Bosnia and Kosovo: U.S. Military Operations
Released: 2004-02-16T00:00:00

U.S. and Allied Participation in Bosnia Peacekeeping (IFOR/SFOR)

IFOR/SFOR Mission

Before February 1993, the Clinton Administration steadfastly refused to contribute ground forces to UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia. It then adopted a policy to provide troopsto oversee implementation of an overall peace settlement. With the 1994 peace negotiations atWright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton OH, Administration officials began to lay out theirrationale and initial planning for U.S. participation in a NATO-led peace implementation force(IFOR) for Bosnia. Administration officials argued that U.S. participation with ground forces wasnecessary for two main reasons: 1) the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serb negotiators all made U.S. groundforce participation a condition of their accepting any peace settlement; and 2) U.S. participation wasnecessary for the United States to maintain a leadership position in NATO. President Clintonsubsequently emphasized a moral responsibility to aid in ending the savagery of the Bosnian conflict.

On December 14, 1995, the Presidents of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia signed a peace agreement in Paris. In brief, the military elements of the agreement, in addition to establishing IFOR andgranting it full authority and freedom of movement to enforce the agreement, called for: 1)withdrawal of forces behind cease-fire lines within 30 days, with a demilitarized zone (DMZ) of fourkilometers; 2) withdrawal of heavy weapons and personnel to barracks; 3) provision of informationon personnel, weaponry, and landmines; 4) arms reduction negotiations under the auspices of theOrganization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE). All these objectives have beencompleted.

To enforce the military provisions of the Dayton agreements, NATO sent the Intervention Force or (IFOR), which comprised approximately 54,000 ground troops in Bosnia proper. That forcedesignation lasted until December 20, 1996, when it was changed to Stabilization Force (SFOR). This reflected the decision by NATO's members that the Bosnia deployment should not have aspecified end-date, but rather that its duration would be tied to successful accomplishment of DaytonPeace Accord provisions. Though the SFOR operations have U.N. Security Council authorization,there is no "dual-key" command relationship with the United Nations.

SFOR's mission, as defined by NATO HQ, is "to provide a continued military presence in order to deter renewed hostilities, stabilize and consolidate the peace, and thus contribute to a secureenvironment and provide and maintain broad support for civil implementation plans." Toaccomplish this mission, NATO has identified key military and supporting tasks, as follows. Keymilitary tasks are:

Maintain a deterrent military presence.

Prevent major hostilities or removal of weapons fromcantonment.

Operate the Joint Military Committees.

Contribute to a secure environment for civil organizations to carry out theirresponsibilities.

Ensure force protection and freedom of movement.

Ensure compliance with the cease-fire and the demilitarized Zone ofSeparation.

Monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the DaytonAccords.

Enforce the rules and procedures covering Bosnia-Herzegovina airspace.

Among key supporting tasks, to be undertaken within the capabilities and at the discretion of SFOR, are:

Provide, on a case-by-case basis, support to the High Commissioner.

Support the implementation of the arbitration decision concerning the contestedBrcko Corridor. Support the conduct of elections and installation of electedofficials.

Support the return of displaced persons, but not forcibly return them or guardspecific locations.

Support the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal, the Organization forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe, and the International Police Task Force.

Supporting tasks have become the primary focus for SFOR operations, given that the military provisions of the Dayton Accords continue to be observed. The International War Crimes Tribunalrequested and received protection for its investigators and for suspected war crimes sites. SFOR alsoagreed to detain suspected war criminals, if encountered, but until late 1997 declined to participatein pursuit operations. This refusal to take more effective action to apprehend suspected warcriminals led to continued criticism from the War Crimes Tribunal and human rights advocates. Those who favored greater action stressed the importance of supporting the International War CrimesTribunal and the destabilizing influence of Karadzic and other Serb and Croat extremists. Since1997, SFOR has played a more active role in detaining indicted suspects. Additional detentions andvoluntary surrenders, perhaps encouraged by NATO's greater involvement, have resulted in over halfof those indicted for war crimes currently being in custody. Former Bosnian Serb leaders Karadzicand Mladic, however, remain at large.

