Unmanned Aerial Systems: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Pilot Training
Released: 2015-05-14T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Unmanned Aerial Systems

DOD defines a UAS as “a system whose components include the necessary equipment, networks, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft”—that is, an aircraft that does not carry a human operator and is capable of flight under remote control or autonomous programming. DOD classifies its UAS into five groups that are based on attributes of weight and capabilities including vehicle airspeed and operating altitude. For example, group 1 UAS weigh 20 pounds or less whereas group 5 UAS weigh more than 1,320 pounds. Servicemembers who operate the larger and more capable UAS, in group 3 or above, are either manned- aircraft pilots or pilots specializing in flying UAS and are to receive 4 or more months of training to prepare them to fly UAS. In contrast, personnel who operate the less capable UAS that are classified in groups 1 and 2 generally operate UAS as an additional duty. Service headquarters officials stated that personnel who operate UAS in group 1 receive about 2 weeks of training and personnel who operate UAS in group 2 receive anywhere from 2 weeks to 3 months of training.

Each of the services flies various types of large UAS in groups 3, 4, and 5. The Air Force flies the MQ-1 (Predator), the MQ-9 (Reaper), and the larger RQ-4 (Global Hawk). The Army flies the RQ-7 (Shadow), the MQ-5 (Hunter) and the MQ-1C (Gray Eagle). The Marine Corps flies the RQ-7B (Shadow) and the RQ-21A (Black Jack). Finally, the Navy flies the MQ-4C (Triton) and the MQ-8 (Fire Scout).

UAS Personnel Staffing

Each service uses a different term to refer to the UAS pilot position and a different strategy to assign personnel to this position. For example, the Air Force uses the term remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) pilot and assigns officers to this position. Specifically, the Air Force assigns various types of officers to serve in these positions including (1) temporarily re-assigned manned-aircraft pilots, (2) manned-aircraft pilots and other Air Force aviation officers who have converted to this career permanently, (3) graduates of manned-aircraft pilot training on their first assignment, and (4) pilots who specialize in flying UAS with limited manned-aircraft experience. The Army uses the term unmanned aircraft system operator and assigns enlisted personnel to this position, who receive no manned- aircraft flight training. See table 1 for a summary of the terms and the staffing strategies each service uses.

Training for Pilots of Unmanned Aerial Systems

The services are responsible for providing three types of individual training to UAS pilots: initial qualification, mission, and continuation training. Each of the services is responsible for providing initial qualification training to UAS pilots in two phases. In the first phase, pilots are taught the fundamentals of aviation and in the second phase pilots learn to fly a particular UAS. Each of the services uses similar but slightly different approaches to train their UAS pilots.

Army. The first phase of training consists of an 8-week common core course for all UAS pilots. During this phase, the Army is responsible for teaching its pilots the fundamentals of aerodynamics, flight safety, and navigation. During the second phase of training, the Army is responsible for teaching its UAS pilots to fly one of the Army’s three UAS. This training lasts between 12 and 25 weeks depending on the UAS that is the focus of the course. During this phase, the Army teaches its pilots to launch and recover a UAS, conduct reconnaissance and surveillance, and participate in a field training exercise. In addition, all Army UAS pilots are trained as sensor operators in the aircrew of a UAS. Thus, pilots learn to operate UAS sensors during their initial qualification training.

Air Force. During the first phase of training, UAS pilots who specialize in flying a UAS attend 5 months of training called undergraduate UAS training. This training consists of three courses: first, these pilots learn to fly a small manned aircraft for 39 hours; second, they use a simulator to learn to fly a manned aircraft using instruments; and third, they learn about the fundamentals of flying a UAS in a classroom setting. Air Force UAS pilots who the Air Force re-assigns from its manned-aircraft pilot ranks do not attend this first phase of training because they received flight training as manned- aircraft pilots. During the second phase of training, all UAS pilots attend a 4-month course at a formal training unit to learn to fly one of the Air Force’s three UAS platforms. Most active duty Air Force pilots attend the formal training unit at Holloman Air Force Base to learn to fly the Air Force’s MQ-1 Predator or MQ-9 Reaper.

Marine Corps. During the first phase of training, UAS pilots who specialize in flying a UAS attend 5 months of training with the Air Force called undergraduate UAS training. This training consists of three courses: First, these pilots learn to fly a small manned aircraft for 39 hours; second, they use a simulator to learn to fly a manned aircraft using instruments; and third, they learn about the fundamentals of flying a UAS in a classroom setting. During the second phase of training, Marine Corps UAS pilots attend the Army’s 8-week UAS pilot common course and 10-week UAS pilot training courses at Fort Huachuca to become familiar with flying the RQ-7 Shadow, which the Marine Corps flies.

Navy. In January 2015, the Navy began providing a 7- to 8-week UAS initial qualification course in San Diego, CA to its pilots of the MQ-8 Fire Scout, which is a rotary wing UAS. The Navy assigns manned- helicopter aircraft pilots who receive manned helicopter training and have served, or are serving, in an assignment in a manned-helicopter squadron prior to attending this course. As of March 2015, the Navy is developing plans for its initial qualification course for its MQ-4C Triton, which is a fixed-wing UAS.

