Nuclear Cleanup of Rocky Flats: DOE Can Use Lessons Learned to Improve Oversight of Other Sites' Cleanup Activities
Released: 2006-07-10T00:00:00

Letter

Background

For nearly 40 years, the Rocky Flats plant, located about 16 miles northwest of downtown Denver, served as a nuclear weapons production facility. Afterward, the site bore the scars of that role: soil, groundwater, surface water, and many of the buildings at the site were contaminated with radioactive materials, such as plutonium and uranium; toxic metals, such as beryllium; and hazardous chemicals, such as cleaning solvents and degreasers. Accordingly, the site became one of DOE’s priorities for environmental cleanup. While most of the approximately 6,300 acres that make up the Rocky Flats site served through the years as an undeveloped buffer zone, about one-half of a square mile (385 acres) in the center of the site constituted the industrial area, where for decades, plutonium was shaped into plutonium triggers or “pits” for use in nuclear weapons. About one-fourth of the site’s more than 800 original structures (e.g., buildings and storage tanks) were radiologically or chemically contaminated—some severely so—by site operations over the years.

The site was cleaned up under the terms of a contract between DOE and Kaiser-Hill. The first contract took effect July 1, 1995. In late 1999, DOE and Kaiser-Hill negotiated a new contract, which took effect on February 1, 2000. The cleanup work was done predominantly by subcontractors, under the contractor’s management.

The 2000 contract specified both the contractor’s and DOE’s responsibilities. The contractor was responsible for processing, packaging, and shipping off site all of Rocky Flats’ nuclear materials and radioactive and hazardous wastes; cleaning up and demolishing more than 700 structures that remained on site in February 2000; and cleaning up the site’s contaminated soil and groundwater. DOE was required to provide a variety of services and items to support the project. Essentially, the contract required DOE to arrange receiver sites for all the materials and wastes and obtain the necessary certifications for the containers in which the materials and wastes had to be packed and shipped. Many DOE sites played a significant role in Rocky Flats’ cleanup and closure, especially those sites that received materials or wastes from Rocky Flats, such as the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico, the Nevada Test Site, and the Hanford Site in Washington.

Much of the cleanup work at Rocky Flats was labor intensive and tedious. Plutonium is dangerous to human health, even in minute quantities, especially if inhaled or ingested. Accordingly, workers handling plutonium- contaminated materials and equipment had to wear cumbersome protective suits with enclosed respiratory systems, and sometimes had to wield heavy and ungainly tools. Also, the equipment being worked on had to be enclosed within plastic or glass to prevent airborne contaminants from reaching unprotected workers or surfaces. Figure 1 shows workers in protective clothing cutting contaminated materials to fit shipping containers.

Four Key Factors Contributed to Early Cleanup

Four key factors contributed to the early completion of the physical cleanup of Rocky Flats: (1) DOE and the contractor overcame several major challenges identified in GAO’s 2001 report on the Rocky Flats cleanup, (2) DOE and the site’s regulatory agencies agreed to use an accelerated process to clean up the site, (3) a number of site-specific characteristics combined to limit the scope and complexity of the cleanup effort, and (4) DOE offered the contractor $560 million in total incentive fees to finish the cleanup ahead of schedule and under cost.

DOE and Contractor Overcame Previously Identified Cleanup Challenges

The first key factor that contributed to the early completion of the physical cleanup of Rocky Flats was that DOE and the contractor resolved four of the five major challenges we identified in our 2001 report. These challenges included (1) completing the decontamination and demolition of the site’s structures; (2) overcoming limitations on the available number of transportation casks and on the loading capability for transuranic waste; (3) identifying the overall scope of the cleanup project—specifically, the extent of contamination, the eventual use of the site, and the level of cleanup that eventual use would require; (4) getting the automated plutonium-packaging system to reliably perform at the rate needed for timely completion; and (5) preventing safety problems, which can result in work shutdowns and delay cleanup work.

Completing Decontamination and Demolition of Structures

One major challenge DOE and the contractor overcame was completing the decontamination and demolition of hundreds of structures at the site. At the end of fiscal year 2000, the contractor had completed only about 10 percent of the predemolition work, which included activities such as removing plutonium and other nuclear materials from furnaces, pipes, and other locations within buildings; draining and removing plutonium- or uranium-laden liquids or residues from process pipes and tanks; dismantling plutonium-processing furnaces; stripping out contaminated process pipelines; and cutting up and removing hundreds of contaminated gloveboxes. Further, at the time of our 2001 report, the contractor had demolished only 81 of the 802 structures that existed at the site when cleanup began. That accomplishment equated to about 10 percent of the total number of structures and only about 5 percent of the total square footage. Remaining to be demolished at the end of fiscal year 2000 were 721 structures, encompassing about 3.4 million square feet.

DOE and the contractor overcame challenges to decontamination and demolition primarily through innovation, as workers continuously sought innovative cleanup technologies that would accomplish tasks more safely, quickly, and cheaply. For example, the contractor found that it could chemically decontaminate large pieces of equipment, such as tanks and gloveboxes, by wiping their surfaces with a liquid cerium nitrate solution. By doing so, the contractor could reduce the contamination enough that the contaminated object could be shipped as low-level radioactive waste rather than transuranic waste, which requires a more costly shipping and disposal process. The Rocky Flats buildings contained approximately 1,475 gloveboxes, ranging from shoe box size to the size of an entire room. By reducing the level of contamination, the contractor could ship even large gloveboxes whole, rather than having to cut them into pieces small enough to fit into standard waste boxes used for shipping transuranic waste. Figure 2 shows workers using cerium nitrate to decontaminate a glovebox and loading a dismantled, decontaminated glovebox into a container for shipping.

The use of explosives in building demolition was another important time- saving demolition technique. Contractor officials said they had learned lessons from another DOE site at which DOE had doubted the demolitions experts and reduced the amount of explosives used, resulting in an explosion that failed to bring the structure down. At Rocky Flats, accordingly, the contractor and DOE brought in demolitions experts and, while closely reviewing the demolition plans and overseeing the work, let the experts’ opinions prevail. As a result, the use of explosives saved time and money for the contractor and DOE. For example, in bringing down building 881, one of the four original manufacturing facilities at Rocky Flats, a contractor official estimated that the use of explosives saved about 4 months, and reduced risks to workers by removing hazards associated with heavy equipment and the falling debris that typically results from their use in lieu of explosives. After being completely decontaminated, building 881 was wired with explosives and, as shown in figure 3, collapsed into its basement.

In addition to building 881, the contractor used explosives to bring down smaller facilities, such as the guard and water towers, and to separate the concrete from the rebar (the steel reinforcing bar) on the walls of building 886.

Additional information on decontamination and demolition activities at Rocky Flats is contained in appendix III.

Overcoming Limitations on Shipping and Transportation Capabilities

A second challenge DOE and the contractor overcame was limitations on the available number of transportation casks and on the loading capability for transuranic waste. At the time of our 2001 report, the contractor’s ability to ship the total volume of waste off site to DOE’s WIPP facility by the target closure date was in doubt because of uncertainties about whether DOE could obtain and provide the number of transportation casks necessary to meet the contractor’s projected shipping schedule, especially for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and because of uncertainties about whether the three loading facilities (two of which were still under construction at the time of our 2000 review) would be able to meet the shipping schedule for the site’s peak shipping years. That shipping schedule had been compressed by various events, including delays in the opening of WIPP.

DOE and the contractor overcame this challenge primarily through cooperation and perseverance. Whenever a DOE site could not use a shipping container as scheduled, WIPP would send the container to Rocky Flats instead. Also, DOE headquarters maintained a high priority on Rocky Flats throughout the cleanup and made sure that it received the government-furnished services and items it needed. Figure 4 shows special transportation casks used to transport transuranic waste.

Also, while buildings at Rocky Flats were being demolished, the contractor built the two additional loading facilities, as previously mentioned, to ensure that loading and shipping schedules could be supported. The new facilities resolved the challenge of inadequate loading capability and allowed the contractor to increase its transuranic waste-shipping capability to 15 shipments a week.

Identifying the Overall Scope of the Cleanup

A third major challenge DOE and the contractor overcame was identifying the overall scope of the cleanup—specifically, the extent of contamination, the eventual use of the site, and the level of cleanup that eventual use would require. At the time of our 2001 report, the postcleanup use of the site—and, therefore, the level of cleanup required—was uncertain. Moreover, the extent of soil contamination on the site and the depth and degree of contamination under many of the former production buildings was not fully understood, particularly in the former industrial area, because parts of the site had not been fully sampled. Finally, at the time of our 2001 report, DOE, the regulatory agencies, and the community stakeholders had not yet reached agreement on an appropriate level of soil cleanup, although various studies were under way. These challenges were resolved through congressional intervention and community collaboration.

Congressional action ended the uncertainty about the end use of the site with passage of the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge Act of 2001 (Refuge Act). Knowing the site’s end use enabled DOE and the regulatory agencies to then make assumptions about site users and their risk of exposure to residual contamination. The risk posed to a person by exposure to a contaminant is measured by a combination of the contaminant’s toxicity, together with the frequency, pathway, and duration of exposure. Thus, a more stringent cleanup level is required for a site that will be used constantly, such as for residential purposes, than for a site that will be used sporadically, such as for recreational purposes. Once the Refuge Act was passed, DOE and the regulatory agencies assumed that the principal site users would be wildlife refuge workers, who would spend about 8 hours a day at the site (4 hours indoors and 4 hours outdoors), 250 days a year, for 18.7 years; and refuge visitors, who would spend about 2.5 hours a day at the site, 100 days a year, for 30 years (6 years as a child and 24 years as an adult). Soil cleanup levels could then be set at a level that would protect both types of users.

DOE collaborated with the community in determining the level of remediation the cleanup would achieve. Before passage of the Refuge Act, the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement had specified an interim soil cleanup level (action level) of 651 picocuries of plutonium per gram (pCi/g) of soil, meaning that a soil cleanup action would be triggered by a soil sample indicating the existence of plutonium in excess of 651 pCi/g. This action level was considered unacceptable by the two stakeholder community groups: the Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board and the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments; these groups argued for a much more stringent action level. DOE funded a community-directed, independent scientific assessment of soil action levels. This independent assessment was overseen by a panel of community representatives. DOE also funded a workshop, organized by the Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board, featuring experts who provided presentations on radiological assessments, risk analyses, and various computer-modeling scenarios and assumptions. Working with local governments and members of the public, DOE and the regulatory agencies ultimately agreed on a soil action level of 50 picocuries of plutonium per gram (pCi/g) of surface soil (i.e., the top 3 feet of soil), meaning that a remedial action would be triggered by a soil sample indicating the existence of plutonium in excess of 50 pCi/g. A plutonium level of 50 pCi/g translates to a risk level of 1 in 500,000 (that is, this level of contamination could result in one more case of cancer than otherwise would have been expected in every 500,000 persons). DOE and the regulatory agencies decided that, with a surface soil action level of 50 pCi/g, higher concentrations of plutonium in soil could remain at greater depth. Accordingly, DOE and the regulatory agencies agreed to set an action level of 3,000 pCi/g for depths of 3 to 6 feet below the surface, depending on the extent of the contamination. Once a remedial action was triggered, cleanup would continue until contamination greater than 1,000 pCi/g had been removed.

In addition to collaborating on decisions about soil cleanup levels, community groups provided comments and advice on many other aspects of the cleanup that influenced DOE’s decisions in some cases. Our survey of the Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board and the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments found that 21 of the 25 respondents were very or somewhat satisfied with how DOE engaged the group in the cleanup process. Also, 19 of the 25 respondents said they were very or somewhat satisfied with how DOE used the group’s input. Nearly all (23 of 25) said they believed the groups’ input had a very or somewhat positive effect on the cleanup process.

Problems with Automated Plutonium-Packaging System

The unreliable functioning of the automated plutonium-packaging system is the only one of the five challenges we identified in 2001 that DOE and the contractor never fully resolved. It was only through persistence and “brute force” that the packaging was finally completed in July 2003, more than a year late and at least $50 million over budget. The system never worked reliably, and many of the processes that were designed to be automated had to be done manually. It required continuous maintenance and modification, and broke down as many as two or three times a day, requiring a “triage” repair team on call 24 hours a day. Nevertheless, according to DOE officials, the pursuit of any alternative to the system would probably have resulted in even greater cost and schedule delays. Figure 5 shows GAO officials and staff being briefed on the glovebox line behind the automated plutonium-packaging system; this glovebox line handled the prepackaging of wet combustibles.

The final challenge that DOE and the contractor overcame was safety problems, which can result in shutdowns and delay cleanup work. At the time of our 2001 report, DOE was concerned about the number and severity of safety violations that had occurred since the inception of the 2000 contract. In response to those concerns, the contractor developed a comprehensive plan to improve its safety and compliance performance.

Although some safety incidents occurred after our 2001 report, the contractor’s overall safety performance improved. In two key measures of safety, for example, Rocky Flats’ performance was considerably better than the average performance in the construction industry. One of these measures is total recordable cases (TRC). Recordable cases, in general, are any that require “more than a Band-Aid,TM” according to a contractor safety official—for example, an injury that requires stitches, prescription medication, or 1 or more days away from work. At Rocky Flats, the 12- month TRC rolling average at the end of 2004 was 0.9 per 100 full-time workers. This was a significant improvement over the 7.6 rate that existed at the site in July 1995, when Kaiser-Hill took over from the previous contractor. By comparison, the TRC average in the construction industry for calendar year 2004 was 6.4 per 100 full-time workers. The contractually established limit for TRCs at Rocky Flats was a 12-month rolling average of 3.5 per 100 full-time workers. Using the other key measure of safety, lost workdays, Rocky Flats also performed well. At the end of 2004, the site’s 12-month rolling average rate for lost workday cases was 0.2, much lower than the site’s July 1995 rate of 4.6 and well below the construction industry rate of 2.4 for calendar year 2004. The contractually established limit for lost workdays at Rocky Flats was a 12-month rolling average rate of 2.0.

The contractor’s safety director reported that these safety improvements were achieved through a combination of actions, including getting the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer, and other top management officials involved; improving the work-planning process to incorporate job-hazards analyses; involving the workers early in safety- planning and job-hazards analyses; holding first-line supervisors (i.e., foremen) responsible for informing workers of top management’s emphasis on safety; and improving the training provided to workers. The site developed a course, commonly known as Rocky Flats 101, that contained a hands-on, simulated work environment in which workers learned how to use ladders and various other tools in contaminated spaces. The course was very effective, according to the safety director.

Accelerated Cleanup Process Allowed Faster, More Collaborative Work

The second key factor that contributed to the early completion of the physical cleanup of Rocky Flats was the use of an accelerated cleanup process. The Rocky Flats cleanup began in the late 1980s and early 1990s with extensive characterization (sampling of soil, groundwater, surface water, and air). But after several years of characterization, public frustration was building at the lack of visible progress in cleaning up the contamination at the site. According to DOE officials, the extensive sampling that was done at the site in the late 1980s and early 1990s, together with historical documents about the use and disposal of materials and wastes, facilitated use of the accelerated process. Instead of proceeding under the full CERCLA/RCRA process, the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement authorized DOE to perform most of the cleanup through removal actions. In a 1996 report, we recommended that DOE make greater use of removal actions to increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of cleanups. Under the accelerated process, cleanup actions, including soil removal, occur early and throughout the process rather than at the end, with confirmation sampling at each cleanup area to ensure that the remediation was sufficient. DOE officials report that the accelerated process allowed more timely removal of contaminants from the site.

The pace of work in reviewing and approving cleanup documents was “frantic,” according to Colorado officials. Colorado, DOE, and the contractor agreed on a “review template” of documents Colorado needed to see for each building and area; the template allowed Colorado officials to provide immediate review by working closely with the contractor.

