Uranium Contamination: Overall Scope, Time Frame, and Cost Information Is Needed for Contamination Cleanup on the Navajo Reservation
Released: 2014-05-05T00:00:00

Letter

Background

In keeping with its trust responsibility with respect to Indian tribes, the federal government holds title to the Navajo and Hopi tribal land in trust for the benefit of the tribes and their members. In this context, this section provides information on (1) the Navajo Nation and Hopi Tribe; (2) uranium mining and processing on the Navajo reservation and its environmental effects; (3) Navajo people’s exposure to uranium contamination and related health effects; (4) key statutes relevant to addressing uranium contamination; and (5) the roles of federal and tribal agencies and selected actions taken to address uranium contamination on the Navajo and Hopi reservations prior to 2008.

Navajo Nation and Hopi Tribe

The Navajo reservation consists of more than 24,000 square miles of land—about the size of the state of West Virginia—in the states of Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, making it the largest reservation, geographically, in the United States. The Hopi reservation consists of approximately 2,500 square miles of land in northeastern Arizona, entirely surrounded by the Navajo reservation. Figure 1 shows the locations of the Navajo and Hopi reservations, as well as the locations of 521 abandoned uranium mines and other key sites.

According to the 2010 Census, 174,000 people lived on Navajo land, and, according to Census Bureau estimates, more than 90 percent of the population identified as Navajo. Navajo culture is historically agrarian, and the Navajo people tend to live in small group clusters that are widely dispersed across the reservation. Many Navajo graze sheep and other livestock, which they use for wool and for consumption, among other things. According to Census Bureau estimates, the Navajo reservation’s poverty rate is more than twice as high as the poverty rate in the state of Arizona, with 38 percent of people on the reservation—and 44 percent of all children on the reservation—living in poverty. Most homes do not have electricity or telephones; roads are unpaved, and there are no urban centers, although there are large towns generally found near the boundaries of the reservation. Residents living in homes without piped, regulated water sources haul their water from a nearby source, and many of these sources are unregulated, untreated water sources such as livestock wells or natural springs. The Navajo Nation government includes 110 local government subdivisions, known as chapters.

There are more than 5,000 Hopi living on Hopi land, according to the 2010 Census. Poverty rates on the Hopi reservation are similar to those among the Navajo. There were no uranium mines on the Hopi reservation.

Uranium Mining and Processing on the Navajo Reservation and its Environmental Effects

The Navajo reservation is located on the southern end of a stretch of naturally occurring uranium deposits that spans the western United States (see fig. 2). The uranium found on the reservation is primarily located in sandstone formations that range from surface outcrops to deposits more than 4,000 feet deep.

On the Navajo reservation, uranium ore was removed from the ground at more than 500 mines, generally through open pit mining for ore deposits located relatively close to the surface, or underground mining for deeper deposits. The mines were often located in mountainous areas and consisted of multiple features, such as portals and vertical shafts. The material left behind after the ore was removed—known as waste rock— was then disposed, often in nearby piles, and contained dangerous materials, such as radium, radon, and heavy metals. Once mining ceased at a site, companies often abandoned the mines, leaving the waste rock piles in place without conducting any cleanup or posting signs warning about the dangers of contamination or physical hazards. The extracted ore was sent to an off-site processing facility called a mill. At the mill, the mined uranium ore was crushed, ground, and then fed to a leaching system that produced yellow slurry—called yellowcake—that was further processed for use in nuclear weapons or, as of the mid-1960s, for use in nuclear power plants. The leaching system left a waste product known as mill tailings that retained some toxic contaminants. The tailings were of a sandy consistency and mixtures of tailings and water were placed in unlined evaporation ponds at the mill site. DOE estimates that millions of gallons of water contaminated by mill tailings were released into the groundwater over the life of the sites through the unlined ponds. In addition, on July 16, 1979, the largest release of radioactive materials in the United States occurred when a dam on one of the evaporation ponds broke at a processing site near Church Rock, New Mexico, resulting in the release of 94 million gallons of radioactive waste to the Puerco River, which flowed through nearby communities. Figure 3 depicts the uranium mining and processing that occurred on or near the Navajo reservation.

