Liberia: Transition to Peace
Released: 2004-10-28T00:00:00

Overview and Recent Developments

In August 2003, a political accord was signed that formally ended over three and one-half yearsof armed civil conflict in Liberia, a small West African country of about 3.3 million people. Sincethat time, the country has made steady progress toward consolidating peace, initiating post-warresettlement and socio-economic reconstruction, and establishing functional interim stateinstitutions. Despite such progress, there are indications that these and other related goals -- suchas the conduct of credible and transparent democratic elections, the creation of a durably transparentand effective governance regime, and a transition from reconstruction to long-term economic growth-- face diverse and substantial obstacles.

U.S.-Backed Peace and Transitional Process

Donor Assistance. Liberia's progress has been aided, in part, by international donors, including the United States, which held a pledging conferencefor Liberia in New York on February 5-6, 2004. At the conference, donors pledged over $522million in relief and reconstruction assistance for Liberia; $200 million of this amount was pledgedby the United States. (1) The donor conference, attendedby representatives of 96 countries and 45public and private organizations, reviewed the plans of the National Transitional Government ofLiberia (NTGL) for a post-conflict transition, as well as progress toward implementation of a peaceaccord signed in August 2003. It also received an update on the activities and views of the UnitedNations (U.N.) Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and considered a program of assistance organizedaround a "Results-Focused Transition Framework" centering on reconstruction and rehabilitationactivities in 2004 and 2005. The framework's main elements, which underpin the efforts of themultiple functional U.N. agencies and many of the non-governmental organizations that are activein Liberia, include the following:

Security maintenance, demobilization and reintegration, development of democratic governance and the rule of law, police training and reform, andelections;

Protection of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), advocacy forhuman and gender-based rights, combating HIV/AIDS;

Provision of basic services, including water, sanitation, health care, andeducation, and related services;

Economic development policy strategy and restoration of productive capacityand livelihoods; and

Reconstruction of infrastructure, e.g., electricity, transport,telecommunications, and housing.

U.S. Supplemental Appropriation. The donor conference followed President Bush's November 6, 2003, signing into law of the EmergencySupplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan,2004 , P.L. 108-106 . It provided $245 million for assessed costs of United Nations (U.N.)peacekeeping operations in Liberia, and up to $205.5 million for peace, humanitarian disaster, andfamine assistance for Liberia. (2)

U.N. Mission and Transitional Government. The authorization of sharply increased U.S. assistance to Liberia followed the deployment on October1, 2003 of UNMIL, authorized by the U.N. Security Council on September 19, 2003, and theestablishment of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). The NTGL, inauguratedon October 14, 2003, was formed in accordance with a peace agreement signed in Accra, Ghana,which formally ended the Liberian conflict. The NTGL is led by Gyude ( Joo-deh ) Bryant, abusinessman and Episcopal church layman of ethnic Grebo descent, who leads the Liberian ActionParty. As head of state, Bryant occupies the office of chairman, a post designated in the August 2003Comprehensive Peace Agreement (hereafter labeled the CPA), as the top executive NTGL positionin order to emphasize the transitory nature of the NTGL and to forebear the naming of a presidentprior to elections. The NTGL vice-chairman is Wesley Johnson, a university economics lecturerwho heads the Liberian United Peoples' Party.

Peace Accord. The signing of the CPA on August 18, 2003 followed two and a half months of negotiations mediated by the Economic Community ofWest African States (ECOWAS) and the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL). (3) Itssignatories include the armed parties in Liberia's conflict and Liberia's leading political parties andcivil society groups. The armed parties included the forces of Liberia's former president, CharlesTaylor, and two armed anti-Taylor rebel groups, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy(LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL).

The accord provides for disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) programs and a peace-building process in Liberia. It mandates that the NTGL implement a largelyfailed June 17, 2003 cease-fire agreement; (4) monitorand coordinate the DDRR process, withinternational assistance, as well as a range of other political and reconstruction programs; and assistin the preparation and conduct of internationally supervised elections in October 2005. (5) Other keyprovisions of the accord include

The stipulated establishment of various political processes, legal authorities, mandates, and bodies, including an Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) and a NationalCommission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) toimplement the peace accord, and a timetable for this purpose;

Military and police restructuring;

Release of political prisoners and prisoners of war;

The apportionment of key government leadership positions among accordsignatories;

"Consideration" of "a recommendation for general amnesty to all persons andparties engaged or involved in military activities during the Liberian civil conflict";

Naming of a new supreme court; and

The creation of a Contracts and Monopolies Commission (CMC), aGovernance Reform Commission (GRC), an Independent National Commission on Human Rights(INCHR), a National Electoral Commission (NEC), a National Transitional Legislative Assembly(NTLA), and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

Key Turning Points. The signing of the peace accord was preceded by two key events: the departure from Liberia on August 11, 2003 of CharlesTaylor, who resigned from the presidency and went into exile in Nigeria after accepting an offer ofpolitical asylum from its government; and the deployment by ECOWAS of a military interventionforce known as the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL).

The departure of Taylor, elected Liberia's president in 1997 after its first civil war (1989-1997), followed intense international pressure on him to leave Liberia, as he had publicly pledged to do onJune 4, 2003. After Taylor's departure, the vice president, Moses Blah, assumed the presidency ashead of a caretaker government, pending the swearing in of the NTGL. Several developments appearto have motivated Taylor's decision to leave. These include the possibility that if he did not acceptNigeria's asylum offer, he would have faced immediate extradition to Sierra Leone to answerinternational war crimes charges (see below); continuing military gains by LURD and MODEL; andLURD's refusal to engage in serious conflict resolution efforts while Taylor remained in office. Hisdeparture appears to have been a key factor motivating LURD and MODEL to agree to the CPA.

The ECOWAS intervention sought to end heavy fighting and alleviate a worsening humanitarian crisis in the wake of the failed June 17 cease-fire. ECOMIL was mandated withmonitoring and securing the cease-fire, enabling the delivery of relief aid, and preparing the way forUNMIL. Lead elements of ECOMIL, predominantly comprised of a Nigerian battalion that had beenserving with the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), began deploying to Liberia on August4, 2003. An additional Nigerian battalion, one of several West African forces trained underOperation Focus Relief, (6) and troops from Mali,Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Togo, Ghana, andBenin, continued to arrive throughout August and into September 2003. ECOMIL, which reacheda full force strength of over 3,560 members by mid-September, deployed with the aid of extensiveU.S. and U.N. assistance. The United States provided logistical and transport services,communications equipment, and other supplies worth $26 million in funds drawn from U.S.peacekeeping operations accounts. This assistance was delivered primarily by PAE GovernmentServices, Inc., a military logistics services firm that had previously supported ECOWAS forces inLiberia and Sierra Leone, in liaison with elements of the U.S. military Joint Task Force Liberia (seebelow).

Liberia's Conflict: Background

Actors and Patterns in Liberia's Conflict

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Liberia's recent conflict, the second in a decade, (7) began when LURDlaunched a series of cross-border raids into Liberia's northwestern Lofa County in mid-year 2000,reportedly from nearby bases in southern Guinea. These actions resembled several similar, butabortive, attacks launched in 1999, likely by fighters who later formed LURD, which began tocoalesce in mid-1999. It was initially primarily comprised of Liberians living in Sierra Leone andGuinea as exiles and refugees. (8) LURD's nominalleader, Sekou Damate Conneh, is a formerLiberian tax collector of Mandingo heritage who fled to Guinea in 1990. He later worked as an autotrader and businessman, and was imprisoned after returning to Liberia in 1997; he later again fledto Guinea. Conneh reportedly has close relations with the authorities in Conakry, but these appearto have been mediated, in part, by his wife, Aisha Keita-Conneh, who is reportedly a personaladvisor to ContÃ©, including on spiritual matters. Differences between the couple, discussed below,contributed to internal rifts within LURD.

MODEL. The formation of LURD was motivated by its members' mutual opposition to what they viewed as a persistent pattern of ethnic bias, politicalexclusion, human rights abuses, and corruption under Taylor. LURD's ethnically diverse make-upreflected the commonality of such views across ethnic lines. Such shared views were not strongenough, however, to permanently overcome parochial self interests, leadership rivalries, and a historyof competition between the two ethnic groups, the Mandingo and the Krahn, that initially formed thebulk of LURD's membership. In early 2003, such issues prompted some of its Krahn members todepart LURD and form MODEL. (9)

MODEL appears to have been formed as the result of a merger between LURD members based in the west of Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia's neighbor, and Force Lima, a militia based in the same area. Force Lima was formed in late 2002 to counter Liberian militias -- reportedly backed by the Taylorgovernment -- that entered the Cote d'Ivoire in support of two Ivorian rebel groups that inNovember 2002 had taken up arms against the Ivorian government of President Laurent Gbagbo. Many of Force Lima's recruits were anti-Taylor Liberian Krahn refugees who had lived for extendedperiods in western Cote d'Ivoire, which is the traditional homeland of the Guere, an Ivorian ethnicgroup closely related to the Krahn by culture and language. Force Lima, and later MODEL, werereportedly backed by the Gbagbo government, which dismissed such allegations, and its supporters.

Despite the emergence of MODEL as a LURD splinter group, there remained linkages between the two organizations. They reportedly shared some common sources of financial support, and somemembers were affiliated with both groups, which shared a common foe and did not militarily opposeone another. In addition to such commonalities, both groups have faced internal divisions, and bothare seen as susceptible to further fissures, particularly due to by rank-and-file members' resentmentof their leaders' actual or perceived access to state resources and the perks of state office, whichsome hold as officials of the NTGL.

Pattern of Conflict. After the first LURD attacks in 2000, the armed rebel campaign, though episodic and seasonal, grew both in its geographic extentand military intensity. Initially concentrated in Lofa, hostilities gradually spread south and then tocentral Liberia, as LURD launched operations further afield, including attacks near to the capital,Monrovia. By late 2002, many western and central Liberian towns had been the site of combat orhad experienced indirect effects of war, such as influxes of displaced persons, the activities of armedelements, and the negative impact on daily life and economic activities of generally rising insecurity. As the conflict grew, rebel forces gradually seized more territory and held it for increasingly longperiods, notably in 2003, but the military situation was often fluid. Belligerents' territorial controlwas limited and transitory. Fighting often focused on provisioning, looting, and harassment raids,and often targeted displaced persons' camps, rural industries, and towns along Liberia's rudimentaryroad network. Marginal changes in variables, such as access to arms materiÃ©l, provisions, ormanpower, often shifted the tactical balance between forces, which were often poorly trained,lacking in discipline, and frequently prone to arbitrary behavior. All of the armed groups recruitedlarge numbers of children and adolescents, and heavy use of drugs, alcohol, and other intoxicantswas, and likely remains, common among Liberian combatants. (10)

Rebel Gains. In early 2003, MODEL moved into eastern Liberia from the areas in Cote d'Ivoire near the Liberian border. It soon made significantmilitary in-roads there, and over the next few months expanded its area of operations, successfullyseizing territory and many towns in Liberia' eastern counties and along the coast. (11) In April 2003,an ECOWAS assessment team reported that LURD and MODEL together controlled about 60% ofLiberian territory. Rebel gains continued. LURD launched three intense assaults on the capital, twoin June and one in late July. Monrovians dubbed these "World War" "I," "II," and "III" because ofthe indiscriminate use of mortars and other projectiles during the fighting, and due to the highcivilian casualty rate that resulted.

Decline of Conflict. Periodic fighting continued following the deployment of ECOMIL, and persisted after the signing of the CPA and the subsequentdeployment of UNMIL in early October 2004. It gradually decreased in scope and frequency,however, as peacekeepers expanded their areas of deployment. Fighting following the CPAappeared to have been motivated by looting opportunities -- particularly in contested zones -- andby the belligerents' attempts to consolidate or extend control over territory and weaken their foesprior to the further deployment of peacekeepers. (12) Another factor motivating the continued use ofarms was the apparent reticence of the armed groups' leaders to participate in disarmament beforetheir political demands, primarily relating to the allocation of government positions, were met --despite having signed and repeatedly publicly endorsed the peace accord.