Although the cleanup agreement specified that Colorado had 14 days (30 days in some cases) to review and provide comments on cleanup-related documents, use of the review template shortened the review time considerably. For example, the contractor would send draft documents to Colorado officials, who would provide comments directly to the contractor; the contractor then would respond by making corrections, providing additional data or documents, or doing more work if necessary. By working closely with the contractor along the way to resolve questions or concerns, Colorado was able to respond quickly—sometimes on the same day—to DOE’s faxed requests for official approval of cleanup-related documents. Colorado officials pointed out that had they not been willing to work in this way with the contractor, but had instead taken the 14 or 30 days provided for review and approval under the cleanup agreement, the contractor would not have been able to complete the cleanup as early as it did. (DOE noted that Colorado’s work with the contractor was not done without DOE’s involvement; as mentioned throughout the report, the entire process was collaborative.)

DOE, EPA, and Colorado agreed that the accelerated process and the collaboration it fostered were essential to the cleanup’s early completion. According to EPA and Colorado officials, their agencies had staff on site “continuously,” working in the field with DOE and contractor staff to discuss and observe cleanup operations, and requiring “real time” changes as necessary. Throughout the process, the regulatory agencies were intimately involved in reviewing data and otherwise contributing to the development of studies, plans, and decision documents. As a result, the “back end” of the review process was very streamlined, according to contractor officials.

While the accelerated cleanup actions were under way, and as data from the completed cleanup actions became available, DOE concurrently conducted the remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS), which summarizes site conditions at closure and evaluates necessary long-term remedies, such as site monitoring. Based on all of the data collected at the site, including the results of the individual accelerated cleanup actions and the RI/FS, DOE will identify its preferred final remedy in the proposed plan, which will be released for formal public comment once the final RI/FS has been approved by EPA and Colorado. DOE shared the draft RI/FS with the public and obtained EPA’s and Colorado’s comments on it; these comments were considered during preparation of the final RI/FS. After considering comments received on the proposed plan during a 60-day public comment period, DOE will select and document its preferred remedy in the final decision document. Once EPA and Colorado approve the final decision document, it will serve as both the corrective action decision (under RCRA) and the record of decision (under CERCLA).

Site-Specific Characteristics Aided Cleanup Effort

The third key factor that contributed to the early completion of the physical cleanup of Rocky Flats was a confluence of circumstances—climatic, geologic, chemical, structural and economic—that confined the scope and complexity of the cleanup effort. Climatically and geologically, the semiarid climate and the alluvial fan upon which the site is located contributed to slow erosion of soils over time, thus inhibiting the off-site migration of contaminants. The site also benefited from layers of shale and claystone— hundreds of feet thick in places—that prevented contamination from seeping into the deep drinking-water aquifer that underlies part of the site.

Chemically, the cleanup was aided by the nature of the two key contaminants—plutonium and americium, which are essentially insoluble in water and, instead, tend to bind to soil and sediment particles, according to a study undertaken in the late 1990s. At Rocky Flats, there is little groundwater movement, and no groundwater was contaminated with plutonium and americium. Instead, soil was the predominant environmental medium requiring cleanup. Remediation of contaminated soil generally consists of digging it up and shipping it to a disposal site, a simpler task than remediating groundwater. The contaminants move around the site, and potentially off site, by surface-soil erosion, wind, or surface water. For example, westerly winds spread contaminated soil to off-site lands east of Rocky Flats. In a 1997 combined corrective action decision/record of decision about these lands, EPA and Colorado determined that the lands did not pose an unacceptable or significant risk to human health or the environment, notwithstanding the low levels of plutonium and americium that existed in the soil—in portions of the lands—from Rocky Flats activities.

Structurally, the robust construction of the plutonium-processing buildings, with their thick concrete floors and walls, contained many leaks and spills of radioactive and hazardous materials, thereby limiting the extent and severity of contamination under the buildings. Building 371, for example, was a complex, extremely strong, and rigid structure that was built to withstand accidents such as earthquakes, tornadoes, winds, and fires. The building was a partially buried structure of reinforced concrete with an extensive foundation of concrete caissons up to 6 feet in diameter, drilled into bedrock, and concrete wall and slab thicknesses beyond typical industrial use and code requirements. Similarly, building 771 featured concrete thicknesses ranging from 6.5 inches to more than 2 feet.

Finally, the local economy was a factor in the success of the cleanup, according to Colorado officials. The local economy was not heavily dependent on the cleanup project to provide jobs, so closing the site did not meet large-scale community opposition.

DOE Provided the Contractor with a Financial Incentive to Finish Early and Under Cost

The fourth key factor that contributed to the early completion of the physical cleanup of Rocky Flats involved certain features of the cleanup contract, including a substantial financial incentive for the contractor to finish the cleanup work ahead of schedule and below budget. The contract provided for an incentive fee tied partly to schedule but predominantly to cost. The contractor would earn the target fee of $340 million if it completed its work between December 16, 2006, and March 31, 2007, at a cost between $4 billion and $4.2 billion. If the contractor completed the cleanup outside of these schedule and cost ranges, the fee would rise or fall accordingly—to as much as $460 million for less costly, earlier completion, or as little as $130 million for more costly, later completion. In 2003, when officials saw that the contractor was confident of earning the maximum fee and was no longer working aggressively to further shorten the completion timeline or reduce costs, DOE approved a $100 million increase in the maximum incentive fee. In the end, DOE awarded the contractor $49 million of the additional available fee, based on a reduction in the total project cost of an additional $129 million.

DOE also encouraged the contractor to continue its practice of sharing incentive fees among its workforce by offering employees financial incentives to continue to work safely and generate ideas for ways to save costs and time. In its initial contract bid for the 1995 contract for the Rocky Flats cleanup, Kaiser-Hill committed to share 20 percent of its profits with employees. The contractor’s president explained that incentives were offered across the workforce, although the incentive type varied by work group. Salaried employees were individually evaluated based on their project and safety performance; the value of their incentive pay was based on the final total project cost. For hourly employees, incentive pay was determined though collective bargaining but was primarily based on schedule performance. Steelworkers received an annual incentive bonus, based on schedule performance; workers in the building trades received an annual hourly increase, also based on schedule performance. The contractor also had a safety incentive program that included spot cash awards. Over the life of the project, the contractor distributed approximately $100 million of company earnings (about 20 percent of its $510 million incentive fee) to its workers, and DOE contributed an additional $30 million that was used for incentive pay.

According to the contractor, financial incentives for early or under-budget completion of a project are a powerful motivator; however, it is important to note that the financial incentive offered at Rocky Flats was only one of many factors contributing to the early completion of the cleanup. In GAO’s experience, such incentives are not always this successful. As we reported in December 2005, the Department of Defense has not fared well at using incentive-fee contracts to improve cost-control behavior or meet program goals. Specifically, about half of the 27 incentive-fee contracts included in GAO’s review failed or were projected to fail to meet a key measure of program success—completing the objective (i.e., delivering the product or service specified by the contract) at or below the target price. Research on incentive fees by GAO, Harvard University, and the RAND Corporation going back decades has concluded that incentive fees do not consistently motivate contractors to control cost.

Additionally, according to the contractor, enhanced workforce transition benefits could be considered important to worker motivation and productivity. Enhanced benefits included pension and post-retirement medical benefits and outplacement services such as relocation and education benefits.

Another unusual and critically important feature of the Rocky Flats contract was consistent funding. An underlying premise of the contractor’s ability to finish the job early and under budget was that a stable source of funding would be provided throughout the cleanup. As part of the contract negotiation process, DOE and the contractor assumed an annual funding level of $657 million per year. Both DOE headquarters and Congress helped each year to ensure that the site received a consistent funding level. The contract also stipulated the services and items that the government would provide, including making a number of shipping containers available and arranging treatment and disposal sites for radioactive waste at the site. If DOE did not meet its contractual obligation, it would be grounds for changing the contract. In that way, DOE bore the liability for any role it had in increasing contract costs.

Cleanup of Rocky Flats Is Complete at a Cost of about $10 Billion, but Key Steps Remain Before the Planned Wildlife Refuge Will Open

The physical cleanup at Rocky Flats is complete, at a total cost (including long-term costs) of about $10 billion; however, several regulatory steps remain before land can be transferred to the Department of the Interior for establishment of the wildlife refuge planned for the site. After DOE issues and considers public comments on its proposed plan, identifying its preferred alternative for the site’s future monitoring and remediation, EPA and Colorado will jointly determine whether any further cleanup is needed at the site or whether the cleanup actions already taken are sufficient to render the site safe for its intended purpose. A final decision by EPA and Colorado is expected in late 2006. If they decide that no further action is needed to remediate the site, EPA will delete portions of the site from the CERCLA National Priorities List and certify that the cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats has been completed; the Secretary of the Interior can then accept administrative jurisdiction of designated lands and establish the refuge, in accordance with the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge Act of 2001.

Regulatory Steps Remain Before the Site Can Open as a Wildlife Refuge

Although the contractor has finished the cleanup at Rocky Flats, DOE, EPA, and Colorado must complete the remaining steps of the regulatory process before Rocky Flats can be removed from the National Priorities List. On October 13, 2005, the contractor declared that it had successfully completed the Rocky Flats cleanup—more than 1 year before the target cleanup completion date cited in the contract and more than 3 years before the completion date the contractor thought likely in our 2001 report. aste eqivlent to 65-tory building the length nd width of football field, inclding more thn 15,000 cubic meter of trsunic nd other rdioctive waste, more thn 500,000 cubic meter of low-level nd other rdioctive waste, more thn 800,000 cubic meter of sanitry waste, nd more thn 4,300 cubic meter of hrdousaste (ee fig. 6). installed covers at two landfills; investigated and remediated, as necessary, 421 areas of known or suspected contamination, including 360 cleanup areas such as individual hazardous substance sites and contamination located under buildings; and installed three barriers and a seep collection system to treat contaminated groundwater plumes; installed passive treatment systems to protect surface water quality.

Figure 6 illustrates the equivalent amounts of waste removed and contaminated water treated at Rocky Flats during the cleanup.

Figure 7 shows the site as it was in 1995, when the contractor began its cleanup job, and on October 13, 2005, when the contractor declared its job done.

The contract provided that when the contractor declared the cleanup finished, DOE would have 90 days to either accept the project as complete or provide the contractor with a list of items to address. In November 2005, DOE provided the contractor with the final list. In December 2005, after reviewing cleanup documentation, doing a final walk-through of the site, and ensuring that the contractor had completed the remaining items, DOE agreed that the contractor had fulfilled all of the cleanup actions specified in the contract and the cleanup was complete.

The next steps include the review, revision, and final approval of the remaining regulatory documents. Figure 8 shows the key steps in Rocky Flats’ transition from a cleanup site to a wildlife refuge.

Those steps are as follows: July 2006: DOE expects to issue its proposed plan, specifying its preference for future monitoring and remediation of the site from among the following alternatives outlined in an RI/FS: (1) no further action, with monitoring; (2) monitoring plus both institutional and physical controls; and (3) monitoring and both institutional and physical controls, plus additional targeted removal of plutonium-contaminated soil in an isolated area to reduce the excess cancer risk for wildlife refuge workers from 1 in 500,000 to 1 in 1,000,000. The proposed plan will also specify the area to be retained by DOE rather than transferred to FWS. As agreed between DOE and the regulatory agencies, the plan will be issued for a 60-day public comment period, which will include a public hearing.

November 2006: After considering public comments on the proposed plan, EPA and Colorado expect to finalize and issue the final joint decision document. The final decision document will specify what additional cleanup, if any, is necessary at the site and what monitoring and institutional and physical controls, if any, will be necessary. The document will also include a “responsiveness summary” that responds to questions from the public and other stakeholders on the proposed plan.

December 2006: EPA expects to certify that the cleanup is complete. It may then remove portions of the site from the National Priorities List.

Early 2007: DOE expects to transfer jurisdiction of the majority of the site (approximately 5,400 acres) to FWS. The specific acreage to be transferred will be specified in the final decision document and will be contingent upon DOE’s purchasing privately owned “essential mineral rights” (i.e., the right to mine sand and gravel) affecting about 700 acres. Under the legislation authorizing DOE to purchase these essential mineral rights, the refuge will not include land that is subject to sand and gravel mining or is being actively mined by private parties. 2012 through 2022: FWS expects to open public access trails and facilities in the wildlife refuge, as described in the agency’s Final Comprehensive Conservation Plan. FWS’s ability to implement its conservation plan is contingent on funding availability. In the first year following land transfer and refuge establishment, if funds are available, FWS will open one 1.75-mile pedestrian trail, which will follow the existing road to the Lindsay Ranch homestead site, which dates from the early 1940s (see fig. 9).

Before opening other trails, FWS officials said they will concentrate on restoring wildlife and plant habitat, controlling noxious weeds, removing roads and culverts, and restoring the prairie grasslands. As funding permits, between 2012 and 2022, they plan to phase in the remaining 15 miles of trail as well as other public-use facilities, such as parking lots, a visitors’ kiosk, wildlife-viewing blinds, and scenic overlooks. Figure 10 depicts FWS’s plan for visitor use at the refuge, including about 16 miles of trails, parking, and developed overlooks.

Even after the wildlife refuge opens, some stewardship activities will likely continue at the site for an indeterminate time. For example, DOE will maintain groundwater monitoring wells and treatment facilities as long as necessary, subject to approval of the regulatory agencies. Additionally, as required by CERCLA, DOE will review the site at least every 5 years to determine whether remedies continue to be fully protective of human health and the environment. DOE, EPA, and Colorado reviewed parts of the site in 2002; the next review is scheduled for 2007.

Further, DOE negotiated an environmental covenant with Colorado for one of the landfills at the site, called the Present Landfill. The purpose of this covenant is to ensure protection of human health and the environment by preventing intrusions into the landfill or damage to the various engineered structures on adjoining lands and preventing exposure to hazardous wastes. The covenant, which runs with the land in perpetuity, is binding on DOE and all other interested parties (including persons using the land), as well as their heirs and successors. Activities prohibited by the covenant include digging, drilling, tilling, grading, and excavating, as well as any activities that could damage or impair the proper functioning of the landfill cap and runoff controls, the passive seep intercept and treatment system, or the groundwater monitoring wells. According to a DOE official, DOE and the state anticipate that the covenant for the Present Landfill will be supplanted by a broader covenant for the DOE-retained lands; this broader covenant will become effective with execution of the final decision document (the combined corrective action decision/record of decision).

The long-term care of the site is a subject of continuing debate and, for some, concern. The long-term condition and care of the site were the concerns most mentioned by community group survey respondents. Of the 17 (of 25) survey respondents who said they had remaining concerns about the cleanup, 15 mentioned concerns about what would happen at the site in the future.

Rocky Flats Cleanup Cost about $10 Billion, Including Long-Term Costs

The total cost of the cleanup—about $10 billion—comprises costs incurred from 1995 through 2005 and estimated long-term costs through about 2080. Costs incurred to date include the following: The 2000 closure contract cost DOE over $4.1 billion through October 2005—nearly half the total cost of cleanup through closure. This cost includes the $510 million incentive fee that DOE paid the contractor.

The 1995 cleanup contract cost DOE nearly $3.6 billion through early 2000, including a $120 million fee to the contractor.

The cost of DOE’s Rocky Flats Field Office from fiscal year 1995 through October 2005 was nearly $760 million. This cost included staff salaries, site utilities, litigation support, regulatory oversight, and other expenses.

The cost incurred by other DOE sites in support of the Rocky Flats closure was approximately $138 million, for such activities as certifying shipping containers, providing transportation for nuclear materials and wastes, and receiving and storing Rocky Flats’ materials and wastes.

In addition, in January 2006, Congress authorized DOE to spend up to $10 million on the purchase of designated “essential mineral rights” at the Rocky Flats site. The law provided that these mineral rights at the site can be purchased only from willing sellers and that the cost must not exceed fair market value. In January 2006, DOE shared the results of an appraisal of the mineral rights with the three ownership groups at Rocky Flats. DOE will meet with various natural resources trustees, including the Department of the Interior, to determine how to facilitate the sale of the designated essential mineral rights.