Most of the uranium mining and processing on the Navajo reservation occurred from the late 1940s through the 1960s, and the federal government played a variety of roles during this time. For example, as reported by EPA and the Navajo Nation, beginning in the 1940s, the Secretary of the Interior, along with the Navajo Nation, and later BIA, issued leases and permits to private companies and individuals for uranium mining on the Navajo reservation. In another example, the Atomic Energy Commission (Commission)—a precursor agency to DOE—established a series of financial incentives for the discovery and production of domestic uranium, including guaranteed minimum prices for uranium ore and financial bonuses for uranium ore mined from any previously unidentified site, according to a report prepared by the Commission. According to the report, the Commission also provided infrastructure support, such as roads needed to survey mine sites and transport ore. Finally, the federal government was the sole customer of the processed uranium from 1947 to 1965.

Beginning in 1970, uranium from the Navajo reservation was sold exclusively to the commercial sector for use in nuclear power plants, but prices fell in the 1980s, and uranium mining operations on the reservation ended in 1986. Because of lingering contamination and its effects, in 2005 the Navajo Nation enacted a law placing a moratorium on uranium mining and processing on any site within the tribe’s territorial jurisdiction. In 2012, the Navajo Nation enacted a law prohibiting transportation of uranium ore or radioactive waste through lands under the tribe’s territorial jurisdiction unless fees, bonding, and other requirements were met. The 2012 law also stated that the Navajo Nation generally opposed transportation of uranium ore or radioactive materials, except for the purpose of disposing of materials from past mining or milling in a long- term facility outside of the tribe’s territorial jurisdiction or a temporary facility within the jurisdiction. Even with these laws, however, increases in the price of uranium during the past 10 years have sparked renewed interest in uranium mining and processing on and near the Navajo reservation, and opinions over new mining appear split, especially given the potential for job creation offered by the industry in economically depressed areas. For example, a committee of the Navajo Nation Council approved a resolution in December 2013 acknowledging a private company’s right-of-way across tribal land near Church Rock, New Mexico, and authorizing its use for a demonstration project that extracts uranium from beneath the surface. The Navajo Nation Department of Justice has concluded that the resolution conflicts with the 2005 and 2012 laws.

Exposure to Uranium and Its Health Effects

Uranium is present naturally in virtually all soil, rock, and water, and is spread throughout the environment by geological processes, as well as by wind and rain. On the Navajo reservation, winds blow during most of the year, exceeding 50 miles per hour at times, and localized, heavy rainstorms occur throughout the summer. When uranium is present in the environment, people may be exposed to it, as well as the radioactive by- products that are created as uranium decays—including radium and radon (a gas)—through a variety of exposure pathways. For example, Navajo people have been exposed to naturally occurring uranium and its by-products by drinking water from unregulated wells that tap into groundwater that comes into contact with underground uranium deposits. People are also exposed to naturally occurring radon when it migrates into their homes from the uranium-bearing soil underneath.

Mining and milling processes on the Navajo reservation created new pathways for exposure to uranium, increasing the amount of potential exposure at the surface. When the uranium mines were in operation, uranium miners inhaled radioactive dust and radon in and near the mines where they worked. Miners tracked the dust into their homes, exposing their families. Community members occasionally used materials from the mines and mill sites to build their houses and ceremonial structures, leading to increased radon inside these structures. When waste rock piles were left next to abandoned mines, wind and rain at times spread—and could continue to spread—the hazardous materials, sometimes through intermittent streams, where these materials could come into contact with residents of nearby communities, who could then be exposed by inhalation or ingestion. Residents of some communities located near the mines reported playing as children in and around the open mines. Many of the exposure pathways that existed when the mines and processing sites were in operation have been eliminated, and the Navajo Nation has stated that the most significant safety hazards that were present at the abandoned mines have been addressed. However, there are pathways of exposure that remain for Navajo residents today (see fig. 4).

Although historic, occupational exposure to uranium has been shown by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and others to have affected human health, the extent to which the Navajo people have experienced health effects resulting from uranium exposures in other ways has not been thoroughly examined and remains uncertain. For nonoccupational exposures, comprehensive health studies have not been conducted to assess the health effects of uranium contamination on Navajo communities or other communities located near active or abandoned uranium mines and processing sites, but Navajo community members who have lived near these sites have reported a variety of serious health effects, including cancers, according to CDC. EPA reports that exposure to gamma radiation—such as from waste rock located near abandoned mines—can cause a variety of cancers, including lung cancer and leukemia, and that exposure to radon can cause lung cancer. Because of these potential dangers, EPA recommends that people stay away from areas on the Navajo reservation with especially high levels of radiation—more than 10-times above the naturally-occurring, background radiation—in order to avoid potential health effects. ATSDR and EPA have noted that the abandoned mines pose a risk especially to children, since children tend to put dirt in their mouths, and the dirt at the mines could be contaminated. EPA noted in the 2008 5-year plan that inhabitants of structures constructed with uranium mining waste are at risk of developing lung cancer because of the increased presence of radon in indoor air. In addition, given the consumption by Navajo residents of livestock that have grazed on plants located on or near abandoned mine sites, residents and researchers have identified the need to study the potential for exposure to radiation through consuming these animals.

