Radio Communications: Congressional Action Needed to Ensure Agencies Collaborate to Develop a Joint Solution
Released: 2008-12-12T00:00:00

Letter

Matters for Congressional Consideration

Congress should consider requiring the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Treasury to collaborate on the development and implementation of a joint radio communications solution. Specifically, Congress should consider requiring the departments to establish an effective governance structure that includes a formal process for making decisions and resolving disputes, define and articulate a common outcome for this joint effort, and develop a joint strategy for improving radio communications.

Congress should also consider specifying deadlines for completing each of these requirements.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from DOJ, DHS, and the Treasury, which are reprinted in appendixes II, III, and IV respectively.

In comments from DOJ, the Assistant Attorney General for Administration largely disagreed with our findings and conclusions. DOJ stated that we had not recognized that circumstances had changed since the inception of our review and that departmental leaders had agreed on a common approach that would address concerns we have raised. However, we believe that our review accurately characterizes the evolution of circumstances throughout the development of IWN as well as the current status of the program. For example, we noted in our briefing slides that the departments had collaborated productively on the Seattle/Blaine pilot program, which served as a working demonstration and test of the IWN design. We also acknowledged in the slides that the departments had recently established a memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding development of interoperable communications systems in the future. While that step is important, an effective governance structure still needs to be implemented before decisions can be made and procedures established for overcoming the differing missions, priorities, funding structures, and capabilities among the departments.

DOJ also commented that the current business environment is not conducive to a single mobile-radio solution, and that such an approach is no longer feasible or cost-effective. In the slides we pointed out that a single, common project or system is not necessarily the best solution, and our conclusions do not advocate such a system as the best solution. We concluded that successful collaboration on a joint solution—whether that solution is IWN or an alternative approach—is necessary to promote efficient use of resources, reduce duplicative efforts, and encourage interoperability. Although a joint solution could be based on a single, nationwide network, such as an extension of the original IWN design, it could also be, for example, a mutually agreed-upon strategy for developing separate but interoperable networks and systems.

DOJ stated that it planned to continue pursuing eventual integration and interoperability with DHS and other entities using common standards and guidelines rather than through a single, central solution. We agree that the implementation of common standards and guidelines are important and can help facilitate a joint project such as this. The Seattle/Blaine pilot project, for example, was based on the Project 25 set of standards. However, agreement has not yet been reached on the standards and guidelines that are to shape future collaboration among the departments on a joint approach to radio communications. As reflected in the briefing slides, we believe that success hinges on a means to overcome differences in missions and cultures, a collaborative governance structure through which decisions are made and disputes resolved, and a joint strategy to align activities and resources to achieve a joint solution.

DOJ also stated that where the report seemed to suggest that DOJ and other agencies had not collaborated, that in fact the departments had worked together and collaborated extensively. However, as described in the briefing, we disagree with this statement. While DOJ has collaborated with other agencies on the Seattle/Blaine pilot project, the agencies determined that that specific system design could not be implemented on a nationwide scale, and they have not acted collaboratively to identify an alternative approach for a jointly coordinated communication solution. As discussed in the briefing, while the departments recently established an MOU regarding development of interoperable communications systems in the future, no progress had been made in re-establishing the joint governance structure outlined in the agreement, and the departments have been actively working to develop independent communications systems. In effectively abandoning collaboration on a joint solution, the departments risk duplication of effort and inefficient use of resources as they continue to invest significant resources in independent solutions.

Further, these stovepipe efforts will not ensure the interoperability needed to serve day-to-day law enforcement operations or a coordinated response to terrorist or other events. As stated above, the adoption of key collaboration practices will be critical to a successful outcome.

Finally, the department stated that it understood GAO’s concern that the departments risk duplication of effort and that it had made great progress in minimizing duplication/overlap, as evidenced by the Seattle/Blaine pilot project. However, as discussed above, the pilot project has not been chosen as a basis for a jointly coordinated, nationwide communications solution, nor has any other specific strategy been adopted that would provide assurance that duplication will be minimized in the future. DOJ also agreed that agencies must begin meeting quarterly to improve communications and that they must better document their overall, collective strategy beyond the MOU. Until a joint strategy to align activities and resources is adopted, we believe the potential for duplication and overlap remains.

In comments from DHS, the Director of the Departmental Audit Liaison Office discussed the development of the IWN program and noted that issues had been identified with joint governance, the management of priorities and requirements across multiple departments, and addressing user requirements within schedule constraints. In this regard, DHS stated that our report was focused on mandating that the three agencies have one radio communications solution and that it implied that any other option would result in a stovepipe of non-interoperable communications systems. We disagree. As discussed above, in the slides we pointed out that a single, common project or system is not necessarily the best solution, and we do not advocate such a system as the best solution. We concluded that successful collaboration on a joint solution—whether that solution is IWN or an alternative approach—is necessary to promote efficient use of resources, reduce duplicative efforts, and encourage interoperability. Although a joint solution could be based on a single, nationwide network, such as an extension of the original IWN design, it could also be, for example, a mutually agreed-upon strategy for developing separate but interoperable networks and systems.

