Military Base Closures: Agreement on a 2005 Round
Released: 2003-01-22T00:00:00

Introduction (1)

This report discusses key base closure developments, beginning with the 105th Congress andcontinuing into the 107th Congress. The most recent notable development has been the December28, 2001 signing into law ( P.L. 107-107 ) of legislation, initially sponsored by Senator Carl Levin andSenator John McCain, to conduct one new base closure round in 2005. The legislation extends andamends the 1990 base closure and realignment Act ( P.L. 101-510 ) that expired after the 1995 round.

All action on the 451 installations scheduled to be closed and realigned by the 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC commissions was completed by the end of FY2001, as scheduled. (2) Ninety-seven installations were major military bases. According to the most recent estimates, theseBRAC closures and realignments have produced net savings of about $16.7 billion, and annualrecurring savings thereafter of about $6.6 billion. (3)

It was widely acknowledged, at the time of the 1995 round, that additional base closures wouldbe necessary, given the continuing downward trend in defense spending and force structure (unitsand personnel). Two years later, the Department of Defense began to press its case in earnest. OnMay 19, 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen released a long awaited report, the QuadrennialDefense Review (QDR). In the report, a major review of military strategy and capabilities, he calledfor two more rounds of closures, one in 1999 and the second in 2001. He explained that, despite fourprevious rounds, the downsizing of DOD's base structure had fallen behind the downsizing of itsforce structure. He pointed out that

Since the first base closure round, force structure has come down by 33% and will have declined by a total of 36% when we finish the reductions underthe QDR. During the same period, we will have reduced domestic infrastructure by 21%.... We mustshed more weight. (4)

He further explained that closing more bases was dictated not only by the need to achieve a proper balance between infrastructure and force structure, but also by the need to secure significantsavings that would allow DOD to fund adequately future readiness and weapons acquisitionprograms. He stated that without the savings from new rounds of closing, DOD would behard-pressed to fulfill its missions and responsibilities in the future.

Closures and the 105th Congress

Secretary of Defense Cohen's plan to begin new rounds of closures within the next five yearswas met with a decided lack of enthusiasm on Capitol Hill. Many Members expressed deep concernover the likely economic and political fallout in their districts from any such new rounds. Bothdefense committees of the House and Senate, during their mark-ups of the FY1998 DODauthorization bills, declined to support new base closure legislation. On June 12, 1997, the SenateArmed Services Committee narrowly failed, on a 9-9 vote, to approve a proposal to authorize twomore rounds of base closing in 1999 and 2001. The next day, Senator Carl Levin, the committee'sranking Democrat, along with Senator John McCain, Senator Dan Coats, and Senator Charles Robb,pledged to push for more base closings when the DOD authorization bill went to the floor. SenatorLevin said that, if Congress was serious about having funds for new weapons, it was necessary toreduce excess infrastructure.

On July 9, the full Senate voted 66-33 against the McCain-Levin initiative and in support of a substitute amendment that delayed any new base closings until DOD developed "accountingtechniques" to accurately measure the costs and savings from previous and future rounds. Under thesubstitute amendment, sponsored by Senator Byron Dorgan, Senator Trent Lott, and Senator TomDaschle, DOD was required to prepare and submit its cost/savings report to Congress "in a timelymanner." Although no specific date was set, the provision stipulated that the report must becompleted with adequate time for Congress to authorize another round of base closings in 2001.

In the House National Security Committee, opposition to a new round of closures was considerably stronger. Representative Joel Hefley, chairman of the subcommittee on militaryinstallations, indicated that there should be no new base closure rounds for at least five years. He,as well as others, questioned DOD's estimate of actual savings, especially in the short- andmedium-term, given the substantial up-front costs of shutting down bases. Although DOD officialshave claimed net savings, beginning in FY1996 and increasing into the future, the CongressionalBudget Office, in a December 1996 report, stated that it was unable to confirm or assess thoseestimates. (5)

Congressional opponents, further, objected to rushing into new rounds of closures without a complete and thorough understanding of the military implications of previous rounds. In this regard,they also questioned the validity of DOD's major premise that there should be a one-to-onecorrelation between the percentage of reduction in end-strength and in base closings.

