Border Security: Progress and Challenges with the Use of Technology, Tactical Infrastructure, and Personnel to Secure the Southwest Border
Released: 2018-03-15T00:00:00

Letter

CBP Has Made Progress Deploying Surveillance Technology along the Southwest Border, but Has Not Fully Assessed Effectiveness

On multiple occasions since 2011, we have reported on the progress the Border Patrol has made deploying technologies along the southwest border. Figure 1 shows the land-based surveillance technology systems used by the Border Patrol.

In November 2017, we reported on the progress the Border Patrol made deploying technology along the southwest border in accordance with its 2011 Arizona Technology Plan and 2014 Southwest Border Technology Plan. For example, we reported that, according to officials, the Border Patrol had completed deployments of all planned Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS), Mobile Surveillance Capability systems, and Unattended Ground Sensors, as well as 15 of 53 Integrated Fixed Tower systems to Arizona. The Border Patrol had also completed deployments of select technologies to Texas and California, including deploying 32 Mobile Surveillance Capability systems. In addition, the Border Patrol had efforts underway to deploy other technology programs, but at the time of our report, some of those programs had not yet begun deployment or were not yet under contract. For example, we reported that, according to the Border Patrol officials responsible for the RVSS program, the Border Patrol had begun planning the designs of the command and control centers and towers for the Rio Grande Valley sector in Texas. Further, we reported that the Border Patrol had not yet initiated deployments of RVSS to Texas because, according to Border Patrol officials, the program had only recently completed contract negotiations for procuring those systems. Additionally, the Border Patrol initially awarded the contract to procure and deploy Mobile Video Surveillance System units to Texas in 2014, but did not award the contract until 2015 because of bid and size protests, and the vendor that was awarded the contract did not begin work until March 2016. Our November 2017 report includes more detailed information about the deployment status of surveillance technology along the southwest border as of October 2017.

We also reported in November 2017 that the Border Patrol had made progress identifying performance metrics for the technologies deployed along the Southwest Border, but additional actions are needed to fully implement our prior recommendations in this area. For example, in November 2011, we found that CBP did not have the information needed to fully support and implement the Arizona Technology Plan and recommended that CBP (1) determine the mission benefits to be derived from implementation of the Arizona Technology Plan and (2) develop and apply key attributes for metrics to assess program implementation. CBP concurred with our recommendations and has implemented one of them. Specifically, in March 2014, we reported that CBP had identified mission benefits of its surveillance technologies to be deployed along the southwest border, such as improved situational awareness and agent safety. However, the agency had not developed key attributes for performance metrics for all surveillance technologies to be deployed.

Further, we reported in March 2014 that CBP did not capture complete data on the contributions of these technologies. When used in combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, these data could be used to better determine the impact of CBP’s surveillance technologies on CBP’s border security efforts and inform resource allocation decisions. Therefore, we recommended that CBP (1) require data on technology contributions to apprehensions or seizures to be tracked and recorded within its database and (2) subsequently analyze available data on apprehensions and technological assists—in combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, as appropriate—to determine the contribution of surveillance technologies. CBP concurred with our recommendations and has implemented one of them. Specifically, in June 2014, the Border Patrol issued guidance informing agents that the asset assist data field—which records assisting technology or other assets (canine teams)—in its database had become a mandatory data field.

While the Border Patrol has taken action to collect data on technology, it has not taken additional steps to determine the contribution of surveillance technologies to CBP’s border security efforts. In April 2017, we reported that the Border Patrol had provided us a case study that assessed technology assist data, along with other measures, to determine the contributions of surveillance technologies to its mission. We reported that this was a helpful step in developing and applying performance metrics; however, the case study was limited to one border location and the analysis was limited to select technologies. In November 2017, we reported that Border Patrol officials demonstrated the agency’s new Tracking, Sign Cutting, and Modeling (TSM) system, which they said is intended to connect between agents’ actions (such as identification of a subject through the use of a camera) and results (such as an apprehension) and allow for more comprehensive analysis of the contributions of surveillance technologies to the Border Patrol’s mission. One official said that data from the TSM will have the potential to provide decision makers with performance indicators, such as changes in apprehensions or traffic before and after technology deployments. However, at the time of our review, TSM was still early in its use and officials confirmed that it was not yet used to support such analytic efforts. We continue to believe that it is important for the Border Patrol to assess technologies’ contributions to border security and will continue to monitor the progress of the TSM and other Border Patrol efforts to meet our 2011 and 2014 recommendations.