Regarding the breakdown of the original collaborative structure for the IWN program, DHS commented that DHS and DOJ are employing different radio designs funded by Congress that are commensurate with spectrum needs in their environments and that the two departments have different regional priorities, such that a common system will not work on a national level. In the briefing, we recognized that the two departments had different priorities and that those differences led to an inability to resolve conflicts on the original IWN program. However, as discussed above, in effectively abandoning collaboration on a joint solution, the departments risk duplication of effort and inefficient use of resources as they continue to invest significant resources in independent solutions. Given their differences, adoption of key collaboration practices will be critical to ensuring that separate projects in the two departments are successfully coordinated in the future so that radio communications are improved among federal agencies, costs reduced, and duplication eliminated wherever possible.

DHS also commented that we had not discussed the departments’ concerns about the projected expense of expanding the Seattle/Blaine pilot project to a national level. While we did not discuss specific cost projections for this option, which is no longer being considered, we recognize that any investment in coordinated future communications between the departments will be substantial. Accordingly, it will be critical to ensure a properly coordinated approach so that duplication and overlap is avoided.

Regarding current collaboration with DOJ and Treasury, DHS noted that a memorandum of understanding had been signed in January 2008 and described how decisions are to be made under this agreement. DHS went on to describe internal priorities, such as the need for radio system upgrades in Customs and Border Protection, and stated that any cross- departmental efforts should not result in delays to these priorities. We do not dispute the urgency for upgrading radio systems that DHS cites. However, given that all three departments have differing priorities, as discussed in the slides, it remains critical that key collaboration practices are adopted to ensure successful coordination across departments.

Finally, DHS briefly outlined its vision for a “tiered” strategy for achieving effective radio communications in a timely and cost-effective manner. DHS stated that the first goal of the partnership will be to define an outcome and an associated joint strategy. We agree that these elements—along with an effective governance structure that includes a formal process for making decisions and resolving disputes—are key elements for successful collaboration and implementation of a joint radio communications solution.

In comments from the Treasury, the Chief Information Officer stated that the department continued to be highly supportive of the overall goals of the IWN program and looked forward to continuing to work with DOJ and DHS to advance law enforcement and emergency services communications.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees and the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and Secretary of the Treasury. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6253 or at willemssenj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Briefing to Staff of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

Radio Communications: Congressional Action Needed to Ensure Agencies Collaborate to Develop a Joint Solution

September 25, 2008

Objective, Scope, and Methodology DOJ, DHS, and Treasury Are No Longer Pursuing a Joint Solution Agency Comments and Our Evaluation The tragic events of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina have highlighted the critical importance of having effective radio communications systems for law enforcement and public safety agencies including federal agencies with such responsibilities. In order to effectively respond to events such as natural disasters, criminal activities, and domestic terrorism, law enforcement and public safety agencies need reliable systems that enable communication with their counterparts in other disciplines and jurisdictions. Further, since the 1990s, increasing demand for radio communications capabilities in both the private and public sectors has created a need to use radio communications capacity more efficiently.

The Integrated Wireless Network (IWN) was intended to be a collaborative effort among the Departments of Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), and the Treasury to provide secure, seamless, interoperable, and reliable nationwide wireless communications in support of federal agents and officers engaged in law enforcement, protective services, homeland defense, and disaster response missions. This initiative, begun in 2001, was originally estimated to cost approximately $5 billion. the ability of different tem to redily connect with ech other nd enable timely commniction.

Objective, Scope, and Methodology As agreed, our objective for this review was to determine the extent to which DOJ, DHS, and Treasury are developing a joint radio communications solution to improve communication among federal agencies. To address our objective, we reviewed and analyzed documentation from DOJ, DHS, and Treasury to determine the status of IWN, interviewed officials from each department about the extent to which they are collaborating with the other departments on IWN or an alternative joint radio communications solution, reviewed and analyzed documentation for independent radio communications projects at DOJ and DHS to identify actions the departments are taking to improve their radio communications systems, reviewed and analyzed past and present agreements among the departments to determine the extent to which a governance structure is in place that enables effective collaboration, and compared collaboration activities performed by the departments to selected practices previously identified by GAO as helpful to sustaining collaboration Objective, Scope, and Methodology among federal agencies.