Despite the lack of broad support on Capitol Hill, senior DOD officials, as well as the President, continued to press for new rounds of base closures in the near future. Both Secretary of DefenseCohen and the retiring Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John Shalikashvili, issuedstatements in September 1997 calling for more base closures as a way of making funds available fortop priority weapons programs. (6) On November 10,the Secretary of Defense and other seniorPentagon officials announced a series of reforms, titled "Defense Reform Initiative" (DRI), thatincluded two additional rounds of base closures in 2001 and 2005. These rounds, it was asserted,would eventually result in annual savings of about $1.4 billion each, or a total of $2.8 billion. (7) Thisfigure represented about half of the overall $6 billion annual savings anticipated from DRI actionsthat include, in addition to base closings, increased outsourcing to private industry, shifting topaperless contracting, administration, and publishing, and reducing the number of personnelemployed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other agencies, departments, and activities.

Further support for two, or more, new rounds of base closures came from the December 1997 report entitled Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century . (8) Members of theDOD-sponsored National Defense Panel that prepared the report strongly urged Congress and theDefense Department to "move quickly to restore the base realignment and closure process." Theycalled for closures to begin "earlier than the current 2001-2005 department proposal." In hisendorsement of the panel's findings, Secretary of Defense Cohen emphasized, as he had in the past,the importance of two additional BRAC rounds as a means of financing and accelerating thetransformation of U.S. military capabilities. (9)

Dispute over Depot Privatization

A highly contentious aspect of the base closure debate involved President Clinton's actionsconcerning the last of the four rounds. The 1995 base closure commission had recommended theclosing of two of the Air Force's five major maintenance depots: at McClellan Air Force Base (CA)and Kelly Air Force Base (TX). The recommendation had been justified on the grounds that all fivedepots were operating at under 50% capacity, and that significant savings could be achieved bytransferring McClellan's and Kelly's workloads to the three remaining depots in Utah, Oklahoma,and Georgia. (10)

President Clinton vigorously opposed closing McClellan and Kelly depots, arguing that California and Texas had already suffered disproportionately from effects of the three previousclosure rounds. (11) He moved to prevent furtherloss of jobs in California and Texas by directing thatprivate firms be allowed to assume the work on site -- otherwise known as "privatization-in-place." Opponents of the President, however, were quick to charge him with unprecedented politicalmeddling in the base closing process. They accused him of trying to curry favor with the people ofvote-rich California and Texas, vital in his bid for reelection. (12)

Legislators from Oklahoma, Georgia, and Utah opposed the privatization plan, believing that it deprived their local populations of jobs that would have been otherwise created under the initialrecommendation of the 1995 base closure commission. Also, they knew that the existingprivatization plan, if permitted to proceed, left their depots highly vulnerable to closure wheneverthe next round of base reductions occurred. (13)

Resentment among some Members over President Clinton's 1995 intervention persisted until the end of his second term. His action was repeatedly cited by congressional opponents as reasonfor their opposition to any new base closure rounds. (14) Some Members sought to block DOD fromproceeding with plans to privatize depot maintenance work at McClellan and Kelly air force bases. On June 5, 1997, the House military readiness subcommittee approved an amendment to the FY1998defense authorization bill prohibiting privatization at the two depots unless the Secretary of Defensecertified that the three remaining depots were operating at an efficient 80% capacity. These otherdepots, as mentioned above, were operating at approximately 50% capacity. The full House NationalSecurity Committee approved the measure on June 16. Similar depot language was approved by thefull Senate Armed Services Committee on June 17. However, in the face of a threatened filibusterby the four Senators representing California and Texas, the depot-related provisions were removedfrom the DOD authorization bill prior to floor consideration. (15)

In floor debate, on June 23, 1997, Representative Terry Everett led an effort to delete the depot-related restrictions in the House FY1998 defense authorization bill. His amendment wasdefeated by a vote of 145 to 278. In the other chamber, Senator Inhofe spearheaded an effort torestore depot-restrictions to the Senate bill. He and his co-sponsors, however, withdrew theiramendment on July 11, just before its floor consideration.

