Afghanistan: Challenges and Options for Reconstructing a Stable and Moderate State
Released: 2002-07-11T00:00:00

Focus and Scope of This Report

The U.S.-led effort to end permanently Afghanistan's role as a base for anti-western Islamicterrorists requires not only the defeat of the Taliban-which has been achieved through American,allied, and Afghan military action, but also the reconstruction of a stable, effective and ideologicallymoderate Afghan state. Otherwise, the country could again become a base for terrorism. Failure toachieve stability in Afghanistan is also likely to have wider repercussions for the stability of Pakistanand the Central Asian states.

Unlike 1989, when the U.S. Government closed its embassy in Kabul only ten days after the withdrawal of the last Soviet forces, the Bush Administration has concluded that the United Stateshas a major stake in the creation of a stable Afghanistan, and that it cannot be left to the armedAfghan contenders for power alone to decide the country's future. The Administration has not yetgiven a detailed indication of what longer-term role it envisions for the United States in the political,economic, and social reconstruction of Afghanistan beyond current plans for emergency food andagricultural assistance, assistance in the formation of a new national army, and anti-narcotics aid. However, both the President and the Congress have declared that the United States will play a majorrole, in conjunction with NATO allies and Japan, the United Nations, and international financialinstitutions, to promote economic development and encourage political stability in Afghanistan. (1)

The stakes for the United States include denying sanctuary and support for Al Qaeda terrorists, maintaining positive influence with a nuclear-armed and politically unstable Pakistan, curtailing themassive flow of opium-based drugs from Afghanistan, and, possibly, facilitating the creation of analternative to Iran and Russia as routes for the export of Central Asian oil and gas. For all of thesereasons, the future U.S. role in Afghanistan and the adjacent region is likely to be an important focusof interaction between the Administration and Congress in considering foreign assistance anddefense budget priorities and policy issues during the Spring of 2002.

Congress has strongly supported American involvement in supporting the fledgling government headed by Karzai, and many of the several dozen Members of Congress who have visitedAfghanistan have advocated more U.S. aid than is currently planned, the more prompt delivery ofaid to the Karzai administration, and an expanded U.S. role in peacekeeping. In terms of action byCongress, H.R. 3994 (Hyde), the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, wasintroduced "To authorize economic and democratic development assistance for Afghanistan and toauthorize military assistance for Afghanistan and certain other foreign countries." The bill wasmarked up by the House International Relations Committee on March 20 and reported (amended)on April 25 ( H.Rept. 107-420 ), addresses the overall direction and focus of U.S. policy towardshumanitarian relief and refugee repatriation, economic reconstruction, the suppression of narcoticsproduction, and support for a democratic and market-oriented Afghanistan. The bill would authorizeabout $1.05 billion in appropriations for assistance to Afghanistan, subject to certain conditions,from FY2002 to FY2005. A Senate version of the bill, S. 2712 , was introduced bySenator Chuck Hagel on July 9, 2002.

This report provides information on and analysis of the current situation in Afghanistan, taking into consideration the country's essential characteristics and political developments since about thetime of the overthrow of the last Afghan King, Zahir Shah, in 1973, and sketches out four possiblescenarios for Afghanistan's future. The scenarios incorporate the profound effects of the Communistcoup of 1978, the 1979-1989 Soviet occupation, subsequent civil war, and the rise and fall of theTaliban. Finally, the report identifies and analyzes factors that will influence Afghanistan's politicalfuture, and discusses three policy areas in particular in which actions by the United States could becrucial, and three policy issues for congressional consideration. An appendix contains keydocuments relating to the December 2001 Bonn Agreement, which is the framework for currentefforts to create a stable and democratic Afghanistan.

This report will be updated in response to major political developments, but it is not intended to track issues concerning Afghanistan on a regular basis. Broader and more frequently updatedcoverage of issues concerning Afghanistan and U.S. policy is contained in CRS Report RL30588 , Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns , by [author name scrubbed]. For information andanalysis concerning U.S. and other international humanitarian and reconstruction assistance toAfghanistan, see CRS Report RL31355 , Afghanistan's Path to Reconstruction: Obstacles,Challenges, and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed].

Current Framework for the Reconstruction of a Stable and Moderate Afghan State

Achieving the goal of a stable and moderate Afghanistan depends on the establishment of apolitical process that has at least the tacit support of the major organized ethnic and tribal groups andcontenders for power, as well as ordinary Afghans who are simply seeking some kind of peace andnormalcy in their lives. After nearly three decades since the overthrow of the Afghan monarchy andthe onset of a three-cornered struggle involving the forces of moderate reform and market-orientedeconomic modernization, Islamic fundamentalism, and Marxism, most of the past elements ofAfghan unity and stability have been shattered and are not even remembered by the more than halfof the current population who were born after the overthrow of the last monarch, Zahir Shah. (2)

Bonn Accord of December 2001

A beginning towards the goal of reconstructing a stable and moderate Afghanistan was made at an international conference near Bonn, Germany, during December 2001, when representativesof various parties and ethnic groups agreed to the creation of an Interim Administration, and aprocedure, with timetables, for drafting a new constitution and establishing, within two years, anelected government.

As in the case of a U.N.-backed effort in 1992, which failed, the composition of the delegation was more representative on paper than in reality. The 23 signatories to the December 2001agreement represented four anti-Taliban groups: The Northern Alliance , representing the ethnicTajik and Uzbek forces then occupying Kabul and other northern cities; the Rome Process ,representing largely Pashtun exile followers of former King Zahir Shah; the Cyprus Group ,representing largely Shi'a Muslim groups supported by Iran; and the Peshwar Group , consistinglargely of Pashtun exile factions with headquarters in Peshawar, Pakistan. Of these, only theNorthern Alliance, which became closely allied with U.S. forces in the campaign against the Talibanand Al Qaeda, commanded significant military power. The composition of the Rome and Peshawargroups was heavily tilted towards Western-educated professionals and other members of the formerurbanized Pashtun elite. (3) Pashtun commanders andlocal shura (governing councils) in SouthernAfghanistan, the home base of the Taliban, were not directly represented.

As agreed, the parties to the negotiations inaugurated a 28-member multi-ethnic interim Afghan administration on December 22, 2001, headed by Hamid Karzai, a prominent Pashtun tribal leaderwith a modern, democratic outlook, close ties to the former royal family and the westernized,expatriate elite, and good relations with the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance. The InterimAdministration also included two women, both medical doctors, who head the ministries of women'saffairs and health, respectively. Indicative of the fragile nature of the bargaining to date, anagreed-upon roadmap for the achievement of a democratic political structure leaves most of thedetails for the future. (See Appendix I for the terms of the agreement.)

Outcome of the June 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga

Another important milestone was achieved in June 2002 with the generally successful conclusion of an Emergency Loya Jirga ("Grand Council"), which confirmed Karzai as head of aTransitional Administration charged with organizing an effective government, supervising thedrafting of a constitution, and preparing the country for national elections in December 2002. Thedelegates to the Loya Jirga also informally approved Karzai's choices for the most important cabinetposts, but not without considerable complaint from groups which felt they had received insufficientrepresentation in the new administration. These include members of the various Pashtun tribes, whotogether constitute a plurality of 35-40 percent of the population, and other non-Tajik ethnic groupssuch as the Uzbeks and Hazaras. (For a fuller analysis of the Loya Jirga outcome see below.)

Development of the Afghan State under the Durrani Pashtun Monarchy

One way to envision the circumstances that might support the creation of a stable and moderateAfghan state is to consider the country's past political history and the factors that in the past haveenhanced or undermined stability and modernization. The establishment of Afghanistan as a nationstate dates essentially from 1747, when Ahmad Shah Durrani, a tribal Pashtun (4) chief of the Sadozailine of the Abdali tribe, gained election by his tribe as the ruler (Amir) of territories approximatingthe present boundaries of Afghanistan. Under the Durrani ascendancy, Afghanistan experienced allthe vicissitudes of dynastic chance and survived as a political entity largely as a buffer state whosenorthern and southern boundaries conformed to the high water line of the expanding British andRussian empires, and the periodically resurgent Iranian empire.

In the 20th century Afghanistan teetered between bursts of Western and Soviet-aided modernization and recurrent reaction spearheaded by the twin sources of rural power in the Pashtunheartland: secular leaders, including tribal chieftains, local notables, or commanders, and Muslimclerics of various kinds, including mullahs and influential pirs (spiritual leaders) of the mystical Sufi Islamic sects, which predominate in Afghanistan and Southern Asia. In many respects the traditionallocal power structure, outside of Kabul and a few other population centers, approximated that in therural, pre-industrial West, with men of property or learning exercising governmental power andclergy providing spiritual guidance, moral authority, and often local political influence.

In general, modernization progressed faster among two sections of the population: Tajiks and Uzbeks in the North, who practiced settled agriculture or carried on commerce, and the morecosmopolitan, "Persianized," residents of Kabul of various ethnic origins, including "detribalized"Pashtuns. The traditional Pashtun tribes of Southern Afghanistan, many of whom are or werenomadic, have been more resistant to centralization and modernization, but nonetheless have longthought of themselves as the "real" Afghans.

Pashtun dominance has long been a source of resentment among Afghanistan's minority groups: the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. Both the Afghan Tajiks and those in Tajikistan have linguistic andcultural connections with Iran, but usually not religious. In matters of religion, the Tajiks, like thePashtuns, follow the Sunni school of Islam, the larger of the two main Islamic divisions. TheUzbeks have ethnic and linguistic connections to Uzbekistan and Central Asia, and are also Sunn iMuslims. The Hazaras are a Shi'a Muslim minority with ethnic ties to Central Asia and religiousties to Iran.

The language issue also divides the tribal Pashtuns from other Afghans. Dari, a form of classical Persian, has long been the language of the court and of commerce. In fact, more Afghansspeak Dari than Pashto. The former is the lingua franca of the North and West, and is spoken byabout 50% of the population, including most non-Pashtun minorities, whereas Pashto speakersaccount for something over one-third of the population. Some Afghan sources claim that the formerKing, Zahir Shah, and most of his relatives, cannot even speak Pashto. (5)

Long-Standing Pattern of Violent Leadership Change

The still-incomplete conversion of Afghanistan from a largely tribal society to a nation state has been a process of slow advance and frequent periods of violent traditionalist reaction. Every Afghanking during the past century was either assassinated or deposed (Table 1). The first modernizingKing, Habibullah Khan (1901-1919), was assassinated, probably for being viewed as a tool ofBritain. (6) The most ambitious modernizer, AmanullahKhan (1919-1929), was deposed. Hisfar-reaching economic and social modernization policies-especially the emancipation ofwomen-engendered a violent reaction on the part of mullahs , tribal leaders, and tribes opposed tothe dominant Durrani confederation, especially those of the numerically larger Gilzai confederation. Among other innovations inspired by his travel to Europe, Turkey, and Iran, Aminullah created theAfghan Royal Air Force, outlawed polygamy, instituted compulsory education for both sexes,separated secular and religious authority, and created the first consultative national assembly.

