March 11 Terrorist Attacks in Madrid and Spain's Elections: Implications for U.S. Policy
Released: 2004-10-05T00:00:00

RS21812 -- March 11 Terrorist Attacks in Madrid and Spain's Elections: Implications for U.S.Policy

October 5, 2004

Summary

This report discusses the March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid,Spain and their impact on Spain's March 14 parliamentary elections, which resulted in the surprise victory of theSocialist Party over the ruling right-of-center Popular Party. The report also examines some of the possibleimplications of the attacks and the elections for the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, the war on terrorism and U.S.-Spainrelations. This report will be updated as warranted. See also CRS Report RS21794 , Iraq Coalition: PublicOpinionIndicators in Selected European Countries , by [author name scrubbed].

March 11 Terrorist Attacks in Spain

During the morning rush hour of March 11, 2004, bombs hidden in 10 backpacks exploded within 15 minutesof eachother on four trains along a nine-mile stretch of a commuter line from the suburb of Santa Eugenia to the busyAtocharail terminal in Madrid. Three other backpack bombs were defused by police. The explosions killed 191 personsandwounded over 1800 others. The death toll was by far the largest ever for a terrorist attack in Spain and was thelargestin Europe since the 1988 bombing of a Pan Am airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland. The attacks took place exactlytwoand one-half years after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.

The Spanish government, led by Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar of the right-of-center Popular Party (PP), quicklyinsisted that the attacks were the work of the Basque terrorist group ETA and downplayed any suggestion thatIslamicextremists could be involved. In justifying their view, Spanish officials noted that they had stopped an ETA efforttoplace bombs on trains on Christmas Eve 2003 and had intercepted on February 29 a Madrid-bound van loaded bytheETA with one thousand pounds of explosives. On the day of the attack, at Spain's urging, the U.N. Security Councilpassed Resolution 1530, which condemned ETA's alleged role in the bombing. However, skeptics noted that thescope of the attacks, the detailed planning and precision needed to carry them out, and above all, the huge casualtytollwere more likely to be hallmarks of Al Qaeda or an Al Qaeda-like organization, not ETA.

The credibility of the government began to crumble quickly as indications emerged of the possible involvement ofIslamic extremists in the bombings. Less than four hours after the attacks, police found several detonators and anaudiotape of verses from the Koran in an abandoned van in the town of Alcala de Henares, through which thebombedtrains had passed. About 12 hours after the attacks, police found a cellphone from an unexploded backpack bomb. They traced it to a business owned by a Moroccan immigrant named Jamal Zougam, who was suspected of havinglinks to Al Qaeda. Despite these discoveries on the day of the attacks, the government continued to insist publiclythatETA was responsible until hours before the polls opened on March 14, when police arrested Zougam as well as twoother Moroccans and two Indians suspected of involvement in the attacks. (1)

The government's perceived mishandling of the crisis sparked outrage among many Spaniards. Critics of the government charged that it had deliberately tried to focus blame on ETA rather than Al Qaeda, knowing that if thepublic believed that ETA had committed the attacks, the government's popularity could be enhanced, due to thebroadpublic support for its hard-line stance against ETA. On the other hand, if Al Qaeda or an affiliated group wasresponsible, critics asserted, the government feared that it would lose support because many voters would believethatit had brought the attacks on Spain by its highly unpopular support for the war in Iraq.

