Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options
Released: 2005-05-24T00:00:00

Introduction: The 9/11 Commission Report and Long-Standing Contradictions in U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan and South Asia(1)

In calling for a clear, strong, and long-term commitment to the military-dominatedgovernment of Pakistan despite serious concerns about that country's nuclear proliferation activities, The Final Report of the 9/11 Commission cast into sharp relief two long-standing dilemmasconcerning U.S. policy towards Pakistan and South Asia. First, in an often strained securityrelationship spanning more than five decades, U.S. and Pakistani national security objectives haveseldom been congruent. Pakistan has viewed the alliance primarily in the context of its rivalry withIndia, whereas U.S. policymakers have tended to view it from the perspective of regional stabilityand U.S. global security interests. Mutual security agreements concluded with Pakistan in 1954 and1959, which remain in force, were part of the U.S. "Containment" policy towards the SovietUnion. (2) Second, U.S.nuclear nonproliferation objectives towards Pakistan (and India) repeatedly have been subordinatedto other important U.S. goals. During the 1980s, Pakistan exploited its key role as a conduit for aidto the anti-Soviet Afghan mujahidin to avoid U.S. nuclear nonproliferation sanctions and receiveannually some $600 million annually in U.S. military and economic aid. Underscoring Pakistan'sdifferent agenda, some of the radical Islamists favored by its military intelligence service laterformed the core of Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

During the 1980s, Pakistan successfully exploited its importance as a conduit for aid to theanti-Soviet Afghan mujahidin both to forestall the imposition of economic and military sanctionsotherwise required by U.S. nuclear nonproliferation laws and to gain some $600 million annuallyin U.S. military and economic aid. Ironically, not only did Pakistan develop its nuclear weaponscapability during the 1980s while receiving major U.S. economic and military assistance, butbecause it was partially hostage to Islamabad's own foreign policy objectives, the United Statesunwittingly facilitated the rise of a radical anti-U.S. Islamic terrorist movement. (3) The ranks of Al Qaeda andthe Taliban include some of the very same radical Islamists nurtured by Pakistan's Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI) organization and supported and armed by the CIA in the successful effort to drivethe Soviet Army out of Afghanistan. Some observers view this unwanted legacy as cause for notlosing sight of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and other interests when seeking to forge closerantiterrorism ties to a country that has been a major and recent source of the proliferation of nucleartechnology and materials, and which also faces some degree of risk of itself falling under the controlof radical Islamists. This report seeks, in part, to explore whether there may be ways for gainingmore leverage with Pakistan on the proliferation issue without jeopardizing Islamabad's cooperationon terrorism.

Figure 1. Country Map of Pakistan

Squaring the Circle: Antiterrorism Cooperation with a Prime Source of Nuclear Proliferation

Neither the 9/11 Commission Report nor legislation enacted to implement itsrecommendations directly address the issue of balancing U.S. assistance to promote counterterrorismcooperation and stabilize Pakistan against Islamist extremism, with curbing nuclear proliferationactivities emanating from Pakistan. Congress endorsed and funded for FY2005 only a request fromthe Bush Administration for a new five-year, $3 billion, package of U.S. economic and militaryassistance to Pakistan. Congress also signaled its concern that Pakistan was not sufficientlycooperating with U.S. efforts to eliminate A.Q. Khan's illicit nuclear supply network by revising anexisting reporting requirement under the Foreign Assistance Act, 1961, amended, but did notcondition U.S. assistance to Pakistan on the imposing of any specific performance-relatednonproliferation requirements. (4) (See Legislation section at the end of this report.)

In theory, achieving the two most critical U.S. policy objectives relating to Pakistan --defeating radical Islamic terrorism and deterring nuclear proliferation -- should be complementary,since the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists is, in the words of the Vice-Chairman of the9/11 Commission, former Representative Lee Hamilton, "the ultimate nightmare." In practice,however, the historical record shows that the dual American objectives often have been operationallyincompatible, especially the goals of promoting democracy and preventing nuclear proliferation. From that perspective, Vice-Chairman Hamilton observed at an August 24, 2004 hearing of theHouse International Relations Committee, "I think Pakistan represents as tough a problem as thereis in American foreign policy today." (5)

Press reports in late December 2004 and early 2005 concerning the covert supply networkestablished by A.Q. Khan underscored the challenge of addressing simultaneously the terrorist andnuclear proliferation threats in U.S. policy towards Pakistan. The New York Times reported onDecember 26, 2004, that both the Bush Administration and the United Nations' International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) had gathered evidence in the Middle East and Asia indicating that Khan'snetwork may be much more extensive than previously assumed. The extent and degree of threatposed by Khan's network has become apparent through the discovery in Libya of plans for an atomicbomb and other elements of a "nuclear starter kit," evidence that Pakistan has been the source ofmost of Iran's uranium enrichment know-how and technology, strong indications that Pakistan hasbeen the main source of centrifuges or components for North Korea's secret uranium enrichmentprogram. U.S. and officials and experts of the IAEA strongly suspect that Khan's network also wasinvolved in transporting North Korean uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6), the feedstock for uraniumenrichment centrifuges, to Libya. (6)

In addition to A.Q. Khan's network, U.S. officials revealed the existence of another illicittrafficking ring in January 2004, this one involved in illegally exporting sensitive U.S. technologyfor Pakistan's own nuclear weapons and missile programs. In September 2004, an Israeli arms dealerresident in South Africa, Asher Karni, pleaded guilty to five Federal felony charges related to hiskey role in a number of unlicensed exports of sensitive dual-use U.S. technology to Pakistan viaSouth Africa and Dubai, including high speed switches called triggered spark gaps, which can beused in nuclear weapons. Karni's customer in Pakistan was an Islamabad-based company, Pakland,owned by Humayun Khan (no relation to A.Q. Khan), with long-standing ties to Pakistan's militaryand nuclear establishment. U.S. officials say that Karni's Cape Town company also suppliedmissile-related and possibly nuclear-related technology to India. (7) (See details below). (8)

Congressional Concerns and Perspectives

In the face of continuing evidence that Pakistan remains involved in nuclear proliferationactivities, some Members of Congress and some policy analysts and observers are concerned thatthe United States may be ignoring the lessons of the 1980s in again subordinating its nuclearnonproliferation interests to other policy objectives. During the 108th Congress, these concerns wereraised by some Members of Congress in committee hearings and in proposed legislation that did notreceive action.

Pending legislation in the 109th Congress likewise appears to reflect, in part, the desire ofsome Members of Congress to recalibrate the balance between U.S. counterterrorism andnonproliferation objectives. These initiatives would condition U.S. assistance on more cooperationfrom Pakistan concerning A.Q. Khan's network and the curtailment of other actions by Pakistan tooppose or undermine U.S. efforts to curb nuclear proliferation. (See details in section entitled"Legislation" at the end of this report.)

This report briefly recounts previous failed efforts to reconcile conflicting American regionalsecurity and nuclear nonproliferation policy objectives regarding Pakistan; (2) documents A.Q.Khan's role, whether with or without official involvement, in supplying nuclear technology to"rogue" states and how these activities escaped detection by U.S. intelligence agencies; (3) considersissues regarding the nature, objectives, and viability of the military-dominated government headedby President Pervez Musharraf; and, (4) outlines a series of unilateral and multilateral U.S. options,with a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each, for gaining further nuclearnonproliferation cooperation from Pakistan and forestalling future exports from Pakistan of nuclearand dual-use components, materials, and technology. This report will not be further updated.

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: "Hard Choices" or the Same Choices?

The 9/11 Commission Report emphasizes the need for "hard choices"and "difficult long-termcommitments" to Pakistan. (9) The Report explicitly notes that the need for a pragmatic approachinevitably involves compromises with other important U.S. interests such as democracy and nuclearnon-proliferation. The Report does not address the issue of where the balance should be struckbetween supporting the Musharraf government as a necessary means of fighting terrorism.

Perhaps because of its relatively narrow mandate, the 9/11 Commission focused more on the urgency of maintaining a stable and cooperative government in Islamabad that would remain apartner in the war against terrorism and less on Pakistan's role as a source of nuclear proliferation.In the view of the 9/11 Commission, maintaining close cooperation with Pakistan in the fight againstAl Qaeda and keeping Pakistan's nuclear capabilities out of the hands of terrorists depends criticallyon supporting President Pervez Musharraf's vision of a moderate, modernizing Islamic state.

The 9/11 Commission addressed only in an oblique manner the issue of Pakistan's pastnuclear proliferation activities and the risk of further proliferation emanating from Pakistan. TheReport's section on Pakistan acknowledges, but does not dwell on, Pakistan's continuing potentialto be a source of technology and know-how for other states or terrorist groups intent on acquiringnuclear weapons. It noted President Musharraf's repeated assurances that "Pakistan does not barterwith its nuclear technology," but also observed that "proliferation concerns have been long-standing."

A section of the 9/11 Commission Report dealing more generally with the threat of nuclearproliferation takes note of Khan's role in establishing illegal covert networks for global transfer ofnuclear technology and materials, but its recommendations are not Pakistan-specific. Rather, theReport emphasizes multilateral solutions based on "an international legal regime with universaljurisdiction to enable the capture, interdiction, and prosecution of smugglers" by any state that findsthem operating covertly in its territory. The Report specifically calls for expanding the 2003Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the 1991 "Nunn-Lugar" Cooperative Threat Reduction(CTR) Program. The PSI emphasizes international cooperation to interdict WMD and ballisticmissile shipments, while the CTR concentrates on securing nuclear weapons and other dangerousmaterials scattered throughout the territories of the former Soviet Union, which could fall into thehands of terrorists. (10)

Instead of hard choices, some observers judge that the Bush Administration and Congresshave little choice but to provide substantial assistance to Pakistan to bolster Musharraf and to gainthe closest possible antiterrorist cooperation from Islamabad, without regard to issues such asdemocracy and nuclear proliferation. From this perspective, the issue may be less one of choicesthan following the logic of unpleasant realities. The hardest choices may in fact be those faced byPresident Musharraf, given the broad public antipathy in Pakistan towards U.S. policy in the MiddleEast, including the war in Iraq and support of Israel, and the widely held misperception that the U.S.war on terrorism is in fact a war against Islam.

Past as Prologue: Pakistan and the Recurrent Dilemma of Conflicting U.S. Policy Goals(11)

The effort to reconcile U.S. nuclear proliferation objectives towards Pakistan with moreimmediate American regional and global security concerns has a long and less than encouraginghistory. References by the 9/11 Report to Pakistan's perception of the United States as an unreliableally relate directly to fundamental differences in U.S. and Pakistani expectations of the alliance, andthe consequent unwillingness of several U.S. Administrations to support Pakistan in its wars withIndia in 1965 and 1971. (12)

India's 1974 Nuclear Test and the Beginning of the U.S. Policy Dilemma

Pakistan emerged as a major source of nuclear proliferation concern following India'sunderground test of 1974, itself a delayed response to China's 1965 nuclear test. Because itstechnological base was far smaller than India's, Pakistan concentrated on obtaining nuclear materialsand technology from abroad, and by whatever means. Successful U.S. diplomatic efforts in the late1970s to prevent France from delivering a uranium reprocessing plant to Pakistan, which could turnspent reactor fuel into plutonium marked the beginning of a long struggle to prevent Pakistan fromacquiring what some, including the then-Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, werealready calling the "Islamic bomb" (13)

Unfortunately, the U.S. effort to close off Pakistan's ability to employ the reprocessing routeto a nuclear bomb was already being undercut by A.Q. Khan's initiation of a secret program toproduce high-enriched uranium, the alternative kind of nuclear weapons material. While workingat a European nuclear facility in the Netherlands, URENCO, Khan had stolen the plans for anuranium enrichment facility. In 1983 a Dutch court convicted Khan of nuclear espionage in absentia,an action that was later overturned on a technicality. (14) Because of Khan's success in acquiring the necessary materialsand technology from abroad, including items obtained illegally from the United States, Americanefforts to prevent Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons became much more difficult. EventuallyU.S. efforts were overtaken by Cold War developments that caused successive U.S. administrationsand Congress to flinch repeatedly as Islamabad transgressed each new U.S. "red line."

