U.S. Sanctions on Burma
Released: 2012-10-19T00:00:00

Overview of Sanctions

The United States imposes sanctions on Burma by a variety of means, including certain laws and presidential executive orders (E.O.s) specifically targeting Burma, as well as laws that impose sanctions on countries for unacceptable behavior related to functional issues of importance to the U.S. government, such as nuclear proliferation or human trafficking. The Burma-specific laws and E.O.s were issued between 1990 and 2012, often in response to actions on the part of Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), that were considered sufficiently egregious to warrant the imposition of sanctions. The result is a web of overlapping sanctions subject to differing restrictions, waiver provisions, expiration conditions, and reporting requirements.

U.S. sanctions targeted solely at Burma are specified in six federal laws, a series of presidential executive orders, and certain presidential determinations. The six laws are:

Section 138 of the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 (Section 138) ( P.L. 101-382 )—requires the President to impose "such economic sanctions upon Burma as the President determines to be appropriate," unless the President certifies certain conditions pertaining to human rights and counternarcotics have been met; Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Section 307) (P.L. 87–195), as amended by the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 ( P.L. 103-236 )—withholds U.S. contributions to selected international organizations with programs in Burma; Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (Section 570) ( P.L. 104-208 ) —imposes various specific sanctions on Burma, unless the President certifies that certain human rights and democracy standards have been met; The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (2003 BFDA) ( P.L. 108-61 )—requires the President to impose a ban on the import of products of Burma; freeze assets of certain Burmese officials; block U.S. support for loans from international financial institutions (IFIs); and ban visas for certain Burmese officials; The Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act) ( P.L. 110-286 )—bans the direct and indirect import of products containing Burmese jadeite and rubies; expands the list of Burmese officials subjected to visa bans and financial sanctions; and allows for the placement of restrictions on use of correspondent accounts to provide services to Burmese officials; and P.L. 112-192 —provides the President with the authority to waive U.S. opposition to assistance to Burma from IFIs, subject to certain conditions.

Five presidential executive orders (E.O.) currently in force impose sanctions on Burma. The five E.O.s are:

E.O. 13047 —Issued on May 20, 1997, by President Bill Clinton, it bans all new investments in Burma, as required by Section 570; E.O. 13310 —Issued on July 28, 2003, by President George W. Bush, it brings the sanction regime into compliance with certain provisions of the BFDA, including the freezing of assets of certain Burmese officials and the prohibition of the provision of financial services to Burma; E.O. 13448 —Issued on October 18, 2007, by President Bush, it added to the list of Burmese officials and entities subject to the freezing of assets; E.O. 13464 —Issued on April 30, 2008, by President Bush, it added to the list of Burmese officials and entities subject to the freezing of assets; and E.O. 13619 – Issued on July 11, 2012, by President Obama, it expanded the list of Burmese nationals subject to visa bans, the freezing of assets, and other targeted sanctions.

On October 3, 1996, President Clinton issued Presidential Proclamation 6925 denying entry into the United States of "persons who formulate, implement, or benefit from policies that impede Burma's transition to democracy, and the immediate family members of such persons." President Bush issued Presidential Determination No. 2009–11 on January 15, 2009, providing a limited waiver of some of the sanctions in the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act, stating that doing so was "in the national interest of the United States."

The E.O.s sanctioning Burma rely on the authority vested in the President by the Constitution, the five Burma sanctions laws, and the following laws:

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1997, or IEEPA ( P.L. 95-223 ; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)—authorizes the President to impose certain types of international trade or financial sanctions to deal with a threat to national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States; and The National Emergencies Act, or NEA ( P.L. 94-412 ; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)—authorizes the President (under certain conditions) to declare a national emergency.

To carry out and execute the authority conveyed by the IEEPA, the President must declare a national emergency by invoking the NEA. Invocations of the IEEPA are subject to annual renewal requirements. Section 301 of U.S.C. Title 3, Chapter 35 allows the President to delegate authority (under certain conditions) to other government officials to carry out responsibilities on behalf of the President. In most cases, this has been either the Secretary of State or the Treasury Secretary. President Obama gave official notice to Congress on May 17, 2012, that he was continuing for another year (May 21, 2012-May 20, 2013) the international emergency with respect to Burma, and renewing the provisions of E.O. 13047, E.O. 13310, E.O. 13448, and E.O. 13464, which are still in force.

The implementation of the Burma-specific sanctions instituted by the preceding laws and E.O.s, and that have been delegated to the Treasury Secretary, is governed by Part 537 of Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). These Burmese sanction regulations cover the import ban, the prohibition of the provision of financial services, and the prohibition of new investments in Burma. Other portions of the CFR cover some portions of Burmese-specific sanctions.

Recent U.S. Sanctions Policy

Current U.S. policy towards Burma can be characterized as the balancing of bilateral engagement and an assortment of political and economic sanctions—an approach sometimes referred to as "pragmatic engagement." The stated intent of U.S. policy is to persuade and/or pressure Burma's year-old, quasi-civilian Union Government to release all political prisoners from detention and advance the nation's transition to a representative, democratically elected civilian government that will respect the human rights of the people of Burma, including its ethnic minorities. Since Burma's former ruling military junta formally transferred power to a quasi-civilian government in April 2011, Burma's Union Government and Union Parliament have implemented a number of political reforms that the Obama Administration sees as progress towards the fulfillment of U.S. objectives in Burma.

Frequently described as being in an "action for action" mode, recent U.S. policy discussions have generally focused on establishing criteria for amending, waiving, and/or removing existing U.S. sanctions. In an April 4, 2012, press briefing, two unnamed senior Administration officials gave some indication of the current principles underlying current Burma policy. The first principle is "to send a clear signal of support for the reform process and reformers." The second principle is to remove the "bluntness" of the existing sanctions and refocus them onto "the regressive elements, the corrupt elements, the elements that are not looking forward and consistent with reform going forward."

Over the last 12 months, the Obama Administration has taken several steps designed to foster further reforms in Burma and support individuals identified as being generally supportive of political and economic reforms. The first steps were taken following the second of the four prisoner releases and were announced by Secretary Clinton during her historic trip to Burma. Another series of steps was announced following the April 2012 parliamentary by-elections. The latest changes were announced to coincide with the visits of President Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi to the United States in September 2012.

