Nuclear Command and Control: Current Programs and Issues
Released: 2006-05-03T00:00:00

Introduction

Directing the use of nuclear weapons is surely the gravest decision a President can make. The process established for the President to perform this function is "Nuclear Command andControl" (NC2). NC2 is defined as

the exercise of authority and direction by the President,as Commander in Chief, through established command lines, over nuclear weapon operations ofmilitary forces; as Chief Executive over all Government activities that support those operations; and,as Head of State over required multinational actions that support those operations. (1)

The infrastructure that supports the President and his Unified Command Commanders inexercising this authority is the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS). (2) The NCCS is defined as:

The designated combination of flexible and enduringelements including facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, personnel, and the structurein which these elements are integrated, all of which are essential for planning, directing, andcontrolling nuclear weapon operations of military forces and the activities that support thoseoperations. The purpose of the NCCS shall be to provide the President with all capabilities requiredto exercise his authority over nuclear weapons operations. (3)

The NCCS supports the President's constitutional responsibilities as Commander in Chiefand is part of Continuity of Government activities, and so may warrant Congressional oversight andinterest. Congress, when authorizing and appropriating funds and in its oversight role, reviewsDepartment of Defense's (DOD's) plans to sustain and modernize the NCCS. In the past, DOD hasconducted reviews of nuclear posture and systems and communicated those findings to thelegislative branch. (4) Increased momentum to implement the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) findings, as well as thepublication of DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), could provide an opportunity forCongress to revisit the structure and future relevance of the NCCS.

Today's NCCS architecture still largely bears a shape that stems from its Cold War origins,despite the 14 years since the dissolution of the USSR. However, as the threat from Russia haswaned, some analysts see the potential for nuclear challenges from China, North Korea, or Iran,which could drive a continued need for robust NC2, but possibly with a structure different fromtoday. Other analysts note that the addition of non-nuclear responses and active defenses advocatedby the 2001 NPR could drive additional complex requirements. Further, the individual platformsthat make up the NCCS serve in secondary roles that give other user agencies equities in continuedsupport for legacy systems. These equities will need to be reconciled with the recommendationsfrom the 2006 QDR to retire some of these Cold War platforms.

Despite its strategic and budgetary implications, the NCCS is often not well understood andreceives little attention from outside the military establishment. This report will describe NCCSplatforms and functions, discuss the current role of the NCCS in light of the 2001 NPR and 2006QDR, examine current issues related to the role of the NCCS from both process and technologyperspectives, and review proposed modernization initiatives.

The Nuclear Command and Control System Infrastructure

Nuclear Command and Control Platforms

The lead elements of the NCCS form the National Military Command System (NMCS). TheNMCS is "the priority component of the Global Command and Control System designed to supportthe Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their responsibilities." (5) It provides the NationalCommand Authorities (NCA) (6) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) withcommand and control of the armed forces, both nuclear and conventional. (7) The NMCS includes thefollowing command nodes and supporting components:

Figure 1. National Military Command System Nodes

Source: "National Command & Control: The National Military Command System (NMCS),"October 2001, at http://www.afcea.org/education/briefs/lublinoct2001.ppt .

National Military Command Center (NMCC) . The NMCC is the primary location for national command and control on a day to day basis. Thiscenter is staffed around-the-clock, and each "watch team" is led by a General or Admiral, known asthe "Deputy Director for Operations." Located in a shielded room in the Pentagon, the NMCC isresponsible for monitoring nuclear forces and ongoing conventional military operations, and can beaugmented by additional response cells in the event of a crisis. (8)

National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC). If ground based command centers are destroyed, the NAOC can serve as a survivable airbornebackup to the NMCC's command and control capabilities. A NAOC aircraft is always on alert, andthe mobility of this airborne platform contributes to its survivability. The NAOCs are a fleet ofmodified Boeing 747-200B aircraft, each of which can include a crew of up to 114 people, and arebased at Offutt AFB in Nebraska. Its communications, which include both Extremely HighFrequency (EHF) and Very Low Frequency-Low Frequency (VLF/LF) links, are hardened againstElectromagnetic Pulse (EMP). Although the Joint Staff tasks the aircraft, U.S. Strategic Command(USSTRATCOM) (9) provides personnel and day-to-day administration, while the Air Force's Air Combat Commandserves as the program's resource manager. (10)

Site-R . Located at Fort Ritchie, Maryland, Site-Rcan be activated from a "cold" status to serve as an alternate NMCC location. (11)

USSTRATCOM Global Operations Center(GOC). Located underneath the USSTRATCOM Headquarters at Offutt AFB,Nebraska, the GOC can serve as a back up element to the NMCS for essential emergency actions. This center also serves as the command center for the USSTRATCOM Commander, one of thefour-star-general Unified Combatant Commanders, for the day-to-day management of his forces andfor providing situational awareness. The facility is protected against EMP, and has its ownemergency power supply to enable extended operations. This facility is staffed 24 hours a day, 365days a year, with each team led by a Senior Controller who is always a full Colonel (Air Force,Army, or Marine Corps) or Captain (Navy). (12)

USSTRATCOM Airborne Command Post(ABNCP). Should the USSTRATCOM GOC be unable to fulfill its role, the E-6BABNCP can serve as a survivable airborne backup. The ABNCPs are a fleet of modified Boeing 707aircraft, each of which carries a crew of 22, which includes aircrew, communications operators, andbattlestaff personnel. Historically, each battle staff has been led by a General or Admiral, known asthe Airborne Emergency Action Officer (AEAO). This aircraft fulfills two additional key missions. As the Airborne Launch Control System (ALCS), the aircraft has the ability to communicate launchcodes directly to ICBM launch facilities to command launch, in the event that their launch controlcenters are unable to perform that function. Also, the E-6B can serve as the Take Charge And MoveOut (TACAMO) relay for Navy ballistic missile submarines. The airplane can deploy a2Â½-mile-long trailing wire antenna and communicate directives to the submarines over its VLF/LFsystem. In addition to the VLF/LF, the ABNCP can communicate using Ultra-High Frequency(UHF) or EHF satellite systems. While USSTRATCOM provides the battlestaff personnel, theaircraft, aircrew, and communications operators are from the Navy's Strategic Communications(STRATCOMM) Wing One, based at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. (13)

USSTRATCOM Mobile Consolidated Command Center(MCCC). The MCCC is a convoy of trucks that can deploy during a crisis to serveas a survivable road-mobile backup to the USSTRATCOM GOC or ABNCP. (14)

What Are the Functions of Nuclear Command and Control Systems?