Spanish police have made progress in breaking up the terrorist cell responsible for the attack. On March 30, SpanishInterior Minister Angel Acebes said that the government suspected the Al Qaeda-linked Moroccan IslamicCombatantGroup with involvement in the attacks. Spanish and Moroccan officials believe the group was also involved in May2003 suicide bombing attacks in Casablanca, Morocco which killed 45 people, including several Spaniards. OnApril2, an unexploded bomb was found on railroad tracks between Madrid and Seville. On April 3, seven men suspectedofinvolvement in the Madrid attacks were killed when they blew themselves up after they were surrounded by police.The dead included the alleged leader of the terrorists, Serhane ben Abdelmajid Farkhet, known as "the Tunisian." Police found evidence that the group was ready to commit additional attacks. Police have said that the groupfinancedits activities through drug trafficking and other crimes. In June 2004, Italian police arrested Rabei Osman SayedAhmed, known as 'Mohammed the Egyptian." Ahmed, a former explosives instructor in Al Qaeda training camps,was one of the principal planners of the March 11 attacks, according to police. By September 2004, nearly twodozenpersons charged with involvement in the attacks were in police custody. A parliamentary commission began aninvestigation into the March 11 attacks and the government's response to them in June 2004.

Spain's March 14 Election

The terrorist attacks took place just before Spain's March 14 parliamentary elections, leading some observerstoconclude that they may have been intended to influence the vote. In a public opinion poll taken in February 2004,two-thirds of those polled said that the war in Iraq had increased the threat of terrorism, and 85% were concernedabout a possible terrorist strike against Spain. (2) Nevertheless, although the opposition Socialist Party (PSOE) led byJose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero campaigned in part on the strong public opposition to the government's Iraq policy,theruling PP appeared to be poised for a narrow victory, based on its record of a largely successful economic policyandits tough stand against ETA. The PP campaign was led not by Aznar, who is retiring from politics at the end of histerm, but by his successor as PP leader, Mariano Rajoy.

Although the PP held a lead in opinion polls in the weeks prior to the election, its projected margin of victory shranksteadily. According to the final opinion polls published on March 7 (Spanish law imposes a blackout on public pollsfive days before an election), PP was expected to win 42% of the vote and the PSOE 38%. These totals would havemeant that the PP would likely have lost its absolute majority in parliament, but would have likely stayed in powerincoalition with smaller regional parties. Another late poll taken before the bombings put the PP's lead at 2.5%. Internal polls of both parties on the day before the attacks reportedly had the two parties in a virtual dead heat. (3)

The results of the election surprised many observers. The Socialist Party of Spain (PSOE) won 42.5% of thevote tothe PP's 37.6%. The Socialists won 164 seats in the Congress of Deputies, up from 125 in the previous parliament. The PP won 148 seats, down from its previous total of 183 seats. The Socialists fell short of an absolute majority,sothey will have to form a coalition, perhaps among the United Left, a tiny, hard-line Communist party, and severalregional parties. The PP maintained control of the Senate, the regionally-based house of the parliament.

Turnout for the vote was 77.2%, up from 68.7% in the 2000 elections. It should be noted that this turnout, while high,is not unprecedented in Spain's recent electoral history, and is often associated with changes in government. Turnoutin 1996 was 77.38% and 79.97% in 1982, each case corresponding to a victory by the opposition of the time. (4) SomeSpanish observers attributed a large part of the PSOE's success to the votes of about 2 million young, first-timevoters. Madrid-based observers noted that the news of the arrest of Al Qaeda-linked figures on the evening ofMarch13 was transmitted rapidly among young people by cellphone, as was the exhortation, perhaps encouraged bySocialistsupporters, to punish the government at the polls. (5)

Implications

A Victory for Terror or Spanish Democracy?

After the elections, a delicate issue raised by political leaders and analysts in Spain and throughout the world has been:did Al Qaeda "win" this election by intimidating the Spanish electorate (thereby perhaps setting a troublingprecedentfor other countries), or did the election result demonstrate the strength of Spain's democracy? Some Spaniards,especially supporters of the Socialists, said that the result did not reflect a desire to appease terrorists, but was duetopublic anger at an allegedly arrogant government that had made decisions on Iraq and other issues without thesupportof the Spanish public. They note that public opinion polls had shown that up to 90% of the public was opposed tothegovernment's support for the war in Iraq and rejected a link between the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq. Theeffort to blame ETA for the March 11 bombing was the final straw for many voters, they assert. As for the chargethatthe terrorist attacks had determined the outcome, Zapatero's supporters point to a post-election poll in which only8.8% of those polled said that the terrorist attacks had affected their vote. (6)

