Security Cooperation: Comparison of Proposed Provisions for the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
Released: 2016-11-01T00:00:00

Introduction

Security cooperation provisions in the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) have escalated ongoing debates over U.S. security sector assistance to foreign countries and raised questions regarding whether existing authorities are able to meet current and evolving requirements. As the 114 th Congress winds down, Members of Congress are expected to reconcile remaining differences in the FY2017 NDAA. Policymakers and observers anticipate that the outcome of conference deliberations could significantly change the security cooperation and security sector assistance policy landscape.

Since World War II, the U.S. Department of State has served as the lead agency in guiding U.S. security assistance to foreign countries, with long-standing authorities codified in Title 22 (Foreign Relations) of the U.S. Code and funded through congressional appropriations to the State Department. Such engagements have been viewed by many, including in Congress, as a tool of foreign policy. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) implements some of these programs, but for many decades, it otherwise relegated the training, equipping, and assisting of foreign military forces as a secondary mission on its list of priorities, far below war-fighting.

Over time, however, and particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has granted DOD new authorities in annual NDAAs and in Title 10 (Armed Services) of the U.S. Code to engage in "security cooperation" with foreign militaries and other security forces—now considered by DOD to be an "important tool" for executing its national security responsibilities and "an integral element of the DOD mission." This trend underlies a significant expansion of DOD direct engagements with foreign security forces and an accompanying increase in DOD's role in foreign policy decision-making. The incremental nature of Congress's adjustments to DOD's Title 10 authorities, however, has resulted in some 80 or more provisions that are described as an unwieldy "patchwork," which complicates the management, application, and oversight of such engagements.

Congress enacted many of these DOD authorities to respond to emerging threats, but also imposed limits on their scope, application, and duration, sometimes based on country- or region-specific conditions and concerns. For at least 15 years, DOD's security cooperation authorities (and funding) have grown with its counterterrorism responsibilities, involvement in overseas contingency operations, evolving national security priorities, and efforts to counter asymmetrical threats. Some practitioners view today's mix of provisions as an obstacle to DOD's effective planning and execution of its objectives. Some also view the patchwork as problematic for State Department coordination of foreign policy. While some legal restrictions appear to stem from congressional oversight concerns, those restrictions may also complicate congressional oversight efforts in practice.

In many respects, proposed provisions in the FY2017 NDAA seek to address existing concerns about how the security cooperation enterprise functions and to improve the ability of Congress to evaluate DOD's application of an expanded repertoire of security cooperation authorities. Provisions in the FY2017 NDAA, particularly those in the Senate-passed version of the bill ( S. 2943 ), could also alter the way in which DOD conducts security cooperation programming, the relationship between DOD and the State Department on security cooperation and security sector assistance matters, and Congress's oversight of related funding and programming.

Security Cooperation "Reform" Proposals in the FY2017 NDAA

In April 2016, following a review of its security cooperation authorities, DOD formally submitted 10 proposals for the FY2017 NDAA to Congress that would consolidate several authorities already located in Title 10 of the U.S. Code and codify other temporary authorities and reporting requirements into a new chapter within Title 10, entitled "Security Cooperation." The proposals were sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and vetted and approved through the interagency process, including by the Office of Management and Budget and the State Department.

One of DOD's overarching goals in its proposals was to organize and consolidate existing authorities. Another goal was to standardize statutory language, in an effort to provide more clarity to security cooperation planners and improve their ability to use existing authorities more effectively. Although some existing authorities would remain unchanged in substance as part of the proposals, others would be modified. Five authorities would be repealed for lack of use or redundancy. DOD also proposed consolidating several congressional reporting requirements on certain security cooperation authorities.

The House and Senate responded to DOD's proposals in different ways. The House-passed version of the FY2017 NDAA, H.R. 4909 , included some of DOD's proposals, but only those that make no or minor changes to existing authorities. Recognizing calls for further security cooperation restructuring, but not incorporating major changes in the FY2017 NDAA, H.R. 4909 included a provision (§1206) that would require an "independent assessment" of DOD security cooperation programs.