DOE anticipates that long-term costs will exceed $1.3 billion. The bulk of these costs will be the cost to DOE for pensions and postretirement benefits (primarily medical and life insurance coverage) for the contractor’s Rocky Flats employees. These costs will likely exceed $1 billion, including about $822 million in medical benefits alone. DOE is liable for such costs under the provisions of not only the 2000 contract, but also previous site management contracts with Kaiser-Hill and its predecessors. Postretirement benefits and pensions are part of the total allowable compensation for DOE contractor employees, and DOE considers them to be necessary to attract the most qualified employees. DOE Order 350.1 provides that when operations at a DOE facility are terminated and no other work is to occur under the contract (as in the case of Rocky Flats), pension and postretirement health benefit continuation will be provided by DOE for those contractor employees who earned retirement benefits in these plans. According to actuarial estimates prepared for DOE by a consultant, payments for contractor employees at Rocky Flats will continue until about 2064.

At Rocky Flats, 2,815 (43 percent) of 6,616 contractor employees were eligible for postretirement benefits. These employees worked for either the prime contractor (Kaiser-Hill) or one of its major subcontractors, and retired between January 1, 1995, and December 31, 2005. The estimated cost of over $1 billion does not include pensions and postretirement benefits for employees who would have become eligible if the site had closed on its original target closure date of December 31, 2006. When the site closed more than a year ahead of schedule, the early closure date preceded the eligibility date for full pensions and postretirement benefits of 34 employees, according to a contractor official.

Costs for the long-term stewardship of the site are estimated at $303 million. Long-term stewardship includes site surveillance and maintenance, as well as management of site records and information systems. For many decades to come, DOE will need to monitor environmental conditions at the site and maintain the systems and structures that remain there (e.g., groundwater treatment systems, ponds and surface water control features, and landfills). According to draft DOE guidance, surveillance and maintenance refers to “all activities necessary to ensure protection of human health and the environment following cleanup at a site, in perpetuity.” Thus, while long-term stewardship costs are estimated through about 2080, some costs will continue beyond that, depending on the extent of stewardship needed.

Our 2001 report noted that the total cost could rise if any claims for monetary damages were brought against DOE to compensate for injuries to natural resources. Under CERCLA, federal, state, and Indian tribal officials who have been designated as trustees can file claims for monetary damages for injuries to natural resources (including wildlife, fish, and lakes) resulting from releases of hazardous substances. Damages are usually for injuries that were not rectified by the cleanup and are to be used to restore, replace, or acquire equivalent resources. In a November 2005 report, DOE’s Inspector General said that DOE had not yet conducted the required Natural Resource Damage Assessment at Rocky Flats and that only the completion of that assessment would determine whether additional costs will be ultimately incurred.

But speculation about the potential cost of natural resource damage claims at the site was laid to rest with passage of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act. Under the act, a natural resource damage liability claim would be considered to be satisfied by the purchase of mineral rights for $10 million, as authorized by the act, or the payment of the authorized $10 million to the natural resource trustees, or a combination of the two, for a total payment of $10 million. Although DOE had agreed with the Inspector General’s recommendation to immediately initiate the damage assessment, the subsequent provisions of the Defense Authorization Act rendered the damage assessment requirement moot.

Numerous Measures Were Taken to Assess the Cleanup’s Sufficiency, but DOE Could Improve Its Oversight of Data Quality and Clarify Its Verification Policy

Numerous measures were and are being taken to assess the sufficiency of the cleanup; although these measures appear adequate, DOE did not carry out some aspects of its oversight responsibilities. Cleanup assessment measures include (1) the completion of the CERCLA and RCRA regulatory process, (2) DOE’s verification of the contractor’s remediation of radiologically contaminated soil, and (3) other reviews by federal agencies and independent consultants. The first assessment measure—completion of the CERCLA and RCRA regulatory review and approval process—relies on remediation data collected throughout the cleanup. Our review showed that the contractor appeared to have comprehensive quality controls for data. Nevertheless, DOE did not independently review the quality of these data. A DOE official said that, while he had no explanation for DOE’s not conducting the required reviews, DOE officials’ day-to-day review of data did enable them to detect data issues as they arose. The second assessment measure—DOE’s verification of the contractor’s actions to remediate radiologically contaminated surface soil—was not completed. DOE decided to eliminate parts of the planned independent review of the accuracy of contractor-conducted scans for remaining radiological contamination because DOE officials decided that the likely results would not justify the completion of an independent review. The third assessment measure—outside reviews—included a consultant review that convinced DOE to revise a key water management strategy at the site, and a federal review that found no public health hazard for the communities surrounding Rocky Flats.

DOE Did Not Independently Review the Quality of Cleanup Data Crucial to the Regulatory Process

DOE did not independently review the quality of the data obtained throughout the cleanup—data crucial to the first assessment of the cleanup’s sufficiency, the CERCLA and RCRA process. As discussed earlier, the final steps of this regulatory process are still in progress, but much of the process is complete. Key data were obtained through a four-step process of remediating 360 individual areas at Rocky Flats, and EPA and Colorado documented their approval of these cleanups in closeout reports, giving DOE officials confidence that the site will meet the final cleanup requirements. The closeout reports also include data on residual contamination (i.e., the contamination that remains following completion of the cleanup action). The residual contamination data were analyzed in a draft comprehensive risk assessment that was part of the remedial investigation/feasibility study, which determined that the site’s overall risk falls within EPA’s acceptable risk range. Because the data from the accelerated actions are crucial to the regulatory agencies’ final decision on the sufficiency of the cleanup, we reviewed the controls in place to ensure the quality of these data. We discussed these data quality policies and procedures with DOE, EPA, Colorado, and contractor and subcontractor officials and determined that, although the contractor’s data quality controls appeared robust and comprehensive, DOE could improve its oversight of them. Further, our review of several closeout documents revealed that the policies and procedures were generally followed.

Soil Cleanup Actions Followed a Four-Step Process

At Rocky Flats, accelerated soil cleanup actions were generally completed and approved through a four-step process. As of May 2006, EPA and Colorado officials said they had approved the closeout reports on all 360 areas of known or suspected contamination at Rocky Flats and had concluded that no further accelerated cleanup actions were necessary for those areas. Closeout reports are the last step of a regulatory approach that documented the accelerated cleanup actions taken, quantified contaminants remaining after the cleanup actions were completed, and documented whether the project goals had been met. The remediation of each area of soil contamination at Rocky Flats followed a four-step process: characterization, contaminant remediation, confirmation sampling, and clean fill and project documentation.

The first step—characterization—identified whether contamination had occurred. The contractor had to design a sampling and analysis approach for each specific cleanup area and receive DOE’s approval before submitting the approach to the regulatory agencies for their review and approval. Once a potentially contaminated area was identified, the contractor would propose one of several approaches to collect the necessary samples. For example, the contractor might choose a standard statistical sampling approach, which entails designing a sample grid capable of identifying an elevated area of contamination with 90 percent confidence, then applying that grid to the actual cleanup area. Sample collection involved taking small scoops of dirt, which were analyzed in a laboratory for a variety of contaminants such as metals, volatile organic compounds, and radionuclides.

The second step—contaminant remediation—cleans up any contaminants that characterization found to exceed acceptable levels. Again, the contractor would prepare a remediation plan, based on a standardized approach for removing soil, in consultation with EPA, Colorado, and members of the public, for EPA and Colorado to approve. Once approval was granted, the contractor could proceed with the actual cleanup. Cleanup typically involved digging out the contaminated soil, packaging it, and shipping it to a licensed treatment or disposal facility. The depth to which soil was removed varied depending on the type and severity of contamination. In some areas, less than a foot of soil needed to be removed; in other areas, 20 feet of soil needed to be removed. The contractor took samples throughout the remediation to identify when the remediation goal had been met and could then move on to the third step. According to officials of both EPA and Colorado, they frequently directed their staff to observe the cleanup actions to ensure they were being implemented as agreed. Colorado officials said that, while the frequency and duration of their oversight varied by project, daily interaction and observation by Colorado staff was typical.

The third step—confirmation sampling—required taking small scoops of dirt from areas where the contractor believed remediation was complete, and having them analyzed for the presence of previously identified contaminants. The samples could be analyzed at an on-site laboratory or sent off site, depending on the types of contaminants. If the laboratory confirmed that the contaminants had been removed to an acceptable level, the contractor could move on to the next step. If the laboratory results showed an unacceptable level of contaminants, then additional soil would be removed, followed by additional confirmation sampling. Additional soil removal and sampling rarely occurred, however, because field measurements and analyses were used to guide the remediation work before the final confirmation samples were taken.

The fourth and final step—clean fill and project documentation—included filling the excavated area and preparing a closeout report that documented that the cleanup had met the stated goals and quantified any residual contamination. The contractor generally filled the excavated area with Rocky Flats alluvium, a mixture of sand, dirt, and gravel. Documentation of residual contamination was important to the regulatory process because these data were instrumental in completing the remedial investigation and feasibility study, including the comprehensive risk assessment. After DOE approved the closeout report, it was delivered to the regulatory agencies for final approval. The regulatory agencies’ approval meant that the cleanup was sufficient and that no further accelerated action was needed. This four-step remediation process is illustrated in figure 11.

Although soil remediation was the primary cleanup focus at Rocky Flats, some groundwater required remediation for elevated levels of uranium, nitrates, and volatile organic compounds. Three passive systems were installed to treat the contaminants in the groundwater. At one former waste-drum storage area, for example, remediation of a carbon tetrachloride plume, along with other volatile organic compounds, involved excavating about 700 cubic yards of contaminated soils, treating them through thermal desorption, and then constructing a passive treatment system that uses iron filings to cleanse contaminants from the groundwater. Figure 12 shows the cleanup of a plume of carbon tetrachloride and other volatile organic compounds (VOC) that originated from a waste-drum storage area at Rocky Flats.

Because of the tendency of plutonium and americium particles to cling to soil, a primary concern among stakeholders was the potential off-site transport of soil contaminated with plutonium and americium via surface water. Contaminated soil washes into ditches and streams when it rains or snows. Accordingly, cleanup efforts have focused on the surface soils to reduce the source of radionuclides that could be susceptible to erosion and eventual transport off site via Walnut and Woman Creeks. Also, surface water is managed and monitored both on site—through a series of holding ponds—and at the points where it leaves the site. The ponds, which DOE constructed decades ago to retain any major release during operations, are used to ensure that water leaving the site meets all applicable water quality standards. DOE operates the final pond in each series as a “batch and release” system; that is, releases from those ponds occur only after water sampling has confirmed that the water meets water quality standards. The efficacy of the accelerated cleanup actions taken to protect water quality will be evaluated in the remedial investigation/feasibility study. Figure 13 shows the terminal pond in one series.

The draft sitewide comprehensive risk assessment, one of several documents that will contribute to the final regulatory decision on the sufficiency of the Rocky Flats cleanup, concluded that the cumulative remaining risk to human health and the environment at Rocky Flats is acceptable. The draft comprehensive risk assessment—part of the larger remedial investigation and feasibility study—concluded that the cumulative risk to human health, after completion of the accelerated cleanup actions, falls at the more protective end of EPA’s “excess cancer rate” risk range of between 1 in 10,000 and 1 in 1,000,000. This is the range that EPA considers to be adequately protective of human health.

As discussed previously, the Rocky Flats cleanup was designed so that any residual contamination after completion of the accelerated cleanup actions would be documented in closeout reports and subsequently analyzed in accordance with the exposure assumptions in the sitewide comprehensive risk assessment. The comprehensive risk assessment incorporated approximately 2 million data records and examined both human and ecological risk. Specific tasks included identifying remaining contamination at Rocky Flats and determining whether it can adversely affect humans, animals, or plants; determining whether pathways exist whereby human or ecological receptors may come into contact with these contaminants, for example, through inhalation or ingestion of surface water; assessing the contaminants’ potential effects, including cancer, on the human and ecological receptors, where complete pathways exist; and calculating the potential risk to the human and ecological receptors, based on the pathways and the levels and toxicity of the contaminants.

The human health risk assessment calculated the risk that residual contaminants posed to wildlife refuge workers and visitors. The assessment identified five residual contaminants at the site that could affect human health, including plutonium located adjacent to the most contaminated precleanup areas of the site. The risk model assumed that the primary pathways for plutonium were either through inhalation or through skin contact. Based on assumptions about how frequently a wildlife refuge worker would be exposed to residual plutonium at the site, the model calculated an EPA acceptable risk of 1 in 500,000 excess cancers, and an even lesser risk for a refuge visitor.

The ecological risk assessment estimated the risk that exposure to any residual contaminants would pose to species of concern, including the Preble’s Meadow jumping mouse, a protected species. After modeling risks to selected terrestrial and aquatic species, the risk assessment concluded that the residual contaminants at Rocky Flats do not represent a significant risk of adverse ecological effects to these species.

Nearly all respondents to our community group survey expressed confidence in the cleanup’s outcome. Specifically, 11 of 25 respondents said they were very or extremely confident that the cleanup will be protective of public health and the environment, and another 12 said they were somewhat confident.

Rocky Flats Cleanup Data Quality Procedures Comprehensive, but DOE’s Oversight Was Lacking

One of the most important aspects of the cleanup process was ensuring the validity of the data used to determine whether the site had been remediated to the agreed-upon levels. However, DOE did not complete the independent and management assessments required by the cleanup agreement to ensure that these data quality controls were working as intended. We identified four key data quality controls: establishing data quality objectives, using data quality parameters, verifying and validating data, and auditing laboratories that analyzed samples for Rocky Flats. Our review showed that the contractor generally followed these data quality controls and documented its compliance with them. Appendix IV contains additional information on the four data quality controls and our review of the contractor’s compliance with them.

Although the data quality controls the contractor had in place appeared to be robust and comprehensive, DOE did not conduct independent assessments to ensure that this was the case. Specifically, DOE did not conduct the management and independent assessments called for by the quality assurance project plan. A quality assurance project plan describes the planning, implementation, and assessment procedures for a particular project, as well as any specific quality assurance and quality control activities. These independent assessments, according to DOE’s Management Assessment and Independent Assessment Guide, are intended to measure the adequacy of work performance, among other things. Among the essential areas that should be assessed, according to the guide, are data quality controls such as calibration controls, computer software controls, and environmental management systems.

DOE’s failure to conduct independent assessments is particularly troubling because of the importance of the cleanup and residual contamination data. These data were not only the basis for EPA’s and Colorado’s approvals of the accelerated cleanup actions, but also the foundation for EPA’s and Colorado’s pending decisions about the overall sufficiency of the site’s cleanup. Without independent assessments of the contractor’s data quality control measures, DOE had no assurance that the controls were working as intended. Also troubling was that EPA and Colorado—the regulatory agencies that jointly approved the site’s quality assurance project plan and are responsible for ensuring its implementation—were unfamiliar with these assessment requirements. When we discussed with EPA officials DOE’s failure to conduct independent or management assessments, they acknowledged that their confidence in the data quality would have been increased had DOE completed these assessments. A DOE official said he had no explanation for DOE’s not conducting the required assessments, other than that DOE officials had reviewed sampling and analysis plans, remediation plans, and closeout reports, and discussed with the contractor any data quality issues that arose.

Colorado officials said they reviewed the data and the controls provided by the contractor, which is the state’s standard procedure for determining the usability of data provided it, and that DOE’s failure to conduct assessments of the data does not affect the decisions made by the state. Colorado noted that it did not have significant issues with the data provided, and that any data issues were resolved using the consultative process, including bringing in experts to discuss and resolve specific issues. In addition, Colorado said, it performed routine independent sampling and analysis of water samples, as well as occasional building samples, which confirmed the data results provided to the state. Accordingly, although DOE assessments might have provided another check on data quality and adequacy, the lack of these assessments had little adverse effect on the quality or usability of the data and does not cloud the results or appropriateness of the site’s cleanup.

