Information Sharing: DHS Is Assessing Fusion Center Capabilities and Results, but Needs to More Accurately Account for Federal Funding Provided to Centers
Released: 2014-11-06T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Fusion Centers

The federal government recognizes fusion centers as assets that are critical to enhancing homeland security because they coordinate the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of law enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and terrorism information. Centers also serve as focal points for the two-way exchange of information between federal agencies and state and local governments. As of June 2014, there were 78 fusion centers across the United States, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories that collectively make up the National Network. These include centers that are statewide or broad in jurisdiction—such as those operated by state police—and regional centers that usually cover large cities with substantial populations and numerous critical infrastructure sites, which may be operated by a city or county law enforcement or emergency management agency.

Recognition as a fusion center within the National Network generally requires that the governor of the state make this formal designation; a state or local governmental agency oversees and manages the center; the center has plans and procedures to function as a focal point for sharing law enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and terrorism information; and the center has achieved requisite baseline capabilities as DHS—on behalf of federal interagency partners—determines through an annual assessment of each fusion center’s capabilities. A state or local law enforcement official generally serves as the center director, but non- law enforcement contract personnel can also serve in this capacity as determined by the applicable agency that owns and operates the center. Analyst positions within these centers often make up a substantial portion of the staffing and typically include a combination of state, local, and federal personnel.

While each center engages in core information-sharing functions— namely, the receipt, analysis, gathering, and dissemination of threat- related information—some centers focus more broadly on “all-crimes” or “all-hazards,” in addition to terrorism and homeland security information. Fusion centers can issue a combination of situational awareness and analytical products—such as daily or weekly bulletins on criminal or intelligence information and intelligence assessments—which, in general, provide reporting on an emerging threat, group, or crime. Centers primarily create these products for law enforcement entities and other partners within their jurisdiction, such as owners and operators of critical infrastructure. Fusion centers also collect and process tips and leads as part of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI), and provide outreach and training to the private sector and other governmental partners.

Federal Support to Fusion Centers

The 9/11 Commission Act required that the DHS Secretary establish a DHS State, Local and Regional Fusion Center Initiative and that—in coordination with representatives from fusion centers and the states—the department take certain actions to support the initiative. For example, the act requires the Secretary to support federal efforts to integrate fusion centers into the ISE, assign personnel to centers, incorporate fusion center intelligence information into DHS information, provide training, and facilitate close communication and coordination between the centers and DHS. The law also requires the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, to establish guidelines for fusion centers that include standards that fusion centers must address.that centers collaboratively develop a mission statement, identify expectations and goals, measure performance, and determine center effectiveness; create a collaborative environment for the sharing of intelligence and information among federal, state, local, and tribal These include, for example, government agencies, the private sector, and the public, consistent with guidance from the President and the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE); and offer a variety of intelligence and information services and products.

Within DHS, I&A’s SLPO is responsible for providing a link among the fusion center; the intelligence community; and state, local, and private sector partners.either part-time or full-time personnel to fusion centers to support center operations and serve as liaisons between the fusion center and federal components.

Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities and Assessment Process

In September 2008, DHS and DOJ jointly published the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, which the agencies developed in collaboration with the PM-ISE and other federal, state, and local officials. This document identified the capabilities determined necessary to achieve a national, integrated network of fusion centers and detailed the standards necessary for a fusion center to be considered capable of performing basic functions by the fusion center community. In 2010, fusion center directors, in partnership with the federal government, distilled the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers into priorities, including four Critical Operational Capabilities: receive: ability to receive classified and unclassified information from federal partners. analyze: ability to assess local implications of that threat information through the use of a formal risk assessment process. disseminate: ability to further disseminate that threat information to other state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector entities within their jurisdiction; and gather: ability to gather locally-generated information, aggregate it, analyze it, and share it with federal partners as appropriate.

In September 2010, federal, state, and local officials completed the first nationwide assessment of fusion centers to evaluate center capabilities and to establish priorities for federal government support. The assessment process focuses on measuring fusion center implementation of the four Critical Operational Capabilities, as well as four additional Enabling Capabilities (privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections; sustainment strategy; communications and outreach; and security). Since 2011, DHS has taken the lead to manage and implement the annual assessment process as a core component of its broader Fusion Center Performance Program. The other two components of the performance program are DHS activities to further develop capabilities and mitigate gaps, as well as an exercise program to evaluate fusion center capabilities in practice, called the Fusion Center Readiness Initiative.

Federal Grants to Fusion Centers

While fusion centers are state and locally owned, the federal government has continued to provide federal grant funding to support center operations, in part because the government expects the National Network of Fusion Centers to be a key player in sharing information. The fiscal year 2013 Homeland Security Grant Program guidance also identified the maturation and enhancement of fusion centers as one of five priority areas for HSGP funding. The HSGP consists of three separate programs, two of which states and local jurisdictions have primarily used to help fund fusion centers—the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). These grant programs are not specifically focused on, or limited to, fusion centers and the fusion centers do not receive direct, dedicated funding from DHS. Rather, a state administrative agency—the state-level agency responsible for managing all homeland security grants and associated program requirements—or an urban area’s working group, which has similar responsibilities, determines the amount of grant funding a fusion center receives. A fusion center typically contributes to the development of a state’s federal grant application by providing information on how the center will use the proposed funding it requests, called an investment justification.

DHS Performance Program Helps Fusion Centers Assess Capabilities and Address Gaps, and DHS Has Plans to Further Evaluate Capabilities through Exercises

Fusion Center Assessment Process Is Systematically Assessing Capabilities and Monitoring Progress; Most Centers Are Achieving Baseline Capabilities

As the cornerstone of DHS’s efforts to evaluate how fusion centers are meeting designated standards for the four critical capabilities and four enabling capabilities, the fusion center annual assessment process is serving to assess and monitor capability development for both individual fusion centers and the National Network. To determine capability scores, each fusion center completes an online questionnaire that addresses multiple attributes for each of the eight capabilities, for a collective total of 50 individual attributes. For example, the “gather” capability is composed of 8 total attributes, which include questions to determine if the center has a documented process to manage tips and leads and has identified standing information needs from DHS entities, among other partners. These attributes form the basis by which DHS assesses each fusion center’s progress from year to year. The highest possible score that each fusion center can receive is 100 points.