Durrani rule was broken briefly by a bandit Tajik interloper, Bacha-i Saqqo ("Son of the Water Carrier"), who took power initially with support from dissident Gilzai tribes. His rule lasted onlynine months, but Pashtuns still consider the brief rule by a Tajik as a humiliation-sentiments thathave been resurrected by the dominance of the current Transitional Administration by Tajiks. (7)

Table 1. Afghan Kings and Rulers Since 1901: A Record ofViolent Regime Change

Growth of National Institutions Under Zahir Shah (1933-1973)

The modern Afghan state reached its apogee, in a manner of speaking, under Zahir Shah, whoascended the throne in 1933 following the assassination of his father, Mohammad Nadir Shah. Mindful of the fate of his predecessors who were perceived as having sacrificed the country'sinterests to obtain foreign support, or as having too aggressively challenged the power of the tribalchiefs and mullahs, Zahir Shah attempted a cautious modernization program while keeping ajudicious distance (or so it seemed at the time) from both the United States and the Soviet Union,while accepting aid from both.

Political Tensions Arising Out of Modernization (8)

As in the case of the former Shah of Iran, Zahir Shah's efforts to promote modernization inadvertently fostered the creation of new social and political forces which ultimately underminedhis rule. Zahir Shah was and remains something of an enigma. He ascended the throne at age 19,and for thirty years largely left the government in the hands of relatives-first by uncles until about1953, and later by his cousin, Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud. Perhaps too late, Zahir Shahfinally took charge of the government in 1963, after Daoud's policy of hostility towards Pakistan (seebelow) led that country to close the common border, cutting of Afghanistan's southern trade linksand devastating the economy. Despite his effort to reduce the role of the royal family and hispromulgation of a new constitution with some limited democratic features, notably an elected, butparty-less bicameral parliament, with limited powers to check and balance the executive authority,Zahir Shah's liberalization program was still-born. This outcome generally has been attributed tothe King's lack of assertiveness and the fear of the country's social and economic elite of beingdisplaced by popularly elected leaders.

Among other accomplishments, Zahir Shah and his new advisors and officials extended the reach of the central government by expanding the army and the national police system, enlarging thefunctions of the civilian bureaucracy, expanding the national educational system, and bringing acentral government presence down to the local level. Although these developments helped tostrengthen the state and weaken tribalism, their net effect was not wholly positive. The army andpolice were widely regarded as repressive, and the bureaucracy and local governmental apparatuswere said to be corrupt, grasping, incompetent, and dominated, at the upper levels, by the King'srelatives.

The latter years of Zahir Shah's reign brought significant economic modernization, but not enough to take Afghanistan out of the ranks of the least developed countries. On the positive side,the middle class in Kabul and other cities swelled from an estimate of fewer than a thousand at theend of World War II to almost 100,000 by the early 1970s. But public frustration grew over the factthat the government bureaucracy was not up to the task of managing and maintaining the economicand physical infrastructure provided by aid donors. (9)

Rise of Marxist and Radical Islamist Conflict. The political opening provided by the 1964 constitution boosted the aspirations of both a smallleftist intelligentsia and radical Islamic counterparts. The Marxist People's Democratic Party ofAfghanistan (PDPA) was founded on January 1, 1965, with the explicit goal of contesting theelections held that year under the new constitution-elections that were officially party-less. Theradical leftists tended to dominate parliamentary proceedings, while moderates, who had more tolose, remained cowed by political repression. Most of the major figures who later served in theSoviet-backed Marxist regime, notably Nur Mohamad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, and Babrak Karmal,were active in the first elected parliament. (10)

The emergence of the radical left was paralleled by the growth of a radical Islamist movement, starting with the foundation of the Organization of Muslim Youth at Kabul University in themid-1960s. The Islamists reacted not only to the rise of the left but also to the long tradition ofco-option of Muslim clerics by the government.

Soon after emerging, both the Marxists and the Islamic right split along primarily ethnic lines. The PDPA was divided between a largely Pashtun Kalq ("masses") movement under Taraki andAmin, and a more urban and moderate Parcham ("flag") wing under Karmal. The split in theIslamist ranks was both ethnic and generational-between the followers of Professor BurnhanuddinRabbani, a Tajik religious scholar who founded the Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society), and thoseattracted to "Engineer" Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun Kabul University engineering student. Hekmatyar became the leader in an even more radical organization, the Hezb-i-Islami .(IslamicParty). Both the leftists and the Islamists adopted similar authoritarian, Leninist-style, forms of partyorganization. (11)

Zahir Shah's Counterproductive Foreign Policy

Afghan foreign policy under Zahir Shah was characterized by two mutually reinforcing policy pillars that greatly influenced Afghanistan's subsequent political history. The first was the doggedpursuit of the cause of "Pashtunistan" (or "Paktunistan" in the dialect of Southeast Afghanistan andamong Pakistani Pashtuns), a popular campaign for the return of ethnic Pashtun territories previouslyceded to British India. These territories became part of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province afterPakistan and India gained independence in 1947, but remained loosely tied to Afghanistan throughtrade, nomadic grazing, and family connections. (12) The second foreign policy pillar was the effortto reap maximum gains from the East-West Cold War by playing one superpower off against theother.

Chronically Strained Relations with Pakistan. The Paktunistan campaign was pursued with particular intensity during the period 1953 to 1963,when the King's cousin, Mohammad Daoud, served as prime minister. The diplomatic agitation andfrequent border incidents led to chronic strains in Pakistan-Afghan relations, including periodicclosures by Pakistan of the common border, driving Afghanistan deeper into dependence on theSoviet Union for aid, trade, and military support. Ultimately, Daoud's policies so harmed theAfghan economy that the King sought and received his cousin's resignation. (A decade later Daoudwould overthrow the monarchy and make himself President of the first Afghan republic.) (13)

Rising Soviet and Declining U.S. Influence. The conjunction of Afghan irredentism and the U.S. Cold War alliance with Pakistan caused friction inU.S.-Afghan relations and led Kabul to drift into the Soviet orbit. U.S. arms assistance to Pakistanunder the Mutual Security Program of 1954, which was aimed at checking Soviet expansion, hadunintended consequences in the case of Afghanistan. Partly to placate Islamabad, the EisenhowerAdministration and its successors rejected Kabul's requests for military aid, causing the U.S.S.R.to become Afghanistan's main supplier of arms and military training. Soviet weapons and thepresence of Soviet advisors gave Moscow extensive influence within the Afghan army and air force. The Soviets also constructed important military airfields at Bagram, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Shindand,a gas pipeline to Soviet Central Asia, and a network of surfaced roads linking Afghanistan to theU.S.S.R. The northern road network and Bagram air base played key roles in the 1979 Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan. (14)

The United States actively contested for influence with the U.S.S.R., but was handicapped by geography and geopolitics. Vice-President Richard M. Nixon visited the country in 1953, at theoutset of the Eisenhower Administration, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower visited Kabul in1959. King Zahir Shah, likewise, visited Washington in 1963, about the time that he began takinga more active role in governing the country. The United States continued to provide economicassistance for projects such as the Helmand River irrigation project in southern Afghanistan, and theconstruction of an international airport at Kandahar that became a classic foreign aid "whiteelephant" project, but Moscow's influence became dominant. (15)

Mohammad Daoud and the Afghan Republic, 1973-1979

In 1973 Daoud emerged from the political wilderness to overthrow the monarchy and establish the Republic of Afghanistan, using younger, Soviet-trained army officers who were members of theParcham ("Banner") wing of the Marxist PDPA to carry out a relatively bloodless coup. The King,who was in Rome for medical treatment, remained there permanently. Daoud became president ofa new Afghan Republic, with a president and a single-party legislature. The new constitution wasapproved by a Loya Jirga ("Grand Council"), the traditional mechanism for giving assent to the rulerby representatives of tribes, ethnic groups, and other interests, in January 1977.

To the consternation of his supporters, Daoud as president reversed a number of policies from his days as prime minister. After using leftist allies to repress Islamic militants during the first twoyears of his rule, Daoud turned on them in the mid-1970s, purging leftists from the army andcracking down on the PDPA. He also began slowly to distance himself from the Soviet Union andcultivate relations with the Shah of Iran and the Saudi monarchy, and improve ties with Pakistan.

On the domestic front, Daoud did little to move Afghanistan towards modernity or democracy. Afghanistan remained one of the poorest countries in the world, with little in the way of industry oreconomic infrastructure. At the same time, his repression of both the Islamists and the leftists, histactical withdrawal of support for Paktunistan, and disregard for parliament, created a host ofenemies. The murder of a prominent Afghan communist in early 1978, allegedly by governmentagents, set in motion the April 27, 1978, coup against Daoud led by leftist army officers and thePDPA. Daoud and his family were murdered after rebellious troops stormed the Presidential palace,bringing to an end more than 230 years of Durrani Pashtun rule.

Destruction of the Traditional Social Fabric: PDPA Rule and Soviet Occupation, 1978-89

Daoud's overthrow and the Soviet invasion caused a diaspora of Afghanistan's small educatedand professional elite and the families associated with the rule of Zahir Shah, leading to the collapseof most vestiges of the old order. The Afghan communists attempted a number of social changesthat under other circumstances would have been viewed as progressive, including measures topromote secular education and liberate women, but the PDPA leaders, who came mainly from urbanareas, had little understanding of the countryside or respect for rural traditions. Their clumsy effortsto overturn the social and political order in the tribal areas provoked widespread rebellion. Equallyimportant, a long-standing, bitter, and unresolvable split between the Kalq faction of the PDPA, ledby President Nur Mohammad Taraki and Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, and Parcham faction, ledby Babrak Karmal, a Soviet protÃ©gÃ©, brought the government to the point of collapse.

In addition to the basic Parcham-Khalq conflict, the Afghan revolution spawned a number of violent radical groups, both leftist and Islamist. In early 1979, under circumstances still describedas "murky" by the State Department, U.S. Ambassador Adolph "Spike" Dubs was kidnaped by agroup of men whose identities remain a matter of speculation and dispute, but who were alleged tobe Maoist opponents of the regime. Dubs was killed in a fusillade of fire when Afghan interiorministry forces, reportedly at the urging of Soviet advisors, stormed the building in which he wasbeing held. (16)

The more nationalistic Khalqis gained the upper hand in the summer of 1978 and sent Babrak Karmal and a number of other prominent Parchamites, who tended to have pro-Soviet leanings, intoexile as ambassadors to Soviet Bloc countries. By early 1979 the renewed split in the PDPA and thereckless policies of Prime Minister Amin, the most energetic of the governing duo, had sparkedwidespread rebellions. Taraki visited Moscow in September 1979, where he was elaborately feted,and returned probably with orders to get rid of Amin. In October 1979, however, Amin moved first,organizing the murder of Taraki and seizing power.