The services also provide mission and continuation training to their UAS pilots. Mission qualification training includes all training that takes place once a servicemember reaches their operational unit but before that servicemember is designated as being qualified to perform the unit’s missions. Continuation training includes all training that takes place once a servicemember finishes mission qualification training and is designed to maintain and improve UAS piloting skills.

The Army and the Air Force Face Challenges Ensuring that Their UAS Pilots Complete Their Required Training

Most Army UAS Pilots Are Not Completing All of Their Unit Training, and the Army Does Not Have Visibility over Whether UAS Pilots in Units Have Completed Training

Most Army UAS Pilots Are Not Completing Continuation Training

A March 2015 Army review showed that pilots in most Army Shadow units did not complete training in their units in fiscal year 2014, which we corroborated through both discussions with pilots in our focus groups and unit responses to our questionnaires. One of the core characteristics of a strategic training and development process calls for agency leaders and managers to consistently demonstrate that they support and value continuous learning. However, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command conducted a review from January 2015 through March 2015 and found that 61 of the Army’s 65 Shadow units that were not deployed had completed an average of 150 hours of flight training. Further, the Army assessed that these units were at the lowest levels of unit training proficiency in the Army’s readiness reporting system.

Army Training and Doctrine Command officials stated that in January 2015, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Army Training and Doctrine Command to evaluate unit training for Army UAS units to determine if training was a factor that caused UAS mishaps in combat. These officials stated that in response to the Chief of Staff’s direction they evaluated the total flight hours completed to conduct training by 65 Shadow units that were not deployed, 13 deployed Shadow units, and 2 Shadow units at the UAS initial qualification school at Ft. Huachuca. Training and Doctrine Command assessed the level of unit readiness associated with the amount of training these units completed using the Army’s unit training proficiency system specified in Army Pamphlet 220-1, Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army Procedures. This system includes a four-tiered rating system ranging from T-1 to T-4. In this system a T-1 rating indicates the highest level of unit training proficiency, whereas T-3 and T-4 ratings indicate that the unit is untrained on one or more of the mission essential tasks that the unit was designed to perform in an operational environment. Using this system to assess the 65 Shadow units that were not deployed, Training and Doctrine Command found that 1 unit was rated at T-1, 3 units were rated at T-2, and 61 units were rated at T-3 or T-4. In addition, Training and Doctrine Command found that 11 of the 13 deployed units were rated T-1 and the other 2 deployed Shadow units were rated T-2, and both of the units at the UAS training school were rated at T-1 (see table 2).

Army Training and Doctrine Command found a number of factors led to UAS pilots in Army Shadow units not completing training in their units in fiscal year 2014. For example, the review found that UAS units organized under infantry brigades have a particular challenge completing training in their units because the unit commanders and leadership overseeing these brigades may not be fully aware of the UAS units’ training requirements. In addition, the review found that a number of warrant officers were not qualified and current on the units’ aircraft that they were assigned to oversee. The review included recommendations that the Army plans to implement to increase emphasis on training in UAS units, to provide training on UAS training to unit commanders, and to establish a system to report UAS training readiness on periodic unit status reports. However, as of April 2015 the Army had not yet taken actions to implement these recommendations, and Army Training and Doctrine Command officials were unable to provide a timeframe for implementation of the recommendations.

Similarly, focus groups we conducted with Army UAS pilots and responses to questionnaires we administered indicated that Army UAS pilots face challenges to complete training in units. In particular, pilots in all eight of the focus groups we conducted with Army UAS pilots stated that they cannot complete training in their units. For example, a pilot in one of our focus groups stated that during his 3 years as a UAS pilot, he had been regularly tasked to complete non-training-related activities, and as a result he completed a total of 36 training flight hours even though the requirement is 24 flight hours per year. Further, we administered a questionnaire to various offices within each military service and five of the six Army UAS units that responded indicated that their units faced challenges completing training in their units. For example, one unit respondent stated that Army UAS units rarely have the time to meet their training requirements. A second unit respondent stated that Army UAS units are taxed trying to maintain proper training in units and have little time to progress into proficient pilots due to training equipment and resource constraints. A third respondent stated that training in units is very limited due to competing priorities, including being consistently tasked by Army Forces Command to train other units, which prevents their unit from training their own UAS operators. In addition, four of the six Army UAS units that responded stated that the Army provides too little funding for the training that takes place in units to help ensure that this training achieves the Army goals for that training.

Further, focus groups we conducted with Army UAS pilots and some Army officials indicated that leadership of larger non-aviation units that oversee Army UAS units may not fully understand the training needs for Army UAS pilots. Specifically, pilots in seven of the eight focus groups that we conducted with Army UAS pilots stated that leadership of larger non-aviation units that oversee their UAS units do not understand UAS pilot training. Moreover, four of the six units that responded to our questionnaire indicated that leadership of larger non-aviation units that oversee Army UAS units lacks understanding of UAS unit training needs. For example, a unit official who responded to our questionnaire stated that Army headquarters leadership provides very limited support for UAS continuation training. Another unit official who responded to our questionnaire stated that “unit leadership has a fundamental lack of understanding of our training requirements.” In addition, officials at Army Forces Command and an official who oversees Army UAS assignments at Army Human Resources Command stated that infantry commanders at the battalion and brigade level who oversee UAS units do not understand the aviation training requirements for Army UAS pilots. Further, Army UAS pilots in all of the focus groups we conducted stated that they had difficulty completing UAS pilot training in units because they spend a significant amount of time performing additional duties such as lawn care, janitorial services, and guard duty.