DOE’s Planned Cleanup Verification Not Completed

The second assessment of the cleanup’s sufficiency—DOE’s planned verification of the contractor’s remediation of radiologically contaminated soil—was inconsistent and not completed as planned. DOE policy currently requires radiological cleanup to be verified, but the policy is unclear about how and why verification should be done. DOE’s planned verification for the cleanup at Rocky Flats was twofold: First, DOE asked the contractor to develop a final scanning and sampling plan, and second, DOE asked its Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) to develop a separate verification plan that included a review of contractor- conducted scans for remaining radiological contamination. However, DOE chose not to complete several of the plan’s objectives, including part of ORISE’s review. A DOE official said they had decided that these activities would not provide sufficient additional information to justify their completion, but he had no documentation to support this decision. As a result, DOE lost the opportunity to independently verify the sufficiency of several aspects of the cleanup.

The respondents to our community group survey had mixed views on the degree to which the verification activities—in the aggregate—affected their confidence in the site’s cleanup. Of the 21 (of 25) who provided responses, 13 said that the verification activities greatly or somewhat increased their confidence in the site’s cleanup. Another 8 said the verification activities had no effect or a negative effect on their confidence. The remaining four said they either did not know or had no basis to judge.

DOE Policy Unclear on Application and Purpose of Verification

Although DOE has a general policy on radiological cleanup verification, its guidance is unclear on how the policy applies and what the verification goals are. In January 2001, the Secretary of Energy issued a memorandum that contained guidance on the release of radiological property and directed DOE field offices to “establish independent verification programs” that “should be commensurate with the potential for contamination, as well as the complexity and hazard.” Additional DOE guidance on verification is found in other documents, including draft guidance called “Control and Release of Property with Residual Radioactive Material;” this document implements guidance for DOE Order 5400.5, which includes requirements for the release of radiologically contaminated property. The draft guidance, which was approved for interim use, includes a section on verification that states that “the DOE organization responsible for the release of property should verify or provide for independent verification of the radiological condition of the property before release.” However, the draft neither contains specific guidance about verification techniques nor specifies the goals of verification. Accordingly, it was little help to Rocky Flats officials and may have contributed to the inconsistent implementation of the verification plan.

Lacking clear guidance, DOE’s project manager at Rocky Flats said he took a common sense approach that, in his view, fulfills the intent of DOE’s policy by cleaning the site up through the CERCLA and RCRA process. That is, he believes that the regulatory agencies’ approvals of the radiological cleanup actions at the site constitute independent verification. However, the official acknowledged that there is room for interpretation and disagreement on this issue. Another area of confusion was what the goals of the independent verification should be. At Rocky Flats, DOE officials commissioned a cleanup verification plan that used a different methodology than the one used to implement the cleanup. The result was that while the cleanup verification confirmed that an area had met the standards of the cleanup agreement, it also identified “hot spots” that caused alarm among the public at the end of the 10-year cleanup. The Rocky Flats manager stated that clear guidance on independent verification would have been helpful, especially as to how it related to CERCLA cleanups.

DOE Did Not Fully Implement Its Planned Verification or Explain Its Reasons for Not Doing So

Although DOE agreed to ORISE’s final verification plan, DOE did not fully implement it and did not offer a public explanation for its decision. Specifically, ORISE never completed two of its objectives—an assessment of the aerial and ground-based scanning and an assessment of the contractor’s investigations of the results of the aerial and targeted ground- based scans. According to a DOE official, DOE decided in mid-September 2005 that it needed to re-evaluate the need for ORISE’s work. DOE decided that because the contractor’s aerial survey had failed to find any anomalies, ORISE’s remaining work was unnecessary. DOE remained unsure about the final outcome of the ground-based scanning but still decided not to ask ORISE to complete the remaining objectives. A DOE official explained that completing the work was not warranted, given the results of the aerial and ground-based scanning. According to an ORISE official, DOE’s Rocky Flats Project Office notified ORISE on November 11, 2005, that it would not be asked to complete the remaining objectives. Additional information on DOE’s independent verification is contained in appendix IV.

Independent Consultants and Other Federal Agencies Conducted Additional Cleanup Reviews, and Some Influenced DOE’s Final Cleanup Strategy

Reviews conducted by independent consultants and other federal agencies commented on cleanup actions, and some reviews influenced the final cleanup strategy, thereby providing additional assurance to DOE and the regulatory agencies that their remedial decisions were correct. Independent consultants, hired by local stakeholder organizations, commented on several cleanup remedies, including surface and groundwater cleanup actions and landfill remediation. Some of these influenced the final cleanup; for example, a study on surface water management called for a specific pond discharge strategy, with which DOE concurred. On the other hand, DOE did not incorporate all comments and suggestions made by independent contractors, such as recommendations on how to close a landfill. Other federal agencies, including the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and FWS, also conducted studies, one of which concluded that no health hazard existed for surrounding communities. Another study is still under way.

Several Recommendations from Independent Consultants Were Incorporated into Site Remedies, but Disagreements and Concerns Remain

Independent consultants, hired by local communities or through the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments, conducted technical reviews of cleanup actions and provided recommendations, some of which DOE incorporated into its cleanup plan. The Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments sponsored these independent reviews to assure the local governments and the public that the cleanup would meet the regulatory guidelines. Overall, members of the Coalition initiated four technical reviews, which examined groundwater, surface water and pond management, and landfill remediation. The Coalition hired a consultant to comment on DOE’s independent verification process.

One instance in which DOE incorporated a recommendation from a consultant involved surface water management. During Rocky Flats’ operational days, a series of ponds was constructed as part of a surface water management system to ensure that no contaminated surface water left the site. As a safeguard to ensure that all water leaving the site meets the state’s water quality standards, the water is tested prior to its release. An independent consultant’s study raised the concern that DOE was allowing one of the terminal ponds to fill to a high level, thereby diminishing its ability to store large quantities of water should a heavy rainfall occur. Such an event could result in water being released without being tested. The independent review recommended that DOE maintain the pond at a lower capacity as a precautionary strategy, and DOE concurred. Another example was DOE’s concurrence with the Coalition consultant’s recommendation that ORISE include in its verification plan a 100 percent scan of certain areas to detect any residual contamination that might exceed established cleanup levels.

However, several of the independent consultants’ reviews identified points of contention with DOE’s ultimate cleanup approach. One area of contention involved the landfill that had been used at Rocky Flats in the 1950s and 1960s. DOE’s characterization of the landfill suggested that uranium and volatile organic compounds were present. DOE and the regulatory agencies subsequently agreed to implement an accelerated cleanup action that included buttressing the landfill to prevent the waste from slumping into Woman Creek; regrading parts of the landfill, which is located on a hillside, to prevent erosion; placing 2 feet of soil atop the surface to isolate the contaminants; installing storm water management berms to divert surface flows to perimeter channels; and seeding the entire cover, buttress, and channels with native grass species. An independent review disagreed with several aspects of this accelerated action, including that it did not include a biointrusion layer; these layers inhibit the ability of burrowing animals like mice and prairie dogs to bring contaminants up to the surface, where people at the site might be exposed to them. DOE and Colorado felt that a biointrusion layer was unnecessary because the accelerated cleanup action met the legal requirements for landfill closure, and the observed environmental conditions indicated that the landfill posed only a minimal risk. EPA added that the issue of biointrusion was examined during the remedy’s design, with the conclusion that the steep slope (18 percent), combined with the native grass cover, would not be attractive habitat for burrowing animals. In the end, a biointrusion layer was not included in the landfill cover. Monitoring of Woman Creek and wells will continue at locations both upgradient and downgradient of the landfill to ensure that no contaminants are escaping from the landfill.

Other Federal Reviews Concluded Minimal Risk or Are Still Under Way

The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), part of the Department of Health and Human Services, conducted a public health assessment that concluded that Rocky Flats poses no health hazard. Specifically, ATSDR concluded that the Rocky Flats data present a consistent picture that local residents’ current and future exposures to contaminants from Rocky Flats are below levels associated with adverse health effects. ATSDR officials conducted their own data reliability tests on the site’s data and concluded that the data were adequate to make public health decisions. The officials then assessed the contaminant pathways at Rocky Flats, including soil, air, and surface water and groundwater and concluded that environmental contamination at Rocky Flats posed no apparent public health hazard to surrounding communities. (However, ATSDR did not evaluate the health implications for people within the boundaries of Rocky Flats.) ATSDR offered several recommendations on how to ensure that the site’s contamination will not pose a future risk to residents of surrounding communities, including continued monitoring of surface water along the eastern boundary of the site and groundwater wells. DOE is not required to officially respond to the ATSDR recommendations, but reported that the recommendations had already been included, or were under discussion with the regulatory agencies for inclusion, in the postclosure monitoring and maintenance plans.

Additionally, as discussed previously, the 5-year reviews required by CERCLA will continue to compile information about whether remedies at the site continue to fully protect human health and the environment. The first 5-year review, completed in 2002, included areas of the site for which final decision documents (i.e., corrective action decisions/records of decision) had been completed, as well as areas where accelerated cleanup actions had been completed as of September 30, 2001. At that time, final decision documents had been completed for two areas (the 881 hillside and the off-site areas), and accelerated cleanup actions had been completed at several areas. Among the completed accelerated actions were the removal and, as necessary, treatment of contaminated debris and soil at several trenches; the installation of three groundwater treatment systems; the removal of contaminated sludge from solar evaporation ponds; and emptying and treating the contents of six underground storage tanks. The review concluded that the remedies for these two areas were protective and that the accelerated actions had addressed immediate hazards and were generally functioning as intended. The review of the off-site areas, though not required under EPA guidance, was nonetheless conducted because of the substantial public interest in those areas. The off-site areas did not have a defined boundary, but rather referred to off-site contamination emanating from Rocky Flats in general, including surface contamination of lands to the east of the site, along with the Great Western Reservoir, Standley Lake, and Mower Reservoir. The review concluded that all calculated excess cancer risks in the entire unit were well within or below EPA’s acceptable risk range of 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1,000,000.

Also, FWS sampled areas at Rocky Flats that are likely to become part of the future wildlife refuge. Prior to any transfer of land management authority to FWS, FWS typically surveys the property to identify any potential hazardous substances that pose a threat to fish and wildlife. In May 2006, consistent with its survey plan, FWS took 45 soil samples (including four duplicate samples), mostly along proposed trails as indicated in the Comprehensive Conservation Plan for the refuge. The samples will be examined for a range of potential contaminants, including metals, radionuclides, organics, and polychlorinated biphenyls, commonly referred to as PCBs. FWS took an additional 12 vegetation samples (including one duplicate sample), principally to ensure that any future prescribed burns will be safe. An FWS official said that the results of the laboratory analyses of the samples are due in early July, at an estimated cost of $70,000. If the results identify contaminants that concern them, FWS officials will notify DOE, EPA, and Colorado; the agencies will then determine what steps would need to be taken.

DOE Implemented Some Lessons Learned at Rocky Flats but Has No Requirement to Ensure That Lessons Learned Are Implemented at Other Sites

Although DOE has identified and implemented at other cleanup sites some lessons learned at Rocky Flats, DOE does not require applicable lessons learned at one cleanup site to be implemented at others. The Rocky Flats project offers many lessons about innovative techniques, risk- and cost- sharing contract provisions, accelerated cleanup processes, involvement of community groups, oversight of contractor controls over data quality, and cleanup verification processes. However, DOE has not developed a system to ensure that all lessons are captured and implemented as appropriate at other DOE sites. As a result, DOE may be missing valuable time- and cost- saving opportunities at other sites that are planning or undergoing cleanup.

DOE Identified Lessons from Rocky Flats and Assessed Their Applicability to Other Sites

DOE has gathered and disseminated to some other DOE sites numerous lessons learned at Rocky Flats. These lessons included the following: Clearly define government oversight of the contractor, and limit the number of DOE personnel providing direction.

Conduct external reviews of the project baselines to build credibility and provide objective recommendations for project improvement.

Use employee incentives to reward high-performing individuals.

Use a flexible project management approach that allows the contractor to complete the project in the safest and most cost-effective manner.

Establish a clear “end state” vision and risk-based cleanup defined in conjunction with specific future land/site use.

Develop and use an integrated project baseline schedule and budget.

Use government-furnished services and items to integrate and manage the delivery of items not within the contractor’s control.

Implement new technology that significantly accelerates the schedule and reduces total costs, such as techniques for reducing the number of radioactive waste shipments off site for disposal.

In October 2002, DOE authorized a corporate review team to determine the effectiveness of DOE cleanup efforts. In 2003, the team reviewed work activities, management processes, and contract administration practices at selected sites, and used a checklist of more than 50 lessons learned at Rocky Flats to assess their applicability and potential benefits to each site. The review team issued nine reports with findings and recommendations. With the exception of one report, which was part of the preliminary review effort, each report also included the team’s determination of whether the lessons on the checklist applied to the sites, and the progress the sites had made toward implementing applicable lessons learned.

DOE Lacks a System for Ensuring Continued Collection and Implementation of Lessons Learned at Its Cleanup Sites

During 2004 and 2005, DOE’s Office of Performance Assessment conducted follow-up reviews of many of the sites the corporate review team had reviewed earlier. These follow-up reviews, however, did not assess whether the sites had implemented the lessons learned from Rocky Flats. According to the DOE official responsible for tracking the status of these reviews, DOE does not require sites to implement applicable lessons from Rocky Flats (or from other cleanup sites). Instead, he said, each site is responsible for tracking its implementation of these lessons. Although he said he believes the sites are taking steps to implement those lessons and are continuing to improve their systems for managing cleanup, he had no documentation to support his conclusions.

DOE’s Office of Performance Assessment reviewed lessons learned at Rocky Flats in the March 2004 and June 2005 Rocky Flats baseline performance review reports. In the 2004 report, DOE noted that valuable information and processes from Rocky Flats should be available to other sites that are beginning the cleanup process. The report noted that DOE’s Rocky Flats office had begun a program to archive project cost information that could be used to prepare cost estimates for future contracts at other sites, and recommended that the office develop a database that identifies the number of personnel and time durations required to perform specific cleanup tasks. According to the Rocky Flats DOE manager, the cost- archiving program continued to provide periodic information updates, and provided the final download of project data to DOE’s Office of Engineering and Construction Management in December 2005. The 2005 Rocky Flats baseline performance review report included 30 additional lessons learned at Rocky Flats. Among these were improved contract language that established a close working relationship between DOE and the contractor, made measurement of progress easier, and reduced the need for contract changes; improved safety processes at the site; consolidated procurement functions; and streamlined methods for handling and shipping radioactive waste and disposing of excess property. One of the lessons identified in the 2005 report actually resulted from a request from another cleanup site. A DOE official in the Office of Performance Assessment told us that officials at DOE’s Office of Environmental Management visited Rocky Flats in 2005 to document lessons learned from the demolition of a plutonium- processing building. They visited Rocky Flats at the request of DOE officials at the Savannah River site who were designing a similar facility and sought information from the Rocky Flats demolition that might improve the design of their building.

Although DOE has a database of environmental safety and health lessons, it does not have a database of broader lessons learned across the DOE complex. DOE has a nationwide database managed by the Society for Effective Lessons Learned Sharing, a volunteer DOE organization dedicated to identifying, sharing, and using lessons learned in order to improve the safety, efficiency, and effectiveness of DOE work processes. These lessons focus primarily on individual safety incidents and how to prevent their recurrence. However, the database generally does not capture lessons dealing with broader issues such as contract management, pricing, and working with regulatory agencies. Consequently, DOE may not be maximizing the use of valuable information that could save time and money. “DOE Headquarters has a responsibility to assure that such lessons are being transferred across sites with similar facilities. Sharing lessons learned needs aggressive attention; without it valuable savings are lost and frustrations compounded. Lessons learned are useful for mitigating risk and providing training material for project directors/managers.

The report also recommended that DOE proactively encourage the sharing of lessons learned. According to a DOE headquarters official, a national database of lessons learned from closure sites would allow DOE to proactively share experiences that would benefit future closure operations.