Effects of Conflict

Political Conditions. As the LURD insurgency burgeoned, political conditions deteriorated, and the Taylor government began to curtail politicalactivities. In early 2002, it imposed a state of emergency and, separately, a ban on political activitiesand gatherings. (13) These actions, which remainedin effect until September 2002, reflected Taylor'spersistent intolerance of political opposition. Under his leadership, foreign observers and manyLiberians assert, opposition parties were harassed and their activities curtailed. U.S. Ambassadorto Liberia John W. Blaney, like many Liberian and foreign observers, charged that opposition partieswere harassed, their activities curtailed, and that presidential candidate eligibility restrictions,including lengthy domestic residency requirements, were likely to limit electoral competition ingeneral elections then slated to be held in October 2003. (14) Opposition parties charged that theElectoral Commission, which regulated elections law and administration, was controlled by partisansof Taylor's ruling National Patriotic Party (NPP), and that a range of proposed electoral code reformswere likely create outcomes favorable to the NPP. Such concerns prompted repeated domestic andinternational calls for elections to be postponed, but the government insisted until early May 2003that credible elections could and would be held in mid-October 2003, as scheduled. In May 2003,as rebels gains continued, the Taylor government indicated that it might accept a 12 to 18 monthelection deferral, if a constitutionally valid term extension "framework" could be crafted. (15)

Human Rights Conditions. As restrictions on political activities increased, a rising number of security operations and attendant human rightsabuses were reported. Persons viewed by state security forces as dissidents or rebel supporters,particularly ex-fighters and members of certain ethnic groups, were detained and harassed, oftenviolently, during raids in urban areas and camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Manydetainees were released relatively quickly, sometimes after beatings and or bribing of arrestingagents; a smaller number were held for longer periods. Theft and extortion by security forces,frequently linked to lack of combatant pay, reportedly became frequent, as did the impressment ofyouths into military service.

In war-affected areas, reports of more numerous and severe abuses against civilians were common. Human rights and other groups assert that both government and rebel forces have carriedout executions, beatings, torture, and other abuses against civilians, including rape, and abductionfor purposes of forced labor. The same actors were accused of looting and burning towns and IDPcamps, causing further internal dislocation. Both rebel and state forces periodically issued summaryjudgments and sanctions, often violent, against those within their own ranks accused of looting andother crimes. During the LURD assaults on Monrovia in June and July 2003, government militaryforces were reportedly particularly abusive and violently exploitative. Widespread abuses continuedin combat zones after the signing of the CPA, notably in September 2003, and following thedeployment of UNMIL, though at a gradually decreasing rate.

Humanitarian Conditions. The spread of hostilities caused already poor humanitarian and economic conditions in much of Liberia todeteriorate sharply, particularly in late 2002 and 2003. Even where relief aid could be delivered,needs often outstripped available supplies. IDP camps in Liberia were typically overcrowded andaffected by severe resource constraints. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs (OCHA) reported in May 2003 that in camps "minimum standards of assistance are not met,and there are major gaps with regard to the provision of food, safe water and sanitation, health andeducation services as well as protection." Humanitarian assistance increasingly became the targetof raids by the armed groups. IDP camps were violently assaulted and their residents forced to flee,abandoning food allocations that combatants then seized.

By April/May 2003 humanitarian relief agencies were unable to provide emergency assistance in 11 of Liberia's 15 counties due to combat and related insecurity. Subsequently, suchorganizations lost access to nearly all of Liberia; all but a few withdrew entirely from Liberia forextended periods from June through August 2003. Three major attacks on Monrovia in June andJuly caused IDPs to flee to central Monrovia, causing a dramatic and extensive worsening ofhumanitarian conditions. By August, over 300,000 displaced persons were living in or nearMonrovia. Food stocks ran extremely low, and food price inflation rose sharply, as did cases ofmalnutrition, notably among children. Access to potable water decreased due to contamination andovercrowding, and outbreaks of respiratory and stomach disease, including cholera, occurred. Suchconditions were aggravated by the extensive violence that characterized the fighting in Monrovia. Civilians were robbed and abused by combatants, hundreds of victims of gunshot and shrapnel wereadmitted to hospitals, and several hundred bodies were collected from streets during and after eachmajor military assault. The belligerents also stole numerous vehicles from relief groups and lootedhumanitarian supply warehouses. As of mid-September 2003, fighting had internally displacedabout 500,000 Liberians, and about 311,000 were refugees to neighboring countries as ofOctober/November. (16) Thousands of IDPs andrefugees from other countries remained in areas ofLiberia that continued to be largely inaccessible to relief agencies until several months after thepeace accord.

International Dimensions of Liberia's Conflict

Regional Effects

Persistent Regional Threat. For nearly a decade and a half prior to the August 2003 peace accord, cycles of conflict in Liberia generated a range ofeffects that undermined the national security, political stability, and economic prosperity of itsneighbors, and brought about negative repercussions in the wider sub-region. Among the mostserious of such effects -- which continue to threaten Liberia's neighbors -- include the spread ofsmall arms; the diffusion of violence-based social norms, often with commercial underpinnings; anincreasing amount of mercenary activity in the region; the deployment of diverse, often state-assistedrebel groups along regional borders; a rise in human rights abuses; and the creation of aggrievedrefugee and internally displaced populations. A variety of fighters allied with Taylor's 1989-1997civil war faction or, after his election, with the Liberian government, participated in the SierraLeonean civil war (1991-2002); (17) in fighting insouthern Guinea in 2000-2001; and in Cote d'Ivoirein late 2002 and 2003.

Guinea and Liberia. Taylor's government and that of Lansana ContÃ©, Guinea's president, maintained poor, highly antagonistic relations. ContÃ© bitterlyopposed Taylor, and each government regularly accused the other of sponsoring aggression againstit. During and after the first Liberian civil war, many factional opponents of Taylor and civilians --many from ethnic groups, notably the Mandingo, who feared mistreatment by the Taylor government-- sought refuge in Guinea. LURD, which grew out of this exile milieu, allegedly received supportfrom the government of Guinea, beginning around the time of its inception. LURD fighters laterassisted the Guinean government to defeat a series of attacks on towns and villages in southernGuinea carried out between September 2000 and early 2001 by a mix of forces made up of RUFfighters from Sierra Leone, Liberian militias, a small number of Guinean rebels, and mercenariesfrom the region. In addition to allowing LURD to maintain rear bases in southern Guinea, theGuinean government reportedly supported LURD by supplying it with arms, and periodicallyprovided tactical military assistance, such as cross-border mortar and helicopter air fire support. Such reports were routinely been denied by Guinea's government. (18)

The influence of Guinea with respect to developments in Liberia was underlined by a series of visits to Conakry during and after the peace negotiations by officials, including U.S. andECOWAS diplomats; the interim Liberian President, Moses Blah; UNMIL head Jacques Klein; andChairman Bryant. LURD leaders also appeared to have received continuing logistical and securitysupport from Guinea in the period after the signing of the peace accord. In late September 2003,Conneh traveled to Liberia from Guinea to announce LURD's intention to end combat. His convoywas guarded by Guinean government soldiers and included Guinean government vehicles, and hepaid tribute to Guinea's role in backing LURD's objectives. (19) Similarly, when Aisha Keita-Connehtraveled to Monrovia in January 2004, she was accompanied by Guinean military bodyguards. (20)

Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia. In late 2002, a mix of factional fighters, mercenaries, and refugee recruits from Liberia became involved in clashes, humanrights abuses, and looting in western Cote d'Ivoire. Violence there burgeoned in the wake of aSeptember 2002 rebellion centered in northern Cote d'Ivoire. The Liberians joined diverse armedgroups that were active in the Ivorian west, some fighting in support of the Ivorian government, andsome against it; others were involved in banditry. The Taylor government asserted that it wasunaffiliated with any of these groups, but there were repeated reports to the contrary. Fighters andlooted goods reportedly traversed the Liberia-Cote d'Ivoire border frequently, and the two country'sgovernments accused one another of sponsoring armed rebel groups against the other. Such chargeswere the product of Cote d'Ivoire's current political crisis, but had roots in direct and indirect,long-standing, Ivorian involvement in Liberia's two conflicts. Numerous press and analytical reportscharged that the Ivorian government provided backing for MODEL. Though violence in westernCote d'Ivoire has generally subsided, there have been periodic reports of tensions between localIvorian citizens and foreign immigrants and refugees in the area.

Peace efforts in both Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire have taken heed of the cross-border dynamics of conflict along the Liberian-Ivorian frontier. Many of the same actors mediating in Cote d'Ivoirewere involved in congruous efforts to end Liberia's conflict, and UNMIL and the U.N. Operationin Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) share intelligence information. In November 2003, UNMIL head JacquesKlein appealed for French-speaking peacekeepers, in light of cross-border flows between Liberia,Cote d'Ivoire, and Guinea of refugees and armed groups. Similarly, former President Taylor and hisIvorian counterpart, Laurence Gbagbo, met in Togo in early May 2003. They later announced plans,which were never implemented, to deploy along their shared border a joint military monitoring force.

International Responses

Poor economic conditions and persistent conflict-related humanitarian needs have long motivated a continuous flow of international relief assistance to Liberia and its neighbors. Similarly,the region has been the focus of repeated international conflict resolution efforts centered aroundmediation attempts and, in the case of Liberia, the imposition of proscriptive sanctions on itsgovernment. Some policy makers also have expressed concern over reports alleging that the Taylorgovernment hosted Al Qaeda agents and facilitated their purchase of West African diamonds. (21)

United Nations

U.N. Security Council Sanctions. Liberia is subject to international sanctions first imposed, though since modified, by the U.N. Security Councilin March 2001 (S/RES/1343) after it found that the Taylor government had repeatedly violatedearlier U.N. resolutions by providing military support and safe haven for the rebel Sierra LeoneRevolutionary United Front (RUF), in part in exchange for Sierra Leonean diamonds. S/RES/1343demanded that the Taylor government end such support, seize RUF assets and expel all RUFmembers in Liberia, and end its trafficking in arms for diamonds. It banned the direct or indirectimport of rough diamonds from or through Liberia; flights of Liberian-registered aircraft; theshipment of arms and related materiÃ©l to Liberia; and foreign travel by senior Liberian officials.

The sanctions were extended for a year in May 2002 (S/RES/1408), after the Security Council found that Liberia had not fully complied with S/RES/1343, as Liberia later formally admitted,claiming the right to do so for reasons of self defense under Article 51 of U.N. Charter. Some Taylorcritics advocated widening the sanctions to include measures to decrease the Taylor government'saccess to national timber, rubber, and maritime revenues, which they alleged it was diverting forprivate purposes and uses to fund regional conflict. On May 6, 2003, the Security Council extendedsanctions on Liberia for a year (S/RES/1478) and added a ten-month ban on the import of Liberiantimber, which began July 7, 2003, though it also decided to assess and mitigate possible negativehumanitarian or socio-economic effects of its sanctions.

On December 22, 2003, the Security Council terminated the sanctions and replaced them with new ones (S/RES/1521). In doing so, it cited concerns that the cease-fire and CPA were "not yetbeing universally implemented throughout Liberia"; that much of its territory remained outside theauthority of the NTGL, particularly where UNMIL had yet to deploy; that there continued to belinkages between the illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources like diamonds and timber,leading to a the proliferation and trafficking of illegal arms, and the fueling and exacerbation ofconflicts in Liberia and other areas of West Africa; and that the situation in Liberia, the proliferationof arms and armed non-state actors and mercenaries in the subregion continued to constitute a threatto international peace and security in Liberia and the region. S/RES/1521 banned for one year:

The export to Liberia for any recipient of all arms, military materiÃ©l, and technical support relating to such items, with certain exceptions for UNMIL and otherU.N.-approved purposes, such as security sector reform programs, and humanitarian/protectivepurposes;

Foreign travel or transit of "individuals... who constitute a threat" to Liberia'speace process or regional security, specifically including senior members of the former Taylorgovernment and their spouses, members of the Liberian armed forces with links to Taylor, andindividuals affected by travel restrictions under S/RES/1343;

The direct or indirect import of rough diamonds from or through Liberia;and

The import of Liberian logs and timber products. It also urged the NTGL toestablish full control over timber harvesting areas and timber-based revenues

S/RES/1521 also

Called upon NTGL to establish an "effective Certificate of Origin regime" for Liberian rough diamonds that would potentially allow Liberia to join the Kimberley Process and leadto a lifting of the diamond trade sanctions;

Urged the NTGL to establish full control and oversight of all public revenues,specifically including those generated by the Liberian International Ship and Corporate Registry, andto use such funds for national development; and

Mandated the formation of a sanctions monitoring Committee and aninvestigatory panel of experts.