The fundamental premise underlying nuclear command and control is that only the Presidentcan direct the use of nuclear weapons. (15) The Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) has evolvedto serve the President's requirements for advice and decision making for the strategic nuclear forces. Some of the major functions that the NCCS must perform include: (16)

Situation Monitoring. The external military,political, or physical environment could signal upcoming events or shape the freedom of action ofdeterrence forces. Thus, the command elements must monitor strategic intelligence, both fromclassified means and from open sources, for indicators. Most of the NCCS centers include anintelligence cell that is linked to classified national intelligence systems. This capability can helpwith anticipating crises, although sometimes 24-hour news services such as CNN are the firstindicator. Situation monitoring can also include tracking the weather, which can affect aircraftoperations.

Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment(TW/AA). Detecting and analyzing a potential attack is one of the mosttime-sensitive functions that contributes to the NCCS process. It is vital to verify quickly a missilelaunch and discern whether it is a false indication, a previously announced space launch, a potentialattack, or some other event. Next, determining the origin, size, and potential targets of the attackshould aid decision makers in shaping their response. To provide a high degree of certaintyregarding this critical information, the TW/AA centers rely on a concept called "dualphenomenology." Dual phenomenology means that two different systems, in this case satellites andradars, are used to verify an attack.

Decision Making. Doctrine recommends that thePresident consult with senior commanders in making a decision to employ nuclear weapons. Bystatute, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is the primary military advisor to thePresident ( P.L. 99-433 ). (17) The President may choose to consult with other advisors as well. The system must provide connectivity between the President, his advisors, and his nuclearcommanders, as well as continuous situation updates, so that he has the best information possibleon which to base a decision.

Force Management. Data on the readiness of thenuclear deterrent and supporting forces is important to decision makers both on a day-to-day basisand in a crisis. This data could include forces available, locations, or maintenance/supply status. This function could also include alerting forces during a crisis. The force management processcollects this information and presents it in quickly understandable formats for key leadership.

Force Direction. This function includes two keyaspects of nuclear command and control: nuclear surety (sometimes called "negative control") andpositive control. Nuclear surety comprises the controls designed to prevent unauthorized use ofnuclear weapons. Positive control describes those elements that assure instructions to launch nuclearweapons reach the forces and will be carried out if given by the President. (18) Force direction includesboth employing forces and ending hostilities.

Figure 2. National Military Command System Connectivity to the Forces

Source: "National Command & Control: The National Military Command System (NMCS),"October 2001, at http://www.afcea.org/education/briefs/lublinoct2001.ppt .

In order to accomplish these expectations in the potentially confusing and demandingenvironment of nuclear employment, the NCCS must fulfill several key attributes. Primarily, it mustbe survivable. The system may have to operate in extreme blast, heat, fallout, EMP, chemical, orbiological environments. National leadership must be able to exercise control throughout any crisis. This survivability can be achieved by hardening, mobility, redundancy, or concealment. (19)

The NCCS must also be reliable. It should support rapid connectivity between decision makersand forces during time critical events. It should work properly when called upon. It should notgenerate false alarms or pass inaccurate information. (20)

Last, the NCCS needs to be a secure system. Security limits access to these sensitive processesto those who are authorized, and it ensures the authenticity of communications. These systemsshould have protection against jamming or interference with the links between the leadership andthe forces. It is also vital to prevent hostile listening or intercept of these communications. (21) Security may be evenmore challenged as potential adversaries adopt asymmetric capabilities such as computerattack. (22)

The Current Role of Nuclear Command and Control

The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review

Nuclear command and control was highlighted as the center of the deterrence construct in theDOD's 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. (23) Congress directed this review in the FY2001 National DefenseAppropriations Act ( P.L. 106-398 , sect. 1041). The legislation required the review to include:

(1) The role of nuclear forces in United States militarystrategy, planning, and programming.

(2) The policy requirements and objectives for theUnited States to maintain a safe, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrence posture.

(3) The relationship among United States nucleardeterrence policy, targeting strategy, and arms control objectives.

(4) The levels and composition of the nuclear deliverysystems that will be required for implementing the United States national and military strategy,including any plans for replacing or modifying existing systems.

(5) The nuclear weapons complex that will be requiredfor implementing the United States national and military strategy, including any plans to modernizeor modify the complex.

(6) The active and inactive nuclear weapons stockpilethat will be required for implementing the United States national and military strategy, including anyplans for replacing or modifying warheads. (24)

On January 9, 2002, J.D. Crouch, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International SecurityPolicy, briefed the public on the unclassified aspects of the NPR report. Assistant Secretary Crouchproposed that changes in the multinational environment drove the need for the NPR. He stated thatsince the Cold War was over, there was a new relationship with Russia. The Administration wantedto encourage a positive evolution in that relationship and move away from mutual assureddestruction. (25) Heclaimed that this evolution would entail a reduced dependence on offensive nuclear forces fordeterrence. Meanwhile, he also highlighted the NPR contention that the U.S. may face multiplepolitical opponents posing newly emerging threats, particularly from the proliferation of weaponsof mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles to deliver them. (26)

DOD held that these potential new threats were difficult to anticipate, so a "capabilities basedapproach" was needed. The "capabilities based" concept strove to provide the President with a widerange of options to better tailor the national response to potential adversaries and defeat anyaggressor. The NPR embodied this approach in the architecture of a "new triad" of capabilities. (27) The first leg of the NPR'snew triad includes nuclear and non-nuclear offensive forces. Active defenses (such as interceptortechnologies) and passive defensive forces (identification and warning capabilities) constitute thesecond leg of the new triad, to increase the range of options and reduce the reliance on offensivesystems. A responsive weapons infrastructure for supporting deployed forces and developing newsystems completes the NPR's new triad construct.

The Administration places command, control, intelligence, and planning figuratively andliterally at the center of the NPR's new triad, linking its components. It envisions enhancedcommand and control to improve the precision of strike and defense forces. It also seeks acapability to plan adaptively , rapidly enabling the military to confront emerging threats, thusenhancing deterrence during crises and improving the conduct of operations. The Administrationhopes command and control advances will better integrate nuclear and non-nuclear forces to increasetheir ability to quickly respond and increase the forces' flexibility in changing situations. (28) This increased emphasison NC2 capabilities in the NPR could translate into new systems initiatives.

Figure 3: The NPR Depiction of the "New Triad"

Source: Department of Defense, "Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review," January 2,2002. http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html .