While the Army review and our analysis show that most Army UAS pilots are not completing training in their units, the high-level interest expressed by the Chief of Staff of the Army and Army Training and Doctrine Command’s review and associated recommendations, if effectively implemented, could help address the Army’s training shortfalls.

Army Does Not Have Visibility over the Amount of Training that Pilots in Some UAS Units Have Completed

The Army does not have visibility over the amount of training that pilots in some Army UAS units have completed. Another one of the core characteristics of a strategic training framework highlights the importance of quality data regarding training. However, in our current review, we found that the Army does not have access to data that would allow it to measure the amount of training that UAS pilots have completed in Army UAS units. The Army’s Unmanned Aircraft System Commander’s Guide and Aircrew Training Manual establishes three readiness levels for Army UAS pilots. Readiness level training begins with the development of proficiency at the individual level at readiness level three and progresses through crew to collective proficiency at readiness levels two and one. The Army assigns readiness level designations to UAS pilots to identify the training that UAS pilots have completed and the training that they need to complete to progress to the next level of readiness.

Army Forces Command identifies the Army UAS units that are ready to deploy, according to Army Forces Command officials. Army Forces Command officials stated that they need information about the readiness level of pilots in UAS units to determine if a unit is ready to deploy and perform its mission. These officials stated that currently they review Army unit status reports to determine if a unit is prepared to deploy. These officials stated that Army unit status reports provide information on a variety of factors related to a unit’s readiness to perform its mission including the unit’s materiel, personnel staffing levels, and an assessment of a unit’s training. However, officials from Army headquarters, Army Forces Command, and Army Aviation Center of Excellence stated that these reports do not provide any information on the readiness levels of the UAS pilots in UAS units because the Army does not require these reports to include this information. In addition, the organizational structure of many Army UAS units is an impediment to visibility over training completed in these units. Specifically, the Army’s RQ-7B Shadow units are organized under larger units. According to Forces Command officials, these larger units oversee multiple smaller units, including UAS units and other units that have different functions, such as intelligence. However, these officials also stated that the readiness information for these UAS units is combined with training information from other, non-UAS units in the unit status reports because unit status reports do not provide lower- unit level details. Officials at Forces Command stated that, using these reports, they have designated units as available for deployment and later learned that a significant portion of the pilots in those units had not completed their readiness level training. Without requiring information on the readiness of pilots in UAS units as part of unit status reports, Army Forces Command will continue to lack visibility over the amount of training that UAS pilots have completed in units.

Air Force UAS Pilots Do Not Complete the Majority of Their Continuation Training

Air Force officials stated that Air Force UAS pilots do not complete the majority of their required continuation training, even though an Air Force memorandum allows pilots to credit operational flights towards meeting training requirements. Another one of the core characteristics we found constitutes a strategic training framework is that agency leaders and managers consistently demonstrate that they support and value continuous learning. However, in December 2014, the commanding general of Air Combat Command wrote in a memo to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force that since 2007, Air Force UAS units have conducted “virtually no continuation training” because the Air Force has continuously surged to support combatant command requirements. Additionally, Air Force officials at a number of locations stated that Air Force UAS pilots rarely conduct continuation training for any of their unit’s missions. These locations include headquarters, Air Combat Command, as well as the Vice Wing Commander and multiple squadron commanders at Creech Air Force Base and the Wing and Operations Group Commanders at Holloman Air Force Bases.

We found that a nongeneralizable sample of training records for seven Air Force UAS units showed that, on average, 35 percent of the pilots in these units completed the continuation training for all of their seven required missions in fiscal year 2014. The situation occurred despite an Air Combat Command memorandum that allows pilots to credit flights taken on operational missions towards continuation training requirements, provided that the flights meet certain conditions. This memorandum also requires UAS pilots to conduct specified numbers of training flights associated with each of the missions that MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper units perform. We found that 91 percent or more of the pilots in the seven units completed continuation training for one of the seven missions, specifically the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission, which involves obtaining information about the activities and resources of an enemy. In contrast, an average of 26 percent of pilots in these seven units completed the continuation training for another one of the seven missions, the air interdiction mission, which involves diverting or destroying the enemy’s military potential. Air Force officials stated that operational flights do not provide an ideal environment to conduct training because pilots are not able to perform all of the tasks needed for a training flight during operational missions. Moreover, Creech Air Force Base officials also stated that UAS pilots at Creech Air Force Base conduct continuation training on less than two percent of all the hours that UAS pilots on Creech Air Force Base currently fly.