On June 17, 2004, the Security Council reviewed the sanctions under S/RES/1521, but declined to lift them (S/RES/1549). Instead, having taken note of a NTGL request that sanctions on Liberia'stimber and diamonds be lifted, the Security Council decided to re-establish a panel of experts andmandated that it assess general compliance with the sanctions and progress toward the goalsunderlying their imposition, which the NTGL had also requested. The passage of S/RES/1549 waspreceded by the Security Council's decision on March 12, 2004 (S/RES/1532), to freeze the assetsof the former president, Charles Taylor, as well as those of his family and close allies, and to traceand freeze funds and other economic assets owned or controlled by the same parties. PresidentBush's Executive Order 13348, of July 22, 2004, implements this ban in the United States. Thetransitional government of Liberia implemented the ban in Liberia in mid-October 2004, though theSupreme Court subsequently halted the action with reference to two reputed Taylor associates.

U.N. and ECOWAS. The establishment and deployment of UNMIL was preceded by the Security Council's authorization, before the CPA wassigned, of a Multinational Force (MNF) in Liberia. Its purpose was to support the implementationof the much-violated June 17, 2003 cease-fire agreement and to establish a secure environment forthe delivery of humanitarian relief. On August 1, 2003, the Security Council adopted a resolution1497. It authorized an MNF and labeled as "critical" President Taylor's departure from power, tobe followed by the installation of a transitional government in Liberia and the subsequentdeployment of a U.N. stabilization successor force to the country by October 1, 2003. It providedthe MNF with a waiver of U.N. sanctions banning the import of military materiÃ©l into Liberia andauthorized the MNF to act under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (i.e., gave it authority to usemilitary force to ensure international peace and security). It also provided that all personnel of "acontributing state" would be subject to the "exclusive jurisdiction" of that state, unless jurisdictionis waived by a state. The provision was seen as exempting participating troops from potentialprosecution in the International Criminal Court (ICC). (22)

While S/RES/1497 did not explicitly equate the MNF with the ECOWAS intervention force that was then preparing to deploy to Liberia, it did authorize UNAMSIL to provide logistical supportfor 30 days to ECOWAS for the purpose of fielding the force that subsequently became known asECOMIL. The term MNF was used in the resolution, in part, because in the weeks preceding theauthorization of the MNF, ECOWAS leaders had conditioned their contribution of troops to theMNF on the expectation they would be joined in this effort by other nations. In the end, however,no other nations contributed troops to the MNF; it was ultimately comprised solely of ECOMIL,which deployed days after S/RES/1497 was passed, as described previously.

U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). UNMIL, authorized on September 19, 2003, by the U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of theU.N. Charter (S/RES/1509), commenced operations on October 1, 2003. The formal deploymentof UNMIL, which at the time lacked the bulk of its troop strength, had the legal effect of dissolvingECOMIL and transferring its authority to UNMIL. Simultaneously, the troops that had comprisedECOMIL were inducted into UNMIL, and became its initial core force.

UNMIL was authorized a force of up to 15,000 U.N. military personnel, including as many as 250 military observers, 160 staff officers, and up to 1,115 civilian police officers, and "appropriate"civilian components. Upon the establishment of UNMIL, the small, previously existing U.N. Officein Liberia (UNOL) was dissolved, and certain of its assets folded into UNMIL. The Security Councilgave UNMIL a multi-faceted, 12-month initial mandate. Key duties include monitoring andimplementation of the CPA and June cease-fire accord, and creation of an action plan forimplementing a comprehensive DDRR program, in cooperation with other international actors. S/RES/1509 also mandated that UNMIL:

Disengage and canton at secure sites the Liberian armed parties' military forces;

Support the work of the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC), a body createdunder the June 17 cease-fire accord;

Implement a voluntary disarmament program;

Provide security for key government installations, and other vital infrastructure,such as transport hubs;

Protect and enable the free operation of U.N. staff andfacilities;

Facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid;

Assist in the protection and promotion of human rights in Liberia;and

Protect civilians under imminent threat of violence, under certainconditions.

The resolution further mandated that UNMIL assist the NTGL to:

Monitor, restructure, and retrain Liberia's police and military forces;

Re-establish national authority and administrative capacitiesnation-wide;

Develop a "strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including anational legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions";

Restore proper administration and regulation of natural resources;and

Prepare for national elections scheduled for no later than the end of2005;

UNMIL is headed by Jacques Paul Klein, who had been appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia on July 9, 2003. Klein is a retired U.S. Air Force General andsenior U.S. diplomat, and former head of the U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). Other top UNMIL officials include its Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Daniel IshmaelOpande of Kenya, the former commander of UNAMSIL; Souren Seraydarian of Syria, the DeputySpecial Representative of the Secretary-General for Operations and Rule of Law; Abou Moussa ofChad, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Relief, Recovery andRehabilitation and U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator for Liberia; and UNMIL Police CommissionerMark A. Kroeker, the former police chief of Portland, Oregon.

Current Situation

Numerous medium to long-term challenges face Liberia and its donors. These include:

Achieving a transition from a situation of humanitarian crisis requiring emergency assistance to one characterized by resettlement and economicrecovery.

The re-establishment of state authority throughout Liberia's national territory.

The rebuilding and reform of government institutions, facilities, and capacities, notably those of the functional ministries, revenue-earning and regulatory independent agencies, thepolice, and the justice system.

General socio-economic recovery and rehabilitation of national physical infrastructure.

Other current peace and security-related operational issues that face the NTGL, UNMIL, and Liberia's international donors include continued implementation of the CPA, particularly with regardto maintenance of security; completion of DDRR; progress in preparing for elections; and resolutionof the status of Charles Taylor, both as an exile in Nigeria and as a war crimes indictee.

National Recovery

Current Humanitarian Situation. Humanitarian conditions remain difficult in much of Liberia, but are continuing to improve, particularly inMonrovia and other urban areas. Relief organizations have progressively expanded their areas ofoperation nationwide since August 2003, when humanitarian emergency operations were reinitiatedafter the deployment of ECOMIL and the signing of the peace accord. The socio-economic situationalso began to slowly stabilize at that time due to the arrival of renewed food and fuel imports andthe reopening of businesses and key transport corridors. During the past year, U.N. agencies, inconcert with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and NTGL ministries, in a forum called theHumanitarian Action Committee, have implemented a wide range of projects. These target needsrelating to nutrition, water and sanitation, primary healthcare services and transportationinfrastructure rebuilding, and the continuing assessment of socio-economic conditions in local areasthroughout Liberia. Many initial efforts have taken the form of "quick-impact projects" meant toprovide immediate basic outputs. Several disease immunization campaigns have also beenundertaken.

Despite considerable progress, there remain high levels of basic humanitarian need in Liberia. In August 2004, according to USAID, quoting U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)data, there were 300,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in camps in Liberia. Additionally, there were 350,000 Liberian refugees living in Guinea, Sierra Leone, CÃ´te d'Ivoire,and Ghana, as well as 4,000 Sierra Leoneans living in Liberia. As of early June, about 80,000Liberian refugees had independently repatriated to Liberia following the end of the conflict. Accessto relief supplies and, in some cases, limited public services are most readily available IDP campsand informal settlements in urban areas, but these are also characterized by overcrowding.

Nutrition. Over 418,000 individuals currently depend on monthly food distributions from the World Food Program (WFP), though the number ofbeneficiaries has varied widely, to almost double that number in some months. In early August2004, the WFP announced that it would decrease rations due to shortages of pulses, effectivelyreducing the daily caloric nutrition levels of rations by about 27%, though corn-soya supplementswere added. Further food aid supply shortages were forecast by the WFP due to lapses in donorfunding. As of late August, according to a September 2004 WFP report, severe malnutrition -- attributable, in part, to illnesses, such as malaria, diarrhea, and cholera that tend to rise during thecurrent rainy season -- was being reported in some areas. Such reporting, and associated reliefresponses, are in part due to the continuing extension of relief agency activities and increasinglyregular assessments of medical and humanitarian needs throughout the country. Provision ofadequate potable water is a key component of both emergency relief delivery and resettlementprograms.

Resettlement. While increasing numbers of IDPs are spontaneously resettling (i.e., autonomously moving to permanent places of settlement with little,if any, assistance from relief agencies), the bulk of displaced populations have yet to move to theirpermanent areas of residence. U.N. and NGO agencies that will support resettlement operations arecurrently planning these activities, and stockpiling and procuring resources that will be required tocarry them out. Such resources include seed, tool, and basic transitional non-food item packages,as well as follow-up programs aimed at rehabilitating and providing basic social service facilitiesfor newly resettled communities. Formal resettlement programs will not begin until areas targetedfor return have been declared safe by an organ called the Security Assessment Committee forResettlement (SACR), made up of NTGL, U.N., and NGOs representatives. Such declarations willrequire that in each targeted area, UNMIL peacekeepers be deployed; disarmament programs becompleted; social and local police services be functioning; that the area be freely accessible tohumanitarian agencies; and that spontaneous resettlements in the area be assessed, as a means ofdetermining the likely success of formal return activities. The UNHCR began to assist in therepatriation and resettlement of refugees from surrounding countries in early October 2004.

Education. In late 2003, the NTGL Education Ministry of the began efforts to reinitiate education activities, which had declined dramatically asthe conflict grew. Most Liberian young adults and school-aged children have had limited access toschooling and are largely illiterate, in contrast to older generations, which are generallywell-educated by regional standards. The NTGL's efforts have been assisted by the U.N. Children'sFund (UNICEF), through its Back to School Campaign. UNICEF helped coordinate educationalfacility assessments, delivered "school in a box" emergency school supply kits, and implemented arapid master teacher "train the trainers" program. According to UNMIL, most primary andsecondary schools in urban areas are operational, and UNICEF has delivered over 10,000 schoolsupply kits adequate for the needs of 800,000 pupils; has trained 12,000 primary school teachers; andis supplying schools with access to clean water. Nationwide, current core activities aimed atrebuilding the education sector include facilities and manpower assessments; creation of teachertraining, vocational/skills-building, and education promotion programs; efforts to support girls'education; school rehabilitation, construction, and provisioning; and school-based delivery ofhealthcare and supplementary nutrition. WFP programs currently reach over 395,000 pupils, andplans call for the expansion of such aid to about 65,000 additional children by late 2004 (23) . Compared to progress in reopening schools, progress toward reinitiating activities at the universitylevel has been halting. The University of Liberia (UL) has opened, but only about 20% of enrolledstudents are reportedly fully registered, and in August 2004, students and faculty launched a boycottin protest against the nomination of the NTGL of a new UL president. (24)

General Economic Recovery. Nation-wide, commerce is growing, in part because key transport routes are free of factional checkpoints. In coreurban areas, a wide variety of imported goods are reportedly available from major trading companies,many Lebanese-run, which in turn supply small-scale retailers and street merchants. Publicinfrastructure remains devastated. Monrovia, with a population of about 1 million, lacks piped waterand public electricity mains; most electricity is produced by private generators. These sectors aretargeted for donor-aided rehabilitation. In July 2004, a Spanish firm was awarded a licence toexplore for offshore oil.

Despite a normalizing economic situation, some observers are concerned that the upswing in economic activity in Liberia is driven by donor-financed expenditures, and may not reflectfundamental economic recovery. As of mid-October 2004, $354 million of $520 million in donorpledges made in February 2004 had been received. About half of these receipts were earmarked forhumanitarian activities and about half for reconstruction projects. Some observers worry thathumanitarian crises in other world regions, such as Sudan, may undermine donors' actualcontribution of assistance they have previously pledged.

Re-establishment of State Institutions. A phased extension of state authority continues to be undertaken by the NTGL and the National TransitionalLegislative Assembly (NTLA) with the assistance of UNMIL, particularly its civil affairs elements. It has been hampered, however, due to a paucity of basic facilities and resources to rehabilitate them;by insecurity, notably in rural areas; and by friction among local authorities (25) . The latter include amix of those affiliated with the armed factions, who in some cases were appointed prior to theestablishment of the NTGL and in others in coordination with the NTGL; traditional leaders; andthose still in place from previous regimes. NTLA and local objections to unilateral nominations oflocal officials by the NTGL executive have reportedly led to deeper cooperation between thesebranches of the transitional government, principally through a process by which a county-levelcommittee vets and recommends a pool of candidates from which NTGL nominees are selected bythe NTGL chair.

