Nuclear Weapons in Russia: Safety, Security, and Control Issues
Released: 2004-01-21T00:00:00

Introduction

After the 1991 demise of the Soviet Union, many analysts grew concerned that nuclear weaponsmight be lost or stolen, or that some might be launched by accident or without authorization byresponsible officials. Many of these weapons were located outside Russia, but have since beenreturned to storage areas in Russia. The United States has offered, through efforts such as the Nunn-LugarCooperative Threat Reduction Program, to enhance safety and security at nuclear facilities inRussia. Concerns about the long-term effects of economic hardship and the increasing age of Soviet-era systemscontinue to prompt questions about the security of Russia's nuclear weapons andmaterials.

This report provides background information on the location of nuclear weapons at the time of the demise of the Soviet Union and their subsequent relocation to storage and deployment areas inRussia. It also provides a description of the safety, security, and control issues raised in 1991 andin more recent years. It includes a brief listing of the cooperative programs and assistance theUnited States has provided to Russia and the other former Soviet states in an effort to addressconcerns about the safety and security of nuclear weapons and materials. (1)

Sources of Concern

Location of Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union

When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, it possessed, according to most estimates, more than 27,000 nuclear weapons. These included more than 11,000 strategic nuclear weapons --warheads on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballisticmissiles (SLBMs), and in bombers with the range needed to attack the continental United States --and over 15,000 warheads for nonstrategic tactical nuclear weapons (such as artillery shells,short-range missiles, nuclear air-defense and ballistic missile defense interceptors, nuclear torpedoesand sea-launched cruise missiles, and nuclear weapons for shorter-range aircraft). (2) By early 2003,after fully implementing the START I Treaty, Russia retained around 5,500 warheads on its strategicnuclear weapons. (3) According to some reports, Russiaalso still has between 7,000 and 12,000warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. (4)

In 1991, more than 80% of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, including all ballistic missile submarines, were deployed at bases in Russia. The remaining strategic nuclear weapons weredeployed in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. By the end of 1996, these states had all returned theirnuclear warheads to Russia and begun to eliminate the launchers for strategic nuclear weapons underthe terms of the START I Treaty. By the end of 1998, only Ukraine still had Soviet-era strategicmissiles in silos on its territory, and it continued its efforts to eliminate these missiles and their silos. The last SS-19 ICBM was eliminated at the end of February 1999, and all SS-24 silos wereeliminated by October, 2001. After lengthy and unsuccessful negotiations with Russia, Ukrainebegan to dismantle the Soviet-era bombers on its territory. However, in August 1999, Ukraine andRussia announced that Russia would take 8 of these aircraft as partial payment for Ukraine's debtfor natural gas deliveries from Russia. In October 1999, the two nations completed the details of thetransaction and noted that Russia would buy 11 of the strategic bombers from Ukraine. Table 1,below, depicts the number of nuclear weapons deployed in these states in late 1991 and their statustoday.

Many of the Soviet Union's tactical nuclear weapons were also stationed outside Russia, in Eastern Europe or in republics that were closer to prospective theaters of operation. The weaponsin Eastern Europe had reportedly been returned to Russia by 1989. In late 1991, the majority ofweapons outside Russia reportedly were in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, with perhaps less than5% in Georgia and the Central Asian states (Kirghizia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.) According to officials in Russia and these other states, all the weapons had been moved to storageareas in Russia by the end of 1992.

The command and control system for all Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear weapons was centered in Moscow. As the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991, Russian President BorisYeltsin replaced Soviet President Gorbachev at the top of the command authority, but the rest of thesystem remained the same.

Table 1. Strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Non-Russian Republics

Source: U.S. Department of Defense.

Concerns about Command, Control, Safety, and Security

Many in the United States and Russia have voiced concerns about safety, security, and control over nuclear weapons in Russia. These concerns center on three general areas -- concerns aboutweaknesses in Russia's command and control system; concerns about the possible loss of nuclearwarheads due to lax security or accounting at nuclear weapons facilities; and concerns about the lossor theft of nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons facilities.