Key Statutes Relevant to Addressing Uranium Contamination

Two key statutes involved with addressing uranium contamination are (1) CERCLA, also known as Superfund, and (2) UMTRCA.

CERCLA established the Superfund program in 1980 to protect human health and the environment from the effects of hazardous substances, including uranium. Under CERCLA, potentially responsible parties—such as current or former owners or operators of a mine site containing hazardous substances—are liable for conducting or paying for cleanup of hazardous substances at contaminated sites. If the federal government is a potentially responsible party at a site, it is liable for cleanup costs even if there are nonfederal potentially responsible parties. For example, one court has held that the federal government was liable as an owner under CERCLA for the cleanup costs at a mine located within an Indian reservation.

Under CERCLA, EPA has the authority to compel potentially responsible parties to clean up contaminated sites, or to conduct cleanups itself and then seek reimbursement from the potentially responsible parties. EPA may compel cleanup by bringing an enforcement action against a potentially responsible party or by attempting to reach an administrative agreement—known as an administrative order on consent, or a settlement agreement—requiring the responsible party to perform and pay for site cleanup. Sometimes, however, potentially responsible parties cannot be identified or may be financially unable to perform the cleanup.

Under the Superfund program, EPA and potentially responsible parties can undertake two types of cleanups: (1) removal actions and (2) remedial actions.

Removal actions are generally shorter-term or emergency cleanups to mitigate immediate threats. These include time-critical removals for threats requiring action within 6 months, and non-time-critical removals for threats where action can be delayed to account for a 6-month or longer planning period, which includes a site evaluation to characterize the site and identify and analyze removal alternatives. Removal actions can include, for example, installing a fence around a contaminated site and excavating contaminated soils for disposal, and can be quite complex. Removal actions can be financed by the Hazardous Substance Superfund Trust Fund (Superfund Trust Fund).

Remedial actions typically are longer-term actions that involve a more elaborate process to permanently and significantly reduce contamination. Remedial actions are taken instead of, or in addition to, a removal action. Before undertaking a remedial action, a remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS) is conducted in accordance with an approved work plan to (1) characterize site conditions and assess the risks to human health and the environment, among other things, and (2) evaluate various options to address the problems identified. A remedy is selected for addressing the site’s contamination in a record of decision, and the design of the selected remedy is then developed and implemented (see fig. 5). Only sites on the National Priorities List (NPL)—EPA’s list of the nation’s most contaminated sites—are eligible to have remedial actions financed by the Superfund Trust Fund. None of the mine sites on the Navajo reservation are currently listed on the NPL.

UMTRCA required DOE to take remedial actions at certain uranium mill sites across the country—and properties in the vicinity that were contaminated with radioactive materials from the mill sites—to stabilize and control the mill tailings in a safe and environmentally sound manner and to minimize or eliminate health hazards, among other things.

UMTRCA included four sites on the Navajo reservation: Mexican Hat, Monument Valley, Shiprock, and Tuba City, which we refer to as the Rare Metals site in this report. Under the act, DOE is also responsible for ensuring that any residual radioactive minerals entering the groundwater do not exceed specified limits; therefore, DOE maintains groundwater remediation systems at sites where groundwater contamination has persisted. In accordance with the act, the Secretary of Energy has entered into cooperative agreements with the Navajo Nation to perform the remedial actions at the sites located on the tribe’s land; the current agreement lasts until 2017. The act also required DOE to complete the remedial actions at the processing sites and vicinity properties before DOE’s authority under the act, as amended, to perform these actions expired in 1998; DOE’s authority to perform groundwater restoration activities has not expired. UMTRCA did not include provisions for DOE to remediate abandoned uranium mines.

Federal and Tribal Agencies’ Roles and Selected Actions Taken to Address Uranium Contamination on or Near the Navajo Reservation Prior to 2008

A variety of federal agencies have specific roles in addressing uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation. Table 1 outlines the agencies, their roles, and selected actions they took to begin addressing the contamination prior to 2008.