The Senate-passed version of the FY2017 NDAA, S. 2943 , would incorporate nearly all of DOD's proposals into a new security cooperation chapter in the U.S. Code. Furthermore, S. 2943 proposed several new, interrelated measures intended to better align DOD's programs and funding with what authorizing committee members have advanced as current and evolving strategic requirements, while also seeking to address existing challenges associated with executing security cooperation activities.

In addition, S. 2943 offered provisions that would centralize all DOD security cooperation programs under a new funding mechanism; create a professionalized security cooperation workforce; support budgeting transparency; and require assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of security cooperation programs and activities. Proposals would also variously alter the statutorily required role of the State Department in overseeing security cooperation programs by changing existing requirements that the Secretary of State approve or jointly formulate certain existing DOD programs and activities.

The Senate Armed Services Committee's (SASC's) markup of the FY2017 NDAA, from which the security cooperation proposals of S. 2943 originate, explained its purpose and objectives:

In an effort to respond to the complaints of our military commanders and the Department more broadly, the NDAA contains a major reform designed to modernize and streamline DOD's security cooperation enterprise.... Together these steps will substantially reduce the cumbersome patchwork of legal authorities and sources of funding and significantly improve operational outcomes, program management, congressional oversight, and public transparency. By breaking down existing stovepipes, these reforms will also enable the Department to better align security cooperation activities with strategic objectives.

In July 2016, the FY2017 NDAA went to conference to resolve differences between the House- and Senate-passed versions, and the lame duck session beginning in November is expected to address the NDAA conference report. Security cooperation provisions in the conference report may differ substantively from proposals contained in H.R. 4909 and S. 2943 , as passed by the House on May 18, 2016, and the Senate on June 14, 2016, respectively.

For an overview and comparison of provisions associated with the proposed enactment of a new chapter in Title 10 on security cooperation, see Appendix A .

Key Proposed Changes

As part of the proposed enactment of a new chapter in Title 10 of the U.S. Code devoted specifically to security cooperation, nearly 60 existing provisions in Title 10 or public law may variously be transferred, codified, modified, consolidated, repealed, or otherwise affected. Key proposed changes involve (1) changes to DOD's "global train and equip" authority, (2) changes to broaden the scope of existing DOD authorities, (3) changes to the State Department's role, (4) creation of a Security Cooperation Enhancement Fund (SCEF), and (5) changes to DOD's security cooperation management.

Changes to DOD's "Global Train and Equip" Authority

Among the proposed changes to the FY2017 NDAA, S. 2943 is the most far-reaching in extent, particularly in its proposal to replace 10 U.S.C. 2282 on "Authority to Build the Capacity of Foreign Security Forces" with a new permanent authority that is much broader. First granted on a temporary basis in the FY2006 NDAA, the existing authority allows DOD to train and equip foreign security forces to conduct counterterrorism operations or to participate in or support allied or coalition military or stability operations in the U.S. national security interest.

S. 2943 would authorize DOD to train and equip foreign forces for additional purposes, authorizing new activities, removing geographic limitations, allowing the U.S. military to provide types of support to a potentially wider range of foreign entities, and changing the way funds are administered. This re-conceptualized "global train and equip" authority would be codified at 10 U.S.C. 333, within the proposed new security cooperation chapter.

S. 2943 would broaden the scope of authorized foreign capacity building to include training and equipping for

counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) operations; counter-illicit drug trafficking operations; counter-transnational organized crime (TOC) operations; maritime and border security operations; military intelligence operations in support of lawful military operations; humanitarian and disaster assistance operations; and national territorial defense of the foreign country concerned.

As part of the expansions in the scope of authorized foreign capacity building, the proposed new Section 333 would also authorize provisions of lethal equipment on a global scale, which DOD is not currently authorized to provide under its existing counternarcotics, C-TOC, and humanitarian and disaster assistance programs and activities. The authority would also provide specific authority for DOD to train and equip foreign forces for humanitarian and disaster assistance and to fund programs in support of foreign national territorial defense. S. 2943 would also newly authorize DOD to support the sustainment of previously provided equipment under Section 333 to foreign partners. Moreover, S. 2943 would require human rights training, already a required element of 10 U.S.C. 2282, and defense institution building to be elements of all foreign capacity building conducted pursuant to its proposed new Section 333.

