DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations on DOD's Progress on Addressing Timeliness and Quality Issues
Released: 2010-11-16T00:00:00

Letter

DOD Has Made Significant Progress in Reducing the Time for Processing Initial Personnel Security Clearances for DOD Personnel

DOD has made significant progress in reducing delays in personnel security clearance decisions and in meeting statutory timeliness objectives since we first designated DOD’s personnel security clearance program as a high-risk area in 2005. In 2007, we found that initial clearances for DOD industry personnel took an average of 325 days to complete. With the passage of IRTPA in 2004, timeliness requirements were established in law under which executive branch agencies were initially required to make decisions on at least 80 percent of initial clearances within an average of 120 days. We found that by 2008, DOD had made significant improvements in reducing delays. For example, in examining fiscal year 2008 data, we reported that the average of the fastest 80 percent of initial DOD clearances, including military, civilians, and industry personnel, took an average of 87 days to complete, well below what was required by law. However, despite these improvements, we continued to designate this program as a high-risk area due to more stringent timeliness objectives that were to take effect in December 2009. IRTPA required the Performance Accountability Council to develop a plan under which, to the extent practical, each authorized adjudicative agency would be required to make a determination on at least 90 percent of all applications for a personnel security clearance within an average of 60 days from the date of receipt of the completed application by an authorized investigative agency. Although the government is required to only report on the average of the fastest 90 percent of cases, we previously identified that the absence of comprehensive reporting limits full visibility over the timeliness of initial clearance decisions. Consistent with GAO’s recommendation, the government now reports on the remaining 10 percent.

Our ongoing work has shown that DOD has continued to improve its timeliness and DOD reports that it is meeting the new statutory timeliness requirements. According to data provided by the Performance Accountability Council, DOD initial personnel security clearances met the 60 day IRTPA overall timeliness objective and the 20 day objective for the timeliness of adjudications for each of the first, second, and third quarters of fiscal year 2010, as shown in Table 1. Over this same period, average timeliness for the fastest 90 percent of DOD industry personnel security clearances ranged from 64 days to 69 days. In addition, DOD reported meeting the IRTPA 40 day timeliness objective for investigations in the third quarter of fiscal year 2010. However, timeliness data for investigations is a reflection of OPM as the investigative service provider for DOD.

DOD’s Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office adjudicates clearances for industrial personnel. When the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office identifies issues with these cases that may potentially affect the adjudicative decision, they sumit the cases to the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals. The time it takes the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office to arrive at the initial decision is included in DOD timeliness. However, timeliness information is not reported for cases sent to the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals. ”DOD other” includes 1) all secret and confidential clearances and initial top secret clearances adjudicated y the DOD Central Adjudication Facilities for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Washington Headuarters Services and 2) the initial Sensitive Compartmented Information clearance cases adjudicated on their ehalf y elements of the intelligence community, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Although DOD has made significant progress in reducing delays in making personnel security clearance decisions, it is important that DOD sustain this progress. Reducing delays in the security clearance process will enable DOD to reduce risks to national security, expedite the start of classified work, hire the best-qualified workers, and decrease the government’s cost of national security-related contracts.

Positive Steps Have Been Taken to Address Quality and Enhance Visibility Over the Security Clearance Process

We are also encouraged by a number of recent developments that are intended to enhance visibility over the quality of the security clearance process. In our prior work, we have stated that timeliness alone does not provide a complete picture of the clearance process and we emphasized the need for attention to quality. However, we found an uneven attention to quality within DOD’s process; specifically, we found missing documentation in reports prepared by OPM that DOD adjudicators had used to make clearance decisions. In May 2009, for example, we estimated that 87 percent of OPM investigative reports provided to DOD at three Central Adjudication Facilities in July 2008 were missing required documentation. Because neither OPM nor DOD measured the completeness of their investigative reports or adjudicative files, we reported that both agencies were limited in their ability to explain the extent to which, or the reasons why, some documents were incomplete. Incomplete documentation may increase the time needed to complete the clearance process, increase the overall costs of the process, and reduce the assurance that appropriate safeguards are in place to prevent DOD from granting clearances to untrustworthy individuals. We emphasized that building quality throughout DOD’s process could promote positive outcomes, such as facilitating reciprocity with other agencies.

DOD has taken a number of positive steps to integrate quality into its investigative and adjudicative processes and demonstrated the commitment of senior leadership to reforming the personnel security process within DOD. For example, according to DOD officials, DOD recently initiated the creation of a Performance Accountability Directorate within USD(I)’s Directorate of Security to provide oversight and accountability for the DOD Central Adjudication Facilities that process DOD adjudicative decisions. Most importantly, DOD has also issued guidance and developed tools to measure quality. For example: Guidance. DOD has taken steps to issue guidance on adjudication standards. On November 8, 2009, the USD(I) issued guidance on adjudication standards that outline the minimum documentation requirements adjudicators must adhere to when documenting personnel security clearance adjudication rationales in the Joint Adjudication Management System. These standards are for cases with significant derogatory information and for Single Scope Background Investigations that are missing standard investigative scope items but were still adjudicated. In response to our recommendation, the USD(I) issued additional guidance on March 10, 2010 that clarifies when adjudicators may use incomplete investigative reports as the basis for granting clearances. This guidance provides standards that can be used for the sufficient explanation of missing or incomplete scope items.

Tools. DOD has taken steps to measure the frequency with which documentation for investigations and adjudications meets federal standards. DOD developed two tracking tools—the Rapid Assessment of Incomplete Security Evaluations (RAISE) and the Review of Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and Rationales (RADAR)— to assess the quality of investigative and adjudication documentation. These tracking tools are embedded capabilities in DOD’s Clearance Adjudication Tracking System (CATS), which is used by all non-intelligence DOD Central Adjudication Facilities. Although these are positive steps, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of these tools as they have not yet been fully deployed.