Key Role of Congress in Shaping Basic U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy

From the time of India's first "peaceful" underground nuclear test in 1974, Congress hasplayed the leading role in formulating the legislative parameters governing U.S. nonproliferationpolicy. Pakistan's efforts to acquire technology from abroad, as well as concern that the FordAdministration had not responded adequately to India's abuse of U.S. and Canadian peaceful nuclearassistance, led Congress in the late 1970s to enact two landmark nuclear nonproliferation provisionsto the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, amended. Section 669 of the FAA, first enacted in1976 and expanded in 1977 (Symington-Glenn Amendment), (15) banned U.S. economic, andmilitary assistance, and export credits to countries that have not placed all of their nuclear facilitiesand materials under the inspection regime of the United Nations International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) or that deliver, receive, acquire or transfer nuclear enrichment technology. Section670 (Glenn Amendment), first adopted in 1977, (16) provided the same sanctions in the case of countries that acquireor transfer nuclear reprocessing technology or explode or transfer a nuclear device. Theseprovisions, amended, are now contained in Sections 101 and 102 of the Arms Export Control Act(AECA). (17)

Congress had India as well as Pakistan in mind when it enacted the Nuclear NonproliferationAct (NNPA) of 1978, which also generally enjoyed the support of the Carter Administration. TheNNPA, among other things, bans the sale of U.S. uranium fuel to countries that do not accept theimposition of "full-scope" IAEA inspections and safeguards. Because of India's unwillingness toaccept these terms, the United States abrogated a 30-year bilateral agreement under which it hadcommitted to sell low-enriched uranium fuel for India's U.S.-supplied Tarapur Atomic PowerStation. (18)

Alternating U.S. Policy Priorities Towards Pakistan

The United States chose its nuclear proliferation interests over its regional security interestsin April 1979, when President Carter cut off U.S. assistance to Pakistan under Section 669 of theForeign Assistance Act of 1961, amended, following the discovery that Pakistan had a secreturanium enrichment program. Later, in November of the same year, U.S.-Pakistan relations reacheda nadir after a mob attacked and burned the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and several other U.S.facilities in response to false reports, possibly spread by the Iranian revolutionary leader, theAyatollah Khomeini, that the United States was somehow involved in a takeover of the GrandMosque in Mecca by Islamic extremists. (19)

The policy of giving priority to nonproliferation in relations with Pakistan proved short-lived. As in the case of the 9/11 attacks some three decades later, the December 1979 Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan created a quick reversal of U.S. nuclear proliferation and other security policy priorities. President Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, set the tone in a memo ofDecember 26, 1979, when he reportedly told the President that the United States had no choice butto repair its then-tattered relations with Pakistan. Reportedly, Brzezinski told the President thatgaining Pakistan's support against the Soviet occupation "will require ... more guarantees to it[Pakistan], more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy cannot be dictated by ournonproliferation policy." (20)

Pakistan's key role in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan continued to trump U.S. nuclearnonproliferation concerns until the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989. Congress supported thisreordering of U.S. policy priorities in 1981, by adding a new Section 620E of the FAA, which gavethe President qualified authority to waive for a period of six-years the provisions of Section 669. Congress annually appropriated funds for a six-year, $3.2 billion program of economic and militaryassistance to Pakistan, much like the five-year, $3 billion program requested by the BushAdministration for the period FY2005-2009. Despite Washington's periodic warnings, Pakistan notonly continued to develop a nuclear weapons capability but companies connected with its nuclearprogram, were caught trying to export dual-use materials such as krytrons, used to trigger nuclearexplosions, and specially hardened steel, in violation of U.S. export control laws. In 1986 Pakistan'smilitary ruler, President Zia ul-Haq, reportedly told an interviewer "It is our right to obtain thetechnology. And when we acquire this technology, the Islamic world will possess it with us." (21)

Failed Efforts to Reconcile U.S. Cold War and Nuclear Proliferation Objectives: The 1985 "Pressler Amendment" and the 1990 Aid Cutoff

In 1985, in the face of incontrovertible evidence that Pakistan was continuing to develop anuclear weapons capability, despite repeated denials by President Zia ul- Haq, the ReaganAdministration agreed to accept a new provision to U.S. foreign assistance law, the so-called PresslerAmendment, Sec. 620E(e) of the FAA, requiring the President to certify annually that Pakistan didnot possess a nuclear explosive device as a condition of U.S. assistance. President Reagan andPresident George H. W. made such findings for three years after passage of the amendment, but eachwas successively more circumscribed. In 1990, President Bush informed Congress that he could nolonger make such a certification, and that most economic and all military assistance to Pakistanwould be suspended. (22)

The 9/11 Commission's references to Pakistan's belief that past U.S. support has beenself-serving relate in large part to this development, even though Islamabad had ample warning thatits nuclear activities were putting its assistance in jeopardy. Although the U.S. Government deniedthe charge, Pakistani commentators asserted that the imposition of sanctions was directly related to1989 withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan, which made Pakistan no longer critical toU.S. regional security policy. (23)

India and Pakistan's May 1998 Nuclear Tests and the Decline of Sanctions as a U.S. Nonproliferation Policy Approach

When India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 1998, Congress and the ClintonAdministration moved with a haste surprising to many observers to waive most of theproliferation-related economic and military sanctions required by U.S. foreign assistance law on bothcountries. (Pakistan subsequently became ineligible for most forms of U.S. aid for other reasons --see below). The reaction of the President and Congress appeared to reflect several factors, includinga decline in the belief of the efficacy of sanctions once the tests were a fait accompli , efforts by U.S.agricultural interests to prevent a loss of markets, and the rising influence of the India caucus inCongress.

Legislation passed in July 1998 made Pakistan eligible for agricultural export credits to buyU.S. winter wheat, while legislation signed into law in October that year, "The India and PakistanRelief Act," gave the President the authority to waive various economic sanctions for one year. Laterin October 1998 Congress made this authority permanent and also extended it, with conditions, toinclude military assistance, foreign military sales credits, and exports to high technology entities, inthe FY2000 Department of Defense appropriation. India was able to take advantage of many ofthese relaxations of sanctions but Pakistan remained ineligible for most U.S. assistance on two othergrounds: General Musharraf's October 1999 military coup; and the fact that Pakistan had fallen intoarrears in its debt repayments to the United States. (24)

U.S. Policy Reversal After 9/11

The 9/11 terrorist attacks, as in the case of the December 1979 Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan, immediately changed Pakistan's status from that of a problem country with which theUnited States had strained relations to a critical regional ally, but they put the U.S. Government onceagain at a disadvantage in dealing with Pakistan's nuclear activities. A number of nonproliferationexperts agree with the critical importance of keeping Pakistan's nuclear weapons and materials outof the reach of terrorists, but they disagree with the Commission's assumption that PresidentMusharraf is a sufficiently reliable partner, absent a more forthcoming attitude from the Pakistanigovernment on the activities of A.Q. Khan and his network. Others question the whether Pakistanis fully committed to fighting the war against terrorism, let alone exercising nuclear restraint.

Among the most serious sources of concern is the well-documented past involvement ofsome members of the Army's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) organization with Al Qaeda and theTaliban, and the possibility that some officers retain sympathies with both groups. In the words ofone analyst, "...Pakistan's official alliance with the United States in the war on terror has onlyincreased the danger posed by al-Qaeda sympathizers within its nuclear establishment." (25) These considerations areseen as a significant factor in Musharraf's refusal to provide adequate information about A.Q. Khan'snetwork. Some observers argue that without additional nonproliferation policy initiatives beyondthose already adopted by the Bush Administration, embracing and supporting Musharraf is aninadequate response to danger posed by Pakistan's nuclear establishment and its past role as possiblythe most important single source of nuclear proliferation to radical states.

Even if President Musharraf's assurances are taken at face value, Pakistan remains asignificant source of proliferation risk. Still outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Pakistanis not bound by that treaty's prohibitions on nuclear weapon states transferring nuclear-weaponsrelated technology or materials to any other state (or encouraging or assisting any state). It also isnot a member of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, a informal organization of countries producingnuclear materials and technology that has established guidelines for nuclear exports. While Pakistanileaders have proclaimed that their nuclear weapons are secure and that Pakistan has not beeninvolved in selling or transferring nuclear weapons technology, this claim is cast into doubt by theactivities of Dr. A.Q. Khan over more than a decade.

Details on Pakistan's Proliferation Activities(26)

Pakistan has been involved in the covert acquisition of nuclear-related technologies since atleast the mid-1970s. Khan, a German-educated metallurgist worked in the early 1970s for acontractor to a European nuclear consortium, URENCO, located in the Netherlands. Reportedly,after India's 1974 underground nuclear test, Pakistan's then-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto askedKhan to head up a Pakistani uranium enrichment project. Khan returned to Pakistan in 1976 withsecret plans for a Dutch-designed uranium enrichment centrifuge assembly. (27)

The A.Q. Khan Network

Because Pakistan lacked an adequate industrial base or sufficient scientific expertise to buildan enrichment facility from domestically available resources, Khan began almost immediately to puttogether a network to obtain necessary materials and technology from abroad. Evidence concerningany official Pakistani involvement in the network remains largely circumstantial. Khan's effortswere foiled a number of times by the U.S. and European governments, but it became clear by themid-1980s that Pakistan was making significant progress towards the ability to produceweapons-grade uranium. What was not understood, however, that Khan also started using hisnetwork personally to reap millions of U.S. dollars by providing nuclear knowhow, technology, andmaterials to other countries seeking a nuclear weapons capability.

It is now clear that A.Q. Khan and several other scientists from the Khan ResearchLaboratories sold nuclear technology from the 1980s through 2002 to several countries, includingIran, Libya, and North Korea. (28) President Bush, in a speech that focused on proliferation at theNational Defense University on February 11, 2004, outlined some aspects of Khan's network:

Khan led the network, operating mostly out of Pakistan

A factory in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, manufactured centrifuge parts (ScomiPrecision Engineering)

BSA Tahir, a Sri Lankan businessman, ran SMB computers in Dubai as a frontcompany

Network operatives in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa purchased othercomponents.

Much of the information about exactly what Khan sold has been gathered from pressaccounts; although Khan reportedly signed a 12-page confession in early February 2004, the text ofthat confession has not been made public. Moreover, it appears that the confession was writtenunder pressure, which could further distort the truth about Khan's activities.

