Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities
Released: 2009-03-02T00:00:00

Letter

Background

According to IAEA, between 1993 and 2006, there were 1,080 confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking and unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. Eighteen of these cases involved weapons-usable material—plutonium and highly enriched uranium—that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon. IAEA also reported that 124 cases involved materials that could be used to produce a device that uses conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a “dirty bomb”). Past confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking in highly enriched uranium and plutonium involved seizures of kilogram quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material but most have involved very small quantities. In some of these cases, it is possible that the seized material was a sample of larger quantities available for illegal purchase. IAEA concluded that these materials pose a continuous potential security threat to the international community, including the United States.

Nuclear material could be smuggled into the United States in a variety of ways: hidden in a car, train or ship; sent through the mail; carried in a private aircraft or small boat; carried in personal luggage through an airport; or walked across the border. In response to these threats, U.S. agencies—including DHS, DOD, DOE, and State—fund, manage, and implement programs to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries and the United States. DOD, DOE, and State are responsible specifically for the overseas programs. Many of these programs started operations prior to DNDO’s creation and collectively cover all of the geographic regions of the global strategy. (See fig. 1.)

For example, DOE’s Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting program, initiated in 1995, provides support to the Russian Federation and other former Soviet Union countries to secure nuclear weapons and weapons material that may be at risk of theft or diversion. In addition, during the 1990s, the United States began deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in countries of the former Soviet Union. DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program was established in the early 1990s to help address proliferation concerns in the former Soviet Union, including helping secure sites where nuclear weapons are located. Two other DOD programs have provided radiation portal monitors, hand-held equipment, and radiation detection training to countries in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Similarly, DOE’s Second Line of Defense program, initiated in 1998, supplies radiation detection equipment, training, and communication systems to Russia and other countries. DOE’s Megaports Initiative, also part of the Second Line of Defense program, began in 2003 and is focused on providing radiation detection systems at major international seaports. Once the equipment is installed, it is then operated by foreign government officials and port personnel working at these ports. State also has programs that provide radiation detection equipment and training to numerous countries.

Domestically, DHS, in conjunction with other federal, state, and local agencies, is responsible for combating nuclear smuggling in the United States and has provided radiation detection equipment, including portal monitors, personal radiation detectors (known as pagers), and radioactive isotope identifiers at U.S. ports of entry, as well as in other settings. For example, DHS has equipped Coast Guard boarding and inspection teams with portable detection systems and has provided equipment, training, and assistance in other maritime, air, and land venues. In addition, DOE has programs to secure nuclear and radioactive sources domestically. For example, the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction program recovers and manages excess and unwanted radioactive sources that belong to U.S. licensees. In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as well as 35 states that have signed an agreement with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, are responsible for regulating the security of radioactive and nuclear materials within the United States through its Radiological Materials and Reactor Security Programs.

Several types of radiation detection equipment are used by CBP, the Coast Guard, and other agencies involved in radiological and nuclear detection activities: radiation portal monitors, radioactive isotope identification devices (RIID), and personal radiation detectors, among others. Portal monitors are stationary or mobile pieces of equipment that can detect radioactive materials carried by vehicles or transported in cargo containers. RIIDs are a type of handheld radiation detection equipment that can detect radiation as well as identify the specific isotope of the radioactive source. Personal radiation detectors are worn by CBP officials, Coast Guard boarding teams, and other law enforcement agents. Unlike portal monitors and RIIDs, personal radiation pagers function primarily as personal safety devices to alert the individual wearer when he or she is exposed to an increased level of radiation. Under certain circumstances these devices also could be used to detect smuggled nuclear material. However, they can only indicate variations in the general level of radiation and their sensitivity is limited because of the small size of the detector. Therefore, they should not be relied upon for that purpose.

All radiation detection devices have limitations in their ability to detect and identify nuclear material. Detecting attempted nuclear smuggling is difficult because many sources of radiation are legal and not harmful when used as intended. These materials can trigger alarms—known as nuisance or innocent alarms—that may be difficult to distinguish in some cases from alarms that could sound in the event of a true case of nuclear smuggling without a thorough secondary inspection. Nuisance or innocent alarms can be caused by patients who have recently had cancer treatments, a wide range of cargo with naturally occurring radiation (e.g., fertilizer, ceramics, and food products), and legitimate shipments of radiological sources for use in medicine and industry. Additionally, detecting actual cases of illicit trafficking in weapons-useable nuclear material is complicated: one of the materials of greatest concern in terms of proliferation—highly enriched uranium—is among the most difficult materials to detect because of its relatively low level of radioactivity.

DNDO is currently testing the next generation of radiation portal monitors—the advanced spectroscopic portal monitor, or ASP. We have repeatedly raised concerns about DNDO’s efforts to develop and test ASPs. Specifically, we found that testing of ASPs at DOE’s Nevada Test Site did not represent an objective or rigorous assessment because DNDO used biased test methods that enhanced the apparent performance of the ASPs and did not test the limitations of the ASPs’ detection capabilities. In 2008, we also found that DNDO’s cost estimate to equip U.S. ports of entry with radiation detection equipment is unreliable because it omits major project costs and relies on a flawed methodology. Furthermore, the agency is no longer following the original project execution plan, the scope of the agency’s current ASP deployment strategy has changed, and DNDO now plans a much more limited deployment of the ASP than initially proposed. The current ASP testing is expected to continue into 2009.

DNDO Is in the Early Stages of Enhancing Domestic Initiatives for Nuclear Detection

DNDO’s ultimate goal is to expand radiological and nuclear detection capabilities to areas identified as vulnerable to nuclear smuggling. To that end, in 2005, DNDO identified critical gaps in domestic efforts to prevent and detect radiological and nuclear smuggling, including, but not limited to: (1) land border areas between ports of entry into the United States, (2) aviation, and (3) small maritime craft. However, DNDO is still in the early stages of developing initiatives to address these vulnerabilities, and it has not clearly articulated a long-term plan for how to achieve its goal of closing these gaps by expanding radiological and nuclear detection capabilities in the time frames identified.