A major element of the Obama's Administration's efforts to foster reforms in Burma has been the utilization of presidential authority to waive or ease some of the existing political and economic sanctions on Burma. Although the presidential waivers effectively lift the sanctions, they do not revoke or remove the sanctions, which can be reimposed at any time. Table 1 summarizes the sanction waivers authorized to date, as well as which sanctions remain in effect. In addition, the Obama Administration has indicated it intends to partially or totally waive the general import ban at some future date, and use recently created authority to support assistance to Burma by international financial institutions.

Clinton's Trip to Burma and the First Major Policy Changes

Secretary Clinton traveled to Burma from November 30 to December 2, 2011—the first Secretary of State to visit Burma since John Foster Dulles' trip in 1955. During her visit to Burma, she announced that the United States would consider the exchange of ambassadors and would introduce several new U.S. development programs including an English language program; aid to victims of Burma's internal conflict (especially land mine victims); and academic exchange programs. An official traveling with Secretary Clinton reportedly told the press that initially $200,000 would be provided for the program for victims of the internal conflict, with the goal of raising the funding to $800,000, out of existing appropriations. The English language program was to be financed by a $25 million grant by Brunei. Other programs would use approximately $1 million out of existing appropriations. In a separate announcement, USAID said that it intended to expand an existing $24 million anti-malaria program into Burma. All of the initiatives announced by Secretary Clinton during her visit are permissible under the current U.S. sanction regime.

On February 3, 2012, President Obama issued a presidential memorandum waiving Section 110(d)(1)(B) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) with respect to Burma. The law requires the U.S. executive directors of international financial institutions to vote against, "and use the Executive Director's best efforts" to deny non-trade, non-humanitarian loans or other use of funds to Burma through multilateral development banks (MDBs) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While Section 5 of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 still requires the U.S. executive directors of the IMF and MDBs "to oppose, and vote against the extension by such institution of any loan or financial or technical assistance to Burma," the Obama Administration maintains that the presidential waiver of the TVPA provision partially opens the door for the IMF and MDBs to provide additional technical support to Burma.

Major Policy Changes Following the By-Elections

On April 1, 2012, Burma held a parliamentary by-election to fill 45 vacant seats across much of the country. The by-election garnered national and international interest not because of its potential influence on the balance of power within the Parliament, but because of the decision by pro-democracy opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and other National League for Democracy (NLD) members to run as candidates. The NLD had refused to run in the November 2010 elections because it considered the election laws overly restrictive. Although an improvement over the November 2010 parliamentary elections, the April by-elections by most assessments did not achieve the four standards set forth by United Nations Special Rapporteur Tomás Quintana—free, fair, transparent, and inclusive. According to the official results announced by the Union Election Commission, Aung San Suu Kyi and 42 of her fellow NLD candidates won, with the 2 remaining seats going to a candidate from the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and a candidate from the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP).

The Obama Administration issued a statement on April 1, congratulating "the people of Burma on their participation in the electoral process, and Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy on their strong showing in the polls." A more detailed response came two days later, after the official results had been announced. On April 4, 2012, Secretary Clinton announced that United States would undertake five steps to support and foster reforms in Burma "in light of the by-elections and other progress in recent months." The five steps are

1. Seeking an agreement with Burma on the exchange of fully accredited ambassadors—it was subsequently revealed that Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma Derek Mitchell would likely be the U.S. nominee; 2. Establishing an in-country USAID mission and supporting a normal country program for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)—Currently, USAID activities for Burma are being administered by the mission in Bangkok, Thailand; for a number of years, the United States has restricted UNDP activities in Burma to prevent any funds benefiting the Burmese government, including local officials; 3. Relaxing restrictions on private U.S. organizations providing nonprofit activities in Burma designed to promote democracy, provide healthcare, or offer education; 4. Facilitating travel to the United States for selected pro-reform Burmese officials; and 5. Beginning the process of a targeted easing of the ban on the export of U.S. financial services and investment as part of a broader effort to help accelerate economic modernization and political reforms.

All of these steps are to be taken using existing executive authority granted by the constitution and relevant federal laws, including the major Burmese sanctions laws. According to Secretary Clinton, these five steps were chosen following consultation with Congress, "as well as our allies and friends in Europe and Asia."

In a separate background briefing organized by the State Department on the same day as Secretary Clinton's announcement, two unnamed senior Administration officials provided additional information about the five steps. Regarding relaxing restrictions on private U.S. organizations providing nonprofit activities in Burma, the officials said that the State Department was working with the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to create an "expanded general license" to facilitate the approval of such activities. OFAC approved this new general license on April 17, 2012, authorizing the exportation and reexportation of financial services to Burma for six types of not-for-profit projects. With respect to the easing of trade and investment restrictions, the officials indicated that the intent is to identify areas that will have an "immediate impact on the livelihood of the people in the country" and will reduce impediments to the reform process. When asked to identify economic areas that may be chosen for the easing of trade and investment restrictions, the officials specifically mentioned agriculture, banking, tourism, and possibly telecommunications. They also stated that the United States would have to be very careful regarding activities in "more regressive sectors," such as gems, timber, and activities in ethnic minority areas where there is a history of the Burmese government approving projects opposed by the local population.

In terms of the method of implementing the five steps, the officials said that the plan is to use existing waiver authorities and/or to rescind executive orders, and that there was "no plan at the current time to ask [Congress] to get rid of anything legislative." Some of the announced steps—in particular, the establishment of a USAID mission in Burma, U.S. support for UNDP projects in Burma, the relaxation of restrictions on nonprofit activities in Burma by private entities, and the facilitation of travel by selected Burmese officials—may require the explicit invoking of presidential authority in existing sanction laws (possibly involving the issuance of a presidential executive order), as well as the delivery to Congress of a presidential determination and certification stipulating that the situation meets the waiver provisions in existing sanction laws. The implications of each of the five announced steps for existing U.S. sanctions will be discussed in the section, " Summary of Burma-Specific Sanctions ," below.