SLPO completed its third iteration of the annual assessment process in 2013, and released its annual report of the aggregate findings from this assessment in July 2014. Results of the 2013 assessment indicate that fusion centers are continuing to increase overall capability scores, and many are nearing full achievement of the 50 individual attributes that the assessment uses as evaluation criteria. Specifically, the average overall capability score reported for the National Network was 91.7 out of 100 in This score represents an improvement of about 3 points from the 2013. 2012 average score of 88.4 and continues an upward trend from the average national score of 76.8 identified in 2011. These increases reflect that fusion centers are continuing to take steps to achieve designated capabilities and mitigate gaps identified in prior years. However, scores also decreased for 1 or more of the capability attributes for 15 centers in 2013, a fact that, according to SLPO officials, highlights the importance of continued monitoring through the annual assessment.

The 2013 assessment data cover the time period from August 2012 through July 2013.

The overall assessment scores represent fusion centers’ progress in establishing designated baseline capabilities—such as implementing specified policies and procedures—but the scores may not reflect improvements in overall performance or homeland security contributions. That is, the assessment questions are intended to capture the extent to which each fusion center—regardless of size or staffing level—has met baseline capabilities to receive, analyze, gather, and disseminate information. However, the actual output of products and services can vary considerably by center based on risk environment, resource levels, or other factors. For example, 11 individual attributes constitute the “analyze” capability, and represent a broad range of activities, such as having developed an analytical production plan, the ability to access subject matter experts, and being able to contribute to local and national threat assessments. A center may report the successful completion of such activities and improve its overall assessment scores, but the scores do not reflect if the center effectively administered these activities or if they resulted in any considerable impact. For example, developing an analytical production plan may not equate to effectively meeting the plan’s targets or producing the types of reports identified therein. This highlights the importance of further validating these capabilities through other mechanisms, such as the Fusion Center Readiness Initiative and targeted performance metrics, which we discuss later in the report. Nevertheless, the annual assessment process reflects a mechanism for systematically assessing existing baseline capabilities and gaps, and provides fusion centers an indicator of their progress in achieving baseline capabilities. SLPO program management officials noted that they intend for other efforts, including the recent development of additional performance measures, to help capture the extent to which centers are achieving intended results and supporting the federal government’s homeland security mission.

All 10 directors of the fusion centers we visited stated that the annual assessment program is an effective process to evaluate their capabilities against a uniform standard, and serves to identify potential opportunities for improvement. For example, directors identified specific actions that their fusion center took to address an individual attribute and improve the center’s capability score, such as developing a plan, policy, or developing additional mechanisms to disseminate alerts. In general, the directors we spoke with stated that the administrative requirements for completing the assessment were reasonable and that center staff could generally complete these steps in a few days. In addition to assessing capabilities and related gaps, 2 directors noted that the assessment can serve as an effective mechanism to familiarize a new director with the center, given the relatively frequent turnover in directors across the National Network. Two directors also said that they use the assessment results to brief center management, such as state homeland security directors, on center operations, and that these results provide information on progress the center made toward achieving baseline capabilities. Further, 5 of the 10 directors we interviewed specifically noted the DHS requirement to utilize the assessment results to inform annual federal grant funding requests. Generally, the directors reported that while the grant requests are routinely focused on maintaining existing capabilities through analytical staff positions and technology platforms, the requests may also target the development of plans or other actions necessary to address attribute gaps, as applicable.

With the average assessment score now at almost 92 percent—and many centers achieving the highest possible score of 100—SLPO officials stated that the assessment process is unlikely to drive significant new capability development. The majority of the fusion centers that we visited had achieved scores of over 95 percent, and in 2 cases, center directors did not plan to address the 1 or 2 remaining attributes required for a perfect score because they said the cost and administrative burden outweighed the benefit. One example cited was requiring fusion centers to verify that recipients received all products as intended. These directors continued to support the overall assessment process, but they acknowledged that their focus would likely shift to maintaining existing capabilities rather than trying to achieve new capabilities to close any remaining gaps.

Although fusion centers are continuing to mature and are beginning to maintain high scores, SLPO officials said that they do not plan to change the current assessment process or any of the individual attributes to potentially capture additional capabilities. The officials noted that the current process and attributes remain important to help monitor and sustain existing capabilities and protect against possible backsliding as fusion center directors turn over and fusion center funding becomes more constrained. These officials also noted the importance of maintaining a common standard that all fusion centers can achieve, regardless of size, staffing, or location. Moreover, the officials said that they plan to maintain the existing assessment questions to ensure direct comparability of results from year to year. Finally, as discussed later, DHS uses the assessment to collect data to measure progress according to certain performance measures.

Fusion Center Directors We Contacted Found DHS Technical Assistance and Other Resources to Mitigate Gaps Helpful

As the second key component of the Fusion Center Performance Program, SLPO conducts activities to identify common capability gaps across the National Network and provides resources for fusion centers— such as technical assistance and document templates—to help centers address and mitigate these gaps. Within the annual assessment report, SLPO provides a summary of findings regarding National Network capability scores and progress made, and includes data-informed recommendations that are intended to address commonly identified gaps. SLPO also includes specific recommendations for each of the eight capabilities, as well as several overall areas identified as needing improvement. For example, the 2012 report highlighted the need to identify analytical products that meet specific information needs, as well as expanded involvement in local government bodies to promote improved collaboration. As part of information collection efforts during the annual assessment process, SLPO officials noted that they also solicit feedback regarding the quality and effectiveness of federal support activities, such as training and technical assistance, received over the previous 12 months. According to officials, SLPO uses this information to help develop the suite of mitigation resources to be provided in the following year.