We performed our audit work in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area at DOJ, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, DHS, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, Treasury, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration. We also conducted work at these agencies’ field offices in the Seattle, Washington, metropolitan area, which was the location of the key pilot demonstration for the IWN program.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to September 2008, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives, and we believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. nd GAO, Electronic Government: Potential Exists for Enhancing Collaboration on Four Initiatives, GAO-04-6 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 10, 2003).

While DOJ, DHS, and Treasury had originally intended IWN to be a joint radio communications solution to improve communication among law enforcement agencies, IWN is no longer being pursued as a joint development project. Instead of focusing on a joint solution, the departments have begun independently modernizing their own wireless communications systems. While DOJ and Treasury (and later DHS) collaborated on a pilot demonstration of IWN in the Seattle/Blaine area that continues to provide service to multiple agencies, the departments have determined that this specific system design cannot be implemented on a nationwide scale, and they have not acted collaboratively to identify an alternative approach for a jointly coordinated communications solution. In addition, the formal governance structure that was established among the three departments has been disbanded, and the contract for developing a new IWN design, awarded over a year and a half ago, is not being used jointly by the departments for this purpose. Currently, DOJ is planning to implement a nationwide network for its component agencies, and DHS and its components are pursuing numerous independent solutions.

A primary reason why the collaboration on a joint communications solution has not been successful is that the departments did not effectively employ key cross-agency collaboration practices. Specifically, they could not agree on a common outcome or purpose to overcome their differences in missions, cultures, and established ways of doing business; they have not established a collaborative governance structure with a process for decision making and resolving disputes; and they have not developed a joint strategy for moving forward. While DHS considers improving radio communications at the nation’s borders to be a major priority, DOJ’s priorities are in other areas. Program officials from both departments acknowledged that differing priorities led to an inability to resolve conflicts. As a result, they now have several initiatives aimed at high-level coordination, none of which are focused on developing a joint communications solution. Department officials have indicated that they have not made any progress on re- establishing a joint governance structure and decision-making procedures for a joint communications solution.

In abandoning collaboration on a joint solution, the departments risk duplication of effort and inefficient use of resources as they continue to invest significant resources in independent solutions. Further, these stovepipe efforts will not ensure the interoperability needed to serve day-to-day law enforcement operations or a coordinated response to terrorist or other events.

Given the importance of collaborating effectively toward improving radio communications among federal agencies, reducing costs, and eliminating duplication where possible and the departments’ failure to develop a joint radio communications solution through their own initiative, Congress should consider requiring that the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Treasury employ key cross-agency collaboration practices discussed in this report to develop a joint radio communications solution.

We received comments via e-mail from DOJ and DHS on a draft of these briefing slides. Treasury officials stated that they had no comments on the draft briefing slides.

In their comments, officials from DOJ’s Office of the Chief Information Officer disagreed with our findings and conclusions in several areas. First, the department officials stated that our analysis was flawed and unrealistic in focusing on a single, common project as the best solution for supporting missions, improving interoperability, and achieving cost efficiencies. We disagree that our conclusions advocate a single system as the best solution and clarified our position in the briefing that a joint approach could mean a single system or it could be a mutually agreed-upon strategy for developing separate but interoperable networks.

Second, DOJ officials stated that we misrepresented their efforts to work with other agencies, including DHS, and that the department had tried to reach consensus and compromise with DHS but organizational challenges could not be overcome. We acknowledge that DOJ took steps to collaborate on IWN; however, we also note that when the challenges of collaborating could not be overcome, progress stalled. Rather than contradicting our conclusions, we believe these facts support our analysis that key practices for collaborating were not established or sustained. Unless such practices are established and sustained, the departments are unlikely to succeed at implementing a joint collaborative solution.

Third, department officials stated that we unfairly characterized the results of the Seattle/Blaine pilot and failed to recognize DHS’s lack of contribution to the pilot and its requirements development. However, the pilot and its requirements development occurred prior to DHS’s involvement in the program. Further, we acknowledge within our briefing that the pilot provided a working demonstration and test of the preliminary network design as well as several specific benefits. Nevertheless, our discussions with users in the pilot area reveal that the pilot network did not meet many of their needs. In order to make progress in addressing unmet needs through a joint partnership, it will be important that the departments collaborate on alternative approaches based on lessons learned from this pilot.

Finally, DOJ expressed concern that our findings did not address the business and operational issues facing IWN, including differing missions and priorities and a lack of funding. While these issues can be challenging, the departments have not implemented the governance structure or employed the key collaboration practices needed to overcome these challenges.

