Military Base Closures: Implementing the 2005 Round
Released: 2005-06-01T00:00:00

Introduction(1)

On November 15, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued a memorandum tosenior staff regarding the implementation of the new base realignment and closure (BRAC) roundauthorized by Congress in 2001. (2) He emphasized that, as part of the Department of Defense'stransformation initiative, "new force structures must be accompanied by a new base structure," andadded that "BRAC 2005 should be the means by which we reconfigure our current infrastructure[bases] into one in which operational capacity maximizes both war fighting capability andefficiency." (3) He, then,directed that the process begin immediately. It was, in effect, the formal launching of DOD's 2005base closure implementation process. (4)

The Secretary of Defense also revealed in his memo a particularly important BRAC 2005objective, namely examining and implementing opportunities for greater joint activity as a meansof achieving a more efficient base structure. He explained that prior BRAC rounds had analyzedfunctions on a unique service-to-service approach and, therefore, did not benefit from jointexamination of functions that cross services. It would appear, for example, that DOD's network ofresearch laboratories, medical facilities, maintenance depots, and testing and evaluation facilities willbecome prime candidates for consolidation in the next round.

In respect to the selection process, Secretary Rumsfeld declared that DOD would not makeany binding closure or realignment decisions prior to the submission of its final recommendationsto the new BRAC commission in May 2005. It should be noted, however, that his statement leftopen the possibility (if not likelihood) of DOD conducting internal, non-binding deliberations.

To underscore the importance of the new BRAC round, Secretary Rumsfeld has created twoOffice of the Secretary of Defense-level groups to oversee and operate the BRAC 2005 process. First of these is the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary. Itserves as the policy-making and oversight body for the entire process. The second, subordinategroup is the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG), chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense(Acquisition, Testing, and Logistics). It will be responsible for the detailed direction necessary toconduct the BRAC 2005 analyses. (5)

Early Requirements and Developments

In implementing the 2005 round, DOD's first three requirements are (1) to develop a forcestructure plan, (2) to conduct a comprehensive inventory of military installations, and (3) toestablish criteria for selecting bases for closure or realignment.

Force Structure Plan

In regard to the first, the Secretary of Defense must develop a force structure plan based onan assessment of the probable threats to the national security over a 20-year period, beginning withFY2005. He is also required to estimate the end-strength levels and the major military force unitsneeded to meet such threats. Finally, the Secretary of Defense must estimate the anticipated levelof funding that will be necessary to carry out the plan.

Comprehensive Inventory

Second, the Secretary of Defense is required to conduct a comprehensive inventory of U.S.military installations. He must, under the terms of the new BRAC law, determine the anticipatedneed and availability of military installations outside the United States. In addition, the Secretaryof Defense must give special consideration to any efficiencies that might be gained from the use ofjoint tenancy by more than one branch of the Armed Forces at a military installation.

Selection Criteria

Third, the Secretary of Defense must develop a set of criteria for selecting bases for closureand realignment. He must address a broad range of military, fiscal, and environmental considerationslikely to affect closure and realignment decisions. In prior rounds, DOD assigned highest priorityto four criteria related to military value. An additional four included return on investment, economicimpact, community infrastructure, and environmental impact. The eight selection criteria asproposed for the 2005 round are, in almost every essential detail, the same as those adopted andimplemented in the three past rounds.

The bolded sections of DOD's new draft criteria below reveal the pertinent additions, aspublished in the Federal Register on December 23, 2003 (vol. 68, no. 246, pp. 74221-74222).

Military Value.

1. Current and future mission requirements and impacton operational readiness of DOD's total force, including the impact on joint warfighting, training,and readiness.

2. Availability and condition of land, facilities, andassociated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, and air forcesthroughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the ArmedForces in homeland defense missions) at both the existing and potential receivinglocations.

3. Ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization,and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations to supportoperations and training .

4. Cost and manpowerimplications.

Other Considerations.

5. Extent and timing of potential costs and savings,including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment,for the savings to exceed the costs.

6. Economic impact on existing communities in thevicinity of military installations .

7. Ability of both existing and potential receivingcommunities' infrastructure to support forces, missions, andpersonnel.

8. Environmental impact, including the impact of costsrelated to potential environmental restorations, waste management and environmental complianceactivities .

Significant features of the new list include (1) reassertion of the overall importance of "military value," (2) increased emphasis on joint war-fighting, training, and readiness, and (3)dependence on local communities to support military missions.