According to program documentation, the gap mitigation resources are intended to help fusion centers address gaps in capabilities and enhance the knowledge and skills of fusion center personnel. These resources include a combination of guidance and reference materials, as well as targeted training and technical assistance programs. Two key documents comprise the gap mitigation resources—the Gap Mitigation Guidebook and an annual publication of Gap Mitigation Activities. The guidebook notes that this resource is intended to assist fusion centers in developing and implementing plans, policies, or standard operating procedures for each of the critical operating capabilities. It includes plan templates and reference materials that DHS intends to help fusion centers define and document key business processes, such as the protection of privacy and civil liberties. The Gap Mitigation Activities is a dynamic document informed by both the annual assessment results and feedback DHS receives from fusion centers. For example, the 2013 Gap Mitigation Activities “menu” included a total of over 60 activities identified to enhance or sustain fusion center capabilities across each of the core capabilities. Specific resources identified include a combination of new and existing activities intended to enhance and support capability development, including staff exchange programs, risk analysis and product feedback templates, and training and technical assistance designed to educate fusion center personnel on specific subjects, such as basic intelligence analysis.

All 10 fusion center directors we visited said that they were aware of DHS’s annual Gap Mitigation Activities—such as its listing of analytical training courses and exchange programs—and the 6 directors that discussed participation in these activities said they were effective. Three directors also specifically referenced the Gap Mitigation Guidebook and said that they utilized a template or other written reference materials contained within the document. In addition, several fusion center directors said that they routinely interact with directors from other centers and one noted they were most likely to address any identified capability gaps by obtaining an example of a plan or policy from another center, or inquiring about their approach to addressing a capability. In general, our interviews with fusion center directors and SLPO headquarters officials indicate that SLPO routinely provided outreach and communications to these fusion centers regarding the mitigation support resources that are available.

DHS Has Not Yet Fully Implemented an Exercise Program to Further Evaluate Fusion Center Capabilities, but Is Planning Additional Actions

The Fusion Center Readiness Initiative is a core component of the Fusion Center Performance Program, but it remains in the early stages of development largely because of staffing challenges. According to DHS program documents, this initiative includes the establishment of an annual exercise program that is intended to provide fusion centers an opportunity to apply and evaluate capabilities in an operational context. According to DHS officials, the exercise program is intended to help define capability improvement priorities and identify investment focus areas, as well as provide support and functional consistency across the National Network. The officials noted that limited progress has been made in developing an exercise program since 2012 because of challenges in hiring a candidate to fill a key program management position. However, the officials said that this position was successfully staffed in June 2014.

Although the Fusion Center Readiness Initiative is not fully implemented, DHS has taken steps to conduct several drills and exercises involving fusion centers in recent years. For example, in August 2012, SLPO facilitated an exercise incorporating 7 fusion centers and other partners, including representatives from FBI, CBP, and the Transportation Security Administration. This day-long exercise included four objectives that collectively targeted each of the fusion centers’ critical and enabling capabilities. The after-action report identifies 18 individual corrective actions and includes implementation details, such as the entity responsible for taking the action and the expected time frame for completion.

According to SLPO officials, efforts are underway to schedule and coordinate additional fusion center exercises. Specifically, the officials noted that they plan to conduct exercises under the readiness initiative every 2 years with participation from a group of 7 to 10 fusion centers. The officials said that the longer-term vision is to conduct up to three exercises per year—as well as drills addressing specific analytical capabilities and communications. SLPO officials also noted the importance of aligning these activities with DHS’s National Exercise Program.

Officials from the 10 fusion centers we visited also reported that centers often participate in exercises and drills sponsored by a combination of other federal, state, and local partners. The scope and purpose of these exercises varied and ranged from full-scale exercises simulating a real- world threat scenario to routine drills validating communication and alert notification procedures. Fusion centers also reported on their participation in such exercises as part of publications the centers develop to identify key products and services provided to centers’ partners over the year.

Federal Agencies Have Defined Fusion Center Expectations and Developed Measures to Assess Homeland Security Contributions

Federal Agencies Have Developed a Combination of High-Level Strategic Guidance and Specific Capability Expectations for Fusion Centers

Over the past decade, Congress has enacted laws and federal agencies have issued guidance and related documents that help to define expectations for fusion centers, which have evolved from high-level guidance focused on terrorism-related information sharing to more specific guidance that defines expectations for fusion center capabilities, operations, and functions. For example, provisions of the Intelligence Reform Act, as amended, recognize that state and local partners have a role in the sharing of terrorism-related information. In 2005, as states and localities began to create centers, DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE issued more specific guidance to fusion centers through Fusion Center Guidelines that recommended procedures for establishing and maintaining centers, training personnel, and producing privacy and civil liberties policies. In conjunction with the guidelines, in 2008, DOJ’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative issued Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, which further clarified expectations for fusion center capabilities and management and administrative functions, such as those related to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information. Based on our analysis of the collective laws and federal agency guidance issued to date, federal agencies have defined expectations for fusion centers related to their role in information- sharing activities.policies.

Stakeholders Have Developed a National Strategy That Also Addresses Fusion Center Expectations

The NFCA—in collaboration with other state, local, and federal entities— developed a national strategy that builds upon federal guidance to further outline key roles and priorities of the National Network from the fusion center perspective. Among the elements included in the strategy is an overview of the current status of the network; the network’s roles in supporting information-sharing activities; and future goals, objectives, and initiatives that the network is to carry out to support national security over the period defined by the strategy, 2014 to 2017. The NFCA strategy was issued in July 2014. The NFCA President noted that the strategy is intended to help standardize how fusion centers function across the network and further clarify the standards established in the baseline capabilities guidance related to the analysis and dissemination of intelligence information, among other things. The strategy also provides specific examples that outline the network’s contributions to national security and the types of services fusion centers provide to state, local, and federal partners, among others. For example, the strategy discusses the centers’ role in vetting information in support of the NSI and also providing analysis that increases the value of analytic products centers produce.

Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, Majority Staff Report on the National Network of Fusion Centers (Washington, D.C.: July 2013). outline a broader set of activities the National Network expects to accomplish over the next 3 years, as figure 1 illustrates.

The strategy also identifies 37 specific initiatives that support the goals and objectives that further highlight efforts that the National Network expects to complete over the 3 years. For example, 1 initiative related to goal 4 is to work with federal partners to establish a minimum level of engagement and expectations that are uniform and consistent across all regions and field offices related to access to data systems.

In addition to the recommendation that centers themselves articulate a national strategy, the majority staff report also called for federal agencies to develop a federal strategy that explains how and why the federal government engages with fusion centers. The NFCA President also noted that a federal strategy could, among other things, provide fusion centers with a better understanding of the methodology federal agencies use to deploy personnel to centers and standardize centers’ access to federal data systems. SLPO officials said that DHS does not plan to develop a federal strategy, since they believe this information currently exists in the various strategy and guideline documents already issued. However, DHS is currently working in coordination with DOJ to develop a Federal Framework for Supporting the National Network of Fusion Centers that a senior I&A official said is intended to help summarize the collective federal efforts guiding support to fusion centers. The official also noted that the framework will include efforts related to assessment and performance programs, resource allocations, governance processes, and analytic standards, among others. In technical comments provided on a draft of this report, DHS noted that the federal framework document will also include strategic objectives and priorities, in addition to identifying current efforts. DHS added that a draft of this updated approach was presented to the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council and the Fusion Center and Suspicious Activity Reporting Subcommittee of the Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee for feedback in September 2014.

DHS Has Developed New Performance Measures to Assess Fusion Center Contributions to Homeland Security

In coordination with fusion centers and federal partners, DHS has developed 45 performance measures designed to capture standardized data to assess the impact and contribution of fusion centers on information sharing and homeland security. DHS initially reported on five measures in the 2012 fusion center assessment report. For example, one measure included the number of suspicious activity reports that fusion centers submit to the FBI that result in the initiation or an enhancement of an FBI investigation.

To build upon these five initial measures, in 2013, DHS began an effort to develop a “logic model” that graphically depicts how fusion center inputs (e.g., funding and personnel), processes (e.g., activities and initiatives), outputs (e.g., products and services), and outcomes (e.g., effect or results) relate to one another. According to DHS’s performance measures definition guide, the logic model was used to develop an additional 40 performance measures, and collectively, the 45 measures are intended to determine the impact of fusion centers and homeland security contributions. The guide notes that, using the logic model, 24 of the measures are defined as outcome measures, which are grouped into six outcome categories, examples of which are illustrated in table 2.

According to the guide, 21 of the 45 measures, also based on the logic model, are intended to capture the outputs of key fusion center functions and quantify the number of products or services delivered as a result of a process, such as situational awareness reporting. Examples of such measures are shown in table 3.

We assessed SLPO’s 45 performance measures against criteria for successful measures that GAO developed in connection with work conducted on the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. Specifically, the criteria include key attributes developed to assess performance goals and measures based on a combination of previously established GAO criteria, GPRA, and the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, as well as related performance management literature.analysis showed that, collectively, the fusion center performance measures are generally aligned with the successful attributes. For example, among other attributes, the measures are aligned with DHS’s goals and missions, are clearly stated, appear objective, and cover the core activities of the program. While the new measures do not currently incorporate performance targets, as our prior work suggests, SLPO officials stated that they plan to analyze data collected for the measures in 2013 to establish baseline targets for future years.

According to the Performance Measures Definition Guide, data obtained from responses to DHS’s annual assessments of fusion centers will provide information to implement some of the 45 measures. Data for other measures will come from internal DHS offices, other federal agencies—such as the FBI—and other fusion center partners, including the National Governors Association and state homeland security advisors. SLPO implemented 34 of the 45 performance measures as part of the 2013 fusion center annual assessment and plans to implement the remaining 11 measures in future assessment cycles as additional data collection mechanisms are established.

Since all of the new performance measures have not yet been fully implemented, it is too early to determine how these measures collectively will help assess fusion center contributions to homeland security. For example, 10 of the 11 performance measures that were not implemented as part of the 2013 annual assessment are intended to assess outcomes of fusion center activities related to enhancing homeland security, and SLPO has not yet developed methodologies for collecting the data. An example of an outcome measure not yet implemented is the percentage of key customers—including state homeland security advisors—reporting that fusion center products and services resulted in increased situational awareness of threats within their area of responsibility. According to SLPO officials, these measures are still in development since limitations currently exist to collect data to implement them, but they are taking steps to overcome these limitations. For example, some measures require DHS to put additional data collection requirements into place or develop new systems. Appendix I contains a summary of fusion center performance measures and their implementation status.

The 2013 annual report on fusion centers contained results for the 34 measures that SLPO had implemented and noted that over 98 percent of The report also fusion centers provided data related to all 34 measures.highlighted specific measures that show the National Network’s contributions to federal homeland security efforts. For example, the report noted that fusion centers developed about 6,000 products in 2013 and linked 2,250 (37.5 percent) to Homeland Security Standing Information Needs. The report also noted that fusion centers issued 275 collaborative products with federal partners in 2013, a 7.4 percent increase from 256 in 2012.

The 2013 annual assessment’s focus on performance measures reflects that DHS and the National Network are taking steps to better capture key results and outcomes of fusion center activities and their overall contributions in support of the homeland security mission.