Policy Changes Announced on May 17

On May 16, 2012, Burma's Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin arrived in Washington, DC, for a two-day visit at the invitation of Secretary Clinton. During the foreign minister's visit, the Obama Administration announced three significant developments in U.S. policy towards Burma:

1. The White House released a Presidential Memorandum renewing for one year the national emergency with respect to Burma, and thereby extending the sanctions contained in E.O. 13047, E.O. 13310, E.O. 13448, and E.O. 13464 for another year; 2. President Obama formally nominated Derek Mitchell to be the U.S. ambassador to Burma; 3. President Obama announced an easing of U.S. "bans on the exportation of financial services and new investment in Burma."

Following her meeting with the foreign minister, Secretary Clinton provided additional details of the easing of the investment and financial service bans. According to Secretary Clinton, steps were to be taken "to permit American investment in the country and export of U.S. financial services." She stated that the State Department intended to work with Congress, the U.S. Treasury, and other government agencies "to be sure we are promoting responsible investment and deterring abuses." She also called upon the U.S. business community to set a "good corporate example of doing business in a transparent, responsible manner."

In a subsequent press briefing, unnamed senior Administration officials provided more details about the planned easing of the investment and financial services ban. U.S. investors in Burma will be allowed to invest in all sectors and export financial services to any Burmese entity, so long as the investment partner or entity in Burma is not on OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. To ensure that "bad actors" will not receive benefits from the U.S. easing of sanctions, the SDN is to be regularly updated. The criteria for placing a person or company on the SDN list are still to be determined, but will probably include evaluations of business practices and attitudes towards Burma's reforms. With regard to Clinton's call for U.S. businesses to be good examples in Burma, the State Department said it was working with Congress, U.S. companies, human rights organizations, non-governmental organizations active in Burma, and other interested parties to develop voluntary corporate governance standards for U.S companies doing business in Burma.

Implementing the May 17 Announcements

On July 11, 2012, the Obama Administration released a series of documents involving the President, the State Department, and the U.S. Treasury to implement the easing of selected sanctions announced on May 17, 2012. In addition, Executive Order 13619 broadened the scope of sanctions targeted at specific Burmese nationals to include persons who "directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security or stability of Burma"; are responsible for or complicit in the commission of human rights abuses in Burma; have been involved in arms trade with North Korea; or have assisted in acts of these kinds. The implications of easing of the selected sanctions and the broadening of other sanctions will be discussed in the section, " Summary of Burma-Specific Sanctions ," below.

On July 11, 2012, the Obama Administration eased two of the existing sanctions on Burma—a general ban on new U.S. investments in Burma and a prohibition on the export or re-export of financial services to Burma. The general ban on new U.S. investments in Burma was imposed by section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997 ( P.L. 104-208 ). The prohibition of the export or re-export of financial services to Burma was implemented by section 2 of E.O. 13310 based on presidential authority granted by IEEPA.

New Investments

Via a presidential memorandum, President Obama delegated authority to waive the investment ban as granted by section 570(e) of P.L. 104-208 to Secretary Clinton. That authority was then exercised by Deputy Secretary of State Thomas R. Nides, who reportedly notified Congress of the waiver decision. The waiver paved the way for OFAC to release its decision to create General License No. 17, "Authorizing New Investment in Burma." General License No. 17 allows new investments in Burma by U.S. persons subject to certain limitations: no investments with Burma's Ministry of Defense or any armed group (state or non-state) in Burma; no investments with Burmese nationals and companies subject to sanctions. In addition, all U.S. investors in Burma must comply with a new State Department reporting requirement for investments in Burma. New investments in Burma do not require pre-approval or notification, but the U.S. investor is liable if it is determined that an investment has been made with a sanctioned Burmese entity.

The State Department reporting requirements have two parts. First, any investment involving the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) must be reported to the State Department within 60 days of the investment. Second, all investments in Burma with an aggregate value of over $500,000 must be reported to State Department providing specific information about the investment each year by April 1. Certain portions of this information will be made public. An investment is considered to have occurred on the date the parties entered into a contact or the U.S. party purchased a share of ownership (including equity interest) in a resource located in Burma.

Financial Services

OFAC also announced the creation of General License No. 16, "Authorizing the Exportation or Reexportation of Financial Services to Burma." The new license permits the export or reexport of financial services to Burma, subject to certain restrictions: no provision of financial services to Burma's Ministry of Defense or any armed group (state or non-state) in Burma, Burmese nationals or companies subject to sanctions, or debits to a blocked account. General License No. 16 supersedes General License No. 14-C and 15. The provision of financial services does not require pre-approval from or notification to OFAC. However, the provision of financial services to sanctioned Burmese entities is subject to the penalties prescribed by IEEPA.

New Targeted Sanction

In addition to easing the two specific sanctions, President Obama imposed sanctions on certain Burmese nationals via E.O. 13619. The E.O. prohibits the issuance of a visa to, freezes the assets of, and bans the provision of financial services to any person who:

has engaged in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Burma; is responsible for or complicit in the commission of human rights abuses in Burma; directly or indirectly imported, exported, reexported, sold, or supplied arms or related materiel from North Korea to Burma; is a senior official of an entity that has engaged in any of the preceding activities; has materially assisted or supported persons engaged in the preceding activities; or is owned or controlled by a person subject to these sanctions.

Policy Changes Announced in September 2012

As had been done in May, the Obama Administration announced further easing of sanctions on Burma that were concurrent with the separate U.S. visits by Aung San Suu Kyi and President Thein Sein in September 2012. On September 19, 2012, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Treasury Department removed President Thein Sein and Lower House Speaker Shwe Mann from its list of Specially Designated Nationals (SDN), effectively eliminating any financial sanctions imposed of the two Burmese officials. On the same day, Representative Edward Royce, on behalf of the President, introduced H.R. 6431 , which would grant the President the authority to waive U.S. opposition to IFI assistance to Burma if the President determines that doing so is in the national interest of the United States. H.R. 6431 was passed the same day by voice vote in the House and on September 22 by unanimous consent in the Senate, and was signed into law ( P.L. 112-192 ) by the President on October 5, 2012.

Prior to her meeting in New York City with President Thein Sein on September 26, 2012, Secretary Clinton announced that steps were being taken to ease restrictions on the import of Burmese goods into the United States. According to Secretary Clinton, the easing of the import ban was being done "in recognition of the continued progress toward reform and in response to requests from both the government and the opposition [in Burma]." In a separate State Department briefing that same day, two senior State Department officials indicated that the timeline and scope of the announced easing of the import ban was unknown, and would involve consultation with Congress.