According to Air Force officials, some Air Force UAS pilots have not completed their continuation training because they spend most of their time conducting operational missions due to shortages of UAS pilots and high workloads. In addition, Creech Air Force Base officials stated that UAS pilots perform one to two of their required missions regularly based on operational needs, which also allows them to fulfill training requirements for those missions. However, due to shortages of UAS pilots and high workloads some pilots do not complete training requirements for their other five to six missions. As of March 2015, the Air Force has staffed the UAS pilot career field at 83 percent of the total number of UAS pilots that the Air Force believes are necessary to sustain current UAS operations and training. We conducted focus groups with seven groups of Air Force UAS pilots and pilots in all these groups stated that they could not conduct continuation training because their units were understaffed. In addition, Air Force headquarters officials stated that they think the current number of UAS pilots that the Air Force has approved for its UAS units is not enough to accomplish the workload of UAS units. As a result, workloads for Air Force UAS units are high, and in January 2015, the Secretary of the Air Force stated that on average Air Force UAS pilots fly 6 days in a row and work 13- to 14-hour days.

In April 2014, we found that the Air Force had shortages of UAS pilots and we made multiple recommendations to address these shortages. In particular, we found that the Air Force had operated below its optimum crew ratio, which is a metric used to determine the personnel needs for Air Force aviation units, and that the Air Force had not tailored its recruiting and retention strategy to align with the specific needs and challenges of UAS pilots. We made four recommendations related to these findings including that the Air Force update crew ratios for UAS units to help ensure that the Air Force establishes a more accurate understanding of the required number of UAS pilots needed in its units and that the Air Force develop a recruiting and retention strategy that is tailored to the specific needs and challenges of UAS pilots to help ensure that the Air Force can meet and retain required staffing levels to meet its mission.

The Air Force concurred with these recommendations and has taken some actions but has not yet fully implemented them. Specifically, a headquarters Air Force official stated that, in February 2015, the Air Force completed the first phase of a three-phase personnel requirements study designed to update the UAS unit crew ratio. The headquarters official also stated that Air Force senior leaders are reviewing the results of the first phase of the study and expect to update the UAS unit crew ratio by summer 2015. In addition, in fiscal year 2014, the Air Force began using a new process that provides the Air Force with greater flexibility to assign cadets who were preparing to join the Air Force. Under this process, the cadets are assigned to various Air Force careers, which enabled the Air Force to meet its quota for the number of cadets who graduate from Air Force officer schools and agree to serve as UAS pilots. Further, in January 2015, the Air Force more than doubled the Assignment Incentive Pay for UAS pilots who are reaching the end of their 6-year service commitment to $1500 a month. As noted above, the Air Force continues to face a shortage of UAS pilots, but fully implementing our April 2014 recommendations would better position the Air Force to address these shortages. See additional information on these recommendations and the Air Force’s actions to date in appendix I.

The Army and the Air Force Have Taken Actions to Increase the Number of Instructors in UAS Units, but the Army Has Not Fully Addressed Potential Risks that Could Hinder the Success of Its UAS Pilot Training

The Army Has Taken Action to Increase the Number of Instructors, but Its Use of Less Experienced Instructors Could Affect the Quality of UAS Pilot Training

The Army has taken action to increase the number of UAS pilot instructors, but in doing so, it is using less experienced instructors, which could affect the quality of the training provided to UAS pilots. The Army significantly increased the number of UAS units and UAS pilots in recent years, and as a result many lack the experience and proficiency needed to be an instructor, according to officials from the Army Aviation Center of Excellence. To address this shortage and accommodate the need for more instructors, the Army began to waive course prerequisites for the UAS instructor course so that it could enable these less experienced and less proficient UAS pilots to become instructors, according to officials from the Army Aviation Center of Excellence.

Army Aviation Center of Excellence officials also stated that the instructor course prerequisites are important because they help ensure that the UAS pilots the Army trains to become instructors are the most experienced and most proficient pilots and can successfully train other UAS pilots. One of the officials also stated that the Army would prefer not to grant waivers to any UAS pilot attending the course so that the pilots who become instructors would be experienced and able to share their experiences with the pilots they train. In contrast, pilots with less experience may not be able to refer to and use more varied experiences during instructional time with UAS pilots and thus may not be as prepared to successfully train other UAS pilots to perform at the highest levels of proficiency.

The instructor course prerequisites include a minimum rank, a minimum number of flying hours piloting a UAS, whether a pilot has completed their readiness level training, and whether a pilot has recently completed certain flying tasks—known as currency. For example, the Army course prerequisites specify that pilots attending the course to become an instructor for the MQ-1C Gray Eagle should (1) hold the enlisted rank of sergeant (E-5), (2) have flown a UAS for a minimum of 200 hours, (3) be designated at readiness level one, and (4) be current in their experience, specifically by having flown a UAS within the last 60 days.

According to an official from the Aviation Center of Excellence, a pilot’s battalion commander and the commander of the UAS school are responsible for approving requests to waive these course prerequisites. Following their approval, a pilot’s unit commander assesses the pilot’s potential to successfully complete the instructor training and fulfill duties required of instructors. The Army waived the instructor course prerequisites for about 40 percent of the UAS pilots attending the course from the beginning of fiscal year 2013 through February 2015. Specifically, the Army waived one or more of these course prerequisites for 38 percent of the pilots who attended the course in fiscal year 2013, 48 percent of the pilots who attended the course in fiscal year 2014, and 23 percent of the pilots who attended the course from October 2014 through February 2015 (see table 3).