Land border areas between ports of entry. The United States has more than 6,000 miles of land border susceptible to illegal crossings by people and vehicles. DNDO began addressing this gap in 2005 and currently is jointly working with CBP to equip Border Patrol agents—who are responsible for patrolling the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico—with portable radiological and nuclear detection equipment by 2012. Portability is critical to strengthening radiation detection efforts because it expands the opportunity to detect a potential radiological threat should a Border Patrol agent encounter one. To date, as part of a phased approach, DNDO and CBP have tested and evaluated radiation detection equipment and CBP developed operating procedures for using the equipment and resolving radiation alarms along the southern U.S. border. However, similar tests along the northern U.S. border have been postponed. Specifically, DNDO and CBP originally scheduled equipment testing along the southern border for January 2008 and along the northern border for March 2008. However, they did not actually begin testing along the southern border until May 2008. According to a CBP official, DNDO explained that this schedule slip was caused by a delay in selecting the equipment for the test. DNDO told us that it chose to conduct an additional review of commercially available detection equipment before field testing, which caused these tests to be delayed. As a result of preliminary findings from the field tests, DNDO and CBP decided in November 2008 to indefinitely postpone the previously scheduled tests along the northern border. According to these agencies, the preliminary test results indicated that further technological improvements will be necessary before the portable radiation detection equipment can be distributed more widely for use in this environment. Full distribution of equipment along the land border areas between ports of entry is contingent on completing these field evaluations and entails providing detection equipment and operating procedures to all 20 Border Patrol sectors across the United States. Assuming no further schedule and technological delays, the radiation detection equipment to help secure the U.S. land border areas between ports of entry may not be fully in place until fiscal year 2012. According to DNDO, the agency requested a total of $33.6 million in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 for such initiatives, but it has not estimated the total cost for this effort beyond those years.

One of DNDO’s roles in supporting the effort to close gaps in the land border area between ports of entry is to procure and supply detection equipment to CBP. However, according to CBP officials, in fiscal year 2008, DNDO did not procure needed radiation detection equipment in a timely manner. Specifically, CBP’s Office of Field Operations—responsible for official ports of entry—and its Office of Border Patrol requested approximately 240 additional RIIDs. However, according to CBP officials, DNDO did not fill its procurement needs. As of November 2008, only 64 of the 240 devices requested had been delivered to CBP. This situation is particularly problematic for the Border Patrol because its agents do not have enough RIIDs to meet their current patrol needs, according to a Border Patrol official.

Aviation. Because nuclear weapons and material can be small and portable enough to be carried on most aircraft, CBP, with the support of DNDO, has been working on initiatives to screen all incoming international planes, cargo, and passengers. Although progress has been made on screening international general aviation, many of the other initiatives are either in their initial phases or still on the drawing board and it is unclear how long it will take or how much it will cost to complete these initiatives. In fiscal years 2008 and 2009, DNDO has requested a total of $35 million for aviation-related activities; however, it has not estimated the costs of these initiatives beyond the near term.

Since December 2007, CBP has been screening 100 percent of arriving international general aviation aircraft (approximately 400 flights per day) for radiological and nuclear material. According to DNDO officials, such efforts are being included in the strategy for the first time. To assist with the international general aviation initiative, DNDO managed the testing and evaluation of radiation detection devices in close coordination with CBP officials to ensure that the technology and operating procedures would be consistent with CBP’s responsibilities to screen all aircraft arriving from outside the United States. Specifically, in 2008, DNDO, in partnership with CBP, tested portable radiation detection equipment for use in scanning small, medium, and large international general aviation aircraft and assessed whether CBP screening procedures needed to be modified.

While CBP has made progress in ensuring that appropriate operating procedures for using the equipment and resolving radiation alarms are established and all international general aviation is screened, its other aviation initiatives have not proceeded as smoothly or have not yet begun. CBP is working with DNDO on an initiative to screen international air cargo for radiological and nuclear material and has chosen Dulles International Airport as the first location for this screening. According to DNDO, this airport was chosen first because it has one gate through which all cargo travels. However, because both international and domestic cargo pass through this gate, the start of operations was delayed until September 2008 due to jurisdictional issues between CBP and TSA—CBP is responsible for screening international cargo for radiological and nuclear material and TSA for scanning domestic cargo for explosives. The two agencies had to reach an agreement allowing CBP to screen all cargo for radiological and nuclear material, regardless of origin. (Fig. 2 shows cargo moving through a stationary radiation portal monitor at Dulles International Airport.)

In October 2008, we visited Dulles to observe this operation, including a demonstration of radiation detection capabilities. CBP sent a vehicle containing a small sample of Cesium-137—a radiological material that is considered a highly attractive source for the purpose of a radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb—through the detection equipment. Cesium-137, which is generally in the form of a powder similar to talc, is highly dispersible. CBP uses this sample to routinely test equipment. However, the detection equipment failed to sound an alarm until the material had passed through it for a third time. CBP officials told us that this source material triggered an alarm during a test earlier that week, and attributed the problems with this demonstration to either the shielding of the source material by the vehicle or to a weak signal given off by the material because it may be nearing the end of its usable life.

CBP plans to have cargo screening at the 30 U.S. airports that account for 99 percent of incoming international cargo by 2014. However, because cargo processing at Dulles is simpler than at other airports, due to the configuration of its cargo area, CBP officials acknowledged that their plan is very ambitious. According to CBP officials, expanding the cargo screening initiative to larger, more complicated airports will require CBP to devise different operational procedures and possibly develop new detection technology. DNDO and CBP also plan to cooperate with other federal agencies on an initiative to screen passengers and baggage from international commercial flights. However, according to DNDO, it is still working on the basic approach for this initiative, such as where to locate passenger and baggage scanning equipment in an airport. To date, DNDO and CBP have initiated a pilot program for screening international passengers and their baggage at airports. In fiscal year 2008, they completed site surveys at five airports in order to develop requirements for testing planned for fiscal year 2009.

Current aviation initiatives focus on radiation detection both prior to departure from a foreign location and after the aircraft lands in the United States. Ultimately, DNDO and CBP would like the detection of radiological and nuclear materials to occur as far outside of U.S. borders as possible— at the point of departure instead of the point of entry. For example, rather than screening international general aviation once the plane arrives in the United States, it would be preferrable to screen the plane at the country from which it departs. However, such a strategy would rely on negotiating agreements with foreign governments, which could prove challenging given concerns about sovereignty and rights of access. Furthermore, DNDO officials were uncertain when and if agreements could be reached with enough foreign governments to establish a more effective aviation strategy. As of December 2008, DHS has concluded agreements with Ireland and Aruba to include radiological and nuclear screening of international general aviation aircraft in these countries.