Recent Nuclear Doctrine Developments

The Bush Administration and the Department of Defense have begun implementing theframework embodied in the 2001 NPR. USSTRATCOM assumed responsibility for additionalmissions in the latest revision of the Unified Command Plan, implemented shortly after the NPR'spublication. These functions include global strike, space operations, missile defense, informationoperations, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence surveillance, andreconnaissance (C4ISR). (29) Organizational changes continued moving forward in January2005, when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld designated USSTRATCOM as the focal pointfor combating weapons of mass destruction. By September 2005, General James Cartwright, theCommander of USSTRATCOM, had established a Center for Combating Weapons of MassDestruction, in partnership with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, to execute this function. (30) These additions to theUSSTRATCOM mission portfolio institutionalized the view of the post-Cold War environmentarticulated in the 2001 NPR.

DOD has begun to incorporate the NPR thinking into its doctrinal guidance to militarycommanders. Press reports in 2005 noted that the Joint Staff was preparing an update to its"Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations," last published in 1995. These reports suggested that aspecific area of emphasis in the new doctrine is deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction andacting to prevent or retaliate against their use if required. Of interest with respect to nuclearcommand and control are the doctrine's discussion of crisis action planning and emphasis onintegrating nuclear and non-nuclear offensive forces with defensive forces. (31) However, other pressreports indicate that this draft update may have been cancelled. (32)

Reports suggest that the new joint doctrine would emphasize rapid crisis action planning torespond to unanticipated WMD threats. This concept is also a carry-over from the 2001 NPR. Crisisaction planning is defined as "...the time sensitive development of joint operations plans and ordersin response to an imminent crisis." (33) The need for rapid planning has been recognized in theconventional combatant commands for many years, while the nuclear plan has often been viewedas the product of a long term deliberate planning effort. Compressing the time required to developand disseminate plans to nuclear forces during a crisis could require further growth in computerworkstation capability and availability at the nuclear command centers. These centers must buildthese plans under time pressure and integrate these products with other military operations. It couldalso require increases in communications capacity, similar to what conventional air forces have seenwith the need to disseminate the daily Air Tasking Order in combat theaters. Networkedcollaborative planning systems are gradually becoming the norm in conventional military operations,and planners accustomed to these capabilities may desire to rely on them for nuclear planning aswell. Senior leaders are increasingly expecting bandwidth-hungry video-teleconferencing links fortheir long distance deliberations and analysis regarding proposed courses of action. Robustcommunications would be key to coordination with intelligence providers, who would need toforward frequent updates and imagery on the latest data for WMD targets.

Congress recently directed the Secretary of Defense to appoint a 12-member commission toreview implementation of the 2001 NPR. Specifically, the FY2006 Defense Authorization Actchartered this commission to study the programmatic requirements needed to achieve the NPR goals. This study would presumably include an examination of the NC2 requirements. This commissionis required to submit its report to Congress by June 30, 2007. (34) As some might argue thatthere has been only limited movement to implement the NPR's findings, this commission mightmove that debate forward.

A vital aspect that the NPR does not address is the policy for the role and uses of nuclearweapons, although it does suggest that precision non-nuclear or even "non-kinetic" weapons mightfulfill missions previously allocated to nuclear weapons and so permit a smaller arsenal. However,the continued presence of these weapons in the U.S. arsenal for the foreseeable future seems likely. An overarching approach to nuclear weapons policy could in turn determine the shape of the requiredcommand and control architecture. Assumptions, such as whether a small deterrent or largecounterforce capability would remain or whether the NC2 system would be expected to "ride out"an exchange, shape the requirements for the degree of robustness, redundancy, or survivabilityrequired.

Nuclear Command and Control Issues

Is the Cold War Architecture Still Relevant?

Today's nuclear command and control systems originated and acquired most of their presentconfiguration during the Cold War. The NORAD-Cheyenne Mountain Complex achieved initialoperational capability in 1966. (35) The first version of the E-4 National Airborne Operations Centerwas delivered in 1974. (36) The current USSTRATCOM underground command post wasbuilt between 1986 and 1989. (37) The focus of these systems was to manage a massive nuclearconfrontation with the Soviet Union. In certain aspects, these systems have changed little since theend of the Cold War and subsequent reviews of nuclear posture. As the Defense Departmentexamines difficult resources tradeoffs, it is relevant to ask, is this infrastructure still appropriatetoday? The post-Cold War environment could impose new requirements on the NCCS, that theseCold War systems might not best fulfill, and that might necessitate spending on new programs.

The nature of the threat can shape the challenges to the NC2 infrastructure. A particularproblem with respect to assuring nuclear command and control during the Cold War was the threatof a "decapitation attack." A decapitation attack would specifically target national and militaryleadership with the intent of disrupting the lines of authority required to direct a retaliation attack. This concern over decapitation was especially pervasive during the 1980s. While such an attackcould prevent a response from the deterrent force or at least blunt the cohesion of a retaliation effort,the greatest concern centered on the potential loss of political control of a conflict's escalation ortermination. Analysts argued that the nuclear command and control architecture needed to be ableto continue functioning through an attack in order to ensure government control of theweapons. (38) Thisoutlook shaped upgrades to nuclear command and control that were implemented in the 1980s, suchas increased redundancy and survivability of communication links.

The threat of such a strike from Russia today is considerably diminished compared to the ColdWar. Indeed, U.S. policy considers the relationship with Russia to be no longer adversarial. (39) The Strategic OffensiveReductions Treaty (also known as the Moscow Treaty), agreed to by Presidents Bush and Putin in2002, committed each side to reduce deployed nuclear weapons to levels between 1,700 and 2,200. Such arms levels represent a significant decrease from the tens of thousands deployed during theheight of the Cold War. (40) Therefore, in the current strategic and fiscally constrainedenvironment, is the overlapping redundancy and expense of a command and control architecturedesigned to function during a major nuclear exchange still justified?

Despite the demise of the Soviet Union, most analysts agree that the United States could facea wide range of challenges in the future. For example, there is debate regarding a potential nuclearthreat from China. (41) DOD analysts claim that overall military expenditures from the People's Republic may amount toas much as $90 billion in 2005, and could triple by 2025. Specifically, the Chinese are acquiringmore survivable systems, such as the mobile DF-31A ICBM, and currently have other ICBM systemsthat can target nearly all of the United States. Comments from General Zhu Chenghu, the dean ofChina's National Defense University, threatening that the Chinese would attack U.S. cities withnuclear weapons if the United States were to come to Taiwan's aid against China, were widelyreported in the U.S. media. (42) Peter Brooks, from the Heritage Foundation, suggested intestimony before the House Armed Services Committee that China may be striving for preeminencein the Pacific Rim and East Asia. (43)

However, other analysts, even in DOD circles, counter with a "get real" school that argues thatthe China threat is overstated. Kurt Campbell, from the Center for Strategic and Internationalstudies, suggested in testimony that the relationship with China is not the clear confrontation thatshaped the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union. Indeed, there are many areas wherecooperation characterizes the U.S. and European relationships with China. (44) Some might even arguethat highlighting a "China threat" represents the latest effort in the search for a great power peercompetitor--one that the defense establishment has not found since the end of the Cold War era,similar to the warnings about a "coming war with Japan" prevalent in the 1990s. Such a threat mightbe viewed as justifying the development of major weapons systems to satisfy the military's "comfortzone" (unlike the threat from non-state actors such as al Qaeda). Yet an increasing Chinese nuclearcapability, if accompanied by hostile relations or diplomatic crisis, could pose a renewedsurvivability threat to the nuclear command and control system.