In conference committee, the depot-related language in the House bill became a major bone of contention and obstacle to reaching final agreement on the FY1998 defense authorization bill. Asof early October, it was reportedly the only remaining issue to be resolved. Neither of the opposingcamps seemed willing to yield -- with one side threatening filibuster and/or veto if public-privatedepot competition at McClellan and Kelly air force bases were not allowed to go forward, and theother side insisting that without language prohibiting depot competition, there would be no bill. Aresolution was achieved by the Senate and House conferees and reported on October 23 ( H.Rept.105-340 ). Under the compromise agreement, the limit on depot work that could be done by privatecontractors was increased from 40% to 50%. On the other hand, a broadened definition of the "corework" that must be done by government depots served to offset the benefits to private contractorsof their percentage increase.

On October 28, the House passed the conference report by a vote of 286 to 123. On the following day, the Senate debated the conference report's provisions regarding depot maintenanceoperations at length, but did not move to a final vote. A bid by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison topostpone a final vote on the FY1998 defense authorization until January 18, 1998 was denied. OnNovember 6, the Senate reached final agreement, passing the conference report by a vote of 90 to10. President Clinton signed the bill into law on November 18 ( P.L. 105-85 ).

DOD Report on Costs and Savings

In the FY1998 defense authorization act cited above, Congress included language (Section2824) that prohibited DOD from taking any concrete steps towards planning and implementing newbase closures until it had submitted a report on "costs and savings attributable to the first four roundsof closure and realignment; and on the need, if any, for additional rounds." The detailedrequirements set forth in the Dorgan Amendment included ten "Elements" and eight "Methods ofPresenting Information." The deadline for delivery of the report was set for "no later than thePresident's submission to Congress of the budget for FY2000" (January-February 1999).

On April 2, 1998, far in advance of the deadline, the Department of Defense submitted its report to Congress. (16) Secretary of Defense Cohen, inhis introductory statements, stressed several keypoints in calling for new base closure and realignment legislation in the current year. He stated thatthe base structure was, currently, 23% in excess of what was needed, and that savings from two newrounds of closings would provide vital funding for modernization of weapons systems and improvedreadiness. He reminded Congress that while the defense budget was down 40% and force structure36%, base structure had declined only 21%. He cited several other examples of the significantimbalance between force and base structures. The number of Navy ships was scheduled to drop by46% between 1989 and 2003; while berthing space would decline by only 18%. The number ofArmy soldiers was slated to fall 43% in the same period, compared with only a 7% planned reductionin classroom space.

The base closure report, in providing information requested by Congress in Section 2824, claimed that the closure costs of the 1988 and 1993 rounds were less than the Pentagon's originalestimate. It asserted that the costs of the 1991 and 1995 rounds, when completed, would be roughlyequal to the estimates. The report claimed that the resulting savings from the shutdown of bases andfacilities during BRAC's 1988-1995 rounds would exceed initial estimates. More specifically, DODexpected net total savings of about $14 billion through 2001. Annual savings, thereafter, wereestimated at $5.6 billion. These figures were later revised upward by the Department of Defense andGeneral Accounting Office. (17)

The two new rounds of closures in 2001 and 2005 sought by the Pentagon were expected to produce, after implementation, additional savings of about $3 billion a year. As required byCongress in Section 2824, both CBO and GAO were to review and comment on the accuracy andreliability of the report's findings. Other significant features of the base closure report included (1)a recommendation by DOD to apply the model of previous independent base closure commissionsfor the two rounds proposed for 2001 and 2005; and (2) a statement touting the successful economicrecovery from base closures of many impacted communities.