Officials from DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate did not state whether they agreed or disagreed with our findings but provided suggestions for consideration in the development of a joint strategy, including expanding the partnership to include other federal departments, leveraging existing infrastructure across all levels of government, and ensuring that interoperability is a priority focus. The additional considerations proposed by DHS for inclusion in the joint partnership are consistent with our results and may merit attention as the partnership develops. DHS officials also provided technical comments that we have incorporated into the briefing slides, as appropriate.

Radio frequency communications are vital to public safety organizations that respond to natural disasters and terrorist acts. These organizations include the nation’s first responders (such as firefighters, police officers, and ambulance services) as well as federal agencies that have law enforcement and public safety responsibilities, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Federal law enforcement agencies rely on wireless land mobile radio systems for their day-to-day operations and use radio communications to provide for the safety of agents and the public. Further, in order to perform public safety operations effectively, these communications must be secure as well as reliable.

The origins of the IWN program date back to 2001. At that time, DOJ and Treasury were independently pursuing efforts to upgrade their land mobile radio systems to meet a National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) requirement to reduce their use of radio frequency spectrum. Due to the similarity of their law enforcement missions and overlapping geographic jurisdictions, the two departments began discussing a joint project in August 2001. assed the Telecommniction Athoriztion Act of 1992 (Pub. L. No. 102-538 (1992)), which mndted tht the Secretry of Commerce nd the NTIA (the orgniztion reponle for effective use of rdio freqencie y federgencie) develop pln to mke more efficient use of federl lnd moile rdio pectrm. In repone, NTIA reqired, with certin exception, tht the chnnel bandwidth in certin freqency band used y federgencie for lnd moile rdio tem e redced from 25 to 12.5 kilohertz. Thi redction in chnnel bandwidth i referred to asrrowbanding. NTIA pecified different time frme for the trition based on the freqency band nd whether it was new or exiting tem.

The subsequent events of 9/11 further underscored the need for secure, wireless, interoperable communications for all levels of government, and in November 2001, DOJ and Treasury took the initiative to create the IWN program by signing a memorandum of understanding to collaborate on achieving cost efficiencies and improving communications operability among their own law enforcement agencies as well as with other federal, state, and local organizations. The IWN joint program was intended to be a nationwide radio communications system that would provide secure, seamless, and reliable wireless communications in support of law enforcement. In addition, the IWN program would serve as a means for upgrading aging equipment. network for several federal agencies and enabled interoperability with several state and local law enforcement organizations in the Seattle/Blaine area.

Following the establishment of DHS, several law enforcement components from DOJ and Treasury were transferred to the new department and the scope of IWN was expanded. In June 2004, DOJ, DHS, and Treasury signed a new memorandum of understanding. This agreement established the following governance structure to oversee and carry out the implementation of IWN: The Joint Program Office, consisting of staff assigned to the office on a full-time basis from each of the departments, was responsible for—among other things— performing all IWN program administrative and project management functions. commniction eqipment. gement Office irrently reponle for fnding nd mgement relted to wireless commniction nd IWN for the deprtment. tion Officer was originlly reponle for the IWN progrt DHS. Since DHSas creted, the deprtment went throgh erie of mgement chnge. In My 2007, the Office of the Chief Informtion Officer trferred ll mgement reponilitie for IWN to the newly formed Office of Emergency Commniction, which irrently reponle for IWN. The Office of the Chief Informtion Officer retined authority over pectrlloction for the DHS component. m Office repreent the deprtment in IWN-relted ctivitie. However, while Treasury crrently has abt 4,500 gent, the totl ner of gent nd officer who re potentil rdio user mong ll three deprtment over 80,000. policy and program direction to the Joint Program Office.

The National Project Team, comprised of representatives from each component/bureau participating in the IWN program, was responsible for— among other things—providing information to the Joint Program Office required for the development, implementation, and administration of the IWN system.

The memorandum of understanding described identical responsibilities and resource contributions for DOJ and DHS. However, Treasury was not required to share the costs of designing and building IWN, given its reduced number of law enforcement personnel after creation of DHS.

In July 2004, the IWN Executive Board initiated an acquisition strategy to award a contract to: obtain reliable, secure, nationwide wireless communication capabilities; reduce costs by leveraging economies of scale; enable rapid deployment of radio communications functionality nationwide; enhance interoperability, operational effectiveness, and support though increased coverage and capabilities; and establish interoperability with other federal and non-federal wireless users through the consistent application of standards developed from this effort.

The strategy envisioned selecting a single contractor to implement the entire IWN program using a 3-phased process: In phase 1, vendors submitted information regarding their high-level conceptual approach, organizational experience, and past performance. As a result of this process, four vendors continued in the acquisition process. This phase was completed in December 2004.

In phase 2, the four vendors submitted detailed technical, management, and cost proposals to accomplish the entire IWN program. Based on an evaluation of these proposals, two vendors were awarded contracts to prepare detailed system designs. This phase was originally scheduled for completion in May 2005 but was not completed until June 2006.