BRAC Developments: 2003

In mid-January 2003, two senior members of the House Armed Services Committee(Representative Gene Taylor and Representative Joel Hefley) expressed the desire to either changeor repeal the new base closure law ( P.L. 107-107 ). (6) Several months later, on May 6, Representative Hefley, chairmanof the House Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee, announced he would be receptive to apostponement, but would not offer an amendment. (7)

On May 9, 2003, the Readiness Subcommittee approved its part of the defense authorizationbill ( H.R. 1588 ), in which it adopted an amendment by Representative Taylor to repealthe 2005 round. A few days later, however, the full House Armed Services Committee voted torestore the 2005 closings. The chairman, Representative Duncan Hunter, argued that killing thebase-closing round would only lead to a veto by the President and make the committeeirrelevant. (8)

On May 21, 2003, the White House threatened to veto any bill if it included languagedelaying or cancelling DOD's ability to conduct another round of closures. (9)

On May 22, 2003, the House passed its defense authorization bill, including a provision thatwould exempt half of domestic bases from being closed. The bill, also, would require theDepartment of Defense to maintain a sufficient number of bases to handle a surge in military forcesin the event of a future crisis. In final conference action in early November 2003, the "exemption"initiative failed, while the "surge" initiative succeeded ( H.Rept. 108-354 ). (10)

Also, on May 22, 2003, the Senate passed its defense bill ( S. 1050 ). It did notcontain any significant domestic base closure language, but did provide authority to create acommission to review overseas bases. In later conference action, however, the overseas basesinitiative was dropped. (11) The issue, nevertheless, remained alive. On November 4, 2003,the Military Construction Appropriations Act for FY2004 (Section 128) provided for a commissionof eight members to review overseas bases. It further stipulated that appointment of the membersmust be made no later than 45 days after enactment of the act. (12)

On June 4, 2003, Senator Byron Dorgan offered an amendment to repeal the authority for anew base closure round in 2005. He said he could not think of a worse time to consider such a step. Senator Trent Lott, a co-sponsor of the amendment, concurred. He explained that "At this time, wehave not properly assessed our needs. We are at war. It sends a terrible signal, and it is bad for theeconomy." He later suggested that, perhaps, delaying the next round to 2006 might be worthconsidering." (13) Inopposition, Senator Saxby Chambliss said that "putting off the BRAC 2005 round now will onlyprolong the anxiety in our communities surrounding our military installations." (14) In the final vote, theamendment was defeated 42 to 53 -- a margin that many might regard as surprisingly close.

In contrast, letters sent to the committees by Pentagon officials strenuously argued that DODwas overburdened with an infrastructure that was simply no longer needed to support the size of theU.S. forces. The Secretary of Defense stressed that "BRAC provides the opportunity to configureour infrastructure to maximize capability and efficiency." (15)

On July 1, 2003, DOD officials issued a memo reorganizing its installations and environmentoffice in anticipation of the impending 2005 base realignment and closure round. It created a newBRAC directorate that would identify which bases to eliminate. In the past, DOD has acceded tothe individual services' recommendations on closures. In the new round, it appears the Office of theSecretary of Defense is poised to exercise a much greater degree of control. (16)

The House defense appropriations bill for 2004 included a provision that would closeRoosevelt Roads Naval Station, Puerto Rico's largest employer. Several Members of Congressinsisted that without the live-fire bombing range on Vieques island, there was little military valuein retaining the military base. (17) The Senate's appropriations bill did not contain language forclosing the base.

Under Section 8132 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY2004 ( P.L.108-87 ), the Secretary of the Navy was directed to close the Naval Station Roosevelt Roads not laterthan six months after its enactment, which occurred on September 30, 2003. Virtually all themilitary activity at the Naval Station has ceased, and military units and functions have beentransferred to other installations located in the southeastern continental United States.

The act also required that the closure be carried out in accordance with the procedures andauthorities contained in the relevant Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, ascurrently amended.

On December 23, 2003, the Pentagon issued its initial criteria for selecting bases for closureand realignment, sending it to the Federal Register for public comment as required by law. (18) DOD stated that it wouldtake into consideration military installations' current and future capabilities, cost and manpower,location availability, economic impact on communities, ability to support personnel, andenvironmental impact. In addition, the President was required to certify that there was need for anew BRAC round and that there would be an annual net savings by the end of FY2011.