Those critical of the election result note that the government appeared to be headed for a narrow victory just daysbefore the attack, appearing to make the attack the decisive factor in the result. Some observers, including somein theUnited States, have criticized the election results as dangerous appeasement of terrorists. On March 17, HouseSpeaker Dennis Hastert said, "Here's a country that stood against terrorism and had a huge terrorist act within theircountry, and they chose to change their government and to, in a sense, appease terrorists." Representative HenryHyde,chairman of the House International Relations Committee, said "the vote in Spain was a great victory for AlQaeda." (7) Administration officials have avoided making statements directly critical of the election results, perhaps fearing theirimpact on relations with the new government.

Like their Socialist adversaries, Spanish conservatives reject any implication that the election result revealed cowardice by the Spanish people, noting Spain's struggle of more than three decades against ETA and its continuedcommitment to the deployment in Afghanistan after a May 2003 plane crash that killed 62 Spanish soldiers returningfrom the country. However, according to one view, some Spaniards may be laboring under a delusion that they canopt out of the dangers of globalization, while enjoying the benefits. According to this interpretation, many in Spainmay believe that their country is a secondary player in world affairs and should not get mixed up in great powerpolitics. This supposed attitude is said to be a result of Spain's historical development, which has included acenturies-long decline from great power status and international isolation under the Franco regime. These observersbelieve that this attitude may be bolstered by perceptions among some Spaniards that the United States, includingtheBush Administration, knows little about Spain, and is insensitive to Spanish concerns. (8)

Possible Impact on the U.S.-Led Coalition in Iraq and the War on Terrorism

On April 18, 2004, the day after the new Spanish government took office, Zapatero announced the immediate withdrawal of the 1,300 Spanish troops in Iraq. The suddenness of the move came as a surprise to many observers,because during the campaign Zapatero had left open at least the possibility that the troops could stay, if certainconditions were met. In a five-minute phone call to Zapatero, President Bush expressed regret about the "abrupt"Spanish decision and warned against taking actions that would give "false comfort to terrorists." All Spanishcombattroops left Iraq by April 27. Unnamed U.S. officials sharply criticized the way the withdrawal was planned, sayingitwas done without proper coordination and in an "unprofessional" way that could unnecessarily jeopardize operationsand lives. (9) Given that Spain's troops made up lessthan 1% of coalition forces in Iraq, it may be argued that thelong-term military impact of a Spanish withdrawal may not be dramatic. However, some observers are concernedthatthe Spanish withdrawal could be part of a trend of declining public support for the Iraq mission in Europeanmembers,which could undermine the coalition in the long run. (10)

Zapatero has stressed that his first priority is the fight against terrorism, and has called for closer cooperation amongEU police and intelligence services. In September 2004, French and Spanish officials announced a joint unit ofpoliceand judges to combat terrorist groups, including ETA and Islamic extremists. However, the new government'scommitment to use military force to fight terror may be less certain. Zapatero has said that military force shouldbe a"last resort' in the war against terrorism, claiming that it "can never be an effective method for eliminating orfightingfanatic, radical and criminal groups." (11)

Nevertheless, as a signal that it is still committed to the global war on terror, Spain expanded its contribution to theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from 137 to 1,040 in August 2004, in order to provideadditional security for Afghanistan's October 2004 elections. However, Spain plans to withdraw 500 of the troopsafter the elections, despite Afghan pleas to extend the deployment of the entire contingent.