Duration of NATO Bosnia Operations. In late 1996, the lack of progress in civilian reconstruction and continued friction among the ethnic factions,including within the Muslim-Croat Federation, led to the widespread belief that some NATOmilitary force would be required beyond IFOR's December 20, 1996 mandate. These concerns ledNATO's political leaders to authorize the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December, 1996, to lastuntil June 1998. By the end of 1997, there was little optimism that Bosnia would have a viablenational state or economy by that time. (1) Fragilegovernment institutions and continued ethnicantagonisms lead most observers to believe that an international military force of substantial size willbe necessary in Bosnia for perhaps years, if further internecine warfare is to be averted. Some, suchthe former High Representative Carl Bildt, have suggested the permanent stationing of NATO troopsin Bosnia because they believe the region's conflict to be the single greatest threat to contemporaryEuropean security, and hence should be a long-term NATO concern. While not accepting thisposition, in March 1998, NATO foreign ministers re-authorized SFOR, and tied the duration of itsdeployment to the achievement of specified benchmarks of success in implementing the DaytonAccords.

NATO leaders hope that tying withdrawal to demonstrable political and administrative progress will encourage more widespread cooperation in implementing the Accords. Those who endorse anextended SFOR believe that a return to ethnic warfare in Bosnia holds greater dangers for U.S.security interests than the prospect of continued U.S. deployments in the region. They also point outthat Bosnia is the type of mission for which NATO is supposedly shaping its forces after the collapseof the Warsaw Pact, and the inability or unwillingness to bring a lasting peace to Bosnia would bringNATO's credibility into question.

Some of those opposing extended operations in Bosnia question whether the Dayton Accords are, in fact, a workable basis for Bosnia's future, and suggest they are rather a settlementinternationally imposed with inadequate indigenous support. There has been a concern in Congressabout the United States being drawn into a military commitment without a foreseeable end.Reflecting this, the FY1999 DOD Authorization Act ( P.L. 105-261 ) contained several "sense of theCongress" provisions, and established extensive reporting requirements for both the President andthe Secretary of Defense regarding Bosnia operations. Among these provisions are:

1)U.S. ground forces should not remain in Bosnia indefinitely, and that the President should work with SFOR nations to allow the U.S. to withdraw its ground forces; 2) aNATO-led force, without U.S. ground troops, might be suitable for continued operations, and theUnited States might supply intelligence and logistical support, and a "ready reserve force in theregion".

Semiannual presidential reports providing: 1) the expected duration ofdeployment; 2) the percentage of Dayton Accord "benchmarks" achieved and the time forcompletion of those remaining; 3) the status of the paramilitary police force; 4) a detailed discussionof the specific missions undertaken by U.S. forces, including cost estimates and an assessment ofthe risks involved; 5) a joint assessment by the Secretaries of Defense and State of the planning forEuropean assumption of SFOR operations.

Costs. Each nation contributing to IFOR/SFOR bears the cost of its own deployment and operations. Prior to IFOR/SFOR, DOD carried out airsupport and maritime intercept operations in conjunction with U.N. peace-keeping efforts and theU.N. arms embargo. FY1996 saw the introduction of U.S. ground forces into Bosnia, and theconsequent increase in incremental costs reflected in Table 1. The term "incremental costs" refersto those costs over and above those of normal day-to-day DOD peacetime operations.

These costs have been covered through a combination of DOD annual budget appropriations, supplemental appropriations, transfers between budget accounts, and re-programmings within DODOperations & Maintenance and Military Personnel accounts. To remain within the limits of thebalanced budget agreement, the supplemental appropriations have been sometimes offset byreductions in other elements of the DOD budget. The Administration requested that theFY1998/FY1999 funding for Bosnia be "emergency" appropriations, which under the balancedbudget agreement raised the cap on both defense spending and total discretionary spending. TheAdministration justified this on the grounds that Bosnia costs were not included in the calculationsfor the balanced budget agreement. For the previous three years, however, Congress had directedthat the costs of military operations in Bosnia be provided within the annual caps for defensespending. Departing from this position, the FY1999 DOD Authorization Act granted the emergencyappropriations status. It capped spending of FY1999 funds for Bosnia operations at $1,858,600,000,thus prohibiting DOD from exceeding Administration-projected expenditures without congressionalaction. The FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act ( P.L. 105-277 ) provided the Administration's fullsupplemental request for Bosnia operations as an emergency appropriation. Funding for Bosnia forFY2000 and FY2001 was provided through normal appropriations to the Overseas ContingencyOperations Fund, as indicated in Table 1 .

Beginning with the FY2002 budget, both the Bosnia and Kosovo operations are no longer funded through the Overseas Contingency Fund, but rather through the individual service budgets.