Others analysts argue that rogue states such as Iran or North Korea, emboldened by their pursuitof nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology, pose threats that reinforce the need to preservea viable NC2 architecture. North Korea has been actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability sincethe 1960s. Pakistani nuclear scientist and black marketeer A.Q. Khan traveled to North Koreaseveral times in the 1990s and may have provided a source of information for Kim Jong Il's efforts. In February 2005, North Korea publicly announced it had nuclear weapons. However, withoutindications of a nuclear test, it is difficult to verify this claim. Based on estimates of the amount ofbomb grade fissile material that may have been diverted from North Korean nuclear reactors, RobertNorris and Hans Kristensen of the Natural Resources Defense Council place the number of NorthKorean bombs as possibly ten. It is also known that North Korea manufactures multiple variants ofSCUD type missiles, the longer range NoDong missile, and the potentially intercontinental rangeTaepoDong missiles. However, it is unclear if the North Koreans have the capability to mate anuclear weapon to these delivery systems. (45) Also, reliable information from inside the country is nearlynon-existent. In addition, post-Iraq criticisms of U.S. intelligence community assessments havemade government experts reluctant to publicly commit to estimates regarding the North Koreanprograms. Some analysts go so far as to suggest that North Korean claims to possess nuclearweapons are themselves deception efforts to bluff the United States. (46)

The Iranian nuclear program also poses dilemmas for threat analysts. The currentadministration asserts that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, and intelligence analysts project thatthe Islamic Republic is roughly ten years away from having an atomic bomb capability. (47) Other commentatorspredict that Iran might have nuclear weapons significantly earlier. Some in Israel predict an Iranianbomb within two years, while the Institute for Science and International Security says they couldhave the capability by 2009. (48) However, other analysts emphasize that engaging in nuclear fuelcycle research and development falls within the scope of work permitted Iran within NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty obligations. (49) The secrecy and concealment in which Iran has enveloped theactivities at Natanz and other nuclear sites has served to elevate suspicions. Iran also may beattempting to develop nuclear capable long range delivery systems, as evidenced by the recent testingof its 1,500 km range Shahab-3 missile and the alleged discovery of plans for a nose-cone optimizedfor a nuclear weapon. (50) Indeed, press reports have referenced an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) study thatlinks the Iranian military's study of high explosives, an essential element to constructing a nuclearweapon, to the Iranian civilian nuclear program. (51) Iran's increasingly strident rhetoric regarding the destruction ofIsrael and the United States exacerbates concerns about hostile Iranian intentions. (52)

Nations that have small nuclear arsenals could threaten disproportionate effects on U.S.infrastructure, including command and control systems, through an electromagnetic pulse(EMP). (53) A highaltitude nuclear explosion generates an electrical field, with coverage depending on the height of theburst, that causes a voltage surge in power lines and communications cables. This voltage surgewould immediately damage unprotected electronic components, such as computers or electricaltransformers, leading to the failure of air traffic control, medical care, food preservation anddistribution, or heating as the primary control computers or power systems fail. The potential resultwould be a cascading series of failures of interrelated critical infrastructure elements, similar to whatwas seen after Hurricane Katrina hit the Louisiana coast. Some argue that such a catastrophe couldlead to the deaths of thousands if not millions of people. (54) Congress chartered the Commission to Assess the Threat to theUnited States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack (or EMP Commission) to analyze and report onthe scope of the EMP threat. (55)

Some analysts argue that detonating a high altitude nuclear burst to generate EMP against theU.S. critical infrastructure might be one way that China could use its nuclear capability against theUS, rather than launching a massive strike. William Graham, who chaired the EMP Commission,noted the great interest reflected in Chinese military literature regarding EMP attack. (56) Experts also suggest thatthis could be the purpose of the nuclear and ballistic missile programs in North Korea and Iran. Itis suggested that the profile of recent North Korean and Iranian missile tests, which detonated at highaltitude and were viewed at first as failures, could indicate preparation for such a strategy. Onescenario involves launching a short range missile, such as Iran's Shahab-3, from a freighter off theU.S. coast. (57) Technology may also be emerging that enables generation of an EMP burst with more localizedeffects without detonating a nuclear weapon. (58)

Some scepticism may be warranted, however, regarding the scope of the EMP threat. Someanalysts claim that military and some commercial systems may withstand an EMP burst with onlyfew adverse effects, and that most key infrastructure would continue to function. Many key militarysystems, particularly in the area of command and control, include EMP protection. Othercommercial systems can inexpensively add EMP protection. The threat from a single weapon attackfrom a freighter off the U.S. coast, in this view, would not cause the catastrophic failures envisionedby some. (59) It mightalso be noted that the motivation for China to use EMP against the continental United States wouldbe unclear, given potential retaliatory consequences, although use against U.S. forces aiding Taiwanmight be more conceivable. Further, some analysts contend that the North Korean long rangeballistic missile program has stalled, because Russia and China have become less willing to sharekey advanced technologies with Kim Jong Il's regime. (60) Still others note that it would be extremely difficult for roguestates such as North Korea or Iran, let alone a terrorist group, to develop a nuclear weapon thatwould effectively generate the large area EMP effects postulated by some. (61) However, the EMPCommission has found that maintenance of EMP hardening and practice of EMP procedures in themilitary may have declined since the 1990s. (62) Indeed, Congress recently directed reestablishment of the EMPCommission, with an assignment to deliver a report by June 30, 2007. It was specifically tasked tolook at the vulnerability of military systems and progress on protecting these systems fromEMP. (63) Some mightview the EMP threat as supporting a continued requirement for the capabilities to be able to operatein an EMP environment instilled in the nuclear command and control infrastructure during the ColdWar.