Federal Agencies Reported Deploying 288 Personnel to Fusion Centers in 2013 and Generally Defined Roles and Responsibilities

Federal Agencies Reported Deploying 288 Personnel to Fusion Centers in 2013

SLPO produces an annual Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory report that shows the number of federal personnel agencies report that they deployed to fusion centers—either full- or part- time—as well as the non- personnel support agencies provided. Figure 2 shows the number of personnel federal agencies reported deploying to fusion centers from fiscal years 2011 through 2013.

The Federal Resource Allocation Criteria—issued by the PM-ISE— defines the general criteria that federal departments and agencies are to use when making deployments and other resource allocations to fusion centers.must designate the fusion center as an official state center and the center must participate in the baseline capabilities annual assessment process. While the criteria provide high-level guidance to federal agencies, they For example, the criteria note that the governor of the state can develop additional criteria to inform deployment decisions, such as how closely the missions of the fusion center and agency align. For fusion centers where agencies have not deployed federal personnel, agencies can provide support through off-site personnel or liaison representatives, who can provide access to federal data systems, among other things. Federal agencies can also provide non-personnel resources to fusion centers, such as training, technical assistance, participation in exercises, security clearance administration, and travel. According to federal cost inventory reports, federal agencies provided fusion centers with non- personnel support totaling about $32.8 million in fiscal year 2011 and about $18 million in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. The 2012 report lists several factors that contributed to the reduction in federal funding between the fiscal years, including continuing federal agencies’ budget reductions and agencies transitioning from the initial costs of developing data systems to maintaining the systems.

I&A Has Developed Guidance for Deploying Personnel to Fusion Centers, although Specific Roles and Responsibilities Depend on Center Needs and Capabilities

As of June 2014, I&A had deployed a total of 74 intelligence officers to fusion centers across the National Network, as well as 9 regional directors to manage officer activities. As of this date, I&A had also deployed a total of 6 intelligence analysts to centers, as well as reports I&A officers that collectively cover every fusion center in the network.has developed general guidance that defines the roles and responsibilities for each of these deployed positions, as shown in table 4.

Intelligence officers perform a range of activities at fusion centers depending on the center’s size, maturity, capabilities, and needs. For example, at a smaller center we visited, the intelligence officer’s activities included training local intelligence analysts on basic analytic techniques and helping to develop and produce intelligence products. At two large fusion centers we visited that had their own experienced intelligence analysts, the intelligence officers focused on performing more extensive outreach with government and private sector partners and reviewing local analysts’ finished intelligence products prior to dissemination. According to intelligence officers at 2 of the 10 centers we visited, regional directors that supervise intelligence officers allow them flexibility to support the fusion center in the capacity that best benefits center operations.

In addition, intelligence officers also stated that regional directors and I&A management communicate expectations to intelligence officers through oral discussion and employee performance plans. These plans describe expectations across a broad set of competencies that include accountability for results, communications, critical thinking, engagement, and collaboration, among others. According to intelligence officers and regional directors we interviewed, these plans also provide a mechanism to identify specific performance goals for the intelligence officer based upon the needs and objectives of the fusion center. For example, according to a performance plan template that we reviewed, an intelligence officer’s goal is to facilitate the fusion centers’ execution of the intelligence cycle. To address this goal, the officer can perform research and identify analytical training opportunities for the fusion center and advocate and facilitate the production of joint analytic products with other centers, among other things.

According to 7 of the 10 of the fusion center directors we interviewed, intelligence officers have helped the center develop analytic capabilities. For example, 3 directors noted that officers participate in and arrange intelligence training for the local intelligence analysts at the fusion center. At 1 fusion center, the director emphasized the importance of having the intelligence officer on-site to bring DHS and broader nationwide perspectives on intelligence to the fusion center. One other director noted that the intelligence officer provided the center with a connection to other DHS components in the area of responsibility. Officers also served as a conduit to DHS headquarters personnel and subject matter experts to respond to inquiries on issues such as the annual fusion center assessment process. According to 1 fusion center director, intelligence officers also benefit the center by maintaining effective relationships with external stakeholders such as InfraGard members and the area Protective Security Advisor program.

Intelligence Analysts and Reports Officers

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive Number 203—Analytic Standards (Washington D.C.: June 21, 2007). deploying analysts to additional fusion centers and expanding the deployments to 2-year rotations.

DHS has also deployed reports officers to fusion centers to primarily collect raw intelligence and develop intelligence information reports— formerly known as homeland intelligence reports—which are intended to address the intelligence community’s information requirements. In a 2012 report, congressional staff raised concerns about fusion center intelligence reporting not being timely or of sufficient quality. to senior I&A officials, in response to these concerns, I&A modified procedures for reporting intelligence and training reports officers. For example, according to one regional director, to enhance the quality of reporting, DHS restricted the development and reporting of intelligence information reports to reports officers. Before this change, I&A intelligence officers, among others, were involved in producing homeland intelligence reports for DHS and the intelligence community, which the congressional report notes were, in some instances, unrelated to terrorism and outdated, among other things. One supervisory reports officer we interviewed said that the goal is to standardize the reporting and approval of intelligence reports before releasing them to I&A for further review and then on to the intelligence community. One other reports officer said that I&A also enhanced training for reports officers by increasing the training itinerary from 2 to 3 weeks, in part to spend more time on certain issues— such as cyber security analysis—and place additional emphasis on the quality of reporting over the quantity of reports generated. I&A expanded the reports officer training as part of an officer certification program, which includes supervised on-the-job training as well as an assessment of an officer’s reporting for compliance with standards.

United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers (Washington D.C.: Oct. 3, 2012).