Amin's ruthless power grab and the emergence of an anti-Marxist tribal revolt alarmed the Soviet Union, which feared that Amin was single-handedly destroying the revolution. In December 1979,Leonid Brezhnev gave the fateful order for the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan to keepPDPA government from collapsing. The spearhead forces of the Soviet invasion stormed thepresidential palace and killed Amin, replacing him with Babrak Karmal, the Parcham leader who hadbeen in exile in Moscow. (17)

Anti-Soviet War and the Rise of Islamic Extremism

U.S. policymakers and supporters of the Afghan resistance movement expected that theanti-Soviet campaign by the Afghan mujahidin would contribute to the forging of a new sense ofAfghan nationhood, but the war actually had the opposite effect. Instead of coalescing around acommon cause, the particular circumstances of the conflict intensified the existing ethnic, tribal,religious, and ideological divisions of the society, and intensified power rivalries among individualleaders.

Several aspects of the anti-Soviet war period were particularly divisive, and continue to impede national reconciliation today. One was the boost given to Islamic extremism, which developed ina context of ideological conflict with Western-educated secularists and personal power rivalries. Atbottom, the rise of radical versions of Islam had roots in a reaction against modernization and risingWestern influences associated with what some Islamists viewed as a corrupt and decadent monarchy,and against the Marxists.

Although the anti-Soviet mujahidin often were perceived as backward, albeit admirably dedicated tribesmen, most of the principal Islamist political leaders in the anti-Soviet war inAfghanistan were men of education and social position. More than half of the seven leaders of theso-called Peshawar Alliance that was headquartered in Peshawar, Pakistan, during the anti-Sovietconflict, were university educated. (18) By and large,however, real power in the anti-Soviet resistancetended to flow to younger leaders with an Islamist orientation but a secular background, such asGulbuddin Hekyatyar and Ahmad Shah Masud, who had organizational and military skills, and whocould command, or at least support, mujahidin in the field.

Last, but not least among the sources of division, and increasingly important after the PDPA coup in 1978, was the role of a number of foreign powers, most notably Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, andIran, each of which backed ethnic and ideological favorites, and private promoters of radicalideologies. Pakistan favored Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Saudi Arabia backed Professor Rasul Sayyaf,and Iran supported several small Shi'a Hazara groups. Osama bin Laden's role dates from late1980s, when he and a number of other private Saudis attempted to promote their radical version ofSunni Islam among the Afghan mujahidin .

Collapse of the Afghan State, 1989-1996

A power struggle following the Soviet withdrawal set the stage for the rise of the Taliban. Theinitial round involved rival mujahidin groups headquartered in Peshawar, who were members of theso-called Alliance and the remaining supporters of the communist government headed byNajibullah, including a reduced but still intact Afghan army. Despite several promising negotiations,neither the seven Alliance parties headquartered in Peshawar, nor the commanders in thecountryside, who met separately in a meeting organized by the late Abdul Haq, one of the mostprominent field commanders, were able to agree on a division of power.

Failure of a U.N. Brokered Power Transfer In 1992

The regional power rivalries and unbridled ambitions of the principal political leaders and field commanders did much to turn victory over the Soviets into a new period of misery for the country. The chain of events following the Soviet withdrawal may provide some lessons for the present,especially the effort during 1991 and 1992 of Benon Sevan, the representative of the U.N. SecretaryGeneral, to broker a peace settlement between the Najibullah regime in Kabul and the mujahidin . The final version of the plan, which had been accepted by most of the parties and commanders andtheir foreign backers, especially Pakistan and Iran, provided for a peace settlement on lines verysimilar to the Bonn Accord of December 2001:

the early (within weeks) formation of "pre-transition council"

a transitional authority to govern the country, leading to

"free and fair elections" within about two years

Sevan reportedly came close to gaining full agreement among the Afghan parties and their international supporters on the outlines of a proposed settlement, only to have the effort effectivelytorpedoed by dissension among the mujahidin parties and the decision of Najibullah, on March 18,1992, to retract his prior commitment to resign the presidency as part of a settlement.

The negotiating deadlock was broken militarily by the General Dostum, an Uzbek and former "Hero" of the Marxist government, who abandoned the Kabul regime and joined forces with AhmedShah Masud, the much celebrated Tajik commander. Militarily, Dostum's move resolved athree-cornered power struggle between the Tajiks under Rabbani and Masud, the Uzbeks underDostum, and non-mainstream Pashtuns, under Pakistan's favorite, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, in favorof the Tajiks. Dostum also blocked Najibullah's attempted flight to the Soviet Union. Instead,Najibullah fled to the United Nations compound, where he received political asylum. (One of thefirst acts of the Taliban after taking Kabul in September 1996, was to drag Najibullah from the U.N.compound and brutally execute him.)

Three-Cornered Ethnic Power Conflict in the 1992-1996 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

With Hekmatyar on the outside - literally and figuratively - the new Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, like the current Transitional Administration, was largely a non-Pashtun affair. Theoriginal plan was that the presidency would rotate among the mujahidin leadership, but after the firstpresident, Sibghatullah Mojadedi, a moderate Islamist with no significant military forces, gave wayto Rabbani, the latter refused to give it up. The right to control Kabul became the object of a newfree-for-all among the well-armed, ethnically-aligned factions. The Uzbek Dostum switched sidesonce more, aligning with the Pashtun Hekmatyar against the Tajiks led by Rabbani and Masud. During 1993 and 1994 Hekmatyar's forces pounded much of Kabul to rubble with rockets, reducingthe population from about 2 million at the end of the Soviet occupation period to less than 500,000. In May 1996 Rabbani and Masud made a deal with Hekmatyar, giving him the presidency, but allof them were routed by the Taliban in September 1996. Hekmatyar fled ultimately to Iran, andRabbani and Masud to their redoubt in the Panjsher Valley, where they were sustained by limitedassistance from their old enemy, Russia. Rabbani, who in the interim had reclaimed the presidency,took the credentials of the internationally recognized Afghan Islamic Republic of Afghanistan withhim. (19)

Rise and Fall of the Taliban

The story of the rise of the Taliban (plural of Talib , an Islamic student) has been well coveredin the press and other media since the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the onset of theanti-terrorist war in Afghanistan. Several aspects of the Taliban's rise to power have continuingrelevance as cautionaries to the United States and other international supporters of the InterimAdministration under Mohammad Karzai:

First, the Taliban were widely welcomed, especially in the Pashtun areas, for putting an end to endemic petty warfare and disorder, including especially the disruption of trade andcommerce. This is still a goal of great importance to commercial interests as well as ordinaryAfghans.

Second, the Taliban recruited and coopted numerous tribal leaders who were motivated mainly by self-interest-the maintenance of their personal power-rather than ideology. Many of these same leaders and their followers continue to be a major factor in the PashtunSouth.

Third, the Taliban represented a Pashtun resurgence in the reaction to the rising power of the non-Pashtun minorities, and completed the near total polarization of the country onPashtun/non-Pashtun lines. This conflict is by no means resolved, as evident by the bad feelingexpressed by many Pashtuns at the June 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga .

Finally, the preference of the Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, to rule from his southern home base of Kandahar, symbolized starkly the cultural alienation of Pashtunconservatives from the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance, which had controlled Kabul, Bagram,and adjacent areas during the period 1992-1996, and had earned a reputation, especially amongPashtuns, for oppression and misrule.

Prospects for Recreating a Stable and Moderate Afghan State

Achieving the goal of the United States, its allies, and the international community of a stableand moderate Afghan state will depend on many factors, both internal and external. Most of thesefactors cannot now be predicted with any certainty, but if past is prologue, it may be possible toachieve a rough understanding of the requirements for ending Afghanistan's steady disintegrationand reconstructing a stable and moderate state. The following section evaluates the prospects ofachieving this goal by considering the main contributing factors in past periods of comparativestability, the status of these factors at present, the comparative strength of various claimants topower, and four possible scenarios that might result from the actions of internal forces and externalactors.

Past Elements of Stability and Current Status

Although many Afghans now tend to look back to the rein of Zahir Shah with somewhat rose colored lenses, Afghanistan did in fact enjoy a kind of stability during most of the reign of ZahirShah (1933-1973). Even if the conditions that facilitated past stability cannot be recreated, it isuseful to understand what they were, if only as an indicator of their presence or absence in thecurrent situation. Also, the factors that allowed stability under Zahir Shah proved temporary, andultimately led to political instability and the overthrow of the monarchy. After three decades ofbrutal civil war, Afghanistan today retains few of its characteristics under the Afghan monarchy oreven under Daoud's Republic.

Sources of Legitimacy. In modern times the king and most senior officials have been members of the Durani Pashtun tribe. The 1964 constitution,which imposed some formal limits on royal authority, nonetheless provided that the succession "shallcontinue in the House of His Majesty Mohammad Nadir Shah." (20) For most of his reign, ZahirShah's legitimacy was perhaps accepted by most of the Pashtuns and others who counted politically,both in Kabul and in the countryside. By the end of his reign, however, the legitimacy of the Kingand his officials was increasingly contested by university students both on the left and the Islamicright, and by members of the growing middle and professional classes, who were frustrated at beingdenied a meaningful role in national affairs. Since the overthrow of Zahir Shah, each turn of thepolitical wheel has reduced the legitimacy of the state.

Currently, the main sources of legitimacy of the Transitional Administration with ordinary Afghans are Karzai's personal acceptability to disparate elements, his ability to attract internationalsupport, and the promise of a future democratic political order. Opponents of the currentgovernment, especially current or former Taliban, radical Islamists, and warlords, do not accept itslegitimacy, though they may cooperate or avoid openly challenging it out of self-interest. Karzai'sconnection to the former royal family does not by itself convey legitimacy, but may appeal to someAfghans, especially Kabul residents and Pashtuns in southern Afghanistan, who remember bettertimes past. Among many Pashtun royalists, he is regarded as a turncoat.

Acceptable Ethnic Balance. Ethnic and tribal conflict has long been the bane of Afghanistan. The main fault line has been between the Pashtuns,who form a plurality of something less than 40 percent of the population, and the minority Tajiks,Uzbeks, Hazaras, and others. In the best of times the ethnic balance was preserved through a kindof informal social compact that provided for Pashtun control over the main levers of power but leftconsiderable space for the Tajiks, and to a lesser extent the Uzbeks, to participate in the middlelevels of the administration and the army, and to dominate the commercial life of Kabul and othercities.

Positive Center-Provincial Relations. The third element in past periods of stability has been comparative harmony between the state, whose officialsstaffed the central government ministries and the provincial administrations, and the tribal leaders,Muslim clerics, and other notables who constituted the local power centers outside the capital. Thisrelationship was aided by the fact that relatively few demands were imposed by the centralgovernment, which carried out limited functions. Relations between the state and local forces hadbecome progressively more difficult with the increase of modernization and economic development. The complete breakdown of any semblance of a functioning administration, starting with the Marxistcoup in 1978, including the destruction of the central bureaucracy and the complete disappearanceof the Kabul's involvement in provincial affairs, will make it very difficult to reestablish thestructure of a functioning nation state.

