Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Needs to Improve Guidance on Weapon Limitations and Planning for Its Stockpile Surveillance Program
Released: 2012-02-08T00:00:00

Letter

Scope and Methodology

To determine the number and type of nuclear weapon limitations, we reviewed each weapon’s current MAR and associated NNSA guidance. We then interviewed officials from NNSA and the national laboratories to obtain clarification on technically complicated limitations. NNSA and DOD do not group limitations into types or categories. However, in order to report unclassified weapon limitation information in this report, we developed categories for types of limitations based on the MAR information. Using content analysis methodology, two analysts independently assessed each limitation and coded it as a certain type of limitation. To determine DOD officials’ concerns with the limitations’ impact for nuclear weapon operations, maintenance, and war planning, we interviewed officials in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Navy and Air Force lead project officers from each weapon’s Project Officer Group and interviewed and received briefings from officials in STRATCOM’s Joint Functional Component Command For Global Strike, the entity responsible for preparing and maintaining the nation’s nuclear war plan. In addition, we reviewed and analyzed the last five annual assessment reports (fiscal years 2006 to 2010) to determine what limitations the STRATCOM Commander reported. We also interviewed the current chairman of a technical advisory group who is responsible for completing the majority of the STRATCOM Commander’s annual assessment report and reviewed prior GAO work on the annual assessment process. To determine what, if any, mitigation actions DOD and NNSA currently engage in or plan to complete to address nuclear weapon limitations, we reviewed NNSA guidance and interviewed NNSA, national laboratory, and DOD officials. To determine how NNSA manages and reports on nuclear weapon limitations, we reviewed (1) established procedures governing the MAR development and revision process, (2) NNSA guidance on nuclear weapon limitations, and (3) documents associated with an ongoing joint DOD/NNSA review of nuclear weapon military requirements. We compared the documents with the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. To determine if certain nuclear weapon limitations were potentially no longer applicable, we compared limitations with the most current information related to corrective actions as well as the current applicability of military requirements, as reported by NNSA guidance on limitations and officials from NNSA, the national laboratories, and DOD.

To determine the extent to which NNSA has taken actions to address its recommendations on its surveillance program, we reviewed NNSA’s draft October 2010 management review and analyzed key NNSA documentation related to implementation efforts. This documentation includes a draft version of NNSA’s surveillance program manual; charters establishing the roles and responsibilities for entities responsible for managing the program; draft project management tools; and newly established procedures for establishing, executing, and tracking surveillance testing requirements. In addition, we interviewed key NNSA personnel, including the acting senior technical advisor for surveillance, about NNSA’s planned efforts to address its recommendations. We also compared NNSA’s actions against the federal standards for addressing recommendations from management reviews contained in the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-123, Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control. To determine the national laboratories’ role in the surveillance program, we conducted site visits, toured select facilities used to conduct surveillance tests, interviewed officials, and received briefings from officials at LLNL and SNL.information in writing from LANL.

We conducted our work from October 2010 to February 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Background

NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs is responsible for the manufacture, maintenance, refurbishment, surveillance, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. Most modern nuclear weapons consist of three sets of components—a primary, a secondary, and a set of nonnuclear components enclosed in a case. When detonated, the primary and secondary components, which together are referred to as the weapon’s “nuclear explosive package,” produce the weapon’s explosive force, or “yield.” LANL, located in Los Alamos, New Mexico, and LLNL, located in Livermore, California, have design responsibility for the nuclear explosive package. SNL, located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Livermore, California, has design responsibility for nonnuclear components. Some nonnuclear components—collectively called “limited-life components”— have shorter service lives than the weapon itself and, therefore, must be periodically replaced. The U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile consists of eight weapons systems. Table 1 shows the weapon systems in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, their dates of entry into the stockpile, and the laboratories and military services responsible for each system.