Small maritime vessels. A Coast Guard analysis revealed that small boats pose a greater threat for nuclear smuggling than transporting illicit material in shipping containers, according to a senior Coast Guard official. These small boats, which include maritime craft less than 300 gross tons, number in the millions. DNDO efforts related to radiological and nuclear detection on small maritime vessels are part of a larger DHS effort—the Small Vessel Security Strategy. This strategy recognizes a number of risks that small vessels pose, including serving as a vehicle to smuggle weapons or terrorists into the United States, and using the boat itself as an improvised explosive device. DHS is working to develop a Small Vessel Security Strategy implementation plan, which will, among other things, identify needed research, development, and testing, and recommend actions for future efforts and put the strategy into action. To address one of the vulnerabilities, DNDO has been working since 2005 with multiple federal agencies, including the Coast Guard and CBP, as well as state and local agencies, to develop and expand capabilities to detect radiological and nuclear materials that could be smuggled on small maritime craft. Coast Guard and CBP are responsible for developing the screening procedures and making decisions about what vessels are to be screened; DNDO provides the radiological and nuclear detection equipment. Coast Guard and DNDO have entered into a Joint Acquisition Strategy to update the current Coast Guard detection technology inventory, as well as to acquire new equipment if necessary.

There are a number of challenges associated with radiological detection capabilities in the maritime environment that have limited DNDO’s ability to roll this initiative out widely. Specifically, these agencies have a pilot project underway in Puget Sound, Washington, to field-test equipment and develop standard operating procedures for detecting and interdicting radiological and nuclear materials on small vessels. DNDO chose Puget Sound because of its proximity to Vancouver, Canada, the host of the 2010 Winter Olympics; its military and economic significance; and the large number of commercial and recreational vessels. DNDO is also expanding this pilot to San Diego, California, where it has conducted an initial assessment of the area and briefed officials about the program. DNDO selected San Diego as a pilot location because of its proximity to Mexico, geographic configuration, and many military facilities. DNDO is currently in the first year of a 3-year pilot program; the Puget Sound and San Diego operations are scheduled to be completed in December 2010. According to DNDO’s data for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, the agency requested $14.7 million for the pilot project and a total of $54.2 million for these and other maritime initiatives.

One significant challenge in developing maritime radiological and nuclear detection efforts is sustaining them beyond the original pilot projects; DNDO has not yet developed plans for doing so. In addition to the Coast Guard and CBP, state and local governments play a key role in maritime law enforcement activities. For example, in Puget Sound, the majority of the law enforcement personnel and equipment available for radiological and nuclear detection belong to the 15 state, tribal, and local agencies participating in the pilot. However, these agencies generally have limited resources, making it difficult to expand their mission to include radiological and nuclear detection. Furthermore, these agencies have competing demands and could choose to fund other priorities. Although DNDO is providing these agencies with the initial equipment, support, training, and maintenance during the Puget Sound and San Diego pilots, it is expecting them to seek funding from federal grant programs to sustain these initiatives. For many state and local agency officials we spoke with, the uncertainty of federal resources jeopardizes their ability to continue radiological and nuclear detection activities. According to one local sheriff from Washington state, if funding to maintain and support radiation detection equipment provided during the pilot disappears, his department will not continue radiological and nuclear detection activities.

Other state and local agencies participating in the Puget Sound pilot also emphasized the difficulty in keeping personnel trained on detection equipment without additional federal support beyond the current pilot project. Because maritime law enforcement personnel may not frequently need to use the equipment, future training is necessary to ensure that that they maintain their skills. However, without the additional resources currently provided by DNDO, state and local agencies would have difficulty covering the costs associated with ongoing training, including overtime salaries for personnel who have to take on the regular duties of those being trained.

Given these state and local concerns, DNDO’s strategy for sustaining such programs appears problematic. According to DNDO officials, sustaining the existing pilot programs will be the responsibility of the local jurisdictions through a well-established federal grants process. Specifically, DNDO anticipates that funding for these programs will come from Homeland Security grants, Urban Areas Security Initiative grants, and the DHS Port Security Grant Program. However, DNDO currently does not have a plan detailing which locations it would target next for the maritime program, nor has it estimated the total cost of this initiative.

According to DNDO officials, the office has focused first on just two locations in order to determine whether maritime screening of small vessels for radiological and nuclear material is feasible and to gather lessons learned that can be used to minimize challenges and develop operating procedures for using the radiation detection equipment and resolving radiation alarms in other areas. However, DNDO has not established criteria for assessing the success of this pilot effort to help determine whether it should be expanded to other locations. Should its concept for detecting and interdicting radiological and nuclear material smuggled on small maritime vessels prove feasible, DNDO plans to develop guidance so that state and local law enforcement agencies can implement their own maritime radiological and nuclear detection programs.

In addition, unlike radiation detection technology for land or aviation, technology in the maritime environment is relatively undeveloped and poses unique challenges. For example, the level of background radiation in water differs from the level of background radiation on land, which affects the capability of equipment to detect and identify certain types of radioactive material. Furthermore, the equipment needs to be water resistant and designed so that it can be used by agents who need their hands free to board and climb around ships. To date, DNDO has, among other things, tested boat-mounted radiation detectors, detection equipment that can be carried in a backpack, and handheld radiological detection and identification devices that can withstand exposure to water. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment in the maritime environment remains limited. For example: The boat-mounted radiation equipment is unable to indicate the direction of the radioactive material causing the alarm, making it difficult to identify the potential threat in an open sea with many small vessels, according to a local law enforcement officer we spoke with. CBP Air and Marine officers also expressed uncertainty about how boat-mounted detection equipment, which has been tested only in a fairly controlled lake environment, will work in a more turbulent open sea environment, where it is more difficult to detect and determine radioactive material. DNDO officials told us that a fiscal year 2009 initiative will assess boat-mounted detection systems in real-world environments.

The backpack radiation equipment works best when physically worn by someone, according to a DNDO official. However, Coast Guard officers already have a difficult time maneuvering through the small passageways on boats with the current equipment they must wear. (Fig. 3 shows a Coast Guard officer wearing standard boarding team equipment, without a backpack.) The backpacks have the potential to further decrease officers’ maneuverability and their ability to inspect boats.

If a hand-held radiological detection and identification device is accidentally dropped overboard, it does not float and can withstand being submerged under only 30 feet of water. These handheld devices cost $15,000 per unit, making them expensive to replace.

DNDO has also delayed in rolling out radiation detection equipment to the agencies engaged in its maritime initiatives. Although federal, state, and local agencies in the Puget Sound pilot determined their equipment needs in April 2008 and submitted this request to DNDO, they have received little equipment. According to a DNDO official, DNDO was slow to process the order and once it was placed, the manufacturer was unable to fill the order in a timely manner and did not immediately notify DNDO of this delay. According to DNDO, once it was notified of the delay from the vender, it borrowed units from the Coast Guard so that the pilot could proceed. Of the 362 personal radiation detectors ordered, 95 had been delivered as of October 2008. However, the order may not be completely filled until early 2009.