Harmony Between the State and Islam. Last, but not least, past stability depended heavily on the maintenance of a balance between the spheres of thestate and Islam. For much of the country's history, the state managed provincial and tribal affairsthrough the agency of the mullahs and other clerics, who also enjoyed state patronage. By the 1970s,these relations had become strained owing to the rise of various ideologically Islamist movementsand parties. The Taliban successfully avoided this conundrum by creating a theocratic system thatlargely eliminated the apparatus of the state. Resistance from the Islamists and traditionalists couldcreate a serious challenge to the objectives of the United States, the United Nations, and theinternational community, all of which support in one way or another a modernist developmentagenda, including emphasis on matters such as women's rights and universal secular education.

Critical Role of Foreign Powers. Interaction with foreign powers has been a critical dimension of Afghan history. In the distant past, Afghanistan wasboth a well-spring of empires and a corridor through which conquerors passed to the richer lands ofwhat are now India and Pakistan. The Afghan Lodhi Dynasty ruled parts of what is now Pakistanand northern India from the mid-tenth century until being displaced by the Moghul Empire in themid-16th century-a muticultural construction which included a large admixture of Afghans in themilitary ranks. In modern times Afghanistan has generally been the object of foreignconquest-especially by Persia, British India, and Russia. The Durrani Dynasty established andmaintained its dominance by fighting off British and Russian incursions. The collapse of Durranirule led to extreme foreign intervention in the form of invasion and occupation by the Soviet Unionand support to the anti-Soviet resistance by a host of powers, including especially the United States,Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. The Taliban came to power with critical Pakistani and SaudiArabian support, while Russia and Iran sought to bolster the Alliance forces of Rabbani and Masud.

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the effort to get rid of the Taliban brought the United States, Russia, Uzbekistan and other former Soviet Central Asian republics into an uneasycommon cause. The anti-Taliban campaign appeared initially to draw Iran into a more cooperativerelationship with the United States, albeit only tacitly, but Tehran's objectives became less clear withthe defeat of the Taliban and the growing presence of U.S. and other Western military forces in thecountry. Iran's reported reinvolvement in Afghan affairs, including alleged support to both IsmailKhan in Herat and the Uzbek leader, General Dostum, in Mazar-i-Sharif, have troubled U.S. andallied officials. (21) Since the collapse of the Taliban,Pakistan appears, at least for the time being,largely to have lost its former ability to influence Afghanistan by manipulating the Pashtuns andsupporting Islamic radicalism.

Negotiating the Multi-Layered Afghan Power Matrix

Resolving the ethnic problems and constructing a government with recognized legitimacy will be a daunting task that requires reconciling a wide array of competing interests and personalities. Rather than a two-dimensional schematic the Afghan political matrix has the appearance of aRubik's Cube, with numerous layers of independent actors, many of whom have the potential tointeract with each other in various combinations.

Ethnicity. The country's ethnic divisions lie at heart of the problem of achieving national unity, and constitute the first layer. Even personalambition, the most overt driving force of disunity, operates within an ethnic context. Since theSoviet withdrawal in 1989 ethnicity has been the main common denominator of civil strife. Atpresent, Tajik-Pashtun rivalry is the core issue affecting Afghan politics, with the Pashtuns viewingthe Interim Administration as Tajik-dominated.

Regionally-Based Warlords and Commanders. The second layer consists of warlords and commanders, whose ranks include the Panjsheri Tajikcommanders of the of the Northern Alliance, such as General Mohammad Fahim ; theUzbekstrongman General Rashid Dostum , who holds the nominal post of Deputy Defense Minister intheInterim Administration; Ismail Khan , a Tajik leader who controls four provinces in the areaaroundHerat who often acts independently from the Northern Alliance, with whom he is affiliated; andnumerous rival tribal leaders and warlords of the Pashtun belt, such as Kandahar Governor GulAgha Shirzai , a Durrani Pashtun, and various commanders among the Eastern Shura ("governingcouncil"), an influential body centered around Nangahar Province, which includes Jalalabad. Untilrecently Nangahar Province had been under the control of an ethnic Pashtun ally of the NorthernAlliance, Haji Abdul Qadir , elder brother of Abdul Haq, who was killed by the Taliban lastOctoberin a vain attempt to generate a uprising by local Pashtun tribes. Haji Qadir was murdered byunknown assassins outside his office in Kabul in early July 2002, a few days after accepting the postof vice-president (one of three so-designated). Last but not least are remnants of the Taliban whoare more known for their role as tribal leaders and commanders, rather than Islamic zealots, whoappear to retain local support, if not strength, in many parts of the Pashtun South.

Ideologically-Oriented Political Party Leaders. These leaders constitute a third layer. They range from a few modernist politicians affiliated withex-King Zahir Shah, such as Sayyid Ahmad Gailani , an urbane hereditary leader ( pir) of themoderate sufi Islamic sect, through "moderate Islamists" like Cairo-educated SabghatullahMojadiddi , and a range of Islamic radicals.

The more intensely anti-Western political aspirants include, most notably, Burnhanuddin Rabbani and his predominantly Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami ("Islamic Society"), and GulbuddinHekmatyar (Hezb-i-Islami) , once the favorite of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)andreportedly the largest recipient of CIA arms and assistance during the anti-Soviet war. The NewYork Times reported on May 9, 2002, that the CIA targeted Hekmatyar in an attack on a convoy nearKabul in order to preempt anticipated attacks on U.S., coalition, and Afghan government forces andfigures, including interim leader Karzai. Hekmatyar is said to have survived a strike on his convoyby a Hellfire missile fired from a Predator drone reconnaissance aircraft.

Rabbani, a native of Badakhshan Province in the extreme Northeast, is more of a traditionalist than a radical, but has shown strong hostility to Western influence and secularization. Ideologically,the closest Pashtun counterpart to Rabbani may be Yunis Khalis , who heads a different factionofthe Hezb-i-Islami than the one headed by Hekmatyar, and was one of the few mujahidin politicalleaders to lead men in combat. A remarkably vigorous 87 year old who reportedly once exercisedinfluence over Mullah Omar before breaking with the Taliban, Khalis still enjoys support among theEastern Pashtun tribes in the region around Jalalabad.

Rabbani, still viewed as the political "Godfather" of the Northern Alliance, now finds his authority challenged by younger leaders of his party, General Mohammad Fahim and YounisQanooni (who are also military commanders, as noted above) and Dr. AbdullahAbdullah , whois of mixed Tajik-Pashtun ancestry. This "Panjsheri Tajik triumvirate" overrode his objections andassumed the key ministries of defense, interior, and foreign affairs. Rabbani may still may wieldconsiderable influence with the rank and file of the party.

The most pan-Islamic members of the ideological layer (and hence most inclined towards cooperation with Islamic terrorists) include Saudi-backed Abdul Rasoon Sayyaf and his Ittehad-e-Islami , and the aforementioned Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Both have beenmentioned in analleged plot against the Interim Administration that resulted in hundreds of arrests in Kabul earlyApril 2002. (22) Hekmatyar, a consummatepower-seeker who reportedly enjoys qualified support fromIran, recently has sought to make common cause with former Taliban opponents. (23)

Rural-Based Leadership. The patchwork of local tribal headers, mullahs, educated notables, and large landowners constitutes a fourth layer. Thisgroup has multiple sources of connection to higher layers. After almost three decades of conflictwhich has steadily destroyed the basic social, political, and economic structure of the country, manyanalysts question whether traditional leaders are capable of regaining influence via the respectcustomarily given to age, lineage, and education. In the absence of a firm Afghan government orinternational peacekeeper presence, the new forces of local power-the commanders and militialeaders-are likely to engage in endless maneuvering for local dominance and control sources ofrevenue, such as "tax" collections on roads and the opium trade.

Economic Interests. Layer Five is composed of a variety of economic interests with countrywide influence, most notably the " transport mafia ", drug kingpins , and smugglers , many of whom appear to play all three roles. A more positivecomponent of this economic interest layer would include exiles , ranging from businessmen,technocrats, and former civil servants, most of whose ties are to Kabul and a few other cities.

Dynamic Interaction of Individual Actors and Forces

These individual actors and forces are capable of considerable flexibility of alignment; the strongest operate across multiple layers. The Tajik component of the NorthernAlliance is thestrongest, but the organization also enjoys opportunistic support from the Uzbeks and Hazaras, andeven some Pashtuns. The Northern Alliance has the most effective military forces and apolitical-ideological party structure in the form of Rabbani's Jamiat-i-Islami . Finally, the NorthernAlliance benefits from having powerful foreign patrons-Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, and, more recently,the United States. The Uzbek warlord, General Dostum , controls a vital road connection withCentral Asia and has made and broken several different governments and alliances, and has noapparent Uzbek rivals. The Pashtuns , on the contrary, are divided by tribal and personal loyalties,and weakened by the historical divisions among the Durrani Confederation and Gilzais, in the west,and between the Western Pashtuns as a group and the more independent and unaffiliated EasternPashtun tribal groupings. The Hazaras , a long repressed Shi'a minority of mongol stock, havegained in assertiveness as a consequence of their role in the anti-Soviet campaign and their struggleagainst ethnic cleansing by the Taliban. Organized under the banner of the Hizb-e-Wahadat , andled by Karim Khalili , the Hazaras are not strong enough to bid for power in their own right, buttheywill fight for their autonomy if they feel threatened. (24) During the June 2002 Loya Jirga PresidentKarzai named Khalili as one of three vice-presidents, with unspecified powers.

Potential Swing Groups. The muddled matrix is complicated further by the unpredictable behavior of "swing" groups who historically have playedthe spoiler's role. In addition to Dostum, noted above, these include particularlyindependent-minded tribes in southeastern Afghanistan, especially the Shinwaris who inhabitNangahar Province and other areas around Jalalabad and the Kyber Pass. Traditionally the Shinwarisand other eastern Pashtun tribes have engaged in drug production and smuggling, and preyed onKhyber Pass goods traffic. Valuing their independence, they rejected the Durrani supremacy. TheEastern Pashtun tribes often have allied with Tajik and dissident Pashtun challengers to Durrani rule. During the anti-Soviet war, the Shinwaris and other eastern Pashtuns provided the main base ofsupport for competing radical mujahidin groups led by Yunis Khalis and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, bothof whom belong to non-mainstream Pashtun tribes. These are the tribes who assisted U.S. forcesin the assault on the Tora Bora, some of whom also may have facilitated the escape of Al Qaedaforces. (25) Because Nangarhar Province is one ofthe most productive opium growing regions andcommands one of the main land routes to Pakistan and the West, internecine conflict among ahandful of powerful commanders and tribal leaders has greatly intensified in the post-Taliban era. (26)

It was largely because of the potential swing value of the Shinwaris and other Eastern Pashtun tribes that Karzai and senior Tajik leaders in the Northern Alliance-dominated InterimAdministration had appointed the late Haji Abdul Qadir as governor of Nangahar Province, andalso why he was made a vice-president after the June 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga . Qadir, who washead of one of the wealthiest families in the region, was a former mujahidin commander who heldthe same governorship during 1992-1995.