Russia's Nuclear Command and Control System. Russia's nuclear command and control system consists, generally speaking, of early warningsatellites and sensors that would warn of an imminent attack on Russian territory; the senior politicaland military leaders who would assess the nature of the attack and, if necessary, authorize a responseusing Russia's nuclear weapons; and the communications links that these commanders would useto consult with each other and to transmit messages authorizing the use of nuclear weapons tocommanders in the field. These messages would contain the authorizing and enabling codes neededto "unlock" the permissive action links (PALs) and other technologies used to make sure that nuclearweapons could not be armed and launched without authorization from the central commandauthority. (5)

Analysts in the United States and Russia have pointed to the degradation of Russia's early warning network of satellites and radars to note that Russia may eventually lack the ability tomonitor and react to strategic threats to its own territory. In early 1997, Russia's Defense MinisterRodionov stated that he feared a loss of control over Russian strategic nuclear forces in the futureif additional funding were not available to maintain and modernize the communications links in thenuclear command and control structure. Furthermore, in June and July 1998, both of Russia'sgeostationary early warning satellites failed; leaving Russia to rely on older satellites and groundradar stations for early warning of ballistic missile attacks. These systems could not providecontinuous coverage of U.S. missile launch sites. Furthermore, at the end of August, 1998, Latviashut down the Skrunda radar, which had provided Russia with early warning of ballistic missileattacks. Russia has since replaced some of these assets, but concerns remain about potential gapsin coverage.

The U.S. Defense Department has downplayed concerns about a loss of control over Russia's nuclear weapons, noting that the central command structure remains in place. But some analysts fearthat Russia could respond to the degradation of the system by disseminating codes needed to launchnuclear weapons to commanders in the field to make sure that these commanders could launchmissiles in a conflict. This might increase the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized use ofthese weapons.

In addition, according to Russian press reports, strategic rocket forces personnel have faced serious financial hardship over the years. Some analysts fear that inadequate funding for trainingand maintenance, along with low morale, could lead to an eventual breakdown of authority. Although problems with the troops probably would not lead to the unauthorized use of nuclearweapons, they could make it difficult for Russia to remain confident in the reliability andeffectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. The National Intelligence Council reported, in February 2002,that these concerns had eased somewhat in recent years, as the Russian economy had improved andwages were restored. Russia has also implemented several programs that screen troops responsiblefor nuclear weapons for psychological, drug, and alcohol problems.

Safety and Security of Stored Nuclear Warheads. In the early 1990s, Russia withdrew most nonstrategic nuclear weapons from deployment and placedthem in secure storage areas. Russia has consolidated these weapons, reducing from several hundredto, perhaps, less than one hundred storage facilities. Russian officials also contend that they havebegun to dismantle these warheads at a rate of around 2,000 per year. The United States does nothave independent confirmation of this number, and some analysts suspect that Russia could still have12,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its storage facilities. Many in the United Statesremain concerned about the level of security at these facilities and some fear that, as a result of poorsecurity and inadequate record-keeping, Russia may not be able to keep track of all its warheads.

In September 1997, former Russian Security Council head and national security advisor Alexander Lebed alleged that Russian authorities could not locate 100 out of 250 small portablenuclear demolition munitions. The Russian Defense Ministry responded by noting that "the Russiansystem of nuclear weapons safety keeps nuclear weapons under full control and makes anyunauthorized transport of them impossible." It also stressed that all nuclear weapons had beenwithdrawn to Russia from the former Soviet republics. Other Russian observers also discountedLebed's allegations. In early October 1997, Lebed appeared to withdraw his allegation, stating thathe had investigated the matter and had found no evidence of missing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless,the debate in Russia continued, with some alleging that Russia never had such small munitions andothers confirming that the munitions existed but denying that any are unaccounted for. The WhiteHouse stressed that the United States had "no credible information that any [Russian] nuclearweapon ... has ever been available on the black market."

In late 1997, George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence indicated that the United States remained concerned about the possible loss or theft of nuclear weapons and materials in Russia dueto declining social and economic conditions. He did not, however, offer any evidence that suchlosses had already occurred. But conditions continued to deteriorate, and some wages went unpaidfor several months during the financial crisis that began in mid-1998. As a result, many analystshave continued to express concerns about the "human factor" and the possibility that low morale andpoor living conditions may combine to weaken security and controls over nuclear weapons.

General Eugene Habiger, the former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, visited nuclear weapons storage facilities in Russia to observe safety and security procedures on twooccasions, in October 1997 and June 1998. He stated that he was impressed with what he saw,although he acknowledged the tour only focused on strategic nuclear weapons and provided noinformation about security procedures at storage facilities for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. He alsonoted that Russia lacked many high-tech devices the United States used to maintain security at itsnuclear bases and seemed to rely more heavily on added manpower. But he stated that he did nothave any serious concerns about the security of Russia's nuclear weapons.