DNDO, in coordination with the Coast Guard, the New York City Police Department (NYPD), and other state and local agencies, is also engaged in maritime nuclear detection activities in the New York City area as part of the Securing the Cities initiative. This initiative is intended to enhance protection and response capabilities in and around high-risk urban area by designing a system to detect and interdict illicit radioactive materials that may be used as a weapon. As with the Puget Sound pilot, the agencie involved in the initiative’s maritime activities do not presently have enough equipment to meet their needs, according to officials particip ating in the Securing the Cities initiative. For example, the Coast Guard has one boat, with radiation detection equipment provided by DOE, and the NYPD has two boats with radiation detection equipment. However, NYPD officials told us that the NYPD has another 28 boats that need to be equipped with radiation detection technology and these equipment purchases depend on the availability of future federal grant funding.

DNDO Has Limited Role in Influencing U.S. Efforts to Combat Radiologi and Nuclear Smuggling Ov

lthough DNDO has no authority over other federal agencies’ programs to A combat radiological and nuclear smuggling overseas, it has exchanged lessons learned with DOD, DOE, and State and provided technical expertise on radiological and nuclear detection equipment. Howeve r, most of DNDO’s efforts are modest in scope and reflect the fact that DOD, DOE, and State have well-established programs to combat nuclear smuggling overseas. DNDO officials told us that their efforts to develop a more comprehensive approach to global nuclear detection are very comple because each agency has a distinct area of authority. Areas in which DNDO has been able to contribute to other agencies’ overseas progra include the following: DOD. DNDO has been working with DOD, among other agencies, to develop radiation detection equipment and to minimize duplication o f research efforts. For example, DNDO and DOD are collaborating throu the National Institute for Standards and Technology to develop interagency standards and common practices for testing and eva radiation detection systems. These standards will be threat based and wi state the minimum detection capability that certain radiation detection systems should have to perform their purpose.

D addressing gaps in DOE’s overseas radiation detection programs that are similar to those DNDO has been working on domestically. For example, DOE’s Second Line of Defense program had focused more on placing fixe detectors at particular sites. However, as a result of DOE’s review of its existing nuclear detection programs and its discussion with other agencies, including DNDO, DOE officials told us the agency has be work with law enforcement officials in other countries to improve detection capabilities for the land between ports of entry. DOE officials OE. DNDO has been collaborating with DOE to develop strategies for gun to said they also are considering assisting other countries with the implementation of mobile detection technologies, similar to thos domestically by CBP. DNDO and DOE also are exchanging lessons learn from both agencies’ efforts to screen aviation, specifically the development of standard operating procedures for using hand-held radiation detection equipment. tate. DNDO is working with State on the Global Initiative to Combat S Nuclear Terrorism—which provides 75 countries with an opportunity t integrate resources and share information and expertise on nuclear o smuggling prevention, detection, and response—to develop model guidelines that other countries can use to establish their own nucle detection strategies. DNDO sponsored a Global Initiative workshop in March 2008 to help 25 countries develop a draft of the model guidelines document. This document, among other things, is intended to raise awareness about the elements of an effective nuclear detection strat and build consensus for its implementation. In addition, DNDO personne have traveled with officials from State to countries involved in the department’s Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, a program to a ssess and improve the capabilities of countries to combat smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials, in order to provide advice to these countries on how to build their own capabilities to counter nuclear smuggling. DNDO also helped State develop questions that these countries could use to assess their own vulnerabilities.

In addition to providing the U.S. government agencies engaged in international nuclear detection programs with knowledge gained f domestic nuclear detection initiatives, DNDO has been directed by thes agencies to develop an inventory of radiation detection equipment deployed overseas. In a March 2006 report, we recommended that S tate, working with DOD and DOE, create, maintain, and share a comprehensiv list of all U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment provided to foreign governments. In December 2006, State, in coordination with DOD, DOE , and DHS, issued a strategic plan giving DNDO responsibility for gathering data on the deployment of radiation detection equipment overseas, including portal monitors and handheld devices. As part of DNDO’s efforts to develop the global strategy for nuclear detection, it is charge d with maintaining this database, share information from it at interagency e meetings, and provide other relevant government agencies with access to the database. According to DNDO, it collected information on radiation detection equipment from DOD, DOE, and State most recently in 2007 and is updating some of the information in 2008 and 2009. A DNDO official also said that the agency analyzed these data to determine the proximity of radiation detection equipment to areas with nuclear facilities.

A Total of $2.8 Billion D Was Budgeted in Fiscal Year 2007 f Programs Associated with Detecting Radiological an d Nuclear Materials

HS, DOD, DOE, and State budgeted a total of $2.8 billion in fiscal year 2007 for the programs included in the global strategy for radiological and nuclear detection, according to DNDO. Nearly the same amount of funds— $1.1 billion—were budgeted for programs and activities to (1) combat nuclear smuggling overseas and (2) detect nuclear materials primarily a U.S. borders and ports of entry; a smaller portion was budgeted for cross- cutting programs. By agency, the majority of 2007 budgeted funds for the global strategy for radiological and nuclear detection went to DOE— 62 percent. Although DNDO has detailed information on the budgets fo r various security and detection programs, it is not using this information t coordinate with other agencies on the overall strategic direction of these detection efforts.

Amounts Budgeted for Programs to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Overseas and to Detect Nuclear Materials Primarily at U.S. Bo and Ports of Entry Were Nearly the Same

According to our analysis of DNDO’s data, of the approximately $2.8 billion agencies budgeted in fiscal year 2007, about 39 percen t went to combat nuclear smuggling overseas, while 41 percent went to programs to detect and secure radiological and nuclear materials at and within U.S. borders; another 20 percent went to programs that cut across foreign an domestic activities. Figure 4 shows budgets by program focus and by agency.

