Army Aviation: The RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter Issue
Released: 2003-07-02T00:00:00

RS20522 -- Army Aviation: The RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter Issue

Updated July 2, 2003

Background (1)

The RAH-66 Comanche is a next generation armed reconnaissance helicopter. It is the first helicopter designed anddeveloped specifically for this mission. The Comanche is being designed to stealthily penetrate enemy airspace andconductreconnaissance. It is to incorporate advanced computers and communications to play a leading role in the digital,networkcentric battlespace, with enough weaponry to engage a wide range of targets. Some call the Comanche the world'smostsophisticated combat helicopter, with more lines of software code than even the F/A-22 Raptor. (2)

The Comanche's primaryroles would be to seek out enemy forces and designate targets for the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter at night, inadverseweather, and in battlefields obscured by smoke and dust..

Originally, the Army envisioned developing and procuring 5,023 Comanches to replace the Army's 1960s-era observation,utility transport, and attack helicopters (OH-6, OH-58, UH-1, AH-1). Budget constraints and force structuremodificationscaused significant modifications to the Comanche program. First, the utility transport version of the platform wascanceledand the procurement objective reduced to 1,292 armed reconnaissance helicopters. Second, the FY1993 budgetdeferred aproduction decision until 2006 and trimmed the number of prototypes from six to three. Third, in December 1994DoDtrimmed $2 billion from the RAH-66 program and dropped another prototype, going from three to two. Fourth, in1995, theArmy restructured the program to add 6 "experimental operational capability" helicopters within the reduced budgetlimits,in part by producing them without the armaments suite.

In April 2000 the Comanche program successfully completed a series of tests and was cleared to begin its two-year, $3.1billion Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase (3) . Boeing-Sikorsy has built and flown two Comancheprototypes. The first pre-production model, and the third Comanche is being built and is expected to be flown firstin March2005. (4) The last plan was for five pre-productionaircraft to be built in this phase and eight production aircraft were due fordelivery by 2004 for initial operational testing and evaluation. A total of 14 initial operational capability RAH-66swasplanned for delivery at the end of 2006 (5) and 1,213Comanches were to have been produced through 2024. On October 21,2002 it was announced that former DoD acquisition chief Pete Aldridge had signed an acquisition decisionmemorandum(ADM) giving final approval for the latest restructuring of the RAH-66 program. Under this new plan, the totalpurchase ofComanches would be reduced from 1,213 to 650 aircraft. Seventy three aircraft will be produced during Low RateInitialProduction (LRIP) in different blocks. Nine EMD aircraft, which will most likely be used as trainers, will be builtanddelivered by 2006. The Comanche's Initial Operating Capability (IOC) will be achieved in September 2009, threeyearslater than originally planned, and nine months after the most recent plan. The remaining 577 aircraft will beproduced undera full rate production schedule of 60 aircraft per year, starting in 2011. The Army had wanted to boost the productionrate to96 aircraft per year as part of an effort to cut costs. (6)

This restructuring reduces the Comanche's production phase from $39.3 billion to an estimated $26.9 billion. DoD hasagreed to add $3.7 billion to the helicopter's $3.2 billion full-scale development program. Army officials estimatethat thecost of each Comanche, adjusted for inflation, will increase by 33 percent - to $32.3 million (7)

Much of the program's problems have been due to the amount of systems that have been developed concurrently. Forexample, the radar, armor, and navigation and communication systems were all being developed at the same time. (8) Thelatest restructuring will reduce this concurrence by delaying the fielding of certain capabilities - the radar system,a highlevel of control of UAVs, full air-to-air engagement with the turreted gun system, Link 16 datalink, and satellitecommunications - to later blocks. (9)

The program was also restructured to field a companion UAV for the Comanche, which will be developed with fundsintended to upgrade Comanche itself. More sophisticated sensors and a better power drive system will be sacrificedin lieuof the UAV development. Comanche officials estimate that about $644 million between fiscal years 2004 and 2009will bespent on the Comanche's UAV instead of the platform itself. (10) The Army has experimented with teaming UAVs and bothApache and Comanche for several years, including work with the RQ-5A Hunter . (11) It is currently unclear whether theComanche's companion will be an operational UAV, one currently in development, or one developed specificallyfor thejob.

If there are no further changes, Comanche prime contractors Boeing and Sikorsky would build helicopters through 2019." (12) However, the final word on Comanche numbers has not been spoken. Some note that while DoD originally plannedtoprocure approximately 1,100 H-60 helicopters, over 2,500 have been procured to date. (13) Army officials claim that 650aircraft are too few, and that they require 819 Comanches to effectively equip their Objective Force which is hopedto beready by 2008. Plans call for fielding detachments of 12 Comanche aircraft to the Objective Force brigade-strength'units ofaction,' accompanied by eight UAVs." (14)

In May 2002, DoD's Inspector General (IG) reviewed the restructured Comanche program. The IG report called therestructuring a constructive approach to reducing risk and improving the program. However, the IG cautioned thatcontinued emphasis is required to ensure that integration problems do not emerge in the future that could result inincreasedcost and schedule. (15)