Some in Congress have also expressed concern about Russia's stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The Senate added an amendment to the FY1999 Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 105-261 ) and theFY2000 Defense Authorization Bill ( S. 1059 ) calling on the President topress Russia to reduce these weapons in accordance with its pledges from 1991 and 1992. Theamendment also required that the Secretary of Defense submit a report detailing the numbers, types,strategic implications, and proliferation risks associated with Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons. A request for this report remained in the House and Senate versions of the FY2001 DefenseAuthorization Bill.

After the terrorist attacks in Washington and New York in September 2001, Russian officials reportedly increased security at nuclear weapons facilities. They also denied, on several occasions,that any Russian nuclear weapons were missing. They insisted that terrorists had not gained accessto Russia's nuclear arsenal.

Former Soviet Nuclear Facilities and Materials

Concerns about the loss or theft of nuclear materials from Russia have grown since the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, although more because of growingconcerns about the demand for those materials than new concerns about their security in Russia. Forexample, some analysts and government officials have noted that Osama bin Laden may have soughtto acquire nuclear materials, possibly to construct a nuclear explosive device, but, more likely, toconstruct a "dirty bomb." With this type of weapon, nuclear waste or other radioactive materialswould be combined with conventional explosives and dispersed over a wide area.

Over the years, there have been numerous reports of nuclear materials from facilities in the former Soviet Union appearing on the black market in Europe. In most cases, the materials lackedthe purity to be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. However, in several of the reported cases,the materials could have been useful to a nation seeking to develop nuclear weapons. In May 1999,the National Research Council, an arm of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, issued a reportstating that security at Russia's nuclear materials facilities was worse than previously reported. (6) Thereport argued for sustained cooperation between the United States and Russia to improve securityand prevent the diversion of these materials. Officials from the Russian Atomic Energy Ministrydisputed these reports and argued that some safeguards are Russian facilities were more stringentthan those at U.S. facilities. The National Intelligence Council also highlighted the risks of theft ordiversion from facilities housing nuclear materials in its report to Congress in February 2002. (7)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that there may be enough weapons-usable nuclear materials to produce 40,000 nuclear weapons at facilities in 8 countries that were once a partof the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union secured most of these facilities by placing them in closedcities or by using gates and armed guards. But, according to DOE, budget cuts and politicalupheavals have eroded this system. Many facilities lacked fences, monitors, alarms, andcomprehensive accounting systems to keep track of materials. Reports indicate that even thosefacilities with security and monitoring systems often disconnected them to save money on electricbills and to reduce false alarms. They also have been unable to pay the guards and officers chargedwith maintaining security at the facilities.

Deterioration of economic conditions and the decline in military spending displaced many scientists and engineers who worked in Soviet nuclear programs. Although reports of scientistsmoving to other countries have waned, the economic problems continue. For example, on July 23,1998, several thousand staff members at Arzamas-16, one of Russia's premier nuclear researchfacilities, stopped work during a three-hour strike. They sought back payment for wages and budgetallocations for 1997 and a pay increase for 1998. Nuclear workers from several of the closed citiesparticipated in a strike in mid-September 1998, with many traveling to Moscow for protests at theAtomic Ministry (MINATOM).

Cooperative Programs to Address Concerns

The United States and the former Soviet states have cooperated in many ways over the yearsto address the concerns described above. The United States provides nearly $1 billion per year inassistance, through programs in the State Department, Energy Department, and Defense Department,to help the former Soviet states secure and eliminate nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, tohelp secure and eliminate the materials used in these weapons, and to help provide alternativeemployment for the scientists and engineers who had been a part of the Soviet Union's weaponscomplex. These programs, which have provided nearly $7 billion in funding in the past 12 years,are designed to reduce the risk that weapons, materials, or scientists from the former Soviet Unionmight provide useful to other nations seeking their own weapons of mass destruction. They havemet with many challenges over the years, but most analysts agree that these cooperative efforts havehelped reduce potential threats from former Soviet weapons of mass destruction. The followingsection briefly describes some of these programs. (8)

DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program

In November 1991, Congress allocated $400 million in Department of Defense funds to help the former Soviet republics secure their nuclear weapons. The funds were to provide Russia,Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan assistance in 1) the transportation, storage, safeguarding anddestruction of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the dismantlement of missiles andlaunchers; 2) the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and, 3) theprevention of diversion of weapons-related scientific expertise. Although some Members havequestioned the benefits and administration CTR Program, Congress has consistently supported itscentral objectives, allocating between $300 and $475 million each year since the program'sinception.