Brief History of U.S. Sanctions on Burma

U.S. sanctions on Burma are the end result of a general, but uneven decline in U.S. relations with Burma and its military, the Tatmadaw, since World War II. For the most part, the decline is due to what the U.S. government sees as a general disregard by the Burmese military for the human rights and civil liberties of the people of Burma. However, part of the tensions between the Tatmadaw and the United States can be attributed to a failure to address Burma's internal security concerns in the early years after its independence.

During World War II, the United States utilized Burma as a base of operations against Japanese forces in China and Southeast Asia, engendering generally cordial relations with Burma's civilian and military leadership. Following the war, the former British colony of Burma became an independent nation, led by a civilian government. The new nation became a member of the United Nations in 1948, was a founding member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1952—with the full support of the United States. The United States and Burma also established full diplomatic relations.

Relations between the two nations began to sour following World War II for various reasons. First, Burma was increasingly frustrated by U.S. reluctance to resolve the status of displaced Kuomintang (KMT) soldiers operating out of northeastern Burma against the newly established People's Republic of China (PRC). In 1953, U.S. economic assistance to Burma temporarily ceased in part because of the friction over the KMT soldiers in Burma. Second, Burma's civilian government proved to be unstable, due in part to various ethnic-based militia groups operating in the country, and in part due to a 1962 coup d'état staged by the military under the name of the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). The new military government chose to foster closer ties to the PRC, a decision that the United States did not like. Third, the military government also demonstrated a general lack of respect for the human rights of its citizens, clamping down on opposition groups calling for a return to civilian rule.

Despite the cooling of relations, U.S. policy towards Burma remained relatively normal. The United States also accepted Burma as one of the original beneficiaries of its Generalized System of Preference (GSP) program in 1976. It also granted Burma Most Favored Nation (MFN, now referred to as Normal Trade Relations, or NTR) status, and supported the provision of developmental assistance by international financial institutions. There were also close military to military relations (including a major International Military Education and Training [IMET] program) until 1988.

The implementing of sanctions on Burma did not begin until after the Tatmadaw brutally suppressed a peaceful, popular protest that has become known as the 8888 Uprising. Starting in the fall of 1987, popular protests against the military government sprang up throughout Burma, reaching a peak in August 1988. On August 8, 1988, the military quashed the protest, killing and injuring an unknown number of protesters. In the aftermath of the event, the military regrouped and the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) assumed power.

Three days following the crackdown, the Senate passed S.Res. 464 , condemning the killings and mass arrests, supporting a return to democracy in Burma, and calling on the Reagan Administration to raise the issue of human rights and reconciliation with Burmese officials. On September 7, 1988, the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 529 condemning the killing of unarmed protesters, paying tribute to the people of Burma and their struggle for democracy, and calling on the executive branch to review assistance programs in Burma. The Reagan Administration responded on September 23, 1988, by suspending all U.S. aid to Burma, including counternarcotics programs, and stopping all arms sales—starting the gradual progress of sanctions on Burma. On April 13, 1989, President George H. W. Bush issued Presidential Proclamation 5955, amending the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program and suspending preferential treatment.

After assuming power, SLORC announced that it intended to expedite the return to civilian rule by holding parliamentary elections to form a Pyithu Hluttaw (Union Assembly) on May 27, 1990. On September 27, 1988, SLORC released a new law governing the registration of political parties, and on May 31, 1989, it issued a new law governing the upcoming parliamentary election. Although 235 political parties registered for the election, only 4 parties won more than 10 of the 485 contested seats. In a surprise to many, the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, received 59.9% of the valid votes and won 382 seats, while SLORC's political party, the National Unity Party, received 21.2% of the vote, but only 10 seats.

SLORC and Burma's military were shocked by the election results, and refused to allow the Union Assembly to meet. Instead, the Burmese military arrested and detained many of the opposition leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi. Protests, led by Buddhist monks and university students, were brutally suppressed. SLORC declared martial law.

Congress responded to the post-election crackdown by including Burmese sanction language in the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-382 ), which it passed on August 20, 1990. Section 138 of the law granted the President the authority to impose "such economic sanctions upon Burma as the President determines to be appropriate, including any sanctions appropriate under the Narcotics Control Trade Act of 1986." A version of the act which passed the Senate by a vote of 92-0 would have prohibited all imports from Burma.

Prior to the passage of Customs and Trade Act of 1990, the Bush Administration had suspended Burma's eligibility for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program on April 13, 1989. President Bush also designated Burma as a drug-producing and/or drug-trafficking country under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 on February 28, 1990, which required the United States to oppose loans to Burma by international financial institutions. After the passage of Customs and Trade Act of 1990, the Bush Administration invoked the law's authority on August 5, 1991, and refused to renew the Bilateral Textile Agreement with Burma, which had lapsed on December 31, 1990.

During the 1990s, Congress considered a number of bills and resolutions calling for additional sanctions on Burma. Most of those measures failed to emerge from committee, with a few notable exceptions. On April 30, 1994, Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 ( P.L. 103-236 ) which amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and withheld a portion of U.S. contributions to international organizations with programs for Burma, including the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), but excluding IAEA and UNICEF. Language restricting U.S. funding for UNDP if it conducted programs in Burma was included in legislation up to FY2008, but not since then.

In July 1995, the Free Burma Act of 1995 ( S. 1092 ) was introduced, which would have placed a broad range of sanctions on Burma, including a ban on U.S. investment and assistance, the suspension of GSP privileges and normal trade relations, the prohibition of all imports of Burmese goods, travel restrictions to and from Burma, and U.S. opposition to all multilateral assistance. According to some scholars, the severity of the sanctions in this bill was sufficient to persuade SLORC to release Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest on July 10, 1995.

Even after the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, Congress approved new sanctions on Burma in Section 570 of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 ( P.L. 104-208 ), including a cessation of all non-humanitarian assistance, a ban on the issuance of entry visas for Burmese government officials, and instructions for U.S. representatives for international financial institutions to vote against loans or funding to Burma. On October 3, 1996, President Clinton issued Presidential Proclamation 6925, suspending visas for "persons who formulate, implement, or benefit from policies that impede Burma's transition to democracy, and the immediate family members of such persons." In addition, the law required the President to prohibit new investments in Burma by U.S. persons. On May 20, 1997, President Clinton released E.O. 13047 banning all new investments in Burma.