Table 1. DOD Incremental Cost of Bosnia Operations, FY1992-2002 (in $ millions)

Source: Department of Defense

* Other Bosnia-related Operations include: Able Sentry (Macedonia preventative deployment), Deny Flight/DecisiveEdge/Deliberate Forge (air support), Sharp Guard ( maritimeintercept), and Provide Promise (humanitarian relief).

IFOR/SFOR Force Components. DOD has scheduled the major unit rotations for SFOR through May 2005, should the deployment last thatlong. Six of the eight 6-month long rotations will be commanded by National Guard Divisions, andall will include National Guard and/or Army Reserve units. The parent units involved are:

10/03-04/04 - 34th Infantry Division (Minnesota NG)

04/04-10/04 - 38th Infantry Division (Indiana NG)

10/04-04/05 - 42nd Infantry Division (New York NG)

The current U.S. SFOR contingent in Bosnia is about 1,800. U.S. forces are headquartered in the Tuzla area in eastern Bosnia. British forces are headquartered in central Bosnia at Gornii Vakuf,and French forces in Mostar. Other national contingents are subordinated to these three majorcommands, all of which serve under a NATO commander, who is based in Sarajevo. The fullStabilization Force numbers about 12,000 troops.

The troop requirements for Iraq military operations have intensified pressure to speed the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and encourage the European NATO allies to assume full responsibilityfor Bosnia operations, with the U.S. supplying intelligence, logistical, and other support -- but noground troops. The NATO allies have responded that by pointing out that non-U.S. forces currentlycomprise almost 80% of SFOR. They further emphasize that continued U.S. presence in the Balkansis fundamental to the continuance of the operations. The Bush Administration has indicated that,although there will be no unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the Balkans, consultations regardingcontinued U.S. participation will be on-going with the NATO allies. Discussions among NATOdefense ministers in February have indicated that the number of SFOR troops will be reduced byabout one-third during 2004, and that it is now expected that the European Union (EU) will assumeresponsibility for Bosnian peacekeeping operations in 2005. The EU contingent will comprise bothmilitary and police personnel, and is likely to be somewhat smaller than SFOR.

U.S. and Allied Peacekeeping in Kosovo

Background

Once an autonomous province of the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo has a 90% ethnic Albanian population. It nevertheless holds an emotional place in Serbian nationalist tradition. As part of hisnationalist program, Yugoslav President Milosevic revoked Kosovo's autonomous status, puttingit under control of the Serbian-dominated Belgrade government. An armed ethnic Albanianresistance movement developed, led by the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army. The Belgradegovernment responded in early 1998 with counter-insurgency operations, with Yugoslav military ground units and aircraft destroying villages, and executing civilians suspected of supporting theinsurgents.

In 1998, NATO political leaders turned their attention to the Kosovo region because of the flow of refugees into Western Europe and Albania (itself destabilized by regional uprisings in 1997), andconcerns about the conflict spilling over into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(FYROM). FYROM, an independent nation bordering Kosovo to the southeast, also has a largeAlbanian population alienated from its central government.

In May 1998, the North Atlantic Council, NATO's governing body, directed accelerated assessment of "a full range of options with the mission of halting or disrupting a systematiccampaign of violent repression in Kosovo." Options considered included; 1) preventativedeployments in Albania and FYROM to stabilize the borders; 2) declaration of no-fly/no tank zonesin Kosovo and enforcement of them with NATO air forces; 3) direct military intervention eitherthrough airstrikes or ground troops deployments; and 4) peacekeeping deployments in the event ofa political resolution.

On September 24, 1998, NATO defense ministers authorized an "activation warning" for limited air strikes and a phased air campaign in Kosovo. On October 12, NATO defense ministersauthorized an "activation order," placing the necessary forces under the NATO command. Thefollowing day, it was announced that U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke had negotiated an agreementwith Serbian leader Milosevic that postponed the threat of airstrikes if the Serbian government 1)would reduce its troops and security forces in Kosovo to "pre-crisis" levels; 2) permit unarmedNATO reconnaissance flights over Kosovo; 3) accede to an international force of 2,000 unarmedcivilian monitors to oversee the ceasefire; and 4) begin meaningful negotiations towards Kosovarautonomy.