Rocky Flats Offers Additional Lessons That May Be Applicable to Other DOE Sites

During our review, we gathered additional lessons learned at Rocky Flats that could be useful for other DOE sites. These lessons include the following: Safety is a priority. According to DOE officials, this lesson was reinforced throughout Rocky Flats’ cleanup. Early in the cleanup, DOE officials recognized that a significant investment in hazard identification, safety planning, and safety implementation (i.e., the integrated safety management system) during the actual work would ensure that the work was performed without unacceptable risks or unnecessary delays. Later, DOE officials said they came to understand that this focus on safety not only helped work progress, but also facilitated efficiency by building trust and engaging the workforce. Safety was both consistent with, and essential to, effective project execution.

Performance-based contract incentives improve results.

According to DOE officials, the first contract they had with Kaiser-Hill demonstrated that attaching incentives to clearly defined performance measures vastly improved actual results. The 2000 contract took the concept to the next level, providing large incentives to the contractor and the workers to safely and compliantly complete the cleanup within the target schedule and cost. The additional incentives for schedule and cost savings resulted in closure more than a year ahead of schedule and $530 million under budget. However, as previously noted, such incentives are not always this successful, and the financial incentive offered at Rocky Flats was only one of many factors contributing to the cleanup’s early completion.

Take a consultative approach to cleanup decisions. As previously discussed, the collaborative process was essential to the cleanup’s early completion. According to DOE officials, the cleanup was successful because all of the stakeholders were engaged in the process and supportive of the ultimate goal. The input of numerous key figures, including members of Congress, senior DOE managers, state and local elected officials, and officials of federal and state regulatory agencies, was actively solicited and ultimately met with the convergence of the cleanup agreement, the contract, and the desired end state. DOE officials said they communicated openly and often with stakeholders to seek the best solutions, and they came to value input from formerly dogmatic opponents. Moreover, Colorado, EPA, DOE, and the contractor worked closely together on cleanup decisions from the beginning through the end. As cleanup proceeded on an area, Colorado had access to meetings and detailed information about the cleanup. In the event that Colorado or EPA considered a particular activity to be unsafe, the Rocky Flats cleanup agreement granted them the authority to stop work.

Don’t let unresolved issues delay progress. DOE officials said that if they had focused on what they could not do or delayed work until all questions were answered, the project would not have been completed and the target completion date would probably still be in question. Colorado officials emphasized, however, that this does not mean that work progressed without the appropriate approvals from Colorado and EPA. It is Colorado’s understanding that the consultative process, with all of its oversight and meetings to discuss activities and issues, ensured that all issues were addressed and resolved in a timely manner before activities occurred.

Obtain stable project funding. As discussed earlier, consistent project funding was a key factor in the cleanup’s early completion. According to DOE and EPA officials, congressional and departmental commitment to stable funding over the life of the project aided tremendously in project planning and execution. Also, the stable funding helped in regulatory interactions and credibility with the general public.

Involve the future site manager in remedial decisions. According to FWS, when a former DOE site is considered for conversion to a wildlife refuge, it is “vastly preferable” for FWS to be involved early in the cleanup process and have a decision-making role. DOE officials agreed and said they have actively involved FWS since passage of the Refuge Act. According to DOE officials, FWS substantially influenced cleanup decisions, even in areas of the site that will not become part of the future refuge. For example, they said, FWS’s input effected a major change in the cover design for the present landfill. Additionally, FWS influenced the composition of the revegetation seed mixes sitewide and the methods of protecting sensitive habitat and endangered species. But DOE did not incorporate all of FWS’s suggestions, such as characterizing and disposing of waste in the original landfill, incorporating barriers around landfills to discourage intrusion by burrowing animals, and using irrigation and soil amendment to enhance the success of seeded native vegetation. According to DOE officials, the two agencies’ different perspectives on cleanup methods highlight the difficulty of coordination between two federal agencies that have different missions. These difficulties can persist even when staff of the two agencies are collocated and interact daily, as was the case at Rocky Flats. In retrospect, DOE officials said, it would have been better to recognize that difficulty early and obtain an executive–level consensus on the vision for the outcome.

Be aware of potential beryllium contamination. According to a senior contractor official, beryllium was “ubiquitous” at the site; it was found even in containers of metals and oxides. In terms of worker safety, beryllium was more of a predemolition challenge than other contaminants because there is no effective way to monitor beryllium on a real-time basis.

Question accepted technologies. The contractor was able to save substantial money and time at Rocky Flats by questioning the usual disposal and remediation processes. For example, the accepted practice was that a glovebox or any part of one was, by definition, transuranic waste. However, the contractor found a way to decontaminate gloveboxes and dispose of them much more easily and less expensively as low-level waste. According to a senior contractor official, this particular technical lesson learned at Rocky Flats may be applicable to DOE’s cleanup work at the Hanford site.

Contain contaminated water. According to an official with the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, lessons learned at Rocky Flats included the importance of ensuring that there are no underground drainage systems or conduits when large amounts of water are used during a cleanup. This lesson stemmed from an unfortunate experience in the cleanup of building 771, when water used in decontamination efforts seeped into underground conduits that had not been adequately plugged. The water flushed contaminants through the conduits, resulting in elevated levels of americium in one series of ponds at the site. This turned out to be an expensive lesson, as the contractor had to bring in equipment and treat about 26 million gallons of americium-contaminated water.

Although DOE captured and implemented at other sites some of the lessons it learned at Rocky Flats, others risk being lost. For example, contractor and DOE officials said that at Rocky Flats, and at other cleanup sites, many lessons that could be gleaned from records and data will be lost if not recorded, summarized, or otherwise captured and shared. According to the Rocky Flats manager, an effort termed the “Legacy Project” was begun in 2001 to start collecting the project knowledge and lessons before the institutional memory was lost. This effort continued intermittently through the summer of 2005, drawing upon record documents, working papers, and personal experience. Also, DOE Rocky Flats officials said that officials of DOE’s Legacy Management office in Grand Junction, Colorado, had shared with them lessons learned from the Grand Junction office’s experience working with the long-term management of sites formerly contaminated by uranium mill tailings. According to the Rocky Flats manager, these lessons will be brought to Rocky Flats as Legacy Management executes its responsibilities for site management and maintenance. As the mission scope of Legacy Management expands, it will continue to carry experience from Rocky Flats to other sites that are transferred to it for long-term care. Also, although DOE officials told us in March 2005 that they were planning a workshop on lessons learned at Rocky Flats in decontamination and demolition, that workshop has not been held. According to the Rocky Flats manager, several technical assist visits occurred with contractor and DOE personnel from sites in Idaho, Ohio, and Washington. These visits were believed to be more focused and efficient than a workshop format. At this time, a general workshop is not planned; however, technical assist and assessment visits to facilitate the sharing of lessons are continuing.

DOE officials at Rocky Flats have drafted the Rocky Flats Closure Legacy report, a lengthy document that captures the 4-year effort of the Legacy Project. It is currently at DOE headquarters for review and comment and is expected to be released in June 2006.

Conclusions

Strong DOE oversight of data quality is important because accurate and complete data are paramount to DOE’s, EPA’s, and Colorado’s decisions about the sufficiency of the Rocky Flats cleanup. At Rocky Flats, DOE placed undue reliance on the contractor to have appropriate data quality controls, and did not complete the required management and independent assessments of the data’s quality. Our review showed that the contractor at Rocky Flats appeared to have comprehensive data quality controls, but this does not negate DOE’s responsibility to independently monitor and assess those controls throughout the cleanup. Also, although DOE policies call for independent verification of cleanup results, the applicability of the policies to cleanups conducted under CERCLA or RCRA is unclear. Lacking clear and specific guidance on cleanup verification, DOE officials at Rocky Flats undertook what they thought was a reasonable approach. However, DOE did not complete all of the cleanup verification activities it had planned; it also did not publicly explain its rationale for not doing so. As a result, DOE lost a valuable opportunity to increase public awareness of, and confidence in, the verification results. Ironically, although the verification activities were undertaken to increase public confidence in the cleanup, the results sparked additional questions from the public. Finally, although DOE has implemented at other cleanup sites some of the lessons learned at Rocky Flats, DOE does not require that lessons learned at one site be implemented, where applicable, at other sites. As a result, DOE stands to lose the benefits that such lessons have to offer.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve DOE’s oversight of cleanup activities, its conduct of cleanup verification activities, and its monitoring of lessons learned at DOE cleanup sites, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following three actions: Ensure that DOE independently assesses contractors’ controls over data quality.

Clarify guidance on whether and how to conduct cleanup verification activities.

Assess the costs and benefits of developing a method to track the lessons learned from cleanup activities at DOE sites across the nation, including methods for determining whether lessons are being applied at applicable locations.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DOE, Interior, EPA, Colorado, and Kaiser-Hill for their review and comment. DOE, Interior, Colorado, and Kaiser-Hill provided written comments (see apps. V, VI, VII, and VIII, respectively). EPA did not provide official written comments but did provide editorial and technical suggestions, as did the other agencies, that we incorporated, as appropriate.

DOE commented that it found the report to be comprehensive, generally thorough, clear, and well structured. DOE agreed that a robust and effective lessons learned program would be beneficial and said it intends to follow through and revitalize such a program within DOE’s Office of Environmental Management. DOE reiterated the importance of teamwork and agency support in accelerating the cleanup of the Rocky Flats site, noting that the regulatory agencies, community groups, and local government organizations worked tirelessly along with DOE and contractor organizations to overcome obstacles. DOE also emphasized that the high priority given the Rocky Flats cleanup within the DOE complex and at the congressional level, together with the provision of level annual funding, was critical to the success of the project.

DOE did not agree or disagree with our recommendations that it ensure independent assessments of data quality and clarify its guidance on cleanup verification. In its specific comments, however, DOE noted that there is direction and guidance on independent verification and other independent assessments, and referenced several documents that provide such guidance. We were aware of these documents and had discussed several of them with DOE officials at the Rocky Flats Project Office, who said the documents were not helpful in guiding their decisions about whether to conduct verification activities or how to ensure compatibility between available verification strategies and the cleanup strategies undertaken at the site.

In its specific comments, DOE also stated that there is an additional regulatory step DOE must take before releasing the site to the Department of the Interior, pursuant to the requirements of DOE Order 5400.5 governing the release of real property with residual radioactive material. DOE suggested that we reference this regulatory requirement in the report section dealing with additional steps to be taken. We did not adopt this suggestion because our report’s discussion of regulatory steps focused on those that remain to be taken by EPA and Colorado, the regulatory agencies at the site. We do, however, reference DOE Order 5400.5 and its draft implementing guidance in our discussion of cleanup verification activities. We noted that the draft implementing guidance neither contains specific guidance about verification techniques nor specifies the goals of verification and, consequently, was little help to Rocky Flats officials and may have contributed to the inconsistent implementation of the verification plan.

The Department of the Interior generally agreed with the information that pertains to the Fish and Wildlife Service. The department said that at this point, it is unable to determine when Rocky Flats will be open to the public, due to the uncertainty of the completion of the transfer of the site. We incorporated the department’s suggestion that we focus on the transfer of administrative jurisdiction from DOE to the department rather than focusing on when the public may access the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge. Also, as the department suggested, we clarified the discussions of actions EPA must take to facilitate the transfer and the acquisition of privately owned mineral rights.

Colorado commented that the report provides an appropriate recognition of issues and actions occurring during the remedial activities at Rocky Flats. Colorado emphasized that it has been an integral participant in Rocky Flats’ cleanup and closure; it provided continual in-depth regulatory oversight of the investigative and remedial activities for both building decontamination and demolition and environmental restoration. Colorado cited the dedicated efforts of its staff, along with the consultative process, as expediting completion of an accelerated cleanup that resulted in significant cost savings for DOE and for U.S. taxpayers.

Kaiser-Hill commented that the report was thorough, well-written, and accurate in its description of Kaiser-Hill’s role in the cleanup of Rocky Flats. Kaiser-Hill agreed with the report’s focus on the contribution of Kaiser-Hill’s workforce, and stated that the incentive contract played an important role in the success of the cleanup project. Kaiser-Hill noted that the success of the project was also due to the cooperative decision-making process that evolved among DOE, Kaiser-Hill, EPA, Colorado, and local communities, aided by a firm political commitment to accelerate the cleanup.

Kaiser-Hill said it believes that the report’s calculation of the total cost of the cleanup is misleading because it includes tangential costs such as health and pension benefits, which alone add about $1 billion to the cost reported. Kaiser-Hill noted that a significant portion of these benefit costs were accrued by previous contractors. Kaiser-Hill acknowledged, however, that such costs represent financial obligations to the taxpayer. For our purposes, inclusion of these costs was necessary to report total costs of the cleanup since 1995, including long-term costs.

Additionally, Kaiser-Hill commented that because the final disposition of trench T-7 (the fourth individual cleanup project we reviewed in depth) required only minimal cleanup, it was completed through the standard “no further accelerated action” justification process. According to the contractor, the justification documentation for such areas (those requiring minimal cleanup) should include information on data quality and adequacy, but not at the same level of detail as was required for other cleanup areas. We recognize that areas closed out through the “no further accelerated action” process may not necessitate the same level of data quality documentation as other areas. Nevertheless, the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement requires that the justification documentation for “no further accelerated action” areas include information on data quality and usability. The documentation we reviewed for trench T-7 did not include such information.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Energy and the Interior, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Kaiser-Hill Company, interested congressional committees, and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IX.

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our review objectives were to determine the (1) factors that contributed to the early completion of the physical cleanup at Rocky Flats; (2) work remaining as well as total project costs, including long-term costs; (3) measures in place to assess whether the cleanup achieved a level of protection of public health and environment consistent with the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement; and (4) lessons the Rocky Flats project may hold for other Department of Energy (DOE) cleanup projects.

In conducting our work, we visited the Rocky Flats site and reviewed documents and data prepared by DOE, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (Colorado), the Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the contractor, and various scientific organizations. We also interviewed officials of these entities.

To determine the factors that contributed to the physical cleanup’s early completion, we interviewed DOE, EPA, Colorado, and contractor officials and reviewed agency and contractor documents on cleanup accomplishments and techniques, project activity reports, and decontamination and demolition accomplishments. Information on innovative cleanup techniques is presented in appendix III.

To determine the work remaining as well as total project costs, including long-term costs, we reviewed documents and data prepared by DOE, EPA, Colorado, FWS, and the contractor, and interviewed officials of these entities. We reviewed documents and discussed issues pertaining to the cleanup requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended (CERCLA), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as amended (RCRA). We also reviewed documents and discussed issues pertaining to the plans for the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge, cost records and estimates, and pension plan provisions. We also analyzed documents related to the cost- plus-incentive-fee contract, including contract negotiation documents, the contract cost and fee structure, and contract modifications, but we did not evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the contract.

To determine the measures in place to assess whether the cleanup would achieve a level of protection of public health and environment consistent with the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement, we reviewed documents and discussed issues pertaining to cleanup verification strategies and results. We also reviewed scientific analyses, such as a study of how contaminants migrate through soil and water and an assessment of the public health risk posed by contaminants remaining at the site. We reviewed the general content of these analyses but did not evaluate the science underlying them.

In addition, because decisions about the sufficiency of the cleanup have been and will be based on remediation data, we assessed the soundness of the agencies’ and contractor’s processes and procedures for ensuring data quality. We visited the subcontractor that performed data verification and validation activities, and we reviewed the results of audits of the key laboratories used by the contractor to analyze samples of radioactively contaminated soil.

We also selected a nonprobability sample of four accelerated cleanup actions, based on several criteria, including whether EPA or Colorado was the lead regulatory agency and whether the contamination was in the surface soil or under contaminated buildings. Because radionuclide contamination was the primary concern at the site, we selected cleanup actions of plutonium-contaminated soil. For each selected cleanup action, we reviewed data quality controls pertaining to data quality objectives, data quality parameters, and data verification and validation. We did not evaluate the remedial data or analyses themselves. Information on our data quality review results and details of DOE’s verification activities are presented in appendix IV.