Since 2000, additional bills and resolutions have been introduced in Congress seeking to apply more sanctions on Burma. In October 2000, identical bills were introduced in the House and the Senate ( H.R. 5603 and S. 3246 ; 106 th Congress) that would have banned all textile and apparel imports from Burma. In the spring of 2001, similar bills ( H.R. 2211 and S. 926 ; 107 th Congress) were introduced that would have "prohibited the importation of any article that is produced, manufactured, or grown in Burma." However, Congress did not pass any new sanction legislation until after the spring 2003 crackdown on opposition parties (which included the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition leaders), when it approved the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 ( P.L. 108-61 ). Similarly, Congress did not pass the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act until the SPDC crushed a nationwide protest initiated by Buddhist monks in the autumn of 2007—the so-called "Saffron Revolution." After the protests had been quashed, the SPDC arrested and imprisoned many of the leaders, and defrocked and relocated a number of the Buddhist monks involved in the protests.

The George W. Bush Administration did not take significant action on Burma until after the attacks on the Burmese opposition in the spring of 2003 and the passage of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (BFDA). Using authority granted by the BFDA and other laws (see " Summary of Burma-Specific Sanctions "), President George W. Bush issued E.O. 13310, E.O. 13448, and E.O. 13464 on July 28, 2003, October 18, 2007, and April 30, 2008, respectively. Since assuming office, President Barack Obama's actions regarding Burmese sanctions have included renewing the international emergency with respect to Burma (thereby extending the sanctions under E.O. 13047, E.O. 13310, E.O. 13448, and E.O. 13464), and issuing a presidential determination and a memorandum waiving some of the sanctions related to the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000.

There are some distinct patterns in the history of U.S. relations with Burma. First, despite the general decline in relations following World War II, the imposition of sanctions did not begin until after the suppression of the 8888 Uprising in 1988. Second, subsequent U.S. sanctions have generally been imposed after Burma's military has severely violated the human rights and civil liberties of its political opponents and/or the Burmese people. Third, Congress has been more proactive in pushing for the imposition of sanctions on Burma than the White House. Fourth, it is unclear if the imposition of sanctions has had a demonstrable effect on the SPDC or its predecessors. Fifth, it is equally unclear if the absence of U.S. sanctions on Burma would have led to an improvement in the political situation in Burma.

Summary of Burma-Specific Sanctions

The existing U.S. sanctions specifically targeted at Burma can be generally divided into several broad categories. First, there are bans on issuing visas to certain Burmese government officials (particularly the leadership of the State Peace and Development Council [SDPC] and the Union Solidarity Development Association [USDA]), members of their families, and their business associates. Second, there are restrictions on the provision of financial services to certain Burmese government officials, members of their families, and their business associates. Third, certain assets of selected individuals held by U.S. entities have been "frozen." Fourth, there is a general prohibition on the import of goods of Burmese origin. Fifth, there is a prohibition on the import of certain types of goods and goods from certain companies. Sixth, there is a ban on new U.S. investments in Burma, including investments in third country companies. Seventh, there are restrictions on the provision of bilateral and multilateral assistance to Burma.

Some of the types of sanctions are included in more than one of the laws or E.O.s listed above, with at times apparently overlapping provisions. In addition, depending on the specific provisions of the laws or E.O.s, the sanctions may be subject to differing presidential waiver provisions, renewal or extension conditions, or reporting requirements. A summary of the various provisions in the laws or E.O.s for each type of sanction follows in tabular form. In cases where the Obama Administration has indicated its intent to relax or modify the existing type of sanction, a brief description of what steps may be necessary to implement the proposed change is provided, and the relevant waiver or removal conditions are highlighted in the table.

Visa Bans

There are three laws that include restrictions on the issuance of visas to certain Burmese nationals: Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997; the 2003 BFDA; and the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act, plus Presidential Proclamation 6925 and E.O. 13619. The nature and scope of the visa restrictions differ in each case. In addition, although there is no language in the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act indicating that it supersedes the prior visa restrictions, a representative of the State Department indicated that their current interpretation is that 2003 BFDA provisions authorize a visa ban, but do not require their implementation, and that so far no President has invoked the visa ban authority granted in the 2003 BFDA.

Secretary Clinton in her April 4 remarks said that the Obama Administration was prepared to facilitate "travel to the United States for selected government officials and parliamentarians." In a subsequent press briefing, unnamed Administration officials indicated that the intent is to allow visits by "select reform-minded authorities." Existing sanctions laws—most notably Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 and the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act—authorize the President to waive restrictions on the issuance of visas to Burmese officials. In the case of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act, the President is to determine and certify in writing to Congress that the waiver is in the national interest of the United States. Presumably, such a written notification to Congress is required for each case in which the President invokes the authority to waive the visa ban.

On July 11, 2012, President Obama released E.O. 13619, "Blocking Property of Persons Threatening the Peace, Security, or Stability of Burma." Section 5 of E.O. 13619 prohibits the entry into the United States as immigrants or nonimmigrants "aliens determined to meet one or more of the criteria in subsection 1(a) of the document."

Restrictions on Financial Services

Restrictions on the provision of certain types of financial services to Burma from the United States or by a "United States person" are in E.O. 13047, E.O. 13310, the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act, and E.O. 13619. The Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act also allows the Secretary of the Treasury to place restrictions on the use of correspondent or payable-through accounts in U.S. financial institutions, but the Secretary has not exercised this option.