The Debate over Mission and Capabilities

The RAH-66 Comanche is designed to replace the aging AH-1 and OH-58D helicopters and to augment the AH-64 Apacheattack helicopter. Critics of the Comanche program argue that there is no need for a highly sophisticated, very lowobservable armed reconnaissance helicopter in today's threat environment. They contend that Comanche'scapabilities and mission requirements were developed in response to a Cold War threat environment that no longer exists. Criticsalso arguethat the Comanche's role and capabilities are too similar to the Apache's to justify the costs of the helicopter'sdevelopmentand production. They would cancel the RAH-66, and use the savings to upgrade the OH-58 aircraft and the AH-64DApache's Longbow (16) target acquisitioncapabilities. Others say that Comanche's reduced radar signature will do little tomake it more survivable than current helicopters. They note that in Iraq, Army and Marine Corps helicopters wereshotdown or damaged by IR-guided missiles, rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms fire, none of which use radarsfortargeting.

Proponents of the RAH-66 agree that the Cold War threat has disappeared, but counter that today's low-intensity regionalconflicts (such as Kosovo and Somalia) place even greater burdens on Army aviation. U.S. Forces must be moredeployable, less reliant on forward bases, and more versatile than they were during the Cold War. Supporters arguethatComanche satisfies all three criteria. Furthermore, proponents argue that Comanche makes the whole force moreeffectiveand will reduce the Army's maintenance burden. This perspective, proponents argue, is supported by initial resultsfrom anArmy "Analysis of Alternatives." This study compared attack and air cavalry squadrons equipped with AH-64DLongbowsand OH-58D Kiowa Warriors to units composed of Apaches and Comanches. The force equipped with Comanchesreportedly demonstrated better situational awareness, survivability and lethality than the other force. The Comancheprovided better sensing, lethality, range, agility, survivability, and versatility than the Kiowa units. Comanche alsoimproved the effectiveness of the Longbow when the two aircraft were mixed in attack units. The RAH-66's stealthimproved Apache Longbow's survivability when cooperative tactics, techniques and procedures were used. (17)

Claims of reduced maintenance burdens for the Comanche, however, are more controversial than are claims of itseffectiveness (18) . Projected ratios of maintenanceman-hours to flight hours have varied over time. The Army hopes toachieve a ratio of 2.6 hours of maintenance to every one hour of flight; however, both the General Accounting OfficeandCongressional Budget Office assert that projected reductions in maintenance are always optimistic. (19) Additionally, somestudies conclude that the Comanche is more expensive to fly than the Kiowa Warrior ($2,042/hour vs $1,598/hour),butless expensive than the AH-64D, which can cost as much as $3,622/hour to fly. (20)

The Comanche's role vis-a-vis the Apache is a continued point of debate. The most recent reduction in the Comancheprogram has increased the prominence of the AH-64 Apache. To compensate for fewer Comanches, the Army isconsidering improvements to Apache, such as a life-extension program or upgrades. Another option may be toprocure more Longbow models. (21) Some suggest that the DABdecision reaffirms the Apache's place as the Army's attack aircraft, andquestion whether Comanche should pursue features such as the external fuel, Armaments and Munitions System,or anair-to-air missile capability. (22)

Another issue is whether the Army will upgrade Comanche for 'heavy' attack requirements. In November 2001, Armyofficials said they were planning on a heavy variant of the RAH-66 as a replacement for the AH-64D. As part ofArmytransformation plan, Army officials said that the Comanche could perform the attack as well as the armedreconnaissancemission in the future. (23) It is unclear whether theRAH-66 could maintain its stealthy profile while carrying externalweapons, however, and some questions whether Comanche - which currently suffers from weight problems - hasthepower and fuel capacity to take on even more weight. (24) The Marine Corps is expected to seek a replacement for its AH-1ZSuper Cobra helicopters around 2020 and it has been suggested that a joint program with the Army is worthinvestigating. (25)

Congressional Action

Congress strongly supported the Comanche program by consistently meeting or exceeding DoD's budget requests forfunding. In its report on DoD's FY1996 budget request, the House Armed Services Committee reproached both theArmyand the DoD for tepid commitment to the program, urging that it be given a higher funding priority and thatfull-scaleproduction by 2004 be guaranteed. (26)

Summary of Recent Comanche R&D Funding in $ Millions

In their reports ( H.Rept. 108-106 , H.R. 1588; and S.Rept. 108-46 , S. 1050 ), House and Senate authorizers respectively matched the Administration's request for FY04 Comanche funding.