Under 10 U.S.C. 2282, DOD programs are required to be "jointly formulated" with the State Department, allowing, at least in theory, both agencies a role in the design of the programs. Furthermore, 10 U.S.C. 2282 requires the Secretary of State's "concurrence" (approval) of such programs before they could be implemented. S. 2943 would retain the Secretary of State concurrence requirement and extend it to all engagements covered under the proposed new authority, but it would remove the requirement for joint formulation. It is not clear, however, whether the proposed elimination of a statutory requirement for joint formulation would alter, in practice, the State Department's role in providing input in the planning process.

The SASC report accompanying S. 2943 ( S.Rept. 114-255 ) explained its proposed new Section 333 authority and its relationship to State Department-led security assistance programs:

[T]his consolidation is not intended to create a Department of Defense mission that competes with security assistance overseen by the State Department. Rather, a consolidated ''train and equip'' authority should enable the Department to meet its own defense-specific objectives in support of broader defense strategy and plans, as well as to better integrate title 10 security cooperation activities into the broader United States Government approach to security sector assistance.

The Senate provisions appear to seek a balance between expanding DOD's authorities and flexibility to train and equip foreign partners as needs emerge, maintaining some State Department role in the formulation and approval of new security cooperation programs, and creating more congressional tools to conduct oversight activities and funds.

In a move that could increase DOD's flexibility to train and equip foreign partners as needs emerge, S. 2943 would omit a current limitation in 10 U.S.C. 2282 that prohibits DOD from providing assistance to a "foreign country that is otherwise prohibited from receiving such... assistance under any other provision of law." Reflecting a desire for increased transparency, S. 2943 would require quarterly reports to Congress on Section 333's use, as well as congressional notification at least 15 days prior to initiating authorized activities. S. 2943 's proposal to establish the SCEF, discussed below, and authorize more than $2.1 billion in FY2017 for an expanded set of foreign capacity building efforts also represents a potentially significant change.

10 U.S.C. 2282 is also addressed in DOD's proposals and in H.R. 4909 . DOD's proposals would also transfer the existing authority to a new proposed chapter on security cooperation in Title 10 of the U.S. Code, but limited proposed changes to newly authorizing additional sustainment of equipment provided by DOD and the extension of deadlines for expenditure of obligated funds. H.R. 4909 , for its part, would not make substantive changes to the authority in 10 U.S.C. 2282 other than moving it to a new chapter of the U.S. Code.

Changes to Broaden the Scope of Existing DOD Authorities

In addition to proposed changes to DOD's "global train and equip" authority, other proposals, particularly those envisioned by DOD and S. 2943 , would substantively expand the scope of DOD's existing authorities to conduct security cooperation program and activities in several respects. Examples of such changes include the following:

Expanding the purposes for which security cooperation is authorized . S. 2943 would modify the purpose of DOD's Regional Centers for Security Studies (10 U.S.C. 184) to conduct training in lieu of "exchange of ideas" and broaden the purpose of the "Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program" (10 U.S.C. 2249c) by eliminating references that limit its current scope to counterterrorism. Expanding authorized activities. DOD's proposals and S. 2943 would expand 10 U.S.C. 127d to authorize the provision of operational support (i.e., logistic support, supplies, and services) not only to foreign countries participating in military or stability operations that benefit U.S. national interests, but also for such operations even if the United States is not participating. In some instances, DOD's proposals and S. 2943 would additionally authorize up to $750,000 in small-scale construction per project. Broadening the geographical scope of security cooperation . DOD's proposals and S. 2943 would globalize existing authorities to pay for certain personnel expenses (i.e., travel and subsistence expenses) for theater security cooperation. In other instances, proposals would authorize support to more than just "developing" countries—instead authorizing support to "friendly foreign countries" (without defining the term). Increasing the types of foreign personnel that can b enefit from DOD engagement . DOD's proposals and S. 2943 would authorize reciprocal and non-reciprocal exchanges with non-military foreign personnel and representatives, including personnel of non-defense security ministries and international or regional security organizations. In provisions to codify and modify an authority for U.S. general purpose forces to train with foreign military and other security forces, proposals differ on how to re-define the term "other security forces" (including whether to authorize training with civilian police, including local police). Changing funding limits and related provisions. DOD's proposals and S. 2943 include provisions to change existing funding caps, conditions on the availability of funds across fiscal years, and congressional notification requirements upon which funding is predicated. Such changes would affect authorities on operational support to foreign countries and the payment of incremental expenses associated with U.S. general purpose forces training with foreign forces. With its proposed establishment of a Security Cooperation Enhancement Fund (SCEF), S. 2943 would additionally change the way funding for security cooperation would be administered.