During its first decade, the CTR program allocated most of its funds to projects that were designed to help Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan eliminate strategic offensive nuclearweapons limited by the START Treaty. It has also helped improve the safety and security of nuclearwarheads in transit and in storage. The program has also provided funding to help Russia build afacility to dispose of its chemical weapons; this project has proven far more controversial inCongress than projects aimed at the elimination of strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Forexample, Congress denied funding for this project in FY2000 and FY2001.

The Bush Administration conducted a wide-ranging review of U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in Russia during its first year in office. Many analysts expected thisreview to lead to reductions in funding and the elimination of some projects. The Administration,however, concluded that the programs did serve U.S. national security interests; it identified severalefforts that would receive added funding. At the same, time, though, the Administration altered thestated objectives of the program. Past legislation had stated that the CTR program should provideRussia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan assistance in the transportation, storage, safeguarding anddestruction of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the dismantlement of missiles andlaunchers, the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and the prevention ofdiversion of weapons-related scientific expertise. The program's new objectives are to dismantleweapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructure in the former Soviet Union;consolidate and secure weapons of mass destruction and related technologies and materials; increasetransparency and encourage higher standards of conduct, and support defense and militarycooperation with the objective of preventing proliferation. Although these new objectives may notalter CTR priorities in the near-term, the potential exists for significant changes in the future. Inparticular, funding may shift away from the transportation, storage, and elimination of nuclearweapons towards efforts to secure and eliminate chemical and biological weapons.

Furthermore, the new emphasis on encouraging "higher standards of conduct" confirms that Administration's added interest in conditioning U.S. assistance on policies and activities pursuedby the recipient nations. This focus was evident in Bush Administration policies in early 2002 whenthe Administration stated that it would not certify that Russia was committed to its arms controlobligations under the Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions. The law states thatthis certification is necessary for a recipient nation to receive assistance under the CTR program orthe State Department nonproliferation programs. The Administration indicated that Russia had notcooperated fully with the United States in sharing information relevant to the implementation ofthese treaties. It then asked Congress to waive the requirement for the certification, so that theUnited States could emphasize its concern with Russian compliance without interrupting fundingfor the CTR program. Some observers criticized the Administration's certification policy, noting thateven the Administration agrees that these programs serve U.S. security interests, and that theirsuspension could undermine U.S. nonproliferation policy.

State Department Programs

The State Department funds several nonproliferation programs in Russia and the other former Soviet states. Several of these are designed to help with border and export controls, to reduce therisk that nuclear materials might be smuggled out of the former Soviet territory. The StateDepartment also administers the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow and theScience and Technology Center in Ukraine. These centers are designed to provide research andpeaceful employment opportunities for nuclear scientists and engineers. The Centers beganoperations in 1992 and have, thus far, funded around 450 projects at a cost of $145 million. Morethan 17,000 scientists and engineers have participated in ISTC projects. Many continue to work attheir primary jobs in Russia's research facilities. But, because most have not received their fullsalaries at their primary jobs, the grants from the ISTC permit them to support their families withoutcontemplating selling their knowledge to nations seeking nuclear weapons. The BushAdministration has recommended expanding the science centers, in part due to concerns about thepotential risk that biological weapons scientists might be lured to programs in other nations. Itsbudget for FY2003 contained $52 million for a program that combines the Science Centers and theState Department's program for redirecting biological weapons scientists in the former Soviet Union.

Department of Energy Programs

Although the Nunn-Lugar CTR program, in its early years, focused on securing nuclear weapons, it did include some funding for materials control and protection. But government-to-governmentnegotiations with Russia and the other republics proceeded slowly, so projects atfacilities with these materials did not begin until 1994. In a parallel effort that sought to reduce thesedelays, experts from the U.S. nuclear laboratories also began, in 1994, less formal contacts with theircounterparts in Russia to identify and solve safety and security problems at Russian facilities. Together, the government-to-government and lab-to-lab projects constitute the Material Protection,Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program, which is funded through the U.S. Department ofEnergy.