Potential Issues for Congress

In light of the facts and arguments presented above, Congress may wish to pursue the following lines of inquiry:

Comanche is the Army's only major aviation development program. The Comanche Operational RequirementsDocument describes the RAH-66's contribution to future Army warfighting missions. It states that "Aviationcapabilitiesadd increased deployability, versatility, lethality, flexibility, mobility, extended coverage and sustainment toManeuver,Fire Support, Air Defense..."and other mission areas. If the Comanche buy is reduced, what effect will this have onlong-term capabilities? How much does Comanche contribute to combat power vis-a-vis the light armored vehiclesthatthe also Army wants? $6.8 billion has been spent on the Comanche through FY03. (27) Will a purchase of 650 helicopters be a sufficient returnon this R&D investment? Some say that in recent conflicts, fixed wing aircraft have played a more prominent role, than Army attackhelicopters.Might improved versions of the AC-130 and A-10, or the STOVL variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, be moreeffectiveproviders of Close Air Support to Army ground forces than the RAH-66? The need for Comanche has been challenged on the basis that its capabilities do not differentiate it sufficientlyfromApache to merit its development. However, turning this argument around, some would assert that the Comancheiswell-suited to be the Apache's replacement as the Army's premier attack helicopter and the Army's best platformforfuture growth and development in this area. Subsequently, one could anticipate a helicopter force structurecomposedsolely of heavy lift (CH-47), battlefield utility (UH-60), and scout/attack (RAH-66) aircraft. What are the merits ofthisforce structure? Consideration of export issues is part and parcel of any military program. How much might Comanche exportscontributeto sustaining the aviation industrial base and balancing U.S. trade? As a new platform, and one less overtly designedforattack than the Apache, might the Comanche be offered for export to a larger number of countries than the AH-64?Conversely, due to its low observable features might Comanche exports need to be limited to our closest allies?

Footnotes

1. (back) This report supercedes CRS Report 96-525 F, Army Aviation: RAH-66 Comanche , by Steven R. Bowman. Washington,1996 (Archived).

2. (back) Vernon Loeb. "Fate of Army Chopper OnThe Block." Washington Post . August 31, 2002. p.2.

3. (back) "Comanche Cleared to Begin Engineeringand Manufacturing Development." Defense Daily . April 6, 2000.

4. (back) Kent Faulk. "Comanche Helicopter OnLast Chance To Fly." Birmingham News . July 1, 2002.

5. (back) Telephone conversation with JackSatterfield, Boeing spokesman; Capaccio, Tony, U.S. Army To Make Decision onHelicopter Purchases in April, Bloomberg News Service , March 2, 2000.

6. (back) Neil Baumgardner. "Aldridge InksComanche Acquisition Decision Memorandum, Numbers Cut To 650." Defense Daily. October 21, 2002.

7. (back) Tony Capaccio. "Boeing, UTX SeePositive Impact in Comanche Cut." Bloomberg.com. October 23, 2002.

8. (back) Neil Baumgardner. "Army Ready to MoveForward with Comanche, Program Manager Says." Defense Daily. February28, 2002.

9. (back) Baumgardner. OpCit. "Aldridge Inks Comanche Acquisition Decision Memorandum."

10. (back) Erin Winograd. "Army LeadersAdamant That 650 Comanches Won't Meet Requirements." Inside the Army. October28, 2002. p.10.

11. (back) Kim Burger. "AUSA - Army EyesApache to Fill Comanche Gap." Jane's Defense Weekly. October 30, 2002.

12. (back) Robert Wall. "New Comanche PlanGets Green Light." Aviation Week & Space Technology. October 28, 2002.

13. (back) Ron Laurenzo. "Comanche's LookingUp, But Now Comes The Crunch." Defense Week. June 2, 2003.

14. (back) Burger. OpCit "AUSA- Army Eyes Apache to Fill Comanche Gap."

15. (back) James Asker. "Pentagon Inspector:Latest Comanche Development Plan Reduces Program Risk." Aviation Week &Space Technology. May 19, 2003.

16. (back) The AH-64D Longbow is an upgradedversion of the AH-64A which includes a millimeter-wave Fire Control Radartarget acquisition system and fire-and-forget Hellfire missiles.

17. (back) Erin Winograd. "Initial Results ofAlternatives Analysis Show RAH-66 Contributions." Inside the Army . January 24,2000.

18. (back) Claims of improved maintenancerequirements are based on projections of advanced processes and technologies whichwon't be proven until the aircraft is fielded. In general, more technologically sophisticated weapon systems are moredifficult to maintain than less sophisticated weapon systems.

19. (back) CRS Report 96-525, ArmyAviation: RAH-66 Comanche . P. 3-4.

20. (back) Winograd OpCit . "InitialResults of Alternatives Analysis Show RAH-66 Contributions."

21. (back) Burger. OpCit . "AUSA- Army Eyes Apache to Fill Comanche Gap."

22. (back) Winograd. OpCit . "ArmyLeaders Adamant That 650 Comanches Won't Meet Requirements."

23. (back) Neil Baumgardner. Heavy Comancheto Replace Apache, Army Officials Say. Defense Daily. November 13, 2001.

24. (back) Tony Capaccio. Boeing, United TechComanche Copter's Cost, Weight Hit by GAO. Bloomberg.com . May 18, 2001.

25. (back) Kim Burger. "US Army CutsComanche Buy." Jane's Defense Weekly. October 16, 2002. p.3.

26. (back) U.S. Congress. House ofRepresentatives. Committee on National Security, National Defense Authorization Act forFiscal Year 1996, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. 104-131, June 1, 1995. P.91.

27. (back) Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)Summary Tables. (As of June 30, 2002)Department of Defense, OUSD(A&T),Systems Acquisition. http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/index.html .