A subsequent Air Force memo (April 26) added fuel to the controversy over base closures. The memo reportedly cited John D. Podesta, the White House deputy chief of staff, as having triedthrough a DOD official, to encourage Lockheed Martin Corporation to go after some of the depotmaintenance work at McClellan Air Force Base and keep the work in Sacramento. (18) Membersadamantly opposed to keeping depot maintenance work at both McClellan AFB and Kelly AFBaccused the Administration of continuing to meddle in the base closure process. The level ofsuspicion increased, as did the level of rhetoric, with Members issuing forceful statements inopposition to new base closures, such as "dead on arrival,""smoking gun," and "over my deadbody." (19)

Reaction on Capitol Hill to the April 2, 1998 report's call for two new base closure rounds was similar to that of the previous year -- strong and widespread resistance. The House NationalSecurity Committee remained broadly opposed to any closings in the near future. This degree ofopposition was mirrored also in the House as a whole. The Senate Armed Services Committee wasmore evenly divided on the issue than the House committee. In its mark-up session, the Senatecommittee defeated by a 10-8 margin a proposed new round of base closures in 2001 (press releasedated May 8, 1998). Senator John McCain and Senator Carl Levin, principal co-sponsors of newBRAC legislation the previous year (as well as in 1997), indicated that they were prepared, however,to seek support for passage of a floor amendment during Senate consideration of the FY1999 defenseauthorization bill ( S. 2057 / S. 2060 ). In the end, with sentiment of themajority clearly running against them, the Senators abandoned their initiative. (20)

In floor action (June 25), the Senate voted 48-45 in support of an amendment to the FY1999 defense authorization bill that would have made it more difficult for the Pentagon to move aheadwith base closings. Amendment No. 2981, sponsored by Senator James Inhofe, would haverestricted the Administration from closing bases with 225 or more civilian personnel (a reductionfrom the current threshold of 300 set in law). It would also have restricted the Pentagon fromrealigning bases with 750 civilian personnel, or more than "40% of the total number of civilianpersonnel authorized to be employed at such military installation." Further, the amendment wouldhave prevented the Pentagon from closing a base within four years after completing a realignmentof such base. The intent of this provision was to delay, if not block, the Department of Defense fromquickly moving to close a particular base by reducing the number of civilian employees to less than225. In addition, the Inhofe amendment expressed congressional opposition to any new rounds ofclosures and realignments until all actions from previous rounds had been completed.

The Inhofe amendment was dropped from the FY1999 defense authorization bill during conference.

CBO and GAO Assessments

The Congressional Budget Office submitted its review of DOD's base realignment and closurereport on July 1, 1998. (21) It stated that the reportprovided most, but not all, of the information thatthe Congress had requested. It found DOD's estimates of savings from previous closure rounds, asfully implemented, consistent with its own estimates: $5.6 billion as compared to $5 billion. However, CBO explained that the firm measures of BRAC savings requested by the Congress "donot -- and cannot exist." It elaborated, as follows:

BRAC savings are really avoided costs -- costs that DOD would have incurred if BRAC actions had not taken place. Because those avoided costs arenot actual expenditures, DOD cannot observe them and record them in its financial records. As aresult, DOD can only estimate savings rather than actually measurethem.

In its review, CBO observed that DOD's report had provided a clear and coherent summary of why future base closure rounds would produce significant savings. It noted, however, that DODprovided "little analysis of those data or insight into the number and types of installations that mightbe closed in the event of future BRAC rounds." Other significant CBO findings included:

An analysis of the likely impact of future base closures on local communities cannot be attempted until the specific communities are identified; even then,it would be very difficult to do.

DOD was unable to locate some of the requested data, including the original cost and savings estimates that it gave to the BRACcommissions.

Estimates of BRAC costs and savings would be more accurate if they included [DOD's] environmental and caretaker costs for some bases after thesix-year implementation period is over.