Phase 3 was to select the winning contractor based on evaluation of the detailed system designs submitted by each contractor. As a result of this process, General Dynamics C4 Systems was selected as the IWN systems integrator in April 2007.

Figure 1 shows a timeline of major events related to IWN.

We have previously reported on the importance of communications interoperability to effective public safety operations. Interoperability has been significantly hampered by the use of incompatible radio systems. Different technologies and configurations, including proprietary designs made by different manufacturers, have limited the interoperability of such systems.

In 2004, we reported that a fundamental barrier to successfully establishing interoperable communications for public safety was the lack of effective, collaborative, interdisciplinary, and intergovernmental planning. Further, in 2007, we made recommendations to DHS to improve interoperable communications among federal, state, and local first responders.Among other things, we recommended that DHS develop a plan that strategically focused its interoperability programs and provided quantifiable performance measures. Program officials indicated that they were in the process of developing such a plan; however, they had not established a completion date for it. ly 20, 2004).

We have also previously reported on key practices agencies should employ to help them overcome the barriers to successful inter-agency collaboration. These practices include: Defining and articulating a common outcome or purpose that overcomes differences in department missions, cultures, and established ways of doing business.

Establishing a governance structure, including a collaborative management structure with defined leadership, roles and responsibilities, and a formalized process for making decisions and resolving disputes.

Establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies that work in concert with those of the partners or are joint in nature to align activities and resources to accomplish the common outcome.

Implementing these practices is critical to sustaining a successful inter-agency project such as IWN.

DOJ, DHS, and Treasury are no longer pursuing a joint solution Given the importance of radio communications and the reality of limited resources, it is critical that agencies find ways to work together to achieve effective and efficient interoperable solutions. In particular, the advantages of collaborating to develop a joint radio communications solution clearly outweigh the benefits of each department pursuing its own radio communications initiative, as DOJ, DHS, and Treasury agreed when they signed on to the IWN program. The benefits of developing IWN as a joint communications solution, as identified by the program, include: supporting departmental missions effectively and efficiently, providing sufficient communications coverage for current operations, achieving efficient use of radio spectrum, improving interoperability with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, achieving cost efficiencies through resource consolidation and economies of scale.

Achieving these benefits hinges on successful inter-agency collaboration.

DOJ, DHS, and Treasury are no longer pursuing a joint solution Despite early progress, the departments are pursuing independent solutions Although the departments made early progress in jointly developing and implementing a pilot program, they are no longer pursuing IWN as a joint solution and instead are independently modernizing their own wireless communications systems.

DOJ and Treasury (and later DHS) contributed resources to develop an operational pilot in the Seattle/Blaine area to demonstrate the original IWN design. This pilot provided a working demonstration and test of the preliminary network design, generally improved communications in the coverage area, addressed federal encryption requirements through new equipment, established technical solutions for interoperability with selected state and local organizations, and provided valuable lessons learned. While the pilot remains operational and has been expanded to increase coverage in areas of Washington and Oregon, several DOJ and DHS components in the region have been unable to fully use the system due to unmet requirements. Components in the area continue to maintain legacy networks to ensure complete coverage.

Since the pilot demonstration, DOJ and DHS have concluded that the pilot design could not be implemented jointly on a nationwide scale. DOJ officials expressed concern that it would be too expensive to expand the pilot network to fulfill DOJ, DHS and Treasury requirements on a nationwide scale, while DHS officials were also concerned that the design would not be technically well suited to meet DHS needs.

DOJ, DHS, and Treasury are no longer pursuing a joint solution Since deciding not to proceed with the IWN pilot design jointly, the departments have not developed an alternative approach for collaborating on a joint communications solution, either through development of a single, nationwide network, such as an extension of the original IWN design, or a through a mutually agreed-upon strategy for developing separate but interoperable networks and systems that can accommodate the needs of all participants and incorporate the lessons learned from prior efforts (such as the pilot). For example: The departments have not used their IWN contract as a vehicle for development of a joint solution. For nearly three years, DOJ, DHS, and Treasury jointly participated in the process of selecting a systems integrator. However, since that selection, the departments have not used the IWN contract (awarded a year and a half ago) to begin developing a joint nationwide radio communications solution. Instead, the task order that has been issued based on the IWN contract is being used for establishing a joint program office for the contractor and DOJ—not for DHS or Treasury. The task order specifies that the contractor will draft architecture documents for developing a communications system for DOJ—it does not include DHS or Treasury.