Stakes for the Participants. The participants in the current power struggle are driven by a variety of largely negative motives-especially ethnicnationalism, personal power aspirations, vanity, and greed. Principal among the more concretestakes is control and taxation of transportation routes and nodal points, and control of the drug trade.

Several contenting impulses and aspirations currently dominate the struggle to define the future of Afghanistan. Most of these tendencies have both positive and negative aspects:

despite the depth of ethnic and tribal divisions, all of the contenders for power continue to regard themselves as Afghans, but Pashtun-Tajik antipathy remains high, and Pashtunsare especially angry that Tajiks hold most of the power in Kabul;

as it did with the Taliban, the powerful transportation mafia will stronglysupport the establishment of a government that can secure the highways and confine the collectionof taxes and customs duties to the border crossings; but the government currently has no power toprovide security, and cannot do so until basic power issues are resolved;

the prospect of $10-15 billion in international aid provides substantialincentives for Afghans to cooperate, at least minimally, with the Interim Administration, but concreteaid has been very slow in arriving and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and internationaldonor organizations are unable to deliver assistance to much of the countryside due to ongoing powerstruggles;

finally, awareness among the current contenders for power, especially withinthe ranks of the Tajiks of the Northern Alliance, of the costs of the internecine conflict that followedthe Soviet withdrawal is evident, and most of the main figures in the Transitional Administrationappear to be eager not to repeat the mistakes of the past. However, as suggested by the conflictbetween Uzbek and Tajik forces for the control of Mazar-i-Sharif and the assassination of HajiQadir, what some call the 23-year-old civil war has not ended, and many Afghans are not ready toput aside past quarrels or give up their personal power aspirations.

Four Scenarios for the Future Afghan State

Because more than two decades of conflict have largely destroyed the old Afghan polity andeconomy, the past offers no reliable "roadmap" to constructing a politically stable and economicallyviable Afghan state. This conclusion is strongly suggested by two particular developments of thepast two decades-the collapse of the Durrani ascendancy, which started with Daoud's coup in 1973,and the rise of Tajik power and, to a lesser extent, that of other ethnic minorities. Durrani politicaldominance is not likely to be reestablished because of the scattering of the Afghan elite numberingperhaps 100,000, largely to North America and Europe, and the polarization of Pashtun society byinternal conflict and the rise of the predominantly Pashtun Taliban. The return of King Zahir Shahto his country after more than 30 years of exile, may lend some support to the political process butcannot restore the previous status quo-nor is it intended to under the Bonn Accord. A bid byrelatives of the king and their supporters to give the king-and, hence, themselves-a direct role in thegovernance of the country was checked by the exercise of forceful influence by Karzai, the PanjsheriTajik leaders of the Northern Alliance, and, reportedly, the United States.

For better or worse, the Tajiks, who are less divided than the Pashtuns, now appear firmly established in Kabul and the Northeast, and Ismail Khan, another Tajik, who styles himself " Emir "(an Arabic word equivalent to prince or ruler) and acts independently of the his former NorthernAlliance colleagues, has largely uncontested control of Herat. General Dostum's control of Mazar-i-Sharif is being contested, but seems insured for the time being. On the other hand,Kandahar, Jalalabad, and other important population centers in the Pashtun South and Southeastshow no similar coalescence under one leader or group of leaders.

Democratic Pluralism - A Necessity, Not a Luxury

The breakdown of the royalist governing structure and the subsequent inability of either the mujahidin or the Taliban to establish a stable government suggests strongly that both at theprovincial and central levels, stability, if it is possible, seems most likely to come from some formof democratic process. After decades of civil war with a high level of involvement by nearly theentire society, many more Afghans have been politically mobilized than ever in the past. The ideaof returning to a traditional autocratic system, even a benign one, seems likely to be rejected by mostAfghans. As discussed below, a situation involving a largely powerless government in Kabul,coupled with control of the rest of the country by self-appointed regional warlords, might providesome temporary stability but would involve the de facto dissolution of the Afghan state-not aprescription for stability and moderation. These goals are far more likely to be achieved if thevarious competing groups can agree on a workable constitutional model that provides all of the mainethnic and other interests with fair representation and at least the opportunity to cooperate acrossethnic, tribal, and ideological lines to seek to participate in a governing majority.

The future of the Afghan state, whether pluralistic or not, depends on a number of factors, especially the actions of the main Afghan contenders for power, the policies of neighboring countrieswith the capacity to intervene in Afghan affairs, and those of the United States and the internationalcommunity. At present, several different outcomes can be envisioned. Four of the more plausibleones are described below, in descending order of desirability for the Afghans and for U.S. interests.

1. Transitional Regime Leading to Pluralistic Democracy

Under present circumstances the most desirable outcome would be the successful formation of a broadly representative transitional authority leading ultimately to the establishment of a pluralisticdemocracy, as envisioned by the agreement reached at Bonn in early December 2001. Although theJune 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga appeared to move the political process in the direction outlinedby the Bonn agreement, a number of basic question marks remain about the nature and effectivenessof the Transitional Administration and the outlines of the future constitution and political system.

Both the negative lessons of recent history and the attraction of major international aid may constitute sufficient incentives for cooperation among the current members of the TransitionalAdministration in Kabul, but it is questionable whether these negative and positive incentives willbe enough to gain the cooperation of warlords and commanders in the main cities and the provinces. Likewise, an important obstacle to ethnic harmony-the collapse of Pashtun political cohesivenessand the related sense of being dispossessed-is unlikely to be solved by the adjustment of cabinetposts, since the Tajiks will not willingly give up effective control of the key ministries concernedwith defense, internal security, and foreign affairs. (27) The best chance of creating a government witha broadly accepted claim to legitimacy would be one that rests on the foundation of a representativelegislature.

2. Northern Alliance-Dominated State

The most obvious consequence of the rise and fall of the Taliban is the stronger position of the minority ethnic groups of the Northern Alliance. Controlling Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, andHerat, the constituent elements of the Northern Alliance effectively hold sway over more than halfof the country and all its six international borders except the one with Pakistan. Whether the mainAlliance ethnic components-Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras - have adequately absorbed the lesson oftheir previous internecine conflict and self-serving opportunism remains doubtful at this point. SomeAlliance leaders clearly understand that the revival of Pashtun power under the banner of the Talibanoccurred because of past Alliance excesses. Others, notably General Dostum and Ismail Khan, stillappear to seek to create a local fiefdoms, and will cooperate with the other Alliance components onlyto the extent that it serves their personal power interests.

The Panjsheri Tajiks retained their primacy in the June 2002 Northern Alliance, especially Marshal Fahim, who was continued as Defense Minister and who has been characterized by a seniorU.S. official as one of the "winners" coming out of the conclave. (28) The replacement of YunisQanooni as interior minister by Taj Muhammad Wardak is not viewed as a significant reduction ofTajik control, especially since Qanooni was given a new post as "Security Advisor" in addition toheading the education ministry. (29) It remains tobe seen whether non-Tajiks appointed to otherministries will actually become a part of the governing power structure. The Karzai administrationthus remains at risk of being perceived as simply a cover for Tajik dominance at the center. Sincethe former Northern Alliance still stands little chance of establishing effective sway over thesouthern Pashtun heartland, the end result could be a de facto partition, along the lines of the thirdscenario, below.

3. Disappearance of a Unified Afghan State

The complete disappearance of an Afghan state, which still seems unlikely, could occur if current divisions become unresolvable. The regional consequences would be severe. It is doubtfulwhether neighboring countries would be able to avoid competing for control or influence overadjacent areas on the Afghan side of the border. Among other considerations, countries challengedby Islamic extremism or ethnic revolts, such as in the case of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, would notwant to allow a "no man's land" on their borders. Russia would have a similar interest, i.e., toprevent the overthrow of friendly central Asian states or the establishment of havens for Chechensand other armed independence movements. In addition, if the prospects for Afghan unity were torecede, Russia could decide to give the de facto partition a push to enhance the prospects that the oiland gas of Central Asia exits through Russia and the loose successor to the Soviet Union, theCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Afghanistan's western and southern neighbors have a particularly strong traditional interest in influencing Afghan affairs. Iran would be tempted to extend its influence over vast parts of westernAfghanistan that had historically been part of the Persian empire, and also to protect the interests ofco-religionists in the central Hazarajat. Already ties between Iran and the four western borderprovinces commanded by Ismail Khan are close and apparently growing.

Pakistan has foresworn any intent to interfere in Afghan affairs as part of its current cooperation with the United States, but if chaos should ensue, Islamabad likely would once again deem itnecessary to find and support Afghan allies who might be able to stabilize the Pashtun belt andcontest for power in Kabul with the Northern Alliance. Such potential allies are not now apparent,but could emerge out current leaders affiliated with Karzai, remnants of the Taliban or-less likelyat this point-the old protege of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) organization, GulbuddinHekmatyar.

Many analysts and observers are concerned the current situation looks much like the most benign form of disintegration-i.e., the appearance of a unified government, but with little real poweror resources at its command. In addition to regional warlords, a number of areas are effectivelyunder the authority of regional or local shuras (councils of commanders, mullahs, and elders). Fromone point of view, these bodies represent a rough kind of tribal democracy, but in many cases theyare dominated by rich families and/or those with the most men under arms. One particular problemarising out of disintegration is that very little of Afghanistan is without significant numbers ofminorities. Hence, "ethnic cleansing" and voluntary population realignments could create a majorhumanitarian crisis. Some human rights abuses have already been inflicted on Pashtuns living inTajik-majority areas of the North, creating thousands of additional internally displaced persons(IDPs) in refugee camps for internal refugees. (30) The temptation of neighbors to secure their bordersand promote the interests of ethnic and religious counterparts would be strong.

The descent of Afghanistan into chaos once again would jeopardize a number of important U.S. interests. These include access to the oil and gas resources of Central Asia, instability that couldspread to the Persian Gulf, a further expansion of opium production in Afghanistan, and thecontinued use of Afghan territory by terrorist groups. The already difficult task of maintainingPakistani cooperation against terrorism might become impossible.

4. Caretaker Ward of the International Community

The potential negative consequences of failure to recreate a stable Afghanistan could conceivably impel the United States, its allies, important neighbors such as Russia, and theinternational community, to seek to set up an Afghan-staffed caretaker government backed withforeign advisors and enough international peacekeepers to maintain security in Kabul and othercities. This approach, by which international peacekeeping and nation-building would becomequasi-permanent, rather than transitional, could only work if the Afghans themselves-and thewarlords in particular-decided that accepting such an effort by the international community waspreferable to unending civil strife or undesired political outcomes. In theory, if basic security,services, and reconstruction could be provided to more densely populated areas, Afghans outside thereach of the immediate caretaker authority would gravitate to secure areas to seek the benefits ofinternational support.

