Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): Background, Process, and Issues
Released: 2001-06-21T00:00:00

RS20771 -- Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): Background, Process, and Issues

Updated June 21, 2001

Background

The Quadrennial Defense Review for 2001 is a congressionally mandated review of national defense strategy. The Secretary of Defense is required to analyze, among other things, forcestructure, modernization plans, military infrastructure, and the defense budget with a view towards establishing aroadmap for defense programs for the next 20 years. Thiscomprehensive assessment could profoundly effect the nation's ability to carry out its national security strategy inthe new millennium.

Genesis of QDR 2001. The1990s produced a number of defense related studies meant to reshape American military strategy in lightof the downfall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. These studies included the "Base Force" structure,the Bottom Up Review, the Commission on Roles and Missions, theQuadrennial Defense Review of 1997, and the 1997 National Defense Panel. In the early 1990s the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, coined the term "BaseForce." It was used to designate a proposed structure representing the minimum armed forces necessary for theUnited States to meet the national security objectives defined by policymakers, notably the capability to conduct two major theater wars simultaneously. (1) In 1993, the Bottom Up Review (BUR) acknowledged the significant changesin the global securityenvironment by articulating a strategy where the Department of Defense sought to prevent conflict by promotingdemocracy and peaceful resolution of conflict while connecting theU.S. military to the militaries of other countries, especially those of the former Soviet Union. (2) The BUR addressed the need for peacekeeping andpeace enforcement operations butused the two major theater war (MTW) scenario as the main force shaping construct. (3) Iraq and North Korea were seen as regional powers able to initiatesimultaneous conflictsrequiring a U.S. military response. Their capabilities in turn drove force planning, structure, and capabilities of theAmerican military forces.

The BUR was criticized on various grounds. Some thought the resultant construct was merely a budget driven review and failed to adequately address the challenges of the newinternational security environment. As a result, in the 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, Congressmandated the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM). The CORM waslater criticized for failing to depart from the two-MTW scenario. Its most significant contributions includedsuggestions that DoD undertake a major quadrennial strategy review and thatthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop a clear vision for future joint operations. (4) Reacting to one of the CORM recommendations,Congress directed the 1997 QuadrennialDefense Review as a method to conduct a "fundamental and comprehensive examination of America's defenseneeds." (5)

The First QDR. QDR 97 described a strategy of "shape, respond, prepare" in which the military must shape the environment throughdeterrence and engagement, remain prepared to engage in a spectrum of conflicts ranging from small scalecontingencies to major theater war, and prepare for an uncertain future. Inaddition, the report acknowledged the military must contend with additional threats including the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, advanced technologies, the drug trade,organized crime, uncontrolled immigration, and threats to the U.S. homeland. (6) As with the BUR and CORM, the QDR retained the two-MTW construct asits force shaping tool. As aresult, the1997 QDR was again criticized by many as a budget driven assessment of what military force structurewould be like if funded at present budget levels.

The Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996 established the independent National Defense Panel (NDP) as a forum to review the results of the 1997 QDR. The NDP report tookexception to what it termed broadly as the QDR's less than ambitious plan for defense transformation, stating that,"our current security arrangements--will not be adequate to meetingthe challenges of the future." (7) It also recommendeda comprehensive look at scaling back or cancelling "legacy systems." (8) Most significantly the NDP report challenged therequirement to fight two major theater wars simultaneously as simply a force sizing tool and not a viable strategy. The two-MTW construct was criticized as a means to justify Cold Warbased force structure and as a roadblock to implementing transformation strategies enabling the military to preparefor future threats. (9)

The second Quadrennial Defense Review is now fully under way. The 2001 QDR presents an opportunity to assess future U.S. security challenges and link them to an overarchingmilitary strategy designed to protect the interests of the U.S. as a whole. Its results however, are not binding, andmay be significantly altered by the administration.

QDR Process

The 106th Congress created a permanent requirement for a Quadrennial Defense Review by inserting Section 118 into Chapter 2 of title 10, United States Code, which states that everyfour years the Secretary of Defense will:

.....conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budgetplan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view towards determiningand expressing the defense strategy of the United States andestablishing a defense program for the next 20 years. (10)

The purpose of the 2001 QDR as stated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 is to1) delineate a military strategy consistent with the most recent NationalSecurity Strategy (11) , 2) define the defense programsto successfully execute the full range of missions assigned the military by that strategy, and 3) identify the budgetplan necessary tosuccessfully execute those missions at a low-to-moderate level of risk.