In February 2007, we reported on the process that DOD and DOE have established for fulfilling the annual assessment of the safety, performance, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear stockpile.STRATCOM Commander’s annual assessment of the nuclear stockpile is based primarily on the advice of a technical advisory group and provides an operational perspective; (2) the technical advisory group holds an annual conference where each entity involved in managing the stockpile—national laboratories, Project Officer Groups, NNSA, and DOD—present briefings to provide a complete perspective on the various issues affecting the stockpile; and (3) the laboratory director’s annual assessment is derived primarily from ongoing activities associated with NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program, such as the results of weapon system and component level tests conducted We found that (1) the by NNSA’s stockpile surveillance program as well as data that provides an assessment of a weapon’s current reliability.

NNSA’s stockpile surveillance program comprises the Core Surveillance Program and the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign, which are funded separately. Under the Core Surveillance Program, the national laboratories and production plants evaluate weapons and weapon components for the attributes of function, condition, material properties, and chemical composition through the following:

System-Level Laboratory Testing. For such tests, units from each stockpiled weapon are chosen annually, either randomly or specifically, and sent to the Pantex Plant for disassembly, inspection, reconfiguration, and testing by the national laboratories.

System-Level Flight Testing. These tests drop or launch a weapon with its nuclear material removed. NNSA coordinates flight testing with DOD, which is responsible for providing the military assets (e.g., aircraft and missiles) needed to drop or launch a weapon.

Component and Material Testing. These tests are conducted on nuclear and nonnuclear components and materials by both the national laboratories and the production plants that manufactured them.

NNSA defines campaigns as technically challenging, multiyear, multifunctional efforts to develop and maintain the critical capabilities needed to continue assessing the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile without underground testing. tomography (CT) image analysis tool for a particular nuclear component, which NNSA officials said they believe will enhance its ability to identify potential defects or anomalies. NNSA plans to conduct approximately 30 of these CT component tests in fiscal year 2012 under Core Surveillance, according to planning documents. Figure 1 shows the interrelationships among the segments of NNSA’s Stockpile Surveillance Program.

Action Being Taken to Address Limitations of U.S. Nuclear Weapons

For all U.S. nuclear weapons in the current nuclear stockpile, NNSA identified 52 weapon limitations, and of these, the majority fall into six types. DOD officials told us that a few limitations are a concern due to the potential impact on DOD weapon operation, maintenance, and war planning, but these officials also said that current and planned mitigation actions generally address their concerns with weapon limitations. We found that NNSA guidance to DOD on some limitations contains incomplete information, and DOD officials told us that the way NNSA communicates the potential impact of limitations on nuclear weapon operation, maintenance, and war planning is sometimes unclear. Furthermore, the national laboratories identified four existing weapon limitations (8 percent of all limitations) that are no longer valid—because, among other things, corrective action to address the limitation is complete—while some limitations will remain in effect until DOD changes potentially outdated military requirements.

Types of Limitations, DOD Concerns, and Mitigation Actions

We characterized the 52 limitations that NNSA identified for all U.S. nuclear weapons into 10 types of limitations based on our analysis of each weapon’s MAR and associated guidance documents as well as through interviews with officials from NNSA, the national laboratories, and DOD. Eighty-six percent of these limitations fall into 6 types: detonation safety under abnormal conditions, weapon reliability, weapon delivery, more frequent replacement of limited life components, nuclear yield, and worker safety. According to DOD officials, a large majority of these weapon limitations do not impact DOD nuclear weapon operation, maintenance, and war planning activities. However, some DOD officials expressed concerns to us over the impact of a few weapon limitations, such as increased maintenance costs or additional issues to consider when developing war plans. For most limitations about which they raised concerns, DOD officials told us that current DOD mitigation actions, as well as the successful completion of ongoing and planned NNSA efforts, should address these concerns. DOD officials stated that the current stockpile allows sufficient flexibility to mitigate limitations. However, they told us there may be less flexibility in the future as the stockpile continues to age and decreases in size. Moreover, officials at one national laboratory told us that a smaller stockpile may not be able to support required mitigation actions if additional limitations, especially those that result in large decreases to weapon reliability, are identified in the future. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review states that the United States is currently considering future stockpile reductions that would be based on a variety of factors, including the continuing implementation of NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program.nuclear weapon limitations and the percentage of those limitations by type.