Generally, in areas outside the capital, the dispatch of government officials has centered on key population centers and areas where UNMIL has deployed troops and where the demobilization ofex-combatants has been initiated. Key tasks of local officials include coordination with the NTGL,U.N., and NGO agencies of programs to reintegrate and resettle ex-combatants and internallydisplaced persons in their communities of residence; the initiation of local infrastructure and publicfacilities needs-assessments; and, in a few cases, the initiation of reconstruction projects. Anotherkey goal of the NTGL is to restore state control, in concert with local officials where appropriate,over the exploitation and regulation of natural resources, notably forests and diamonds, in part inorder to comply with the conditions required for U.N. sanctions on Liberia to be lifted. Thegovernment recently deployed revenue collectors to Liberia's main towns. Throughout much of2004, protection of borders had been an on-going area of concern with regard to the reassertion ofcentral state authority, because in many instances, factional fighters remained in control of frontiers. In early September, however, the UNSG reported that UNMIL had worked with the NTGL to deployimmigration and customs officials to key border crossings, and was engaged in negotiations witharmed faction elements aimed at ensuring they relinquish to the NTGL public facilities that havecontrolled or occupied. UNMIL is also assisting ad-hoc committees to mediate housing and propertydisputes, particularly those pertaining to families resettling or returning to their home areas.

In Monrovia, many NTGL ministry headquarters lack basic equipment, provisions, and the logistical capacity or resources to obtain them, though donor-funded ministerial rehabilitationprojects, including U.S.-funded programs, are attempting to remedy this situation. Despite suchchallenges, the NTGL has taken a number of steps to re-establish basic government processes. It hasdirected that all state revenues be submitted to the central bank, though some critics claim that notall funds have been subjected to this requirement, and replaced the former Taylor-era head of theCentral Bank, who critics had accused of aiding corrupt practices under the former government.

In late March 2004, the NTGL submitted a $23.5 million interim budget, derived from maritime and customs receipts among other domestic revenues, covering the period from February to June2004, which the legislature passed weeks later, with minor increases. The budget covered onlygovernment current wage bills, but did not address massive civil servant salary arrears, a centralgrievance of public sector workers, a key political constituency. In mid-May 2004, in response tosuch concerns and following talks with public sector labor leaders, the NTGL stated that it wouldbegin bi-monthly payments of such arrears through mid-2005, beginning in late July 2004, aftercompletion of a general public audit aimed at removing ghost workers from the state payrolls andpreventing future salaries fraud. Despite this commitment, in late May government workersundertook a labor strike, viewed by the NTGL as illegal, to demand immediate payment of salaryarrears. The government worker strike began during a separate, multi-week wage arrears strike byLiberia Telecommunications Corporation workers. In late July, NTGL Chairman Bryant reiteratedthe NTGL's commitment to beginning arrears payments. The NTGL subsequently proposed a regular$80 million 2004/2005 budget.

Transparency. While the NTGL has made progress toward re-initiating government functions, some observers worry that it may lack thecapacity to ensure that all state operations are conducted in a transparent and accountable manner. Some claim that government office holders are acting for their own benefit or are engaging innepotism. Critics claim that in a post-conflict country with an average 2003 income of $130 percapita, the issuance of new vehicles to numerous public office holders, including most of theparliament, is an indication of these office holders' self enrichment. They also cite concerns aboutrepeated overseas trips by NTLA officials, some accompanied by retinues of associates; the sale ofLiberian state overseas properties, such as embassies, and of a $10 million stockpile of iron ore, anddisposition of revenues thereof; the taxation of former monopoly firms; the disposition of revenuesfrom certain shipping-related state agencies; and lack of progress toward auditing and regulatingnatural resource concessions and proceeds (26) . UNMIL head Jacques Klein has criticized the NTGLfor making making slow progress in many areas, notably with regard to elections. In late July,reportedly noting that "each of the warring factions got ministries ... staffed top to bottom with theirpeople," he attributed such lack of progress to the assertion that "some people are thinking, 'Whynext year? I like being in my government job - what's the rush?' " (27)

In late October 2004, a joint World Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF) fiscal management assessment team in Liberia called for increased transparency, reform, and accountabilityin NTGL fiscal management and budgeting. The team stated that they viewed such an outcome asa pre-condition for the removal of U.N. sanctions on Liberia, and as a signal to donors consideringthe provision of increased aid to Liberia. The team also stated that donors are concerned about theNTGL's purchase of 76 Grand Cherokee jeeps for the parliament, though they expressed optimismthat donors would likely eventually grant Liberia foreign debt relief. (28)

Despite some criticisms of its performance, the NTGL has received plaudits from many observers for undertaking incipient reforms of the Central Bank of Liberia (CBL), including an orderthat all state revenues be placed in a CBL account. The NTGL has also announced that severalgovernment agencies are to be audited, with foreign technical assistance. The replacement of theformer CBL governor has generated similar praise. In May 2004, the then-CBL governor, EliasSaleeby, resigned under pressure from the NTLA and, reportedly, from the IMF. Saleeby, a formerIMF staff who had served as Central Bank governor during the Taylor regime, had been re-appointedto the post in October 2003. He had, however, become the focus of increasing criticism fromparliamentarians who challenged his authority to print about $12.3 million worth of Liberiancurrency, without parliamentary approval, during Taylor's final months in power. Saleeby reportedlyhad claimed that a 1999 law gave the Bank the authority to do so. He was also the target of criticismfrom diverse Liberian and foreign observers because of his close association with Taylor and thehigh level of public sector corruption and fiscal chaos that characterized the Liberian governmentunder Taylor and Saleeby's tenure. In May 2004, a visiting IMF delegation reportedly threatenedto refuse to work with the Central Bank until Saleeby's resignation. (29)

Reforms in the Security and Legal Sectors. A Rule of Law Implementation Committee, made up of NTGL and UNMIL representatives, has beenformed to coordinate police, judicial, and prison reforms. Liberia's National Police Academyre-opened in mid-July, and training of screened and vetted cadets, drawn from a mix of internalpolice and external candidates, began in at the end of the month. The Academy's capacity remainslimited, however, due to rehabilitation requirements, for which funds were lacking as of earlySeptember 2004. Further police recruitments, aided by UNMIL CIVPOL, are continuing, and allexisting law enforcement personnel are being enrolled in a nation-wide registry.

A limited number of courts at various levels, including the Supreme Court, are now functioning, though with limited resources, and UNMIL-aided training and vetting of judges at all levels belowthe Supreme Court has begun. UNMIL and experts from various donor countries are working withthe NTGL to reform and rehabilitate the national justice system through implementation ofmonitoring, advisory and training programs in diverse rule-of-law institutions, through limited,quick-impact rehabilitation projects targeting key institutions' facilities.

Plans for the reform of Liberia's armed forces, as provided for under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), are not complete. U.S. Defense and State Department officials are in the processof assessing and recommending a potential program for military restructuring. Of the $200 millionin IDFA funds under P.L. 108-106 , $35 million was dedicated to U.S. assistance to support Liberianmilitary reform. U.S. defense officials, however, estimate that a total of between $118 million and$200 million will ultimately be required to achieve the goal of rebuilding a 3,000- 4,000 personmilitary. Other U.S. planning projects a possible need for a 4,000-6,000 person military. Officials have provisionally identified within the Administration's FY2005 and FY2006 requests $118 millionin regional peacekeeping, Foreign Military Financing, and supplemental funds that, if appropriatedand sanctioned for this purpose, might be used to substantially begin such restructuring. They arealso seeking the assistance of other donor nations in accomplishing this goal.

Security Issues

UNMIL Deployment. UNMIL troops have deployed throughout Liberia, including at key border sites, and its civilian police (CIVPOL) elementsare present at 25 main locations nationwide, and are expected to undertake further deployments. Asof the end of September 2004, UNMIL, which has an authorized troop ceiling of 15,000 personnel,had a total strength of 14,363 troops; 201 military observers; and 1,089 CIVPOL; and over 423international civilian personnel. The deployment of a communications group then under formationwas expected to bring UNMIL up to its fully authorized troop level. UNMIL had experienced 23fatalities, none as a result of a hostile act. As of the same date, UNMIL personnel were drawn from60 countries; the largest combined military/CIVPOL contingents were from Bangladesh, Pakistan,Ethiopia, and Nigeria. The United States had contributed six troops; five military observers; and 72civilian police. UNMIL had earlier faced challenges in recruiting personnel from troop contributingcountries. (30)

Security Situation. The nation-wide deployment of UNMIL, together with the continuing success of disarmament and demobilization programs forex-combatants (see below), has contributed to a generally calm and improving security situation inLiberia, though the country remains subject to periodic unrest and volatility. In addition to carryingout disarmament activities, UNMIL troops routinely monitor roads and borders, the latter by landand air, and carry out search and seizure operations aimed at intercepting and halting trafficking inillicit arms and ammunition. No significant cease-fire violations between the three armed factionswere recorded to date in 2004. Intra-factional rivalries have on several occasions, however, turnedviolent and threatened public security, as have periodic civil unrest and criminal activities, includingsporadic looting and assaults, theft, or extortion of civilians by ex-combatants. Such threats haveprimarily affected Monrovia and other population centers, where many disarmed ex-combatants arepresent, and localities awaiting the start of disarmament programs.

Intra-Factional Tensions. Limited discord within MODEL and among former government force elements, most commonly involving disputes betweenfield level fighters and their immediate commanders, has periodically been reported. More seriousintra-factional tensions, however, have occurred within LURD. Throughout late 2003 and 2004,there were persistent reports of rivalries between one group of LURD members, including severalkey political leaders said to be allied primarily with Sekou Conneh, and a second LURD faction. The latter includes several key military commanders who reportedly back Conneh's wife, AishaKeita-Conneh, and Kabineh Janneh, a former LURD peace accord negotiator and the current NTGLMinister of Justice. While Keita-Conneh, who like her husband is a founding leader of LURD, holdsno formal position within the organization, she has long wielded extensive influence over largesegments of LURD.

LURD has long been subject to internal discord; both during the conflict and during the peace talks that ended it, disagreements among the group's leaders were reported. Tensions grew inJanuary 2004, however, when a group of LURD military leaders, disenchanted with Sekou Connehfor not backing their candidacies for positions in the NTGL, alleged that he was engaging infavoritism and accepting bribes in exchange for positions allocated to LURD in the NTGL. Somecalled on Keita-Conneh, who claims to be the "founder and main leader" of LURD, to take over itschairmanship from Conneh. These tensions also appear to have been aggravated by an on-goingmarital dispute between Conneh and Keita-Conneh that reportedly relates, in part, to Conneh'snomination of a relative of his former wife to be NTGL Finance Minister. (31)

Such tensions persisted throughout 2004. In early April, LURD fighters, claiming that they were not receiving adequate disarmament assistance and that their leaders were neglecting theirneeds, looted and rioted in the central city of Gbargna. In early June, a group of LURD leaders,claiming status as LURD's "National Executive Council," suspended Conneh "indefinitely" aschairman of LURD, and days later appointed Chayee Doe as the new LURD chair. Doe, however,died in mid-June while undergoing brain surgery in the United States. Subsequently, in June, Jannehwas chosen by the Council as Acting and then permanent LURD Chairman. In early August, the twoopposed LURD factions targeted one another in a series of actions involving vehicle theft,abductions, fistfights and shootings. These incidents, which threatened to escalate and pose ageneral threat to public security, were halted by UNMIL through a combination of police and troopforce deployments and mediation.

Conneh immediately dismissed the legitimacy of his alleged replacement in June 2004, and continues to claim his position as chairman -- though for much of the period after the CPA'ssigning, he resided abroad, and only periodically visited Liberia (32) . His absence from Liberia duringkey events -- such as an April 2004 opening of a disarmament camp in Tubmanburg, LURD'swartime headquarters, and during peace negotiations -- has led some observers to hypothesize thathe may initially have been chosen as a figurehead leader who could later be replaced. According tosuch views, he was selected because he had access to funding and links to the Guinean government,but held little direct sway over LURD's military elements. During the post-accord period, in thisview, Conneh has continually had to struggle to assert his authority within the group, and hasattempted to form alliances with politicians who possess political connections and aspirationsindependent of those of the core military LURD leadership. Such factors may underlie the spate ofintra-LURD violence in early August; it appears, in large part, to have been spurred by Conneh'sreturn to Monrovia and the prospect that he might attempt to re-assert control over LURD'sMonrovia-based leadership. Since that time, Conneh's position appears to have strengthened, assome military leaders formerly allied with Keita-Conneh have begun to distance themselves fromher.

The on-going tensions within LURD are worrying to many observers because of LURD's key position within the NTGL, and its history of using the force of arms to achieve political ends. WereLURD to permanently split into mutually opposed factions, some believe, the threat of significantrenewed armed conflict could re-emerge, and could again destabilize Liberia and endanger theviability of the peace accord. However, in accordance with the CPA, LURD has announced that willofficially dissolve as an armed force on October 31. Observers anticipate that the group willtransform itself into a political party.