Khan's confession came at the end of a two-month investigation by the Pakistani governmentinto his activities, which was sparked by two related proliferation investigations: Iran was pressuredby the IAEA in the fall of 2003 to reveal its foreign sources of centrifuge equipment, if only tosupport its argument that the presence of highly enriched uranium came from foreign contaminationand not its own production of HEU; and Libya renounced its WMD programs in December 2003,revealing all its foreign sources of procurement. Only in February 2004 did Pakistan admit thatnuclear technology was sold to those two countries. The Pakistani government and the NorthKorean government continue to deny any transfers of nuclear technology between Pakistan andNorth Korea. Yet, U.S. officials have testified before Congress that Khan provided such technologyto North Korea. (29) President Bush stated in his February 11th speech that "Khan and his associates provided Iran andLibya and North Korea with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as designs for moreadvanced and efficient models." (30) One popular theory is that Pakistan bartered uranium enrichmenttechnology for missile technology from North Korea, but President Musharraf has stated that"whatever we bought from North Korea is with money." (31)

Khan reportedly sold a full range of technology -- from blueprints and components to fullcentrifuge assemblies, uranium hexafluoride feedstock, and, reportedly, a nuclear weapon design. Assistance to Iran began in the late 1980s and continued at least until the mid-1990s. (32) Assistance to Libya beganin the early1990s and continued into 2002. Assistance to North Korea reportedly began in themid-1990s and may have continued until 2003. However, a German intelligence investigationconcluded as long ago as 1991 that Iraq, and possibly Iran and North Korea, obtained uraniummelting information from Pakistan in the late 1980s. (33) A Pakistani official involved in Khan's investigation reportedlysaid North Korea ordered P-1 centrifuge components from 1997 to 2000. (34) Beyond blueprints,components, full assemblies of centrifuges, and low-enriched uranium, Libya also received --startlingly -- a nuclear weapons design. (35) In the case of Iran and Libya, Khan provided technology for anadvanced centrifuge design (the P-2). (36) There is no confirmation that the nuclear weapon design Libyareceived in 2001 or 2002 is from Pakistan, but some sources have reported that the design containedChinese text and step-by-step instructions for assembling a 1960s HEU implosion device, whichcould indicate that Khan passed on a design Pakistan is long-rumored to have received fromChina. (37)

Most nuclear proliferation experts contend that A.Q. Khan must have had significantlogistical support from elements in the Pakistani military and the civilian nuclear establishment,whether acting in support of Pakistani security policy or his own desire for private gain, or both. Inwhat appeared to be a carefully worded response at a December 21, 2004 press interview, Secretaryof State Colin Powell indicated that the Administration accepted President Musharraf's statementthat he had no knowledge of Khan's activities, but Administration officials have also indicated thatU.S. intelligence officials have not been able to gain access to Khan. (38)

Other Nuclear Suppliers

Questions about President Musharraf's credibility appear to have been reinforced by the arrestin Denver in January 2004 of Asher Karni, a former Israeli military officer and military technologytrader who resides in South Africa, for illegally exporting U.S. dual-use technology to Pakistan. U.S.authorities arrested Karni when he got off an international flight at Denver International Airport, onhis way to a skiing holiday. Karni was charged with violating U.S. export control laws by using afront company and a bogus South African recipient to ship to Pakistan 66 triggered spark gaps --high speed electrical switches that can be used as detonators for nuclear weapons as well as forigniting rocket motors and separating missile stages. At the time, Karni was not aware that hismovements were being monitored by U.S. agencies, and that, at the request of U.S. CommerceDepartment officials, the triggered spark gaps had been rendered useless by the manufacturer, PerkinElmer Optoelecronics, of Salem, Massachusetts. On earlier occasions, Karni was moresuccessful, including a 2003 shipment of sophisticated oscilloscopes to Pakistan that can be used innuclear weapons research. (39) U.S. officials disclosed on Friday, April 8, 2005, that Karni hadentered a sealed admission of guilt to five Federal felony changes and had provided informationabout the export of the triggered spark gaps, as well as "sophisticated electronic equipment togovernment agencies in India, some of whom are involved in nuclear weapons and missileresearch." (40)

In mid-2003, after failed attempts to buy the triggered spark gaps directly were rebuffed bya French company and PerkinElmer, both of which asked for proof that Karni had an necessaryexport license from the Commerce Department, Karni engaged a New Jersey-based front company,Giza Industries, to purchase the items under false pretenses. According to U.S. officials, Karni andKhan had shipped these and other dual use items on the U.S. Export control list using a chain ofcompanies in New Jersey, South Africa, the U.A.E., and Pakistan. Karni engaged a New Jerseycompany, Giza Technologies, Inc., of Secaucus, New Jersey, as a front purchaser, and tookadvantage of the fact dual use items can be exported to South Africa without an export licensebecause South Africa is a member of the Nuclear Supplier Group. Because the triggered spark gapsare also used in a medical device ("lithotripter") that breaks up kidney stones, the shipment wasaddressed to a South African hospital when it left Giza Technologies. Karni's company, Top-CapeTechnology, of Cape Town was the actual recipient in South Africa. (41)

The fact that Karni a sold other sensitive dual use technology to two laboratories connectedwith India's space program that are on the U.S. Commerce Department Entities List -- organizationswhich are barred from receiving certain dual use exports -- suggests to some observers thatadditional countries, including Iran, also may have used the network. (42) Reportedly, of even moreconcern to U.S. officials, Humayun Khan was known to be close to the All Jammu and KashmirMuslim Conference (AJKMC), an organization that supports Pakistani militants fighting Indianforces in Kashmir. The freight forwarder's tracking number indicated that the package was pickedup in Islamabad by an employee of the AJKMC Lithography Aid Society, an organizationpurportedly connected to the Agha Khan Foundation, a charitable organization which maintains aworld-wide network of hospitals. (43) The real purposes of the AJKMC Lithography Aid Society maybe indicated by the fact that it apparently confused lithotripters with lithography, a printing process. Similarities in the Aid Society's stationary and address suggest it is just a cover address for HumayunKhan's Pakland PME. (44)

U.S. officials reportedly have said that because of the large numbers of high speed electricalswitches that had been sought, it seemed likely that they were destined for the Pakistani military andpossibly for other countries that were attempting to produce nuclear weapons. Reportedly, U.S.investigators and analysts have not been able to connect the government of Pakistan, which deniesany involvement in the illegal exports, directly to the transactions. (45) Reportedly, however,some U.S. officials have said in not-for-attribution interviews that the same figures in the Pakistani military who they suspect placed the orders for the triggered spark gaps and other sensitivetechnology via the Arni-Humayun Khan may also have worked with A.Q. Khan. (46)

Some observers suggest, however, that the real problem is not proving the connection, butrather the reluctance of the U.S. government to risk jeopardizing Pakistan's anti-terrorismcooperation by aggressively pursuing the case with Pakistan. In early January 2005, then-Secretaryof State Colin Powell told the press that U.S. officials "have presented evidence to Pakistan's leadersof Pakistani involvement in the spread of nuclear weapons technology," but he gave no indicationof Pakistan's response, if any. (47) Reportedly, according to other unnamed U.S. officials, thereluctance of senior policymakers to pursue the case against Humayun Khan reflects "a largertug-of-war between federal agencies that enforce U.S. nonproliferation laws and policy-makers whoconsider Pakistan too important to embarrass." (48)

As in the A.Q. Khan case, the reported handling of this case by U.S. policymakers appearsto suggest that American dependance on Pakistan for cooperation against terrorism has significantlyinfluenced U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. Two apparent aspects of U.S. policy concern, orare likely to concern, critics of the Administration's priorities.

First, the reported struggle between the State Department, on the one hand, and theCommerce Department and U.S. Customs service, on the other, over how aggressively the UnitedStates should pressure Pakistan for cooperation, creates a perception that nonproliferation policy haslower priority than antiterrorism cooperation with Islamabad. Reportedly, the State Departmentsuccessfully blocked a request by the Commerce Department and the Department of HomelandSecurity to send investigators to Pakistan. (49) By reportedly not making forceful efforts to gain access toHumayun Khan in Pakistan, the United States may be reducing its ability to determine if any of thetechnology procured by Asher Karni's Pakistani partner was transferred to other countries. U.S.investigators are said to be involved in a major effort to follow leads in South Africa, the U.A.E.,India, and elsewhere, and the Administration has made "high-level" requests for cooperation directlyto Musharraf, but some "senior officials" reportedly have complained in press interviews that theserequests have not been made "forcefully or publicly." (50) In April 2005 a Washington, DC, federal grand jury indictedHumayun Khan, who remains at liberty in Pakistan, both for conspiracy to violate U.S. exportcontrol laws, and for violating U.S. laws on three occasions. A conviction on all charges could causeKhan to be sentenced to incarceration for a maximum of 35 years. (51)

Second, some Members of Congress and proliferation experts argue that it is a mistake toacknowledge even tacitly nuclear weapons state status of Pakistan and India, or to acquiesce incontinued pursuit of "vertical proliferation" by both countries through efforts to improve theirexisting nuclear weapons capability. In the context of the five-year NPT Review Conference thatopened at the United Nations in early May 2005, Joseph Cirincione, the head of the Nonproliferationproject of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, reportedly warned that allowing Indiaand Pakistan to expand their arsenals of nuclear weapons without international oversight or theimposition of sanctions will result in a proliferation "chain reaction." (52)

Reported comments by U.S. officials in early 2005 indicate the reluctant acceptance by theAdministration that Pakistan will continue to seek upgrade its nuclear capability, including possiblefuture attempts to illegally export technology from the United States. While U.S. investigators andprosecutors are aggressively seeking to stop efforts by individuals and countries to obtain sensitivecontrolled U.S. technology, senior Administration officials reportedly say that the U.S. governmenthas little leverage over Pakistan. In May 2005, U.S. officials who insisted on anonymity reportedlyexplained to a journalist that the Administration believed its options for putting pressure onMusharraf were few, because Pakistani cooperation remained crucial in the war on terrorism. Oneofficial reportedly made a distinction between horizontal proliferation to would-be nuclear powersand terrorist, and Pakistan's efforts to enhance its existing nuclear capabilities. "It's one thing forthem to cooperate with us to stop [nuclear components] from going elsewhere, such as Iran," theU.S. official reportedly said, "but they will never cooperate with us on efforts to stop things that theyare trying to get. They've got their own program, which they are trying to keep." (53)

Intelligence Issues(54)

It is not possible to describe from open sources what the U.S. intelligence community mayhave known, and when, about the A.Q. Khan network, but it is possible to date some U.S.approaches to Pakistan on this matter from press reports. In addition, it is possible to piece togetherhints of Pakistani collaboration in the nuclear field with the three countries in question. Finally,semi-annual, unclassified reports to Congress on proliferation (so-called Section 721 reports) from1997 to the present may indicate what the intelligence community might have known.

U.S. officials reportedly approached Pakistani officials in 2000 with suspicions aboutactivities conducted by Khan Research Laboratory (KRL) scientists. Pakistan reportedly respondedwith an investigation, forcing Khan into early retirement in March 2001. (55) Shortly after Khan'sdismissal, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage was quoted by the Financial Times as saying that"people who were employed by the nuclear agency and have retired" could be spreading nucleartechnology to other states, including North Korea. (56) However, a senior U.S. nonproliferation official explained weekslater that Armitage's statement led to confusion about the cooperation; that it was really limited tomissile cooperation. (57) President Musharraf told reporters in 2004 that the information U.S. officials gave him several yearsago was not specific enough for him to take action.

Reports of extensive official cooperation between Pakistan and the three countries might alsohave informed the intelligence community's assessment. Pakistan reportedly signed a nuclearcooperation agreement with Iran in 1986, although the terms of that agreement are unknown, andIranian scientists received training in Pakistan in 1988. Libyan funding of the Pakistani nuclearweapons program in the early years long has been alleged, most notably in a 1981 book by SteveWeissman and Herbert Krosney called The Islamic Bomb . (58) Finally, Pakistan'swell-documented missile cooperation with North Korea beginning in the early 1990s, as well as A.Q.Khan's dozen or so trips to North Korea were certainly known to the intelligence community.

Pakistan's Absence in U.S. Intelligence Reports on Proliferation

Despite the existence of intelligence information and rumors in the open literature concerningsignificant Pakistani contacts with radical states known to be seeking nuclear weapons, Congress hasreceived little information on this issue in unclassified reports from intelligence agencies. The CIA'ssemi-annual reports to Congress on the acquisition of technology related to weapons of massdestruction (Section 721 of FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act) do not highlight Pakistaniinvolvement in supplying WMD technology. Pakistan is addressed as a country acquiringtechnology from 1997 to the first half of 2002 and then no longer appears in the reports as a countryof proliferation concern. (59) China, Russia, and North Korea, are regularly included as keysuppliers, but Pakistan has never been included in this list. The first time Pakistan is mentioned asa potential new supplier of technology is for the report ending June 2000." (60) The report covering theperiod to June 2002 addresses "Emerging State and Non-State Suppliers," but neither Pakistan norA.Q. Khan is mentioned by name. The text states that traditional recipients of WMD technologymight follow North Korea's lead in supplying such technology to other countries or non-state actors. Additionally:

Even in cases where states take action to stem suchtransfers, there are growing numbers of knowledgeable individuals or non-state purveyors ofWMD-related materials and technology who are able to act outside the constraints of governments. Such non-state actors are increasingly capable of providing technology and equipment thatpreviously could only be supplied directly by countries with established capabilities.