The MPC&A program began with less than $3 million in the FY1993 Nunn-Lugar budget; it had grown to more than $220 million per year by FY2003. These funds are used to help upgradesecurity and monitoring systems at facilities that house nuclear materials in Russia and the otherformer Soviet states, and to help secure naval nuclear weapons in Russia. By early 2003, DOE hadhelped upgrade security at buildings that contained about 38% of the 603 metric tons that DOEbelieved were at risk of theft. These upgrades include the installation of improved security systemsthat use modern technology and strict material control and accounting systems. The program has alsoprovided security training for Russian nuclear specialists. DOE officials have noted that the programhad has experienced some problems and results have been limited because most of the materials arein Russia's closed nuclear cities and nuclear weapons complex. MINATOM, which is responsiblefor these facilities, has been slow to provide DOE with information about and access to thesefacilities because of the sensitive nature of the nuclear weapons complex.

The Department of Energy also implements two programs that are designed to discourage Russian nuclear weapons scientists from selling their knowledge to other nations. The first of these,the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) Program, funds projects with non-militaryapplications that have commercial value for both the United States and the former Soviet republics. The program has coordinated lab-to-lab contacts that sought to identify technologies at formerSoviet weapons facilities that might have commercial applications. It also matches U.S. governmentfunds with funds provided by U.S. companies in projects that seek to commercialize thesetechnologies. Congress has authorized approximately $20-$30 million for this program each yearsince FY1994. (9)

The second program, the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) is designed to bring commercial enterprises to Russia's closed nuclear cities, so that scientists and engineers will not be tempted tosell their knowledge to nations seeking nuclear weapons. It seeks to promote nonproliferation goalsby helping to redirect the work of nuclear weapons scientists, engineers, and technicians and todevelop commercial opportunities in those cities. For example, it helped finance a computing centerin Sarov, formerly known as Arzamas-16, that will produce software for sale around the world. TheClinton Administration had requested and received $30 million for NCI in FY2001. The BushAdministration, however, cut funding for the NCI program sharply, requesting $6.6 million forFY2002. With this low level of funding, the program would have to withdraw from two of the threenuclear cities that participate. The Administration has also indicated that it would like to eliminatethe NCI program and merge its remaining projects into the IPP program. In the Conference Reporton the FY2002 Defense Authorization Bill, Congress approved the merger of the two programs, intoa new Russian Transition Initiative, but, at the Senate's insistence, required that DOE continue toplan for and fund the NCI programs separately. It also increased funding for the combined programfrom the President's request of $28.8 million to $42 million in the Energy and Water AppropriationsBill and an additional $15 million in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill. The BushAdministration has requested and received $39 million for this combined program in its budget forFY2003. It has requested approximately the same amount for FY2004, with $17 million allocatedto NCI and $23 million allocated to IPP. However, the NCI program ended in late 2003 because theUnited States and Russia have been unable to complete a new implementing agreement. Theyremain at odds over liability protections.

Agreement on the Disposition of Weapons-grade Plutonium. In September 1998, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that eachnation would convert 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium to a form that could not bereturned to nuclear weapons. Clinton Administration officials estimated that this amount wasapproximately half of the U.S. stockpile and perhaps 25% of Russia's stockpile. The agreementhighlighted two means for converting the plutonium -- the parties could either convert it to fuel fornuclear power reactors or mix it with other nuclear wastes and dispose of it in a way the wouldpreclude its use in nuclear weapons. This agreement is designed to ease concerns about the possibletheft or diversion of weapons-grade plutonium by nations or others seeking to develop their ownnuclear weapons. Congress allocated $200 million for this program in the Omnibus AppropriationsAct passed at the end of the 105th Congress. After its review of U.S. nonproliferation programs withRussia, the Bush Administration indicated that it would seek an alternative plan, that would be lesscostly and less complex, to address concerns with Russia's stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium. Under the new plan, the two nations will each convert plutonium to MOX fuel. But U.S. assistanceto Russia for the construction of its MOX plant ended in late 2003 because the United States andRussia have been unable to complete a new implementing agreement. They remain at odds overliability protections for U.S. companies and individuals participating in the program.

Bilateral Meetings

During the 1990s, the United States and Russia also participated in bilateral discussions, in several fora, that sought to identify and resolve issues related to the potential loss of control overRussia's nuclear weapons and materials. The Bush Administration continues to pursue discussionsamong U.S. and Russian working groups, even though it has continued the specific high-levelmeetings on these issues.