CBP Is Planning to Construct New Physical Barriers, but Has Not Yet Assessed the Impact of Existing Fencing

Fencing Is Intended to Assist Agents in Performing Their Duties, but Its Contributions to Border Security Operations Have Not Been Assessed

We have reported on the significant investments CBP has made in tactical infrastructure along the southwest border. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), as amended, provides that the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take actions, as necessary, to install physical barriers and roads in the vicinity of the border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry. The Secure Fence Act of 2006, in amending IIRIRA, required DHS to construct at least two layers of reinforced fencing as well as physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors on certain segments of the southwest border. From fiscal years 2005 through 2015, CBP increased the total miles of primary border fencing on the southwest border from 119 miles to 654 miles—including 354 miles of primary pedestrian fencing and 300 miles of primary vehicle fencing. In addition, CBP has deployed additional layers of pedestrian fencing behind the primary border fencing, including 37 miles of secondary fencing. From fiscal years 2007 through 2015, CBP spent approximately $2.4 billion on tactical infrastructure on the southwestern border—and about 95 percent, or around $2.3 billion, was spent on constructing pedestrian and vehicle fencing. CBP officials reported it will need to spend additional amounts to sustain these investments over their lifetimes. In 2009, CBP estimated that maintaining fencing would cost more than $1 billion over 20 years. CBP used various fencing designs to construct the 654 miles of primary pedestrian and vehicle border fencing. Figure 2 shows examples of existing pedestrian fencing deployed along the border.

In February 2017, we reported that border fencing had benefited border security operations in various ways, according to the Border Patrol. For example, according to officials, border fencing improved agent safety, helped reduce vehicle incursions, and supported Border Patrol agents’ ability to respond to illicit cross-border activities by slowing the progress of illegal entrants. However, we also found that, despite its investments over the years, CBP could not measure the contribution of fencing to border security operations along the southwest border because it had not developed metrics for this assessment. We reported that CBP collected data that could help provide insight into how border fencing contributes to border security operations. For example, we found that CBP collected data on the location of illegal entries that could provide insight into where these illegal activities occurred in relation to the location of various designs of pedestrian and vehicle fencing. We reported that CBP could potentially use these data to compare the occurrence and location of illegal entries before and after fence construction, as well as to help determine the extent to which border fencing contributes to diverting illegal entrants into more rural and remote environments, and border fencing’s impact, if any, on apprehension rates over time. Therefore, we recommended in February 2017 that the Border Patrol develop metrics to assess the contributions of pedestrian and vehicle fencing to border security along the southwest border using the data the Border Patrol already collects and apply this information, as appropriate, when making investment and resource allocation decisions. The agency concurred with our recommendation. As of December 2017, officials reported that CBP plans to establish initial metrics by March 2018 and finalize them in January 2019.

CBP Faces Challenges in Sustaining Tactical Infrastructure and Has Not Provided Guidance on Its Process for Identifying and Deploying Tactical Infrastructure

In February 2017, we also reported that CBP was taking a number of steps to sustain tactical infrastructure along the southwest border; however, it continued to face certain challenges in maintaining this infrastructure. For example, CBP had funding allocated for tactical infrastructure sustainment requirements, but had not prioritized its requirements to make the best use of available funding, since CBP also required contractors to address urgent repair requirements. According to Border Patrol officials, CBP classifies breaches to fencing, grates, or gates as urgent and requiring immediate repair because breaches increase illegal entrants’ ability to enter the country unimpeded. At the time of our February 2017 review, the majority of urgent tactical infrastructure repairs on the southwest border were fence breaches, according to Border Patrol officials. From fiscal years 2010 through 2015, CBP recorded a total of 9,287 breaches in pedestrian fencing, and repair costs averaged $784 per breach.

While contractors provide routine maintenance and address urgent repairs on tactical infrastructure, certain tactical infrastructure assets used by the Border Patrol—such as border fencing—become degraded beyond repair and must be replaced. For example, in February 2017 we reported that CBP had provided routine maintenance and repair services to the primary legacy pedestrian fencing in Sunland Park, New Mexico. However, significant weather events had eroded the foundation of the fencing, according to the Border Patrol officials in the El Paso sector, and in 2015 CBP began to replace 1.4 miles of primary pedestrian fence in this area. We also reported on several additional CBP projects to replace degraded, legacy pedestrian fencing with more modern, bollard style fencing. For example, in fiscal year 2016, CBP began removing and replacing an estimated 7.5 miles of legacy primary pedestrian fencing with modern bollard style fencing within the Tucson sector. In addition, from fiscal years 2011 through 2016, CBP completed four fence replacement projects that replaced 14.1 miles of primary pedestrian legacy fencing in the Tucson and Yuma sectors at a total cost of approximately $68.26 million and an average cost of $4.84 million per mile of replacement fencing. We plan to provide information on additional fence replacement projects in a forthcoming report.