To determine the lessons the Rocky Flats project may hold for other DOE cleanup projects, we reviewed information and interviewed officials of DOE, EPA, FWS, Colorado, and the contractor about lessons learned at Rocky Flats and other sites. We reviewed documents related to and reports from DOE’s Society for Effective Lessons Learned Sharing database, and we interviewed DOE officials involved in various efforts to capture and disseminate lessons learned (from Rocky Flats and elsewhere throughout the DOE complex).

Further, to obtain citizen views about issues such as community input to the cleanup and the effect of various cleanup verification activities, we attended monthly meetings of the two local community groups that served in an advisory capacity to DOE: the Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board and the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments. We also surveyed current and past members (and current staff) of these two groups to obtain their opinions on questions such as how DOE engaged the groups in the cleanup process, how DOE used the groups’ input, how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with the cleanup’s results, and the degree to which DOE’s cleanup verification activities affected their confidence in the cleanup. We pretested the survey twice and revised the questions accordingly. We documented the responses and verified 100 percent of the documentation. Response rates and summary responses are presented in appendix II.

We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards from March 2005 through May 2006.

GAO Survey Methodology, Response Rates, and Summary Responses

To obtain citizen and local government views on the Rocky Flats cleanup, we surveyed current (as of December 2005) and past members and current staff of the two local community groups that served in an advisory capacity to DOE: the Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board and the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments. The survey included questions about how DOE engaged the groups in the cleanup process, how DOE used the groups’ input, what level of confidence group members had in the cleanup’s results, the degree to which DOE’s cleanup verification activities affected their confidence in the cleanup, and any remaining concerns they might have.

Survey Methodology

We designed the survey questions to elicit clear and unbiased responses. We pretested the survey twice and revised questions accordingly. We transferred the survey responses into a spreadsheet and the comments into a narrative document; we then verified that 100 percent of the information was transferred accurately from the individual surveys.

In total, we sent surveys to 58 members (current and past). We obtained group members’ e-mail addresses (or mailing addresses, when e-mail addresses were not available) from the directors of the Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board (Advisory Board) and the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments (Coalition). After e-mailing the survey, we e-mailed two reminder notices to encourage members to respond. Additionally, we attended both groups’ January 2006 meetings and personally encouraged members to submit their surveys.

Survey Response Rates We received a total of 25 responses, or 43 percent of the total surveys sent.

By subgroup, however (e.g., current members of one group, past members of one group), response rates varied widely. For example, the response rate for current members of the Advisory Board was 71 percent, whereas the response rate for current members of the Coalition was 35 percent. Table 1 shows the response rates by subgroup and in total.

Summary Responses

Following is a summary of the survey responses, by question, along with selected illustrative comments by respondents. Narrative responses are not provided in their entirety because we did not wish to introduce a perceptual bias. For some questions, that is, a majority of respondents offered positive and concise comments, but one or two respondents provided negative and lengthy comments. To present all of the comments in their entirety would thus give an unfair perception of emphasis, at least by sheer volume of narrative, to the negative minority and would diminish (again by volume) the positive majority. Accordingly, we summarized the comments to reflect the preponderance of responses, whether positive or negative.

The summary responses begin with question 5, as questions 1 through 4 sought information about whether the respondent was a current or former member of either the Advisory Board or the Coalition and about the length of time the respondent had served as a member of the group. 5. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with how DOE engaged the in the cleanup process?

Don’t know/no basis to judge 6. Please explain or provide examples of how DOE engaged the in the cleanup process.

Comments from 6 of the 21 respondents who reported being “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” (in response to question 5) included the following: “DOE actively engaged the Coalition and local communities in a variety of ways. . . provided opportunities for the Coalition to participate in certain decision-making processes, provided regular series of technical meetings keeping Coalition staff informed on various remediation activities, . . . basically interacted with the Coalition on an almost daily basis during the course of the site’s cleanup.”

DOE’s engagement “varied from one manager to another but was generally good. More important, the CDPHE , EPA and Kaiser-Hill consistently solicited the advice of the Board. In particular, the Board was given access to draft documents and decisions while they still being discussed. This permitted the Board to actively participate in the decision process and influence the decision instead of simply responding to a done deal.”

The “most important three items board makeup, board decision- making process, and board meeting time. The members include a couple of ex-nuclear submarine personnel, a couple of college professors, a groundwater expert, a mining expert, peace activists, etc.; in addition, the attendance and participation of DOE, regulators, cleanup contractors, FWS, and the general public provides technical, emotional, and general interest review on items. Board decisions require that all agree on all formal Board decisions, which forces constructive give and take in the decision making process. Meeting in the evening not only permits the general public to attend, it also permits regulators, DOE, contractors, FWS, etc., etc., to all attend and discuss items— may be the only time they all get together and discuss some of the items. DOE attends all meetings, presents data on requested topics, answers questions, and provides follow-up data as requested. We may not always agree but at least we get the data out there and discuss the issues. Operating as federal board is very important.” “I believe that the DOE did a good job in answering reasonable requests from Board members. did not always jump through every hoop presented nor should they have. Some requests were unreasonable; some would have been impossible, e.g., cleaning up soil to levels that technology couldn’t accomplish.”

DOE “seemed to listen to the Board and take their recommendations seriously, when it fit their plan. . . .” “For the most part, DOE provided copies of documents for review and comment and provided presentations on cleanup and closure issues and decisions. But, the closer to completion the site became, the harder it was to get documents in a timely fashion. As an example, we were usually provided documents at the same time as the regulators, but at the end we received them much later than the regulators. Legacy Management completely ignored the city’s input to LM’s Public Involvement Plan.” 7. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with how the input was used by DOE?

Don’t know/no basis to judge 0 8. Please explain or provide examples of how the input was used by DOE.

Comments from 5 of the 16 respondents who reported being “somewhat satisfied” (in response to question 7) included the following: “The RSAL issue was one on which the DOE listened to the and other public groups.” “In some cases DOE added information to documents or adjusted processes based on the Board’s input.” “The Board’s concerns about the original soil action levels were met with DOE’s agreement to fund the independent review.” “Our input was used on a number of fronts—pond management, ensuring the site would not be a disposal site, and strategy for remediating the original landfill, to name few. Most important is revising the RFCA to better reflect community priorities. The reason I checked ‘somewhat satisfied’ instead of ‘very satisfied’ is that we could never get DOE to incorporate stewardship planning into the cleanup process in a substantive manner. For DOE and the regulators, stewardship was an afterthought that got bucked to the end of the project and into regulatory closure space. We are now at the end of the project and we are still left wondering how DOE will address key questions concerning institutional controls.” “In the Independent Verification process, the Coalition pushed, and the DOE made some changes to their original proposal.” 9. Overall, what kind of effect, if any, do you believe the input had on the cleanup process?

Neither negative nor positive effect Don’t know/no basis to judge 1 10. Please explain or provide examples of how the input affected the cleanup process.

Comments from 7 of the 23 respondents who believed that their group’s input had a “very positive” or “somewhat positive” effect (in response to question 9) included the following: “Opposition of the and other entities to the 651 pCi/g RSAL for plutonium adopted for in the 1996 resulted in DOE funding a citizen oversight panel to hire independent scientific specialists to calculate radionuclide soil action levels (RSALs) for the site. Out of this study came the recommendation that the plutonium RSAL be reduced by 95% from 651 pCi/g to 35 pCi/g. While DOE did not accept this recommendation, it did work with the regulators to reduce the action level for in surface soil (top 3 feet) from 651 to 50 pCi/g. DOE and the regulators, however, pushed a tradeoff, in that in exchange for this better surface cleanup (top 3 feet) the public would have to accept having larger quantities of plutonium left in the subsurface environment—between 1000 and 7000 pCi/g at a depth of 3 to 6 feet below the surface, with no limit on the concentration allowed below 6 feet.” “The Board has had an impact on all areas of the cleanup process . . . from how the landfill caps were constructed, to the overall level of cleanup, to how buildings were safely removed. . . .” “I understand that in the beginning the Board had a tremendous impact on the cleanup. Because of the Board and community members, the surface soil cleanup levels were changed to be more conservative, from 651 pCi/g to 50 pCi/g. I feel the Board had less of an influence later in the process. However, because of the Board, DOE was aware that the community was watching, and I believe the community got a better cleanup because of that.” “DOE solicited a large amount of input from the Coalition over the course of the site’s cleanup. Although not all of the Coalition’s input was incorporated into cleanup plans, a substantial amount of Coalition positions were incorporated into the cleanup. As a result, local community buy-in into the process was enhanced. DOE, Kaiser-Hill, the regulators, and the Coalition were successful partners in the site’s closure.” “We were able to influence the level of cleanup. We were also able to get more cleanup in areas like the 903 pad in exchange for leaving building foundations in place—771 & 371.” “By the Coalition engaging in depth on matters of technical feasibility, schedule, cost, worker safety, D&D design and implementation, contaminant control and monitoring, it forced the DOE, regulators and Kaiser-Hill to focus and impart progress and planning to the Coalition board and public.” “The Coalition affected the cleanup on a number of levels. We were the best supporters and the most effective critic. We helped maintain congressional support for the project and held DOE, Kaiser-Hill and the regulators accountable. We were central to determining the future use of the site and to revising the cleanup priorities to better match the needs of the community. We brought DOE to the table in a public forum which, along principally with the , was central to ensuring the dialogue remained open. We pushed for a free flow of information.” 11. Please explain or provide examples of what, if anything, DOE might have done differently to change the effect of the input on the cleanup process.

Respondents offered a number of suggestions and comments, including the following: “The only change would be on the future monitoring of the site i.e., LSO which has been completely controlled by politics and not by DOE and the board. . . .” “I always believed that if DOE had approached it more as a partnership with their end customer the cleanup process would have been done better.” “ did continue with a very active public participation process to address and all aspects of the cleanup. However, rather than doing this process via the established in 1993 to advise DOE on the cleanup, DOE created a new body, the RFCA Focus Group . . . The value of the Focus Group was that it allowed more intense discussion of details than was usually possible in a meeting. But shifting the principal discussion of the cleanup to the Focus Group . . . had the effect of undermining and marginalizing the .” “DOE could have engaged the Board better in terms of budgeting. We were never asked to partner with the site in requesting funds for our participation through the federal budget process. . . . We also will not be funded for what we saw as a valuable project to develop risk communication tools to help alleviate concerns about the residual contamination at the site. We have heard from citizens who live near the site that they are concerned that contamination has been left behind. There is no way that these citizens are going to read and understand the immense multi-volume Remedial Investigation study and Comprehensive Risk Assessment. If there are any further water quality exceedences, even if they are not life threatening, they are going to call into question the protectiveness of the cleanup. DOE had better hope this doesn’t happen, because they appear to have no plan or the tools to address concerns that might be raised by the less knowledgeable in the community.” “DOE at times declined to allow members of the Board to observe internal meetings between DOE, , and the regulators. This made it more difficult for the Board to thoroughly understand the technical details of a cleanup decision and respond in an educated way.“ “One recurring Coalition theme was the lack of long-term stewardship considerations in remedial action planning and documents. Instead of incorporating the long-term stewardship considerations into the documents, it was left to post-physical closure documents. . . . The Coalition position has always been that long-term stewardship planning should be an integral part of the remedial activities and not relegated to post-closure status.” “As the clean up was underway in early 2005, DOE seemed to agree that ORISE should conduct a [Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual, or MARSSIM]-based final clean up verification. Since this approach was apparently not specified in the contract, Kaiser- Hill balked and DOE was left to fund an over-flight survey by a low flying helicopter to, for PR purposes, attempt to pick up (detect) major hot spots. The overflight technology was not sufficiently sensitive to detect exceedences of the clean up level. In addition due to soil moisture and shielding in the industrial area, the overflight detection approach was of little credible value. By omitting this final verification Kaiser-Hill was able to ‘complete’ physical closure early and collect an added 100 million dollar award.”

We now have a few questions about the results of the cleanup. As you know, since 1995, when it was awarded the Rocky Flats cleanup contract, Kaiser-Hill has decontaminated and demolished hundreds of structures, installed groundwater treatment systems, and removed contaminated soil, among other cleanup tasks specified by the contract and the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement. 12. How confident, if at all, are you that the cleanup will be protective of public health and the environment?

Don’t know/no basis to judge 13. Please explain or provide examples that illustrate your view.

Comments from 4 of the 11 respondents who were “extremely confident” or “very confident” (in response to question 12) in the protective nature of the cleanup included the following: “I believe that phenomenal effort was very effective in cleaning up those sites that needed remediation, e.g., the 903 Pad and uranium trenches.” “I am personally confident that the government will retain possession of the land and keep up the controls now in place so that visitors are safe and protected. I am convinced we got the best cleanup possible for the conditions, political climate, and money spent.” “This process has been open and has benefited from intense public oversight, talented and committed regulators (especially at CDPHE ), and independent reviews of key assumptions and decisions such as the Actinide Migration Panel and the soil action level review. Further, the surface water quality standards are extremely stringent and with rare exception they are getting met. That increases my confidence.” “The main reason I am extremely confident that the cleanup will be protective of public health and the environment is because of the tremendous amount of excellent oversight work provided by the regulators (CDPHE and EPA). I can’t say enough of how impressed I am with the technical staff of the regulatory agencies. They were everywhere during the course of the cleanup, ensuring that the remedial actions performed at the site were properly planned, implemented, and executed.”

Comments from 4 of the 12 respondents who were “somewhat confident” (in response to question 12) in the protective nature of the cleanup included the following: “We don’t know everything that is underground (e.g., landfills) and might seep out—cleanup is probably the most cost-effective that could be done . . .” “I think most of the contamination has been removed. However, I am concerned about isolated hot spots.” “We were very disappointed that DOE changed course on the verification of cleanup. We were led to believe that the verification would be a MARSSIM based approach; what we really received was a process that had never been used for verification purposes (the aerial flyover); an ORISE review that was constrained by DOE and a limited scope review.” “I believe the majority of the buffer area will be very low risk to the public. The ponds, the industrial area, the 903 pad, 903 lip and 903 wind blown area could expose the unsuspecting public to a higher risk depending on individual sensitivities even though the residual Pu level is at or below 50 pCi/g.”

One of the 2 respondents who were “not very” or “not at all” confident (in response to question 12) about the cleanup’s protectiveness said, “I don’t believe that the cleanup was done to be protective of public health and the environment. Otherwise, DOE would not have pursued the wildlife preserve aspect. Basically, the wildlife preserve is an “administrative” control to limit the future land use, limit public exposure to the existing contamination at the site, and allowed DOE to leave behind a lot of contamination.” 14. What, if anything, might have been done differently during the cleanup that would have increased your confidence?

Respondents offered a number of suggestions and comments, including the following: “If the original landfill and the deep basements had been removed, my confidence would be greatly increased. I do understand the reasons for this not occurring.” “A 100 percent scan of the DOE-retained lands would give me a complete idea of what is out there. . . .” “The implementation of our consultants’ recommendations and a “TRUE” MARSSIM based final survey.” “Only after the Focus Group had been meeting for a full year was it finally made clear that the better cleanup sought by some participants was not in the cards because decisions placing a cap on what could be spent had already been made. To some of us involved in this enormously time consuming process, this announcement revealed that the public participation process was in large measure a sham. Some DOE personnel insist that DOE had been open about the fiscal cap, but the DOE official who made the announcement at the Focus Group later said that its effect on the meeting was ‘like throwing a dead rat on the table.’” “I really do not have any concern about the site per se. I am concerned that the legal folderol . . . will continue forever.” “Really we are relying on the best science known and so I am not sure that anything could have been done better.” “The verification could have been performed earlier so that it could have been used as a tool in the cleanup.” “With unlimited funds a total cleanup could have been accomplished— in our real world we have better than could have been expected. FWS now needs the resources to convert the site.” “DOE and the regulators should have required independent based protocols to verify complete and comprehensive surface soil clean up levels site wide. This should have been done by an independent contractor.” 15. At this point in time, do you have any remaining concerns about the cleanup? 16. Please provide examples or details of your remaining concerns.