The formal governance structure for IWN originally supported by the three departments has been disbanded. Specifically, the IWN Executive Board and the National Project Team stopped meeting after award of the IWN contract. In DOJ, DHS, and Treasury are no longer pursuing a joint solution addition, the Joint Program Office that was intended to manage IWN is no longer supported by shared staff and resources from the three agencies. Although officials from the three departments stated that they talk to each other about radio communications issues, these discussions have not occurred on a regular basis and have not been used to re-establish a formal governance structure for developing a joint communications solution. rrently has one employee collocted with the DOJ Wireless Mgement Office to fcilitte exchnge of informtion. DHS doe not contribute ny ff or rerce to the joint progrm office.

DOJ, DHS, and Treasury are no longer pursuing a joint solution legacy systems on a regional basis, replace or decommission certain systems, and deploy new systems to meet federal requirements for reduced spectrum use and encryption. Establishing interoperability with other federal, state, and local organizations; network redundancy; trunking; and spectrum efficiency are to be included in later phases, as funding is available. According to the department, the total cost is estimated at $1.23 billion, and the system will be implemented over 6- 7 years.

DHS is pursuing multiple approaches at both the component and department levels to meet different priorities. For example, since 2005, Customs and Border Protection has been developing and implementing a nationwide radio communications network intended to improve and update radio communications for Customs and Border Protection officers and agents—referred to as the Tactical Communications Modernization Project. In contrast, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials have adopted a different approach, looking for opportunities to strategically partner with other agencies and leverage existing assets to meet their operational requirements. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has submitted a number of proposals to the department for approval. While initiatives such as these are reviewed by the DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer, they are funded at the component level and focus on meeting the needs of individual components.

DOJ, DHS, and Treasury are no longer pursuing a joint solution In addition to such component initiatives, the DHS Office of Emergency Communications (OEC), which is responsible for IWN, is pursuing a high-level strategy for developing radio communications networks, based on shared infrastructure, as an alternative to the original IWN design. The OEC approach, which has been explored with the assistance of the Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications, focuses on coordination with federal, state, and local organizations that are building or planning to build large communications networks so that these networks might also meet the needs of member federal agencies. However, the OEC’s shared infrastructure approach has yet to be approved at the department level. In addition, this approach focuses on coordination with other government agencies and not specifically among DHS components or the law enforcement community, which was an original goal for the IWN program. l Prtnerhip for Interoperable Commniction, which i ponored y the OEC, i n orgniztion intended to ddress federl wireless commniction interoperability y fotering intergovernmentl coopertion nd identifying nd leverging common ynergie. It inclde 44 federl memer gencie nd pproximtely 160 prticipnt.

DOJ, DHS, and Treasury are no longer pursuing a joint solution The departments have not employed key cross-agency collaboration practices A primary reason that collaboration on a joint communications solution has not been successful and the benefits envisioned by the departments have not been realized is that the departments did not effectively employ key cross-agency collaboration practices. As we previously mentioned, these practices include defining and articulating a common outcome or purpose, establishing a governance structure, and establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies to accomplish a common outcome. For example: The departments have not defined and articulated a common outcome or purpose that overcomes differences in department missions, cultures, and established ways of doing business. Although the departments originally recognized the benefits of collaborating on a joint solution, they allowed differences in priorities and opinions to stall their collaboration efforts. Specifically, DOJ saw IWN as a concept or vision for new development, which would culminate in a nationwide radio communications network for federal law enforcement. DHS, in contrast, considered the IWN contract to be a vehicle for systems integration. In addition, DHS considered improving radio communications around the nation’s borders to be a major priority, while DOJ’s priorities were focused in other areas of the nation. Further, the departments could not agree on the direction that IWN should take after deciding that the design of the pilot would not be appropriate for a nationwide network. DOJ and DHS program officials have both acknowledged DOJ, DHS, and Treasury are no longer pursuing a joint solution that differing priorities led to an inability to resolve conflicts. They further explained that delays in progress and continued deterioration of legacy systems led the departments to independently pursue other solutions.

The departments did not establish a collaborative governance structure that includes a management structure, defined roles and responsibilities, and a formalized process for decision making and resolving disputes. Although the departments attempted to establish a joint governance structure, it was not effective at decision making and resolving disputes and the partnership was discontinued. Both DOJ and DHS stated that making joint decisions in their original partnership depended on reaching consensus among the departments, and when consensus could not be reached, progress on IWN stalled.

The departments did not establish a mutual or joint strategy to align activities and resources to accomplish a common outcome. Despite acknowledging the potential benefits from collaborating on a joint solution, the departments have not produced a strategic or implementation plan that outlines a strategy for developing a joint radio communications solution, whether that solution is IWN or an alternative joint approach.