Changes to the State Department's Role

The State Department's role in overseeing DOD's security cooperation engagements varies among existing Title 10 authorities. Beyond S. 2943 's proposed changes to DOD's "global train and equip" authority, discussed above, several other proposals could change the Secretary of State's ability to play a decision-making role in DOD's use of certain security cooperation authorities.

With respect to authorities pertaining to the international exchange of defense personnel and the payment of certain foreign personnel expenses for theater security cooperation, DOD's proposals and S. 2943 would newly authorize the Secretary of Defense to include non-defense foreign personnel. As part of such proposals, DOD proposes adding Secretary of State concurrence when the authorities apply to non-defense foreign personnel. S. 2943 , on the other hand, would not.

In another instance, S. 2943 proposes to consolidate and modify three existing authorities that would, in combination, authorize U.S. special operations forces and general purpose forces to train and conduct military exercises with foreign forces. One of these authorities currently requires Secretary of State concurrence, the second requires Secretary of State consultation, while the third does not specify a State Department role. In consolidating the three authorities, S. 2943 would, among other changes, remove specific references to a State Department role. A related DOD proposal to consolidate two of these provisions, would, in contrast, establish Secretary of State concurrence.

In one instance, S. 2943 would add a provision for Secretary of State concurrence, where none currently exists, while DOD's proposals and H.R. 4909 would not.

Where proposed changes to DOD's security cooperation authorities would reduce requirements for State Department oversight, they have fueled broader debates over the DOD-State Department relationship and their respective roles in the development and execution of security cooperation programs. Reacting to S. 2943 in a Statement of Administration Policy , the Obama Administration generally expressed a desire to strengthen the State Department's role.

Similar sentiments have also been expressed by some Members of Congress. For example, before S. 2943 passed the Senate, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Chair Senator Bob Corker and Ranking Member Ben Cardin sought (but ultimately failed) to amend the bill by, among other changes, reinserting Secretary of State concurrence requirements ( S.Amdt. 4420 ). Meanwhile, S. 3117 , on FY2017 appropriations for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, reiterates a Title 22 provision that identifies the Secretary of State as "responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of... military assistance," including military education and training programs. The committee report accompanying S. 3117 ( S.Rept. 114-290 ) elaborates on its concerns over the lack of State Department oversight of DOD programs:

[T]he failure... to adequately integrate and coordinate foreign and military policies to ensure more effective cooperation among and between U.S. Government departments and agencies, and the complex and dynamic nature of today's security threats, have created parallel and competing foreign assistance programs, particularly at the Department of Defense. Unless conducted in a whole-of-government manner under the direction of the President and the Secretary of State... assistance programs conducted by the Department of Defense without the concurrence of the Secretary of State—from program development through program execution—erodes the coherent, coordinated, and effective implementation of U.S. foreign policy.

Beyond the strict question of State Department concurrence, S. 2943 raises broader questions about the more intangible balance of powers between the departments in determining the scope and conditions of U.S. military engagement with foreign countries, as well as evaluating the impact of such engagements on U.S. foreign policy. In parts of the world where the State Department has historically devoted relatively little "traditional" Title 22 security assistance, such as sub-Saharan Africa, DOD's growing presence is particularly felt—not only in the form of increased DOD funding and activities with partner nations, but also in the form of greater DOD weight in interagency policymaking processes. Such trends may also shift congressional oversight powers and responsibilities away from committees on foreign policy and foreign aid, and toward the defense committees.