South Asia is first mentioned as a region of key suppliers in the report covering January to June2003. However, even in that report, there is no mention of a connection between South Asia, Iran,Libya, or North Korea. In the sections on Iran and North Korea, there is no information on foreignsuppliers, and the section on Libya refers just to Libya seeking "technical exchanges" for dual-useequipment. A.Q. Khan is finally mentioned in the Section 721 report ending December 2004(publication mid-2004):

The exposure of the A.Q. Khan network and its role insupplying nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea illustrate one form of this threat, butcommercial purveyors of dual-use technologies who routinely seek to circumvent internationalexport control regimes to deliver WMD-related equipment and material to WMD-aspirant countriesare of grave concern as well. (61)

Transfers to Iran. By and large, the U.S.intelligence community appears not to have identified Pakistan as a significant source of nucleartechnology for Iran. Concerns about a potential Iranian nuclear weapons program date back to the1970s, with a hiatus during the years of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1989). With the end of that war,the attention of the Iranian government turned back to recreating its nuclear program, including thereactors at Bushehr. When many governments were persuaded not to participate in the project,Russia stepped in to fill the gap, and U.S. attention focused on the nuclear technology Iran mightglean from Russian scientists and engineers. Although centrifuge enrichment techniques were aconcern, the intelligence community had not focused on Pakistan as a particular supplier. In theSection 721 reports, Russia and China are repeatedly mentioned as suppliers to Iran's nuclearprogram. From 1999 to 2001, the report admits that Iran has sought technology from a variety ofsources, but especially Russia. Only in the report for the first half of 2002 is there mention that theU.S. intelligence community suspects Iran is interested in acquiring foreign fissile material andtechnology for weapons development.

Transfers to Libya. Although the U.S.intelligence community long had suspected Libyan interest in developing nuclear weapons, mostanalysts attributed the limited Libyan success to sanctions and lack of an indigenous scientific andengineering base. The IAEA reported in February 2004 that Libya began receiving centrifugecomponents from A.Q. Khan in 1997. Yet, the Section 721 reports did not contain any text abouta Libyan nuclear program until 2000. Then, the report noted that the suspension of U.N. sanctions"has accelerated the pace of procurement efforts in Libya's drive to rejuvenate its ostensibly civiliannuclear program." That report hinted that a nuclear cooperation agreement with Moscow would playa key role. Not until the report for January to June 2002 did the text note that Libya used its secretservices "to try to obtain technical information on the development of WMD, including nuclearweapons." If this was referring to Libya's procurement of a nuclear weapons design from A.Q. Khan,it seems to imply less willingness by Khan to provide the plans than apparently was the case. Thereports for the last half of 2002 and first half of 2003 only mention technical exchanges related todual-use equipment.

Transfers to North Korea. At the time theOctober 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea was negotiated, there was concern about, butscant evidence of, North Korean interest in uranium enrichment. (62) Reports of North Korea'sprocurement of enrichment-related equipment, particularly from Pakistan, date back to themid-1980s (see above), but apparently U.S. intelligence agencies had no evidence of an actualenrichment program. Although a senior North Korean official reportedly admitted that it has anenrichment program to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly during a confrontationalmeeting in Pyongyang in October 2002, Pyongyang has continued to publicly deny possessing sucha program. (63)

It is clear that the U.S. intelligence community knew of multiple trips by A.Q. Khan to NorthKorea, beginning in the mid-1990s. Whether the intelligence community attributed this to missileor nuclear cooperation is unclear, but the role of KRL in both nuclear and missile technology couldpoint to collaboration in one or both areas.

In November 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency distributed a one-page, unclassified whitepaper to Congress on North Korean enrichment capabilities, which noted that the United States had"been suspicious that North Korea has been working on uranium enrichment for several years," andthat it obtained clear evidence "recently" that North Korea had begun constructing a centrifugefacility. (64) The CIAconcluded that North Korea began a centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program in 2000. Further,the paper noted that, in 2001, North Korea "began seeking centrifuge-related materials in largequantities. It also obtained equipment suitable for use in uranium feed and withdrawal systems." The CIA, the report said, had "learned that the North is constructing a plant that could produceenough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational-- which could be as soon as mid-decade." (65)

One media report in 2002 cited Western officials as stating that Pakistan's aid included acomplete design package for a centrifuge rotor assembly; another stated that Pakistan had exportedactual centrifuge rotors (2,000-3,000). (66) In October 2002, the Washington Post reported that NorthKorean efforts to procure high strength aluminum and significant construction activity tipped off theUnited States. (67) Apparently, North Korea attempted to obtain materials from China, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, andEurope, but Pakistan provided most of the assistance related to the rotors.

In the Section 721 reports to Congress, however, there has been little mention of a NorthKorea-Pakistan connection in the nuclear area. In the first report in 1997, the text states that NorthKorea does not require significant outside assistance to produce WMD. In the 1998 report, there isno mention of any procurement related to the nuclear program, and the report for the first half of1999 states that "Pyongyang sought to procure technology worldwide that could have applicationsin its nuclear program, but we do not know of any procurement directly linked to the nuclearweapons program." This statement was included in both reports for 2000, but dropped in reports for2001. The report for the first half of 2002 notes that North Korea began seeking centrifuge-relatedmaterials in large quantities in 2001 but makes no mention of where it procured those items. Thereport covering the last half of 2002 states that "we did not obtain clear evidence indicating thatNorth Korea had begun acquiring material and equipment for a centrifuge facility until mid-2002."

Although the intelligence community might place emphasis on "clear evidence" and thethreshold of a "centrifuge facility," this admission comes after media accounts in October andNovember 2002 of North Korea's centrifuge procurement from Pakistan and perhaps seven yearsafter that procurement apparently began. Only on February 24, 2004, weeks after Khan confessedto his activity, did CIA Director George Tenet tell the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that"We ...believe Pyongyang is pursuing a production-scale uranium enrichment program based ontechnology provided by A.Q. Khan, which would give North Korea an alternative route to nuclearweapons."

Role of A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani Government and Military(68)

Whether the Musharraf government can be trusted to go forward with the United States asa security partner, let alone a Major Non-NATO Ally, while not putting the United States further atrisk from nuclear proliferation, depends in part on the degree of culpability of the Pakistanigovernment and military in A.Q. Khan's activities. Even if, as has been alleged by the Pakistanigovernment, Khan's aggressive marketing of nuclear materials and technology to North Korea, Iran,and Libya was designed to further Khan's outsized ego and financial interests, he could not havefunctioned without some level of cooperation by Pakistani military personnel, who maintained tightsecurity around the key nuclear facilities, and possibly civilian officials as well. This sectiondiscusses the available information on Khan's role and assesses the credibility of Pakistan's denialthat his activities were authorized or supported at the policy level in Islamabad.

Khan's Motives

A.Q. Khan's celebrity status and the degree to which he enriched himself by his activitieshave been cited by some as evidence that his activities were not government policy. In return forassistance provided by Khan and laboratory director Mohammed Farooq (a close associate of Khan),Iran allegedly funneled millions of dollars into foreign bank accounts held by the two men. Reportedly, Khan then used the money to purchase valuable real estate in both Pakistan andDubai. (69) Khanreportedly made numerous trips to Tehran to share his expertise on uranium enrichment procedures. Compensation also may have included the gift of a villa on the Caspian Sea. Khan denies everhaving traveled to Iran. (70) One unnamed aide to Musharraf reportedly said that "Khan hada completely blank check" while in charge of the Khan Research Laboratory (KRL). "He could doanything. He could go anywhere. He could buy anything at any price." (71)

Khan's reputation as a Pakistani "national hero" appears manufactured, produced at theexpense of several other Pakistani scientists who played equal or greater roles in the country'snuclear weapons program. One leading American expert called Khan an "egomaniac" who hadmastered the press to transform his image to that of national hero. (72) Although Khan apparentlydid make Pakistan's nuclear weapons program possible by illegally acquiring the plans for anuranium enrichment facility, this is only one -- albeit a critical one -- of many steps required in theproduction of nuclear weapons. According to one source, much of the nuclear weapons productionprocess was overseen by a lead scientist at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), whichdid not enjoy KRL's high public profile. That scientist, Samar Mubarikmand, may have known ofKhan's activities and may even have used Khan and KRL as a decoy to divert attention from PAEC,where the most critical work on nuclear weapons was being carried out. (73)

Whether President Musharraf's delicate treatment of Khan following the revelations of hisactivities reflects some level of official culpability is arguable. It has been pointed out that, despiteevidence that he had committed serious breaches of Pakistani law, Khan was allowed (by Musharrafhimself) to keep the many millions of ill-gotten dollars, while two former elected Prime Ministershad been exiled and barred from political office for corruption charges involving far lessmoney. (74)

Likewise, it appears that the Pakistani government was, at a very minimum, incredibly laxin responding to rumors of his activities. Even before Pakistan's May 1998 nuclear test, severalscientists working with Khan at KRL reportedly warned government officials that Khan wasinvolved in suspicious activities. (75) There have been reports that Khan's daughter smuggled out ofPakistan documents and a tape-recorded statement indicating that senior Pakistani military officers,including Musharraf, were aware of her father's proliferation activities. (76)

On the other hand, Khan's self-promoted reputation as the father of Pakistan's nuclearweapons program created a motive not only for overlooking his transgressions, but also for seekingto share in his reflected glory. At a formal dinner marking Khan's March 2001 retirement from KRL,President Musharraf lavished praise on the famed metallurgist: "Dr. Khan and his team toiled andsweated, day and night, against all odds and obstacles, against international sanctions and stingoperations, to create, literally out of nothing, with their bare hands, the pride of Pakistan's nuclearcapability." (77) GivenMusharraf's relative unpopularity, some observers suggest that his lavishing praise on Khan does notnecessarily imply approval or complicity in his proliferation activities.

Pakistani Government Response to U.S. Concerns

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Assistant Secretary of State Christina Roccareportedly met with Musharraf in Islamabad in October 2003 to present him with substantiveevidence implicating Khan and several other scientists in a proliferation ring. One unnamedPakistani official said that U.S. intelligence on Khan's movements was so detailed that it seemed atracking device had been planted on his body. (78) In the same month, the network began to unravel at the otherend: centrifuge equipment shipments to Libya were intercepted in the Mediterranean in October andby December 2003, Libyan leader Qadaffi renounced his weapons of mass destructions programs. Libya revealed, to the United States and to others, the assistance that Khan had provided.