BRAC Developments: 2004

DOD Implements Selection Criteria

On January 6, 2004, the Department of Defense requested commanders of installations in theUnited States, its territories and possessions, to gather information as part of the 2005 base closureround. It stated, however, that no information would be released to the public until after DOD haddelivered its list to the independent base closure Commission in the spring of 2005. It also noted thatin the past four completed rounds, 85% of DOD's closures and realignments were approved by theCommission. (19)

On January 22, 2004, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, chairman of the Military ConstructionAppropriations Subcommittee, sent a letter to the Pentagon stating that "While military value isimportant to assessing the necessity of installations, the DOD should also conduct a comprehensivestudy of U.S. facilities abroad and determine whether existing base structures and locations meet theneeds of current and future missions. It would be unwise to close or realign domestic bases that maybe needed for troops returning from outdated facilities abroad."

Senator Hutchison, further, stated that "The DOD should also consider how closing orrealignment of installations affects our homeland security. The current draft criteria, very similarto that proposed in the previous BRAC rounds, do not fully reflect the security of issues our countryfaces in the wake of September 11, 2001. Our nation is not dealing with the same threats as we werein 1995 and, therefore, we must develop new strategies to insure the military does not close a baseonly to later realize its costly mistake." (20)

On February 12, 2004, the Pentagon published its final criteria for the 2005 round. Thecriteria were identical to the initial draft version, leading some who took advantage of theopportunity to comment on the process to criticize the Department's selection. The principal concernamong commentators regarding the final criteria seemed to be its overall vagueness. RepresentativeSam Farr raised the issue on the same day in the House Appropriations Subcommittee hearings onmilitary construction. He stated that the criteria were so broadly constructed that they could suitalmost any desired outcome. (21)

In reply to this charge, the Pentagon explained that, "The inherent mission diversity of themilitary departments and defense agencies makes it impossible for DOD to specify detailed criteria. Broad criteria allow flexibility of application across a wide range of functions within theDepartment." (22)

The 2005 base closure law provided Congress with the option of passing an act ofdisapproval regarding the final selection criteria. It set a deadline of March 1, 2004, for undertakingsuch an action. The deadline having passed without congressional action, DOD's finalization of theselection criteria for closing bases automatically took place.

DOD Sends Report to Congress

On March 23, 2004, as part of the budget justification required by Congress each year, theSecretary of Defense submitted a detailed report on the need for a further BRAC round. He alsocertified that an additional round of closures and realignments would result in annual net savings foreach of the military departments, beginning not later than FY2011. (23) Absent the certification,the 2005 base closure round would have been cancelled.

In the report, DOD developed a long-range force structure plan based on the probable threatsto national security from 2005 to 2025. It also constructed a comprehensive installation inventory,arrayed by military department and by active and reserve component installations. To assess theamount of excess infrastructure anticipated in FY2009, DOD used the parametric analytical approachthat it used in a similar earlier 1998 assessment. (24)

The DOD report focused on major U.S. installations across broad categories, rather than theentire inventory, which includes myriad smaller sites. In addition, DOD weighed the anticipatedcontinuing need for installations outside the United States, as well as any efficiencies that might begained from joint tenancy. Also, DOD used its experiences with prior rounds to assess the economiceffects of base closures and realignments on communities in the vicinity of affected installations.

The report estimated that DOD possessed, in aggregate, 24% excess installation capacity. Itpointed out, however, that "only a comprehensive BRAC analysis can determine the exact nature andlocation of potential excess." (25) It then went on to explain that DOD would conduct a thoroughreview of its existing infrastructure in the coming year, ensuring that all installations will be treatedequally and evaluated on their continuing military value to the nation. (26)

The release of DOD's report was followed, on March 25, 2004, by a House Armed ServicesMilitary Readiness subcommittee hearing on base closures, at which some Members voiced strongopposition to the timing of the new round. Others were more conflicted -- wanting to support thewar on terror, on the one hand, but also concerned about the many open-ended challenges facingDOD and the country, on the other. (27)

On the same day, the General Accounting Office issued a report on the new BRAC round. It stated that DOD's 2005 selection criteria followed a framework similar to that employed in the fourprior rounds. It also said that the criteria were generally sound but pointed out that DOD needed toconsider, in its analyses, the absence of total agency-related and environmental costs. (28)

Congress Considers BRAC Delay

On March 24, 2004, Representative Solomon Ortiz introduced legislation ( H.R. 4023 ), calling for a two-year delay in implementing a new BRAC round. His bill was supported by30 co-sponsors. He said: "This is not the time to be shutting down bases." He noted that the militaryhad on-going operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and might move troops home as it closes downbases overseas. (29)

On March 25, 2004, Representative Joel Hefley, chairman of the House Armed ServicesMilitary Readiness Subcommittee, conducted a lengthy oversight hearing on BRAC. Thediscussions revealed significant emerging bipartisan support for delaying the BRAC process.