Table 1 shows the allocation of these funds by programs to combat nuclear smuggling overseas and within the United States. ajority of the budget for programs to combat international nuclear Programs to combat nuclear smuggling overseas. DOE received the m smuggling—$737 million (or approximately 67 percent) of the $1.1 bill total in fiscal year 2007. For all the agencies, the international program s are largely intended to secure nuclear and radiological materials at their source or detect them in transit. By agency, key programs include the following: DHS budge provides multidisciplinary teams—agents, intelligence analysts, and CBP officers—to selected foreign seaports in order to protect the United Sta from potential terrorist attacks using maritime cargo shipments and to help secure the primary system of containerized shipping for international trade. Another DHS program, the Secure Freight Initiative, is importa to the global strategy for nuclear detection because it provides foreign countries with radiation scanning systems for containers at ports of departure and communications infrastructure to transmit radiological a nuclear material data to the United States. This program is designed t the feasibility of 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound container cargo at seven overseas seaports and involves the deployment of integrated scanning systems, consisting of radiation portal monitors and RIIDs. ted $139 million for its Container Security Initiative, which At DOD, 98 percent of its budget for combating nuclear smuggling o Reduction Program—a program that protects national security by reducing the present threat and preventing the proliferation of weapons o mass destruction. The Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security Progr a budget of $92.8 million to enhance Russia’s security systems at nuclear weapons storage sites and capability to account for and track nuclear weapons scheduled for dismantlement. The Proliferation Prevention Initiative had a budget of $32.4 million to help countries of the former Soviet Union prevent the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction o r related materials across their borders; this initiative provides equipmen logistics support, and training. Finally, the Nuclear Weapons verseas went to three programs that are part of the Cooperative Threat t, Transportation Security Program had a budget of $32.7 million to enhance safe and secure transport of nuclear weapons from operationa l sites and storage areas to enhanced security storage sites and dismantlement sites throughout Russia.

At DOE, two progra b Protection, Control, and Accounting Program had a budget of $414 million. This program provides support to the Russian Feder and other countries of the former of Soviet Union to secure nuc weapons and weapons material that may be at risk of theft or diversion from their current location. Second, DOE’s Second Line of Defense— a cooperative assistance program for deploying radiological and nuclear detection systems and associated training at international border crossings, airports, and seaports—had a budget of $183 million. ms account for about 81 percent of the department’s udget to combat nuclear smuggling overseas. First, the Materials State budgeted approximately $42 million for its Export Control a R weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and conventiona weapons by assisting recipient countries in detecting, deterring, preventing, and interdicting illicit trafficking in weapons and weapons- related items. The program is also designed to provide a wide ra nge of assistance and support, such as offering licensing and legal and regulato technical workshops, and providing detection equipment and training for border control and enforcement agencies. elated Border Security program to help stem the proliferation of Programs to combat radiological and nucl U DOE received most of the budget for programs to combat radiological and nuclear smuggling domestically—$871 million (or 76 percent) of the $1.1 billion budgeted in fiscal year 2007. By agency, key programs include the following: ear smuggling at and within .S. borders. As with programs to combat nuclear smuggling overseas, At DHS, the Advanced Spectroscopic Portals/Radiological Portal Monitors program had a acquisition, and deployment of these technologies to ports of entry. The Securing the Cities initiative, with a fiscal year 2007 budget of $8.47 million, is intended to enhance protection and response capabilities in a around the nation’s highest risk urban areas. Starting with New York City the department will work with state and local officials to develop urb an and regional deployment and operations strategies, identify appropriate detection equipment, establish the necessary support infrastructure, and develop incident management and response protocols. In addition, DHS budgeted $1.1 million for the West Coast Maritime Radiation Detection Program, which is evaluating general radiation detection capabilities to be deployed aboard Coast Guard or other law enforcement vessels that participate in vessel-boarding activities. budget of $209 million to provide systems development, DOD budgeted $1.6 million for domestic radiation detection programs with $1.1 million directed to its Radiation program uses the best available detection technologies to prevent or mitigate the effects of radiation exposure on Pentagon personnel and structures. The remaining funds were budgeted for the department’s Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense, which installed radiologica nuclear sensors at Camp Lejeune.

At DOE, $846 million (or 97 percent) of the $871 million budgeted to combat nuclear smuggling went to S ecurity Program, which is intended to protect DOE’s critical assets— nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, special nuclear mate classified information, and DOE facilities from such threats as terrorist activity, theft, diversion, loss, or unauthorized access. the Nuclear and Radiological Materials Cross-cutting activities that simultaneously support multiple program DHS had nearly half of the $577 million budgeted for cr activities—about $271 million. By agency, key programs include the following: s.

At DHS, the Human Portable Radiation Detection System had a budg $18.1 million to support the development of detection systems and the acquisition of advanced, hand-held radiation detectors. In addition, DHS budgeted about $11 million for the Technical Reachback Program, which provides technical assistance to help personnel operating radiation detection equipment identify the source that triggered the alarm. Finally, the Joint Analysis Center had a budget of $1.75 million to collect and notify appropriate federal, state, and local agencies as early as possi ble of radiological and nuclear threats and coordinate technical support to federal, state, and local authorities.

DOD budgeted $94.5 million of the $137 million of its funds budgeted for cross-cutting programs to support it s Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. These 55 teams are deployed nationwide to support civil authorities during domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives incidents. In addition, the Nuclear Detection Technologies Division of DOD’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency was budgeted $28 million in fiscal year 2007 to develop technologies to detect, locate, and identify radiological and nuclear weapons and materials to support search and interdiction missions.

DNDO’s Joint Annual Interagency Report Is Not Used for Analysis or to Focus Nuclear Detection Priorities

In July 2007, Congress passed the “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,” which required DHS, DOD, DOE, the Department of Justice, and the Director of National Intelligence to coordinate the preparation of a Joint Annual Interagency Review of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. DNDO collected these program- level budget data in response to a statutory requirement that select agencies, including DHS, DOD, DOE, and State, annually assess their capacity to implement their portion of the global nuclear detection strategy. DNDO issued this report in June 2008 after gathering data from relevant agencies on programs and budgets in support of each layer of the global nuclear detection effort. The report provides an overview of the global nuclear detection strategy and discusses programs and budgets for combating nuclear smuggling domestically and overseas.

DNDO has collected these data since 2006. It used these data to identify areas in which new domestic initiatives may be needed. For example, in the most recent review, DNDO said that programs focused on the land border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and maritime pathways will need to grow substantially in the years ahead. However, the Joint Annual Interagency Review does not serve as a tool to analyze nuclear detection budgets across agencies in order to ensure that the level and nature of resources devoted to combating nuclear smuggling are going toward the highest priority gaps and are aligned with the overall strategic direction of global detection efforts.

Agency officials said that their program decisions and budget requests are primarily guided by their agencies’ mission-related needs, rather than by the overarching goals and priorities of a broader, more comprehensive global detection strategy. In addition, DOD, DOE, and State officials told us that the information in the review is primarily used to provide agencies and Congress with an overview of already established programmatic roles and responsibilities across the range of programs to combat nuclear smuggling. Finally, agency officials told us that they do not use the specific budget data included in the Joint Annual Interagency Review to help determine whether funding levels are reasonable in terms of individual agency or governmentwide needs.