In addition to the federal agencies, tribal agencies play key roles and have been actively addressing the impacts of historical uranium mining and processing on or near the Navajo reservation.

Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency (NNEPA). NNEPA is the lead Navajo agency for regulating radiological contamination at abandoned uranium mines. NNEPA addresses uranium contamination on the Navajo reservation through a variety of programs, including the Navajo Superfund program, which is responsible for assessing hazardous waste sites on the reservation, including abandoned uranium mines. NNEPA partners with EPA in working under the structures, abandoned mines, and unregulated drinking water objectives of the 2008 5-year plan, and provides input on the other objectives as well.

Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation/ Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) Department. This Navajo department consists of two programs, the Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program and the UMTRA program. The Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program reclaims abandoned mines on the Navajo reservation. From the 1990s through 2005, the Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program reclaimed more than 900 abandoned uranium mine features found at the 521 mines located on or near the reservation, primarily addressing surface hazards, including stabilizing steep areas and burying uranium-contaminated soils. According to Navajo Nation officials, this work did not address all associated radiological hazards, and the program continues to conduct maintenance on past reclamation work. The department’s UMTRA program provides assistance to DOE under an UMTRCA cooperative agreement at the four former uranium processing sites on the reservation. Under the 2008 5-year plan, the Navajo Nation chose not to have the Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program coordinate its reclamation work with EPA and NNEPA’s abandoned mine work. The UMTRA program, however, supported DOE’s efforts at the former processing sites under the 5-year plan.

Agencies Met the Targets in Six Out of Eight Plan Objectives Primarily Because of Additional Federal Resources

Federal agencies met the targets in six of the eight objectives they established in the 2008 5-year plan, but they did not meet the targets in two of the eight objectives. Reasons the agencies met the targets in five objectives were primarily because additional federal resources, including funding and staff time, were dedicated to their efforts. DOE met the targets in a sixth objective because the agency set targets that represented a continuation of previously required activities. By contrast, the reasons federal agencies did not meet the targets in two objectives were, in part, because of decisions to conduct additional assessment and outreach activities before identifying final cleanup actions. Remaining actions are necessary to meet the targets in these two objectives.

Agencies Met the Targets in Six Out of Eight Plan Objectives

In the 2008 5-year plan, federal agencies identified targets under each of the eight objectives that they intended to meet, in cooperation with tribal agency partners, by the end of the plan period in 2012. We found that the agencies met the targets in six of the eight objectives. According to the agencies’ January 2013 summary report, the 2008 5-year plan outlined a strategy for gaining a better understanding of the scope of the problem and addressing the greatest risks first. The scope of work required to meet most of the targets did not represent the entirety of work necessary to fully address the issues encompassed by each objective. Table 2 explains the actions taken by the federal agencies—and the tribal agencies with whom they worked—during the period of 2008 through 2012, and our assessment of whether these actions met the targets in the 2008 5-year plan.

We also found that federal agencies completed additional actions and produced results beyond the targets in the 2008 5-year plan during the plan period and in 2013. Among other things, EPA, working with the Navajo Nation, conducted a time-critical removal action at the Skyline mine, located within the Oljato Chapter in southern Utah. The action involved moving 25,000 cubic yards of radioactive mine waste—most of which was located at the bottom of a 700-foot high mesa—to a repository constructed on-site at the top of the mesa. According to EPA officials, the agency built the repository to be permanent, but the waste could ultimately be removed from the site given the Navajo Nation’s preference that all contamination be removed from the reservation. EPA undertook smaller, interim removal actions at three other sites, including the Quivira mine, which is located near the Northeast Church Rock mine. At two of the sites, EPA built temporary storage repositories to hold the waste on-site until a final disposal option is selected.

In addition, EPA and NNEPA identified 43 of the 521 abandoned mines as the highest priority for additional assessment work and cleanup actions; EPA officials said these mines are the highest priority because they pose the greatest exposure risks to the Navajo people since elevated radiation levels are present at the mines and they are located near houses or other potentially inhabited structures. EPA recommends that people stay away from areas on the Navajo reservation with such elevated levels of radiation in order to avoid potential health effects. The 43 highest priority mines include 37 mines where radiation levels measured at or above 10-times the background radiation at the mine and where a potentially inhabited house or structure is within one-quarter mile of the mine. Of these mines, 8 mines measured at or above 50-times the background radiation, and 3 mines measured above 95-times the background radiation. EPA and NNEPA identified 6 additional mines as part of the 43 highest priority mines where radiation levels were lower— from 2-times to 10-times background—but that posed especially high risks because, for example, a potentially inhabited house or structure is within 200 feet. EPA Region 9 officials we spoke with said prioritizing the mines benefits both federal and tribal agencies by providing a common road map for their efforts. Figure 6 shows how the 43 highest priority mines relate to the rest of the 521 abandoned uranium mines in terms of radiation levels and distance to homes or structures.