Respondents offered a number of concerns, including the following: “The underground “stuff”—landfills and basements. Who knows what, when and how it might affect us in the future.” “I am not certain how we will maintain control of area for the centuries needed given that we did not know for certain that all contaminants were removed.” “DOE needs to continue water quality monitoring on Woman Creek permanently!” “My remaining concerns with the cleanup have to do with how well the revegetation and erosion control measures function in the next few years. The site needs several good growing seasons to help re-establish vegetation covering the remediated portions of the DOE-retained land. Without adequate vegetative cover, erosion problems can arise which could ultimately result in the mobilization of actinides from the surface soil into surface water.” “My concerns now lie in the importance of creating a robust stewardship plan and assuring that monitoring will continue well into the future as well as knowing that if we find that a remedy has failed the DOE will do what it takes to address this failure.” “I worry about the magnitude of the long-time stewardship responsibilities. There are numerous examples at other sites of where controls fail because governments forget that there are institutional controls which carry with them use restrictions. How we will protect Rocky Flats over the long-term remains somewhat of a mystery for me.” “What will be done in the coming years, and by whom, to keep the public out of the contaminated areas?” “Plutonium and uranium take hundreds of thousands of years to decay.

Even in 100 years, the site can change sufficiently so that subsurface contamination is exposed. Also, physical controls may well decay into dust by the time the next century rolls around and institutional controls could be forgotten. In the future, the site could be used for subsistence farming. Who knows what will happen? The uncertainty of the future contributes the largest concern I have about the cleanup.”

In the summer of 2005, DOE arranged for a number of cleanup verification activities, including Kaiser-Hill’s ground-based scans along the boundaries of previously remediated areas where contamination was once known to exist; Bechtel Nevada’s aerial scan of the site; and the Oak Ridge Institute of Science and Education’s (ORISE) sampling and ground-based scanning of the 903 pad and lip area. We would like your views on the overall verification process, as well as your views on each of these three specific verification activities. 17. How, if at all, did the overall verification process affect your confidence in the site’s cleanup?

Neither increased nor diminished my confidence Don’t know/no basis to judge 4 18. Please explain or provide examples that illustrate how the overall verification process affected your confidence in the site’s cleanup.

Comments from 5 of the 13 respondents who believed that the overall verification process “greatly increased” or “somewhat increased” their confidence (in response to question 17) included the following: “Although I felt there was a low probability of contamination being in the buffer zone, given the level of suspicion and the recent publication of several false and misleading books and articles I felt it was important. This is a good time to state that although almost all the public fear involved radiologic contamination, it is not the most hazardous.” “Additional testing always adds to the vote of confidence.” “The aerial scan was the most effective. The other parts of the verification were too confusing for the majority of the community to understand. When the hot spots were discovered in the 903 Pad Lip Area, those of us more familiar with statistical sampling methodology could understand that it was not that grave of a situation, but those who read newspapers I am sure were not comforted.” “ORISE, although paid by DOE, is an independent . As such, I trust their results.” “The targeted independent verification areas helped to assure my confidence level but did not greatly increase it. I do think the verification process was important to other board members and most of all to the general public. It probably did very little or nothing to assure already skeptical critics of the site cleanup.”

Comments from 2 of the 5 respondents who said the activities “neither increased nor diminished” their confidence (in response to question 17) included the following: “I feel what was done was a waste of time and money and did not tell us anything new.” “Was glad it was in place, but didn’t give me 100% confidence.”

And of the 3 respondents who said the activities “somewhat diminished” or “greatly diminished” their confidence in the cleanup (in response to question 17), 1 said, “It is by no means clear that the full site has ever been well characterized. Former workers are known to say that unknown areas of random dumping were never found by the characterizing methods used, especially the . . . method that took a very limited number of samples in relatively large areas and estimated the contamination in that area based on this very limited sampling. Further, . . . the verification methods used could not detect all hot spots or areas of unknown subsurface contamination.” 19. How, if at all, did Kaiser-Hill’s targeted ground-based scanning activities (using a high-purity germanium, or HPGe, detector mounted on a tripod) affect your confidence in the site’s cleanup?

Neither increased nor diminished my confidence Don’t know/no basis to judge 20. Please explain or provide examples that illustrate how Kaiser- Hill’s targeted ground-based scanning activities affected your confidence in the site’s cleanup.

Comments from 4 of the 11 respondents who said that Kaiser-Hill’s targeted ground-based scanning activities “greatly increased” or “somewhat increased” their confidence in the cleanup (in response to question 19) included the following: “It showed that there was basically no contamination above the cleanup levels left on the site.” “I felt that the areas surveyed had a low risk of contamination. While it only somewhat increased my personal confidence I feel it was critical in increasing the public confidence.” “They targeted areas of concern and proved through testing that cleanup levels had been achieved.” “Showed that the area ‘covered’ by the scan met cleanup criteria.”

Comments from 2 of the 7 respondents who said the activities “neither increased nor diminished” their confidence (in response to question 19) included the following: “There wasn’t enough sampling conducted, and the sampling should have been conducted in more areas after remediation was done and before backfill took place.” “Kaiser-Hill’s scanning activities were part of the cleanup, not part of an independent review. So, I have confidence in what they did, but the question suggests that their scans would increase my confidence in their work. Independent review would have increased my confidence.”

And of the 3 respondents who said the activities “somewhat diminished” their confidence in the cleanup (in response to question 19), 1 said, “DOE and have continued to approach the cleanup using methods designed to not find problems. An approach designed to verify that no problem exists cannot be used to discover problems.” 21. How, if at all, did Bechtel Nevada’s aerial scan of the site (using a helicopter-mounted array of sodium iodide detectors) affect your confidence in the site’s cleanup?

Neither increased nor diminished my confidence Don’t know/no basis to judge 4 22. Please explain or provide examples that illustrate how Bechtel Nevada’s aerial scan of the site affected your confidence in the site’s cleanup.

Comments from 3 of the 9 respondents who said that Bechtel Nevada’s aerial scan of the site “greatly increased” or “somewhat increased” their confidence in the cleanup (in response to question 21) included the following: “The addressed the entire site, not just where one anticipated that contamination could exist.” “The aerial scan just confirmed what DOE had been telling us all along.” “Detection capabilities of aircraft scanners was not as sensitive as I would have liked. System was designed to detect higher concentrations of radionuclides than were expected at Rocky Flats.”

Comments from 2 of the 8 respondents who said the activities “neither increased nor diminished” their confidence (in response to question 21) included the following: “While the technology, if properly applied, might have been sufficient, the results were less than reliable because of ground moisture, shielding in the industrial area by equipment, debris, etc., and over-lot grading, which would have buried contamination. If properly applied, the aerial scan could detect major hot spots but is not designed to detect small hot spots that exceed the cleanup level. The aerial scan was more a public relations ploy than a good science valid verification of site safety and reliable cleanup.” “a method that is suited for determining what has happened in a Three Mile Island Chernobyl type event, not to verify an action did what it was supposed to do.”

And of the 4 respondents who said the activities “somewhat diminished” or “greatly diminished” their confidence in the cleanup (in response to question 21), 1 said, “The established for Rocky Flats set standards for plutonium and other materials that may remain in place according to depth. The aerial scan can only detect what is present on the surface (not surface defined as the top three feet, but surface as limited to a small fraction of this amount). Further, the aerial scan detects hot spots only if they are quite large in extent and relatively high in concentration. The aerial scan is a very valuable tool but also a very limited one.” 23. How, if at all, did ORISE’s verification activities (e.g., soil sampling and surface scans using sodium iodide “FIDLER” scintillation detectors) affect your confidence in the site’s cleanup?

Neither increased nor diminished my confidence Don’t know/no basis to judge 24. Please explain or provide examples that illustrate how ORISE’s verification activities affected your confidence in the site’s cleanup.

Comments from 6 of the 16 respondents who said that ORISE’s verification activities “greatly increased” or “somewhat increased” their confidence in the cleanup (in response to question 23) included the following: “Unlike the two , the ORISE verification was essential in verifying that did in fact perform the work they were being paid to do.” “did find some hot spots that then addressed, so a second check did help to increase belief in cleanup.” “This is the verification activity that turned up the ‘hot spots’ which were eventually remediated. I understand that according to the risk assessment formulas that were developed and the averaging nature of these formulas these ‘hot spots’ technically did not have to be remediated. The decision to remediate these, however, was important to help assure public confidence in the site cleanup.” “The ORISE work ended up raising more questions and concerns by the public. Also, we are left with the impression at the end that their work is incomplete because DOE did not provide them with funding to do the final review of the aerial survey. Also, trying to make MARSSIM fit into what was needed to verify the cleanup at the site was just too difficult to follow. . . . The ORISE work started out with great expectations, but things just got too confusing at the end. For the average citizen, I don’t think the verification made any difference at all.” “The ORISE budget was very limited—about $250,000—and was not sufficient to do an adequate job of site verification because the protocol they had to follow was disjointed.” “ORISE’S work showed that for the area they reviewed, the statistical approach Kaiser-Hill used was valid. However, given that DOE limited ORISE’s work it is hard to extrapolate their findings over a larger area of the site. So, their work was of a limited value.”

Of the 2 respondents who said that the activities “neither increased nor diminished” their confidence (in response to question 23), 1 said: “The review became less and less than promised as time went by: from a MARSSIM-based approach, to an approach greatly restrained by DOE as to what would be reviewed and how the review would be conducted.”

And of the 2 respondents who said that the activities “somewhat diminished” their confidence in the cleanup (in response to question 23), 1 said, “I believe the FIDLER device is a very good way to detect contamination in the surface soil. But its use by ORISE again was limited to areas of known contamination rather than to characterize portions of the site that have not been adequately characterized.” 25. Do you have any additional comments you would like to provide?

Among the respondents’ additional comments were the following: “ provides the only forum that has provided for the public, regulators, DOE, and contractor to discuss the issues and for everyone to have an equal voice. Hope there is someplace in the future (for a couple of years) for such activities to continue. The proposed LSO [long- term stewardship organization] appears to be a waste of government funds—too large of a staff, restricted membership, and too little technical expertise. . . .” “I believe the lessons learned at Rocky Flats could be put to good use at other sites, especially Hanford.” “In the future on any similar rad contaminated sites, DOE should require as a contractual condition that an independent verification of the clean up be implemented using principles. In the 903 pad area where a sampling verification was implemented—hot spots substantially exceeding 50 pCi/g were found and picked up. It would seem reasonable to conclude that other areas of the 903 pad and the industrial area would have similar exceedences.” “DOE, other state agencies, and communities should study what we did at Rocky Flats because we were on the cutting edge of how to work within the regulations but allow great latitude in engaging the community and for remediating a complex nuclear site.” “Standley Lake Cities still have serious concerns about Woman Creek’s risk from Woman Creek has no terminal testing control pond!” “ORISE should have been allowed to survey more of the area and to do some surveying of the Buffer Zone.”

Additional Information on Decontamination and Demolition Activities at Rocky Flats

The contractor used a number of innovative techniques to accomplish decontamination and demolition tasks at Rocky Flats. One of these, as discussed in the report, was the use of a cerium nitrate solution to decontaminate large pieces of equipment. Another innovative decontaminating technique was the contractor’s use of InstaCoteTM to encapsulate large surface-contaminated tanks and other equipment. InstaCote is a polyurea plastic coating that was sprayed on equipment. The InstaCote not only sealed in the contamination, but also served as the shipping conveyance and disposal package. According to DOE officials, use of the InstaCote saved “easily thousands of hours” and increased worker safety, as it eliminated the difficult and dangerous job of cutting contaminated equipment and packaging it for shipment. The InstaCote could be used even with extremely large pieces of contaminated equipment, such as a super-compacter used to reduce waste volume by crushing drums containing radioactive waste and drums that were empty but had formerly contained radioactive waste. Figure 14 shows the super- compacter before InstaCote was applied and with the InstaCote awaiting transport to a disposal facility.

One of the most difficult decontaminating challenges DOE and the contractor overcame was decontaminating concrete. When concrete became contaminated with liquid radioactive waste (e.g., by spills during nuclear material processing or waste disposal), the past practice was to fix the contamination in place using sometimes several layers of an epoxy paint. Before a building containing contaminated concrete could be demolished, this paint had to be removed down to the base material, and the base material had to be decontaminated. The contractor removed the contaminated paint using various methods such as scabbling, shaving, or hydolasing. Scabbling chipped away the first layer of the surface with a pneumatic hammer; however, this option created dust and increased the potential for the release of contaminants into the air. Shaving removed layers of concrete with a machine, and was considered more efficient and less hazardous than hydrolasing for decontaminating concrete surfaces with deeper contamination. Hydrolasing, the preferred method for removing paint and shallow surface contamination, involved blasting away paint and the initial layer of the surface material with water, then self- containing the water and resulting debris. Figure 15 shows the hydrolase system in use in building 886 at Rocky Flats, a former nuclear laboratory known to have light contamination under painted surfaces.

But in some cases, according to a senior contractor official, contaminated liquid had seeped so deeply into the concrete that it could not be removed using any of these three methods. This was the case, for example, in the “infinity room” (so called because the level of radioactive contamination in the room was greater than instruments could measure) of building 771, which had often been referred to as “the most dangerous building in America.” When concrete was contaminated to the core, the only option was to cut it out and remove it. The entire “infinity room” floor had to be cut out and shipped as transuranic waste, as shown in figure 16.

In other cases, when the contaminated concrete was far underground (i.e., in building foundations), it was decontaminated to the lowest levels reasonably achievable and left in place. DOE and the regulatory agencies agreed to decontaminate and leave in place the foundations of buildings 371 and 771/774, and cover them with clean fill dirt. According to DOE and contractor officials, leaving the foundations in place poses little risk to human health and safety because the foundations and the soil around them were decontaminated to specified levels before being covered. Also, they said, leaving the foundations in place was safer for the workers at the site than removing them, which would have required workers wearing respiratory protection systems that constrain movement and visibility to winch up massive, multiton pieces of concrete from a confined space. A Colorado official said he had agreed to the decision to leave the foundations in place after carefully considering the balance between the potential future risk of exposure with the real and immediate risk of worker safety. In lieu of removal, the contractor treated the foundations with a fixative to prevent contaminants from migrating during demolition activities, then covered them with a cushion of sand and a layer of clean fill dirt. According to DOE and contractor officials, plutonium should not migrate out of the foundations, and if it does, it should not migrate beyond the surrounding soil. This contention is supported by the results of the actinide migration study, which concluded that fixed actinide contamination does not readily move in the environment. Also, neither humans nor wildlife would be exposed unless a future major excavation activity were to take place. However slight it may be, the potential risk to human health and safety posed by leaving the foundations in place is the reason that controls such as groundwater monitoring wells and treatment systems will remain in place, according to Colorado officials.

Another innovative decontaminating and demolition strategy the contractor developed in conjunction with DOE and the regulatory agencies involved dividing the site into areas and completing most or all of the work in one area—from building decontamination to demolition—so that environmental remediation could begin in that area while decontamination and demolition work was being done in the next area. This strategy enabled the cleanup to proceed more quickly by allowing the earlier start of environmental restoration work and by allowing workers more time to address any unforeseen circumstances. The strategy also achieved economies of scale, as site services—such as water, steam, and power— could be eliminated throughout an entire area, rather than on a building-by- building basis.

Additional Information on the Quality of Remediation Data at Rocky Flats and on DOE’s Planned and Actual Verification

This appendix presents additional information on our review of the processes and procedures in place at Rocky Flats to evaluate the quality of remediation data. It also presents additional information on DOE’s planned and actual verification of the contractor’s cleanup work.