DNDO Has Not Yet Implemented Recommendation from July 2008 Testimony

In July 2008, we testified on the preliminary findings of our work. Specifically, we found that while DNDO’s initiatives are a step in the right direction for improving the current efforts to combat nuclear smuggling, they are not being undertaken within the larger context of an overarching strategic plan. Although each agency with a role in combating nuclear smuggling has its own planning documents, an overarching strategic plan is needed to guide these efforts to address the gaps and move to a more comprehensive global nuclear detection strategy. Our past work has discussed the importance of strategic planning. We have reported that strategic plans should clearly define objectives to be accomplished, identify the roles and responsibilities for meeting each objective, ensure that the funding necessary to achieve the objectives is available, and employ monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and identify needed improvements. For example, such a plan would define how DNDO would monitor the goal of detecting the movement of radiological and nuclear materials through potential smuggling routes, such as small maritime craft or land border areas in between ports of entry. Moreover, this plan would include agreed-upon processes and procedures to guide the improvement of the efforts to combat nuclear smuggling and coordinate the activities of the participating agencies.

DNDO agreed with the need for an overarching strategic plan and believes that many elements of such a plan exist in DHS and other agency documents, but noted that solutions for addressing gaps and vulnerabilities are still under development. As of December 2008, DNDO had not yet established detailed plans to address those gaps and vulnerabilities, nor had it integrated all the plan elements into an overarching strategic plan, as we recommended.

Conclusions

Preventing terrorists from obtaining and smuggling radiological or nuclear material into the United States is a national security imperative. DNDO has an important and complex task in this regard—develop a global nuclear detection strategy to combat nuclear smuggling and to keep radiological and nuclear material and weapons from entering the United States. However, DNDO has not yet taken steps to work with DOE, DOD, and State to develop an overarching strategic plan, as we recommended in July 2008. Given the national security implications and urgency attached to combating nuclear smuggling globally, we continue to believe that such a plan needs to be established as soon as possible. Without an overarching plan that ties together the various domestic and international efforts to combat nuclear smuggling and clearly describes goals, responsibilities, priorities, resource needs, and performance metrics, it is unclear how the strategy will evolve or whether it is evolving in the right direction.

While DNDO has gathered useful program and budget information in its Joint Annual Interagency Review, we believe it has missed an opportunity to use this information as a basis for working with other agencies—most notably DOD, DOE and State—to identify future priorities, and analyze and help determine future resource allocations. We are not suggesting that any of the agencies participating in U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling cede authority to manage its own programs. However, this information could be used as a tool to better ensure that limited resources are leveraged to promote program effectiveness and avoid potential duplicative efforts. By doing so, we believe the federal government will be better positioned to take a holistic view of global nuclear detection and develop a plan that helps safeguard investments to date, more closely links future goals with the resources necessary to achieve those goals, and enhances the agencies’ ability to operate in a more cohesive and integrated fashion.

DNDO, for its part, has helped highlight the need to address critical gaps in efforts to combat nuclear smuggling domestically. It also has made some progress in developing and supporting initiatives to close these gaps. However, remaining challenges are great, funding is uncertain, time frames are unclear, and the technology may not be available any time soon to bridge some of these vulnerabilities. Without a plan to guide development of initiatives to address domestic gaps, it is unclear how DNDO plans to achieve its objectives of closing these critical gaps, particularly in three key areas—land border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and small maritime vessels.

Maritime detection efforts pose unique technological and operational challenges. DNDO’s maritime pilot is a sensible first step to addressing this vulnerability. However, DNDO should establish criteria for assessing the effectiveness of this effort and use the result of this evaluation to determine the feasibility of expanding this program beyond the pilot stage. Should the pilot prove worthy of replicating, we believe that DNDO will need to engage in additional planning to identify next steps to help ensure that it will be able to roll the program out to other locations in a timely manner.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that U.S. governmentwide efforts to secure the homeland are well coordinated, well conceived, and properly implemented, we reiterate the recommendation we made in our July 2008 testimony to develop an overarching strategic plan. We also recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following four actions: In coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of State, use the Joint Annual Interagency Review to guide future strategic efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. This effort should include analyzing overall budget allocations to determine whether governmentwide resources clearly align with identified priorities to maximize results and whether there is duplication of effort across agencies.

Develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear detection strategy to help ensure the future success of initiatives aimed at closing gaps and vulnerabilities. This plan should focus on, among other things, establishing time frames and costs for the three areas of recent focus—land border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and small maritime vessels.

Develop criteria to assess the effectiveness, cost, and feasibility of the maritime radiological and nuclear pilot program.

Should the decision be made to expand the maritime radiological and nuclear program beyond the pilot, undertake additional planning to identify next steps, including how and where a broader strategy would be implemented, what technology would be needed, what organizations should be involved, and how such efforts would be sustained.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOD, DOE, and State for comment. DHS and DOD provided written comments, which are presented in appendixes I and II, respectively. DOE and State provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD concurred with the recommendation that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Secretary of State, use the Joint Annual Interagency Review to guide future strategic efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. DOD stated that greater use could be made of the review associated with the development of this annual report to guide U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling.

DHS did not directly comment on our recommendations but noted that the recommendations aligned with DNDO’s past, present, and future actions. The department agreed, however, that planning can always be improved and that the office will seek to continue to do so. DHS also reiterated that it agreed with a recommendation that we made in our 2008 testimony on the need for an overarching strategic plan to guide future efforts to combat nuclear smuggling and move toward a more comprehensive global nuclear detection strategy. In its comments, DHS noted that work had already begun on an overarching plan.

DHS also pointed to what, in its view, were a number of shortcomings in the draft report. Specifically, the department believes that we did not give enough credit to DNDO’s strategic planning efforts. The department asserted that we did not clearly and adequately explain the background and context of DNDO’s efforts to develop a global strategy, what has been accomplished so far, what challenges it faces, and what remains to be done. Finally, DHS asserted that the draft contained a number of inaccuracies and omissions that make it less reliable and useful than it could be. DHS also provided a number of more detailed comments on specific issues presented in the draft report. We have addressed those comments in our detailed responses and incorporated changes where appropriate.