The General Accounting Office submitted its review of DOD's report on November 13, 1998. (22) It was longer and provided more supporting detail than the CBO review. GAO gave DOD generallygood grades. It said that, overall, DOD had provided most of the information required by Section2824. GAO affirmed that the four previous BRAC closure rounds would result in substantial netsavings. It noted, however, that "DOD's report should be viewed as providing a roughapproximation of costs and savings rather than precise accounting." It pointed out that "DOD's datasystems do not capture all savings associated with BRAC actions, nor has DOD established aseparate system to track BRAC savings." Other significant GAO findings included

DOD's analysis of operational and readiness indicators has shown no long-term problems affecting military capabilities that can be related to BRAC actions. This general conclusion is also consistent with our prior work.

DOD's report emphasizes that communities affected by prior BRAC actions appear to be rebounding economically. We also have found this to be thecase, although our work also shows that some communities are faring better thanothers.

DOD's report suggests that proposed BRAC rounds in 2001 and 2005 would be conducted like prior rounds. DOD's legislative proposal requestingauthority to conduct two additional BRAC rounds provides a good starting point for consideringfuture legislation, should the Congress decide to authorize additionalrounds.

Closures and the 106th Congress

A "front-burner" issue for Congress at the outset of the 106th Congress was whether toauthorize a new round of base closings. At a November 1998 American Bar Association symposiumon national security, the general counsel of the Senate Armed Services Committee predicted that"There will be a significant attempt to put BRAC in the FY2000 authorization bill, which may wellsucceed." (23) On January 20, 1999, Senator JohnMcCain, along with Senator Carl Levin, sponsoreda bill ( S. 258 ) calling for two new rounds in 2001 and 2003. In support of the bill,Senator McCain pointed to the 23% excess capacity in infrastructure claimed by DOD, and said thatit was "unconscionable" for anyone to avoid looking at the billions of dollars to be saved by closingand realigning more bases. (24) In an effort to winsupport, he and his cosponsors offered twosignificant changes in the law. First, the whole BRAC selection process would begin and finish twomonths later in calendar year 2001 than in previous rounds. It would give a new President theopportunity to nominate members of a base closure commission. Second, privatization-in-placewould not be permitted in closing installations unless the new base closure commission explicitlyrecommended it.

Secretary of Defense William Cohen stressed, at almost every opportunity during the early part of the year, the importance of further base closures. In speaking to the Illinois legislature on January28, 1999, he stated that the most politically challenging aspect of his effort to improve DODefficiency and save money was base closures. He said:

I know that BRAC is now seen as a four-letter word, but I must tell you that the vast sums of money we waste on unneeded facilities is robbing our menand women in uniform of needed training, modern weapons, and a better quality of life. .... The twoadditional rounds we will fight for this year will ultimately save $20 billion [during implementation]and generate $3 billion annually [thereafter].

Despite such appeals, many Members of Congress remained opposed to new rounds, at least for the time-being, because of widespread fear among constituents over such closings. This wasunderscored in hearings on February 2 before the House Armed Services Committee (formerly,House National Security Committee), when Secretary of Defense Cohen's call for two more closurerounds reportedly received a cool response. More ominously, from the Pentagon's perspective, theSenate Armed Services Committee voted on May 12 and 13 against authorizing any new rounds ofclosings during its mark-up of the FY2000 defense authorization bill ( S. 1059 ). OnMay 26, the full Senate rejected a last-ditch effort by Senator John McCain and Senator Carl Levinto revive their base closure initiative during floor debate and passage of the defense bill. The 60 to40 vote marked the third year in a row that DOD's attempt to win support in the Senate to shut downmore bases had been blocked. With opposition to base closures even stronger in the House, mostobservers believed that DOD's high priority initiative had been effectively quashed for the remainderof the year -- if not longer.