The Army has taken some steps to mitigate the potential risks of using less proficient instructors. Specifically, Army Aviation Center of Excellence officials stated that in fiscal year 2015, the Army stopped waiving the instructor course prerequisites that UAS pilots be designated at readiness level one and that pilots be current in their experience flying a UAS. In addition, prior to fiscal year 2015, the Army had provided remedial training to pilots who had not met these two course prerequisites. The Army’s action to stop allowing waivers for these two course prerequisites helps to ensure that the pilots it allows to become instructors meet the minimum UAS flying proficiency course prerequisites.

However, the Army has not fully addressed the potential risks of using less proficient and less experienced instructors. Although the Army reduced the number of waivers granted so far in fiscal year 2015 by no longer waiving the course prerequisites related to minimum proficiency, the Army can continue to grant waivers for the course prerequisites related to experience, including that UAS pilots have a minimum number of flying hours in a UAS and hold the minimum enlisted rank of sergeant. In addition, the Army has not provided additional preparation to address the gap in experience for the instructors who have completed the instructor course nor does it have plans to address this gap in experience for those pilots who will attend the course in the future.

Within a strategic training and development process, one core practice calls for agencies to provide appropriate resources for their training programs, and that agency leaders should consistently demonstrate that they support and value continuous learning. Army officials have stated that experienced instructors are central to providing successful continuous learning to its UAS pilots, and in that regard are important resources in training programs. However, the Army faces risks that by training with less experienced instructors, Army UAS pilots may not be receiving the highest caliber of training needed to prepare them to be able to successfully perform UAS missions in the future. In addition, though the Army expects to face shortages of experienced and proficient UAS pilots through fiscal year 2019, the Army has not fully addressed the potential risks of training with less experienced pilots, such as by providing additional preparation for current and future instructors who do not meet one or more course prerequisites related to experience to enhance their ability to successfully provide training.

The Air Force Has Taken Action to Address Shortages of Instructors at Its UAS Formal Training Unit

The Air Force has taken action to address shortages of instructors at its UAS formal training unit at Holloman Air Force Base. The second major phase of the Air Force’s initial qualification training occurs in the formal training unit, and all of the Air Force’s active duty UAS pilots are to attend this training to learn to operate the UAS that they will fly in their operational units. As we noted earlier, a core characteristic of a strategic training framework is that agencies should provide appropriate resources for its training programs. However, we found that as of March 2015, the Air Force staffed its UAS training squadrons at Holloman Air Force Base at 63 percent of their planned staffing levels. In December 2014, the commanding general of Air Combat Command stated that the Air Force has not fully staffed the formal training unit due to shortages of UAS pilots across the Air Force and as a result “pilot production has been decimated.” An Air Force headquarters official stated that shortages of instructors at the formal training unit are a key reason that the Air Force has shortages of UAS pilots across the Air Force.

An Air Force headquarters official stated that the Air Force is taking action to address these shortages. Specifically, the Air Force is studying the personnel requirements for the formal training unit, and expects the Air Force to report the results of this study by spring 2016. The Air Force official also stated that the results of that study will likely show that the Air Force UAS pilot formal training unit should have additional instructor positions. Although the Air Force formal training unit faces a shortage of UAS instructor pilots, fully implementing our April 2014 recommendations should better position the Air Force to address these shortages.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services Coordinate to Some Extent but Potential Benefits from Enhanced Coordination Efforts to Train UAS Pilots Exist

The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) and the military services coordinate on UAS pilot training in some distinct areas; however, potential benefits from enhanced coordination efforts on training UAS pilots exist. According to key practices, federal agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts by defining a common outcome and establishing joint strategies. Collaborating agencies should also assess their relative strengths and limitations to identify opportunities to leverage each others’ resources. Further, agencies should establish compatible standards, policies, procedures and data systems to enable a cohesive working relationship.

During our review, in January 2015, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) stated that the services should coordinate and collaborate with one another regarding their efforts to train UAS pilots. He stated that in coordinating with one another the services should share best practices to help the department as a whole train its UAS pilots more effectively and efficiently. Further, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary stated that because the services fly similar UAS, they may be able to train their pilots more effectively and efficiently by taking advantage of the lessons learned that they may have acquired as they have trained their pilots separately. He cited similarities between the Air Force’s Predator and the Army’s Gray Eagle and acknowledged similarities between the Air Force’s Global Hawk and the Navy’s Triton (see Fig. 1).

In this review of UAS pilot training, we found that the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) and the services have taken some actions to coordinate on UAS training and these actions are consistent with the key practices that can enhance and sustain federal agency coordination. For example, the Air Force and the Army train all Marine Corps UAS pilots, which is consistent with the practice of identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources to initiate or sustain a collaborative effort. In addition, the Air Force and the Army have published UAS strategies that outline their services’ plans to develop, organize and incorporate the use of UAS into their missions, which is consistent with the practice of reinforcing agency accountability for collaborative efforts with plans and reports. However, the Air Force and Army strategies do not address if or how the services will coordinate with one another on UAS pilot training. Further, we also found that the actions that the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) and the services had taken were not fully consistent with these key practices. See table 4 for a description of these key practices, a description of DOD actions, and our assessment.