On April 1, 2004, the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness and ManagementSupport held hearings that included discussion of the 2005 base closure round. Deputy UnderSecretary of Defense Raymond DuBois argued that any delay in the BRAC process would upset theongoing global posture review aimed at determining which bases in the United States would receivethe overseas force structure. He emphasized that "We must do the overseas piece first ... and by theend of May." (30)

Several weeks later, on May 6, 2004, the HASC subcommittee approved a two-year delaythat would postpone the next base closure round until 2007. Its chairman, Representative JoelHefley, expressed concern over the timing. "It would be a bad mistake to do it in the middle of awar," he said.

On May 12, 2004, the full House Armed Services Committee addressed the base closureissue. Representative Gene Taylor offered an amendment to terminate the 2005 round. Thecommittee, however, adopted a more moderate stand offered by Representative Joel Hefley. Hissubstitute amendment called for delaying the round from 2005 to 2007.

On May 18, 2004, Senator Trent Lott introduced an amendment to delay the 2005 BRACround. He explained that DOD should first close its bases overseas before closing those at home. The Senator was supported by a large number of bipartisan colleagues, but he also confronted strongopposition from Senator John Warner and other key leaders. The amendment was narrowly defeatedby a vote of 49 to 47. (31)

Two days later, on May 20, 2004, the full House voted 259 to 162 to delay base closings until2007. In response to this action, the White House immediately released a statement declaring thatthe Secretary of Defense, and other senior advisers, would urge the President to veto any bill thatweakened, delayed, or repealed the current base closure authority.

On September 23, 2004, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on global forceposture, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld reiterated the threat of a veto. He further stated that thetiming of the planned return of about 70,000 U.S. forces from overseas, along with the scheduledBRAC round, were inextricably linked. (32)

In the same hearing, Senator John Warner, chairman of the defense committee, warned thatcommunities were already spending millions of dollars hiring experts to BRAC-proof theirinstallations. To perpetuate the situation for two more years, he stressed, would be an enormousburden to communities on top of the high cost of keeping open bases no longer needed. (33)

On October 8, 2004, Senate and House conferees reached agreement on the National DefenseAuthorization Act for FY2005, which included continued support of DOD's authority to conduct the2005 base closure and realignment round. Senator John Warner stated, "This Administration priorityis absolutely essential and necessary ... to allow the Department to evaluate its infrastructure and tomake smart decisions to support a well-postured 21st Century military. We must complete thiscrucial process over the next year in order to reduce aging, excess infrastructure, provide resourcesfor the military where they need it the most, and provide investment and development opportunitiesfor the local communities that so strongly support our forces." (34)

On the same day, Representative Duncan Hunter underscored four provisions of the lawintended to improve the BRAC implementation process. These included (1) prohibiting anyrevision of DOD's force-structure plan or infrastructure inventory after March 15, 2005; (2) codifyingthe Secretary of Defense's criteria for selecting bases to be closed and realigned; (3) repealing theauthority of the Secretary of Defense to place installations in inactive status; and (4) prohibiting theCommission from changing the Secretary of Defense's selections -- unless at least two members ofthe Commission visit the installation involved, and at least seven members of the Commissionsupport the decision. (35) This last provision was intended to ensure that a super-majority of BRAC commissionersprevailed. (36)

Community Concerns about BRAC

Local Efforts to Prevent Closures(37)

As a result of the impending new round of base closures, many community leaders have beensearching for ways to protect nearby military installations. In these efforts, they have received muchencouragement and financial support from their respective state and local governments. Millionsof dollars are currently being spent to improve the infrastructure near bases, with the intent ofensuring their survival.

The Pentagon, with an interest in paring down the military, is looking at bases with only oneor two missions, or some other critical vulnerability. At the other end of the continuum is FortJackson, SC which, besides including a basic combat and advanced individual Army trainingprogram, also is the home of a chaplain school, a drill sergeants' school, the Soldier Support Institute,and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute. (38)

In August 2003, leaders in San Antonio, Texas proposed a constitutional amendment authorizing the state to issue $250 million in bonds to help protect Texas military installations. Local communities, under this arrangement are able to borrow the bond proceeds at low rates forprojects that "enhance the military value" of facilities. (39)

In another example, a non-profit community organization in Shreveport, LA offered to buildand refurbish more than 300 housing units at Barksdale Air Force Base -- at no additional cost toDOD. The offer was made after many complaints about the inadequacy of its military housing.