NNSA Has Not Developed a Corrective Action Plan to Improve the Nuclear Stockpile Surveillance Program

NNSA has begun to implement some of the recommendations from its draft October 2010 management review of the nuclear stockpile surveillance program, but NNSA has not developed a formal corrective action plan to guide its multiple actions. The draft October 2010 review, conducted jointly by NNSA and the three national laboratories, makes multiple recommendations to NNSA to address a number of weaknesses in the surveillance program, such as the lack of federal leadership in program management and the absence of formal, documented processes for surveillance planning and management. Actions NNSA has taken to implement the recommendations include the following:

The creation of a Senior Technical Advisor for Surveillance (senior advisor) position. This position was created in response to the review’s recommendation to establish strong NNSA leadership for the surveillance program. According to the official position description, the senior advisor is to serve as the agency’s lead official for surveillance execution and integration and is responsible for providing direction and oversight to major surveillance modernization efforts. The senior advisor reports directly to the senior NNSA official responsible for overseeing stockpile activities related to research, development, design, and production. NNSA designated an acting senior advisor in October 2010 and hired a permanent senior advisor in July 2011. According to NNSA officials, the senior advisor has brought leadership to the surveillance program. For example, when a dispute between national laboratory and production plant officials on the appropriate safety standards for handling a toxic chemical caused a backlog of a key component test, the acting senior advisor was able to mediate this dispute, and the component testing was resumed.

Establishment of a formal requirements-setting process. NNSA formalized the process for having the national laboratories submit surveillance testing requirements and having NNSA’s production plants evaluate the requirements. The process is being applied to surveillance testing requirements for fiscal years 2012 through 2017. Specifically, the national laboratories determine surveillance testing requirements; production plants review these requirements for technical feasibility and resource availability; and a new committee adjudicates unresolved conflicts in priorities. Previously, NNSA had set surveillance testing requirements informally and on an annual basis. National laboratories and production plant officials said that informal planning created problems in executing surveillance tests because, among other reasons, they did not have sufficient time to schedule tests around other stockpile work—such as life extension programs—that used the same personnel and equipment.

A new surveillance governance structure. This structure is intended to promote integrated planning and prioritization as recommended by the management review. Elements of the new structure include the Surveillance Integrated Requirements Working Group (requirements group) and the Surveillance Enterprise Steering Committee (steering committee). Established in July 2011, the requirements group resolves mismatches between surveillance testing requirements and financial, human, and material resources. Specifically, this group examines surveillance testing requirements and assesses the impact of uncompleted tests. Established in May 2011, the steering committee is the highest-level organization in NNSA solely responsible for surveillance; the steering committee approves surveillance testing requirements and will resolve disputes between the national laboratories and the production plants that are not resolved by the requirements group.

Management of the requirements process through a centralized database called the Quality Evaluation Requirements Tracking System. In line with the review’s recommendation regarding critical communication and information pathways, NNSA will require each entity in the Core Surveillance process to use this system to input, access, or manage surveillance data. For example, within this system, the laboratories will issue surveillance testing requirements, and the plants will track progress and document completion of tests. NNSA will use the data in this system as a basis for the formal performance measures the agency uses to hold the national laboratories and production plants accountable for the execution of surveillance activities.

Codification of surveillance governance and processes. Codification supports the review’s recommendation to implement a disciplined and integrated management process, with clear roles and responsibilities. NNSA is codifying surveillance governance and processes in section 5 of the Requirements Management Integration (RMI) manual. When completed, this manual will include the charters for key entities in the newly established surveillance governance structure and clear delineation of roles and responsibilities, according to NNSA officials. The manual will also include at least 12 guidance documents to serve as project management tools. For example, one such document codifies the process for investigating anomalies identified through surveillance activities; another addresses the process for adjusting surveillance schedules or plans. The guidance documents are all currently in draft, with completion expected by the end of September 2012, according to NNSA surveillance program planning documents. The 2010 management review cited the critical need for clear roles and responsibilities for all individuals and committees throughout the surveillance enterprise; it found that the number of committees with undefined or poorly defined roles and responsibilities, combined with inadequate documentation, clearly contributed to NNSA’s past difficulties in modernizing the surveillance program.