In 2014, the Border Patrol began implementing the Requirements Management Process that is designed to facilitate planning for funding and deploying tactical infrastructure and other requirements, according to Border Patrol officials. At the time of our February 2017 review, Border Patrol headquarters and sector officials told us that the Border Patrol lacked adequate guidance for identifying, funding, and deploying tactical infrastructure needs as part of this process. In addition, officials reported experiencing some confusion about their roles and responsibilities in this process. We reported that developing guidance on this process would provide more reasonable assurance that the process is consistently followed across the Border Patrol. We therefore recommended that the Border Patrol develop and implement written guidance to include roles and responsibilities for the steps within its requirements process for identifying, funding, and deploying tactical infrastructure assets for border security operations. The agency concurred with this recommendation and stated that it planned to update the Requirements Management Process and, as part of that update, planned to add communication and training methods and tools to better implement the process. As of December 2017, DHS plans to complete these efforts by September 2019.

CBP Has Tested Barrier Prototypes and Plans to Construct New Barriers in San Diego and Rio Grande Valley Sectors

In response to the January 2017 Executive Order, CBP established the Border Wall System Program to replace and add to existing barriers along the southwest border. In April 2017, DHS leadership authorized CBP to procure barrier prototypes, which are intended to help refine requirements and inform new or updated design standards for the border wall system. CBP subsequently awarded eight contracts with a total value of $5 million for the construction, development, and testing of the prototypes. From October to December 2017, CBP tested eight prototypes—four constructed from concrete and four from other materials—and evaluated them in five areas: breachability, scalability, constructability, design, and aesthetics. CBP officials said the prototype evaluation results are expected by March 2018.

CBP has selected the San Diego and Rio Grande Valley sectors for the first two segments of the border wall system. In the San Diego sector, CBP plans to replace 14 miles of existing primary and secondary barriers. The primary barriers will be rebuilt to existing design standards, but the secondary barriers will be rebuilt to new design standards once established. In the Rio Grande Valley sector, CBP plans to extend an existing barrier by 60 miles using existing design standards. CBP intends to prioritize construction of new or replacement physical barriers based on threat levels, land ownership, and geography, among other things. We have ongoing work reviewing the Border Wall System Program, and we plan to report on the results of that work later this year.

The Border Patrol Has Continued to Face Staffing Challenges

In November 2017 we reported that, in fiscal years 2011 through 2016, the Border Patrol had statutorily-established minimum staffing levels of 21,370 full-time equivalent agent positions, but the Border Patrol has faced challenges in staffing to that level. Border Patrol headquarters, with input from the sectors, determines how many authorized agent positions are allocated to each of the sectors. According to Border Patrol officials, these decisions take into account the relative needs of the sectors, based on threats, intelligence, and the flow of illegal activity. Each sector’s leadership determines how many of the authorized agent positions will be allocated to each station within their sector.

At the end of fiscal year 2017, the Border Patrol reported it had over 19,400 agents on board nationwide, and that over 16,600 of the agents were staffed to sectors along the southwest border. As mentioned earlier, the January 2017 executive order called for the hiring of 5,000 additional Border Patrol agents, subject to available appropriations, and as of November 2017 we reported that the Border Patrol planned to have 26,370 agents by the end of fiscal year 2021. The Acting Commissioner of CBP reported in a February 2017 memo to the Deputy Secretary for Homeland Security that from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2016, the Border Patrol hired an average of 523 agents per year while experiencing a loss of an average of 904 agents per year. The memo cited challenges such as competing with other federal, state, and local law enforcement organizations for applicants. In particular, the memo noted that CBP faces hiring and retention challenges compared to DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (which is also planning to hire additional law enforcement personnel) because CBP’s hiring process requires applicants to take a polygraph examination, Border Patrol agents are deployed to less desirable duty locations, and Border Patrol agents generally receive lower compensation.