Peace Accord Implementation

Substantial progress toward two key challenges to implementation of the CPA -- resolution of persistent disagreements about appointments to posts in the National Transitional Governmentof Liberia (NTGL), and completion of the disarmament and demobilization process -- has beenmade, though neither goal has been completely met. Other key peace accord-related tasks facing theNTGL include the need to improve its functional capacity; ensuring progress toward security sectorreform; and establishing the legal and operational conditions and capacities necessary for the conductof free and fair elections in October 2005.

NTGL Posts. Job-related political demands by the armed actors, notably LURD, repeatedly threatened to prevent the initiation of demobilizationand to undermine the accord and the formation of the NTGL. In mid-September 2003, LURDasserted that the Bryant Administration was planning to deny LURD assistant minister posts, incontravention of the peace accord, and threatened not to join the NTGL. In mid-October, LURDagain requested that job allocations be clarified prior to the inauguration of the National TransitionalLegislative Assembly (NTLA) (33) . Inmid-December 2003, the three armed factions issued a formaldeclaration, which they dubbed The Monrovia Clarification on the 18 August 2003 ComprehensivePeace Agreement , demanding control over virtually all top government posts, including sixministries and 16 independent government agencies allocated to the unarmed political parties andcivil society under the CPA. Their demand, if upheld, would reportedly have caused civilian groupsto lose as many as 33 positions, and spurred the civilians, including the Deputy Chairman of theNTGL, Wesley Johnson, to threaten to resign from the NTGL in protest. While most suchdisagreements have been resolved, in early September 2004, the UNSG reported that "there are stillongoing disputes over government posts which have made it difficult for the TransitionalGovernment to function as a cohesive administration." (34) Similar disputes, mostly pitting the formerarmed factions against unarmed political parties and civil society groups, had earlier arisen over themanner in which National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) seats had been selected.Disagreements over disputed NTLA seats have since been resolved, apart those affecting one seat,for which a special election was slated to be held.

Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration(DDRR). Liberia's peace accord requires the cantonment and "disarmament,demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration" (DDRR) of the armed parties to the conflict. AnUNMIL-supervised disarmament process began in December 2003, but faced immediate andsubstantial problems related to the operational and logistical challenges of rapidly initiating anationwide DDRR program. A key point of the initial failure related to misinformation about theprotocol for paying disarming combatants when the program began in mid-December. Plans calledfor a two-stage payment of $300 to disarming combatants, the first $150 installment to be paid afterinitial induction into the DDRR process. When disarming combatants learned that they would notreceive on-the spot payments upon surrendering their weapons, they rioted and looted in and nearthe capital. Although the unrest was successfully suppressed, and UNMIL announced that it wouldpay each disarming fighter $75 in exchange for their weapon upon entrance into the cantonment site,the DDRR process was halted, pending further planning. Other factors that contributed to thisoutcome included a series of public criticisms of DDRR plans; LURD's initial opposition to theestablishment of a DDRR camp in its territory; and the publicly announced need for more extensivepreparations of DDRR camps, further deployments of UNMIL troops, and public education aboutthe disarmament process.

After repeated postponements, the DDRR process began anew in mid April 2004, and has since recorded significant success, despite a few localized violent incidents associated with someex-combatants' dissatisfaction over the DDRR process and the mishandling of military materiel. Over 95,000 combatants, more than double the initial UNMIL projection of 38,000, have beendemobilized to date. The total includes over 12, 600 women and 10,000 children, about 22% ofthem girls, and at least 530 foreign combatants. Over 21,000 weapons, predominantly lightweapons, have been turned in, as well as substantial amounts of ammunition and unexplodedordnance. Disarmament has occurred in most areas of the country, including some remote borderzones. (35)

Disarmament Challenges. Not all ex-combatants inducted into the DDRR program have surrendered a weapon. This has led to two criticisms of theDDRR process. First, some critics allege that non-combatants are taking advantage of the processto gain demobilization payments, a claim denied by UNMIL, which asserts that it vets all DDRRinductees. Second, some observers fear that the former armed factions may be sequesteringsignificant caches of weapons, which might facilitate a return to armed conflict if Liberia's weakpolitical institutions fail to mediate competing interests. They point to UNMIL's seizure of multipleweapons, on several occasions, as possible evidence for such claims. Similar concerns have beenexpressed with regard to the lower-than-anticipated number of heavy weapons being surrendered. There have been periodic though unconfirmed reports that former Taylor loyalists may be attemptingto recruit and train fighters in southern Guinea, possibly in order to incite a rebellion against thatcountry's government, which opposed that of Taylor.

There have also been reports that some weapons from Liberia have been smuggled out of Liberia into neighboring countries. Some worry, in particular, that weapons and/or ex-combatantsmay cross into neighboring Cote d'Ivoire, where the political situation remains unsettled, and whereDDRR plans call for the payment of demobilization stipends nearly three times as large as thosebeing offered in Liberia. A related matter of contention arises because, although not all disarmedex-combatants surrendered weapons during the much of the DDRR process to date, in August 2004,UNMIL officials reportedly began to reject prospective inductees into disarmament camps wholacked a weapon. While the hand-over of arms is not presently official policy, UNMIL is reportedlyconsidering requiring male combatants to turn in a weapon, while exempting disarming female andchild combatants from such an obligation. The alleged rejection of prospective inductees has causedconsternation among those affected. In mid- September 2004, the National Commission on DDRR(NCDDRR) received a complaint from a former government commander claiming that 2,000 of hismen had been rejected for DDRR.

The completion date for disarmament has also been a matter of contention. In late August 2004, the deputy UNMIL force commander announced that the disarmament program would beextended to December. This would mean that disarmament would continue after refugee repatriationprograms, which began in October, had commenced. The head of UNMIL, Jacques Klein,subsequently announced that the previously-planned disarmament end-date of October 30 would befollowed. On September 7, however, the NCDDRR rejected the October 30 date, calling it"unrealistic and unilateral." It asserted that several disarmament sites had yet to be opened and thatfurther time for disarmament in remote, seasonally inaccessible areas was required. A NCDDRRspokesman also stated that none of the three former armed factions or the NTGL had been officiallynotified of the date announced by Klein, a claim later denied by the deputy head of UNMIL. Chairman Bryant, however, subsequently accepted the October 30 date, and in late September,UNMIL opened its last disarmament site. (36)

A related challenge facing the disarmament process is a reportedly inadequate level of funding for ex-combatant reintegration programs, due in part to donor concerns. Some donors reportedly willnot release pledges for reintegration support until the disarmament process has formally ended. While several large reintegration programs are operating, United Nations and NTGL officialsmaintain that given current levels of funding, not all ex-combatants will receive reintegrationassistance, which these officials see as threatening to the sustainability of the DDRR program as awhole.

Child Soldiers. U.N. agencies have estimated that there are over 15,000 child soldiers in Liberia, many forcibly recruited by the belligerent forces foruse as soldiers, domestic workers, involuntary sexual companions, and porters. Disarmament plansinclude special provisions for addressing the special needs of child ex-combatants, and a ChildProtection Working Group (CPWG) chaired by UNICEF has been created. In late August 2004,however, UNICEF Carol Bellamy made press statements indicating that only about half of theUNICEF's appeal for reintegration projects for child ex-combatants had been funded by donors. (37)

Elections

In January 2004, an independent National Elections Commission (NEC) was appointed by the NTGL, as required under Liberia's CPA; its members include two former Supreme Court justicesand two former Taylor-era members of the NEC. Its mandate is to ensure the conduct of elections"in a manner that is acceptable to all" no later than October 2005 (38) . As called for under the CPA,the United Nations, in cooperation with other members of the ICGL (see above), is designing aprospective U.N. elections assistance program, and possible legal and operational reforms of theelectoral system, as well as a potential elections time line. Such an aid program would have two keygoals: the conduct of "credible" and expertly administered elections, and the creation of a sustainablenational electoral administration capacity in future elections.

A report of an assessment undertaken in April 2004 by the elections technical assistance group IFES stated that any eventual electoral framework should address the following tasks or issues:

Establishment of electoral system (constituency, number of representatives, electoral formula);

Creation of electoral boundaries;

Determination of type of elections to be held (national,general);

Eligibility to vote and process for becoming a voter (including provisions forrefugees and IDPs);

Eligibility and process for political candidacy;

Political party registration and the electoral campaignprocesses;

Elections administration (procedures of operations,appointments);

Voting, vote-counting, and the announcement of resultsprocedures;

Sanctions for specific electoral offences;

Consultative mechanisms;

Elections observation and guarantees for the rights of political partyrepresentatives; and

Election dispute resolution. (39)

An assessment mission by the U.N. Department of Political Affairs Electoral Assistance Division in April 2004 found that the NEC had "very little material and staff capacity to carry outcivic and voter education, voter registration, constituency delimitation and polling." It asserted thatthese activities could not be carried out in timely manner without "extensive internationalassistance." The United Nations projects that administration of the elections will require a one yeardeployment to the UNMIL electoral unit of 32 international experts, 11 national experts, 49 nationalGeneral Service staff; a five-month deployment of an additional 92 national General Service staffto support the Unit's data center; a six to nine month deployment of 220 U.N. Volunteers; and thehiring for six months of 4,080 temporary registration staff. The UNSG has proposed that the costof these workers, as well as funding for registration materials and partial funding for voter educationmaterials, be included in UNMIL's 2005-2006 budget submission. Under this proposal, however,all direct NEC Commission funding would have to come from other sources. In addition to electoralconduct work, the UNMIL CIVPOL unit is preparing for the elections by supporting the training ofabout 1,800 Liberian Police Service personnel. UNMIL projects that a five-week nationwide voterregistration exercise will begin in April 2005 and to proceed for around five weeks. (40)

In July 2004, the NEC chair announced that an estimated $12.4 million would be required to conduct the election, and that about one third of this cost would likely be represented by the in-kindsupport being provided by UNMIL. By comparison, a rough estimate by IFES in April 2004 totaled"$16 million for an elections and operational budget for the period of July 2004 - January 2006," butIFES warned that "this figure would not include local elections, a costly constituency delimitationexercise, out-of country refugee registration/voting, and the necessary logistical support." (41)

The NEC has also begun to prepare for the 2005 election. In July 2004, it hosted a consultative meeting with Liberian political parties. This process reportedly generated a consensus that Liberiansgenerally favor a direct, constituency-based elections, the traditional electoral method in Liberia,rather than proportional party elections, which were employed in the 1997 post-war special election. Following this consultative process, in late August, the NEC submitted to the NTLA for ratificationa draft electoral law, the Electoral Reform Bill, which is currently under parliamentaryconsideration. (42) It proposes the followingmeasures, which include proposed suspensions of articlesof the current constitution and a variety of related legal reforms:

Suspension of Article 83(b), which requires elections on the basis of an absolute majority for all public offices. Instead, the president and vice president would be chosenby a first round absolute majority (over 50%) vote, to be followed by a simple majority run-off votebetween the two highest vote earners if no candidate received an absolute majority in the first roundvote. County-based simple majority votes would be used to elect House representatives andsenators.

Due to the "unlikely" probability of a national census before the 2005 elections,suspension of Article 80(d) of the constitution, which requires a census to demarcate constituenciestotaling no more than 100. Instead, the number of House seats would be fixed at sixty four,representing multi-member constituencies for each county. Each winning candidate would beelected by "an approximately equal number" of voters, though means for accomplishing this end arenot entirely provided for in the bill.

Due to the increase of counties from nine to fifteen since the adoption of thecurrent constitution, suspension of Article 78, requiring political parties to be defined as associationsof at least 500 members in each of at least six counties. Instead the same requirements would apply,but with applicability to at least 12 counties. Currently registered parties would not be subject to thisamendment, and inter-party electoral coalitions would be permitted.

Funding of the NEC by the public treasury, provided that a formal finance andaudit process overseen by special committees be established to oversee NEC spending and ensurethe accountability of NEC activities.

The enactment, for diverse reasons, of a number of technical amendments tothe New Elections Law of 1986, including several provisions aimed at preventing electoralmalfeasance and setting campaign spending limits.

Due to widespread population displacements, the bill would also:

Suspend Article 52(c), which requires that presidential and vice presidential candidates reside Liberia 10 years prior to an election, but wold add a provision requiring that thetwo incumbents not come from the same county;

Suspend Article 30(b), which requires one year of residence and status astaxpayers of all legislative candidates within the constituencies that they propose to represent; and

Amend the New Elections Law of 1986 to allow the NEC to administrativelyand operationally facilitate the registration and voting of displaced persons and refugees, and toprovide assistance to illiterate and disabled persons.