On December 11, 2003, a Pakistani daily reported that two senior KRL scientists had "gonemissing under mysterious circumstances." Later, it became known that laboratory directorMohammed Farooq had been the first Pakistani nuclear scientist to be "detained" for questioning bygovernment authorities on November 27, following the delivery to Islamabad of an IAEA letter onIranian uranium enrichment facilities. (79) Islam-ul Haq, a director at KRL, reportedly was picked up forquestioning as he was dining at Khan's home on January 17, 2004. (80)

As the investigation expanded in January 2004, many Pakistani's criticized the Musharrafgovernment for making scapegoats of lower-level scientists to "appease" the United States. Said therelative of one detained KRL scientist, "It's all to praise or make happy the U.S.A. by framinginnocent people." Opposition political groups were near-unanimous in their dismissal ofproliferation charges, claiming they were part of U.S.-led effort to denuclearize Pakistan; theytypically portrayed Musharraf's cooperation with the United States on this and other issues ascapitulation to a foreign power. (81)

On January 20, Pakistan barred all scientists working on its nuclear weapons program fromleaving the country. The officially-stated reason was to ensure that these individuals would beavailable for questioning, but many believed that the true purpose was to prevent them from talkingto foreign investigators or journalists. (82) One day later, Khan himself was fired from his position asscience advisor to the prime minister, and ensuing reports indicated that Khan was under house arrestin the Pakistani capital. On February 1, Khan reportedly signed a detailed confession indicating thathe had provided Iran, North Korea, and Libya with uranium enrichment technologies andmaterials. (83)

After conceding that some Pakistani scientists had been involved in proliferation, Musharrafsuggested that personal gain was the central motivation, but other motives have been mentioned. When asked about motive, one unnamed senior Pakistani official did not mention greed at all, butrather indicated that Khan had transferred technologies to divert attention from the Pakistan's nuclearprogram, as well as to bolster Islamic solidarity. (84) Key Pakistani investigators reportedly have opined that Khanwas motivated to defy the West, make himself a hero to the Islamic world, and gain wealth. (85) Khan's proliferation ringis reported to have earned $100 million in deals with Libya alone. (86)

Pakistani Military Role?

From the time of the revelations of A.Q. Khan's shipments of nuclear enrichment technologyto North Korea, observers and commentators speculated that this very visible and celebrated figuremust have had the cooperation of Pakistani Army and Air Force personnel at some level. InFebruary 2004, as the Khan story was breaking in the international media, the Washington Post reported that Khan had told a friend and a senior Pakistani investigator that top Pakistani militaryofficers, including Gen. Musharraf, had known about Khan's assistance to North Korea's uraniumenrichment efforts. Khan also reportedly told investigators that General Mirza Aslam Beg, theformer Army Chief (1988-1991), was aware of similar assistance being provided to Iran and that"two other Army chiefs, in addition to Musharraf, knew and approved of his efforts on behalf ofNorth Korea." (87) Oneof these former army chiefs, Jehangir Karamat, became Pakistan's Ambassador to the United Statesin September 2004. A close friend of Khan -- a person who may well have an interest in shiftingblame away from the famed metallurgist -- reportedly described Karamat (along with both Musharrafand Beg) as having been "aware of everything" Khan had done. Karamat's responsibility forPakistan's ballistic missile programs in the late 1990s may have included his taking covert trips toNorth Korea and possibly having direct knowledge about Pakistan's alleged barter deal withPyongyang involving nuclear technology and missiles. (88)

Publicly, Khan accepted all of the blame. In his televised confession to the Pakistani people,Khan sought to "atone for some of the anguish and pain" he had caused by offering his "deepestregrets and unqualified apologies to a traumatized nation." He took "full responsibility" for theproliferation "activities" and emphasized that the Islamabad government had "never ever" authorizedthem. (89) On the nextday, in what appeared to many to be part of a scripted unfolding of events, President Musharrafgranted and upheld a recommendation from his cabinet that Khan not be subjected to anyproliferation-related criminal prosecution. Yet within a week, the Pakistani government announcedthat the pardon was "conditional" and "specific to charges made so far." (90)

Subsequent actions by the Pakistani government underscored doubts that Khan could haveoperated without some level of support by military officers and officials, whether acting on their ownor carrying out government policy. Following Khan's public confession, the Musharraf governmentannounced that it had arrested at least five scientists and administrative officials from KRL,including Mohammed Farooq and Islam-ul Haq. (91) On February 11, Pakistan's Foreign Minister said that "nobodywould be spared" in the ongoing criminal investigation, including Khan. On the same day, fourcivilian scientists and three retired military officers -- including KRL department heads andbrigadiers in charge of security there -- were formally charged with proliferation-related crimes. (92)

President Musharraf himself raised more questions when, on February 9, he acknowledgedthat he had long suspected that Khan was involved in proliferation activities, but argued that theUnited States had failed to provide convincing evidence until the fall of 2003. (93) Why Musharraf had notfollowed up on his own alleged suspicions has not been explained, but a Los Angeles Times reportof May 16 suggests that after Musharraf's coup in 1999, both he and Pakistan's secretiveInter-Services Intelligence organization (ISI) became suspicious of Khan's activities in Dubai. Reportedly Musharraf had decided, in the words of a senior ex-military officer, that "It was time toput an end to this dirty business." Musharraf's main concern, the article argues, was to avoidjeopardizing his desire to get rid of remaining U.S. economic and military sanctions. (94)

Because of Khan's popularity and Musharraf's still shaky hold on power, so this explanationgoes, the President had to move cautiously, but by March 2001 he was fed up with Khan's continuedmeetings with "suspicious men" in Dubai. Musharraf forced the popular hero to retire as the headof Khan Research Laboratories, while making him a cabinet-level senior advisor on nuclear matters,and allowing him to continue to travel abroad. Reportedly, senior ex-military officers maintainedthat Musharraf was not knowledgeable of the extent of Khan's activities, but sacked him essentiallyfor continued insubordination. (95)

Politically, the Khan affair put President Musharraf in a difficult position. When thePakistani Parliament met on February 16, opposition parties accused the government of covering-upthe military's role in proliferating, humiliating Khan, appeasing the United States, and by-passingthe country's elected representatives. (96)

Some Pakistani commentators argued that the Pakistani state should in no way be heldaccountable for the actions of Khan himself. They pointed to Khan's allegedly "total control" ofKRL, reports that the facilities were off-limits to both civilian politicians and the ISI, and an absenceof evidence that Khan's actions were ever transformed into KRL policy. (97)

General Beg, in particular, has long been suspected of having anti-U.S. and pro-Iraniantendencies. Henry Rowan, at the time a U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, has related a January1990 meeting with Gen. Beg , who, he says, "said something like, 'If we don't get adequate supportfrom the U.S., then we may be forced to share nuclear technology with Iran.'" (98) Another source attributesa similar statement by General Beg to late 1990, following the decision by President George H. W.Bush that he could not make the required certification to Congress that Pakistan did not have nuclearweapons, thus invoking the "Pressler Amendment," Sec. 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act,1961, as amended, requiring a cutoff of military and economic assistance to Pakistan. (99)

Beg reportedly has strongly denied having ever having had control over A.Q. Khan -- a rolehe assigned to former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990, 1993-1996) and former PresidentGhulam Ishaq Khan (1988-1993). (100) The accusations concerning Benazir Bhutto and Ghulam IshaqKhan have been made by others, as well. Former Pakistani President Farooq Leghari (1993-1997)insisted that he, former President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and both former Prime Ministers NawazSharif and Benazir Bhutto were fully informed about the country's nuclear weapons program as"nothing was kept secret from us." Leghari claimed that he had no knowledge of proliferationactivities while in office and put responsibility squarely on the shoulders of A.Q. Khan. (101) Benazir Bhutto's chiefdefense advisor from 1988 to 1990, the late Gen. Imtiaz, reportedly pressured Khan to transferout-dated P-I centrifuges to Iran. (102)

Others find Beg's denials less than credible. Addressing Gen. Beg's statements denyingknowledge of transfers to Iran in the 1980s and 1990s, one former Pakistani nuclear scientist claimedthat "nothing moves in the Pakistani nuclear spectrum without the knowledge of the chief of armystaff." (103) Beghimself has claimed that the Pakistani Army has "never been in control" of the country's nuclearweapons program except during periods of military rule. He insisted that the ultimate authority wasalways the "Chief Executive" -- in this case Benazir Bhutto. Bhutto herself claimed that Khan couldnot have been acting alone and that senior government or military officials were seeking to cover-uptheir own complicity. She even asserted that, as Prime Minister, she had turned down severalrequests by military officials and scientists to export Pakistan's nuclear technology. (104)

An aide to then-PM Nawaz Sharif claimed that Beg approached him in 1991 with a proposalto sell nuclear technology to Iran. Reportedly, former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley,said that Beg told him that same year of an "understanding" with the head of Iran's RevolutionaryGuard Corps that Pakistan would help Iran with its nuclear program in return for conventionalweapons and oil. Beg's alleged motive was to form a "grand alliance" of Islamic countries with theability to resist American power in the wake of the U.S.-led military successes in Kuwait and Iraqin early 1991. Beg denies all claims that he sought to provide nuclear assistance to Iran. (105)

The public reaction to the accusations against Khan was predictably nationalistic andanti-American. Many Pakistani observers accused the "foreign media" of bias in singling outPakistan while ignoring the roles played by the citizens of other countries, including those in theWest. They also criticized the IAEA and the United States for turning a blind eye to the nuclearweapons programs of Israel and India. (106) Representative media commentary in Pakistan warned of a"clear and present danger that the West is threatening to dismantle [Pakistan's] nuclear program"through the establishment of "intrusive inspection regimes." Former ISI chief Lt. Gen. Hamid Gulsuggested that the United States would "exploit" the situation to gain joint custody of Pakistan'snuclear weapons "to the total satisfaction of Israel." (107)

A number of civilian politicians and analysts from across Pakistan's political spectrum werequick to suggest that Khan was "falling on his sword" to protect others in the Pakistani governmentand military who also were involved in proliferation activities, perhaps even including Musharrafhimself. (108) Otherssuggested that the series of events leading up to Khan's confession and pardon appeared to have beentightly scripted, and may have been privately endorsed by a U.S. government keen to protect a keycounterterrorism ally. (109)

Bush Administration Statements

The Bush Administration has maintained that "there was no evidence that the top officialsof the Pakistani government were complicit in or approved of [Khan's] proliferation activities." TheBush Administration has found insufficient evidence to trigger U.S. nonproliferation laws, eventhough U.S. officials claim neither to have asked for access to Khan nor believed that such accesswas necessary. (110) Some senior U.S. officials have insisted that the United States is receiving the cooperation it needsfrom Pakistan, but in testimony to Congress on April 29, 2004, then-Deputy Secretary of StateRichard Armitage said that the Administration was "impatient for even greater efforts from PresidentMusharraf." (111) Ina feature article on December 26, 2004, the New York Times reported that the Administration hadreceived little new information from Pakistan to its questions about where Khan obtained the plansfor a nuclear weapon. The article also maintained, based on unnamed sources, that theAdministration had not gained access to his chief assistant, Buhari Sayed Abu Tahir, who has beenjailed in Malaysia as a consequence of the discovery of Khan's network. (112)

In view of the domestic political sensitivity of the issue for President Musharraf, otherstatements by U.S. officials also appear designed to minimize publicly American concern about thelight treatment given A.Q. Khan by Musharraf, despite the gravity of his actions. Responding to aquestion during a CNN interview about President Bush's claim during the September 30, 2004presidential debate, that "the A.Q. Khan network has been brought to justice," then-National SecurityAdvisor Condoleezza Rice reportedly noted the difficult situation for President Musharraf and that"A. Q. Khan, in a sense, has been brought to justice because he is out of the business that he lovedmost." Rice reportedly stated further "And if you don't think national humiliation is justice for whathe did, I think it is. He's nationally humiliated." (113)

Rather than publicly demanding that the Musharraf government make a full revelation ofA.Q. Khan's activities, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell and other State Department officialsinsisted that the United States should play no role in judging Musharraf's handling of the matter. AState Department briefer on February 5, 2004, said he was "impressed by the seriousness of theinvestigation" being conducted in Pakistan and expected that Pakistan would share with theinternational community the information that is gleaned though the investigation. Powell explicitlydescribed the investigation as "a Pakistani internal matter" at a press conference in Islamabad onMarch 18, 2004, though he also said that he was confident that the Pakistani authorities wouldprovide "full disclosure" so that the United States and Pakistan could work together to completelyeliminate Khan's network. (114) Many Pakistani analysts voiced their approval of theconclusion that Khan's activities breached no international laws, thus justifying Musharraf's"prerogative" to pardon. (115)

Other observers have not expressed the same level of confidence that the investigation wouldachieve the stated objectives. The Director-General of the IAEA called Khan "the tip of an iceberg"and claimed that his case "raises more questions than it answers. ... Dr. Khan was not workingalone." (116) A NewYork Times editorial asserted that "Pakistan's military -- and that means General Musharraf -- was,without question, aware of and part of this illicit and perilous commerce. Yet the Bushadministration's reaction," the editorial continued, "has been one of grateful acceptance." (117) Indian reactions werepredictably dismissive of the Khan pardon as a "grand charade" designed to protect the Pakistanimilitary. Many were equally discomfited by the Bush administration's quickness to call Khan'sactivities an "internal matter." (118)

Issues Concerning the Viability of the Musharraf Government As a Long-Term U.S. Security Partner(119)

The critical importance of gaining cooperation against terrorism has been the BushAdministration's main justification for largely setting aside U.S. nonproliferation concerns in the caseof Pakistan. Not only does the United States need Pakistani cooperation, but Musharraf's survivalhas been seen by both the Administration and the 9/11 Commission as an essential requirement formaintaining and increasing Pakistani cooperation. Given the troubled history of U.S.-Pakistansecurity cooperation, the 9/11 Commission Report emphasizes, in particular, the necessity ofavoiding a repetition of the past cycle of engagement, disengagement, and reengagement withPakistan. The following section addresses the stability of the Musharraf government and theprospects for a continuation of current Pakistani policy should President Musharraf leave the scene,for whatever reason.