This scenario likely would require an interim government composed of figures who are acceptable to the major ethnic and other interest groups but who would not themselves be contendersfor power. (31) The most acceptable candidates arelikely to be found among the ranks of Afghans withtechnocratic qualifications, including former senior civil servants, Afghan nationals currently orpreviously with multilateral banks, and other professionals-including current exiles. Some of theseare already in the transitional cabinet. Undoubtedly the government would benefit from theassistance of foreign advisors, either from donor governments or international organizations. Especially weighing against this option is that given Afghanistan's history and current situation, sucha prolonged foreign role could easily become a military and political quagmire.

Factors Affecting the Outcome

Which, if any, of these scenarios prevails likely will be determined by a number of key factors. Some of these are susceptible to external influence, others can only be decided by the Afghansthemselves.

Resolution of Disputes on Power Sharing in the Central Government

Little progress can be achieved on other necessary steps until the parties and groups that have the ability to disrupt the process agree on how to share power. As of mid-2002 it still is not clearthat those with the power to disrupt the interim government will cooperate. Even if a stable powerbalance is achieved at the national level, the basic instinct of most of the Afghan leaders andwarlords still is to compete for "turf" and the opportunities to extract cash from the population in theform of taxes and other levies. This will make it very hard to establish effective centralizedinstitutions and extend the reach of the government into the countryside.

Results of the June 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga. Given the circumstances and obstacles, observers generally regard the Emergency Loya Jirga thattook place in mid-June 2002 as substantially a success. Despite the fact that the sessions weredivisive and sometimes chaotic, and failed to resolve a number of issues concerning power-sharingin a way that is likely to promote peace and reconciliation, there were a number of positive aspectsto the conclave:

the assembly easily confirmed Karzai as head of the new Transitional Administration, a significant vote of confidence in his performance to date and tacitly a victory forthe United States and the international community.

a bid by relatives of Zahir Shah and royalist supporters to drop Karzai andpromote the candidacy of the ex-King as President, rather than just a figurehead, was defeated withapparent assistance from U.S. officials. (32)

the delegates engaged in a remarkably free and often unruly debate that seemsto have brought some degree of satisfaction even to those who saw themselves on the losing end ofthe outcome.

Islamic extremists evidenced little influence and did not obtain significantcabinet representation, although the delegates voted to declare the country an Islamicrepublic.

despite the presence of numerous regional commanders with retinues of armedfollowers, the conclave featured a war of words rather than bullets.

some 160 appointed women not only participated but were heard frequentlyin the debates.

Karzai dropped from his cabinet Amanullah Zadran, a Pashtun, formerlyMinister of Tribal Affairs, whose brother Bacha Khan Zadran, a notorious warlord, has challengedKabul's authority in Paktia Province.

The limitations of the meeting also are readily apparent:

the process for selecting 1,501 delegates representing 32 provinces and several interest groups and communities was highly uneven and in a number of provinces locally powerfulwarlords reportedly used coercion and even murder to influence delegateselection.

the outcome reflected continuing domination of the government by two groupswho have formed an alliance of convenience-Panjshiri Tajiks of the Northern Alliance and Afghanswho are associated with the so-called "Afghan diaspora" and who enjoy western support. Althoughmany of these are de-tribalized Pashtuns with professional backgrounds, they are just as divided astheir tribal cousins, and neither groups of Pushtuns have been able to coalesce in a way that wouldgive them a meaningful share of power.

Karzai's strategy to coopt regional warlords by appointing them asvice-presidents appears to have failed, and might even have backfired in the case of Haji Qadir'sassassination. The rejection of the offered posts by Ismail Khan and General Dostum implies theircontinuing intention to maintain their regional autonomy.

importantly, the delegates failed to reach agreement on any specific plan forcreating a legislature, or deciding whether the country needed a true legislature with powers to makelaw and approve a budget, or some form of advisory council. Failing to resolve this issue, Karzaiproposed that 45 members of the Loya Jirga remain behind as a council to come up with aproposal. (33)

Economic Development and the Issue of Jobs or Guns

Up to a certain point the reestablishment of normal life could allow armed fighters to return to peaceful civilian pursuits, but a resurrected traditional economy cannot provide enough jobs or theright kinds of jobs to fully absorb the ranks of the former combatants of whatever stripe. Withoutjobs, and without a public educational system, young Afghan men are likely to gravitate to theservice of warlords and/or to study in the Islamic madrassas, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. (34) One significant problem is that the families of Afghan emigres have grown in the intervening years,and in many cases will be too large to be supported by the family farmstead, even if it is reclaimedand brought back into production. Some level of industrial development, even rudimentary activitiessuch as food processing, textile manufacturing, and the production of basic farm and householdimplements, would appear necessary to absorb surplus workers and farm labor.

Economic Development and The Future Role Islam

Because most of the Afghan combatants have mobilized on the basis of an appeal to Islamic sentiment, often of a radical fundamentalist nature, progress towards economic modernization islikely to encounter strong resistance, especially with regard to education and the employment ofwomen in the workforce. Nonetheless, reconstruction based on the revitalization and modernizationof the Afghan economy may be the only way to overcome tendencies towards internecine warfareand chaos.

Unless the economy becomes more dynamic, politicized Islam is likely to remain the single most powerful ideological force, even if radical fundamentalism does not appeal to the majority ofAfghans. Assuming that the Taliban remain dispersed and do not play a visible political role, andthat other Islamist forces remain marginalized, religion may not necessarily reemerge as the mainrallying cry of anti-government forces. These are big "ifs," however. The central government mayface difficult choices in attempting to promote modernization and development along secular lines,while not stirring up an Islamist reaction.

Issues for U.S. Policy

Inevitably U.S. policy will have a significant influence on the outcome of the current effort toreconstruct a stable Afghan state. In addition to playing a key role in driving the Taliban frompower, in concert with Afghan forces on the ground, the United States has been the largest donor byfar to the feeding programs of the United Nations World Food Program (WFP), and it is certain tobe the among the leading contributors to economic reconstruction.

For the future, three roles on the part of the United States would appear extremely critical, over and above humanitarian assistance:

1. Support for the Political Process

The creation of a moderate Afghan state requires the establishment of a stable political order, the creation of effective state institutions, and the reconstruction of the country's economicinfrastructure and rural economy. Many other countries and international organizations can provideaid, technical assistance, and even security for Kabul and other important cities, but most observersbelieve that only the United States has the international prestige and influence, the logisticalcapabilities, and the military power to influence decisively the internal Afghan political process. Theinability of the United Nations and humanitarian NGOs to stave off Afghanistan's descent into chaosafter the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, makes clear that the reconstruction of a moderate Afghanstate cannot be accomplished without strong U.S. engagement.

By most accounts the United States played a strong behind-the-scenes role at the June 2002 Loya Jirga in supporting Karzai and short-circuiting a bid by Pushtun supporters of the ex-king,Zahir Shah, to elect him head of state. Unfortunately, the picture of the ex-king, sitting in a chairflanked by Karzai and U.S. special representative for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, anddeclaring-through a statement read by his aid-that he would not be a candidate, tended to reinforcedthe impression of American interference. On the other hand, the bid by relatives and supporters ofthe ex-king to make elect him head of state was widely viewed as a transparent ploy by individualswho are widely regarded as corrupt and out of touch with current Afghan realities.

2. Close Engagement with Pakistan

Close U.S. engagement with Pakistan, the country with the greatest capacity for good or ill, will also be critical to the creation of a stable Afghanistan. Pakistan, which by far has the greatestcapacity to influence developments in the Pashtun South, is also the country whose perceivedinterests are the most threatened by the collapse of the Taliban and the rising power of the Tajik andUzbek-dominated Northern Alliance. Islamabad sees several potential sources of danger, theprimary ones being the possibility of ongoing conflict and chaos in the Pashtun belt and heightenedIndian, Russian, and Iranian influence in Kabul.

The Bush Administration and the Congress appear to recognize that Pakistan's military president, General Musharraf, has crossed the Rubicon in committing to cooperate closely in theU.S.-led anti-terrorist campaign. The decision, which was largely dictated by extreme U.S. pressure,was not without a number of benefits for Pakistan, dramatically displayed during Musharraf'sFebruary 2002 visit to Washington. Apart from various kinds of new assistance and debt relief,Musharraf's crackdown on his own Islamic radicals showed that these groups generally lacked strongpublic support, and strengthened his hold on power. On the other hand, increasing tensions withIndia over Kashmir, fueled by Pakistan's own alleged support of local terrorist groups, hasintensified Islamabad's perception of being squeezed between a potentially hostile or unstableAfghanistan and a demonstrably hostile India.

Especially because of the possession of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan, the United States has a compelling interest in pressuring both Pakistan and India to act responsibly on theKashmir issue, as was demonstrated during a tense standoff in mid-2002, while also making sure thatPakistan continues to play a positive role in Afghanistan and in the anti-terrorist fight. The twinAmerican stakes in cooperation with Islamabad and preventing an Indian-Pakistan appear to mandatethe continuing close engagement with Pakistan, including efforts to promote support for U.S.viewpoints among parties and leaders who are likely to influence Pakistani policies if and whenmilitary rule gives way to elections and the restoration of civilian government.

3. Bilateral Assistance and Participation in International Assistance and Development Efforts

Both the Bush Administration and the Congress have made clear their intention to provide substantial aid to Afghanistan, but the actual amount and kind of assistance that the United Statesprovides could prove highly important to the prospects for recreating a stable Afghan government. The Tokyo meeting of aid donors in January 2002, which was co-hosted by Japan, the United States,the European Union, and Saudi Arabia, generated nearly $1.5 billion in near-term aid pledges,including a U.S. commitment of $296 million. (35) The Bush Administration has allocated about$311.3 million for humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan for FY 2002, which began October 1,2001. (36)

U.S. aid provided through the WFP and NGOs will continue to be important in preventing famine, reconstructing agriculture, and restoring basic infrastructure, but visible bilateral Americanaid would also appear to be critical to influencing U.S.-desired political outcomes. In this respect,many argue that if the Bonn process is to be viable, warlords and others who are calculating whetherto cooperate with the Bonn process or carve out permanent fiefdoms arguably need to see that theInterim Administration, and the arrangements for creating a new, pluralistic democratic order havethe backing of the United States and other aid donors. Observers also note, however, that it is criticalthat U.S. support is seen as bringing concrete benefits for the country and not just influence over theKarzai administration.

Conclusion: Issues for Congressional Consideration

A number of assassinations and other incidents of political violence both before and after theEmergency Loya Jirga underscore that events in Afghanistan may be coming to a head sooner ratherthan later. As of July 2002, positive developments appear in many cases to be offset by negativeones, and the overall state of progress becomes a matter of individual judgment or perspective.

Issues of Special Congressional Interest: Narcotics Production and Women's Rights

In hearing statements, speeches, and in proposed legislation, Members of Congress have stressed their concerns particularly about Afghanistan's status as a major opium production area andabout the status of women. Both of these are extremely complicated issues given Afghanistan'ssocial and economic traditions. Progress on both issues, if it is to occur, clearly depends onfundamental economic and social modernization, which is most likely to occur under a governmentthat has both a progressive outlook and popular support based on participatory politics.