Status of Charles Taylor

Taylor Indictment. A key factor that appears to have motivated Taylor's departure from power was the unsealing of an indictment against him bythe Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) a hybrid U.N.-Sierra Leonean body established to trythose most responsible for war crimes and human rights abuses during Sierra Leone's civil war (43) . The indictment, issued on March 7, 2003, was publicly unsealed on June 4, 2003, as Tayloraddressed opening remarks to the Ghana peace talks. Simultaneously, an arrest warrant for Taylorwas issued, and the SCSL requested that the Ghanaian government detain and transfer him to SierraLeone for prosecution. Ghana claimed non-receipt of SCSL's request, and Taylor abruptly returnedto Liberia, reportedly on a Ghanaian state aircraft. The indictment was seen as weakening Taylor'sstature and bargaining power; the following day, LURD mounted a fierce assault on Monrovia, inan apparent bid to gain pre-negotiation military superiority. The attack, and the initial failure ofMODEL to send a delegation to Ghana, temporarily postponed the talks. LURD threatened towithdraw from the talks if Taylor, who LURD labeled a war criminal, did not resign. Taylor thenthreatened to pull out of talks unless the indictment was lifted. The talks continued, however,leading to the June 17 cease-fire accord.

Indictment: Implications and Asylum Offer. Taylor's indictment was controversial. It was seen by many analysts as a potential impediment toa rapid political settlement leading to Taylor's departure from power and from Liberia. In late June2003, Abdulsalami Abubakar, the former Nigerian head of state and the ECOWAS peacenegotiations mediator, called the indictment counter-productive to mediation efforts. Nigeriasubsequently offered asylum to Taylor, reportedly with strong U.S. encouragement. He initiallyrejected the offer because Nigeria would not guarantee his safety from extradition to face trial, butlater accepted it, after meeting with Nigerian President Olesegun Obasanjo on July 6, and departedLiberia on August 11. The exact terms of his asylum were not publicly stated, but the offerreportedly was made in exchange for Taylor's agreeing to resign, withdraw from Liberian politics,and not talk to the press. News reports alleged, however, that he continued to directly communicatefrom Nigeria with political allies in Liberia, in an attempt to exert continuing control over economic,political, and military events in Liberia (44) . Inmid-September 2003, the Nigerian government rebukedTaylor for his actions, warning that it would "not tolerate any breach of this condition and otherswhich forbid him from engaging in active communication with anyone engaged in political, illegalor governmental activities in Liberia." (45) Reportsof such activities by Taylor have since declined, andhis influence appears to be slowly waning, although periodically such allegations continue to appearin the media. Some observers of Liberian affairs believe his influence -- as projected through avariety of allies, such as top former Taylor administration officials who hold high offices in theNTGL -- remains significant.

Nigeria. Taylor's asylum has caused considerable controversy within Nigeria. Many Nigerians find the presence in their country of a war crimesindictee repugnant. Others see Taylor as a long-time enemy of Nigeria, in part because his forcesreportedly murdered and abused Nigerians during and after the first Liberian civil war. SeveralNigerian legislators have called for Nigeria to surrender Taylor to the International PoliceOrganization (Interpol), which in December 2003 issued a Red Notice for Taylor in response to arequest from the Special Court, but not all legislators support such a move (46) . On December 10,2003, a coalition of Nigerian, Liberian, and Nigerian NGOs, in collaboration with Open Society, apolitical reform and advocacy organization, called on the Nigerian government to revoke Taylor'sasylum and surrender him to the Special Court (47) . More recently, in July 2004, a working quorumof Liberia's transitional parliament rejected a petition from a coalition of 80 human rights andpro-democracy groups calling for the parliament to urge Chairman Bryant to demand that Nigeriaextradite Taylor to face trial before the SCSL.

Taylor's asylum is also the object of a court case by two Nigerian plaintiffs seeking transfer of Taylor to the SCSL. The plaintiffs, former businessmen whose limbs were amputated by SierraLeonean RUF rebels in 1999, are pursuing a consolidated court case that seeks to have the Nigeriangovernment reconsider, and ultimately rescind, its provision of asylum to Taylor. They contend thatTaylor's asylum is illegitimate because it was granted by the Nigerian executive branch, rather thanthe National Refugee Commission, which they contend has sole legal authority to decide asylumclaims. They claim that the executive's actions breached their rights under the Nigerian constitutionand international law, and assert that the Nigerian government's provision of asylum is obstructingTaylor's trial before the SCSL. The government contends that the Nigerian Federal High Court,which is hearing the case, lacks jurisdiction to entertain a suit filed by the two plaintiffs because theylack standing in the case, since they are not parties to the SCSL. It also contends that the plaintiffs'case was filed after relevant statutes of limitation had expired. (48)

In September 2004, the human rights advocacy group Amnesty International applied to the Federal High Court for leave to submit an amicus curiae (friend of the court) brief in the case. Thebrief focuses on two issues: whether war crimes indictees of the SCSL are entitled underinternational law to have or retain refugee status, which the brief concludes is not permitted; andwhether under international law Nigeria must surrender such an indictee if it does not investigateand, if evidentiarily warranted, prosecute such a case. The brief concludes Nigeria must investigatethe case against Taylor or surrender him to the SCSL for prosecution. (49)

Status of SCSL Case Against Taylor. Taylor is pursuing efforts to have the SCSL indictment lifted. In August 2003, his representatives filed acomplaint before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) challenging the jurisdiction of the SpecialCourt to prosecute him. However, according to an ICJ press release, "no action will be taken in theproceedings ... unless and until Sierra Leone consents to the Court's jurisdiction in the case" -- anunlikely prospect, given the Sierra Leone government's support for the case against Taylor. The ICJfinding followed a similar motion first filed before the Special Court itself in July 2003. In lateOctober and November 2003, the Special Court heard arguments by lawyers for Taylor asserting thathis indictment is invalid because he was head of state, and therefore was immune from prosecution,when it was issued. His then-legal counsel also maintained that the Special Court has no power toenforce an arrest warrant outside the borders of Sierra Leone.

Taylor's efforts to quash the indictment have failed. In late May 2004, the SCSL Appeals Chamber rejected Taylor's claim of immunity from prosecution. The prosecution team is nowawaiting Taylor's appearance before the SCSL. In addition, in March 2004, SCSL prosecutionagents, acting under a Liberian court warrant, carried out a search of Taylor's former residences inLiberia, as well as those of his key associates. Taylor could also potentially face additional legalcharges before the sub-regional ECOWAS court. The court's president stated in mid-September2004 that the court has the authority to hear cases filed by a national of any member state, includingcases pertaining to Taylor's role in the Liberian conflict or those in other ECOWAS states. (50)

Asylum: Debate and Implications. The possibility that asylum might provide Taylor with de facto indemnity from prosecution prompted considerabledebate over the implication that the conditions pertaining to his departure from Liberia gave primacyto goals related to political negotiations, rather than those related to justice and the rule of law. Some policy makers and observers, viewing the need for peace as paramount, saw Taylor'sextradition to Sierra Leone as a less pressing objective than a resolution of the war in Liberia and theformation of a transitional government there. Many advocates of this view -- reportedly includingthe Bush Administration -- do not necessarily support indefinite asylum for Taylor, but rather maysee it as a temporary expedient, and implicitly leave the future disposition of his case subject to legaldecisions by the Special Court and decisions by the Nigerian government. (51) Other observers,including some Members of Congress, maintain that Taylor must face the serious charges againsthim, and that his asylum substantially undermines the deterrent effect on other human rights abusers,including the armed parties in Liberia, of the prospect of being subjected to criminal sanctions. (52)

Pressure on Nigeria. Some advocate bringing pressure on Nigeria, which asserts that it "will not be harassed" over its asylum offer, to extraditeTaylor, and several provisions of U.S. law support that goal, in part by conditioning some U.S. aidto Nigeria on its transfer of Taylor to the SCSL. (53) Some observers worry, however, that suchlegislation unfairly targets Nigeria, and could damage U.S.-Nigerian relations or be perceived asunjustifiably punishing Nigeria, and thereby potentially undercut its extensive efforts to bring peaceto Liberia. They argue that the transfer of Taylor to Nigeria was undertaken with full U.S.cognizance and reportedly was urged by Secretary of State Colin Powell. In addition, they stress thatNigerian ECOWAS officials were central in the mediation of the CPA and note that Nigeriaspearheaded the ECOMIL intervention and is a leading UNMIL troop contributing country.

U.S. Law and Taylor. Several U.S. legislative provisions pertain to Taylor's asylum. P.L. 108-106 includes $2 million for "for rewards for anindictee of the Special Court for Sierra Leone." Though it does not mention Taylor by name, thisprovision is widely assumed to be targeted at and applicable to him. After the enactment of P.L.108-106 , the Nigerian government, which called the reward provision "an incitement to terrorism,"increased security for Taylor, and asserted that the provision might prompt violations of itssovereignty (54) .

State Department officials oppose such infringements of sovereignty or associated illegal actions and assert that the apprehension of indictees for which there are U.S. rewards should beundertaken by appropriate government authorities. They also contend that such rewards are notfugitive bounties; rather, according to the State Department, when offered, they are given inexchange for credible information leading to a fugitive's apprehension and transfer to the appropriatecourt of jurisdiction, on a case-by-case basis. In Taylor's case, they maintain, no reward is necessarybecause Taylor is under the control of the Nigerian government. The offer of a reward for hisapprehension would be potentially offered only if he becomes a fugitive. S. 2809 , theDepartments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies AppropriationsAct, 2005, would provide funding for emergencies in the diplomatic and consular service, providingthat funds previously appropriated "for rewards for an indictee of the Special Court for Sierra Leone"be transferred to the SCSL (55) . Other U.S.legislation has concerned the Nigerian government. P.L.108-199 which contains FY2004 foreign operations appropriations, incorporated some provisionssimilar to those in H.R. 2800 (Kolbe). These include measures that could deny someforms of U.S. assistance to Nigeria, including funds for debt restructuring, if it fails to surrender andtransfer Taylor to the Special Court.

U.S. Policy

For much of 2002 until June 2003, Bush Administration policy toward Liberia centered on threeactivities: urging the Taylor Administration and its armed opponents to uphold human rights norms,cease armed hostilities, and engage in direct negotiations; providing emergency humanitarianassistance; and providing relatively small amounts of development assistance (DA). DA,administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), supported internationaland local NGO projects. These sought to increase access to basic health care; bolster food securityby improving food crop production, processing and marketing capacities and small-scalecommunity-level income generation and infrastructure building capacities; and support adult literacyand providing civic education and public information. USAID also focused on improving prospectsfor successful electoral change, primarily through capacity building efforts targeted at civil societygroups and local independent media.

Responses to Increasing Conflict. Beginning in late May and early June 2003, Administration activities relating to Liberia shifted toward ensuringthe protection of Americans and U.S. government personnel and assets in Liberia, and facilitatingthe Liberian cease-fire and peace negotiations in Accra, Ghana (June-August 2003). Several U.S.military teams were dispatched to the region to bolster security for the U.S. embassy, which was hitby mortar fire and stray bullets during heavy fighting in Monrovia, and to evacuate Americans. TheFrench military also evacuated Americans from Liberia.

Embassy Attacks. On June 25, 2003 Greystone, a U.S. embassy storage compound occupied by thousands of civilians fleeing fighting and mortarfire, was hit by two explosions during a second major assault by LURD on Monrovia. Three personswere killed, including two local embassy workers, and 16 were injured. The State Department issueda sharp condemnation of the attack, after earlier labeling the LURD assault a "serious violation ofthe cease-fire" and stated that the attack might remove "any international credibility or recognition"retained by LURD (56) . On June 26, Liberian crowdspiled eleven bodies, including children, in frontof the U.S. embassy, in a demonstration calling for immediate U.S. intervention to halt the fighting. On July 20, a team of 21 U.S. Marines, part of a 41 member Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team(FAST) trained to guard U.S. diplomatic installations, was deployed to Monrovia. Upon its arrival,the FAST faced a hail of mortar fire falling in the vicinity of the embassy. Its deployment wasbacked by U.S. air transport teams based in Senegal and Sierra Leone; the latter carried out severalevacuations from Monrovia. In late July 2003, all of these U.S. military elements became part ofa larger U.S. military effort, dubbed Joint Task Force Liberia.