The RAISE tracking tool will document the instances of missing case information or unresolved case issues for records of investigation provided by OPM. In July 2010, DOD issued guidance requiring that each DOD Central Adjudication Facility that utilizes the Clearance Adjudication Tracking System use the RAISE tracking tool on all incomplete national security investigations and on random samples of other clearance cases accounting for 7 percent of their respective Single Scope Background Investigations and 14 percent of both their Periodic Reinvestigations and National Agency Check with Local Agency Check and Credit Check investigations. The results are to be reported to the DNI who, as Security Executive Agent of the Performance Accountability Council, will arbitrate disagreements between OPM and DOD and clarify policy questions. DOD deployed the RAISE tracking tool to four Central Adjudication Facilities between July and October 2010 and plans to complete deployment to the remaining Central Adjudication Facilities by the beginning of calendar year 2011.

The RADAR tracking tool will enable DOD to independently evaluate the quality of adjudicative decisions against the adjudicative standards. The USD(I) has directed DOD Central Adjudication Facilities to provide adjudication case records to the Defense Personnel Research Center for analysis. The USD(I) plans to use results of the RADAR tracking tool assessments to monitor Central Adjudication Facilities’ compliance with documentation policies, communicate performance to the Central Adjudication Facilities, identify potential weaknesses and training needs, increase compliance, and establish trend data. DOD has completed a pilot program for the use of the RADAR tracking tool and has begun its implementation for the Army, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, and Navy Central Adjudication Facilities in September 2010. Further, implementation is scheduled for the Air Force and Washington Headquarters Services by November 2010.

Beyond these steps, DOD has participated in the development and tracking of quality metrics through the Performance Accountability Council. On March 17, 2010, the leaders of the reform effort—the OMB, OPM, DNI, and DOD—along with GAO, briefed this Subcommittee’s chairman and ranking member on the status of security clearance reform efforts. Subsequent to this briefing, this Subcommittee requested that the Joint Reform Team and GAO engage in an effort to develop metrics to measure the quality of security clearance investigations and adjudications in order to address GAO’s concerns about quality. In May 2010, the leaders of the reform effort provided this Subcommittee with 15 metrics assessing the timeliness and quality of investigations, adjudications, reciprocity, and automation. According to Joint Reform Team officials, these metrics were communicated to executive agencies in June 2010. Given the role of the executive branch and the need for GAO to remain independent in carrying out its auditing responsibilities, decisions related to performance measures and their effective implementation are fundamentally an executive branch management responsibility. However, we are encouraged by the Joint Reform Team’s collaborative efforts to develop these quality measures. We have previously reported that successful performance measures should meet nine criteria. For example, successful measures should clearly link to agency goals, have measurable targets, and be reasonably free from bias. GAO has been examining the Performance Accountability Council metrics and our preliminary observations show that many of the quality metrics appear to address attributes of a successful performance measure, such as being objective, quantifiable, and are linked to reform effort goals. We view the quality metrics as a positive step towards identifying specific quantifiable targets linked to goals that can be measured objectively and used by leaders and others to gauge progress and assess the quality of the personnel security clearance process. Although these are positive developments that can contribute to greater visibility over the clearance process, these measures have not yet been fully implemented and we are continuing to examine these efforts as part of our ongoing work.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we are strongly encouraged by the progress that the Performance Accountability Council, and in particular, DOD, has made over the last few years to implement recommendations, reduce overall timeliness, and take steps to integrate quality into its processes. As I have already noted, based on Performance Accountability Council data, DOD has reported that it is meeting IRTPA timeliness requirements for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2010, which represents significant and noteworthy progress. Moreover, the progress that has been made with respect to the overall governmentwide reform efforts would not be possible without committed and sustained leadership of Congress and by the senior leaders involved in the Performance Accountability Council. Their continued oversight and stewardship of the reform efforts is the cornerstone to sustaining momentum and making future progress. Although DOD has taken steps to develop and implement quality assessment tools, these tools have not yet been fully implemented. Therefore, it is important that management focus is sustained to ensure that these efforts are implemented and continuously evaluated. We are continuing to track timeliness and monitor the implementation and results of DOD’s quality assessment tools. This work will help inform the Comptroller General’s high-risk update decision in January 2011.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond at this time to any questions that you or members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony are Liz McNally, Assistant Director; James Ashley; Joseph M. Capuano; Sara Cradic; Cindy Gilbert; Linda Keefer; James Krustapentus; Greg Marchand; Richard Powelson; and Jillena Roberts.

Related GAO Products

Privacy: OPM Should Better Monitor Implementation of Privacy-Related Policies and Procedures for Background Investigations, GAO-10-849. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2010.

Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process. GAO-10-117T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce Delays But Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain Reform Efforts. GAO-09-684T. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process. GAO-09-488. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting, Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January 22, 2009.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations about Timeliness and Quality. GAO-09-261R. Washington, D.C.: December 19, 2008.

Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008.

Personnel Clearances: Questions for the Record Regarding Security Clearance Reform. GAO-08-965R. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2008.

Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.

Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement. GAO-08-551T. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions for the Record Related to the Quality and Timeliness of Clearances. GAO-08-580R. Washington D.C.: March 25, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. GAO-08-470T. Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2008.

Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found For Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January 2007.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed To Improve The Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-693R. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.

Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Program and the Government Plan for Improving the Clearance Process. GAO-06-323R. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain. GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January 2005.

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