The U.S.-Russian Commission on Economic and TechnologicalCooperation (The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission) . In 1993, Presidents Clintonand Yeltsin established the U.S.-Russian Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation,chaired by Vice President Gore and Russia's Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. Vice President Gore andPrime Minister Chernomyrdin often used their meetings to address issues, such as arms control andmissile defense cooperation, on the agenda for upcoming Presidential summits. For example, in1994, the commission announced that the two sides would cooperate in building a storage facilityat Mayak (described above) for plutonium removed from Russia's nuclear weapons. Vice PresidentGore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin also signed the agreement that established the programthrough which the United States will purchase 500 metric tons of uranium removed from Russiannuclear weapons for use in nuclear power reactors. The also signed an agreement requiring theshutdown of nuclear reactors that produce plutonium for nuclear weapons in Russia, beginning aprocess that evolved over the years, and remains on the agenda for U.S. and Russian cooperation. During their June 24, 1998 meeting, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Kiriyenko signed twoagreements on nuclear issues. The United States agreed to provide Russia with assistance inconverting plutonium from nuclear weapons to fuel for nuclear reactors. In the second agreement,the United States pledged $3.1 million for 9 projects that are designed to help scientists in Russia'sclosed nuclear cities convert their efforts to peaceful civilian endeavors, a project known as theNuclear Cities Initiative.

The Strategic Stability Working Group (SSWG). In late 1993, the United States and Russia established an experts working group to discuss ways toimprove strategic stability, increase mutual confidence, and relax the Cold War nuclear forcepostures. One of the first topics the SSWG addressed was ballistic missile "detargeting." In anagreement that took effect on May 30, 1994, the two nations agreed that no country would betargeted by any strategic forces on either side. Many observers praised this agreement as an overduesign that the United States and Russia no longer consider each other enemies. Some also saw it asa move away from the nuclear hair-trigger and a concrete step to reduce the risk of accidental missilelaunches. Others, however, argued that its benefits were strictly symbolic because both sides couldquickly retarget missiles during a crisis. Many also noted that the measure was not verifiable, soneither side could be sure that the other's missiles were actually detargeted.

Sharing Early Warning Data

As was noted above, many analysts in the United States have expressed concerns about the possible inadvertent launch of Russian nuclear weapons resulting from Russia's weakened ballisticmissile early warning system. In response to these concerns, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreedin September1998 that the United States and Russia would share early warning data for all spacelaunches and ballistic missile launches world wide. They agreed to share data on a continual basis,in real time (rather than providing it annually or biannually); they agreed that data would includeinformation on strategic, theater, and intermediate range missiles, and on space launches; they agreedthe data would be derived from early warning satellites and ground-based radars; and they agreedto establish a multilateral pre-launch notification system that would be open to all nations whoagreed to share data prior to missile or space launches from their territories. The ClintonAdministration emphasized that this agreement would strengthen stability and protect against thepossibility of a nuclear launch triggered by false warning of an attack. Administration officials havealso highlighted the cooperative nature of this endeavor; this Center will provide the first opportunityfor U.S. and Russian military personnel to be permanently involved in a joint military operation.

In mid-December 2000, the United States and Russia signed an agreement outlining the types of information that would be exchanged in the newly-formed Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC)near Moscow. This agreement establishes a pre-launch and post-launch notification system forballistic missile and space launches and designed to reduce the risk that a test, experiment, or spacelaunch, could be misread as a ballistic missile attack. Some critics of the planned center argued itwould hinder U.S. access to space by requiring that notifications before launches, but the militaryspace community reportedly reviewed all the provisions and approved of the plan because it allowsfor exceptions to the notification requirement in the interest of national security. Most experts hopedthe center, which is to be based in an old school building near Moscow, would begin operations in2001. However, the building's renovations have not yet begun. Disagreements between the UnitedStates and Russia about tax issues, along with a general cooling in the relationship between the twocountries, have been cited as reasons for the delay. Congress authorized funding for the JDEC in2002, but withheld 50% of the funds until Russia and the United States reach a cost-sharingagreement and an agreement on taxes and liability for U.S. participants. In a Joint Declarationsigned during their summit meeting in Moscow in May 2002, Presidents Bush and Putin emphasizedthat they remain committed to opening the center. However, progress stopped in 2002 because thetwo sides remained at odds over taxation and liability issues.