Meaningful negotiations never took place, owing to recalcitrance on both sides, and sporadic violence continued, with increasing reports of Serbian executions of Albanian civilians. NATOallies were concerned over the escalating violence and its possible spread to other areas of theBalkans. On January 30, 1999, the NATO allies authorized Secretary-General Solana to orderairstrikes anywhere in Yugoslavia, if the warring Serb and Albanian factions had not reached a peacesettlement by February 20. The "Contact Group," an informal forum of representatives from theUnited States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia dealing with Balkan crises,devised a framework for a peace settlement. They did not wish to encourage continued fighting forKosovar independence, but rather sought a settlement that would restore Kosovo's autonomy withinYugoslavia. However, the Serb government did not agree to the framework, the so-calledRambouillet Agreement, and the talks adjourned.

NATO Offensive Military Operations

During March 1999, Yugoslav Army and paramilitary Ministry of Interior troops moved out of garrison in Kosovo in violation of the October agreement, and about 20,000 additional Serb troopsmassed at the northern Kosovo border. With violence against ethnic Albanian civilians escalating,on March 24, NATO began airstrikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo. These airstrikes were thefirst military offensive action undertaken by NATO without specific U.N. endorsement. U.N.Security Council approval was not sought because both Russia and China, each with veto power onthe Council, opposed the use of force to resolve the Kosovo crisis. The September 23, 1998 U.N.Security Council resolution, which called for the immediate withdrawal of Serbian security forcesfrom Kosovo, did, however, reference the U.N. Charter's Article VII, which permits military forceto maintain international security.

NATO defined five conditions for ending its air campaign:

Cessation of Serb operations against the Albanians in Kosovo;

Withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo;

Acceptance of Kosovar democratic self-government;

Acceptance of a NATO-led peacekeeping force; and

Return of Kosovar refugees.

On May 6, 1999, at the G-8 economic summit, another set of principles for a peace settlement were agreed upon by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Canada, Italy,and Russia. These G-8 principles were:

Immediate end to the violence.

Withdrawal of all Yugoslav military and other securityforces.

Deployment of UN- endorsed international civil and securitypresences.

Interim international administration with U.N. Security Councilapproval.

Return of all refugees, and access for aid organizations.

Substantial self-government for Kosovo.

Economic development of the region.

On June 4,1999, the Yugoslav government accepted the provisions of the G-8 peace plan, and on June 9 NATO and Yugoslav military officials signed a Military-Technical Agreement (MTA)which provided for the phased withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces form Kosovo by June 20, 1999,and detailed the authority of the KFOR commander to enforce the peace agreement with all meansnecessary. On June 10, 1999, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution (No. 2580),endorsing the peace-keeping mission under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.

The Air Campaign (Operation Allied Force). OnMarch 24, 1999, NATO began air operations, code-named Operation Allied Force, against targetsprimarily in Serbia and Kosovo. DOD defined the mission as attacking the Yugoslav militaryinfrastructure with the objective of deterring future attacks on Albanian Kosovars and degrading theability of Yugoslav forces to carry out these operations. Target selection focused on airfields, airdefense and communication centers, military barracks, and some equipment production facilities.Attacks then extended to logistical support facilities and lines of resupply, Yugoslav ground forcesin Kosovo, and the national electrical and television systems. In total, NATO aircraft flew over35,000 sorties (1 aircraft flight), about one-third of which were strike sorties, launching about 23,000munitions.

NATO HQ acknowledged that the air campaign did not impede the Serb operations to drive the Albanian population from Kosovo. The inability to stop Serb operations brought strong criticismof the decision to launch the air campaign while completely ruling out any use of ground forces. Aside from official NATO and Administration spokesmen, few, if any, observers believed that airpower alone could achieve the desired objectives. Press reports indicated that NATO politicalleaders were cautioned of an air campaign's potential shortfalls, but believed that their domesticpublic opinion would not support a ground invasion of Kosovo. It was then perceived as a choicebetween "do nothing" or proceed with air strikes. Some also suggested that in the wake of the 1991Persian Gulf War, some advocates have overemphasized the capabilities of air power, encouragingthe belief that ground forces are no longer as crucial to achieving military objectives.