Creation of a Security Cooperation Enhancement Fund (SCEF)

S. 2943 would establish a SCEF as the primary funding mechanism for DOD security cooperation programs and activities. The SCEF would be codified within the proposed new security cooperation chapter and obligated amounts in the SCEF would remain in the SCEF until expended. Up to 4% of amounts available in the SCEF per fiscal year would be additionally authorized to carry out

the execution and administration of DOD security cooperation programs and activities; annual assessments, monitoring, and evaluations of DOD security cooperation programs and activities; and incremental expenses associated with the Senate-proposed security cooperation workforce development program within DOD.

Funds in the SCEF would be derived from existing accounts and sources of funding for programs and activities executed in accordance with any authorities transferred into the new security cooperation chapter in Title 10 of the U.S. Code (see Table 1 ). S. 2943 would authorize transfers out of and back to the SCEF from other DOD O&M accounts. In addition, it would authorize the Secretary of Defense to accept and retain contributions to the SCEF from outside entities and would require quarterly reports to congressional defense committees regarding SCEF obligations and expenditures.

Beginning in FY2018, all unobligated balances from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Iraq Train and Equip Fund, and the South China Sea Initiative (renamed elsewhere in S. 2943 as the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative), along with other named accounts or funds for DOD security cooperation programs or activities, would be transferred into the SCEF. Beginning in FY2019, all security cooperation programs and activities authorized in the new security cooperation chapter in Title 10 of the U.S. Code would be executed through the SCEF.

Describing the SCEF, S.Rept. 114-255 , accompanying S. 2943 , explained:

Like many observers, the committee has found it increasing [sic] difficult to oversee, monitor, and evaluate the array of military service and defense-wide funding sources for the Department's security cooperation programs and activities. The committee believes that, without any changes to this arrangement, the long-term prospects of the Department's security cooperation programs and activities, particularly its ''train and equip'' activities, are not sustainable. The committee believes that consolidating funding for the Department's security cooperation programs and activities will increase public transparency, flexibility, and congressional oversight.

Further, and of particular importance, the committee also believes that a central fund will allow the Department's senior civilian and military leaders to make strategic choices with respect to the allocation of security cooperation resources against strategic priorities. For too long, the Department's activities in this area have been too diffuse and have lacked strategic coordination—both regionally and functionally. The committee notes that there are currently few nations in which the Department does not actively conduct security cooperation; some estimates have suggested that the Department is engaged in over 180 countries globally. The committee expects the Department to leverage a newly established central fund to prioritize engagements according to strategic imperatives and clearly identified objectives.

Changes to DOD's Security Cooperation Management

S. 2943 also proposes several innovations to fund DOD security cooperation and improve the execution and administration of such programs and activities—particularly newly requiring the following:

Assignment of responsibility for the oversight of security cooperation strategic policy and guidance to a single official and office within DOD's Office of the Secretary of Defense and to the DSCA Director for the execution and administration of all DOD security cooperation programs and activities involving the provision of training, equipping, and other defense services (§1252(m)). Issuance of joint DOD and State Department regulations for the coordination of security cooperation and security assistance programs and activities (§1264). Submission by DOD to Congress of a consolidated annual budget for security cooperation programs and activities (§1262). Establishment of a program for DOD security cooperation workforce development (§1263). Maintenance of a program for assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (A, M & E) in support of its security cooperation programs and activities (§1252(m)). Consolidation of funding in a Security Cooperation Enhancement Fund (SCEF) to be used for the DOD security cooperation programs and activities (§1260).