Better Integration of Core and Enhanced Surveillance. As of August 2011, NNSA charged the managers of the Core Surveillance Program and the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign with defining integration points between them. NNSA also began developing an RMI guidance document detailing how the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign should develop new diagnostic tools. The 2010 review found that NNSA lacked a clearly defined interface between the Core Surveillance Program and Enhanced Surveillance Campaign and that the lack of a documented process for promoting integration, among other things, has resulted in the underutilization of Enhanced Surveillance Campaign capabilities in the Core Surveillance Program’s testing activities. In June 2011, the acting senior advisor told us that integration between Core and Enhanced Surveillance is central to the surveillance program’s future and that increased integration presents a management challenge. Two of the surveillance program’s objectives are to detect precursors of aging weapon components sufficiently early for corrective action in existing weapons and to ensure any defects are not repeated in life extension programs. According to NNSA officials, these objectives depend on the continued development of Enhanced Surveillance Campaign technologies that are then used to improve the number and scope of the Core Surveillance Program’s component and material tests.

National laboratory and DOD officials we spoke with generally viewed NNSA’s current and planned actions to improve the surveillance program as positive developments. However, these actions are not guided by a formal corrective action plan. According to an OMB circular that defines management’s responsibility for internal control in federal agencies, federal managers are to develop a corrective action plan to address weaknesses found in program operations, as identified through management reviews, inspector general and GAO reports, program evaluations, and financial statement audits. Corrective action plans are to include specific dates, assigned responsibilities, and metrics to measure progress to resolve the findings of audits and reviews. The circular also states that agencies should periodically assess and report on the progress of those plans. Furthermore, under the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, federal managers are to take steps to ensure that the findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved by completing, within established time frames, all actions that correct or otherwise resolve the matters brought to management’s attention. A corrective action plan would provide a framework for such time frames, as well as a mechanism for holding management accountable for meeting the time frames. According to the acting senior advisor, NNSA did not address many of the findings and recommendations in its three previous surveillance program management reviews primarily because the agency did not have a specific approach for implementation. This statement echoes the 2010 draft management review finding that the prior reviews’ recommendations were not implemented because, among other reasons, NNSA did not have a well- defined, documented process for executing the surveillance program. In May 2011, more than 6 months after NNSA issued its draft October 2010 management review, the acting senior advisor directed the steering committee to establish a working group to develop a plan to implement the review’s recommendations, but both the scope and time frame of this plan remain uncertain. In the interim, NNSA officials have requested reports on individual actions taken to implement the review’s recommendations but not on the agencywide effort to implement these recommendations. Without such a plan, it is unclear how NNSA will (1) ensure that the draft review’s recommendations are fully implemented and (2) demonstrate to key stakeholders, such as Congress and DOD, that NNSA is committed to improving the surveillance program.

Conclusions

It is critical that U.S. nuclear capability continues to reassure our allies and deter potential adversaries. With most weapons currently in the stockpile having been produced over 20 years ago and being sustained beyond their original design lifetimes, it is a testament to NNSA, the national laboratories, and the production plants that DOD officials were confident that nuclear weapon limitations do not currently reduce the effectiveness of the nation’s strategic deterrent. However, several factors raise concerns with the limitations and NNSA’s management of them. First, some limitations require mitigation actions, which can impose logistical burdens, increased security risks, and war planning restrictions on the Air Force, Navy, and STRATCOM. DOD officials said they would have less flexibility in mitigating limitations in the future should the stockpile’s size be reduced as future arms control agreements are pursued. Second, NNSA guidance on limitations does not always clearly communicate to DOD the potential impacts that limitations have on nuclear weapon operations, maintenance, and war planning and does not include all identified limitations; it is uncertain if the risks associated with limitations are comprehensively identified and analyzed. Third, NNSA’s current list of nuclear weapon limitations may not reflect the most up-to- date information, and the joint DOD and NNSA military requirements review may not contain enough specificity to ensure a relevant and reliable count of limitations.