In addition, officials from three of the four military service headquarters offices who responded to our questionnaire expressed limited support for further coordination with the other services on UAS pilot training. For example, headquarters officials from the Army and the Air Force stated that they did not anticipate any additional benefit to coordinating with the other services on UAS pilot training. Further, headquarters officials from the Army and the Navy stated that they did not foresee any other benefits from coordinating with the other services on UAS pilot training because their services fly different UAS with different missions.

Moreover, DOD has not yet issued a UAS training strategy that addresses if and how the services should coordinate with one another to share information on training UAS pilots. In 2010, we found that DOD had commenced initiatives to address training challenges, but had not developed a results-oriented strategy to prioritize and synchronize these efforts. We recommended that DOD establish a UAS training strategy to comprehensively resolve challenges that affect the ability of the Air Force and the Army to train personnel for UAS operations and DOD concurred with our recommendation. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) engaged the RAND Corporation to draft a UAS training strategy and provided RAND with guidelines about the content and purpose of the strategy. However, these guidelines do not discuss if or how the services should coordinate on UAS pilot training. In September 2014, RAND provided a draft of a UAS training strategy to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness), but the draft also did not discuss coordination on UAS pilot training. As of April 2015, the draft training strategy had not been updated to include this information, and officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) were unable to provide a timeframe for completion of this training strategy.

Until DOD issues a UAS training strategy that addresses if and how the services should coordinate with one another to share information on training UAS pilots, the services may miss opportunities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of this training. In response to our questionnaire, 6 out of the 11 units stated that potential benefits may exist from coordinating with other services on UAS pilot training. For example, 1 Army UAS unit stated that coordinating training with other services could help shorten the amount of time they spend acclimating to other services once deployed and would allow for an easier transition to working together during missions. Additionally, another Army UAS unit stated that they were unable to train because of a poorly written certificate of authorization, which is the document that requires approval by the Federal Aviation Administration before the services can fly their UAS in the National Airspace System. Further, the unit stated that they could have avoided a temporary halt in training and benefited from reaching out to the Air Force for guidance on this process rather than the unit spending time developing their own system. Without taking steps to address coordination among the services, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) and the services may waste scarce funds on training UAS pilots and may limit the efficiency and effectiveness of these training efforts.

Conclusions

DOD’s UAS portfolio has grown over the years to rival the traditional manned systems. In its Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038 report, DOD highlighted the importance of developing a comprehensive UAS training strategy to guide the myriad DOD UAS training efforts across all systems, and to help ensure effective and efficient training of UAS pilots. However, without amending unit status reports to require information on the readiness level of pilots in UAS units, Army Forces Command will continue to lack visibility over the amount of training that UAS pilots have completed in units and will not be able to ensure that all Army UAS units being considered for deployment have completed their required training. In addition, without taking additional steps to mitigate the potential risks of using less experienced instructors, the Army may be unable to ensure that the training these instructors provide will result in highly skilled future UAS pilots. Finally, it is important that DOD identify ways to achieve its missions more efficiently and effectively. It is encouraging that the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) and the services coordinate on UAS pilot training in some areas such as the Air Force and the Army training all Marine Corps UAS pilots and the Air Force and the Army publishing UAS strategies. However, without addressing how the services can enhance their coordination efforts on training UAS pilots in DOD’s forthcoming UAS training strategy, the services may not be able to achieve additional benefits to the efficiency and effectiveness of UAS pilot training across the department.

Recommendations for Executive Action

We are making three recommendations to the Secretary of Defense:

To provide greater visibility over the extent to which Army UAS units have completed required training to leaders responsible for deployment decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to require unit status reports to include information on the readiness levels of UAS pilots in UAS units.

To help ensure that Army UAS pilots receive the highest caliber of training to prepare them to successfully accomplish UAS missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take additional steps to mitigate potential risks posed by its waiver of course prerequisites for less experienced UAS pilots attending the course to become instructors, such as by providing additional preparation for current and future instructors who do not meet one or more course prerequisites to enhance their ability to successfully provide training.

To increase opportunities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of UAS pilot training across DOD, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to address how the services should coordinate with one another in the strategy on UAS pilot training that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is current drafting.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In written comments, DOD concurred with each of our three recommendations. DOD stated that it will review the implementation status of each of the recommendations within six months. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III. DOD also provided technical comments that we have incorporated into this report where applicable.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretaries of the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3604 or FarrellB@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Steps Taken by the Air Force to Address 2014 GAO Recommendations Related to UAS Personnel Challenges

In April 2014, we found that the Air Force had shortages of pilots of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). In particular, we found that the Air Force (1) has operated below its optimum crew ratio, which is a metric used to determine the personnel needs for Air Force aviation units; (2) has not developed a minimum crew ratio; (3) has not tailored its recruiting and retention strategy to align with the specific needs and challenges of UAS pilots; and (4) has not considered the viability of using personnel other than officers such as enlisted or civilians as UAS pilots. We made four recommendations related to these findings. Since we issued our report in April 2014, the Air Force has taken some actions, but has not yet fully implemented them.