Narcotics or Development. The U.S. stake in economic development in Afghanistan is even more clear with regard to Afghan's status as theworld's leading producer of opium. Many of the poppy-growing areas are the fiefdoms of triballeaders whose tribes which have for centuries depended on illicit sources of income, including drugsand smuggling. In the recent past, before the Taliban takeover, international agencies reportedly hadsome success in gaining cuts in poppy production in Nangahar and other poppy-growing areas ofsoutheastern Afghanistan, in exchange for economic assistance, but such gains tended to beinconsistent, at best.

The Karzai administration has announced an ambitious U.S.-backed program to make one-time payments to farmers to destroy their opium crops or face destruction by government agents withoutcompensation. The payments are said to amount to something more than for a wheat crop, but muchless than the value of an opium crop. Reportedly, the United States, the U.K., and other Westerncountries have agreed to finance the program, but U.S. officials are also said to despair of having anymajor impact for three major reasons: (1) the Kabul government simply does not have the staff orreach to have an impact on many of the most important producing areas; (2) the crop is nearly readyfor harvest; and (3) the poppy growers and their affiliated smugglers and warlords will likely fightagainst any effort to forcefully destroy the crops. A decree signed by Chairman Karzai on behalf ofthe interim government, which would make illegal the collection of loans to opium growers, iswidely viewed as unenforceable. (37) Someobservers speculate that malfeasance in the anti-narcoticsprogram in Nangahar Province, and/or the opposition by drug lords, may lie at the root of HajiQadir's assassination in early July 2002. (38)

Future Status of Women in Afghan Society. The issue of the rights of women in Afghan society has been at the center of the struggle betweenmodernization and tradition. The same political conditions that have created support for reactionaryreligious ideas have fostered retrogression in the status of women. Both in the refugee camps andin conflict areas, young men were separated from the company of even their female relatives. Someanalysts believe the lack of ordinary contact with women in the refugee camps across the border inPakistan has heightened sex discrimination in Afghanistan beyond traditional levels. Also, becauseof the concerns of women about their safety in a male-dominated society, they sometimes themselvesembrace the veil and burka out of self-protection. (39)

The picture is not uniformly negative, however. Especially in urban areas, even socially conservative Afghans have recognized the importance of female education. Young women haveflocked enthusiastically to Kabul University and other educational institutions since they havereopened. Two regional warlords, General Dostum in the North and Ismail Khan in the West supportand fund female education. The real rate of progress in this area, however, probably will depend onthe pace of economic revival and modernization.

Women's organizations and other observers regard the outcome of the Loya Jirga as mixed. On the one hand, women actively participated and their often eloquent speeches received a respectfulhearing. A woman even ran for president-coming in a distant second in a three cornered race. Onthe other hand, a conservative Islamic reaction against the participation of women in thecabinet-including a negative opinion from Karzai's appointee as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,an Islamic conservative-caused the President not to re-appoint a woman, Dr. Sima Samar, as theMinister of Women's Affairs. He appointed her as head of the Human Rights Commission,instead. (40)

Three Policy Issues for Possible Congressional Consideration

Congress may wish to consider several issues in particular that bear on the ability of the United States to provide timely and effective assistance and support to the interim government and the Bonnprocess. The first is the reported inability of U.S. representatives in Kabul to provide reliableexpectations regarding the deliveries of various forms of assistance. One source of delay in thedelivery of U.S. support to the Transitional Administration is that funding is scattered over at leastsix different departments and agencies, all of which have their own bureaucratic procedures. Thesebottlenecks have been a persistent problem in a number of situations, including U.S. assistance toBosnia. (41) It may be possible to bring more orderand cohesion to this process without altering basiclines of department and agency authority and responsibility, which have evolved over a long periodof time and would be difficult to change.

Tension between Dual U.S. Objectives. From the point of view of Afghan politics, an even more important issue may be a significant level oftension between the objectives of U.S. military operations against Taliban and Al Qaeda remnantsand the goal of bolstering the power of the Kabul administration vis-Ã -vis regional warlords. Bynearly all accounts, U.S. military forces made brilliant use of local Afghan militias and otherirregular forces, thereby advancing the date for the replacement of the Taliban government by theInterim Administration, as well as saving many lives-American, allied, and Afghan. Unfortunately,U.S. military strategy, including on-going operations, inadvertently has tended to bolster the powerof some warlords who are resisting the imposition of Kabul's authority, and also increased thepossibility that any renewal of internal conflict will be more intense and deadly. A start was madein resolving this contradiction by the recent "graduation" of the first contingent of a new,multi-ethnic national army, but as noted above, this will long remain a negligible force whencompared to those of the regional warlords - even those in Kabul itself.

The mistaken air attacks on four villages in Uruzgan Province in the early hours of July 2, 2002, have generated a number of calls for a reconsideration of U.S. strategy, especially the heavy use ofair power based on intelligence information provided by local Afghan militias and warlords. Severalserious mistaken attacks on civilians, including reported Karzai supporters and villages friendly tothe government, have been blamed at least in part on bad intelligence supplied by local allies of U.S.and other western military forces. Some suspect that several of these incidents may be the result ofdeliberate actions by Afghan warlords and militia leaders to exact revenge on rivals.

Clearly the U.S. and its western allies cannot operate without intelligence provided by local Afghan forces, but the use of extremely lethal ordnance makes any error highly costly in human life. Some analysts and even Afghan victims of U.S. air attacks have suggested that too much relianceis being put on stand-off air attacks and not enough on using ground troops to reconnoiter or engage suspected targets and verify them before initiating devastating air attacks. Because of theseincidents, some observers warn that the policies of the United States, and to a lesser extent itswestern European allies, are resting on shifting sands.

Response to Calls for Expanded International Peacekeeping. Especially because U.S. forces are already engaged as de factoarbiters and peacekeepers, often at risk to the forces themselves, a number of Members of Congresshave called on the Bush Administration to reconsider its opposition to increasing the numbers anddispersion of international peacekeepers, possibly including U.S. forces. (42) The Defense Departmenthas argued that the presence of international peacekeeping forces could complicate the coordinationof their ongoing military operations, and that other countries are not eager to fill this role. Criticsrespond that gaining additional allied participation in peacekeeping requires U.S. leadership andparticipation. (43)

International aid agencies and aid workers are almost universal in declaring that they cannot function without the security provided by international peacekeepers. Also, aid agencies note thatinternational peacekeepers have been a "draw" factor in attracting hundreds of thousands of refugeesback to their homes, but thus far mainly in the neighborhood of Kabul. International relief officialsargue that much more rapid progress could be made in returning both external and internal refugeesto their homes if the size of the peacekeeping force could be enlarged and deployed to otherpopulation centers.

Possible Benefits of a More Transparent U.S. Military Role on theGround. Bush Administration officials say that the military phase of the war is allbut over, but that U.S. troops will remain for a long time in order to keep Al Qaeda and the Talibanoff balance and prevent them from regaining the initiative. Under these circumstances, one potentialbenefit of making the current U.S. role more transparent would be to defuse Afghan suspicions thatthe United States is seeking to convert the ongoing hunt for Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants into anindefinite military occupation. Afghanistan has a history of reacting harshly to the presence offoreign military forces and interference in Afghan politics. Every local conflict that U.S. forces maydefuse has the potential for creating enemies. This is an inevitable consequence of peacekeeping,but since many ordinary Afghans welcome an international presence and the security it provides,operating under U.N. or other international auspices may provoke less of a backlash. Given manyindications from American officials that substantial U.S. forces will remain in Afghanistan for a longtime to come, Congress may wish to consider further the nature and modalities of the U.S. militaryrole, including the relationship of U.S. forces to ISFA.

Appendix I: Bonn Agreements on Afghanistan

AGREEMENT ON PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN PENDING THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan,

In the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan,

Determined to end the tragic conflict in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country,

Reaffirming the independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan,

Acknowledging the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice,

Expressing their appreciation to the Afghan mujahidin who, over the years, have defended the independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the country and have played a major role inthe struggle against terrorism and oppression, and whose sacrifice has now made them both heroesof jihad and champions of peace, stability and reconstruction of their beloved homeland,Afghanistan,

Aware that the unstable situation in Afghanistan requires the implementation of emergency interim arrangements and expressing their deep appreciation to His Excellency ProfessorBurhanuddin Rabbani for his readiness to transfer power to an interim authority which is to beestablished pursuant to this agreement,

Recognizing the need to ensure broad representation in these interim arrangements of all segments of the Afghan population, including groups that have not been adequately represented atthe UN Talks on Afghanistan,

Noting that these interim arrangements are intended as a first step toward the establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government, and are notintended to remain in place beyond the specified period of time,

Recognizing that some time may be required for a new Afghan security force to be fully constituted and functional and that therefore other security provisions detailed in Annex I to thisagreement must meanwhile be put in place,

Considering that the United Nations, as the internationally recognized impartial institution, has a particularly important role to play, detailed in Annex II to this agreement, in the period prior to theestablishment of permanent institutions in Afghanistan,

Have agreed as follows:

THE INTERIM AUTHORITY

I. General provisions

1) An Interim Authority shall be established upon the official transfer of power on 22 December 2001.

2) The Interim Authority shall consist of an Interim Administration presided over by a Chairman, a Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga , anda Supreme Court of Afghanistan, as well as such other courts as may be established by the InterimAdministration. The composition, functions and governing procedures for the InterimAdministration and the Special Independent Commission are set forth in this agreement.

3) Upon the official transfer of power, the Interim Authority shall be the repository of Afghan sovereignty, with immediate effect. As such, it shall, throughout the interim period, representAfghanistan in its external relations and shall occupy the seat of Afghanistan at the United Nationsand in its specialized agencies, as well as in other international institutions and conferences.

4) An Emergency Loya Jirga shall be convened within six months of the establishment of the Interim Authority. The Emergency Loya Jirga will be opened by His Majesty Mohammed Zaher[sic], the former King of Afghanistan. The Emergency Loya Jirga shall decide on a TransitionalAuthority, including a broad-based transitional administration, to lead Afghanistan until such timeas a fully representative government can be elected through free and fair elections to be held no laterthan two years from the date of the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga .

5) The Interim Authority shall cease to exist once the Transitional Authority has been established by the Emergency Loya Jirga .

6) A Constitutional Loya Jirga shall be convened within eighteen months of the establishment of the Transitional Authority, in order to adopt a new constitution for Afghanistan. In order to assistthe Constitutional Loya Jirga prepare the proposed Constitution, the Transitional Administrationshall, within two months of its commencement and with the assistance of the United Nations,establish a Constitutional Commission.

II. Legal framework and judicial system

1) The following legal framework shall be applicable on an interim basis until the adoption of the new Constitution referred to above:

i) The Constitution of 1964, a/ to the extent that its provisions are not inconsistent with those contained in this agreement, and b/ with the exception of those provisions relatingto the monarchy and to the executive and legislative bodies provided in the Constitution;and

ii) existing laws and regulations, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with this agreement or with international legal obligations to which Afghanistan is a party, or withthose applicable provisions contained in the Constitution of 1964, provided that theInterim Authority shall have the power to repeal or amend those laws and regulations.