The stockpile surveillance program provides critical data that informs stockpile decisions. A smaller, aging stockpile calls for increasingly complex and time-sensitive data. NNSA’s multiple actions taken in response to recommendations in its draft 2010 surveillance program management review demonstrate the agency’s commitment to improving the program. NNSA is planning to fully address the findings and implement the recommendations contained in its draft review. However, it is unclear how or if NNSA will do so because the agency has not developed a comprehensive corrective action plan in accordance with OMB Circular No. A-123 that details actions that agency personnel must take to implement the recommendations with specific dates, assigned responsibilities, and metrics to measure progress of this implementation. Completion of such a plan would provide the agency with a reasonable basis for ensuring that recommendations are fully implemented. Without such a plan, NNSA is in danger of not implementing many of the draft review’s recommendations, as it failed to do in its three previous surveillance program management reviews. For example, previous delays in integrating Core and Enhanced Surveillance have been attributed, in part, to a lack of a documented process. Furthermore, the successful development and completion of a comprehensive corrective action plan would demonstrate to key congressional and DOD stakeholders NNSA’s commitment to improving the surveillance program. Without such a plan, it is unclear how NNSA will provide itself and key stakeholders with these assurances.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve the processes used to test and report on the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile, we are making four recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, as appropriate:

To improve the clarity of information NNSA provides to DOD about nuclear weapon limitations, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, (1) expand the guidance provided by NNSA to DOD so that it includes each existing limitation and (2) assess, and revise as appropriate, the guidance provided by NNSA to DOD to ensure it clearly describes the potential impacts that each limitation may have on nuclear weapon operations, maintenance, and war planning.

To improve the reliability and relevance of information associated with limitations, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, determine if the findings of the joint DOD and NNSA military requirements review can be used to eliminate certain limitations.  To increase confidence in NNSA’s ability to fully address all findings and recommendations from its draft surveillance management review, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration prepare and complete a comprehensive corrective action plan in accordance with OMB Circular No. A-123. This plan should identify the detailed actions that agency personnel must take to fully implement the recommendations in the review and include specific dates, assigned responsibilities, and metrics to measure progress of this implementation. This corrective action plan should also address how to better integrate Core and Enhanced Surveillance.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided NNSA and DOD with a draft of this report for their review and comment. In its written comments, NNSA said that GAO did a commendable job in reviewing a highly complex and technical area. NNSA agreed with two of the four recommendations and “agreed in principle” with the other two recommendations. NNSA also outlined the actions that it plans to take to address all four of the report’s recommendations. The complete text of NNSA’s comments is presented in appendix I. NNSA also provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.

For two of the recommendations, NNSA stated that the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Stockpile Management will oversee the development and execution of a corrective action plan for the nuclear stockpile surveillance program and ensure that the findings of the joint DOD and NNSA military requirements review be appropriately implemented. NNSA agreed in principle with the other two recommendations aimed at clarifying the information NNSA provides to DOD on nuclear weapon limitations. NNSA stated that it agrees with the desired outcome of these two recommendations, but NNSA concluded that a key procedural weakness in the process used to report on weapon limitations is the absence of a document that formally communicates DOD’s position on limitations. NNSA said that it will ask the Nuclear Weapons Council to require that military service lead project officers provide NNSA with a consolidated DOD response each time a MAR is issued, and that this response could include any concerns with nuclear weapon limitations. We agree with NNSA that the management of nuclear weapon limitations requires active participation from both NNSA and DOD through the Nuclear Weapons Council. If NNSA and DOD follow through with these planned actions, we believe that the agencies will be responsive to our recommendations.

In its written comments, DOD agreed with all four of the report’s recommendations and said that the process by which nuclear weapon limitations are managed needs to be addressed. DOD said that it will coordinate with NNSA, through the Nuclear Weapons Council, to implement our recommendations. The complete text of DOD’s comments is presented in appendix II.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of NNSA, the appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Jonathan Gill, Assistant Director; Patrick Bernard; and Alisa Beyninson made key contributions to this report. Colin Chambers, Penney Harwell-Caramia, Jon Kucskar, Michelle Munn, Kevin O’Neil, Tim Persons, Rebecca Shea, Carol Shulman, and Kiki Theodoropoulos provided technical assistance.