Further, ATSDR worked with the Navajo Nation, the University of New Mexico, and IHS to develop and begin the Navajo Birth Cohort Study, a health study that is intended to improve the understanding of the relationship between uranium exposures and human health—specifically that of mothers and babies—on the Navajo reservation. According to the study proposal, for the Navajo Nation, congenital anomalies remain the leading cause of infant deaths, and the infant mortality rate among the Navajo people is 8.5 deaths per 1,000 live births, compared with 6.9 deaths per 1,000 live births overall in the United States. ATSDR awarded a research cooperative agreement to the university in August 2010, and ATSDR and the university received approval to begin recruiting participants in February 2013; this approval occurred after a lengthy review process that included obtaining multiple, separate approvals, including from the university, the Navajo Nation, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The Navajo Nation and others expressed frustration about the length of time spent developing and approving the study, which took longer than anticipated for a variety of reasons. For example, one reason for the overall amount of time is that OMB did not approve the information collection necessary for the study, or take other actions, within the 60-day regulatory deadline, but rather approved it after more than 300 days. Now that the study is under way, however, ATSDR officials told us that it has already had positive outcomes in Navajo communities. For example, according to ATSDR officials, recent observations of increased levels of prenatal care across the reservation may be a result of the outreach and community education that has occurred as part of the study. Moreover, according to ATSDR’s study proposal, the results of the study will answer long-standing questions on whether or not exposures to uranium wastes and other environmental contaminants are associated with adverse birth outcomes or developmental delays on the Navajo reservation. Navajo Nation officials, however, stated that the Navajo Birth Cohort Study is just a small step and that more comprehensive studies are needed to better assess the health effects of uranium contamination on the Navajo people.

We found that some of the agencies’ actions during the 2008 5-year plan period yielded additional benefits. For example, outreach to affected communities was an important component of some of the objectives under the 2008 5-year plan, although the plan did not include a strategy for coordinating agencies’ outreach. Regardless, federal agencies began to coordinate these efforts, and, for example, held five joint workshops for stakeholders, including members of Navajo communities affected by uranium contamination, during which the agencies presented information about their efforts and solicited feedback. Federal agencies also partnered with Navajo agencies on some outreach efforts, which was important for their success in some cases. For example, EPA and NNEPA officials told us EPA relied heavily on NNEPA’s outreach staff to communicate with affected community members in identifying and addressing contaminated structures. NNEPA outreach staff’s ability to speak Navajo and their familiarity with Navajo cultural practices allowed them to work more effectively with community members than if EPA had conducted outreach on its own. Other benefits from the agencies’ actions included tribal capacity building and career development and education opportunities for Navajos. For example, EPA helped enhance capacity building within NNEPA by training some of its staff to assess potentially contaminated structures, and it also provided job training to 20 Navajo hazardous waste workers through EPA’s Superfund Job Training Initiative program. In another example, DOE continued to sponsor a summer internship program to give assistance to American Indian college students—including Navajo students—who are pursuing degrees in science, engineering, and technology.

Agencies Met the Targets in Six Objectives Primarily Because of Additional Federal Resources or Because Targets Continued Previously- Established Efforts

We found that a key reason why agencies met the targets for five objectives in the 2008 5-year plan was because additional resources, mostly federal but also private, were dedicated to their efforts. For their work on the objectives addressing contaminated houses, abandoned mines, unregulated drinking water sources, the Highway 160 site, and treatment of health conditions, the agencies either dedicated more funds and staff resources than during the previous 5-year period or received additional appropriations for work related to Navajo uranium contamination. DOE was able to meet the targets for a sixth objective, regarding former uranium processing sites, primarily because its targets largely represented a continuation of previously required activities.