DOJ, DHS, and Treasury are no longer pursuing a joint solution The departments are aware that efforts to collaborate have not been successful. Although they have established three high-level initiatives to address coordination, these initiatives are not focused on implementing a collaborative joint communications solution across DOJ, DHS, and Treasury. Specifically: The three departments signed a new memorandum of understanding in January 2008 that aims at coordinating their joint wireless programs. Although the goals of the current memorandum are similar to those that the departments specified in their 2004 agreement for IWN, DOJ and DHS officials have stated that no progress has been made in re-establishing the joint governance structure outlined by the agreement. In addition, decision-making procedures outlined in the 2008 memorandum—like those in the 2004 agreement—do not clearly define how to overcome barriers faced when consensus cannot be reached among the departments. DOJ and DHS officials agreed the memorandum serves primarily as a means for facilitating communication among the departments when opportunities and funding are available.

DOJ, DHS, and Treasury are no longer pursuing a joint solution Participation in the Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications is voluntary for both federal and state entities, coordination occurs on an ad-hoc basis, and meeting participants do not necessarily include officials who are in positions to make decisions about their agency’s radio communications programs. As previously described, the DHS OEC’s shared infrastructure approach is intended to explore collaboration through the Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications and focuses on coordinating radio communications initiatives among federal, state, and local organizations based on operational needs. However, DOJ officials stated that the Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications serves primarily as a working group of technical staff, while Treasury officials noted that, to date, they have attended the group’s meetings primarily as observers rather than as active participants. Therefore, it is unclear whether this initiative can address the day-to-day mission needs of law enforcement agencies.

DOJ, DHS, and Treasury are no longer pursuing a joint solution In accordance with the 21 Century Emergency Communications Act, the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center (ECPC) has been created and is supported by the OEC. The purposes of this group include serving as the focal point for interdepartmental efforts and providing a clearinghouse for relevant information regarding the ability of emergency response providers and relevant government officials to communicate in the event of natural or man-made disasters and acts of terrorism. DHS officials believe that the creation of the ECPC will address collaboration and may be the proper forum for coordinating a joint solution. However, the charter for this organization has not yet been approved. Although DOJ and Treasury both participate in the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center, DOJ officials noted that this group is focused on emergency communications and response, and it is unclear whether this group can address the day-to-day operational requirements of law enforcement agencies.

DOJ, DHS, and Treasury are no longer pursuing a joint solution DOJ and DHS pursuing independent solutions, it is clear that the departments do not view these initiatives as a means to collaborate on the IWN program and have not defined or committed to an alternative approach to develop a joint communications solution. Without a commitment to collaborate on a joint solution, they will continue to invest significant resources in independent solutions that risk duplication of effort and inefficient use of resources. Further, these stovepipe efforts will not ensure the interoperability needed to serve day-to-day law enforcement operations or for responding to terrorist or other events that require a coordinated response.

Despite early progress on the pilot effort, the departments have been unable to sustain development of a joint radio communications solution on their own. As a result, after seven years of effort, they are no longer pursuing IWN as a joint solution and are instead pursuing potentially duplicative and wasteful independent solutions.

A primary reason that collaboration on a joint communications solution has failed and the benefits envisioned by the departments have not been realized is that the departments did not effectively employ key cross-agency collaboration practices that could overcome the challenges faced in such programs. Specifically, they lacked a means to overcome differences in missions and cultures, a collaborative governance structure that could make decisions and resolve disputes, and a joint strategy to align activities and resources to achieve a joint solution.

As long as the departments pursue separate initiatives and expend their resources independently, they risk duplication and inefficiency, and may fail to achieve the level of interoperability that is vital for both law enforcement and emergency communications. While successful collaboration on a joint solution is necessary, this joint solution could be based on a single, nationwide network, such as an extension of the original IWN design, or it could also be a mutually agreed-upon strategy for developing separate but interoperable networks and systems that incorporate lessons learned from past efforts. Given the importance of collaborating effectively toward improving radio communications among federal agencies, reducing costs, and eliminating duplication where possible and the departments’ failure to develop a joint radio communications solution through their own initiative, Congressional action should be considered to ensure that this collaboration takes place.

The Congress should consider requiring that the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Treasury collaborate on the development and implementation of a joint radio communications solution. Specifically, Congress should consider requiring the departments to: establish an effective governance structure that includes a formal process for making decisions and resolving disputes; define and articulate a common outcome for this joint effort; and develop a joint strategy for improving radio communications.

Congress should also consider specifying deadlines for completing each of these requirements.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation We received comments via e-mail from DOJ and DHS on a draft of these briefing slides. Treasury officials stated that they had no comments on the draft briefing slides.