FBI Headquarters Has Developed Guidance to Help Its Field Offices Determine the Level of Engagement They Should Have with Fusion Centers

As of June 2014, the FBI had deployed 94 intelligence analysts, special agents, and others to 58 fusion centers, and had installed its secure data system (FBINet) at 51 centers. While local field office management makes deployment decisions, FBI headquarters developed guidance in August 2011 that contains several factors local management is to consider when deciding the type of engagement the office will have in supporting a fusion center. These factors include the extent to which the fusion center mission aligns with the FBI’s mission, particularly related to counterterrorism—for example, both organizations share information on terrorism-related activities;

FBI management participates in the fusion center governance structure; the fusion center operates in an accredited secure work environment and has a process to receive, handle, store, and disseminate classified information; the fusion center is capable of receiving, analyzing, disseminating, and gathering information that contributes to the understanding of the current threat environment; and the fusion center immediately shares all emerging, terrorism-related information with the FBI, such as suspicious activity reports.

In addition to this overarching guidance, in February 2013, the FBI developed guidance identifying the key roles and responsibilities of FBI personnel assigned to work with fusion centers. As noted in the document, this guidance is intended to provide additional policy and governance to the field and facilitate uniformity across the FBI while recognizing that individual roles and responsibilities may vary based on fusion center maturity, operational capability, and other factors. The FBI has identified three types of engagement levels it uses to support fusion centers: enhanced (interaction with centers on a regular and reoccurring basis), basic (interaction with centers on a liaison to part-time basis), and liaison (no dedicated resources but FBI maintains an information sharing relationship with the centers). As of July 2014, of the 78 total fusion centers in the National Network, FBI data showed that 38 centers received enhanced support, 20 centers received basic support, and 19 centers received liaison support.

At all 8 of the fusion centers we visited that had FBI personnel deployed, FBI field office management—generally an assistant special agent-in- charge—were involved in the decision to support fusion center activities with personnel and non-personnel resources. Managers at 2 fusion centers said that they also provide guidance and oversight to deployed intelligence analysts and agents regarding their roles and responsibilities, and define general expectations in analysts’ and agents’ performance work plans. The FBI tasks personnel deployed to fusion centers with various duties, which can include performing liaison services with federal, state, local, and private sector partners; reviewing suspicious activity reports for dissemination to fusion center partners; briefing DHS and fusion center personnel on threats; and collaborating with DHS and fusion center staff to develop joint products. FBI officials noted that specific roles and responsibilities for deployed staff also depend on factors such as the size and maturity of the fusion center. For example, at 1 larger center with an established history of FBI engagement we visited, an FBI supervisory intelligence analyst managed the fusion center’s intelligence unit, which consisted of about 35 intelligence analysts. At a smaller center, the FBI intelligence analyst was primarily involved in vetting suspicious activity reports. Among the responsibilities identified by other FBI analysts we spoke with included providing center personnel with intelligence information to enhance situational awareness, intelligence briefings to fusion center leadership, and analysis for the fusion center’s tactical efforts.

Fusion center directors at all 10 of the locations we visited generally viewed engagement with the FBI as beneficial to the center. For example, officials at 1 center noted that access to FBINet was particularly helpful to determine if persons of interest had been the subject of any prior investigations. Officials at another center noted that their relationship with the FBI is working well since issues related to how the center vetted tips and leads before submitting them to the FBI for processing have been resolved. Specifically, this center now embeds personnel on a rotational basis with the FBI unit that reviews these tips and leads. At another fusion center, where the FBI’s engagement included a management role in the center’s intelligence unit, center officials said that the bureau recognizes the overall value that the center provides in supporting intelligence activities.

CBP and ICE Headquarters Rely on Field Office Management to Make Deployment Decisions; CBP Headquarters Is Developing Additional Guidance

CBP and ICE headquarters officials said that local field office management independently makes staff deployment decisions. The officials noted that management generally bases decisions on existing relationships with fusion center personnel and management interpretation of shared mission goals with the center, rather than headquarters-level guidance. For example, one CBP field office determined that because it shared information with the fusion center on issues of mutual interest in the southwest region of the country—such as border security—and both the field office and center provided investigative leads to state, local, and federal law enforcement partners, among other things, the field office would deploy an officer to the center.

According to our interviews with headquarters and field office representatives, roles and responsibilities for deployed CBP and ICE personnel can include activities similar to those performed by I&A and FBI personnel—such as providing liaison support for fusion center operations, access to component data systems, and investigative case support— while also supporting the components’ own missions. For example, a CBP supervisory official we interviewed said that the primary responsibilities of one such deployment included an individual supporting the activities of a task force consisting of fusion center partners, as well as engaging with the DHS intelligence analyst that was deployed to the center to develop intelligence products. An ICE intelligence analyst we interviewed said that, in addition to performing ICE-related work priorities, the analyst’s key roles within the center included coordinating investigative activities and providing data in support of the center’s investigative unit.

CBP and ICE headquarters officials said that they have not created guidance to date for field office management to consider when making deployment decisions primarily because field offices are decentralized units with the authority to make such decisions independent of headquarters management. However, in June 2014, CBP headquarters officials said that they are developing a strategy to assist the agency in determining the most appropriate locations and mechanisms to provide personnel support to fusion centers and other CBP partners. The officials noted that CBP expects to complete the strategy in fiscal year 2015. According to the officials, the strategy will include several elements, including (1) a listing of all existing CBP partnerships with fusion centers and other agencies, (2) a matrix to evaluate current and potential future partnerships against CBP mission needs and operational requirements, and (3) training and equipment requirements to ensure consistency across all partnerships.