In the second session of the 106th Congress, the Administration's FY2000 DOD budget proposal sought authority to close more military bases in the years 2003 and 2005. Deputy Defense SecretaryJohn Hamre emphasized that it was a particularly opportune time for Congress to take the initiativesince the national economy was so strong. (25) Inan effort to win the support of Congress, Secretaryof Defense Cohen said that the base closing process needed to be improved -- that there were toomany bureaucratic obstacles in the transition to private use of a closed base. Also, he contended thatthe failure to close more bases would cost the Pentagon as much as $20 billion that could be betterspent on upgrading and building new weapon systems, as well as increasing the performance levelsof U.S. fighting forces. He also pledged that politics would not be permitted to intrude in any futurebase closure rounds. (26)

Congress, however, chose not to authorize any new rounds of closures in the year 2000. In floor debate, on June 7, 2000, the Senate defeated an amendment to the FY2001 defense authorization bill,once again sponsored by Senator McCain and Senator Levin. The amendment, which would haveauthorized two new rounds in 2003 and 2005, was rejected by a vote of 63 to 35. The positions ofthe opposing sides in the debate reflected the same concerns expressed in previous years.

Closures and the 107th Congress

In the early stages of the 107th Congress, one of DOD's top agenda items was securingauthority for additional military base closures and realignments. On February 27, 2001, Senator CarlLevin and Senator John McCain introduced a bill ( S. 397 ) to authorize two new roundsof base closures in 2003 and 2005. The Taxpayers for Common Sense (TCS), a national budgetwatchdog organization, immediately applauded the initiative and said in a February 27 press releasethat the initiative "would save billions for other important defense priorities." It estimated the costof maintaining excess military bases at about $3.6 billion each year and said that projected Pentagonsavings could amount to as much as $21 billion through 2015 if the military were allowed to closebases in 2003 and 2005. (27)

Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, however, expressed a different point of view in an Austin TX editorial article. (28) She noted a trend towardincreasing restrictions on U.S. military training inlocations abroad, such as Germany, Okinawa, Korea, and Puerto Rico, and she suggested that it "castinto doubt the wisdom of prematurely closing more domestic military bases." She also drewattention to the fact that some BRAC decisions, such as at Reese Air Force Base, TX, and Fort Hood,TX, are now regarded as having been mistakes. In the case of the latter installation, the BRACdecision has been essentially reversed.

On June 27, 2001, the Department of Defense urged Congress to approve another round of base closures and realignments. It noted that the DOD's military infrastructure had an excess capacityof approximately 25%. (29) Later, on August 2,2001, the Pentagon outlined its proposal in greaterdetail. It called for a single, new round of base closings and consolidations, beginning in 2003. Theterm "BRAC" was dropped and replaced by a new title called the "Efficient Facilities Initiative of2001 (EFI)." (30)

It also introduced a new approach for reducing excess infrastructure, based on the experience of Brooks Air Force Base, San Antonio, TX. As a demonstration project, approved by Congress,Brooks AFB was permitted to transfer its property to the local community. In turn, the city leasedback to the base commander property that the service needed to continue its mission. Other detailsof DOD's base closure and realignment proposal conformed, in most respects, to the base-closurelaws of past years.

In the Senate Armed Services Committee, Members grappled with the two base closure proposals -- S. 397 and the Administration's plan. They ultimately agreed upon, and recommended, a series of provisions incorporating elements of both. Meeting in closed session onSeptember 6, 2001, the committee voted 17 to 8 for a new round.

On September 25, 2001, the full Senate approved a new round of base closures and realignments in 2003 by a margin of 53 to 47 -- after an effort by Senator Jim Bunning to shelve theproposal failed. It was, for the Senate proponents of base closure, their first success in five years ofeffort. Immediately prior to the vote, General Henry H. Shelton had sent a letter to Senator JohnWarner, ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee, stating that the country "cannotafford the costs associated with carrying this excess infrastructure." (31) In a separate letter, Secretaryof Defense Rumsfeld stressed that the current struggle with terrorist groups made it all the more"imperative to convert excess capacity into war-fighting ability." (32)

Opponents of the proposal, however, argued that the current war on terrorism, coupled with an uncertain economy, made it the worst time to start closing bases. Minority Leader Trent Lott said:"At a time our reserves are being called up to support our military ... we're going to say, 'Oh, by theway, we're going to look at closing your base. I think the timing is not good.'" (33)