Command and Control Issues from the 2001 NPR

Some of the new missions addressed in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, specifically theinclusion of non-nuclear responses and of active defenses, will add to the challenges for the nuclearcommand and control system. These challenges are both systematic and technical. To integratenuclear offensive forces, non-nuclear offensive forces, and defensive forces, the current commandand control system may need to be improved to take on new challenges. It may need to expand itsreach to include additional participants, such as those responsible for the non-nuclear forces ordefensive forces, in the decision making process or at least as recipients of orders. Implementationof the NPR recommendations could also drive a demand for additional capacity, in the event thatthese additional parties must participate simultaneously in key conferences. It might also force aneed for additional speed and responsiveness, as the time lines for a missile defense response maybe more compressed than for an offensive response during the Cold War.

The process for directing release of non-nuclear strikes presents one area that requires furtherdevelopment. Such responses are presumed to include conventional attacks against strategic targets usingprecision weapons or conventional ballistic missiles, and "non-kinetic options," which are taken toinclude information operations, electronic warfare, energy weapons, and even special operations forcesstrikes. (64) One question thatincluding these additional choices might pose is the determination of "release authority." As previouslymentioned, only the President can direct the release of nuclear weapons. Should the President also berequired to direct the release of these "non-nuclear" or "non-kinetic options" as well? AsCommander-in-Chief, the President is free to determine the level of detail of his involvement in thedirection of military operations. However, other than historic aberrations such as Lyndon Johnson'spersonal selection of targets during the Vietnam War, Presidents have typically not become involved inthe details of planning specific conventional missions, particularly during the course of existinghostilities. (65) The Presidentwas not involved in the building of daily Air Tasking Orders for recent campaigns against Iraq in 1991or 2003, or Kosovo. On the other hand, the targets against which USSTRATCOM might respond couldwell be presumed to have such strategic importance or criticality that they might warrant personalPresidential involvement. These strikes might also be tied to the opening rounds in the commencementof hostilities, which could invite closer Presidential participation. If one desired to require Presidentialauthorization to release these strikes, enforcement of that requirement could pose difficult technical andoperational problems. While nuclear weapons are designed with permissive action link codes to preventuse without Presidential authorization, conventional weapons are not so designed. (66) The process becomes evenmore complex, when conventional weapons are mixed with nuclear weapons on the same platform, suchas in the DOD's recent proposal to include some conventional Trident missiles on nuclear armed ballisticmissile submarines. It will be essential to ensure a process on the weapons platform that ensures onlyconventional weapons are launched if only conventional weapons are ordered to launch. (67)

The non-kinetic strikes, particularly information operations or cyber-attacks, may pose an evengraver problem. Some claim that these attacks can not only strike strategically important targets, butcould produce effects that are strategic in scope, such as shutting down a nation's electrical powernetwork. Indeed, some have expressed concern that such attacks could be the equivalent of a WMDstrike and should be treated as such. (68) Some might argue that as a consequence, the level ofPresidential involvement and control should therefore be more detailed. However, like the case withconventional weapons, technical solutions for enforcing such control have not been discussed.

Adding these non-nuclear and non-kinetic responses will also add additional participants to thecommand and control process. These participants from other communities may not have the sameingrained disciplines or be trained in the same protocols as those from the nuclear community. Ascommand and control lines of authority cross additional organizational boundaries, approvalprocesses may need to be revised so that the cycle time for decision making and implementation doesnot grow excessively. Otherwise, critical targets could be missed because it takes too much time toreach decisions or to grant execution authorities. (69)

The merging of active defenses, particularly missile defenses, into the NC2 architecture alsowill force further adaptation. As with offensive responses, it will be necessary to agree on the releaseauthority. Given what is, at this time, a limited defensive capability, (70) in some scenarios adecision could be needed on what locations to defend and what not to defend. (71) Such a grave decisionmight be viewed as requiring Presidential involvement. However, given what may be fleetingopportunities to respond within a defense system's operational "envelope," taking time to consultwith the President could lead to missing the chance to stop incoming missiles. Therefore, someanalysts recommend that missile defense release authority be delegated to the unified combatantcommander, perhaps supported with standing Presidential guidance. (72) In some cases, choosingwhether a defensive launch or an offensive strike will form the national response, and selectingamong the tradeoffs between the two, could also require Presidential consideration. It will be vitalto choreograph both the offensive and the defensive conversations, so as to accommodate decisionmaking in the limited time frames available. A successful defensive response may alter the rangeof offensive responses under consideration. Alternatively, an attack with the potential to overwhelmthe defensive system may place a higher premium on an earlier offensive response for damagelimitation. (73)

As with the inclusion of non-nuclear offensive strikes, including consideration of defensiveresponses in the decision making process after the detection of a potential attack will addparticipants, with inputs that must also be considered in the short time frame preceding impact. Ascurrently envisioned, regional combatant commanders will have responsibility for defense in theirarea of responsibility, so multiple command centers will be involved. (74) AlthoughUSSTRATCOM is tasked by DOD to take the lead on missile defense, any program will have to belinked to the systems resident in the regional combatant commands, such as USCENTCOM, orUSNORTHCOM, who will have theater missile defense responsibilities and equities in receivingwarning data. (75) General Cartwright, the USSTRATCOM commander, reportedly has given direction already to hispersonnel to ensure that the missile defense command and control systems are interoperable, withcommon technical standards and protocols. (76) As participants are added to decision conferences for missiledefense or non-nuclear offensive responses, the bandwidth demands on already strained networkswill only increase further.

As is true today for nuclear operations, the ultimate customer of any command and controlsystem that includes "non-nuclear" and defensive choices is the President. Ms. M. Elaine Bunn, aresearcher at the National Defense University's Institute for National Security Studies, points out thatthis system must be able to present these choices for Presidential decision, along with theirramifications and tradeoffs, in a manner in which they are easily understandable. It must facilitatethe Commander-in-Chief's ability to smoothly interact with all of his advisers, even aid him inknowing whom to contact for a specific question. It must aid his decisions within the tight time lineof nuclear decision making, but at the same time not overwhelm him. It will be essential to maintaintoday's tight Presidential control of nuclear weapons, as well as to ensure that the orders that reachthe weapons operators are clear and actionable. (77)

Are There Secondary Uses for Nuclear Command and Control Assets?

Beyond supporting the civilian and military leadership in the conduct of nuclear operations,nuclear command and control systems may be useful for other military and government functions,which could contribute to their continuing value. In fact, some of these systems already servemultiple missions in non-nuclear roles. The tight security, robust decision making andcommunications capabilities inherent in these platforms could make them versatile national assets.