ICE headquarters officials did not plan to develop additional guidance to help govern field office personnel deployments. However, DHS is taking additional actions to provide departmental components with information on the support priorities and personnel requirements of individual fusion centers. For example, I&A conducted a survey of fusion centers in 2010— and a follow-up data call in 2012—to help identify fusion center needs for DHS component personnel to meet the centers’ operational mission and requirements. Further, according to a senior I&A official, the forthcoming Federal Framework for Supporting the National Network of Fusion Centers is to include information related to federal resource allocations to fusion centers and is intended to respond, in part, to the efforts called for by the NFCA. DHS also issued the Implementation Guidance for the Federal Resource Allocation Criteria Policy in September 2014. According to the document, this guidance is designed to assist federal agencies in planning and tracking resource deployments. Among the elements included in the guidance are recommended best practices for collecting data on support resources provided to fusion centers. These suggested practices are intended to promote additional consistency across federal agencies and help provide more comprehensive information on the overall federal investment in fusion centers.

Grant Reforms Are Helping DHS Track Fusion Center Projects, but DHS Cannot Accurately Account for Total Funding Provided to Centers

Grant Reforms Are Helping DHS Ensure That Requests for Federal Funding to Support Fusion Centers Are Aligned with Expected Capabilities

In fiscal year 2011, FEMA initiated a requirement that each fusion center complete DHS’s annual baseline capabilities assessment to be eligible for HSGP funding, and federal officials began reviewing the grant requests to ensure that proposed projects target the achievement or sustainment of identified capabilities. Since that time, FEMA and SLPO officials have collaborated to help ensure that each fusion center grant request incorporates the results of the annual assessment as part of the investment justification. Specifically, HSGP grant guidance calls for each fusion center investment justification to describe the investment; identify how the investment supports state or urban area homeland security goals and objectives; explain capability gaps that the investment is intended to address; and describe the outcomes the investment is to achieve, among other things.

Since fiscal year 2012, the grant guidance also requires the investment justification to further identify the specific capabilities and assessment attributes that the proposed projects are intended to address. According to SLPO officials who are responsible for reviewing these investment justifications, the guidance requires narrative statements that support the justifications to include explicit references to the capabilities covered within the annual fusion center assessment. The officials stated that they review each justification to ensure that these narratives adequately address any identified capability gaps. SLPO officials also noted that the narratives have improved from year -to -year based upon feedback provided to grantees, including that FEMA rejected some requests until it received additional information.

Our review of the fiscal year 2013 investment justifications for the 10 fusion centers we visited showed that the narratives routinely referenced targeted capabilities, with most of the narratives focusing on sustaining existing capabilities rather than initiating new ones. For example, the most common areas targeted for funding were maintenance and upgrades of existing technology platforms and sustainment of current staff positions. DHS officials stated that sustainment of existing capabilities would likely be the area of emphasis going forward but noted that these narratives would remain helpful to identify network trends and needs, particularly as funding becomes further constrained. While our review indicated that many of the supporting narratives within the investment justifications lacked explicit details—potentially, in part, because of the focus on sustainment of existing staff positions and technology systems rather than new capabilities—these grant requirements and corresponding review procedures provide a mechanism to help ensure that requested fusion center projects are addressing the achievement of identified baseline capabilities.

FEMA Has Improved Tracking of Federal Grants for Fusion Centers, but Data on Total Levels of Federal Funding Remain Unreliable

In September 2010, we reported on Congress’ interest in knowing the amount of federal funding going to support fusion center operations. However, in the past, DHS generally, and FEMA more specifically, have had challenges in tracking this amount because of the way FEMA captured funding data in its systems. Moreover, a 2012 congressional committee report cited concerns regarding DHS’s ability to provide adequate oversight of its financial support for fusion centers. According to FEMA grant management officials, FEMA initiated a new grant requirement for the 2012 grant cycle in part to address these concerns and help ensure more reliable reporting on fusion center grant funding in the future.

Historically, FEMA relied upon a keyword search of its grant management system to identify likely fusion center projects and related funding.

However, according to the 2012 committee report, depending on the keywords searched, FEMA estimated that grant funding provided to fusion centers from 2003 through 2010 ranged from $289 million to as much as $1.4 billion. Subsequently, FEMA initiated a new requirement for the fiscal year 2012 grant cycle that called for states to submit a separate investment justification for all fusion center projects requested to be funded through the HSGP. As part of this justification, FEMA requires grant applicants to categorize individual fusion center projects among six designated spending categories—equipment, exercises, management and administration, organization, planning, and training. FEMA is to capture this information in its grant management system, which is to allow FEMA to account for aggregate spending in these individual areas across the National Network. FEMA also requires states to specifically identify fusion center projects—via a check mark—on all subsequent reports that these entities submit to FEMA every 6 months, providing the status of project implementation.

FEMA’s 2012 grant requirements represent an improvement over keyword searches in identifying fusion center projects and funding, but the data are unreliable, as grantees have incorrectly categorized many projects. Specifically, in response to our request, FEMA provided data indicating that states obligated approximately $124 million of DHS grant funding to support fusion centers across the network in fiscal year 2012. However, upon further review of the individual project descriptions that states reported, FEMA and SLPO officials determined that states incorrectly categorized many fusion center projects. These include cases in which projects supported broader capabilities not directly related to fusion centers—such as emergency management positions—as well as those that were not specifically supporting center operations. For example, one urban area reported obligating $14 million to a fusion center for automated license plate readers and video surveillance equipment, although the center will be one of a number of system users. Given that FEMA identified that the $124 million estimate contained non-fusion- center-related projects, the figure is unreliable for quantifying total federal grant funding provided to support fusion center operations in 2012. As an alternative estimate of fusion center grant funding, SLPO officials provided us with data on annual fusion center budgets that they collected via the annual assessment process. According to these data that fusion center directors reported, centers received approximately $60 million in DHS grant funding to support their operations in fiscal year 2012. We did not independently evaluate the reliability of this estimate; however, an SLPO official stated that the $60 million estimate was generally consistent with the amount remaining from the $124 million figure provided once non-fusion-center-related projects were subtracted.