The questions listed below are intended to assist DoD in formulating a comprehensive military strategy in lightof the evolving international security environment and rapidly emergingtechnologies. Congress specifically requires the Secretary of Defense to consider precision guided munitions, stealth,night vision, digitization, and communications as he formulates hispreferred force structure options for the next 20 years. (12)

QDR Input. While OSD is responsible for the integration of the QDR effort, it is the Joint Staff that will gather the data and formulatethe inputs from the individual Services, the combatant commands, and Defense Agencies into the end result. TheJoint Staff QDR organization is led by a general officer steeringcommittee that will receive input from eight different panels. Those panels are Strategy and Risk Assessment; ForceGeneration, Capability and Structure; Modernization; Sustainment,Strategic Mobility and Infrastructure; Readiness; Transformation, Innovation and Joint Experimentation;Information Superiority; and Human Resources. Each panel's input will go to aPreparation Group which is assisted by an Integration Group providing budget, analysis, and administrative support. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Service OperationalDeputies, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide guidance and help resolve panel issues as needed. Recentinformation suggests that OSD will form six major issue panels to developoptions and make recommendations for the QDR report. Those panels are tentatively: strategy; force structure;capabilities and investment; information warfare, intelligence, and space;personnel and readiness support infrastructure; and joint organizations. (14)

QDR Process Issues

Several process issues will garner attention as the QDR is undertaken. First, the timing of the QDR itself may be called into question. Numerous major policy actions by the BushAdministration must be considered prior to delineating the National Security Strategy. Second, determining theappropriate military strategy with which to frame the review will be acrucial step. Last, prior studies were criticized by some as being a budget driven process as opposed to strategydriven. Although the military strategy ultimately defined by the QDR willmost likely have budgetary limitations, it is deemed essential to provide a clear picture of how that strategyeffectively defends U.S. national interests.

Timing of the QDR. As discussed earlier, the QDR process was established as a Title 10 requirement for the Secretary of Defense toconduct a QDR "every four years, during a year evenly divisible by four" and to submit the report to Congress "notlater than September 30 of the year in which the review isconducted." (15) The National Security Strategy isdue in June of 2001 with the QDR report to follow by September 30, 2001. If the administration substantiallychanges previoussecurity strategy, DoD will most likely require more time to formulate its strategy and concepts based on the newNational Security Strategy and delineate a coherent military strategywithin which to frame the QDR. It has been suggested by some that the administration take a different approachto the review. Conducting a broad strategic review and using it toestablish priorities with a more extensive study to follow might allow both the administration and DoD to take amore measured view. (16) This method could affectthe administration'sfirst budget submission in 2002. Using results of QDR97 to shape the defense budget until the comprehensivestudy is complete might allow the administration to more coherentlytranslate its National Security Strategy into a different or revamped defense strategy. This approach would requireCongress to amend the QDR legislation now in law.

Appropriate Strategy. Structuring our military forces on the premise the U.S. military will need to fight two simultaneous regionalconflicts provided a logical yardstick during the Cold War and time frame immediately afterward. Some see it asa less likely occurrence in today's environment given the lack ofeligible adversaries that could muster the necessary forces and resources to create that scenario. Since that time,it has been criticized as being more an argument to retain the currentforce structure at the expense of restructuring. Opponents of the two-MTW construct contend it is difficult tosubstantiate the necessity of countering major, cross-border, conventionalconflicts in the current international security environment. The emerging asymmetric threats of terrorism,narco-trafficking, weapons of mass destruction, information warfare,environmental sabotage, anti-access operations, and other low intensity operations may dictate a different approachto force sizing. (17) Conversely, modifying orcompletely changing thecurrent strategy may have an impact on our allies around the world. Changing the two-MTW construct could beperceived by some allies as a lack of resolve and backing away fromcurrent security commitments.

Strategy/Budget Mismatch. The cost of most strategies considered will probably exceed current budget levels. Estimates range fromover $20 billion to $100 billion per year shortfall to fund the 1997 QDR force. (18) The Iraqi no-fly zone enforcement, the Balkans peacekeeping force, andnumerous other small scalecommitments continue to place a strain on the current budget. Budget estimates for transforming the military tomeet future threats while maintaining a credible force to deter currentthreats or win possible conflicts far outreach the proposed defense budgets in the current future years defenseprogram. (19) The overall goal of the QDR processis to create a defensestrategy, complementing the National Security Strategy, bounded by a budget that ensures a "low-to-moderate levelof risk" when executed. In order to do this, most defense specialistssee a likely necessity to either increase the defense budget, restructure and reduce current costs, or reduce thedemands of the current defense strategy. They have urged that the QDRapproach as monitored by Congress address those hard choices.

Conclusion

Besides the process issues mentioned above, Congress may be interested in other aspects of the QDR. It will be important to ensure the DoD QDR organization is an effective analyticstructure that emphasizes jointness and total force thinking versus protection of individual service equities or servicebudget shares. The roles of the regional commander-in-chiefsshould be analyzed as they compete for limited service resources during growing commitments. The transformationstrategies of each service could require a reassessment ofprocurement decisions of systems designed for conventional battle as the United States moves further into theinformation age. The methods of estimating the risks involved in changingthe strategy, the construct the strategy is based upon, and the transformation philosophies of the services could wellaffect the outcome of the QDR. Translating the QDR into a coherentand useful defense strategy to guide the United States into an uncertain future will require challenging choices bythe Congress and Bush Administration.