One type of mission these systems can support is non-nuclear military forces direction andstatus monitoring. For example, the National Military Command Center (NMCC) provides 24-hourmonitoring of all worldwide military operations. In addition to support during crises and conflicts,the NMCC aids management of peacetime contingencies, such as natural disasters. A response cellor crisis action team (CAT) may be formed from members from the Joint Staff, Office of theSecretary of Defense, or other agencies to prepare orders, monitor forces, conduct staff actions, anddeliver briefings needed to respond to a developing situation. (78) Command and controlassets also supported mitigation and recovery activity after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. For example, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) command center atCheyenne Mountain, in Colorado, and the NMCC were closely involved in coordinating therestoration of normal air traffic after the attacks, when all aircraft were ordered grounded. (79)

These assets could be key tools for continuity of operations (COOP) and continuity ofgovernment (COG) during domestic contingencies or natural disasters. For example, the press hasreported that on September 11, 2001, after stopping in Louisiana to give a brief statement, PresidentBush traveled to USSTRATCOM in Omaha, Nebraska. From that secure facility, he was able toreceive updates on the evolving situation and communicate with his national security staff. (80) The press also widelyreported the President's use of the command and control assets at U.S. Northern Command tomonitor the government response to Hurricane Rita, which struck the Gulf coast in September2005. (81)

Nuclear command and control assets can serve more directly to support civil authorities forconsequence mitigation after disasters or other domestic events. In one case, the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have signed amemorandum of agreement to make the National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC), a modifiedBoeing 747-200 command and control aircraft, available for FEMA support during disasters andemergencies. While FEMA did not call on NAOC during Hurricanes Katrina or Rita, it was usedduring Hurricane Opal in 1995. (82)

Finally, senior government leadership values these systems for day-to-day support because oftheir versatile situation monitoring, communications, and tele-conferencing capabilities. The NMCCis co-located in the Pentagon, easily accessible to the Secretary of Defense and other DODleadership. Secretary Rumsfeld is also reported to have relied on the NAOC for support duringofficial travel, such as his recent trips to Iraq and Central Asia. (83)

Using NC2 assets for missions beyond those tied to nuclear forces requires balancing tradeoffs. The high value and small numbers of these assets could lead to fierce competition to share accessin the event of a crisis, potentially creating shortfalls in response plans that count on systemavailability. Tying these systems to other agency functions, such as for FEMA, adds to theorganizations that have equities in the continued viability of a given system, perhaps even after a newsystem has superseded the older system's military utility, or after the military deems the capabilityno longer to be required. This could force costs upon the military to sustain systems that are nolonger desired. Employing these platforms in secondary roles also places added burdens on theirmilitary operators. Training for, or performing secondary roles decreases the time available to ensurereadiness for primary missions. This burden increases if manpower pools shrink.

Nuclear Command and Control System Modernization

What Are Potential Nuclear Command and Control System Requirements?

Given the combination of demands on the nuclear command and control system from thechanging nature of the threat and the recommendations of the Nuclear Posture Review, whatrequirements might be considered for today's systems? In 2001, the DOD chartered a committee toconduct an "End-to-End Review of the U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System." FormerNational Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft chaired the commission, which was tasked withexamining the architecture from "national command authority to individual weapons," balancing"facilitating authorized use and preventing unauthorized use," and considering new technology andpotential threats. (84) Although the findings of this commission have been closely held, it is possible to discuss somegeneral issues.

One of the review's findings regards survivability. Many of the NC2 systems designed duringthe Cold War incorporate varying degrees of hardening against weapon effects. However, thathardening can degrade without periodic maintenance and operators' strict adherence to hardnessprocedures. The End-to-End Review claimed that the maintenance and procedural discipline forsystem hardness may have eroded since the fall of the Berlin Wall. (85)

A second report finding is related to the first. The DOD report advocated shifting NC2 systemslife cycle management to operators from the acquisition community. For example, in the case of AirForce aircraft, a single office oversees an aircraft program through request for proposals, acquisition,fielding, periodic upgrades, and final retirement. That office includes operators who work withlogistics and acquisitions experts. The End-to-End Review proposed the same model for NC2systems. Operator requirements for new capabilities are often not supported in the new systems ormodifications purchased by the acquisition community. This problem is compounded by themultiple agencies with interest or involvement in NC2 systems. (86)

However, relying solely on operator-generated requirements to guide acquisition programs mayalso be problematic. Sometimes these requirements are unrealistic. They can exceed the state of theart that is achievable within a specific program budget or time line. As a corollary, theserequirements may be achievable, but not at a cost congruent with other competing military needs. Additionally, the focus on technical capability sometimes ignores total costs of sustainment andoperation over a system's lifetime. (87) The debate regarding the interaction between meeting operatorneeds and managing acquisition programs economically is ongoing.

A third concern is the decline in the number of people with NC2 expertise. Since the end ofthe Cold War, as nuclear forces have drawn down, the number of people in these skill sets hasdeclined. Further, the prestige of being associated with the nuclear mission has also decreased. Asthe military services reduced manpower, many people with nuclear operations expertise wererequired to master multiple additional specialties, so positions associated with nuclear operationsbecame a "revolving door." As a consequence, the services have experienced a "brain drain" ofpeople with expertise in these "zero defects" disciplines. This results in "on-the-job" learning in keyNC2 positions that require a "person-in-the-loop." Such a lack of depth could hinder desiredresponses during crises. (88)

In addition to threats from potential adversaries, the legacy NC2 architecture may be challengedby the Defense Department's drive toward military transformation. U.S. Strategic Command ismoving with the rest of the defense community toward more network oriented, distributedoperations. In 2004, USSTRATCOM established several subordinate functional componentcommands dedicated to specific mission aspects. Global strike, space operations, missile defense,and information operations were the first functional components activated, recently followed by acommand for combating WMD. These multi-service organizations are also geographicallyseparated. They are the basis for decentralization of activity away from USSTRATCOMheadquarters. These organizations are part of a command move to a more horizontal andcollaborative process and away from the strict vertical and hierarchical methods of the past. (89)

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review proposes some significant changes in NC2 programsthat facilitate USSTRATCOM's move to distributed command and control capabilities as embodiedin the Joint Functional Component Commands. The QDR recommends retiring expensive, legacymobile platforms. One proposal would retire all of the E-4B NAOC aircraft and procure C-32aircraft (a modified Boeing 757 aircraft) as replacements. The NAOC capability to support FEMAwould apparently move to the E-6B aircraft, which would require additional communicationsupgrades. The USSTRATCOM MCCC would also be retired in FY2007, with the view that the newdistributed architecture fulfills the survivability requirements that the MCCC helped to fulfill. TheQDR emphasizes that these new command and control capabilities must be survivable in the eventof WMD, electronic, or cyber-warfare attacks. DOD also proposes that these systems be tailoredmore specifically to include the mission of WMD elimination. (90)

It will likely take a robust communications infrastructure to integrate the activities of these neworganizations. USSTRATCOM is studying implementation of an internet protocol (IP)-basedcommunications architecture to link these distributed locations. (91) However, using an IPnetwork in this type of application has not yet been proven to provide the high degree of assuranceof rapid message transmission needed for nuclear command and control. (92) In particular, high prioritynuclear force direction messages must have priority over other traffic, and the nature of IP routingmay not support this requirement.