Conflict Resolution Efforts. The United States, a key member of the ICGL, actively participated in the peace negotiations in Ghana. These effortssought to improve the security environment in Monrovia; enable then-suspended or otherwiseinterrupted emergency relief operations to resume; and to further resolve the conflict and a transitionof state power. After a cease-fire agreement was signed on June 17, the United States repeatedly andstrongly urged the Liberian belligerents to adhere to it, and to prevent civilian casualties. In late July,Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Pamela Bridgewater traveled to Guinea, where she reportedlymet with LURD Chairman Sekou Conneh and Guinean government officials to emphasize the needfor an end to the conflict and for Guinean support of LURD. Her visit was quickly followed by avisit to Guinea by Walter Kansteiner, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, who reiteratedBridgewater's message to Guinean officials.

In July and August 2003, the United States assisted the deployment of ECOMIL to Liberia (see "Overview and Recent Developments," above) -- a course of action that was preceded by extensivepublic debate about the potential and relative merit of a direct U.S. military intervention. OnceECOMIL had deployed, U.S. policy makers pushed for the creation of a U.N. peacekeeping missionin Liberia. The United States also acted to protect the interests of some Liberians living in theUnited States by granting to those who qualified for Temporary Protected Status (TPS). (57)

U.S. Intervention in Liberia: Debate and Policy Responses

Many Liberians and a number of foreign policy advocates had for several years called for direct international intervention in Liberia -- preferably, in their view, a U.S. led intervention -- to stopthe civil war and assist in resolving the political issues underlying it. As fighting in and aroundMonrovia grew, such calls, including several from world leaders, increased, contributing to agrowing debate in the press and among U.S. policy makers about a potential U.S. intervention inLiberia.

Perspectives on Intervention. Proponents of a potential U.S. intervention in Liberia argued that the United States had long been involved in Liberia-- beginning by founding it -- and benefitted from substantial and enduring Liberian support forthe United States during the Cold War. Opponents argued that bilateral ties had weakenedconsiderably since the 1980s, and that Liberia was peripheral to U.S. interests; that its conflict wasessentially an internal political contest for state power; that potential dangers to U.S. troops, ifdeployed to Liberia, were not warranted; and that the United States was already over-extendedmilitarily across the globe. Some warned that U.S. troops in Liberia would face dangers akin tothose faced by the U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992, in which 29 Americans died. Proponentsasserted that Liberia's political and military situation was qualitatively different from that ofSomalia, and that its citizens welcomed Americans. They also argued that Liberia had become alynchpin for persistent political and economic instability; had engendered increasingly porous borderzones beset by cross-border crime, arms flows, and smuggling; and was the source of severe regionalhumanitarian crises. Liberia had become a failed state, they asserted, that undermined regional U.S.democracy and governance policy goals and constituted a direct threat to the United States byproviding operational space for international criminal actors and international terrorists. They citedreports that the Taylor government had directly aided international terrorist financing by allegedlyfacilitating the purchase by Al Qaeda operatives of Sierra Leonean diamonds. (58)

Initial U.S. Responses. U.S. officials responded to mounting calls for U.S. military intervention by stating that they were assessing the situation inLiberia. They offered no firm commitments or pledges to deploy U.S. troops, however, andsuggested that African militaries could mount an effective intervention force. Secretary of DefenseDonald Rumsfeld noted that African troops had "been well-trained" and equipped for peacekeepingby the United States (59) . On June 30, 2003 JamesCunningham, the U.S. Deputy Ambassador to theU.N., said that prior to the establishment of an intervention force, the United States would requirethat Taylor give up power; that a political agreement among the Liberian parties be finalized; andthat there be international support for a continued peace process. (60)

Humanitarian Assessment and Security Team. In early July 2003, a U.S. Humanitarian Assessment and Security Team (HAST) was dispatchedfrom U.S. European Command (EUCOM) to Monrovia. The 32-member team included experts withmedical, contracting, civil engineering, logistics, water purification and other technical expertise,and a security component. Initial plans called for the HAST to undertake an assessment over a week,but the mission was extended (61) . Some observerssupportive of a U.S. intervention, but skeptical thatone would take place, viewed the HAST as a stop-gap measure undertaken to demonstrate U.S.engagement with Liberia and counter growing international pressure for a U.S.-led intervention onthe eve of President Bush's July 7-12 state visit to Africa. (62)

Military Assistance and Monitoring. A second U.S. military team was dispatched to ECOWAS member states to assess the force readiness andmilitary logistical and equipment needs of these countries prior to their anticipated deployment ofa joint intervention force to Liberia, and to assess a possible U.S. role in supporting such a force (63) . The United States also deployed a private contractor as a member of the Joint Verification Team,a monitoring body that was to be created under the June 2003 cease-fire accord. The contractorperformed liaison functions on behalf of the United States and the ICGL. The same delegate laterassisted ECOWAS to undertake a pre-deployment assessment mission, and subsequently acted asa liaison between ECOMIL and the Joint Task Force Liberia, and helped ECOMIL form the JointMonitoring Committee (JMC), as provided for under the CPA.

Joint Task Force Liberia. In late July 2003, just prior to the arrival a U.S. Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) off the Liberian coast, U.S. militaryelements in the region responding to events in Liberia were integrated into an ad-hoc operational unitdubbed Joint Task Force Liberia. The ARG, which arrived in early August, was deployed inanticipation of possible contingencies requiring a military role, most notably the provision of U.S.assistance to the ECOMIL. It complemented the air support and embassy security teams already inthe region. Personnel from the ARG, part of Joint Task Force Liberia, provided coordination supportfor PAE's delivery of goods and logistics services to ECOMIL (see "Overview and RecentDevelopments," above), and undertook various other security, flight, and infrastructure/logisticalassessment duties in Liberia. (64)

U.S. Assistance: Development Assistance

Three types of U.S. assistance is provided to Liberia: long-term development aid (DA); emergency humanitarian assistance; and post-conflict-focused International Disaster and FamineAssistance (IDFA) aid. Budget figures for these accounts are presented in Appendix 1. The USAIDDA program during the latter years of the Taylor presidency exclusively aided NGOs, notably thoseengaged in primary health care, agriculture, and peace-building activities. It was inactive, however,for much of FY2003 due to insecurity associated with the war. The bulk of USAID's FY2004programs in Liberia are being funded under IDFA. FY2004 DA assistance is limited to $2.4 millionin Child Survival and Health (CSH) programs that support capacity-building for community-basedbasic health services delivery organizations, and $100,000 in Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism,Demining, and Related/Small Arms and Light Weapons Destruction (NADR-SALW) funds. Inaddition, a three-year, $1.5 million Displaced Children and Orphans Fund program targetingvulnerable children has been initiated, and some Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund monies arebeing used to aid disabled children. USAID's West Africa Regional Program supports a smallHIV/AIDS information project.

Programs under the Bush Administration's FY2005 request for Liberia would complement and extend core IDFA program goals. Under the USAID request, an integrated set of CSH programs($1.997 million) would improve access, quality and demand for health services through variouscapacity-building initiatives. Under USAID's Community Revitalization and Reintegration program($.545 million in DA and $25 million in ESF), USAID would resettle and reintegrate refugees, IDPsand ex-combatants in their permanent post-war communities of residence, as well as promote goodgovernance, reconstruction, and economic development. In addition, $5 million in State DepartmentInternational Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds would be used to continue toextend IDFA programs aimed at creating a "credible and competent" national Liberian police forceand competent judicial institutions, and promoting various anti-corruption measures.

U.S. Emergency and Post-War Assistance

The delivery of U.S. emergency humanitarian assistance to Liberia, provided by USAID's Offices of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Food for Peace (FFP), flowed to Liberiaas the conflict grew, beginning with aid provided after a Complex Emergency for the Mano Rivercountries (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) was declared in FY2002. In FY2003, a Liberia-specific Complex Emergency was declared. As of August 27, 2004, total U.S. humanitarianassistance to Liberia in FY2004 totaled $72.96 million. (65) Such aid has supported:

Shelter and camp management activities for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returning refugees, and IDP abuse protection initiatives, including those targetingsexual/gender-based violence;

Targeted emergency food assistance, which includes staple food commodities, provided through direct distribution and food for work programs, and targeted therapeutic andsupplementary feeding programs delivered to vulnerable individuals and through emergency schoolfeeding, maternal/child health programs;

Measles immunization and other health programs, including in IDP camps;

Access to water and sanitation;

Support for the coordination, logistics, and information activities of the U.N. and other humanitarians organizations; and

Reintegration of Liberian returnees and IDPs.

USAID also helped create the Humanitarian Information Center (HIC) for Liberia, an information clearing house for humanitarian aid agencies in Liberia managed by the U.N. Office forthe Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OFDA disaster assessment teams carried outmultiple evaluation missions in the months after the peace accord. Their findings helped shapepreparations for both continuing USAID emergency aid programs and post-conflict recoveryassistance. These preparations also draw from assessment missions undertaken by USAID's AfricaBureau and Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), and information from the U.S. diplomatic missionin Monrovia.

Current U.S. Assistance Programs

In addition to supporting the operation of UNMIL, current U.S. Liberia-related assistance funds a variety of programs meant to consolidate Liberia's transition to peace. USAID and the departmentsof State, the Treasury, and Defense, both individually and in ad-hoc inter-agency working groups,are implementing this integrated package of post-war assistance, which is being predominantlyfunded by approximately $200 million in IDFA funds appropriated under P.L. 108-106 .

Key Issues. Key considerations guiding the pace of delivery and the organization of this aid include:

The potentially limited capacity of the NTGL, Liberian non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other local organizations to efficiently use or absorb large quantities ofexternal resources;

The need to ensure that programs of assistance and capacity-building produce sustainable and durable results; and

The need to incorporate audit functions and a monitoring role for the USAID Inspector General for all USAID-provided assistance to Liberia, and for Treasury Department effortsand general U.S. assistance programs to stress the need for public accountability in Liberia, giventhe relatively large size of the IDFA aid package, and given Liberia's long history of public sectorcorruption.

The IDFA aid has been programed for delivery in two "phases," the first worth a total of $144 million, and the second $86 million, as reflected in tables 1 and 2:

Table 1. U.S. Assistance for Liberia: IDFA, Phase I ($millions)

Sources: Information from USAID and the State Department.

Notes

Table 2. U.S. Assistance for Liberia: IDFA, Phase II ($ millions)

Sources: Information from USAID and the State Department.

Notes a. USFS: U.S. Forest Service /International Programs.

Other Aspects of U.S. Policy toward Liberia. In December 2003, President Bush issued PresidentialDetermination No. 2004-11, which, on the basis of a finding that U.S. assistance toLiberia is in the U.S. national interest, waived "Brooke Amendment"requirementsthat would otherwise have barred or restricted such aid (66) . The State Department hasalso stated that the United States has concluded a bilateral "Article 98 agreement"with Liberia, in part to protect the safety of U.S. personnel operating in Liberia, thusallowing the United States to provide certain kinds of military assistance to Liberia (67) . The United States is also involved in efforts to assess Liberia's progress towardmeeting the provisions under which U.N. sanctions against it may be lifted.

Murder of U.S. Official. No recent progress has been reported in the investigation of the May 2004 murder inMonrovia of John Auffrey, a Defense Department civilian employee who was amember of a U.S. mission that assessed needs and prospects for Liberian militaryrestructuring. Auffrey, a former U.S. Peace Corps volunteer in Sierra Leone, wasfatally stabbed during a robbery in his hotel room. Soon after the crime, foursuspects were provisionally identified, and at least three rewards were offered forinformation leading to their apprehension. In June 2004, three Liberian policeofficers were reportedly charged with aiding the suspects, and several suspects linkedto the killing were later charged with murder. The main suspect, however, who wasreportedly sighted in August 2004 in a country adjacent to Liberia, remains at large. (68)

Congressional Role

From June 2003 through September of that year, Liberia garnered frequent Congressional attention, most notably over the issue of a potential U.S. interventionin Liberia. Reactions by some Members of Congress to potential U.S. interventionin Liberia varied widely. Some, notably several Members of the Congressional BlackCaucus, urged that immediate and substantial U.S. resources and actions be taken toresolve the conflict in Liberia and provide its people with what these Members sawas badly-needed humanitarian assistance (69) . OtherMembers voiced considerablecaution or outright opposition in relation to direct U.S. military intervention inLiberia. Representative Ron Paul, for instance, introduced H.Con.Res. 255 , entitled "Expressing the sense of the Congress that the United States militaryshould not become involved in the Liberian civil war, either alone or as part of aUnited Nations peacekeeping force." (70) Congressional debate incorporated many ofthe perspectives previously outlined (see "Debate on U.S. Intervention in Liberia"). Many Members urged the Administration to confer closely with Congress and keepMembers clearly informed about U.S. policy decisions on Liberia. Some called fora vote in Congress on any decision to deploy U.S. troops on the ground.

