth country, Spain, to provide a perspective on countries that had not been evaluated. We discussed with U.S. officials their views about whether eliminating the Visa Waiver Program would increase U.S. national security.

To describe the importance of the Visa Waiver Program to U.S. relations with other countries, we reviewed government reports, including the U.S. Department of Defense’s Fact Sheet: International Contributions to the War Against Terrorism, the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism—2001, and the U.K. Coalition Information Centre’s Campaign Against Terrorism: A Coalition Update. We reviewed European Union documents, including European Council positions and regulations. We also interviewed officials from the Departments of State, including the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security, and Justice, including the INS, FBI, and DEA in the United States and in Argentina, Belgium, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and Uruguay. We discussed with them whether eliminating countries’ participation in the Visa Waiver Program could affect U.S. relations with those countries and, if so, what the effects might be. Because of the sensitivity of the issues, in four of the six countries, the State Department requested that we not meet with representatives from other countries’ governments or chambers of commerce. We met with the governments of Argentina and Uruguay and with the American Chamber of Commerce in Argentina.

To determine whether requiring citizens of visa waiver countries to obtain visas would affect their decision to travel to the United States, we examined the existing economic literature on tourism and interviewed industry experts. We interviewed officials from State, Foreign Commercial Service Officers in overseas posts, the Department of Commerce’s Office of Travel and Tourism Industries, the Travel Industry Association of America, the World Travel and Tourism Council, and the World Tourism Organization. To determine the contribution of travel from visa waiver countries to the U.S. economy, we reviewed official travel data for 1991– 2001 from Commerce, a 2002 study from Commerce, and data from the Travel Industry Association of America and the World Travel and Tourism Council.

To determine the potential effects that requiring visas and biometrics from current visa waiver travelers would have on State’s resources, we created a cost estimating model using workload and staffing data from State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs and information on the time and costs involved in collecting biometrics. Such information included analogies to the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, averages of biometric vendor costs, expert opinions from the field of biometrics, and cost estimates developed by the International Biometrics Group. We conducted a simulation that varied the cost estimating model approximately 1,000 times with information on variables such as personnel and facility costs to forecast a range for both initial and recurring costs. During our simulation, costs fell below the top of the shaded areas in Figures 3 and 4 in the report 90 percent of the time, while costs fell below the bottom of the shaded areas only 10 percent of the time. In other words, 80 percent of the times we varied our simulation, costs fell within our reported ranges. We chose to report large ranges of cost estimates to reflect the uncertainty of key variables in our cost estimating model, such as costs for consular personnel, space, and supplies; the percentage of visa applicants that State interviews; and the method by which State collects biometrics.We based our estimates on the following assumptions: All costs were expressed in constant fiscal 2002 dollars.

The amount of additional visa applications for current visa waiver travelers would remain about 14 million per year.

Cost estimates provided to us by State, such as Foreign Service national salaries and leasing and maintenance fees, could vary by about 10 percent, barring unforeseen circumstances.

The ratio of Foreign Service nationals needed to assist each Foreign Service officer with nonimmigrant visa processing is 2.5 to 1 but can vary between 2 and 4 to 1.

Under a “low interview” scenario, State would interview 10 percent of all visa applicants and, under a “high interview” scenario, State would interview 95 percent of all visa applicants. Estimates are based on a 4- minute interview.

Consular officers would capture four flat fingerprints from each visa applicant at the embassy or consulate and would store the biometric data in a separate memory storage card from the visa.

Resources would be in place at all visa-issuing posts to collect biometrics for the current 10.3 million visa applications.

Some Foreign Service nationals would spend time both processing visa applications and collecting biometrics.

Visa applicants whom State must interview would visit the embassy to be interviewed and have their biometrics collected on the same day.

We also met with consular officials at the U.S. consulate in Buenos Aires, Argentina, to determine the effect that the elimination of the Visa Waiver Program had on their staff and facility levels. Similarly, we met with consular officials in U.S. consulates in Brussels, Belgium; Rome, Italy; Ljubljana, Slovenia; Madrid, Spain; and Montevideo, Uruguay, to determine how the elimination of the Visa Waiver Program would affect their resources.

We performed our work from February 2002 through August 2002, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Comments from the Department of Justice

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Justice’s letter dated November 4, 2002.

GAO Comments

1.

Justice stated that it does not anticipate significant delays in the incorporation of standardized, machine-verifiable biometrics in the national passports of most Visa Waiver Program countries. We believe that some countries may not be able to establish programs to issue the passports by the 2004 deadline. Our assessment is based on the statements of U.S. State Department and law enforcement officials in Europe and the United States. Moreover, our concern is supported by additional information that we subsequently obtained from the State Department. As of October 2002, State found that only 3 of the 17 countries discussing their plans for issuing biometric passports would meet the deadline. Most of the respondents stated that they did not know if they would meet the deadline. Some of these respondents cited the lack of an international standard as a reason for the uncertainty.

2.

Justice also commented that our discussion of the entry–exit system leaves the impression that implementation of the system is not moving forward. We acknowledge that INS has implemented systems, as of October 1, 2002, to fulfill the requirement for an automated system to monitor the entry and exit of aliens under the Visa Waiver Program. We have added this information to the report. However, we note that there have been delays in implementing the entry–exit system for Visa Waiver Program travelers. Implementation of such a system has been required since 1986. However, the report also points out that an entry–exit system covering all nonimmigrant travelers to the United States has been required since 1996. Moreover, the Justice Inspector General has reported that completion of the entire entry–exit system will take several years.

Comments from the Department of State

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter dated November 7, 2002.

GAO Comments

1. State commented that the discussion of Zacarias Moussaoui should include more details. We do not believe additional details are necessary. We discussed Moussaoui and the 19 individuals who carried out the attacks of September 11, 2001, merely as examples of anecdotal evidence about terrorists entering the United States under the Visa Waiver Program and with visas. 2. State commented that the draft report did not provide detailed information on the border inspection process. State also commented that the draft report overemphasizes the visa application as a solution to perceived weaknesses of the Visa Waver Program and overlooks the possibility that these weaknesses could be resolved through changes in border inspection procedures or other means. We acknowledge the importance of the inspection process for aliens seeking to enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program as well as with visas. We have added a discussion of the inspection process to the report. The Justice Department Inspector General and GAO are conducting more thorough assessments of the border inspection process.

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Acknowledgments

In addition to the persons named above, Lyric Clark, Kendall Schafer, Bruce Kutnick, Mary Moutsos, and Reid Lowe made key contributions to this report.

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