On April 4, 2012, Secretary Clinton announced that the Obama Administration was "beginning the process of a targeted easing of our ban on the export of U.S. financial services and investment as part of a broader effort to help accelerate economic modernization and political reform." On May 17, she stated, "Today, I am announcing new steps to permit American investment in the country and the export of U.S. financial services—the most significant adjustments to our sanctions to date." She also said that the United States will "allow Burmese citizens access to international credit markets and dollar-based transactions." Implementation of the Secretary's announced easing of sanctions occurred on July 11, 2012, via a series of documents (see " Implementing the May 17 Announcements "). The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Department of the Treasury issued General License No. 16, authorizing the exportation or reexportation of financial services to Burma, except "to any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to 31 C.F.R. §537.201(a), Executive Order 13448 …, Executive Order 13464 …, or Executive Order 13619.…"

Section 5(b)(2) of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act prohibits engaging in financial transactions with certain designated Burmese nationals. Section 2 of E.O. 13310 established the general prohibition on the export or reexport of financial services to Burma, subject to the restrictions on financial transaction sanctions contained in Section 203(b) of IEEPA. Section 13 allows the continuation of financial transactions related to U.S. investments or agreements in Burma that pre-date the implementation of the new investment ban on May 21, 1997.

Given that these provisions of E.O. 13310 are based on IEEPA, the President has the authority to waiver, amend, or terminate the general prohibition of the export or reexport of financial services to Burma. However, Section 1703 of IEEPA requires that the President report to Congress anytime he exercises IEEPA authority. The report to Congress must contain:

the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of authority; why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States; the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of those authorities to deal with those circumstances; why the President believes such actions are necessary to deal with those circumstances; and any foreign countries with respect to which such actions are to be taken and why such actions are to be taken with respect to those countries.

"Frozen Assets"

The "freezing" of assets of sanctioned Burmese officials is included in four executive orders—E.O. 13310, E.O. 13448, E.O. 13464, and E.O. 13619—as well as the 2003 BFDA and the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act. Each of the successive executive orders broadened the list of Burmese persons and entities subjected to the asset freeze. The Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act directly tied the list of sanctioned persons to the visa ban list.

General Import Restrictions

Restrictions on the import of goods of Burmese origin in general are included in two laws—Section 138 of the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 and the 2003 BFDA—and one executive order, E.O. 13310. While the two laws ban the import of Burmese products, the executive order provides a waiver to comply with existing international obligations of the United States. On August 2, 2012, Congress passed H.R. 5986 ( P.L. 112-163 ), extending the general import ban to July 25, 2013.

Specific Import Restrictions

Both the 2003 BFDA and the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act contain specific import restrictions in addition to the general prohibition on the import of products described above. The 2003 BFDA bans import of products and services from certain companies. The Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act prohibits the importation of certain products.

Investment Ban

The ban on new investments in Burma is in Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997, and E.O. 13047, with the law providing the presidential authority and the E.O. exercising that authority. On May 17, 2012, President Obama issued an official notice renewing the national emergency with respect to Burma.

On April 4, 2012, Secretary Clinton stated that the Obama Administration was considering easing the ban on new investments in Burma. In a subsequent press briefing, two unnamed senior Administration officials indicated that no final decision had been made on the nature of the easing of the investment ban, but consideration was being given to select certain sectors such as agriculture, tourism, and potentially telecommunications as they are more likely to provide "the most benefit for the average Burmese." Other sectors, associated with "regressive elements [of] the Burmese economy and Burmese society" such as gems and timber, may not be opened to new investments at this time. The financial services sector was also being considered.

On May 17, 2012, Secretary Clinton stated, "The United States will issue a general license that will enable American businesses to invest across the Burmese economy." She also said, "The State Department will work with Congress and our colleagues across the government, particularly the Treasury Department, to implement mechanisms to promote responsible investment and deter abuses."

On July 11, 2012, the Obama Administration issued several documents to waive the ban on new U.S. investments in Burma, subject to certain conditions on with whom the investment can be made (see " New Investments "). General License No. 17, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury, explicitly prohibits U.S. investments with:

Burma's Ministry of Defense (including its Office of Procurement); Any state or non-state armed group; Any entity in which the Ministry of Defense or an armed group own 50% or more interest; or any person whose property is blocked pursuant to 31 C.F.R. §537.201(a); E.O. 13448, E.O. 13464, or E.O. 13619.

Among the people covered by 31 C.F.R. . §537.201(a); are persons determined by the U.S. Treasury to be "a senior official of the Government of Burma, the State Peace and Development Council of Burma, the Union Solidarity and Development Association of Burma, or any successor entity to any of the foregoing."

Bilateral and Multilateral Assistance Ban

Restrictions on bilateral assistance to Burma are in Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997; and Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which withholds U.S. funding for international organizations with programs in Burma, with some specific exceptions. Section 5 of the 2003 BFDA requires the U.S. executive director of each international financial institution (IFI) in which the United States participates to vote against the extension of any loan, financial or technical assistance to Burma. Although the United States lacks enough votes to block an IFI from providing loans or assistance to Burma, in practice, it is unlikely that any IFI will proceed if the United States opposes the aid.

P.L. 112-192 grants the President the authority to waive U.S. opposition to IFIs' assistance to Burma required under Section 5 of the 2003 BFDA if the President determines to do so is in the national interest of the United State. It also states that prior to the President making such a determination, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury shall consult with "the appropriate congressional committees on assistance to be provided to Burma by an international financial institution, and the national interest served by such assistance." The law defines the "appropriate congressional committees" to be "the Committees on Foreign Relations, Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, and Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committees on Financial Services, Foreign Affairs, and Appropriations of the House of Representatives." The term "assistance" includes loans, financial or technical assistance, or "any other use of funds."

With regard to Secretary Clinton's announcement that the United States would support the UNDP establishing a "normal country program" in Burma, current sanction laws may preclude the United States contributing funds to the program. Section 307 of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2227), "Withholding of United States proportionate share for certain programs of international organizations," states:

Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this part shall be available for the United States proportionate share for programs for Burma [emphasis added], North Korea, Syria, Iran, Cuba, or the Palestine Liberation Organization or for projects whose purpose is to provide benefits to the Palestine Liberation Organization or entities associated with it, or at the discretion of the President, Communist countries listed in section 2370(f) of this title.

In other words, Section 307 prohibits the use of U.S. funds contributed to the UNDP (and other international organizations) for programs for Burma. In practice, according to the State Department, for the past decade it has sent a letter to UNDP indicating that the United States may withhold a portion of its contributions if the UNDP funded new programs and activities in Burma. The UNDP has been running a Human Development Initiative (HDI) program in Burma since 1994.