2) The judicial power of Afghanistan shall be independent and shall be vested in a Supreme Court of Afghanistan, and such other courts as may be established by the Interim Administration.The Interim Administration shall establish, with the assistance of the United Nations, a JudicialCommission to rebuild the domestic justice system in accordance with Islamic principles,international standards, the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions.

III. Interim Administration

A. Composition

1) The Interim Administration shall be composed of a Chairman, five Vice Chairmen and 24 other members. Each member, except the Chairman, may head a department of the InterimAdministration.

2) The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan have invited His Majesty Mohammed Zaher [sic], the former King of Afghanistan, to chair the Interim Administration. His Majesty has indicatedthat he would prefer that a suitable candidate acceptable to the participants be selected as the Chairof the Interim Administration.

3) The Chairman, the Vice Chairmen and other members of the Interim Administration have been selected by the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan, as listed in Annex IV to thisagreement. The selection has been made on the basis of professional competence and personalintegrity from lists submitted by the participants in the UN Talks, with due regard to the ethnic,geographic and religious composition of Afghanistan and to the importance of the participation ofwomen.

4) No person serving as a member of the Interim Administration may simultaneously hold membership of the Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency LoyaJirga .

B. Procedures

1) The Chairman of the Interim Administration, or in his/her absence one of the Vice Chairmen, shall call and chair meetings and propose the agenda for these meetings.

2) The Interim Administration shall endeavour to reach its decisions by consensus. In order for any decision to be taken, at least 22 members must be in attendance. If a vote becomes necessary,decisions shall be taken by a majority of the members present and voting, unless otherwise stipulatedin this agreement. The Chairman shall cast the deciding vote in the event that the members aredivided equally.

C. Functions

1) The Interim Administration shall be entrusted with the day-to-day conduct of the affairs of state, and shall have the right to issue decrees for the peace, order and good government ofAfghanistan.

2) The Chairman of the Interim Administration or, in his/her absence, one of the Vice Chairmen, shall represent the Interim Administration as appropriate.

3) Those members responsible for the administration of individual departments shall also be responsible for implementing the policies of the Interim Administration within their areas ofresponsibility.

4) Upon the official transfer of power, the Interim Administration shall have full jurisdiction over the printing and delivery of the national currency and special drawing rights from internationalfinancial institutions. The Interim Administration shall establish, with the assistance of the UnitedNations, a Central Bank of Afghanistan that will regulate the money supply of the country throughtransparent and accountable procedures.

5) The Interim Administration shall establish, with the assistance of the United Nations, an independent Civil Service Commission to provide the Interim Authority and the future TransitionalAuthority with shortlists of candidates for key posts in the administrative departments, as well asthose of governors and uluswals, in order to ensure their competence and integrity.

6) The Interim Administration shall, with the assistance of the United Nations, establish an independent Human Rights Commission, whose responsibilities will include human rightsmonitoring, investigation of violations of human rights, and development of domestic human rightsinstitutions. The Interim Administration may, with the assistance of the United Nations, alsoestablish any other commissions to review matters not covered in this agreement.

7) The members of the Interim Administration shall abide by a Code of Conduct elaborated in accordance with international standards.

8) Failure by a member of the Interim Administration to abide by the provisions of the Code of Conduct shall lead to his/her suspension from that body. The decision to suspend a member shallbe taken by a two-thirds majority of the membership of the Interim Administration on the proposalof its Chairman or any of its Vice Chairmen.

9) The functions and powers of members of the Interim Administration will be further elaborated, as appropriate, with th assistance of the United Nations.

IV. The Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga

1) The Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga shall be established within one month of the establishment of the Interim Authority. The SpecialIndependent Commission will consist of twenty-one members, a number of whom should haveexpertise in constitutional or customary law. The members will be selected from lists of candidatessubmitted by participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan as well as Afghan professional and civilsociety groups. The United Nations will assist with the establishment and functioning of thecommission and of a substantial secretariat.

2) The Special Independent Commission will have the final authority for determining the procedures for and the number of people who will participate in the Emergency Loya Jirga . TheSpecial Independent Commission will draft rules and procedures specifying (i) criteria for allocationof seats to the settled and nomadic population residing in the country; (ii) criteria for allocation ofseats to the Afghan refugees living in Iran, Pakistan, and elsewhere, and Afghans from the diaspora;(iii) criteria for inclusion of civil society organizations and prominent individuals, including Islamicscholars, intellectuals, and traders, both within the country and in the diaspora. The SpecialIndependent Commission will ensure that due attention is paid to the representation in theEmergency Loya Jirga of a significant number of women as well as all other segments of the Afghanpopulation.

3) The Special Independent Commission will publish and disseminate the rules and procedures for the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga at least ten weeks before the Emergency LoyaJirga convenes, together with the date for its commencement and its suggested location and duration.

4) The Special Independent Commission will adopt and implement procedures for monitoring the process of nomination of individuals to the Emergency Loya Jirga to ensure that the process ofindirect election or selection is transparent and fair. To pre-empt conflict over nominations, theSpecial Independent Commission will specify mechanisms for filing of grievances and rules forarbitration of disputes.

5) The Emergency Loya Jirga will elect a Head of the State for the Transitional Administration and will approve proposals for the structure and key personnel of the Transitional Administration.

V. Final provisions

1) Upon the official transfer of power, all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in the country shall come under the command and control of the Interim Authority, and bereorganized according to the requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces.

2) The Interim Authority and the Emergency Loya Jirga shall act in accordance with basic principles and provisions contained in international instruments on human rights and internationalhumanitarian law to which Afghanistan is a party.

3) The Interim Authority shall cooperate with the international community in the fight against terrorism, drugs and organized crime. It shall commit itself to respect international law and maintainpeaceful and friendly relations with neighbouring countries and the rest of the internationalcommunity.

4) The Interim Authority and the Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga will ensure the participation of women as well as the equitable representationof all ethnic and religious communities in the Interim Administration and the Emergency Loya Jirga .

5) All actions taken by the Interim Authority shall be consistent with Security Council resolution 1378 (14 November 2001) and other relevant Security Council resolutions relating toAfghanistan.

6) Rules of procedure for the organs established under the Interim Authority will be elaborated as appropriate with the assistance of the United Nations.

This agreement, of which the annexes constitute an integral part, done in Bonn on this 5th day of December 2001 in the English language, shall be the authentic text, in a single copy which shallremain deposited in the archives of the United Nations. Official texts shall be provided in Dari andPashto, and such other languages as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General maydesignate. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General shall send certified copies in English,Dari and Pashto to each of the participants.

For the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan:

Ms. Amena Afzali

Mr. S. Hussain Anwari

Mr. Hedayat Amin Arsala

Mr. Sayed Hamed Gailani

Mr. Rahmatullah Musa Ghazi

Eng. Abdul Hakim

Mr. Houmayoun Jareer

Mr. Abbas Karimi

Mr. Mustafa Kazimi

Dr. Azizullah Ludin

Mr. Ahmad Wali Massoud

Mr. Hafizullah Asif Mohseni

Prof. Mohammad Ishaq Nadiri

Mr. Mohammad Natiqi

Mr. Yunus Qanooni

Dr. Zalmai Rassoul

Mr. H. Mirwais Sadeq

Dr. Mohammad Jalil Shams

Prof. Abdul Sattar Sirat

Mr. Humayun Tandar

Mrs. Sima Wali

General Abdul Rahim Wardak

Mr. Pacha Khan Zadran

Witnessed for the United Nations by:

Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi

Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan

ANNEX I

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCE

1. The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan recognize that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghans themselves.To this end, they pledge their commitment to do all within their means and influence to ensure suchsecurity, including for all United Nations and other personnel of international governmental andnon-governmental organizations deployed in Afghanistan.

2. With this objective in mind, the participants request the assistance of the international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishment and training of new Afghansecurity and armed forces.

3. Conscious that some time may be required for the new Afghan security and armed forces to be fully constituted and functioning, the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan request theUnited Nations Security Council to consider authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of aUnited Nations mandated force. This force will assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul andits surrounding areas. Such a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded to other urbancentres and other areas.

4. The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan pledge to withdraw all military units from Kabul and other urban centers or other areas in which the UN mandated force is deployed. It wouldalso be desirable if such a force were to assist in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan's infrastructure.

ANNEX II

ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD

1. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General will be responsible for all aspects of the United Nations' work in Afghanistan.

2. The Special Representative shall monitor and assist in the implementation of all aspects of this agreement.

3. The United Nations shall advise the Interim Authority in establishing a politically neutral environment conducive to the holding of the Emergency Loya Jirga in free and fair conditions. TheUnited Nations shall pay special attention to the conduct of those bodies and administrativedepartments which could directly influence the convening and outcome of the Emergency LoyaJirga .

4. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General or his/her delegate may be invited to attend the meetings of the Interim Administration and the Special Independent Commission on theConvening of the Emergency Loya Jirga .

5. If for whatever reason the Interim Administration or the Special Independent Commission were actively prevented from meeting or unable to reach a decision on a matter related to theconvening of the Emergency Loya Jirga , the Special Representative of the Secretary-General shall,taking into account the views expressed in the Interim Administration or in the Special IndependentCommission, use his/her good offices with a view to facilitating a resolution to the impasse or adecision.

6. The United Nations shall have the right to investigate human rights violations and, where necessary, recommend corrective action. It will also be responsible for the development andimplementation of a programme of human rights education to promote respect for and understandingof human rights.

ANNEX III

REQUEST TO THE UNITED NATIONS BY THE PARTICIPANTS AT THE UN TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN

The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan hereby

1. Request that the United Nations and the international community take the necessary measures to guarantee the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Afghanistan as well as thenon-interference by foreign countries in Afghanistan's internal affairs;

2. Urge the United Nations, the international community, particularly donor countries and multilateral institutions, to reaffirm, strengthen and implement their commitment to assist with therehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan, in coordination with the InterimAuthority;

3. Request the United Nations to conduct as soon as possible (i) a registration of voters in advance of the general elections that will be held upon the adoption of the new constitution by theconstitutional Loya Jirga and (ii) a census of the population of Afghanistan.

4. Urge the United Nations and the international community, in recognition of the heroic role played by the mujahidin in protecting the independence of Afghanistan and the dignity of its people,to take the necessary measures, in coordination with the Interim Authority, to assist in thereintegration of the mujahidin into the new Afghan security and armed forces;

5. Invite the United Nations and the international community to create a fund to assist the families and other dependents of martyrs and victims of the war, as well as the war disabled;

6. Strongly urge that the United Nations, the international community and regional organizations cooperate with the Interim Authority to combat international terrorism, cultivation andtrafficking of illicit drugs and provide Afghan farmers with financial, material and technicalresources for alternative crop production.