In other cases, state "retention" grants have been awarded to help local communities (1)establish links between military bases and state universities; (2) utilize the potential forpublic-private partnerships; and (3) consider exchanging military land with private developers inreturn for building new base facilities.

When asked for advice on how to prevent base closures, one leading former defense officialanswered that the communities should emphasize existing strengths and new partnerships with themilitary. "Our advice to the communities," he said, "was always the same -- make sure the strengthsof your facility are known." (40)

Addressing the Encroachment Issue

Of special concern to many communities, as well as the Department of Defense, is "rangeencroachment." It is the process whereby a military base is progressively hemmed in by urbangrowth, competition for air space, protection of an endangered species, and other factors. Such adevelopment can detract from a base's desirability, and thus make it a target for future closure andrealignment in the next round.

In the past, the Department of Defense has regarded encroachment as a local governmentissue over which it had little or no control. According to one Pentagon official, John Leigh, thefederal government remained virtually powerless to intervene in local community growth issues. However, laws have been passed in the last few years that now require local jurisdictions to considerthe impact of new growth on military readiness when making land-use decisions. (41)

An October 2002 study by the National Governors Association drew attention to the risingproblem of encroachment in many states. A condensed section of the study follows:

Civilian encroachment is beginning to restrict oreliminate testing and training activities in many locations. Eighty percent of our nation's installationsare experiencing urban growth at a rate higher than the national average. Residential andcommercial communities are potentially exposed to artillery fire, aircraft noise, dust, and worse yetaccidents.

As urban growth and development increase near andaround bases, so do land-use conflicts between mission activities and local communities. Forinstance, many military airports conduct night training exercises. The city lights of encroachingdevelopment often compromise the effectiveness of night vision equipment, making night trainingexercises impractical.

The extent of urban encroachment and its effect onoperational activity of an installation is a consideration in determining its future viability, and suchmission constraint can lead to activity reductions or even closures. The resulting reduction ininstallation personnel and mission activities can jeopardize economic activity, jobs, and tax revenues.Encroachment puts local and state economies at risk. (42)

The FY2003 defense authorization act ( P.L. 107-314 ) included a natural resource conversionprovision that addressed the impact of land development on military installations. The Pentagonargued that environmental requirements placed serious limitations on the use of certain lands. Asa result, Section 2881 authorized the Secretary of Defense to create conservation buffer zones outsideits installations to help prevent urban sprawl, while also providing habitat for endangered species.Environmental advocates have argued that DOD needs to work more closely with developers andlocal officials, who are likely to be focused on increasing the area's tax base.

The FY2004 defense authorization conference report requires the Secretary of Defense toconduct a comprehensive study on the impact of various types of encroachment issues affectingmilitary installations and operational ranges. The report must be completed not later than January31, 2006. (43)

U.S. Overseas Basing Initiative

On August 16, 2004, the President announced that the Pentagon would redistribute itsoverseas bases as a means of achieving a more agile and flexible force. The initiative, as part of aGlobal Posture Review, came after three years of study and consultation. In his statement, thePresident made it clear he would retain a significant military presence overseas, but that he alsointended to bring home about 60,000 to 70,000 uniformed personnel and about 100,000 familymembers and civilian employees over the next ten years. (44)

Opponents of the 2005 base realignment and closure plan have seized on the President'sannouncement, arguing that roughly one-third of the soldiers overseas will be returning home andthat, given the circumstances, it would be premature to close domestic facilities. Key Members ofCongress, most notably Senators Kay Bailey Hutchison and Dianne Feinstein (Chair and RankingMember of the Senate Appropriations' Subcommittee on Military Construction), expressed theirconcerns in this regard.

On April 8, 2003, these two Senators sponsored a bill ( S. 949 ) to create abipartisan Overseas Basing Commission (OBC). (45) Its purpose was "to assess the adequacy of the U.S. militaryfootprint overseas, consider the feasibility and advisability of closing any current U.S. installations,and provide to Congress recommendations for a comprehensive overseas basing strategy that meetsthe current and projected needs of the United States." (46)

On April 29, 2003, the sponsors explained: "If we reduce our overseas presence, we needstatewide bases to station returning troops. It is senseless to close bases on U.S. soil in 2005 onlyto determine a few years later that we made a costly, irrevocable mistake." (47) The two Members ofCongress also said that the new commission would last for one year, include eight congressionallyappointed members, and be completed for the opening of the 2005 BRAC process. (48)

In a July 10, 2003 statement, the White House threatened not to cooperate with an OverseasBasing Commission, saying that it was already looking at current and future force structure andbasing needs. A congressional commission looking over DOD's shoulders, it argued, wasunnecessary. In spite of White House opposition, however, the OBC became law when PresidentGeorge Bush signed the Fiscal Year 2004 Military Construction Appropriations Act on November22, 2003 ( P.L. 108-132 ).