To address this issue, FEMA is planning additional efforts to help states better categorize fusion center projects and improve the reliability of grant reporting. Specifically, for grant awards issued prior to fiscal year 2014, FEMA plans to provide supplemental guidance to grantees in advance of the next reporting period, which ends on December 31, 2014. According to FEMA officials, this guidance will direct grantees to reassess specified projects to determine if they are properly identified as supporting fusion centers. Additionally, the FEMA officials plan to introduce a series of questions within the FEMA grant reporting system by the end of calendar year 2014 to help grantees assess if designated projects should remain categorized as support to fusion centers. These combined efforts, if implemented as proposed, could provide grantees with information they need to make revisions to incorrect categorizations and help address data reliability issues.

As proposed, the efforts discussed above could also serve to support the overall enhancement of project-level reporting that FEMA is currently implementing, in part, to address our prior recommendations. Although these efforts are not specific to fusion centers, we reported in February 2012 that FEMA lacked visibility over project-level details—particularly within the SHSP and UASI grant programs—and we recommended that DHS collect project information with sufficient detail to identify potential duplication. DHS concurred with this recommendation and, beginning with the 2014 grant cycle, FEMA started implementing a project-based application and reporting process that is intended to help improve oversight for individual projects. FEMA plans for this initiative to be fully implemented for fiscal year 2015.process is intended to help ensure that FEMA receives more comprehensive information from state grantees about project objectives and overall implementation progress.

FEMA officials reported that this The combined efforts of additional guidance and implementation of project-level reporting may help states better categorize fusion center projects, improve the reliability of grant reporting, and enhance oversight of the projects. However, FEMA does not have plans to specifically review state reporting to ensure that grantees act in accordance with the proposed guidance—such as using the drop-down menus as intended— and take steps to revise any misclassified fusion center projects. It is important that projects be accurately categorized, as FEMA uses these data to determine the overall level of federal investment in fusion centers. FEMA officials stated that overall grant monitoring efforts are expected to help improve the reliability of fusion center funding data, but they noted that only a sample of fusion centers will be targeted through these processes. While sampling remains a reasonable approach for FEMA to conduct monitoring across the large number of HSGP projects implemented annually, this approach is not likely to provide FEMA with sufficient visibility over fusion center projects because each state reports information independently and any actions taken by one state to recategorize projects are not generalizable to others. Given the past problems related to data reliability and FEMA not knowing why states may have initially miscategorized fusion center projects, additional actions beyond the monitoring efforts currently planned are important. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, monitoring is important not only to assess the quality of performance over time but also to ensure that audit findings are promptly resolved. Development of a specific mechanism to ensure that states act in accordance with the forthcoming guidance could provide FEMA reasonable assurance that fusion center projects are properly classified and accurately account for total grant funding provided to centers. Such a mechanism could include, for example, having SPLO officials review those projects that states identify as supporting fusion centers to verify that states have accurately done so in accordance with the guidance. SPLO officials are in a position to conduct this review based on their knowledge of the results of the annual center assessments, input from DHS representatives at fusion centers, and other means. Developing a mechanism to ensure that states act in accordance with the proposed guidance could provide DHS, congressional, and other decision makers with more accurate information on the level of federal investment in centers to help decision makers determine future levels of investment.

Conclusions

As focal points within states and urban areas for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and dissemination of law enforcement, homeland security, and terrorism information, fusion centers are uniquely situated to help enhance the national threat picture and help protect the country. As these centers continue to mature, it remains important for DHS to identify the results that centers are achieving and how federal agencies can help support and leverage these centers. The recent expansion of performance measures is a positive step in this process, as are plans to move forward with additional exercises to further evaluate fusion center capabilities. DHS grant funding also remains an important component of federal support to fusion centers, but to date, FEMA has not been able to accurately account for and report on the amount of funds it has provided to centers. FEMA’s proposed efforts to help ensure that grantees provide more accurate information on fusion center projects remain critical to improving reporting, but implementation of a specific mechanism to verify that states have acted in accordance with the forthcoming guidance would further help ensure that these efforts are achieving their intended purpose and fusion center grant reporting is reliable.

Recommendation for Executive Action

To help provide reasonable assurance that data states report on the amount of federal grant funding used to support fusion centers is reliable, we recommend that the FEMA Administrator implement a mechanism to verify that states act in accordance with the proposed grant reporting guidance, when implemented.

Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ for review and comment. In its written comments, summarized below and reprinted in appendix II, DHS concurred with the recommendation and described actions planned to address it. In addition, DHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate. On October 27, 2014, DOJ’s Audit Liaison Group informed us via email that the department did not have any comments on our draft report.

DHS concurred with our recommendation that FEMA develop a mechanism to verify that states act in accordance with proposed guidance to help ensure that data reporting on the amount of federal grant funding used to support fusion centers is reliable. Specifically, DHS said that beginning in January 2015, FEMA—in coordination with I&A as appropriate—will review all fusion center projects to determine whether state reported expenditures are actually in support of a designated fusion center. In the event that the review identifies discrepancies, DHS said that FEMA will work with grantees to obtain additional clarification. In addition, DHS noted that any grantees currently scheduled for monitoring in fiscal year 2015 will receive an in-depth review of all fusion center projects, to include an examination of project progress, impediments to timely completion, and verification of funding data provided by the state. If fully implemented, DHS’s planned efforts will address the intent of the recommendation.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Attorney General, the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and appropriate congressional committees. The report is also available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Summary of Fusion Center Performance Measures

This appendix provides a summary of performance measures that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—in consultation with other partners—has established for the National Network of Fusion Centers. DHS grouped the performance measures by six outcome and five output categories. Table 6 shows a description of measures, their implementation status, and aggregated performance results across the National Network, as reported in the 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers, Final Report.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov.

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Eric Erdman (Assistant Director), Eric Hauswirth, Ryan Lambert, Thomas Lombardi, Linda Miller, Marvin McGill, and Jessica Orr made significant contributions to this report.