Although many of the Senate proposals stem from a desire to modernize and streamline DOD's security cooperation enterprise, some practitioners and observers have raised questions over the feasibility of implementing the Senate's provisions within required timeframes and in the context of broader resource constraints affecting the Pentagon. In particular, despite broad recognition that several of the Senate-proposed provisions could improve the execution and administration of security cooperation programs and activities, some indicate that the next Administration may require longer timeframes for (1) DOD and the State Department to develop regulations for the coordination of security cooperation and security assistance programs and activities, (2) DSCA to administer the changes envisioned by the security cooperation proposals, and (3) DOD to establish and use a central funding mechanism for building foreign security forces capacity through the SCEF.

Preliminary Reactions

Some of the proposed security cooperation provisions in the FY2017 NDAA—including the Senate's proposed security cooperation workforce development program and its measures for improved budget transparency and program accountability—have broad appeal among analysts, policymakers, and practitioners. Others have emerged as flashpoints in a broader debate over DOD's role in security cooperation. This debate, which has been the focus of several hearings in the 114 th Congress, pits those who believe that enhancing DOD's toolkit for security cooperation engagement and management is necessary for accomplishing U.S. strategic objectives, against those who caution against the "militarization" of U.S. foreign policy. This perceived militarization entails perceived shifts in the balance of DOD and State Department funding, resources, and relative bureaucratic and policy influence.

In its June 7, 2016 Statement of Administration Policy on S. 2943 , the Obama Administration welcomed some of the Senate's proposals. In particular, the Administration approved of the Senate's incorporation of its own proposals. The Administration, however, cautioned against the risk of unintended harm to security cooperation and force readiness efforts, as well as the risk of undermining the State Department's lead role in foreign policy and security sector assistance. Where mechanisms already exist or were proposed in DOD's FY2017 package of security cooperation authority revisions, the Administration expressed a desire to maintain State Department oversight mechanisms, including Secretary of State concurrence and joint formulation of programs with DOD.

Some Members and outside observers have publicly expressed similar sentiments, including questions about whether the proposed changes could negatively affect U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy, including with respect to U.S. promotion of human rights.

Representative Adam Smith, ranking member on the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), stated in an interview that the U.S. military's involvement in broad security development and stabilization activities is concerning because it is "not their area of expertise." House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Chair Representative Ed Royce, who is a conferee on the FY2017 NDAA, stated to the media that he would resist any changes that would weaken the State Department's involvement in international security programs and that he would advocate for the House's approach, as passed in H.R. 4909 , as opposed to the proposals in S. 2943 . A news report described a closed SFRC hearing in June 2016 in which Member concerns were reportedly expressed that some existing DOD security cooperation programs and activities hamper broader foreign policy goals in the absence of sufficient State Department oversight. SFRC Chair Senator Corker reportedly raised similar concerns with SASC Chair Senator John McCain. In July 2016, Senators Patrick Leahy, Richard Durbin, ranking members of the State-Foreign Operations and Defense appropriations subcommittees, respectively, joined with Senators Corker and Cardin, chair and ranking member of SFRC, respectively, to write a letter to HASC and SASC regarding the security cooperation and assistance changes proposed in S. 2943 . The Senators reportedly opposed provisions that would not strengthen statutory requirements for State Department coordination, consistent with its lead role in security assistance policy.

In an effort to modify certain aspects of S. 2943 's security cooperation provisions, Senators Corker and Cardin submitted an amendment ( S.Amdt. 4420 ) to the bill. Although the amendment was ultimately tabled and no further action was taken prior to S. 2943 's passage, it signaled several foreign policy concerns in the legislation.

Proponents of security cooperation proposals in the FY2017 NDAA argue that changes are necessary to provide for flexible and robust DOD-led security cooperation authorities that will better serve U.S. strategic and military objectives than the current policy architecture. DOD's Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation, for example, has argued that defense security cooperation should be viewed as a core element of military strategy, as it contributes specifically (1) to mitigating U.S. security risks by enabling partners to operate in coalition with the U.S. military or independently against shared objectives, (2) to deterring adversaries, and (3) to setting theater conditions that enable successful U.S. military operations.