The Overseas Basing Commission was originally scheduled to report its findings byDecember 31, 2004. As a result of delays in forming the OBC, its deadline was extended to August31, 2005 -- with a preliminary draft issued by the end of March.

On November 9, 2004, the OBC held a hearing in which John Hamre, former deputySecretary of Defense, said that DOD had not thought enough about how realigning forces abroadcould be used strategically to shape the international environment in the coming decades. He notedthat the kinds of changes to the U.S. military posture DOD was contemplating at this time weredriven primarily by operational expediency, rather than strategy. "The problem," he emphasized, "isthat in order to be sustainable over the long-term, U.S. bases overseas must be part of an overallpolitical, diplomatic, and strategic framework." He did not feel that the Administration hadestablished "an enduring framework for the new bases DOD was contemplating." (49)

Six months later, on May 5, 2005, the OBC unveiled its preliminary report regarding thePentagon's global basing plans. According to early press accounts, the commission is concerned thatthe Pentagon is pursuing global change too rapidly, and that it is providing insufficient support inseveral other important aspects: such as adequate airlift and sealift, the need for heavy forces inEurope, and "quality of life" issues. (50)

BRAC Developments: 2005

The 2005 BRAC Commission

The 2005 base realignment and closure statute entitled the President to nominate ninemembers to an independent base closure Commission, by a date no later than March 15, 2005. Hewas also given the opportunity to ignore the directive -- with the result that the new BRAC roundwould have been cancelled. (51) The President, however, declined to exercise that authority. (52)

In appointing members to the new BRAC Commission, the statute states that the President should consult with the top congressional leadership, as outlined below:

The three remaining appointments do not require consultation with Congress. A relatedmatter of likely interest will be the composition of the Commission members. In the past fourBRAC rounds, they have included

Former Members of Congress

Retired military leaders

Former U.S. ambassadors

Business leaders -- industry, banking, etc.

Former House and Senate staff members

Former White House staff members

Over a period of two months, from February 1, 2005 to April 1, 2005, the President andsenior congressional leaders conducted a review and, ultimately, approved the selection of ninecommissioners to the 2005 base closure and realignment round.

Speaker of the House J. Dennis Hastert recommended former Representative James V.Hansen of Utah, and Samuel K. Skinner of Illinois. The latter formerly served on President GeorgeBush's chief of staff.

House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi recommended Philip E. Coyle III of California, aformer Assistant Secretary of Defense and Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.

Senate Majority Leader William H. Frist recommended retired General Lloyd W. Newton, USAF (Ret.) of Connecticut, and retired Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr. USN (Ret.) of Virginia.

Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid recommended former Representative James Bilbray ofNevada.

The President selected Anthony A. Principi of California to be the chairman of the2005BRAC Commission. He was, most recently, vice-president of the Pfizer Corporation. In earlieryears, he served as the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the chief counsel for the Senate ArmedServices Committee and the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee, and as a top official with defensecontractor Lockheed Martin. In addition, he is a decorated Vietnam war veteran.

The two other nominees selected by the President were Brigadier General Sue Ellen Turner, USAF (Ret.) of Texas, and General James T. Hill, USA (Ret.) of Florida .

With its formal establishment, the BRAC Commission proceeded to conduct a series of local,D.C. -- area hearings to collect general information on DOD's force structure needs and goals for theBRAC process. It will also conduct regional hearings at locations throughout the country to provideaffected communities with the chance to express their views and concerns. At least onecommissioner, it has been said, will visit each base on DOD's designated list. An additional roundor two of hearings (local and regional) are possible before completion of the BRAC deliberativeprocess -- after which the Commission will send its final list to the President.

It should be noted that, due to current BRAC law, the Commission can only add a base toDOD's list under the following circumstances. Two commissioners must visit the installation -- andseven of the nine commissioners must reach agreement on the final decision. (53) In past rounds, thereappears to be no evidence of such restrictions. A vote by a simple majority of commissioners wassufficient to justify adding a base to DOD's list.