There was also criticism that "command by committee" hampered NATO military leaders' ability to wage an effective, rapidly responsive campaign. Target lists, weapons used, and forcesdeployed were all subject to prior approval by all NATO governments. This slowed decision-making, constrainedoperations, and sometimes emphasized political over military considerations. However, NATO officials maintain that SACEUR received all resources requested, and emphasizedthat this consensual process was critical to ensuring the cohesion of the alliance. A morefundamental criticism is that the air campaign's actual objective from the start was political, notmilitary -- i.e., to bring President Milosevic back to the bargaining table. This, in turn, contributedto a constrained, incremental approach to targeting.

After the air operation, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Gen. Wesley Clark, and the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee Gen.Klaus Naumann all recommended that NATO's decision-making processes for conducting a militarycampaign be examined and, in some way, streamlined. None, however, offered specific suggestions,noting that any changes made would have to gain and sustain acceptance by all NATO members. NATO's current structure and procedures were created to deal with homeland defense againstinvasion. Out-of-area operations like Allied Force present different political constraints and militaryrequirements. Some have suggested greater delegation of authority to NATO's Supreme AlliedCommander, Europe once the alliance has made the decision to carry out a military operation. However, within an alliance of democracies which maintains full consensus as a fundamentalprinciple, this approach has not achieved acceptance. In addressing this issue, Gen. Clarkemphasized that, structural reforms aside, "there has to be a strong political consensus founded ona common perception of military doctrine to overcome the obstacles we hit in the air campaign". (2) In responding to the critics of the air campaign, Gen. Naumann has noted that NATO planned fora limited operation from the outset, and made this fact public, while President Milosevic "plannedfor a war." Naumann also observed that NATO threatened military action, without having aconsensus on how it would be carried out, thereby precluding its military commanders' use of"overwhelming force from the beginning." (3)

In the wake of the Yugoslav acceptance of NATO peace conditions, supporters of reliance upon NATO airpower believe they have been vindicated in their approach. They emphasize that NATOsustained no combat fatalities in the course of the 78-day campaign, and that the completewithdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo was achieved. The air campaign' critics, however,point to the fact that it did not prevent the temporary expulsion of almost the entire Albanianpopulation of Kosovo.

The Department of Defense Joint Staff provided the following statistical summary of the 78-day air campaign:

Total sorties: 37,200

U.S.: 23,208 (62%)

Allies: 13,992 (38%)

Strike sorties: 9,500

U.S.: 5,035 (53%)

Allies: 4,465 (47%)

Intelligence/reconnaissance sorties: 1,200

U.S.: 948 (79%)

Allies: 252 (21%)

Support sorties: 26,500

U.S.: 17,225 (65%)

Allies: 9,275 (35%)

On October 14, 2000, Secretary Cohen and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Shelton provided the Senate Armed Services Committee with DOD's initial "lessons learned" observations. (4) Among the issues addressed, were the following:

Parallel U.S. and NATO command and control structures complicated operational planning and maintenance of unity of command. Disparities between U.S. capabilitiesand those of allies, including precision strike, mobility, and command, control, and communicationscapabilities impeded U.S. ability to operate at optimal effectiveness with NATOallies.

DOD needs to develop options for earlier and more efficient use of its reserveforces.

DOD systems for planning and executing transportation of its forces werestrained by the rapidly evolving requirements.

The heavy commitment of NATO's air defense suppression forces indicatesthe need to find innovative and affordable ways to exploit our technological skills in electroniccombat.

Success using the latest generation of air-delivered munitions systems inKosovo validates plans to increase inventories.

Task Force Hawk (U.S. ground troops in Albania) pointed out the need toregularly experiment with the independent use of key elements of all of our forces without theirusual supporting elements.

Improved unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) mission planning, improvedprocesses for interaction between UAV operators and manned aircraft, frequent and realistic trainingopportunities, and equipment upgrades for individual UAVs all would benefit forceeffectiveness.

Humanitarian operations highlighted the importance of such resources aslinguists and civil affairs personnel, engineering assets capable of emergency repair of roads andbridges in very austere environments, detailed maps, and prepositionedstocks.

It is unclear to what extent NATO members have undertaken to address these concerns. For the U.S. part, some of these issues have again been highlighted by military operations in Iraq, e.g.,transportation of forces and equipment, improved UAV capabilities, and the importance ofhumanitarian/civil operations capabilities.