Notably, the communications bandwidth which would be required for this expandedinfrastructure is already at a premium across the military. During the previous ten years, DODexperienced a 500% growth in communications capacity requirements. The need for satellitecommunications links has grown 1000% since September 11, 2001. Within the next 10 years, thatneed may grow another 2500%. (93) The nuclear community will be competing with the rest of thehigh operations tempo military for these command and control links, for which a dispersedoperations concept increases demand.

It will also be necessary to coordinate the integration of new centers and systems, such as thosefor missile defense or conventional strike, into the NC2 network. It is yet to be determined whatlevel of certification and configuration management will be required. Should it be equal to that forexisting NC2 systems, or is it sufficient to apply a standard that is less demanding but that fostersmore flexibility to modernize? Who will ensure compatibility? Reconciliation of procedures andprotocols in a distributed architecture also will be key to avoiding chaos. As more agencies gainaccess to equivalent data, the chain of command and identification of the level empowered to directaction or forces must be clearly defined and enforced. (94)

What Procurement Programs Are in Progress?

Procurement programs tied to the nuclear command and control system affecting nearly everymajor element of the NC2 architecture appeared in DOD's FY2006 and FY2007 budget requests.Most of these are upgrades and enhancements of existing systems, rather than the procurement ofnew systems.

Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network(MEECN). The MEECN comprises the physical communication links between thePresident and fielded nuclear forces. DOD sought $20.5 million for procurement and $57.3 millionin research and development (R&D) funds for FY2006 to upgrade various aspects of thisnetwork. (95) Congressfully authorized these amounts in the FY2006 Defense Authorization Act (PL 109-163). TheFY2006 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-148) funded $49 million for R&D but did not provideany money for procurement. (96) For the FY2007 budget request, DOD is seeking $3.4 million forprocurement and $64.1 million for R&D. (97) Modernization efforts within MEECN include:

High data rate terminals (the Modified Miniature Receive Terminal or MMRT)for the E-4B and E-6B command and control aircraft, replacing legacy 1960ssystems.

Upgrades of the secure computer terminals (the Defense Injection ReceptionEmergency Action Message Command and Control Terminal or DIRECT) that nuclear commandcenters use to transmit Presidential emergency action messages (EAMs) to the forces.

Improvements of the Very Low Frequency/Low Frequency (VLF/LF) andExtremely High Frequency (EHF) satellite communications (MILSTAR) to the Minuteman ICBMLaunch Control Centers (LCCs) across the upper Midwest United States (the Minuteman MEECNProgram or MMP).

Installation of VLF and EHF communications for bomber and tanker forces(the Ground Element MEECN System or GEMS), replacing legacy systems that DOD contends havebecome unsustainable.

National Military Command System (NMCS). Press reports hint that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has become personally involved indirecting upgrades to the NMCC and its alternate at Site-R. Secretary Rumsfeld has directed thatthe uniformed services consolidate their separate command centers as part of this effort. This movewould culminate in two new centers in the Pentagon: a Unified Command Center and a Resourcesand Situation Awareness Center, which between them would combine the functions of the NMCCand the military services' operations centers. These new centers would be focused on tracking crisesaround the world and on facilitating the Secretary's and Chairman's requirements to provide militaryadvice to the President. These new facilities would be more survivable against nuclear, chemical,biological, and radiological threats and more secure against intelligence gathering. This effort wouldbe timed to coincide with ongoing Pentagon renovation work, and would free up space in thatcrowded facility. The Defense Department claims the consolidation of functions will createefficiencies that allow a manpower reduction as well. The Defense Department requested just over$0.6 million to fund planning, system engineering, and configuration management for this effort inFY2006, with roughly $0.5 million needed each year through 2011. (98) Congress authorized thefull amount of DOD's request for FY2006. The FY2006 appropriation supported the full amount ofthe DOD request. (99) DOD is seeking $0.7 million for FY2007. (100)

Additionally, DOD requested $85.2 million in FY2006 to develop a future system for missilewarning and attack assessment (TW/AA) that would upgrade capabilities at NORAD in CheyenneMountain and at the USSTRATCOM Global Operations Center in Omaha. (101) These systems feedinformation to decision makers at the NMCC. Congress funded the full DOD request in the FY2006Authorization. Congress provided $74.2 million of the DOD budget request in the FY2006appropriations legislation language. (102) For FY2007, DOD is asking for $50.9 million for furtherTW/AA research and development. (103)

Airborne Command and Control. The DefenseDepartment is also requesting funds to enhance both of its airborne nuclear command and controlplatforms, the E-4B NAOC and the E-6B ABNCP (Airborne Command Post). The Air Forcerequested $85.3 million in procurement funds and $18.9 million in research, development, test, andevaluation (RDT&E) funds for the NAOC modifications in FY2006. (104) Congress authorizedthese full amounts in the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act. The FY2006 appropriationsbill funded the full amount of the DOD request as well. (105) DOD's FY2007 budget request is asking for $5.6 million forE-4B modifications procurement and only $283 thousand for R&D. (106) These requests coverimprovements to aircraft structures, propulsion, fuel systems, environmental controls, electricalgeneration, and flight safety. Specific aspects include:

Updates to replace the outdated analog audio distribution and recordingequipment with digital equipment.

Development of an "office in the sky" for senior leaders that will include secureand non-secure voice, video, and data services.

Improvements to the aircraft's on-board local area network(LAN).

Transition from analog to digital of the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) radio linkbetween the aircraft and the ground entry points for telephonecommunication.

Upgrades of the aircraft's precision navigation capability and integration withGlobal Air Traffic systems.