Additional Resources

In accomplishing the targets under five of the objectives outlined in the 2008 5-year plan, according to agency officials, agencies benefited from dedicating additional resources from their existing budgets, receiving additional appropriations to conduct the work, or leveraging funds from private parties. Examples are as follows:

Additional funding and staff time from agencies’ existing budgets. EPA prioritized its work under three objectives of the 2008 5-year plan by dedicating additional resources from its existing budget for addressing contaminated houses, assessing abandoned uranium mines, and addressing unregulated drinking water sources. EPA provided from $1.8 million to $7.8 million annually to the Region 9 Superfund Removal program to fund the program’s Navajo uranium work during the 5-year plan period—a significant increase over the previous 5-year period. For example, from fiscal years 2008 through 2012, EPA reported that it expended $22 million on efforts to identify and address contaminated houses and other structures, compared with the $1.5 million it expended on similar efforts in the preceding 5 years. Throughout the 2008 5-year plan period, the additional Superfund Removal program funds allowed EPA Region 9 to increase the amount of money it spent on the Navajo work even as the national Superfund budget decreased, according to a senior EPA Region 9 official. Further, EPA officials told us that they conducted work that went beyond the 5-year plan targets because of the increased funding the agency dedicated to Navajo uranium work. Specifically, these officials said they could not have completed the removal action at the Skyline mine without the increased funding since the Region 9 Superfund removal program’s prior budget would have been insufficient, and there was no potentially responsible party to contribute funds. In addition to increased funding, EPA Region 9 also increased the number of full-time equivalent employees that it dedicated to its Navajo uranium work from approximately 3.68 in 2008 to 6.95 in 2012. Similarly, IHS reported that its Navajo Area identified nearly $1 million from within its existing budget that it used to support the creation of a uranium-related health screening program, which was established in 2010.

Additional funding from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). EPA and IHS used Recovery Act funds for some of the water infrastructure projects that were selected to serve Navajo communities in which contaminated, unregulated water sources had been identified. For example, in fiscal year 2009, EPA contributed $3 million in Drinking Water Infrastructure Grants Tribal Set Aside funds, and IHS contributed about $2 million from the IHS Recovery Act Sanitation Facilities Construction Fund toward a nearly $10 million, 50-mile extension of a water main to the communities around Sweetwater, Arizona. An EPA official familiar with the project told us that it will supply water to homes within the vicinity of four contaminated, unregulated wells, including a well that had the highest uranium levels of all unregulated water sources tested during the 5-year plan period.

Additional appropriations. In fiscal year 2009, DOE received a $5 million appropriation to carry out a remedial action of the Highway 160 site. The 2008 5-year plan included a target for assessing the site and identifying the best path forward, but not for completing cleanup at the site. According to DOE and NNEPA officials involved with the project, having the resources available to fund assessment and cleanup work allowed the agencies to move forward and complete the cleanup more quickly than they had anticipated. Moreover, NNEPA and DOE also used the appropriated funds to begin to address recently discovered, contaminated structures in the area of the Highway 160 site and the nearby Rare Metals processing site. In addition, ATSDR officials we spoke with said they would not have been able to fund the Navajo Birth Cohort Study without additional appropriations for such research. These officials said ATSDR received an increase of $2 million in funding for fiscal year 2010 to begin the study, and that the agency has subsequently put that amount toward the study.

Leveraging funding from private, potentially responsible parties and other federal agencies. According to EPA officials, the agency was able to complete some of the work that went beyond the targets in the 2008 5-year plan, including conducting the interim time-critical removal actions at the Quivira mine and others, because of funding that came from private, potentially responsible parties. Specifically, EPA issued an administrative order to one of the former operators of the Quivira mine to conduct and pay for the interim removal action. In addition, EPA and NNEPA used funds from a bankruptcy settlement with another potentially responsible party to pay for the interim actions at three other mines or mine-related sites. Without funds from the private, potentially responsible parties, EPA officials said they would not have been able to conduct these actions during the 5-year plan period. Further, EPA officials said that funds from the bankruptcy settlement were instrumental in providing the initial funding for the agency’s efforts to pursue potentially responsible parties at other abandoned uranium mines on the Navajo reservation.

Federal agencies’ ability to share resources was also an important factor in meeting the targets in at least one objective. Specifically, IHS officials told us the agency would not have been able to contribute funding to all 13 drinking water infrastructure projects funded during the 5-year plan period without combining its funds with funds from EPA and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. IHS officials said the agency’s ability to fund these drinking water projects would have been limited because IHS’s share of some of the projects’ costs would have exceeded the agency’s limit for economic feasibility. For example, if the agency had to solely fund a $4.75 million project in Dennehotso, in the northern part of the reservation, it would have cost the agency about $44,000 per home, an amount that would have been considered economically infeasible for IHS in fiscal year 2009, the year the project was funded. However, contributions of $2 million from EPA and $1 million from the Department of Housing and Urban Development reduced IHS’s per-home cost so that the agency was able to participate in funding the project that provided piped drinking water to 107 homes that did not previously have piped water.