Possible Impact on U.S.-Spanish Relations

The change in government in Spain may have a significant effect on U.S.-Spanish relations. The close, personal relationship that developed between President Bush and Aznar is unlikely to be repeated with Zapatero. Aznarforgeda close relationship with the United States in part because he believed that a partnership with the world's onlysuperpower would enhance Spain's role in the world, making it a major international player. A close alliance withtheUnited States also secured U.S. support and aid for Aznar's tough stance against ETA and Basque separatism. Aznar's critics said that the Spanish leader was motivated by a desire to enhance his own personal prestige ratherthanto serve Spain's real interests. In contrast to Aznar's closeness to the Administration, Zapatero appeared to beunconcerned that some of his initial remarks might be taken as insults by the White House. For example, he assertedthat President Bush had based his Iraq policy on "lies" and suggested that the American people should vote him outofoffice in November 2004. (12) More recently, hesuggested that the chances for peace in Iraq would enhanced if morecountries followed Spain's example and pulled their forces out of Iraq, causing the United States to seek aclarification of his remarks. (13)

According to Zapatero, the current focus of Spain's foreign policy is building closer ties to its European Union partners, particularly France and Germany, while still retaining good relations with the United States. Spain's newleaders say they will push forward more vigorously with EU integration. Zapatero's supporters say this policy willbein line with the foreign policy pursued by Spain in the post-Franco era, which they view as being based on a broadpublic consensus, as opposed to the allegedly autocratic style of Aznar.

On the other hand, as in the cases of France and Germany, which have also had difficulties with Washington,damageto U.S.-Spanish relations may be limited by common interests, including the fight against terrorism. In September2004, Spain's attorney general announced that Spain and the United States plan to sign an agreement by the end of2004 under which prosecutors from both countries could share information about Islamic militants. Both theNationalIntelligence Reform Act ( S. 2845 ) and the 9/11 Recommendations Appropriations Act ( H.R. 10 ) call for closer international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, including by eliminating terroristsanctuariesand curtailing terrorist financing.

A question for the future is the use of U.S. military bases in Spain. The Administration was easily able to secure theuse of U.S. bases in Spain for the Iraq operation. The bases played a significant role in the delivery of men andmateriel to the Iraqi theater. Given the criticisms by Spain's new leaders of the concept of what they view as a U.S.policy of "preventive war," it might be more difficult to secure Spanish permission to use the bases in futureoperations, especially if the action did not have prior U.N. Security Council approval.

Footnotes

1. (back) Leslie Crawford and Joshua Levitt, "APlace in the History of Infamy -- How the Government's Assumption andMisjudgement Shook Spain," Financial Times , March 26, 2004, 15.

2. (back) AP/Ipsos poll, March 5, 2004.

3. (back) Lizette Alvarez and Elaine Sciolino,"Parsing Spain's Result: Many Voters Felt Misled," New York Times , March18, 2004, 1.

4. (back) El Pais newspaper website, http://www.elpais.es .

5. (back) Neomi Ramirez and Luis F. Fidalgo,Elecciones Generales 14-M. Resultados. Evolucion del Voto, El Mundo ,March 16, 2004, p. 17.

6. (back) "Spanish Socialists Ten Points Ahead inFirst Post-Election Poll," Agence France Presse , March 22, 2004.

7. (back) "Spanish Politicians Rebuff U.S.Accusations of Appeasement," Associated Press , March 18, 2004.

8. (back) Pablo Pardo, "The Spanish Disposition," The Weekly Standard , March 29, 2004.

9. (back) Robin Wright and Bradley Graham, "SpainPlans to Hasten Withdrawal of Troops," Washington Post, April 22,1004, 25.

10. (back) For more on this issue see CRS Report RS21794 , Iraq Coalition: Public Opinion Indicators in Selected EuropeanCountries , by [author name scrubbed].

11. (back) John Diamond, "Zapatero Wants toAlter War on Terror," USA Today , March 22, 2004, 13.

12. (back) Keith Richburg, "Spain's Next PrimeMinister Says U.S. Should Dump Bush," Washington Post , March 18, 2004,23.

13. (back) "Zapatero Comments on Iraq DrawU.S. Demand for Clarification," Agence France Presse , September 14, 2004.