First, we found no evidence that DNDO engaged in long-term strategic planning to carry out its initiatives to address gaps in domestic nuclear detection. During the course of our review, we specifically asked DNDO for strategic planning documents used to develop and implement a global radiation detection strategy. In response, DNDO officials referred to the more than 4,000 pages of documents provided and stated in their comments on the report that this material was the basis for their plan. Although this information documented the efforts put forth by DNDO in developing its initial strategy and identifying gaps and vulnerabilities, it did not constitute a plan with clear goals, time frames, and costs. More specifically, DNDO commented that we did not mention the DNDO-Coast Guard Joint Acquisition Strategy as a cornerstone of its small maritime strategy, that we only mention DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy in passing in the back of the report, and that we do not mention the DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy implementation plan. We revised the report to include references to the Joint Acquisition Strategy and the implementation plan. However, we disagree with DNDO’s characterization that we failed to give the Small Vessel Security Strategy adequate attention. In fact, the report describes the strategy and how it relates to efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. We would also point out, however, that these planning documents cited by DNDO only apply to one specific critical gap area identified—the small maritime vessel threat.

Second, we disagree with the department’s comment that we did not clearly and adequately explain the background and context of DNDO’s efforts to develop a global strategy, what has been accomplished so far, what remains to be done, and what challenges it faces. Specifically, our report contains an overview of DNDO’s initial approach in developing a global strategy, including providing information on steps DNDO has taken to identify potential pathways for radiological and nuclear material. In addition, the report identified some of DNDO’s accomplishments in specific areas, such as working with the other agencies to develop new radiation detection technologies. Furthermore, we recognize that DNDO has helped highlight the need to address critical gaps in efforts to combat nuclear smuggling, and we have reported DNDO’s key initiatives to improve radiation detection capabilities in areas that had previously received insufficient attention—land borders between the ports of entry, aviation, and maritime. The report also recognizes the many challenges that DNDO faces as it attempts to enhance nuclear detection capabilities, including technological limitations of detection equipment and sustaining initiatives beyond their pilot phase. We also believe that DNDO needs to undertake additional planning so that it can be in a better position to determine the work that remains. That is why our recommendation to develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear detection strategy is so crucial.

Finally, where appropriate, we have incorporated a variety of technical comments provided by DHS to better characterize DNDO’s role and accomplishments, and the challenges it faces in developing a global nuclear detection strategy to combat nuclear smuggling. We do not believe that any of the comments that we incorporated represented a serious flaw in the content or quality of the draft report and in fact improve the technical accuracy of the report. In the few areas where DHS commented that we were factually incorrect, we have made minor changes to the report to clarify our point, to correct technical inaccuracies, or to avoid confusion. Where appropriate, we have provided additional information to further support our point, in some cases using information contained in DHS’s letter.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested congressional committees and Members of Congress, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of State. The report will also be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Homeland Security’s letter dated January 14, 2009.

GAO Comments

1. We agree with DHS that deploying or purchasing ineffective equipment would be inappropriate. We also agree with DHS that, as we reported, field evaluations are not complete and that the necessary equipment may not be deployed until 2012. We discuss the reasons for these delays on page 14 of the report. In addition, we disagree with DHS’s assertion that Border Patrol told us that lessons learned from field evaluations “would help avert large amounts of taxpayer funds for equipment that would not have been effective.” We do not dispute the importance of spending taxpayer dollars wisely; however, it was not expressed to us as such until this letter. 2. We added language on the highlights page to clarify that CBP is also responsible for putting radiation detection equipment in place. 3. We discuss in more depth the technological limitations of detection equipment and sustaining detection efforts on pages 19 through 21 of the report. 4. DHS commented that we have understated the value, importance, and challenge of technology development efforts needed to arrive at effective solutions. We disagree. We acknowledge these challenges in the body of the report and discuss some of the measures DNDO has taken to develop needed equipment. Furthermore, we disagree with DNDO’s statement about our findings regarding the status of sustainability planning. We describe at more length on pages 19 and 20 of the report our concerns with DNDO’s efforts to sustain maritime initiatives into the future. 5. While we do not mention the Phased Deployment Implementation Plan by name, on page 14 we state that DNDO and CBP are jointly working on measures to better secure the border areas between ports of entry and that these efforts are part of a phased approach. We have added clarifying language to the paragraph on page 4 to more clearly delineate the different roles CBP and DNDO play in this regard. Furthermore, while we do not disagree with taking a phased approach, DNDO has not kept to its original schedule and if such delays continue, it is uncertain whether DNDO and CBP will meet their original goal of full deployment of equipment by 2012. 6. We have modified the text on page 16 to include a reference that efforts to screen aviation for radiological and nuclear materials are being included in the strategy for the first time. 7. We have modified the language on page 5 to clarify the roles and responsibilities of DNDO and CBP. 8. DHS may have misunderstood the point we were making concerning maritime screening as compared with land and aviation screening. We agree that non-port of entry screening will require modifications to existing screening operations and new equipment. However, we were told that maritime screening posed unique challenges, which we have documented on pages 18-21 of this report. 9. We disagree with DHS that the conclusions we reach regarding the maritime program are incorrect. Although DHS comments that our conclusions are incorrect, DHS does not dispute the facts we present. Namely, DNDO has not established criteria for assessing the success of pilot efforts and it has no plan detailing which locations it would target next. Furthermore, during the course of our work we heard repeated concerns about the sustainability of the maritime radiological and nuclear screening from state and local law enforcement. Specifically, we asked the maritime mission area manager if a sustainability plan existed and we were told no. After our visit to Puget Sound, we received an e-mail from the manager stating DNDO would begin to develop a sustainability plan should the decision be made to continue the initiative. 10. We understand the role of grants in funding these types of activities and agree with DHS that, according to DNDO, grants are the primary mechanism it plans to rely on for sustaining radiological and nuclear detection activities in the maritime environment. We agree with DNDO efforts to work with the Coast Guard to adapt the Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model to accommodate more explicitly radiological and nuclear detection challenges. However, we maintain our concern that DNDO does not have any detailed plans, including how and where a broader strategy would be implemented, what technology would be needed, what organizations should be involved, and how such efforts would be sustained for this important national security issue. 11. DNDO incorrectly asserted that we did not recognize its contributions to international efforts. On page 23 of the report we acknowledged DNDO’s efforts to look for opportunities to work with other agencies to help strengthen their radiological and nuclear detection efforts, despite the fact that these programs to combat nuclear smuggling are well established and are under the purview of another agency. 12. DNDO has misunderstood the reference to its annual assessment of the global nuclear detection strategy and we believe the text that now appears on page 6 is consistent with our discussion later in the report. Our discussion on page 6 focuses on the global strategy, encompassing radiological and nuclear detection activities across all relevant government agencies. The reference DNDO makes to text later in the report focuses specifically on actions taken by DNDO to enhance domestic detection capabilities. However, we have modified the language to be clearer about what is being discussed in each place. We acknowledge that DNDO does not have authority over the budgets of other agencies and we would not advocate for such authority to be provided to it. However, DNDO is responsible for enhancing and coordinating federal, state, and local efforts to combat nuclear smuggling domestically and overseas. We believe that the analysis we are recommending—that DNDO undertake using data collected as part of the Joint Annual Interagency Review—is consistent with this requirement. 13. We recommended that DNDO develop a strategic plan to guide the development of a more comprehensive global nuclear strategy and delineated what such a plan should contain, including clearly defined objectives, roles, and responsibilities for meeting the objectives; necessary funding; and monitoring mechanisms to determine progress in meeting goals. However, DNDO has not yet produced such a strategic plan. We acknowledge that combating nuclear smuggling on a global scale is a large and complex undertaking. We repeatedly asked DNDO for detailed plans, containing the elements described above, but did not receive any. 14. We have modified the text on page 12 to recognize the role of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 15. DNDO commented that portal monitors can also be used to monitor pedestrians, but according to CBP, it does not currently use portal monitors for this purpose. However, we have modified the text to reflect that portal monitors are used for screening cargo containers. With regard to the use of pagers to detect smuggled nuclear material, we have reported in the past on the limitations of using these devices and that pagers should not be relied upon to detect smuggled nuclear material. 16. None of the radiation detection devices discussed in this report use the active interrogation techniques cited by DHS. 17. DHS commented that including a paragraph on ASPs (now on page 13) was beyond the scope of this audit and should be removed from this report. The scope of our review is presented on pages 3 and 4 of the report. As such, we agree with DHS that our review did not include an assessment of DNDO’s efforts to test and procure ASP technology. However, several prior GAO reports have found significant problems with DNDO’s work in this area. Reporting the results of our prior work in the background of this report is appropriate and germane because portal monitors are a key component of the global nuclear detection strategy. 18. DHS commented that our findings on DNDO’s lack of long-term plans are misleading and suggest DNDO has no plans or strategies. We agree that DNDO has identified gaps and vulnerabilities and has taken some steps to address these, including jointly working with CBP as mentioned on page 14 of our report. However, DHS does not dispute our finding that it has not developed a detailed plan, which clearly conveys the goals, responsibilities, resource needs, and performance metrics needed to further its detection efforts. Identifying gaps and initiating programs are positive steps toward enhancing detection capabilities, but these efforts alone do not constitute a long-term plan. Without a detailed, documented plan, DNDO will be unable to determine whether these new programs are actually succeeding and addressing the identified gaps. 19. We believe DHS had misconstrued our description of efforts to implement radiological and nuclear screening at the border areas in between official ports of entry. We acknowledge that there are a number of challenges associated with implementing portable detection equipment for use in the field and appreciate DNDO and CBPs efforts to develop this capability. However, the fact remains that DNDO has not kept to its original schedule, and if such delays continue, it is uncertain whether DNDO and CBP will meet their original goal of full deployment of such equipment by 2012. 20. Our description of the procurement challenges faced by DNDO and CBP is an accurate summary of the information we were provided. One of DNDO’s primary roles is to test and procure needed radiological and nuclear detection equipment for use by CBP and other agencies. We were informed by CBP that it did not receive the equipment it had originally ordered in the agreed upon time frames.