Overall, the federal agencies reported spending $121 million on work performed under the 2008 5-year plan. These amounts do not include the approximately $17 million in private funds spent during the 5-year plan period, including by potentially responsible parties at the Northeast Church Rock mine, the Quivira mine, and from the bankruptcy settlement, according to the federal agencies’ January 2013 summary report. In contrast, agencies reported spending approximately $42 million during the prior 5 years, and more than half of that amount was spent by DOE at the four processing sites. Figure 7 compares the amount of funds spent by the federal agencies under each objective in the 5-year plan period with the previous 5 years. Because the 2008 5-year plan did not include an overall cost estimate for conducting the work, we cannot determine whether the total amount spent by the agencies was in keeping with their expected costs. The 5-year plan included estimated costs of varying specificity for the first 2 years of the plan—2008 and 2009—since agency budgets for the first 2 years were already in place at the time of the plan’s development but not for the final 3 years of the plan.

For one objective of the 2008 5-year plan—addressing contamination at former uranium processing sites—DOE set targets that largely continued previously authorized activities that the agency was already undertaking, which according to DOE officials, helped the agency accomplish the targets. DOE set targets to continue to address groundwater contamination at three of the sites and to continue long-term surveillance and maintenance at all four sites—actions the agency was required to undertake under UMTRCA. DOE officials told us that continuing to carry out the already approved groundwater remediation strategies at the sites was the most appropriate action for the agency during the 2008 5-year plan period since those were the actions they were explicitly authorized to conduct. Navajo Nation officials told us that they were disappointed that DOE did not increase its level of effort at the sites. They also told us they were concerned that the remediation efforts that DOE is implementing are not achieving sufficient results, and that it appears that the agency is not expected to complete its efforts to treat contaminated groundwater in the foreseeable future.

Agencies Did Not Meet the Targets in Two Objectives for a Variety of Reasons, Including Optimistic Schedules and Decisions to Perform Additional Work That Extended Time Frames

Federal agencies did not meet the targets for two of the eight objectives in the 2008 5-year plan—cleanup of the Northeast Church Rock mine and the Tuba City Dump—for a variety of reasons, including that the schedules were optimistic and ambitious, and EPA decided to increase outreach work at the Northeast Church Rock mine and assessment work at the Tuba City Dump before identifying final cleanup actions for the sites. EPA and BIA officials told us they estimated the schedules based on the information they had at the time, but neither agency anticipated the need for additional steps in the assessment process and therefore did not include these steps in their schedules. Officials from both agencies said they deliberately created ambitious schedules for these sites, in part, to acknowledge the threats they posed and to make it clear that the agencies were committed to cleaning them up. Work remains for both agencies to complete the cleanups at the two sites, and the agencies expect that time frames will likely extend beyond the agencies’ 2014 5-year plan and that federal costs will be in the tens of millions of dollars at each site.

Northeast Church Rock Mine

EPA did not meet its target to complete cleanup of the Northeast Church Rock mine in part because its schedule was optimistic and ambitious. According to the 2008 5-year plan, EPA expected to select the removal action for the site in December 2008; however, this selection did not occur until September 2011. According to EPA officials familiar with the project, selecting the removal action took longer than anticipated for a number of reasons. First, completing the cleanup assessment for the site took 8 months longer than planned. Second, after EPA issued the cleanup assessment, the agency postponed selecting the removal action by 2 years so that agency officials could better understand and attempt to address community concerns. Over this 2-year period, EPA conducted 10 public meetings and brought in a Navajo peacemaker to facilitate discussions and improve communication between the agency and the community. According to EPA officials we spoke with, in order to further respond to community concerns, EPA also began work on some predesign analyses that are normally conducted at a later stage in the cleanup process. EPA officials told us they felt the meetings were valuable and that they have conducted more outreach at this site than at most other sites, but community members we spoke with said they remain frustrated with the decision process and disappointed with the outcome.