Supporters of the initiative, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of putting aside home-state interest in favor of making certain the military enjoyed the full range of resources neededto combat terrorism. Senator John McCain asserted: "This is the time we should place our trust inthe Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff." (34)

No base-closing language was included in the House of Representatives FY2002 defense authorization bill. Indeed, shortly following passage of the Senate bill, Representative James Hansenreportedly stated that the House would oppose the Senate's provision: "We're going to hangtough." (35)

In conference, the House and Senate leaders stood by their respective positions, while resolving most of the other issues on their agenda. The stalemate over base closures lasted for several weeks,holding up passage of S. 1438 . In the absence of a compromise, Senator John McCainreportedly warned that the President might veto the defense bill. (36) Senior negotiators finally agreedto a compromise on December 10, and unveiled it to the public on December 12, 2001. ThePresident signed the defense authorization bill ( P.L. 107-107 ) on December 28, 2001.

The conference report retains most of the former 1990 BRAC Act language, but makes some important changes and modifications that are set forth below. (37)

Congress (Sec. 3001)

(1) Extend the authority of the 1990 base closure and realignment act to authorize one new round in 2005

Secretary of Defense (Sec. 3002)

(1) Submit a force structure plan to include detailed information on end strength and force levels, etc.

(2) Submit (at Sec/Def's discretion) revised force structure plan with FY2006 budget.

(3) Review all types of installation and take into account anticipated need for, and availability of, overseas bases in future.

Include:

(a) inventory of military installations

(b) description of categories of excess infrastructure

(c) economic analysis of options for eliminating or reducing excess infrastructure,including efficiencies from joint use

(4) Certify (after submitting force structure plan and infrastructure inventory) whether need exists for closure and realignment. If so, certify that it would provide annual net savings withinsix years. If Sec/Def fails to provide certification, the process is terminated.

(5) Ensure that military value is the primary consideration in the making of recommendations for closing or realigning military installations.

Commission (Sec. 3003-3004)

(1) Increase number of members from 8 to 9.

(2) Permit Sec/Def to testify before commission on any commission-proposed addition of a base. Decision to add a base must be supported by at least 7 commissioners. Also, Sec/Defmust also be given opportunity to testify on other changes proposed by commission.

(3) Prohibit privatization-in-place of closed or realigned bases prohibited, unless specifically recommended by commission and determined to be the most cost-effective option.

Conclusion

In May 1997, two years after the 1995 base closure commission completed its task, theDepartment of Defense announced that two further closure rounds were needed in 1999 and 2001in order to reduce its excess infrastructure. The proposal met with little enthusiasm on the part ofmost Members of Congress. Subsequent appeals by Secretary of Defense Cohen in 1998, 1999, and2000 fared no better. In 2001, however, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld succeeded in winningapproval from Congress for a new round. He had to settle, however, for a round in 2005, rather thanhis preferred date of 2003.

As a result of the new BRAC, many communities next to military bases are worried about the survival of their installations. Various strategies have been developed, both defensive and offensive.First, and foremost, community leaders are working diligently to keep their military units/functionsat home. On the other hand, they are not averse to acquiring units/functions from other parts of thecountry. In the latter case, success would almost certainly ensure a base's survival in the next round.

A serious concern of many communities near military bases is the growing impact of "range encroachment" -- the process whereby bases are progressively hemmed in by urban growth,competition for air space, protection of endangered species, and other factors that may detract froma base's desirability to the Department of Defense or the BRAC commission. If allowed to continueunabated, such encroachment can have the effect of de-valuing installations to the point that theymay become prime candidates for closure in 2005.

Table 1. 2005 BRAC Timeline

Source: U.S. Congress. House of Representatives, National Defense Authorization Act for FiscalYear 2002, Conference Report ( H.Rept. 107-333 ), December 12, 2001, p. 331-341 and 792-795.

a Also, Sec/Def publishes criteria in Federal Register .

b If President does not send nominations by required date, process is terminated.

c President prepares report containing approval or disapproval.

d Congress has 45 days to pass motion of disapproval, or Commission's list becomes law.