On October 2, 2003, the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Africa held a hearing entitled U.S. Policy Toward Liberia . Liberiaalso featured prominently in hearings held during summer, 2003, by the HouseArmed Services Committee; the Senate Committee on Armed Services; the SenateCommittee on Foreign Relations; and the House Committee on InternationalRelations.

Legislation

Current Appropriations. H.R. 4818 (Kolbe). Foreign Operations, Export Financing, andRelated Programs Appropriations Act, 2005, introduced July 13, 2004, was reportedby the House Committee on Appropriations as an original measure, H.Rept. 108-599 ,on July 13, 2004. It was passed by the House on July 15, 2004 and subsequentlyamended and passed by the Senate, along with a request for a conference, onSeptember 23, 2004, in lieu of S. 2812 . During Senate considerationof H.R. 4818 , Senator Leahy offered S.Amdt. 3684 ,providing not less than $25 million in ESF assistance for Liberia, which was agreedto by unanimous consent. In addition, the Senate version of H.R. 4818 would provide Liberia with a portion of $5 million to address sexual andgender-based violence; and not less than $30 million in Foreign Military Financingaid. The House version contained no similar Liberia-related provisions.

2003 Iraq Supplemental Assistance for Liberia. The key source of U.S. assistance for Liberia is P.L.108-106 , the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for theReconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, ( H.R. 3289 [C. W. BillYoung]). P.L. 108-106 was passed by Congress and signed into law by PresidentBush following the deployment of UNMIL and the inauguration of the NTGL. Itappropriates International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA) funds for Liberiatotaling approximately $200 million to support peace and humanitarian interventionoperations unrelated to natural disasters, and $245 million for the assessed costs ofU.N. peacekeeping in Liberia. During Senate debate on S. 1689 (Stevens), the Iraq Supplemental Appropriations bill (FY2004), which wasincorporated into P.L. 108-106 , several Liberia-related amendments were offered. These included S.Amdt. 1884 (Byrd); S.Amdt. 1885 (Brownback); and S.Amdt. 1807 (Chafee).

Other Enacted Legislation. Other Liberia-related bills that passed into law during the 108th Congress include:

H.J.Res. 2 (C. W. Bill Young). Joint Resolution making consolidated appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2003, and forother purposes. Introduced January 7, 2003; enacted as P.L. 108-007 . Prohibits theappropriation of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Liberia; and requires specialnotification for any funds appropriated by the Act for Liberia.

H.R. 2673 (Bonilla). The Omnibus Appropriations Act, FY2004. Introduced July 9, 2003; enacted as P.L. 108-199 . It prohibits the use of FMF fundsfor Liberia. Requires regular notification to the Committees on Appropriations aboutuse of the funds for Liberia appropriated under the Act. Recognizes the contributionof the Nigerian government to promoting stability and reconciliation in Liberia. Includes measures that could deny some forms of U.S. assistance to Nigeria,including funds for debt restructuring. Such measures are applicable to Nigeriabecause it is a country in which an indictee of the Special Court for Sierra Leone(SCSL), i.e., Charles Taylor, is "credibly alleged to be living." Under the Act, sucha country can receive certain kinds of U.S. assistance only if the Secretary of Statedetermines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that such a governmentis cooperating with the SCSL, including by surrendering and transferring to the SCSLpersons it has indicted. The president can waive such stipulations in the interest ofU.S. national security, if certain conditions are met.

Other Legislation Introduced. Other Liberia-specific bills and resolutions introduced in the 108th Congress includethe following:

H.Con.Res. 233 (Fossella). Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the dire humanitarian situation in Liberia and efforts to introduce peace andjustice to that country; introduced June 26, 2003 and referred to the HouseCommittee on International Relations.

H.Con.Res. 240 (Payne). Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the urgency of providing support for the "Agreement on Ceasefire andCessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Republic of Liberia andLiberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement forDemocracy of Liberia" and for other purposes; introduced July 8, 2003 and referredto the House Committee on International Relations.

H.Con.Res. 255 (Paul). Expressing the sense of the Congress that the United States military should not become involved in the Liberian civil war,either alone or as part of a United Nations peacekeeping force; introduced July 24,2003 and referred to the House Committee on International Relations.

H.R. 1930 (Patrick J. Kennedy). Liberian Refugee Immigration Protection Act of 2003; introduced May 1, 2003; referred to the Subcommittee onImmigration, Border Security, and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 656 (Reed). Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 2003; introduced March 19, 2003, read twice, and referred to the Committee on theJudiciary.

H.R. 3918 (Jackson-Lee). Comprehensive Immigration Fairness Reform Act of 2004; introduced March 9, 2004; referred to the Subcommittee onImmigration, Border Security, and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 4885 (Jackson-Lee). Comprehensive Immigration Fairness Act; introduced July 21, 2004; referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 4511 (Waters). The Justice and Understanding By IMF Loan Elimination and Equity Act of 2004; introduced June 3, 2004; referred to theSubcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, andTechnology, Committee on Financial Services.

H.R. 4793 (Waters). Justice and Understanding By International Loan Elimination and Equity Act of 2004; introduced July 9, 2004; referred to theCommittee on Financial Services.

Appropriations bills introduced in the 108th Congress that contain Liberia-specific provisions include:

S. 1426 (McConnell). Foreign Operations Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2004. FY2004 foreign operationsappropriations were authorized by H.R. 2673 ( P.L. 108-199 , see above),which contains some provisions similar to those in S. 1426 . S. 1426 , as placed on the Senate Calendar on July 17, 2003, seeks toprohibit appropriation of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Liberia and requirespecial notification for any funds appropriated by the Act for Liberia. H.R. 2673 included such measures. S. 1426 also wouldprohibit assistance to governments abetting trade or commerce in diamonds minedin Liberia. Such a provision was not contained in H.R. 2673 , but it didlimit the use of appropriated funds by the Overseas Private Investment Corporationand the U.S. Export-Import Bank to countries participating in the Kimberley Processregulatory regime on conflict diamonds. Currently, Liberia would be affected by thisprovision.

H.R. 2800 (Kolbe). Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY2004 bill. House and Senate conferees agreed to a conference report for H.R. 2800 ; their agreement was incorporated into H.R. 2673 (see above).

H.R. 4818 (Kolbe). Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2005 ; introduced July 13, 2004; reported bythe House Committee on Appropriations as an original measure, H.Rept. 108-599 ,on July 13, 2004; passed by the House on July 15, 2004; amended and passed by theSenate, along with a request for a conference, on September 23, 2004, in lieu of S. 2812 ; message on Senate action sent to the House on September 23,2004. During Senate consideration of H.R. 4818 , Senator Leahy offered S.Amdt. 3684 , providing not less than $25 million in ESF assistance forLiberia, which was agreed to unanimous consent. In addition, the Senate version of H.R. 4818 would provide Liberia with a portion of $5 million to addresssexual and gender-based violence; and not less than $30 million in Foreign MilitaryFinancing aid.

Issues for Congress

In P.L. 108-106 , Congress authorized a relatively large appropriation for Liberia. Oversight activities related to the expenditure of these funds may now become thefocal point for congressional engagement with Liberia. Leading issues that maywarrant such attention include peace consolidation, the trial of Charles Taylor for warcrimes, the operation of the U.N. Mission in Liberia, progress toward rebuildingdemocratic and transparent governance, and U.S. assistance. Key issue in each ofthese areas include:

Peace Consolidation and Reconstruction. Progress toward implementation of the Liberianpeace accord, particularly with regard to

The disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and resettlement process;

Effective functioning of the Liberian transitional government,notably to include the executive's freedom to execute its legal authorities andduties;

Re-establishment of nation-wide governmental authority;

Socio-economic rebuilding; and

Security sector reform and training.

Trial of Charles Taylor. Ensuring the trial of Charles Taylor before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, a stated goal ofU.S. policy on Liberia.

UNMIL. Operational efficiency and effectiveness of UNMIL, possibly to include:

The formulation and implementation of bench-marked goals for progress in its areas of competence under its mandate;

Assurance of adequate force size and capacities during militarymaneuvers, to avoid the kind of military difficulties that beset U.N. peacekeepers inSierra Leone early in their mission there; and

Operational and logistical cooperation with other U.N. missionsin the region, in order to avoid duplication of efforts, efficient use of similarresources, and to achieve economies of scale where possible. (71)

Democracy and Governance. Progress toward democratization and the rule of law, notably to include:

The absence of the threat of force or violence to accomplish political goals, as provided for under the peace accord;

Protection and promotion of human rights and civic freedoms,including of speech, movement, and assembly; and

Implementation of institutional reforms to ensure fiscal andlegal transparency and accountability in government operations, and with regard tothe use of donor-provided assistance.

U.S. Assistance. Monitoring and evaluation of U.S. assistance, particularly relating to

The sequencing of emergency, transitional and development assistance, and the relation of these to long-term institutional reforms andsocio-economic development goals;

The assistance delivery model employed, e.g., direct use of U.S.government staff and resources versus use of contractor or grantees to accomplishU.S. programmatic goals in Liberia; and

Comparative efficiency of outcomes resulting from the use ofdifferent programing models, e.g., direct financing of small-scale non-profit,non-governmental organization projects versus use of larger for-profit contractorsand consortia delivering diverse, integrated packages of deliverables, as through theuse of indefinite quantity contracts.

Appendix 1: U.S. Assistance Trends

After increasing briefly following Liberia's 1989-1997 war, U.S. assistance forLiberia steadily declined, reflecting the Clinton and Bush Administrations' generallycritical views of the Taylor Administration. In FY2002, aid began to be channeled"only through non-governmental organizations" and was "focused narrowly on healthand food security needs in rural communities, along with a modest effort to assistcivil society." (72) The decreasing level of assistanceappeared to be a response to"Liberia's negative role in regional security" and fomenting of conflict in SierraLeone and Guinea "by supporting the [RUF] through illicit diamond and armstrafficking." (73) Subsequent Bush AdministrationCongressional Budget justificationsfor Liberia reflected similar concerns. The Administration's regular FY2004 requestfor Liberia, for instance, stated that "[t]he primary U.S. national interests in Liberiaare to prevent the Government of Liberia from fomenting violence and instability inneighboring countries, and to promote comprehensive internal reform and goodgovernance in Liberia." (74) While regulardevelopment assistance to Liberia graduallydeclined, U.S. emergency assistance to Liberia began to increase as the country'ssecond civil war burgeoned and humanitarian conditions deteriorated.

Table 3. U.S. Emergency and Humanitarian Assistance to Liberia, FY2002-FY2004 ($ Millions)

Source: USAID/OFDA, "Liberia -- Complex Emergency," Situation Report [s], including #14, FY2004, Aug. 27, 2004 and #1, FY2004, Oct. 1, 2003; and Mano River Countries (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone),report #1, Fiscal Year (FY) 2003, Oct. 9, 2002.

a. USAID/OFDA: USAID, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).

b. USAID/FFP: USAID, Food for Peace Program, P.L. 480 Title II FoodAssistance.

c. State/PRM: State Department, Bureau for Population, Refugees, andMigration.

Table 4. Recent U.S. Bilateral Development Assistance to Liberia ($ Millions; totals may reflect rounding)

Sources: Annual U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Congressional Budget Justifications; and State Department Congressional BudgetJustifications for Foreign Operations; USAID, "USAID Assistance To Liberia," Fact Sheet, Feb. 27, 2003; USAID Complex Emergency Situation Reports for Liberia;and CRS estimates allocations.

ï¿½Includes $.4 million for anti-polio Africa Regional account program. Actual CSH was $1.6 million.

* Some of these funds may fund multi-lateral programs for Liberia.

**FFP/ P.L. 108-106 assistance may overlap with Emergency Assistance, above.

a. CSH: Child Survival and Health Programs Fund (formerly Child Survival andDisease Fund).

b. DA: Development Assistance

c. ESF: Economic Support Fund

d. NADR/SALW: Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, & Related/Small andLight Weapons Programs

e. INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

f. International Disaster and Famine Assistance; P.L. 108-106 .

g. P.L. 480, Title II food assistance; primarily Food for Peace Program (FFP).

h. DHRF: Democracy and Human Rights Fund Program (DHRF)

Table 5. P.L.108-106 Supplemental U.S. Assistance for Liberia, FY2004 ($ Millions)

Appendix 2: Acronyms and Terms Used in this Report