Near-Term U.S. Security Needs Versus Longer Term Human Rights and Democracy Goals

U.S. interest in Pakistani democratization exists in tandem with the perceived need to havea stable and effectively-administered ally in the international anti-terrorism coalition. However,while many observers believe that U.S. interests in combating terrorism and weapons proliferationin South Asia entail a "trade-off" with regard to other concerns, some contend that the human rightssituation in Pakistan may itself be a crucial aspect of the incidence of terrorism and religiousextremism. (120) Congressional oversight of U.S.-Pakistan relations in a March 2003 hearing included Memberexpressions of concern about problems with Pakistani democratization and the danger of the UnitedStates "giving full recognition to a military takeover" through continuous waivers of coup-relatedaid restrictions. (121) The military continues to dominate Pakistan's centralized decision making process and, while inoffice, Prime Minister Jamali referred to President Musharraf as being his "boss." (122)

While it is possible to argue that Pakistan is somewhat more democratic since the October2002 elections, many analysts note that the country's democratic institutions and processes areinflexible and unaccommodating of dissent. These observers see Pakistan's political parties seriouslyweakened in recent years, with the military's influence correspondingly more profound. (123) Moreover, numerouscommentators reject the 9/11 Commission's "best hope" label for Musharraf himself as myopic andrepetitive of past U.S. reliance on Pakistani military regimes, especially in light of their view thatPakistan's uncertain political stability is rooted in Musharraf's policies and in the personal supporthe receives from the United States. (124)

President Musharraf remains generally a popular figure in Pakistan, but he has been an objectof hatred for Islamic radicals, including those affiliated with domestic and international terroristorganizations. A March 2004 survey found that 86% of Pakistanis view Musharraf favorably (with60% viewing him very favorably), but 65% also said that they support Osama bin Laden. Musharraf'sgovernment depends on an alliance of six Islamist parties, which use the acronyms MMA ("UnitedAction Front," in English) to maintain a majority in the national parliament. The same alliancecontrols the assemblies in two provinces bordering Afghanistan -- Baluchistan and the North-WestFrontier Province (NWFP). (125) The support of the Islamist parties has been brought intoquestion by Musharraf's decision to break his commitment to step down as Army commander atthe end of the year, a promise he made in 2003 to secure the support of a six Islamic parties inparliament.

The bargain struck with the Islamic parties served both to maintain a governing majority inthe national assembly and to secure passage of an amendment, the 17th to the Pakistani constitution,which, among other things, legitimatized Musharraf's 1999 military coup. (126) The response toMusharraf's indication that he would remain Army chief until the end of his presidential term in 2007suggests that his popularity may have declined. Musharraf has justified keeping his uniform asnecessary to maintain stability. (127)

Overall, the events of September 11, 2001 and after appear to have assisted Musharraf instrengthening his grip on power. One former Pakistani political advisor and diplomat notes that,"Each of Pakistan's patriarchs have based their claim to power on grounds of U.S. support and theirown ability to provide good governance." (128) The perceived U.S. need for a stable and reliable regional allyin its ongoing counterterrorism efforts in South Asia have some analysts concluding that Musharrafremains in a position to take further domestic political advantage of current geopolitical dynamics.

Many analysts believe the advance of democracy and civil society in Pakistan is key to thelong-term success of stated U.S. policy in the region, although the 9/11 Commission Report impliesthat in the short run, anyway, supporting Musharraf is an absolute necessity. At a July 2004 hearingof the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, all three private witnesses, who were veteran Pakistanwatchers, agreed about the potential problems inherent in a perceived U.S. preference for bolsteringMusharraf's authoritarian leadership at the expense of Pakistan's democratic institutions and civilsociety. One witness offered that Musharraf is best seen as a "marginal satisfier" who will do onlythe minimum expected of him. He recommended that, "The United States must alter the impressionour support for Pakistan is essentially support for Musharraf." (129)

Doubts about Musharraf's popularity have been echoed by a leading Pakistani analyst, whocontends that all of the Pakistani president's major policy shifts after September 2001 have comethrough compulsion by external pressure or events and that, while the direction of Pakistan's policychange has been appropriate, "the momentum of change is too slow and awkward and unsure toconstitute a critical and irreversible mass." (130) Many leading Pakistani commentators insist that only byallowing the country's secular political parties fully into the system can the country realize stable andenduring democracy. (131)

American policy makers, however, generally agree with the 9/11 Commission that U.S.interests are for the time being best served by the presence of a strong and secure Islamabadleadership. Thus, while early optimism about Musharraf's potential as a reformer has wanedconsiderably, there are those who still conclude that the existence of an unstable and possiblyIslamicized or failed state between Afghanistan and India -- a state in possession of nuclear weapons-- is a far less desirable circumstance than the present one in which a powerful and secular militaryinstitution maintains a reasonable degree of order in Pakistan. For some, this argument has becomeless persuasive as the country's law-and-order situation has deteriorated in 2004. Pakistan's fragiledemocratic institutions are under continuous threat from the authoritarian influences of the country'spowerful military and quasi-feudal economic structures. Given a stated U.S. position that,"Democratic institutions are required if Pakistan is to thrive economically and to develop further intoan enlightened and moderate Muslim state," (132) Pakistan's domestic political developments likely will beclosely monitored by the United States.

Succession Issues

An acute concern of many U.S. policy makers is the issue of political succession in Pakistan,especially as it relates to potential domestic upheaval and control of that country's nucleararsenal. (133) Theconstitutionally designated successor to the President is the Chairman of the Senate, currently amember of the military-friendly Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) party andMusharraf loyalist Muhammadmian Soomro, an international banker from a well-known Sindhifamily. It is the President's prerogative to appoint Army Chiefs. The consensus view among analystshas the Pakistani military maintaining its substantive administration of the country in the event ofPresident Musharraf's premature removal. The nature of such a potential removal likely wouldinfluence the scope and intensity of military governance. For example, if Musharraf were removedthrough violent means, it is quite possible that the army would declare martial law and rule directlyfor a period. In any case, it is widely assumed that the hierarchical solidarity and historicprofessionalism of Pakistan's military would result in its continued effectiveness as a stabilizingforce, at least in the short- and perhaps middle-term. Despite the apparent sturdiness of the military'scommand structure, there remains widespread pessimism about the ability of political institutionsbuilt by Musharraf to survive his sudden removal, and doubts remain about the viability of politicalsuccession mechanisms. (134)

After his September 2001 policy shift, Musharraf moved to purge pro-Taliban Islamists fromthe higher ranks of the military. In October 2001 Musharraf promoted a trusted associate, LieutenantGeneral Muhammad Yusuf, chief of the general staff of the Pakistan army, to the rank of generaland appointed him as Vice Chief of the Army Staff (VCOS), the senior-most position afterMusharraf. Reportedly, Musharraf earlier had entrusted Yusuf, said to be a ideological moderate,with responsibility for sensitive negotiations with U.S. officials concerning American militaryoperations in Afghanistan. (135) Also in the immediate wake of 9/11 Musharraf namedLt. Gen. Ehsan-ul Haq, corps commander of Peshawar, as the new Director General of the powerfulISI. Haq replaced Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, an officer reportedly regarded as having ties to theTaliban and having been insufficiently responsive to U.S. requests for intelligence on Osama binLaden. Musharraf also was said to have viewed Ahmad as overly ambitious and a potential rival forpower within the military. (136)

After Gen. Yusuf retired in October 2004, Musharraf named a close ally, Lt. Gen. AhsanSalim Hayat, the Karachi Corps Commander, as the new VCOAS. Hayat narrowly escapedassassination in a bloody June 2004 attack on his motorcade, an event which appeared to confirmhis status as an enemy of Islamic extremists. The newly-promoted four-star general is believed tobe one of Musharraf's closest allies in the military and his most likely successor as Army Chief. (137) Musharraf alsoreplaced ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Ehsan-ul Haq, who had overseen the removal of pro-Taliban officersfrom Pakistan's intelligence service after September 2001with a relatively unknown officer, Lt. Gen.Ashfaq Kiani. Musharraf shifted Haq to the post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCommittee, a less powerful position. Some speculate that the new VCOAS, Lt. Gen. Hayat, willexercise close supervision over the ISI and operations against Al Qaeda. (138)

Policy Discussion: More Constraints Than Options(139)

Despite Pakistani denials, considerable evidence suggests that Pakistan continues to beinvolved in the illegal acquisition of nuclear materials and technology to modernize its existingnuclear forces, and, at a minimum, allows the activities of nuclear supply networks on its territory. Such networks may still be involved in supplying nuclear materials, technology, and know-how towould-be nuclear states or even terrorist networks. In addition, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and fissilematerial may be vulnerable to seizure in the event of a coup by dissident military officers or theseizure of power by radical Islamists with sympathy for terrorist groups. Moreover, if not carefullyhandled, U.S. policies aimed at strengthening Pakistan militarily could unintentionally upset currentpositive trends in Pakistan's relations with India that involve considerable political risk for bothgovernments. Resolving or deferring a final settlement of the thus far intractable Kashmir disputewould greatly benefit both U.S. security counterterrorism and nonproliferation interests. Becausethis festering territorial dispute has led the countries to the brink of war on two occasions since bothdeployed nuclear weapons, any actions by the United States that would undermine the currentatmosphere between New Delhi and Islamabad could possibly increase the risk of a conflict thatwould have the potential of escalating to a nuclear exchange. (140)

Given that the reimposition of sanctions seems unlikely in the current situation, the Bushadministration appears to be focusing on preventing the further spread of nuclear weaponscapabilities to "rogue" states and terrorist groups. The Administration has emphasized improvingthe global community's ability to interdict dangerous shipments through the Proliferation SecurityInitiative (PSI), and in shrinking access worldwide to capabilities needed to produce fissile materialcrucial for nuclear weapons. In a speech on February 11, 2004, President Bush proposed a mix ofmeasures to respond to the threat of the nuclear black market. In addition to expanding interdictionefforts (under the PSI) to "shut down labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their assets," thePresident also proposed criminalizing proliferation, expanding cooperative threat reductionmeasures to states like Libya; banning enrichment and reprocessing capabilities beyond those statesthat already have them; making the Additional Protocol (to the NPT) a prerequisite fornuclear-related imports; and creating a special committee at the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) to investigate compliance. (141)