Ground Force Operations -- KFOR (Operation Joint Guardian). . Because air operations did not stop Serb operations against KosovarAlbanians, public discussion of NATO ground force intervention was widespread. U.S. and NATOspokesmen continued to maintain there was no intention to introduce ground troops without "apermissive environment." In the latter weeks of the air campaign, the British government began topush for ground intervention, but was unable to win the support of other alliance members. ThoughPresident Clinton and others publically made the point that no option was permanently "off thetable". and NATO HQ re-examined the military requirements for an invasion of Kosovo and evenSerbia, at no time did there appear alliance-wide support of offensive ground operations. Indeed,several member governments, particularly Greece, Italy, and Germany were publicly adamant in theiropposition.

With the Yugoslav acceptance of the peace plan devised by the G-8, the focus turned to Operation Joint Guardian , the peace-keeping mission to be undertaken by KFOR. To facilitate thisoperation, NATO obtained the Yugoslav acceptance of a Military-Technical Agreement (MTA)prepared by NATO on June 9, 1999. The United Nations Security Council passed a resolution(S/RES/1244) endorsing the peace plan and an "international security presence" in Kosovo for itsenforcement.

KFOR did not begin deploying into Kosovo until June 12, 1999, reportedly waiting tosynchronize its deployment with the withdrawal of Serb forces in order to avoid co-mingling forces. This delay, however, allowed time for a 200-strong contingent of Russian troops to leave their SFORstation in Bosnia and occupy the airport in Pristina, Kosovo's capital. Reportedly planned by theRussian General Staff, and endorsed by president Yeltsin, to ensure Russia a high-profile role inKFOR. This action occasioned high-level U.S.-Russian negotiations. An agreement reached on June18, 1999 provided for shared control of Pristina airport operations, with Russian participation inairport ground operations and air operations under KFOR control and deployment of Russian troopsin the U.S., German, and French sectors. These troops were under a unified KFOR command, witha Russian general officer at KFOR HQ. Once initial tensions dissipated, KFOR commanderspraised the Russian troops for their professionalism and cooperation. Russia ended its participationin KFOR operations in 2003, owing to domestic financial constraints.

The KFOR Military Technical Agreement with the Belgrade government affirms the terms of the peace plan, and provides specific details of its implementation. Some of the main provisions are:

KFOR will deploy and operate without hindrance.

KFOR has the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintaina secure environment, and to carry out its mission, the KFOR commander has the right to compelthe removal or relocation of forces and weapons, and to order the cessation of any activities thatpose a potential threat to KFOR, its mission, or a third party. Failure to comply will result in militaryaction, including the use of necessary force.

KFOR has the right to monitor and inspect all facilities or activities that mayhave a police or military capability, or are deemed otherwise relevant to compliance. The KFORcommander is the "final authority" for the interpretation of the MTA.

Air and Ground Safety Zones will extend 25 and 5 kilometers respectively beyond the borders of Kosovo, and no Yugoslav forces, aside from local police, may enter thesezones without KFOR permission. All Yugoslav military, paramilitary, and police forces will conducta phased withdrawal from Kosovo, to be completed by June 20, 1999.

Yugoslav forces will mark and remove all mines, booby traps, and obstaclesas they withdraw. A subsequent, separate agreement will address the return of "agreed Yugoslav andSerb personnel."

On June 20 1999, NATO announced an agreement with the Kosovo Liberation Army for its phased disbanding. The presence of armed KLA guerillas has given KFOR some concerns, andKFOR has disarmed KLA groups that could have presented a threat to security. In thedemilitarization agreement, the KLA agreed to:

Renounce the use of force and comply with KFOR and U.N. Interim Civil Administration directives. Refrain from hostile or provocative acts, including reprisals ordetentions.

Acknowledge KFOR's use of necessary force to ensurecompliance.

Not carry weapons in specified areas.

In an attempt to involve former KLA personnel in positive activities, NATO and U.N. officials agreed to the creation of the Kosovo Corps. NATO and the U.N. intend the 3,000-strongorganization to be a uniformed civilian force to deal with emergency situations such as forest fires,search and rescue, and reconstruction. Some KLA leaders see the Kosovo Corps as the nucleus ofa future Kosovo army, a view rejected by NATO and U.N. officials.

U.S. and Allied Force Contributions. Of the almost 22,000 troops stationed with KFOR, the United States is providing about 2,100 or 11%. DOD scheduled the major unit rotations for KFOR through May 2005, should the deployment lastthat long. The parent units involved are: 1st Cavalry Division (11/03-05/04); 3rd InfantryDivision(05/04-11/04), and 101st Airborne (11/04-05/05). With the bulk of these units' personnel involvedin rotations for Iraq, however, DOD has not indicated how this might effect deployments to Kosovo.