Regardless of whether the equipment was for use at an official border crossing or for use by Border Patrol officers in the field, the needed equipment was not procured as requested. In CBP’s technical comments on a draft of this report, it stressed that its radiological and nuclear detection equipment procurement funding was handed over to DNDO in 2006. CBP further stated that it believes that the most effective way to procure commercial off-the-shelf equipment is for CBP to have its own radiation and nuclear equipment budget. 21. We have modified the text on pages 15 through 17 to more clearly delineate roles and responsibilities. 22. We have accurately described what we observed during our visit to Dulles International Airport. We were told by CBP officials that the source used in the demonstration was what they use to routinely check the responsiveness of the portal monitor and successfully did just that earlier in the week. 23. We believe DHS has misconstrued our statement about detecting radiological and nuclear material outside the U.S. borders. We are not minimizing the importance of such a goal. In fact, since DNDO believes that it is one of the largest and most important vulnerabilities in the existing detection architecture, it will be even more important that DNDO develop detailed plans for securing such arrangements with as many nations as possible. 24. We have listed on page 18 of the report a number of other factors we were told by DHS officials influenced the decision to pilot the maritime program in the Puget Sound area. In response to the draft report, DHS provided an additional reason for the selection of Puget Sound. 25. We modified the text on page 19 to include the actual funding amount for the pilot project. 26. See comments 9 and 10. 27. DHS provided new information that the Preventative Radiological and Nuclear Detection handbook is under development and that DNDO reached out to state and local entities in its development. This is another positive step. However, as DNDO stated, this handbook is currently in draft, undergoing review, and not yet finalized or in use by any locale. 28. We believe DNDO has incorrectly characterized our finding regarding detection technologies in the maritime environment. On pages 20 and 21, our report delineates some of the technological limitations, as they were presented to us by the users of the equipment. We do not assert that these limitations are insurmountable; only that they exist and should be taken into consideration when crafting a plan for radiological and nuclear detection in the maritime environment. 29. The information contained in the report on page 22 is factually accurate. 30. The information contained on pages 22 and 23 of the report was obtained through interviews with NYPD officials in the presence of a DNDO representative. The primary purpose of the statement was to point out the number of boats with boat-mounted radiation detection equipment in use at the time of our review. 31. While there are other complexities with developing a global nuclear detection strategy, DNDO officials repeatedly told us during the course of our review that a primary complicating factor is the office’s limited ability to influence other agencies’ programs to combat nuclear smuggling. 32. We modified the text on page 25 to reflect DNDO’s efforts to update some of the information. 33. We modified the text on page 25 to reflect the fact that DNDO should coordinate with other agencies on the overall strategic direction of detection efforts. 34. In response to our July 2008 recommendation that DNDO develop an overarching strategic plan, DNDO commented that it has included a request for strategic planning information as part of its efforts to develop the next edition of the Joint Annual Interagency Review. However, DHS did not comment on how this will inform or contribute to an overarching strategic plan to guide future enhancement to global nuclear detection.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact person named above, Glen Levis (Assistant Director), Elizabeth Erdmann, Rachel Girshick, Sandra Kerr, Omari Norman, Kim Raheb, Rebecca Shea, Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, and Tommy Williams made key contributions to this report.

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