In June 2004, President Bush designated Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) asprovided for by Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Thailand, anotherimportant antiterrorism ally, was given the same status in 2003. The designation, long enjoyed byJapan, South Korea, Australia and other allies, makes Pakistan eligible for expedited access toexcess defense articles and other privileges. (142) The designation also appears related to Pakistan's decision topurchase several major weapons systems. On November 16, 2004, the Department of Defensenotified Congress of possible military sales to Pakistan of six Orion P-3C maritime patrol aircraft,2,000 TOW-2A missiles, 14 TOW Fly-to-Buy missiles, six PHALANX Close-In Weapon Systems(CIWS), and an upgrade of six earlier models of the Phalanx shipboard anti-missile defense systems,along with associated equipment for all of the systems. (143)

As if to underscore the possibility that U.S. arms sales to Pakistan could be destabilizing,Pakistan tested a Shaheen nuclear-capable short-range (700 kilometers) ballistic missile onDecember 8, 2004, on the same day that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld arrived in New Delhi formeetings with Indian leaders where he was expected to discuss U.S. arms sales and militarycooperation with India. Reportedly, one of the most important items on the Indian agenda was toacquire the U.S. Patriot ballistic missile defense systems (PAC-2 and/or PAC-3), and to explore thepossibility of obtaining approval to acquire Israel's Arrow battlefield missile defense system whichincludes U.S.-licensed components and technology. India reportedly expressed strong objectionsto the sale of the P-3C surveillance aircraft and the TOW anti-tank missiles. (144)

Within the constraints imposed by dependence on antiterrorist cooperation from Pakistan,U.S. policymakers still may have several options for pursuing a stronger antiproliferation policywhile maintaining Pakistan's status as a "front line" state in the war against terrorism. Possibleapproaches include:

Option 1 -- De Facto Acceptance of Pakistan's Nuclear Activities and Non-Cooperation on the A.Q. Khan Issue on Condition of Maximum Counterterrorism Support

Although the United States may appear to have little choice but to support Musharraf, thedegree of U.S. support matters greatly. One option, which appears to approximate current policy,is to provide large-scale economic and military support to Pakistan, conditioned only on satisfactoryPakistani cooperation against terrorism. The 9/11 Commission Report argues that PresidentMusharraf is "the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan" and an advocate of"enlightened moderation." The Commission recommends that "As the United States makes freshcommitments now, it should make promises that it is prepared to keep for years," provided"Pakistan's leaders are prepared to make difficult choices of their own." (145)

The advantages of this course are that it reduces Pakistani suspicion that, in the words of the9/11 Commission Report, the United States views Pakistan as an "ally of convenience." Theunderlying rationale for this option is that the more confidence that President Musharraf has in theU.S. commitment to Pakistan, the more ready he will be to confront terrorism.

For several reasons the nonproliferation benefits of this option appear few, while the risksmay be high. This option does not fully address the limits of Musharraf's authority in regard toantiterrorist cooperation with the United States and it limits Pakistan's "hard choices" to the fightagainst extremists," not its nuclear behavior. Despite its strong support for the Musharrafgovernment, the Bush Administration has not yet obtained full Pakistani cooperation against AlQaeda and the Taliban. If Musharraf should adopt a zero-tolerance policy of shutting down allterrorist networks he risks a possibly fatal backlash from extreme nationalist and Islamist elementsof the military and militants carrying out an insurgency in Indian-occupied Kashmir, as well as theloss of support from his current political allies among the Islamist parties.

Even if Musharraf or a similarly moderate military successor continues to maintain politicaldominance for the next few years, there is no absolute guarantee that Pakistan will continue its "frontline" status against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Much could depend on Pakistan's volatile politicalsituation. Already, Islamist political forces are impatient with Musharraf's vision of a moderate,modernizing Islamic state and measures, however incomplete to suppress domestic jihadists inBaluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province, and terrorist groups operating in Kashmir.

Even now, some in the Pakistani hierarchy are not prepared to support U.S. policy to thepoint of compromising, in their view, Pakistan's long -term fundamental interests. Some analystsjudge it unlikely that the ISI would ever completely alienate the Taliban. Evidence that more thanone assassination attempt against Musharraf involved collusion between radical Islamists, possiblyAl Qaeda operatives, and lower level Pakistani Air Force personnel, underscores that the militarycontinues to be susceptible to ideological fissures. Radical political change may be unlikely underpresent circumstances, but a violent Islamist campaign against the government or an internal coupcannot be completely ruled out.

Questions about Musharraf's ability to control events appear to be underscored by rumorsin late 2004 and early 2005 that he has been engaged in secret negotiations on a power sharingagreement with the leaders of the two previous governing parties, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)led by Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), led by Nawaz Sharif. Under onerumored deal, Musharraf would remain President at least until 2007, but he would give up hisposition as Chief of the Army Staff, a move also demanded by his current MMA allies, and holdfresh parliamentary elections in 2005. Both Bhutto and Sharif had alternated as civilian primeministers during the 1990s, but both had been overthrown by military coups and both are now inexile. (146) While sucha development would likely be viewed as a positive step towards democratization, a decision byMusharraf to end his alliance with the MMA could provoke a new political crisis. Moreover, thevery fact that the arrangement has been rumored raises questions about Pakistan's stability.

At the same time, questions remain about Pakistan's nuclear policies. The U.S. Governmentcannot verify the Musharraf government's assurances that A.Q. Khan's nuclear sales were not statepolicy and would not be repeated. Moreover, although Pakistan firmly ruled out any limits on itsvertical proliferation activities, i.e., building more nuclear weapons and deploying more capableballistic missiles, Humayun Khan's acquisition of U.S. technology in collaboration with the SouthAfrican arms dealer, Asher Karni, appears to belie this claim. Some of these illegal exports of U.S.technology took place as recently as August 2003. (147) No matter what the United States does at this point it will haveto live with consequences of Pakistan's successful acquisition of nuclear weapons and the potentialfragility of the stability and moderation offered by Musharraf.

In terms of unilateral options that do not directly undercut U.S.-Pakistani cooperation againstterrorism, one U.S. official has said that ultimately the first and best line of defense as regardsU.S.-source technology is the vigilance and cooperation of U.S. companies that sell sensitivetechnology. Reportedly, a French company refused to sell triggered spark gaps to Karni because hedid not have a U.S. export license. (148) It appears that the discovery of Karni's activities occurred onlyby luck and the vigilance of one company, whereas earlier purchases of sensitive technology hadbeen delivered.

For instance, the United States could further increase its assistance to and intelligence andlaw enforcement cooperation with South Africa, currently a country with weak enforcement of itsstringent laws against the export of dual-use technology to non-NSG countries. Should South Africacontinue to demonstrate weak enforcement of its laws against the unlicensed exports ofnuclear-related technology, the U.S. government could unilaterally suspend South Africa's privileges as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to import sensitive U.S. technology without an exportlicense. It is likely, however, that such a move would be opposed by some NSG countries, if for noother reason than that their own enforcement of export controls may have weaknesses.

Option 2 -- Emphasize Multilateral Nonproliferation Strategies

This approach, recommended in the 9/11 report, involves concentrating on the recipient orend-user side of the equation as the most effective way to deny nuclear weapons and materials toterrorists. That is, it emphasized measures to seek to close off global supply networks rather thanpenalizing Pakistan or even demanding a full account of A.Q. Khan's activities and networks.

Proliferation Security Initative. As noted above,the Bush administration appears to be focusing on improving the global community's ability tointerdict dangerous shipments through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and in shrinkingaccess worldwide to capabilities needed to produce fissile material crucial for nuclear weapons. Ina speech on February 11, 2004, President Bush proposed a mix of measures to respond to the threatof the nuclear black market. (149) The President has proposed expanding interdiction effortsunder the PSI, which aims to "shut down labs, to seize their materials, [and] to freeze their assets." The multi-national agreement was announced by President Bush in May 2003 and inaugurated inParis, in September 2003, by the United States, eight European NATO allies, Australia and Japan. Additional countries have joined since. Undersecretary of State John Bolton has described theinitiative, which now enjoys the support of some 60 or more countries, as "foremost among PresidentBush's efforts to stop WMD proliferation." (150)

The 9/11 Commission recommended expanding the PSI, including persuading Russia andChina to join, and providing participating member countries with NATO alliance "intelligence andplanning resources." (151) It is probably crucial to include Russia and China to make thePSI effective, but it will also be important to include, where possible, supplier states. While it isdoubtful that Iran or North Korea would agree to restrictions, making sure that Pakistan no longerengages in proliferation activities would appear critical to the effectiveness of the PSI. From thisperspective, critics charge that it is past time that Pakistan reinforced its promises with concretemeasures.

Proliferation specialists have welcomed the PSI but say that its potential is limited by severalfactors, including its "ad hoc" nature, which depends on the political will of participating countries. Some critics view the PSI as a supplement to a more robust nonproliferation regime and one whichneeds to be bolstered by changes in international law. This includes adopting amendments to theConvention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988), and the adoption of a U.N. resolution that would provide for interdiction activities under Section VIIof the U.N. Charter, which allows the Security Council to authorize sanctions or the use of force tocompel states to comply with its resolutions. (152)

Strengthened International Regimes. U.N.Security Council Resolution 1540, of April 28, 2004, which is based on a U.S. draft, requires allstates to adopt laws against the transfers of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons and as well as delivery systems and related technology, and to report by October 28, 2004, "on efforts to reviewtheir domestic laws and regulations, and to demonstrate that action was being taken to comply withthe Resolution." The resolution explicitly bans states from providing any proliferation help tonon-state actors. (153) The resolution was adopted under Section VII of the U.N. Charter, and is thus binding on allmember states. The resolution requires states to report on the measures they have taken to tightentheir export controls. Although the resolution makes no mention of the right of interdiction orpenalties for non-compliance, it can be viewed as establishing a legal basis for the use of interdictionor sanctions if other means have failed. (154)

It may be possible to ban the further spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilitieswithout a new treaty such as a fissile material production cutoff treaty (FMCT), but new voluntaryagreements remain difficult to enforce. The international community is already working on makingthe Additional Protocol (to full-scope nuclear safeguards agreements) a prerequisite for nuclearimports through the Nuclear Suppliers Group, but Pakistan is not a member of the NSG. Finally,for political reasons, it is unlikely that the IAEA will create a special committee for compliance,although Director General ElBaradei has set up a study group to evaluate several recommendationsthat have emerged as a result of the exposure of the Khan network.

In testimony before Congress one non-official witness deemed that efforts to combat nuclearproliferation remained the "stunted pillar" of the President's National Strategy to Combat Weaponsof Mass Destruction. The witness, Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace, compared FY2004 funding for non-proliferation programs at less than $2 billion, with $41billion for Homeland Security and $81 billion for military counter-proliferation efforts, includingballistic missile defense and the war in Iraq. (155)

Effectively shutting down the black market trade in nuclear technology, materials, andcomponents may be possible with adequate cooperation from host governments, but this objectivewould be easier to accomplish if Pakistan would provide access to A.Q. Khan or otherwise providemore information on the extent of his network. Iran's current defiance of the IAEA and the U.N.Security Council also underscores the limitations of multilateral approaches to countries withsufficient financial and technological resources, and significant reverse leverage.