Subsection (c) provides an exemption for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). The FAA does not grant the President the authority to waive the funding restrictions in Section 307. As a result, the United States cannot financially support a "normal country program" of the UNDP in Burma without Congress passing legislation to permit such funding.

In addition, several past laws—including some appropriation laws—included language that either prohibited the use of U.S. contributions to UNDP for programs and activities in Burma or withheld a portion of U.S. contributions to UNDP until the President or the Secretary of State certified to Congress that the UNDP was in compliance with specific conditions on its programs and activities in Burma. Among the past laws that contained language tying U.S. contributions to UNDP to its programs and activities in Burma were:

Section 431 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 ( P.L. 103-236 ); Section 108(c) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-113 ); and Section 6689b) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-161 ).

However, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-74 ) does not contain language regarding the use of U.S. contributions to UNDP in Burma. It does, however, state in Section 7044(b)(1) that "The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive directors of the appropriate international financial institutions to vote against any loan, agreement, or other financial support to Burma."

Additional Sanctions Based on Functional Issues56

In addition to the targeted sanctions, Burma is currently subject to certain sanctions specified in U.S. laws based on various functional issues. In many cases, the type of assistance or relations restricted or prohibited by these provisions is also addressed under Burma-specific sanction laws. The functional issues include:

Child Soldiers: Burma is prohibited from receiving certain types of foreign assistance under the provisions of the Child Soldiers Preventions Act of 2008 (Title IV of P.L. 110-457 ) because of its designation as a foreign government that hosts governmental armed forces or supports armed groups that recruit and use child soldiers. As a result, Burma is ineligible to receive aid under International Military Education and Training (IMET), the Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Section 1206 assistance, as well as excess defense articles and the issuance of licenses for direct commercial sales of military equipment. Human Trafficking: Burma is prohibited from receiving non-humanitarian and non-trade-related foreign assistance because of its designation by the President as a "Tier 3" country in the 2011 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report. Tier 3 countries are statutorily defined in the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA, P.L. 106-386 , as amended) as noncompliant with the minimum standards for the elimination of TIP and not making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with such standards. On September 30, 2011, President Obama issued Presidential Determination 2001-28, granting Burma a partial waiver of the aid sanctions of the TVPA, to provide assistance for controlling infectious diseases. On February 3, 2012, he issued a presidential memorandum waiving Section 110(d)(1)(B) of the TVPA with respect to Burma. The memorandum specifically waives the requirement for U.S. Executive Directors to vote against "and use the Executive Director's best efforts to deny" non-trade, non-humanitarian loans or other utilization of funds to Burma through multilateral development banks and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Despite the presidential waiver, the requirement that the Executive Director of each multilateral development bank oppose and vote against loans and other forms of assistance to Burma remains in force because of Section 5 of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act (see " Bilateral and Multilateral Assistance Ban " above). Money Laundering and Organized Crime: Burma's Mayflower Bank and Asia Wealth Bank, and the jurisdiction of Burma as a whole, including its state-run banks, are designated as "primary money laundering jurisdictions of concern" under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act ( P.L. 107-56 , as amended) for the country's absence of money laundering regulations, weak oversight of the banking sector, and private bank connections to account holders involved in organized crime, particularly drug trafficking. Under this provision, the Treasury Department imposed a "special measure" to prohibit certain U.S. financial institutions from establishing, maintaining, administering, or managing correspondent or payable-through accounts for, or on behalf of, Myanmar Mayflower Bank, Asia Wealth Bank, and any other Burmese banking institution. This prohibition extends to correspondent or payable-through accounts maintained for other foreign banks when such accounts are used to provide banking services to Burmese banks indirectly. Religious Freedom: The International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA, P.L. 105-292 , as amended) requires that the President conduct an annual review of the status of religious freedom in other nations, and authorizes the imposition of various types of sanctions on nations that seriously violate religious freedom. Burma has been designated a "country of particular concern for religious freedom" pursuant to this act since 1999. Burma was most recently re-designated in 2009. As the sanctioning action imposed on Burma pursuant to IRFA and currently in effect, the Secretary of State has elected to continue the existing arms embargo against Burma. Workers Rights: The Trade Reform Act of 1974 ( P.L. 93-618 , as amended) grants the President the authority to withdraw preferential trade treatment under the U.S. generalized system of preferences (GSP) program if a country "has not taken or is not taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights to workers in the country." On April 13, 1989, President George H. W. Bush issued Presidential Proclamation 5955 suspending Burma's preferential treatment under the GSP program, invoking his authority under the Trade Reform Act of 1974. World Peace and the Security and Foreign Policy of the United States : The President has the authority under the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 ( P.L. 94-329 ) to prohibit all arms exports to a country "in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States." On September 23, 1988, President Reagan invoked his powers under this law to impose an arms embargo on Burma. In addition, on June 9, 1993, the State Department issued a public notice implementing an immediate ban on export of defense articles and services to Burma. The U.S. arms embargo on Burma remains in effect.

Burma had been prohibited from receiving certain types of foreign assistance, as well as other types of foreign policy provisions, because of its designation by the President as a major illicit drug producing and/or drug-transit country under Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA, 87-195, as amended) and Section 706 of Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 ( P.L. 107-228 , as amended). However, presidential determination 2012-15, issued on September 14, 2012, granted Burma (as well as Bolivia and Venezuela) a national interest waiver of the stipulated prohibitions despite its continued designation as a major drug transit and/or major illicit drug producing nation, as well as Burma's designation as a nation that had failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to adhere to its international counternarcotics agreements and take measures set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the FAA.

Additional Sanctions Previously Proposed

Since 1989, some Members of Congress have proposed, and Congress has at times considered, additional sanctions on Burma. Some of those proposed sanctions would go beyond the current sanctions regime. Others would fall under broader sanctions already enacted.

The notion of a complete ban on the importation of products of Burmese origin first appeared in legislation in the Senate version of the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 (see above). It reappeared in proposed legislation in 1995, when S. 1092 was introduced during the 104 th Congress. S. 1092 would have prohibited the importation of any article "produced, manufactured, grown, or extracted in Burma."