Officials from DOJ’s Office of the Chief Information Officer disagreed with our findings and conclusions in several areas and expressed concerns that we did not accurately characterize the department’s efforts to collaborate. Officials from DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate did not state whether they agreed or disagreed with our findings, but provided suggestions for additional consideration; in addition, DHS officials provided technical comments that we incorporated into the briefing slides, as appropriate.

Officials from DOJ’s Office of the Chief Information Officer disagreed with our findings and conclusions in several areas. First, the officials stated that our analysis was flawed and unrealistic in focusing on a single, common project as the best solution for supporting missions, improving interoperability, and achieving cost efficiencies. However, we disagree that our conclusions advocate a single, common project or system as the best solution. We concluded that successful collaboration on a joint solution, whether that solution is IWN or an alternative approach, is necessary to promote efficient use of resources, reduce duplicative efforts, and encourage interoperability. Although a joint solution could be based on a single, nationwide network, such as an extension of the original IWN design, it could also be, for example, a mutually agreed-upon strategy for developing separate but interoperable networks and systems.

Accordingly, we have clarified our briefing slides to emphasize that we have not concluded that a single monolithic project or system is the most appropriate joint collaborative solution.

Second, the department officials stated that we misrepresented DOJ efforts to work with other agencies, including DHS. Specifically, DOJ officials stated that they had tried to reach consensus and compromise with DHS, but DHS leadership had not embraced the concept of a joint program, forcing DOJ to work individually with the DHS components instead of with a single, consolidated program office within the DHS organization. Furthermore, the DOJ officials cited lack of centralized funding at DHS to be another key challenge to collaborating with that department. We acknowledge that DOJ took steps to collaborate on IWN, but when the challenges could not be overcome, progress stalled. We recognize the challenges faced in collaborating among departments, and, in particular, the challenges described by DOJ in collaborating with DHS. However, rather than contradicting our conclusions, we believe these facts support our analysis that key practices for collaborating were not established or sustained. Unless such practices are established and sustained, the departments are unlikely to succeed at implementing a joint collaborative solution.

Third, DOJ officials also stated that we unfairly characterized the results of the Seattle/Blaine pilot and failed to recognize DHS’s lack of contribution to the pilot and its requirements development. However, the pilot and its requirements development Agency Comments and Our Evaluation occurred prior to DHS’s involvement in the program. Further, in our briefing, we note that the Seattle/Blaine pilot afforded several benefits to users in Washington and Oregon, including improving communications in the coverage area and establishing technical solutions for interoperability with state and local organizations. Further, we agree that the pilot served as a working demonstration and test of the IWN design and that additional participation from DHS might have resulted in additional requirements being met. However, our discussions with users and potential users revealed that the pilot network did not meet many of their needs. In order to make progress in addressing unmet needs through a joint partnership, it will be important that the departments collaborate on alternative approaches based on lessons learned from this pilot.

Finally, DOJ officials also expressed concern that our findings did not address business and operational issues facing IWN, including a lack of adequate funding and the differing missions, priorities, funding structures, and existing capabilities at DHS and DOJ. While we agree that the departments have faced significant challenges, we believe that collaboration on a joint strategy remains critically important. We recognize that the departments have taken initial steps to re-establish coordination, such as signing a revised memorandum of understanding. However, an effective governance structure needs to be implemented before decisions can be made and procedures established for overcoming the differing missions, priorities, funding structures, and capabilities among the departments.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation We also obtained comments on a draft of this briefing via e-mail from DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate officials. In these comments, the DHS officials did not state whether they agreed or disagreed with our findings, but they supported the continued development of a joint federal radio communications strategy and stated that more specific guidance was needed. Specifically, DHS identified three elements for inclusion in the development of a joint strategy: Expand the partnership to include other federal departments that rely on mission- critical wireless communications beyond the law enforcement community.

Leverage existing infrastructure across all levels of government to ensure cost effectiveness and reduce duplication of effort.

Ensure that interoperability is a priority focus beyond the upgrade and modernization focuses of the original IWN concept.

In addition, the department stated that there was a need within DHS to further align authority and resources with responsibility for a joint solution. For example, while the Office of Emergency Communications was given responsibility for IWN, it was not given authority and only limited resources for the management of the program and therefore had limited ability to drive stakeholders toward a joint solution. The additional considerations proposed by DHS for inclusion in the joint partnership are consistent with our results, and may merit attention as the partnership Agency Comments and Our Evaluation develops. DHS officials also provided technical comments on our draft briefing slides, which we have incorporated, as appropriate.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of the Treasury

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Linda D. Koontz, Director; John de Ferrari, Assistant Director; Shannin O’Neill; Neil Doherty; Nancy Glover; Nick Marinos; Melissa Schermerhorn; Jennifer Stavros-Turner; and Shaunyce Wallace made key contributions to this report.