Debate On Status of the National Guard

On March 24, 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld received a letter from Illinoiscongressional leaders stating that, according to a provision of federal law, the Pentagon could notclose National Guard bases without a governor's consent. They called on the Secretary toimmediately stop any actions that might violate the law.

On April 12, 2005, the Department of Defense sent a letter to the Illinois lawmakers rejectingtheir claim. The letter stated that, for BRAC to be a truly comprehensive process and to achievesuccess, "the process must involve all installations, including those used by the reservecomponents." (54) Othersources have stated that the BRAC law and the law prohibiting the closing of National Guardfacilities appear to be unrelated.

With the swearing-in of the new base closure Commission on May 3, 2005, the NationalGuard issue resurfaced. In its first set of hearings, the chairman, Anthony J. Principi, asserted thatthe debate over the governor's legal authority would not slow his panel's consideration of DOD'sproposed list -- that it was an issue for the lawyers to decide. (55)

DOD Lowers Estimate of Excess Capacity

On March 29, 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged that the 2005 baseclosure and realignment round might be less extensive than initially expected. At a news conference,he explained that DOD's previous estimate of excess capacity had been 20 to 25 percent, but that "itlooks now like the actual number will be less than the lower figure of that range." He said thechange was due to the ongoing effort by DOD to close military facilities overseas, which in turnnecessitates moving tens of thousands of troops back to U.S. bases -- perhaps, as many as 70,000. Even so, Secretary Rumsfeld expects that the 2005 round of closures and realignments will affectmore installations than all of the four previous rounds. (56)

Effort Made to Block Nominations

On March 31, 2005, Senator Trent Lott placed a hold on the President's nomination of formerSecretary of Veterans Affairs, Anthony Principi, as head of the 2005 base closure Commission. Itwas also reported in the press that Senator Lott intended to place holds on each of the remainingBRAC Commission nominees who had yet to appear before the Armed Services Committee for theirconfirmation hearings. (57) A staunch opponent of BRAC, Senator Lott joined otherlawmakers last year in a bid to delay the 2005 round by two years. His amendment to the Senate'sFY2005 defense authorization bill was narrowly defeated by a vote of 49 to 47. (58)

On April 1, 2005, President Bush took the unusual step of announcing the recess appointmentof all nine BRAC Commission members, thereby eliminating the requirement for Senateconfirmation. (59) Senator John Warner, who heads the Armed Services Committee supported the White Housedecision, saying that such delays might otherwise complicate completion of the 2005 BRAC round.

Base Closure Commission Hearings

On March 15, 2005, the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing on thenomination of Anthony Principi to be the chairman of the base realignment and closure commission.In his comments to the committee, Mr. Principi stressed that the new commission would bebipartisan, that it would comply with the both the intent and spirit of the BRAC law, and would seekall and any information needed from the Department of Defense to make the right decisions. (60)

On April 7, 2005, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life helda hearing on base realignment and closure and its relationship to DOD's global posture review. (61) In his opening remarks,Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Phil Grone underscored three key imperatives: (1) furthering theongoing transformation of the armed forces; (2) maximizing the joint utilization of DOD's assets;and (3) eliminating DOD's excess infrastructure capacity, both at home and abroad. He saidsubsequently that global defense posture changes and domestic base realignment and closure werekey, interlinked elements that supported on-going force transformation. "A well-supportedcapability-based force structure," he stressed "should have infrastructure that is best sized and placedto support national security needs and emerging mission requirements." (62)

On May 3, 2005, the new BRAC Commission held its first hearing, a morning session thatopened with the swearing-in of all nine members. In the first hearing, the Commission was briefedby witnesses from the Congressional Research Service and the Government Accountability Officeon the statute guiding the decisions and criteria that are to be applied in evaluating DOD's proposedselection, the issues it is likely to face in the months to come, as well as the lessons learned fromprior BRAC rounds.

In the afternoon session, the panel was briefed by the chairman of the National IntelligenceCouncil on threats to the United States over the next 20 years. These threats included"unconventional tactics such as sabotage, terrorism, information attacks, and weapons of massdestruction used by terrorists insurgents and other non-state enemies that might alter how the militaryfights its battles." (63) A third hearing was held by the Commission on May 4, 2005, which addressed important DOD force structure issues, including the need to secure the United States from a direct attack and the need tostrengthen partnerships and alliances abroad.