In November 2017, we reported that the availability of agents is one key factor that affects the Border Patrol’s deployment strategy. In particular, officials from all nine southwest border sectors cited current staffing levels and the availability of agents as a challenge for optimal deployment. We reported that, as of May 2017, the Border Patrol had 17,971 authorized agent positions in southwest border sectors, but only 16,522 of those positions were filled—a deficit of 1,449 agents—and eight of the nine southwest border sectors had fewer agents than the number of authorized positions. As a result of these staffing shortages, resources were constrained and station officials had to make decisions about how to prioritize activities for deployment given the number of agents available.

We also reported in November 2017 that within sectors, some stations may be comparatively more understaffed than others because of recruitment and retention challenges, according to officials. Generally, sector officials said that the recruitment and retention challenges associated with particular stations were related to quality of life factors in the area near the station—for example, agents may not want to live with their families in an area without a hospital, with low-performing schools, or with relatively long commutes from their homes to their duty station. This can affect retention of existing agents, but it may also affect whether a new agent accepts a position in that location. For example, officials in one sector said that new agent assignments are not based solely on agency need, but rather also take into consideration agent preferences. These officials added that there is the potential that new agents may decline offers for stations that are perceived as undesirable, or they may resign their position earlier than they otherwise would to pursue employment in a more desirable location. We have ongoing work reviewing CBP’s efforts to recruit, hire, and retain its law enforcement officers, including Border Patrol agents.

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

For questions about this statement, please contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony are Jeanette Henriquez (Assistant Director), Leslie Sarapu (Analyst-in- Charge), Ashley Davis, Alana Finley, Tom Lombardi, Marycella Mierez, and Claire Peachey.

Related GAO Products

Southwest Border Security: Border Patrol Is Deploying Surveillance Technologies but Needs to Improve Data Quality and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-18-119. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2017.

Border Patrol: Issues Related to Agent Deployment Strategy and Immigration Checkpoints. GAO-18-50. Washington, D.C.: November 8, 2017. 2017 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits. GAO-17- 491SP. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2017.

Homeland Security Acquisitions: Earlier Requirements Definition and Clear Documentation of Key Decisions Could Facilitate Ongoing Progress. GAO-17-346SP. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2017.

Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Assess Fencing’s Contributions to Operations and Provide Guidance for Identifying Capability Gaps. GAO-17-331. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2017.

Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Assess Fencing’s Contributions to Operations and Provide Guidance for Identifying Capability Gaps. GAO-17-167SU. Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2016.

Border Security: DHS Surveillance Technology, Unmanned Aerial Systems and Other Assets. GAO-16-671T. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2016. 2016 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits. GAO-16- 375SP. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2016.

Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Has Strengthened Management, but Execution and Affordability Concerns Endure. GAO-16-338SP. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2016.

Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Assess Resource Deployment and Progress. GAO-16-465T. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2016.

Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Implement and Assess Infrastructure and Technology. GAO-15-595T. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2015.

Homeland Security Acquisitions: Addressing Gaps in Oversight and Information is Key to Improving Program Outcomes. GAO-15-541T. Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2015.

Homeland Security Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal Actions Needed to Improve Accountability. GAO-15-171SP. Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2015. 2015 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits. GAO-15- 404SP. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2015.

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-411T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2014.

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-368. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2014.

Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS Implementation and Assessment Efforts. GAO-13-653T. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2013.

Border Security: DHS’s Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S. Borders. GAO-13-414T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2013.

Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs. GAO-13-25. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2012.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan. GAO- 12-106R. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2011.

Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and Development of New Technologies. GAO-11-829T. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2011.

Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and Northern Borders. GAO-11-508T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2011.

Border Security Preliminary Observations on the Status of Key Southwest Border Technology Programs. GAO-11-448T. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2011.

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Strengthen Management and Oversight of Its Prime Contractor. GAO-11-6. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2010.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2010 Expenditure Plan. GAO- 10-877R. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2010.

Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex Acquisitions, GAO-10-588SP. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010.

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program. GAO-10-340. Washington, D.C.: May, 5, 2010.

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, GAO-10-651T. Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010.

Secure Border Initiative: Testing and Problem Resolution Challenges Put Delivery of Technology Program at Risk. GAO-10-511T. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 2010.

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk. GAO-10-158. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2010.

Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-1013T. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2009.

Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-896. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.

Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol’s Mission, but More Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness. GAO-09-824. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2009.

Customs and Border Protection’s Secure Border Initiative Fiscal Year 2009 Expenditure Plan. GAO-09-274R. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2009.

Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Costs. GAO-09-244R. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2009.

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