SASC has insisted, meanwhile, that its security cooperation provisions in S. 2943 are intended to improve DOD and State Department integration on security cooperation efforts. According to SASC, S. 2943 could also address other critiques of DOD's current security cooperation programs and activities, through its provisions to professionalize the security cooperation workforce and provide more tools for DOD to manage its security cooperation programs, including multi-year funding and authority to sustain capacity-building efforts.

Outlook

On July 8, 2016, the FY2017 NDAA went to conference amid pressure from various stakeholders to reconcile disparate viewpoints on security cooperation reform. While the conference report is not yet released, it is expected to be brought before the House and Senate during the lame duck session.

The implementation of changes to DOD's security cooperation authorities may be affected by near-term appropriations decisions. Security cooperation programs and activities are currently funded through December 9, 2016, under the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 114-223 ). The House version of the FY2017 DOD appropriations ( H.R. 5293 ), which passed the House on June 16, 2016, does not include reference to funding for S. 2943 's SCEF or any additional changes to DOD's security cooperation authorities, programs or activities. The Senate version ( S. 3000 ), which was reported out of committee on May 26, 2016, also does not include funding for the SCEF. It does, however, provide for a maximum of $850 million in O&M, Defense-wide funds to remain available until September 30, 2018 and "be available to provide support and assistance to foreign security forces or other groups or individuals to conduct, support or facilitate counterterrorism, crisis response, or Security Enhancement Activities in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017."

Beyond the FY2017 NDAA, broader efforts to review U.S. security sector assistance and explore models of interagency collaboration and alternative budgeting mechanisms, including transfer authorities between DOD and the State Department, are likely to persist. Many anticipate that security cooperation policy questions will continue to challenge policymakers in the next Administration and the 115 th Congress. Key policy questions include the following:

Does the current statutory framework adequately reflect today's strategic environment? If not, would the proposed changes in the FY2017 NDAA meet the needs of existing and emerging threats? If gaps remain, what legislative proposals could be anticipated in future NDAAs? How does security cooperation contribute to U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives? What are the national security implications of unsuccessful security cooperation programs and activities? How should the effectiveness of security cooperation programs and activities be measured and assessed? To what extent should security assistance be viewed as a tool to achieve U.S. military objectives (and thus, a potentially central DOD mission), versus a tool to further U.S. diplomatic partnerships with foreign nations (and thus, primarily a State Department function)? Can those two potentially competing objectives be harmonized? If so, how? What are the key differences between security assistance carried out under Title 22 (State Department) of the U.S. Code and security cooperation programs and activities carried out under Title 10 (DOD) authorities? What are the implications of potentially duplicative authorities? What challenges does the State Department face in meeting its responsibility of "continuous oversight and general direction" of military assistance, education, and training programs, among other features of the conduct of foreign affairs? What aspects of security sector assistance are a shared responsibility? How might changes in DOD's security cooperation authorities affect interagency relations, global perceptions of U.S. civil-military balance, and foreign government interactions on security sector issues? What is the appropriate role for DOD and the U.S. military to play vis-a-vis the domestic and/or civilian security forces, such as police, of foreign countries? In what contexts, if any, is DOD the agency best-placed to train and equip these forces? What risks may be associated with such engagements? How might proposals in the FY2017 NDAA change the scope of DOD's security cooperation mission and the distribution of funding among combatant commands? What are the implications of any such changes? If provisions in the Senate-passed version of the FY2017 NDAA were enacted, would it be feasible for DOD to implement those provisions within timeframes required by the legislation? What would be the implications of delays? How might reforms strengthen or weaken congressional policymaking control and oversight of security cooperation, including implications for committee jurisdiction over such matters? To what extent should Congress place limits (temporal, geographic, human rights-related, etc.) on DOD's ability to provide assistance to foreign security forces? To what extent do such restrictions support, or impede, congressional oversight?

In addition to appropriations decisions and funding constraints in the near-term, the next Administration's management and execution of security sector assistance could be affected by future national-level and agency-specific policy decisions. Further debate on this issue could inspire subsequent rounds of proposals for FY2018 and beyond.

Appendix A. Overview and Comparison of Security Cooperation Provisions in the FY2017 NDAA, as of November 1, 2016