Pentagon Delivers 2005 BRAC List

On May 13, 2005, the new BRAC Commission received DOD's list of base realignments andclosures. The Pentagon announced that it planned to close 33 major U.S. installations and realign 29 others -- in a move to consolidate forces and save almost $50 billion over 20 years. The overallnumber of current major bases, by DOD's account, is 318. In addition to the 62 major installations,DOD seeks to close or realign 775 smaller facilities.

Table 1 compares the first four BRAC rounds (1988 to 1995), with the single, currentlyproposed 2005 round:

Table 1. Results of BRAC-RelatedActions

Table 2 provides information on the impact of new closures and realignments as it may affect state jobs.

Table 2. Net Jobs Lost and Gained

Source: Department of Defense

On May 16, 2005, the BRAC Commission began an intensive schedule of hearings onCapitol Hill. It opened with the appearance of the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, andcontinued throughout the week, with testimony from each of the military chiefs of staff and theirsubordinates.

A number of significant elements have emerged from the hearings, including the following:

The Secretary of Defense stated that the U.S. military has only about 5 to 10percent excess capacity once it takes into consideration the space it will need to accommodate 70,000troops returning from Europe. The Pentagon had earlier estimated it had 20 to 25 percent morecapacity than it needed. The Secretary explained that the upper figure was imprecise, that it wasunclear whether past recommendations included leased space or requirements for maintaining a"surge capacity." (64)

The Pentagon plans to consolidate military Reserve and Guard facilities into125 new multi-component Armed Forces Reserve Centers that would combine Army, Navy, AirForce and Marine Corps elements.

The Army will close 176 ArmyReserve centers and 211 Army National Guard facilities, but it will build 125multi-service Reserve centers in places better suited to help its flaggingrecruiting efforts. Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum, chief of the National Guard Bureau,stated that, "By closing or divesting ourselves of inefficient facilities andmoving to places where we have better demographics and constructing joinfacilities, I think we give better opportunity to the members of the Reservecomponent, make it more convenient and give them more choices." (65) Thisappeared to be the most contentious issue during the earlyhearings.

The Pentagon plans to move thousands of military and civilian workers out ofleased commercial high-rise buildings near the Pentagon in Northern Virginia, and at other urbansites, in order to provide increased security at bases around the country.

The Department of Defense has decided to shift significant numbers of U.S.military forces and assets from New England and the Mid-West to the South and the Far-West. Asquoted by one report, "[The] Pentagon has apparently found its ideal environment: proximity to thecoasts for rapid deployment, cheap and plentiful land, and a culture more tied to martialtraditions." (66)

On May 18, 2005, Representative Jeb Bradley and several other House Armed ServicesCommittee members attempted to halt the BRAC process by introducing a bill that would havedelayed base closings and realignments. The amendment was defeated by voice vote. The Chairmanof the House Readiness Subcommittee, Representative Joel Hefley, sympathized with his colleagues,but allowed that there was not much that they could do to alter the situation.

On May 23, 2005, the BRAC Commission announced that its members would visit 20military sites in many different parts of the country, beginning on May 24 and ending on May 27.A week or so later, the Commission is expected to conduct a series of 16 regional hearings,beginning on June 7 and ending on July 14. Chairman Principi has stated that these visits willprovide, not only a forum for the Commissioners and its staff to learn details of what is happeningat closing bases, but also a forum for them to understand the impact of BRAC decisions on the localcommunities involved.

On May 24, 2005, the Missouri delegation of Congress sent a letter to Secretary of DefenseRumsfeld complaining about the absence of adequate information. It said that the lack of materialwas hurting their ability to make a case to keep bases open. The Pentagon replied that it hadprovided most of the important information and data, with the exception of a small amount ofclassified material that was undergoing DOD's security clearance process. (67)

The following day, Representative Bradley again attempted to postpone the 2005 round bysubmitting an amendment to the FY2006 Defense Authorization bill ( H.R. 1815 ). Herecommended curtailing the next round until one year after certain conditions were met, namely:implementation of DOD's Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure; return of a substantialnumber of U.S. troops from Iraq; submission of DOD's Quadrennial Defense Review to the Houseand Senate Armed Services Committees; and other related requirements. His bill was defeated bya vote of 112-316. (68)

The 2005 BRAC Timeline

The timeline below identifies the key actions involving the 2005 base closure andrealignment round. The most important decisions are those of the President and Congress, whichhave the opportunity, in each of two cases, to completely shut down the overall BRAC process (seebold text).

Table 3. The 2005 BRAC Timeline