Proposed upgrades for the E-6B, a fleet of modified Boeing 707s operated by the Navy forUSSTRATCOM, would also affect both aircraft systems and mission systems for that platform. Thesemodifications, as requested for FY2006, would cost $11.2 million for procurement and $31.4 millionfor RDT&E. The aircraft systems modifications include improved cockpit displays, enhanced navigationand air traffic control integration systems, and a service life assessment of the airframe, which the Navymaintains has exceeded its service life based on weight and usage. Mission system improvements wouldreplace legacy computers, communication switches, and UHF communications equipment that the Navyargues will be unsupportable after 2010. (107) Congress fully supported the Navy's request for the E-6 in theFY2006 Defense Authorization Act. Congress matched the DOD request for procurement and fundedR & D at $35.5 million, higher than the DOD budget figure, in the FY2006 appropriation. (108) For FY2007, the DefenseDepartment is requesting $99.2 million for E-6 modifications procurement and $37.4 million for researchand development. (109)

Satellite Communications. The most visible andperhaps most controversial aspect of nuclear command and control modernization programs is acquisitionof the Advanced EHF (AEHF) communications satellite. AEHF will replenish the aging MILSTAREHF satellite constellation as those spacecraft reach the end of their service life. The MILSTAR satelliteconstellation, used both for strategic nuclear command and control and for tactical warfighters, currentlyhas five satellites, with the first having been launched in 1994. The AEHF system would providesurvivable, secure, anti-jam communications capabilities at higher data rates and capacities than theexisting MILSTAR constellation. Lockheed Martin and Northrop-Grumman are the satellite integrationand communications payload contractors for the AEHF program. The Air Force requested $665.3 million in RDT&E and $529 million for procurement in the FY2006 budget. (110) In the FY2006 DefenseAuthorization, Congress fully funded the Air Force budget request for AEHF. In the FY2006 Defenseappropriations legislation, Congress also matched the DOD budget request for AEHF. (111) In its FY2007 budgetproposal, DOD is not requesting any procurement funds, as it has already purchased the three satellitesproposed for the AEHF constellation. However, the Air Force is still seeking $633 million for FY2007for AEHF R&D. (112)

Unfortunately, like many Air Force satellite acquisition programs, AEHF has suffered fromschedule delays and cost overruns. (113) Technical shortfalls in the development of thecommunications encryption equipment, which the National Security Agency (NSA) must deliver asGovernment Furnished Equipment (GFE) to the satellite contractor, are a major cause of theschedule slips. The first AEHF launch is now targeted for 2008, a substantial delay from anoriginally planned late 2004 launch. Overall, the entire AEHF program is now estimated to cost over$7 billion, a 20% cost growth that forced a Nunn-McCurdy notification (114) from the Air Force toCongress. (115)

AEHF is hoped to serve as a bridge between MILSTAR and the Transformational Satellite(TSAT) program, which is expected to incorporate laser communication cross-links betweensatellites and Internet routing capability. This program would first launch in 2013, which representsa two year slip from Air Force plans due to budget cuts and immature technologies underlying itsadvanced capabilities. Some are proposing that some of these technologies be tested on AEHFsatellites first, to reduce risk on the TSAT program. (116) For FY2006, Congress considered, but did not direct the AirForce to buy an additional AEHF satellite to hedge against further TSAT program delays. Congressdid direct the Air Force to prepare an "analysis of alternatives" report examining the possibility ofacquiring additional AEHF satellites and modifying the Wideband Gapfiller satellites to bridge thegap in the event of further TSAT delays. (117) In the FY2006 Defense Appropriations Act, Congress reducedthe funding for TSAT by $400 million and directed the Air Force to focus on technologydevelopment, rather than transitioning to an acquisition program. Congress approved $436-plusmillion, but reserved $120 million for either purchase of a fourth AEHF satellite or continuedsystems development for TSAT, based on the outcome of the analysis of alternatives study. (118)

Issues for Congress

The increased demands on the nuclear command and control system driven by the 2001 NPRand subsequent DOD policy will pose challenges for the NCCS in the future. The system's legacyCold War architecture will compete for budgetary priority against conventional systems that mayseem to some to be more immediately relevant to today's threat environment and the war on terror. Whether the threat that should shape the NCCS comes from China (or some other nuclear armedpeer competitor), rogue states, or terrorism, some suggest there is continued value in this robustsystem. Others may argue that the system's continued value lies in its ability to fulfill missions oftenviewed as subsidiary or even beyond the traditional DOD purview. However, the key functionsperformed by the NCCS will likely remain requirements as long as the United States maintains anuclear deterrent.

The DOD continues to pursue modernization initiatives across the system, but in a budgetconstrained environment these activities will come under competing pressure from moreconventional missions. Through the FY2007 budget request, the Defense Department has continuedto focus on evolutionary upgrades of the Cold War NCCS architecture. However, USSTRATCOM'sactivation of functional component commands, and some recommendations in the 2006 QDR couldsignal a change in direction. Questions Congress may confront include:

What is the nature of the threat? Some schoolsof thought contend that China is rising to be the US's next military peer competitor, while otherscontend that China is growing to be a partner in the world community. The extent of the threat fromNorth Korea, Iran, or terrorist organizations, whether from a nuclear strike or from an EMP attackare also subject to debate. The capabilities posed by these potential threats may present a "worstcase" against which to configure the nuclear command and control system.

What is the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy and howmight that role affect command and control? There is competition between thosewho believe the role of nuclear weapons should be reduced to give non-proliferation effortscredibility, and those who want to increase their utility to confront proliferators. The role of theweapons will shape the command and control system to support them.

What is the appropriate architecture for theNCCS? Is the current, centralized, linear system developed during the Cold Warstill the right approach to ensuring Presidential positive control and minimizing command andcontrol confusion? Revisions to the NCCS architecture may need to incorporate the additional 2001NPR-driven command and control requirements for non-nuclear offensive responses and activemissile defense. A debate and possibly legislation regarding release authorities may need to precedesuch architectural decisions. Perhaps a more dispersed approach, such as USSTRATCOM nowproposes, may be a better fit for the current threat environment. That approach might also conveymanpower and budget economies in the long run. However, applying a distributed, network styleapproach to nuclear command and control has not yet been tested or proven.

What level of investment in modernization or new procurementis needed or justified? All of the NCCS modernization or procurement initiativesdiscussed above are projected to continue for years into the future. The continued implementationof the 2001 NPR and the findings of the 2006 QDR may adjust or add to those requirements. Theretirement of the E-4B NAOC and MCCC may offer some opportunities for short term savings. Asall of the services look to recapitalize equipment after the wear and tear from duty in Iraq, the NCCSwill be competing against immediate day-to-day services' needs. Are the existing NCCS platformsadequate to requirements? Are they still needed?

What value are the secondary uses of the NCCS? The NCCS represents a national asset built up over decades. Can the taxpayer get added value byemploying these capabilities for ancillary functions? As homeland security missions and domesticdisaster response receive greater government attention, some platforms that already provide supportin these areas have the potential for even greater utility. Do those functions justify continuedinvestment if their primary mission requirements are superseded? If so, should the procurement andoperation of these systems be transferred to civilian agencies?

Appendix A: Nuclear Command and Control Platforms and Programs

Appendix B: Acronyms