In the committee report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, the Senate Committee on Armed Services directed that the Air Force report to the committee by September 30, 2014, on its efforts to implement three recommendations from our 2014 report related to staffing levels of Air Force UAS pilots. On September 22, 2014, the Air Force reported on the status of their efforts to implement these recommendations.

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

We focused on three types of individual training that the services provide to pilots of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) pilots: initial qualification, mission, and continuation training. In addition, we focused our review on initial qualification instructors and instructors within the units. We focused our review on Army and Air Force UAS pilot training programs in our first two objectives assessing the extent to which the Army and the Air Force face challenges in ensuring that their UAS pilots complete their required training and have a sufficient number of UAS pilot instructors. We focused this part of our review on the Army and the Air Force because these services have significantly more UAS pilots than the Navy and the Marine Corps. However, for our third objective, we assessed the coordination that occurs among the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) and all four of the military services because we determined that there may be benefits to collaboration among the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) and all of the services regardless of the maturity and size of their current UAS training programs.

We assessed the reliability of the data we used to support findings in this report by reviewing documentation of the data and interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data and the way they are maintained. Specifically, we assessed the reliability of the Air Force’s data on fiscal year 2014 continuation training flights completed by seven UAS units at Creech Air Force Base to fulfill requirements laid out in the Air Combat Command Ready Aircrew Program Tasking Memorandum; the Army’s fiscal year 2013 to February 2015 data on waivers granted to UAS pilots attending the UAS school to become instructors; and March 2015 data on the Air Force’s UAS pilot staffing levels and staffing levels at the formal training unit. We selected these dates, because they are the most recent years for which the data were available. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, such as the discussion of the percentage of Army UAS pilots that required a waiver to become a UAS instructor by fiscal year; the overall staffing levels of Air Force UAS pilots; the staffing levels of Air Force UAS instructor pilots at the formal training unit; and the completion of continuation training by a nongeneralizeable sample of seven UAS units at Creech Air Force Base.

To evaluate the extent to which the Army and the Air Force face challenges, if any, in ensuring that their UAS pilots complete their required training, we reviewed documents that outline training requirements for UAS pilots in the Army and the Air Force including the Army’s UAS Commander’s Guide and Aircrew Training Manual and the Air Force Air Combat Command Ready Aircrew Program Tasking Memorandum. We also reviewed reports that we previously issued that address topics related to UAS pilot training including a 2014 report on the personnel challenges that Air Force UAS pilots face and a 2010 report on challenges that the Air Force and the Army faced training personnel for UAS operations.

We assessed the services’ UAS pilot training programs using a set of core characteristics that we previously developed in 2004. In 2004, we found that agencies must continue to build their fundamental management capabilities in order to effectively address the nation’s most pressing priorities. To help agencies build their management capabilities, we developed a framework that includes principles and key questions that federal agencies can use to ensure that their training investments are targeted strategically. In developing this framework, we concluded that there is a set of certain core characteristics that constitute a strategic training and development process. These characteristics include leadership commitment and communication; effective resource allocation; and continuous performance improvement. To develop these characteristics in 2004, we consulted government officials and experts in the private sector, academia, and nonprofit organizations; examined laws and regulations related to training and development in the federal government; and reviewed the sizeable body of literature on training and development issues, including previous GAO products on a range of human capital topics.

To identify the extent to which the military services applied these principles in their training programs, we developed a questionnaire based on these characteristics and on the services’ UAS training programs. We adapted these core characteristics by modifying the language of some of the criteria that we used in our questionnaire, to more appropriately apply to UAS pilot training. We reviewed our adaptation with officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness as well as officials from the headquarters of each of the military services. These officials agreed that the framework was relevant to our review and provided feedback on the questions we included in our questionnaire. We distributed the questionnaire to each of the service’s headquarters, training commands, and operational commands. To include diverse UAS unit perspectives, we also randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample of 14 UAS units in each of the services based on factors including aircraft types flown in the UAS unit and geographical location of the unit. We distributed the questionnaire to the commanders of the selected units. We attained an 85 percent response rate for the questionnaires. We analyzed responses we obtained from each of the questionnaires, and compared the perspectives and documentation we collected to the GAO criteria.

We reviewed a March 2015 Army Training and Doctrine Command review that evaluated continuation training for Army UAS units. The results of this review are not generalizable. We also reviewed continuation training requirements included in the Air Force’s 2014 Ready Aircrew Program Tasking Memorandum. We compared these requirements to fiscal year 2014 training data for all seven of Creech Air Force Base’s MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper units that have the same mission requirements outlined in this memorandum. Fiscal year 2014 is the most recent year for which the data were available. The results from these units of this data are not generalizable to other UAS units or fiscal years. We also interviewed Air Force officials at Headquarters, Air Combat Command, Air Education and Training Command, as well as the Vice Wing Commander and multiple UAS unit commanders at Creech Air Force Base and the Wing Commander and Operations Group and multiple UAS unit commanders at Holloman Air Force Base to determine Air Force UAS pilots’ training completion rates; the Air Force’s UAS manning levels; and metrics that Air Force has in place to determine aviation personnel requirements.