As early as June 1989, legislation was introduced in Congress to prohibit the import of selected Burmese products. Initially, these proposed import bans were directed at products of Burmese origin. For example, in the 101 st Congress, H.R. 2578 would have blocked the importation of teak and fish products from Burma. In the 106 th Congress, H.R. 5603 and S. 3246 were introduced, proposing a ban on the importation of all textile and apparel products from Burma. Later on, the proposed import bans would have prohibited the importation of goods containing materials, parts, or components originating in Burma, regardless of the country of origin of the imported good. For example, S. 2172 and S. 2257 of the 110 th Congress would have banned the importation of goods containing "any gemstones or rough unfinished geological materials" and "any teak or other hardwood timber" from Burma, regardless of the country of origin of the imported good.

Various bills and resolutions have also been proposed calling for a broader arms embargo on Burma. In some cases, such as S.Res. 195 of the 102 nd Congress, the President and the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations were to "take the strongest possible action" in support of a global arms embargo on the country. In other cases, such as H.Con.Res. 308 , H.Res. 473 , and S.Con.Res. 107 of the 102 nd Congress, the legislation would have required the President and/or the Secretary of State to press China to end its military assistance to Burma. In the 104 th Congress, S. 1092 would have required the United States to vote against any loan or assistance to China by a multilateral financial institution "until the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committee that the People's Republic of China has terminated arms sales and other arms transfers to Burma."

China is not the only nation specifically identified in congressional legislation to be pressed to support sanctions on Burma. The members of the European Union (EU) and the nine other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been mentioned in several bills as countries that should be pushed to tighten their sanction regimes against Burma. In the 110 th Congress, H.Con.Res. 200 called upon ASEAN to suspend Burma's membership in the organization. In addition, S. 1092 of the 104 th Congress would have denied certain trade benefits to countries designed as "beneficiary developing countries" under Title V of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2461 et seq.), as a "beneficiary country" of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (19 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.), or as a "beneficiary country" of the Andean Trade Preference Act (19 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.) unless those nations entered into an agreement with the United States to cease trade and investment in Burma.

There has also been congressional consideration of broader financial sanctions on Burma. The House version of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act initially included provisions that would have prohibited "United States persons" from entering into economic-financial transactions, paying taxes, or performing "any contract" with Burmese government institutions or individuals. The prohibition of the payment of taxes specifically included the payments of taxes to the Burmese government by the Yadana natural gas project, in which the U.S. corporation Chevron is a major partner. These stricken provisions were replaced in the final bill by a "sense of Congress" statement that Chevron and the other foreign investors should consider voluntary disinvestment from the project.

Another area targeted by congressional legislation for additional sanctions has been investment in Burma. S. 1092 of the 104 th Congress would have banned all existing and new investments by U.S. nationals in Burma. Similarly, S. 2172 of the 110 th Congress would have banned investments in Burma by U.S. persons, including those made prior to May 20, 1997, as well as payments to the SPDC related to the divestment of assets in Burma.

Options for Congress

Various recent developments in Burma sparked a general reexamination of U.S. policy towards Burma, and a discussion of whether U.S. sanctions continue to be an effective means of achieving policy goals or effecting change in Burma. After Senior General Than Shwe formally dissolved the SPDC on March 30, 2011, and officially transferred power to the new Union Government, an era of political reforms and improved communications with the United States has ensued. Since taking office, President Thein Sein has issued prisoner amnesties on six occasions, resulting in the release of 28,838 prisoners, including 745 political prisoners. The Union Parliament has enacted laws that allowed the NLD and other opposition parties to participate in parliamentary by-elections in April 2012, and permit the formation of labor unions. In addition, the Union Government has begun ceasefire talks with several of the nation's ethnic-based militias, concluding preliminary agreements in some cases.

However, serious human rights violations continue to occur in Burma. According to Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), 280 political prisoners remain in detention. The government-backed Union Election Commission refuses to register several ethnic-based political parties. Some labor unions have been unable to register and union organizers have been subjected to harassment and arbitrary dismissal, despite the passage of the new law. Although President Thein Sein issued instructions to stop all attacks on ethnic-based militias, the Tatmadaw continues its assaults and commits severe human rights abuses against civilians in conflict areas.

During its first session, the 112 th Congress generally acted to retain the existing sanctions. It passed H.R. 2017 ( P.L. 112-33 ) on September 30, 2011, extending the general imports restriction in the 2003 BDFA through July 2012. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-74 ), passed on December 15, 2011, reaffirmed other existing sanctions by barring the use of funds for international military education and training, foreign military financing, excess defense articles, or Section 1206 assistance; restricting the use of the State Department's Economic Support Fund to humanitarian assistance in Burma; and restating the requirement that the U.S. executive directors to IFIs vote against "any loan, agreement, or other financial support to Burma." In 2012, Congress passed P.L. 112-163 renewing the general import ban, and P.L. 112-192 , described previously in the report. In general, the 112 th Congress has allowed the Obama Administration to take the lead on deciding when to selectively ease or waive some of the existing sanctions (see " Recent U.S. Sanctions Policy ").

The relative dearth of legislative action does not imply that the 112 th Congress has not demonstrated an interest in U.S. policy in Burma. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held oversight hearings during the second session on U.S. policy in Burma. Several congressional delegations from both the House of Representatives and the Senate have traveled to Burma to assess the extent of the political reforms and discuss U.S. policy with various political leaders. The Obama Administration frequently consults with key Members of Congress regarding possible policy options, as well as to inform Congress of the Administration's interpretation of the situation in Burma. Several Members of Congress have also released statements on Burma, ranging from support for the removal of all sanctions to disapproval of "pragmatic engagement" and the endorsement of the maintenance of all sanctions.

Although presidential waivers permit the temporary suspension of sanctions, the actual removal of existing sanctions may be a more complex proposition because of the overlapping provisions of the laws governing the current sanction regime. In addition, because Burma is subject to sanctions based on assessments related to certain functional issues (e.g., human trafficking, religious freedoms), the repeal of Burma-specific sanction laws or E.O.s may not eliminate certain types of restrictions on Burma. For example, removing prohibitions on certain types of assistance may be more difficult than eliminating bans on the importation of selected goods with materials, parts, or components from Burma. In addition, Congress would likely give consideration to matching the importance or weight of the sanction to the intended message it would be trying to convey to the Burmese government and the people of Burma. Such a balance would also heavily depend on the course of events in Burma in the months ahead.