Expanded Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)Program. Even if Pakistan agreed, which is most unlikely under currentcircumstances, expanding to Pakistan the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,currently focused on Russia and countries of the former Soviet Union, could be difficult for severalreasons. Significant barriers to assistance include U.S. domestic and international legal and politicalrestrictions on cooperation with states outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); the lowlevel of transparency exhibited by Pakistan; lack of incentives for Pakistan to pursue threat reductionmeasures; and potentially competing objectives of threat reduction and nuclear deterrence vis-a-visIndia In fact, Pakistan has made it clear that although it is willing to cooperate on denyingnuclear-related technology to terrorist groups, it has every intention to modernize and expand its ownnuclear forces. Apparently, as the Asher Karni-Humayun Khan ring shows, Pakistan is committedto improving the capabilities of its nuclear weapons even to the point of violating U.S. export lawsto obtain controlled technology. (156)

Option 3 -- Condition High Value Assistance on Access to A.Q. Khan

Some argue that the United States should not provide Pakistan with high value militaryhardware without dramatically improved cooperation on the A.Q. Khan case and other activitieslinking Pakistan to nuclear proliferation. The United States might insist on the following actions byPakistan as a price for obtaining valued military equipment, especially weapons systems that are notdirectly related to counterterrorism cooperation, such as F-16 aircraft, anti-tank weapons, and otherweapons systems that Pakistan is seeking to upgrade its military forces and offset or qualitativelyexceed the capabilities of Indian weapons. This option could also include longer-term waiverauthority on U.S. nuclear and missile proliferation sanctions beyond the current year-to-yearextensions in appropriations bills. This option could require Pakistan's agreement to:

full cooperation on A.Q. Khan's network,

full cooperation also regarding the Asher Karni-Humayun Khannetwork,

strict observance of U.S. export control laws by the government of Pakistan,the Pakistani military, and any third party intermediaries,

absolute commitment on no future transfers of nuclear or missile technology,and

no new nuclear tests and restraint on nuclear and missile competition withIndia

Key Rationale. A key rationale for this optionis that providing Pakistan with such high value weapons systems is only warranted if the benefitsexceed the cost. In this case, the cost to the United States is not just the dollar value of the weaponssystems but also the inevitable complications for relations with India, a country with which theUnited States also has developed a de facto strategic relationship, even if New Delhi is also allowedaccess to coveted U.S. defense technology, as now seems likely. The record of the past half centuryshows that India will seek to match every increase in Pakistan's military capability (and vice-versa). One of the most problematical aspects of selling F-16s to Pakistan is that, in the words of one study,"The F-16 could be Pakistan's primary nuclear-capable aircraft, capable of delivering a1,000-kilogram bomb to a distance of 1,400 kilometers." (157) A key question thatCongress may wish to consider is whether the United States is paying too high a price, including acost to its foreign policy interest in a stable and peaceful India-Pakistan relationship, for what it isgetting from Pakistan. (158)

Potentially Risky Test of Wills. A potentiallysignificant problem with this option is that so long as Islamabad perceives that the BushAdministration needs it more than Pakistan needs the United States, Musharraf or a successor is ina position to turn the tables on U.S. policymakers. That is, instead of treating the F-16s or otherweapons systems as a "carrot," to be earned by additional cooperation, Pakistan could reduce or limitits cooperation on terrorism as a lever to get the United States to agree to allow the purchase of theaircraft and other desired hardware. In fact, some of President Musharraf's remarks at a pressconference during a visit to Washington in early December 2004 -- several months before theAdministration announced its willingness to approve the sale of the F-16s -- could be interpreted aseffort to put counter-pressure on the United States. Musharraf told reporters that he had discussedthe F-16 issue with President Bush and senior U.S. officials, but that the Administration had not yetagreed to the requested purchase. At the same time, Musharraf also implied declining enthusiasmfor using Pakistani forces to hunt for Al Qaeda in tribal zone between Pakistan and Afghanistan,where many believe bin Laden and other senior terrorist leaders may be hiding. He reportedlycriticized the U.S. invasion of Iraq and said that the trail of Osama bin Laden had gone cold, "in largepart" because of a decline in operations by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and delays in the training ofAfghan forces (159)

Although using the offer to sell F-16s to Pakistan as leverage to gain more cooperationregarding A.Q. Khan's network or other objectives could backfire, Musharraf's domestic politicalvulnerabilities noted above might give the United States the upper hand in any test of wills. Moreover, conditioning the sale of F-16s on better responsiveness by Pakistan to U.S. nuclearnonproliferation concerns may be the least risky of the options that involve putting pressure onPakistan, but the viability of this option depends on many factors that are outside U.S. control, andeven that of Musharraf. Because of his somewhat precarious domestic political system, any attemptto achieve a quid-pro-quo would appear to have the best prospects of success if done in secrecy.

F-16 Fighter Aircraft Sale and the India-PakistanConfrontation. On March 25, 2005, at a State Department press briefing, unnamedsenior officials announced that Pakistan would be allowed to buy an unspecified number of F-16s. The officials also announced that the prime contractors on both the F-16 and the F-18 fighters,General Dynamics and McDonnel Douglas respectively, would be allowed to bid on an expectedIndian contract for a new multi-role combat aircraft. The announcement followed a March 2005 tripto six Asian countries, starting with India and Pakistan, by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and,according to an unnamed State Department briefer, "months of thinking through American Strategytowards South Asia."

The briefer designated by the ground rules as "senior official one" placed the possible saleof combat aircraft to India in the context of "a new framework of cooperation," which might alsoinclude the sale of ballistic missile defense technology and even cooperation on nuclear energy. Inresponse to questions from the press, the briefer denied that the sale of F-16s to Pakistan would bedestabilizing, arguing that while the numbers of aircraft provided to Pakistan would be relativelysmall, perhaps in the neighborhood of 25, the Indian government was contemplating a very largescale purchase. (160)

Whether the Administration's decision to approve the request might be the result of asuccessful strategy to gain more cooperation on A.Q. Khan's network and Al Qaeda cannot bedetermined from open sources. Should there be a link to Pakistan's new cooperation with the IAEA,some critics of the Administration's handling of Pakistan's nuclear activities may question the valueof the tradeoff. When a questioner at the March 25, 2005 press briefing commented that theannouncement came shortly after Pakistan announced that it would allow IAEA inspectors to lookat some "nuclear parts" (161) to aid its investigation of Iran's nuclear program, the StateDepartment briefer responded that "We don't want to get into the details of our diplomaticdiscussions with Pakistan on this very sensitive issue." The briefer added, however, that "What wecan say is that the A.Q. Khan issue has obviously been an issue the Secretary has been working onvery hard and she did discuss it during her trip with the Pakistani government and we feel like thePakistani government is offering good cooperation on this front to address the understandableconcerns we have." (162)

Congressional Role and Powers. Congress itselfhas the power under the Arms Export Control Act to block an arms sale by passing a joint resolutionor other legislation with a sufficient margin (i.e., two-thirds or more) to overcome a Presidentialveto. The fact that the Administration has announced its intent to resume sales of F-16s to Pakistandoes not affect Congress' powers. As of mid-May 2005, the Administration had not submitted arequired formal notification of the intent to sell the aircraft. Customarily the Defense Departmentnotifies Congress informally of its intent to carry out an arms sale, but because Pakistan wasdesignated a non-NATO ally in June 2004, Congress would have only 15 calendar days followingthe formal submission of a notification to block a sale. (163)

A refusal by Congress to allow the F-16 sale to go forward would have significant, butunpredictable and almost certainly negative impact on U.S.-Pakistan relations. Consequently, shouldMembers of Congress wish to block the sale or attach conditions with the least negativeconsequences for U.S.-Pakistan cooperation against terrorism, they may wish to seek abehind-the-scenes dialogue with the Administration, or otherwise make their views known prior tothe receipt by Congress of a formal notification of intent to sell the aircraft. Whether theAdministration would be willing to engage with Congress on this issue would likely dependsignificantly on the nature and strength of opposition to current policy.

Option 4 -- Reimposition of Nuclear Nonproliferation Sanctions

For reasons noted above, neither Congress as a whole nor the Administration have shownany interest in reimposing economic and military assistance and arms transfer sanctions in responseto Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities, apart from expanding the scope of existing law toinclude terrorist acts or threats involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Sections 6801,6802, and 6803 of P.L. 108-458 ( S. 2845 ), the Intelligence Reform and TerrorismProtection Act of 2004, amend provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and other laws toexpand their scope by adding penalties for the participation of individuals, either inside or outsidethe United States, in "the development or production of any special nuclear material," or terroristthreats of the use of WMD. (164) In the 109th Congress, H.R. 1553 (see legislationsection, below) would condition U.S. military assistance, arms sales, transfers, and licenses onunrestricted access to A.Q. Khan and full compliance by Pakistan with U.S. and IAEA requests forinformation about his network. This proposed legislation has received no action as of mid-2005.

Either the President or Congress could reimpose sanctions on Pakistan. In the case of thePresident, he could decline to use his general authority under Section 614 of the Foreign AssistanceAct, which gives the President broad powers to waive, subject to consultation with Congress,nonproliferation sections of the Foreign Assistance Act that would otherwise apply to Pakistan. Hecould also decline to use waiver authority provided annually in successive foreign operationsappropriation acts since 2001 to waive provisions of appropriations acts that forbid assistance tocountries in default of their debt repayments or whose democratic government has been overthrownin a military coup.

Congress also has the power to block the President's use of waiver authority under Section614 of the FAA and other legislation. Additionally, Congress could decline to renew the annualforeign operations appropriations authority to waive the ban on aid to countries that are in defaulton their debts or have governments that took power by military coups. Congress could alsocondition U.S. aid to Pakistan on specific requirements such as full cooperation by the Musharrafgovernment in efforts to learn the full extent of A.Q. Khan's network. Under present circumstancesthe President could be expected to resist strongly any effort to constrain his freedom of actionregarding Pakistan, both on policy grounds and the defense of executive branch authority.

Legislation

Section 2235 ("Extension of Pakistan Waivers") of S. 600 , "The ForeignAffairs Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007," reported to the Senate May 26, 2005( S.Rept. 109-35 ), includes a subsection (b) that would (1) renew the current authority of thePresident to waive for FY2006 the application in Pakistan's case of current law providing forsanctions on "any country whose duly elected head of government was deposed by decree or militarycoup, if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that suchwaiver -- (A) would facilitate the transition to democratic rule in Pakistan ; and (B) is important toUnited States efforts to respond to, deter, or prevent acts of international terrorism." Subsection (b)would extend the current exemption of Pakistan from the application of provisions of foreignassistance law regarding foreign country loan defaults.

Section 2236 of S. 600 , "The Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, FiscalYears 2006 and 2007," would amend the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of FY2003 to modifyan existing reporting requirement added in 1992 to require a report to be submitted to Congress nolater than April 1, 2006, as pursuant to Section 620F of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,amended, that "shall include a description of the efforts of the United States Government to achievethe objectives described in subsections (a) and (b), the progress made toward achieving suchobjectives, and the likelihood that such objectives will be achieved by September 30, 2006." (165)

S. 12 , "Targeting Terrorists More Effectively Act of 2005," introduced onJanuary 24, 2005, and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, would authorize a total of$797 in economic and military assistance to Pakistan, subject to conditions. Section 232(d) ofSubtitle D -- "Strategy for the United States Relationship With Afghanistan, Pakistan, and SaudiArabia," would bar military and economic aid to Pakistan "unless the President submits to Congressfor such fiscal year a certification that no military or economic assistance provided by the UnitedStates to the Government of Pakistan will be provided, either directly or indirectly, to a person thatis opposing or undermining the efforts of the United States Government to halt the proliferation ofnuclear weapons." Congress has not passed a foreign assistance authorization bill since 1985, butproposed amendments to the FAA contained in uncompleted authorization bills sometimes areincorporated into the annual appropriations bill for foreign operations.

H.R. 1553 , "The Pakistan Proliferation Accountability Act of 2005," introduced and referred to the House International Relations Committee on April 12, 2005, wouldprohibit military assistance, military sales, transfers or licenses, until the fulfillment of severalrequirements. These include the requirements that the Pakistani government provides unrestrictedaccess to A.Q. Khan, complies fully with requests by the IAEA for assistance in discovering the fullextent of Khan's activities, and the U.S. Government has "determined the nature and extent of theillegal international proliferation network's connection to Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden," and inconjunction with the IAEA has confirmed that complete dismantlement of Khan's network.