Costs of Operation Allied Force/Joint Guardian. Within NATO, each nation participating in Operation Allied Force assumed the cost of its ownoperations. NATO does not provide estimates of the overall cost of the operation or of the cost ofeach member's contributions. (5) (Individual nationsalso assume the full cost of the deployments insupport of on-going KFOR operations.

In April 1999, the Clinton Administration submitted a $6.05 billion emergency supplemental appropriation request to cover military operations in Kosovo and continuing air operations inSouthwest Asia during FY1999. On May 18, 1999, the House approved a House-Senate conferenceagreement on H.R. 1141 , providing $14.9 billion in FY1999 supplementalappropriations. On May 20 1999, the Senate concurred and it was signed into law ( P.L. 106-31 )on May 21. Of this, only $10.8 billion was actually defense-related, and included funds for itemsother than Kosovo operations such as a military pay raise, military construction, training, andequipment/munitions procurement. The Administration's funding request assumed offensivemilitary operations against Yugoslavia through September 1999. With the campaign ending in June,DOD calculated its actual FY1999 incremental costs to be $3.0 billion, and the remainder of theappropriated supplemental were re-programmed.

The Administration's FY2000 budget request contained no funds for combat or peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. The House Armed Services Committee expressed its concern that under orunbudgeted contingency operations have diverted funds from "quality of life, readiness, andmodernization" programs. Seeing no funds budgeted for Kosovo operations in FY2000, and seekingto ensure that incremental Kosovo-related costs would be dealt with only through specific budgetedaccounts or supplemental appropriations, the Committee inserted a provision in DOD's authorizinglegislation ( H.R. 1401 ) prohibiting the use of any funds authorized by the legislationfor military operations in Yugoslavia. On June 9, during consideration on the House floor,Representative Skelton introduced an amendment removing this provision. Upon receiving writtennotice from President Clinton stating that if military readiness were to be harmed by on-goingoperational requirements, he would submit a FY2000 budget amendment request, the House agreed(270-155) to remove the funding prohibition. A $2 billion supplemental appropriation for Kosovowas subsequently included in the FY2001 Military Construction Act ( P.L. 106-246 ). From FY2002-FY2004,Congress has appropriated approximately $2.8 billion for Kosovo operations.

Beginning with the FY2002 budget, both the Bosnia and Kosovo operations are no longer funded through the Overseas Contingency Fund, but rather through the individual service budgets. Consequently, published DOD budget documents do not provide a separate accounting for theseoperations.

Considerations for Congress

At the outset of military operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo, congressional reaction wasmixed. In both cases, resolutions in favor and in opposition to participation passed either the Houseor Senate; but no legislation authorizing or prohibiting U.S. participation passed both chambers.Appropriations for these military operations were never denied, though extensive reportingrequirements often conditioned the funding. (6)

If current intentions are carried out, NATO forces - including U.S. troops - will be completely withdrawn from Bosnia by the end of 2004 and replaced by a European Union force of both policeand military personnel. With that withdrawal, a close monitoring of the EU's mission performanceand Bosnia's political stability would appear to be the primary remaining concerns.

While NATO troops may withdraw from Bosnia, there appears to be no time line for a withdrawal from Kosovo. A continued NATO military presence in Kosovo will probably remainuntil the province's political future is determined, and perhaps for a period thereafter. Whether theNATO contingent need continue to include U.S. troops is, however, open to question. Thepossibility remains that the European Union could eventually assume peace-keeping responsibilitiesin Kosovo also; however, that is unlikely to occur until its performance in Bosnia is evaluated.

Recent Legislation

P.L. 108-384

To authorize appropriations for FY2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense,and for military construction, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 2004, and forother purposes. Signed into law November 24, 2003.

P.L. 108-87

Making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year 2004, and for otherpurposes. Signed into law September 30, 2003.

Additional Reading

CRS Reports

CRS Report RL31053 , Kosovo and U.S. Policy .

CRS Report RL30906(pdf) , Bosnia-Herzegovina and U.S. Policy .

CRS Issue Brief IB94040, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement .

World Wide Web Sites

BosniaLink (DOD) -- http://www.dtic.mil/bosnia/

KFOR Headquarters -- http://www.nato.int/kfor/welcome.html

NATO Headquarters -- http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press.htm