Information on Controls over Data Quality

A critical aspect of the cleanup process was ensuring the validity of the data used to assess whether the site had been remediated to the agreed- upon levels. Accordingly, we reviewed the processes and procedures in place to ensure data quality, and we identified four key controls: (1) establishing data quality objectives, (2) using data quality parameters, (3) verifying and validating data, and (4) auditing laboratories that analyzed samples for Rocky Flats. Our review showed that, overall, the contractor generally followed these data quality controls and clearly documented its compliance with them for the four accelerated cleanup actions we reviewed in depth. For these four cleanup actions—at building 771, the 903 pad, the 903 lip area, and trench T-7—we assessed the closeout reports and the data supporting them to determine the extent to which the data collection and laboratory analyses adhered to data quality standards and procedures. We did not, however, evaluate the remedial data or laboratory analyses themselves.

To assess the use of the first key control—establishing data quality objectives—we identified the criteria documented in the Industrial Area and Buffer Zone Sampling and Analysis Plan. We then reviewed the cleanup project sampling plan addenda, remedial action plans, and cleanup project closeout reports for each of the four projects to determine whether the data quality objectives had been established and were considered during the projects’ cleanup. To assess the use of the second control, we reviewed the four projects’ closeout reports to verify that the data had been checked against the data quality parameters in accordance with the criteria located in both the Rocky Flats Implementation Guidance Document and the Industrial Area and Buffer Zone Sampling and Analysis Plan. These documents establish the guidelines for evaluating analytical data and address the overall quality of the data quality control. We examined the closeout reports for each of the four projects to ensure that the projects met the criteria for the third control—data verification and validation. And finally, to assess the use of the fourth control, we reviewed reports on audits of laboratories that analyzed data for the site’s cleanup. Specifically, we reviewed source documentation from audits conducted by DOE’s consolidated audit program and DOE’s mixed analyte performance evaluation program. We concentrated our review on laboratory audit results relevant to detecting plutonium for the 3-year period during which cleanup was under way for the four projects.

Establishing data quality objectives. DOE and the contractor established data quality objectives to act as planning tools for collecting data and for making decisions. The data quality objectives process is specified in the site’s quality assurance project plan. The process is intended to provide a systematic procedure for defining criteria for data collection, including when and where to collect samples, what level of decision error is tolerable, and how many samples to collect. In our review of the four selected cleanup areas, we found general adherence to the data quality objectives process. For three of the four projects we selected, we verified that both the characterization and confirmation sampling were planned according to the data quality objective process as defined in the Industrial Area and Buffer Zone Sampling and Analysis Plan. Because the fourth project required only minimal cleanup, it was completed through the standard “no further accelerated action” justification process. According to the contractor, the justification documentation for such areas (those requiring minimal cleanup) should include information on data adequacy, but not at the same level of detail as was required for other cleanup areas. We recognize that areas closed out through the “no further accelerated action” process may not necessitate the same level of data quality documentation as other areas. Nevertheless, the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement requires that the justification documentation for “no further accelerated action” areas include information on data quality and usability. The documentation we reviewed for trench T-7 did not include such information.

Applying PARCC parameters. EPA’s policy requires it to apply data quality parameters for precision, accuracy, representativeness, completeness, and comparability—known as the PARCC parameters. Because radionuclides were involved, an additional data quality parameter—sensitivity—was used at Rocky Flats. These parameters provided information to the contractor and the regulatory agencies about the acceptability or utility of the data. For example, precision measures whether using the same analytical technique will result in the same results for a particular sample (i.e., analyzing the same sample twice and comparing the results). According to the sampling and analysis plan, assessments of the data according to the PARCC parameters are documented in the closeout reports for the accelerated cleanup actions and, according to EPA officials, are checked through the verification and validation process discussed next. Our review of the four selected cleanup areas indicated that the PARCC parameters were consistently applied. For three of the four projects we selected, we verified that the data were reviewed in accordance with each of the data quality parameters. The fourth project required only minimal cleanup and was completed through the standard “no further accelerated action” justification process for which no formal data quality discussion was required.

Verifying and validating laboratory data. Data verification was required for 100 percent of the laboratory data at Rocky Flats. Data validation was required for 25 percent of the data, but because this requirement pertained to the Rocky Flats site as a whole, the percentage of data validated could vary considerably from one cleanup area to another. Data verification is a review of a laboratory’s electronic data package summary to evaluate the extent to which the laboratory met specified quality control and reporting criteria. Data validation is a more in-depth review that includes not only verifying the data, but also examining the raw data and manually verifying calculations done by the laboratory. After a laboratory analyzed samples, it sent the results to a subcontractor that reviewed the data according to either the verification or the validation criteria and assigned codes indicating the data’s quality. For example, one code would be assigned to data for which no problems were observed, whereas another code would be assigned to data that did not meet the quality control requirements.

Our review of the closeout reports on the four cleanup projects we selected indicated general adherence to the verification and validation requirements. Specifically, for three of the four projects, at least 98 percent of the overall data had been verified, and between 23 percent and 50 percent had been validated. The contractor provided several explanations for why 100 percent of the data had not been verified. For example, at the 903 lip area, because a number of samples were collected close to the time that the closeout report was submitted, verification and validation occurred after the report was completed. Additionally, the large number of samples collected in September 2004 (from the 903 lip area and other areas around the site) overloaded the verification and validation staff. Most of these records were verified or validated in late November or early December 2004, and all had been verified or validated by early 2005, according to the contractor.

Auditing laboratories. The 32 laboratories that analyzed samples collected from Rocky Flats were required to undergo annual technical audits to ensure the accuracy of their analytical results. Since 2000, contractor officials said they have largely satisfied the audit requirement by voluntarily participating in DOE’s consolidated audit program, with the exception of one on-site laboratory that the contractor audited. A typical DOE laboratory audit, according to the audit program manager, includes a 3-day visit to the laboratory by a team of five to six people. DOE certifies laboratory auditors in particular areas, including chemistry (e.g., radiochemistry or organic chemistry), and uses a standardized checklist to verify that laboratory practices meet DOE standards. When auditors identify problems, they can provide comments or issue priority I or priority II findings. Priority I findings are the most severe; they represent a serious breakdown in management controls that could render the laboratory unacceptable for use or unfit to perform services for DOE. Laboratories that receive priority I and II findings are required to develop and implement corrective action plans, and the contractor’s policy stipulated that laboratories receiving priority I findings could do no more work for Rocky Flats until they had rectified the problem. Of the 118 audits conducted of laboratories analyzing Rocky Flats cleanup samples, only 10 priority I findings were issued, according to the subcontractor official responsible for laboratory audits at Rocky Flats.

We reviewed the performance of the two primary laboratories that analyzed confirmatory samples for plutonium 239 for the four selected cleanup areas and found no areas of concern with the laboratories’ quality. To limit our review, we focused on two performance criteria: (1) laboratory audit findings from DOE’s consolidated audit program documents on alpha spectroscopy, which is used to analyze confirmatory samples for plutonium; and (2) results from DOE’s mixed analyte performance evaluation program, which assesses a laboratory’s analytical abilities by sending the laboratory a sample of a known quantity of a contaminant and comparing the laboratory’s results with the actual quantity. Our review showed that the audit findings for alpha spectroscopy resulted in one audit observation. Our review of the second performance criteria of the tests of the two laboratories’ analytic ability found that, from 2002 through 2004, the two laboratories analyzed a combined total of 16 samples of plutonium 239, or alpha samples, and received acceptable test results in all but 3. Of those 3 samples, 2 samples were considered acceptable but were off by 20 percent to 30 percent, and 1 sample was not acceptable.

Additional Information on DOE’s Planned and Actual Verification Activities

DOE revised two of the planned verification activities at Rocky Flats. First, due to time and cost constraints, DOE reduced the scope of the contractor’s planned scanning and sampling activities. Second, DOE revised the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education’s (ORISE) planned assessment of the contractor’s scans of the 903 lip area. The revision incorporated an approach consistent with the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM). The actual verification activities conducted by both the contractor and ORISE identified “hot spots” of radionuclide-contaminated soil; these hot spots were subsequently remediated.

DOE Reduced Size and Scope of Scanning and Sampling Portion of Planned Verification

The first part of DOE’s cleanup verification effort—the contractor- conducted scanning and sampling—was reduced in scope due to time and cost constraints. In September 2004, the Rocky Flats site manager requested that the contractor develop a sitewide surface radiological survey using the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM). MARSSIM is the outcome of a joint effort by DOE, EPA, the Department of Defense, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to develop uniform guidance for conducting final surveys to demonstrate compliance with specified radiological cleanup levels. It recommends 100 percent scanning of areas most likely to be contaminated with radionuclides.

Scanning can be conducted through use of devices known as high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors, as shown in figure 17, or sodium iodide scintillation detectors, known as FIDLERs. These devices can scan entire areas to determine whether certain radionuclides are present in a given area.

This scanning approach had been used several times by ORISE at Rocky Flats to demonstrate the sufficiency of radiological cleanup of buildings prior to their demolition. However, according to the contractor, DOE had limited experience using this approach to characterize surface soil and sediment. In its October 2004 letter responding to DOE, the contractor concluded that applying MARSSIM across the site would cost approximately $7.5 million and would take 19 months after the site cleanup had been completed. Further, the contractor said that implementing MARSSIM at the site could constitute a “significant contract change,” and could postpone completion of the cleanup. In essence, the difficulty was that the MARSSIM approach was inconsistent with the cleanup strategy. The approved site cleanup strategy was to remove contamination to a 90 percent confidence level, meaning confidence that at least 90 percent of the contamination had been remediated to agreed-upon levels. In contrast, MARSSIM, which was developed years after the Rocky Flats cleanup strategy had been approved and begun, recommends applying a 100 percent verification strategy—that is, scanning areas most likely to contain residual radionuclide contamination. Accordingly, MARSSIM was sure to find “hot spots”—particularly at the 903 pad and lip area, the extent and severity of which would then require investigation and potentially cleanup action. Not having anticipated the implications of applying MARSSIM at the site, in terms of both cost and schedule, DOE subsequently rejected that approach.

In March 2005, the contractor proposed a less expensive, less time- consuming plan for demonstrating the cleanup’s compliance with the cleanup agreement. The plan’s objectives were to verify, with reasonable certainty, that no unknown areas of radiological contamination remained at the site, that all remedial actions were complete, and that existing sampling data remained valid. The verification approach included scanning, sampling, and reviewing historical and existing data. Through such activities, the contractor intended to increase DOE’s and the community groups’ confidence that the cleanup objectives had been achieved. The plan purported to exceed the guidance laid out in MARSSIM, although an ORISE official refuted this claim. Further comments provided by a contractor hired by the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments to provide input on the process added to DOE’s concerns and resulted in DOE’s rejecting the contractor’s sampling methodology.

The contractor’s final scanning and sampling plan, issued in May 2005, included two actions to meet the verification objectives. First, the entire site would be scanned with sodium iodide detectors affixed to a helicopter. According to the contractor, the detectors would detect, within the top several inches of surface soil, gamma rays indicating the existence of any residual plutonium that exceeded 50 picocuries per gram of soil, over a range of 80 square meters—roughly the size of a two-car garage. Figure 18 shows electrical poles that were felled to allow the helicopter to fly as low as possible over the site and the aerial scan of the site for residual plutonium in surface soil.

Of the 21 community group survey respondents who expressed an opinion on the aerial scan, 9 said the scan greatly or somewhat increased their confidence in the site’s cleanup. Another 8 said the scan neither increased nor diminished their confidence, and the other 4 said the aerial scan greatly or somewhat diminished their confidence in the site’s cleanup.

Another component of the contractor’s final plan was targeted ground- based scanning around the perimeter of previously remediated areas, including the perimeter of the major plutonium buildings and the 903 lip area. These scans were conducted with a high-purity germanium detector, as described earlier. Of the 21 community group survey respondents who expressed an opinion on the contractor’s ground-based scans, 11 said these scans greatly or somewhat increased their confidence in the site’s cleanup.

Another 7 said the scans neither increased nor diminished their confidence, and the other 3 said the ground-based scans greatly or somewhat diminished their confidence in the site’s cleanup.

DOE Revised ORISE’s Portion of Planned Verification to Incorporate MARSSIM

The second part of DOE’s cleanup verification effort—ORISE’s review of contractor-conducted scans for remaining radiological contamination— was revised to apply MARSSIM to the 903 lip area. ORISE’s initial plan did not incorporate MARSSIM. However, the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments’ contractor suggested using MARSSIM at the 903 lip area because it had been one of the most contaminated areas. ORISE’s proposed final plan included assessing the performance of the contractor’s aerial and targeted ground-based scanning and the adequacy and completeness of the contractor’s closeout reports for the 903 lip area using MARSSIM.

Results of the Contractor’s Final Scanning and Sampling Cleanup Verification Plan and ORISE’s Independent Verification

Both the contractor’s and ORISE’s verifications identified radionuclide- contaminated soil. At a September 1, 2005, public meeting hosted by the Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board, DOE and the contractor presented the results of the contractor’s and ORISE’s verifications. DOE and the contractor reported that the aerial scan had identified known areas of radionuclide contamination, such as areas where contaminated soil was stored pending its shipment off site. (The scan also identified an off-site area, but subsequent investigation found no contamination there.) However, the aerial scan did not achieve its projected sensitivity. Whereas detection of 50 picocuries of plutonium per gram of soil over 80 square meters was the criterion for success, according to the contractor’s final plan, the scanner achieved this detection level for only 25 percent of the site, owing to the moisture content in the ground and the altitude of the helicopter’s flyover. They also reported that the contractor’s ground-based scan found five areas on the perimeter of the 903 lip area that contained contamination in excess of 50 picocuries per gram of soil, which were subsequently remediated.

In addition, DOE and the contractor reported that ORISE’s MARSSIM sampling had identified 13 “hot spots,” or areas with contamination above the cleanup agreement’s action level of 50 picocuries of plutonium per gram of soil. Contamination in these 13 hot spots ranged from 65 to 425 picocuries of plutonium per gram of soil. However, a DOE official said that DOE would not remediate those areas because the regulatory agencies had already approved the accelerated cleanup actions, and those actions had been conducted in accordance with the cleanup methodology agreed to by DOE and the regulatory agencies. The cleanup methodology required that at least 90 percent of any given area be remediated to the required levels; accordingly, there was a 10 percent chance that areas of elevated contamination remained. Even though the cleanup had been conducted in accordance with the approved methodology (which allowed for the chance of such elevated contamination remaining), DOE’s initial refusal to remediate the hot spots caused concern for the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments, according to the Coalition’s executive director. Within 2 weeks, after consulting with EPA and Colorado, DOE agreed to have the contractor remediate the hot spots.

Overall, hundreds of samples were taken at the 903 pad and lip area, including initial and confirmatory samples. Figure 19 shows postremediation (confirmatory) samples taken by the contractor, as well as verification samples taken by ORISE.

Although DOE had agreed to ORISE’s final independent verification plan, DOE did not have ORISE fully implement the plan, and it did not publicly explain its reasoning. Specifically, DOE did not have ORISE complete the planned assessment of the aerial and ground-based scanning or the planned assessment of the contractor’s investigations of the results of the aerial and targeted ground-based scans. According to a DOE official, DOE decided that the results of these remaining assessments would not justify their completion, particularly because the aerial survey had failed to find any anomalies.

Of the 20 community group survey respondents who expressed an opinion on ORISE’s soil sampling and surface scans (using a FIDLER—a sodium iodide scintillation detector), 16 said the scan greatly or somewhat increased their confidence in the site’s cleanup. Another 2 said the scan neither increased nor diminished their confidence, and the other 2 said the aerial scan greatly or somewhat diminished their confidence in the site’s cleanup.

Comments from the Department of Energy

Comments from the Department of the Interior

Comments from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment

Comments from Kaiser-Hill Company L.L.C.

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Dan Feehan, Assistant Director; Keith Rhodes, GAO’s Chief Technologist; Claire Cyrnak; Glenn Fischer; Tom Kingham; and Pam Tumler made significant contributions to this report. Others who made important contributions included Kevin Bailey, Michael Derr, Doreen Eng, Tom Denomme, Tim DiNapoli, Alison O’Neill, Judy Pagano, Kim Raheb, and Omari Norman. Also, Brandon Haller, Mehrzad Nadji, and Judy Pagano made important contributions to the methodologies used in this report.