To determine the extent to which the Army and the Air Force have a sufficient number of qualified UAS pilot instructors, we identified and analyzed criteria included in the Army’s course prerequisite requirements that provide the minimum requirements for rank, the number of flying hours a pilot has flown, the readiness level of a pilot, and whether that pilot is current, which measures if the pilot has recently completed certain flying tasks. We compared these course prerequisites to the most recent Army documentation on UAS operators who attended the Army school to become an instructor in fiscal year 2013, fiscal year 2014, and October 2014 to February 2015, to determine the number of instructors who met these course prerequisites. We also interviewed the Director of Training at the Army’s initial qualification school at Fort Huachuca, and officials at Army Headquarters to get their views about whether the Army school and units have adequate numbers of instructors.

We also compared Air Force documentation on the actual numbers of Air Force UAS pilots in Air Force UAS assignments to the Air Force planned number of positions for UAS pilots. In addition, we compared the actual numbers of Air Force UAS instructor pilots at the formal training unit at Holloman Air Force Base to the Air Force planned number of positions at the formal training unit. The formal training unit is the organization that provides training for the second major phase of the Air Force’s initial qualification training and all of the Air Force’s active duty UAS pilots are to attend this training to learn to fly the MQ-1 Predator or MQ-9 Reaper. We also interviewed the Wing Commander and Operations Group and multiple UAS unit commanders at the Air Force’s formal training unit at Holloman Air Force Base to get their views about whether the formal training units have a sufficient numbers of instructors.

We visited UAS units at five bases: Ft. Huachuca, AZ; Ft. Hood, TX; Holloman Air Force Base, NM; Creech Air Force Base, NV; and Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC. We chose units at these locations to get a perspective on a variety of UAS operations and selected the locations on the basis of several factors including the type and size of UAS flown in the unit; missions of the unit; whether or not the unit is deployed (we did not meet with units who were deployed); number of UAS pilots in the unit; the major command of the unit; and location of the unit. At each instillation, we met with unit commanders and other leaders to discuss their views about training UAS pilots.

We also conducted 18 focus groups with active-duty UAS pilots at these locations to gain their perspectives on their services’ UAS training efforts. We met with eight Army focus groups, seven Air Force focus groups, and three Marine Corps focus groups for 90 minutes each. To select specific UAS pilots to participate in our focus groups, we worked with officials at each of the instillations to develop a diverse group of active-duty UAS pilots. To obtain a variety of perspectives, we selected UAS pilots with various amounts of experience flying UASs and additional duties in their units. To help ensure an open discussion in the groups, we organized them by rank and met with groups of similar rank. We also met with some groups of instructor pilots separately. These groups typically consisted of six to nine UAS pilots.

We used content analysis to analyze detailed notes from each focus group to identify themes that participants expressed across all or most of the groups. To do this, two GAO analysts analyzed an initial set of the records and individually developed themes. Then, they convened to discuss and agree on a set of themes to perform the coding. The analysts then analyzed our records and made coding decisions based on these themes. Following the initial analysis by one analyst, a second analyst reviewed all of the coding decisions that the first analyst made for each of the records. Where there were discrepancies, the analysts reviewed one another’s coding and rationale for their coding decisions and reached a consensus on which codes should be used. The results of our analyses of the opinions of UAS pilots we obtained during our focus groups are not generalizable to the populations of all UAS pilots in the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

To evaluate the extent to which DOD and the military services coordinate and collaborate with one another to train their UAS pilots, we used criteria for enhancing and sustaining collaboration among federal agencies that we previously developed. We assessed the department’s actions using seven of the eight key practices from our prior report. We excluded one key practice related to reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative efforts through performance management systems. Evaluating this practice involves assessing the extent to which agencies set expectations for senior executives for collaboration within and across organizational boundaries in their individual performance plans. We did not include this key practice in our review because many of the officials who oversee UAS pilot training in the services are military members and the military does not establish individual performance plans for its servicemembers. We reviewed our adaptation with officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness. These officials agreed that these practices were relevant to our review. The seven key practices that we assessed in our review were: (1) defining and articulating a common outcome; (2) establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources; (4) agreeing on roles and responsibilities; (5) establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries; (6) developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; and (7) reinforcing agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports.

To identify the extent to which the DOD organizations applied these practices, we analyzed documentation related to coordination on UAS pilot training that we obtained from a variety of DOD offices. For example, we analyzed guidelines for a UAS training strategy that the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness provided to the RAND Corporation; a draft UAS training strategy developed by the RAND Corporation; UAS strategies that the Army and Air Force issued; and documentation that shows that the Air Force and Army train all Marine Corps UAS pilots. In addition, we analyzed responses we obtained from each of the questionnaires we administered and focused on questions related to coordination among the services. Further, we collected additional information in interviews with officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness, the UAS Task Force, and knowledgeable officials within each military service. We then compared the information we collected from these sources to the key practices that help enhance and sustain coordination that we previously developed to determine the extent to which the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and the military services coordinate to train UAS pilots.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2014 to May 2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix III: Comment from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Lori Atkinson (Assistant Director), James P. Klein, Leigh Ann Sennette, Michael Silver, Paola Tena, Alex Welsh, Erik Wilkins-McKee, and Michael Willems made key contributions to this report.