Third, when estimating the schedule under the 2008 5-year plan, EPA Region 9 officials did not anticipate that additional approval processes would be necessary to implement the removal action for the site that EPA ultimately selected. EPA’s selected action involves disposing of approximately 1 million cubic yards of mine waste within an existing disposal cell for mill tailings at a former uranium processing site. The site is located less than 1 mile from the Northeast Church Rock mine and is regulated and managed by NRC and EPA Region 6, respectively. The former operator of the processing site—which is also the former operator and a potentially responsible party for the mine—currently holds a license from NRC for the existing disposal cell at the former processing site. According to EPA Region 9 officials, for EPA to transfer waste from the mine to the disposal cell, EPA headquarters officials determined that EPA Region 6 would need to approve a Record of Decision, which took 18 months to complete.

A number of steps remain for EPA to fully meet the target of cleaning up the mine. As of February 2014, EPA was in the removal predesign phase of the cleanup process. NRC and DOE are both participating in an EPA- led design work group since NRC will transfer responsibility for the site to DOE once the processing site is closed for long-term surveillance and maintenance pursuant to UMTRCA. Once the design phase is complete, the former operator of the processing site must submit a license amendment request and receive an amended license from NRC before disposing of the mine waste at the former processing site. This former operator and potentially responsible party for the mine is expected to implement the removal action if and when NRC issues the amended license. In addition, NNEPA officials told us they have concerns regarding groundwater contamination at the site that have yet to be examined.

EPA’s current schedule estimate is to complete the removal action in 2020. EPA officials, however, acknowledged that this schedule is also optimistic since it assumes that NRC’s approval process for the license amendment will take 1 year, and that the cleanup itself will take 4 years. NRC officials also said they felt the schedule was too optimistic, and they told us that NRC’s safety and environmental reviews will take approximately 2 years but, if a public hearing on the license amendment is requested, the approval process could take up to 5 years. An EPA project manager for the mine told us EPA is working with NRC to revise the schedule to provide 2 years for the license amendment approval process in order to better account for NRC’s process. Moreover, although the former operator and potentially responsible party at Northeast Church Rock mine is taking the lead for the cleanup, the government will pay up to 33 percent of future cleanup costs; in 2009, EPA estimated that these total future costs could be $44 million.

Tuba City Dump

BIA also did not meet its targets in the 2008 5-year plan for the Tuba City Dump, in part, because the schedules were optimistic and ambitious. Under the plan, BIA was to (1) complete a set of studies to assess whether interim actions were warranted to protect Hopi water supplies, including drinking water wells, by mid-2008; (2) create a work plan for, then conduct and complete a RI/FS by late 2009; and (3) complete a remedial action by the end of 2012. Partway through BIA’s implementation of the 5-year plan, in August 2010, BIA entered into a settlement agreement with EPA to conduct the RI/FS. Under the settlement agreement, BIA’s work is subject to EPA’s approval, and EPA will select the remedial action. As of the end of the 5-year plan period in 2012, BIA had completed the interim action studies, which found the dump did not pose an immediate threat to the wells, and it had implemented certain actions recommended by the studies, including installing a fence around the perimeter and conducting a detailed analysis of one location with high levels of uranium. BIA developed the RI/FS work plan but had not completed the plan’s required work. EPA had not selected a remedial action and, therefore, BIA had not begun or completed a remedial action.

Further, BIA’s actions under the 5-year plan took longer than expected, for various reasons, which also contributed to the agency not meeting the targets. First, BIA spent nearly 1 year longer than expected conducting the interim action studies, and implementing the recommended actions took an additional year that had not been accounted for in the 5-year plan. BIA officials said they underestimated the amount of time needed to complete these efforts. Second, BIA spent more time developing the work plan for the RI/FS than had been anticipated, in part because EPA directed it to significantly revise the work plan. Under the settlement agreement, BIA was responsible for submitting a work plan for EPA approval that specified the activities and deliverables, as well as deadlines, for BIA in the development of the RI/FS. The work plan and its deadlines are legally enforceable once EPA approves the work plan. EPA approved the initial work plan developed by BIA in January 2011, and BIA issued a $2 million task award for its implementation in June 2011. However, in July 2011, 1 month later, EPA notified BIA that it would need to revise the RI/FS work plan, which significantly increased the amount of work to be performed. BIA then spent an additional year working with EPA revising the work plan, which EPA ultimately approved in July 2012. According to EPA correspondence to BIA, although it would delay completion of the RI/FS, the additional investigative work was necessary to resolve conflicting interpretations of data collected over the previous years of assessments and to support a defensible selection of a remedial action for the site. EPA officials said the additional work has yielded valuable information, including determining whether groundwater contamination at the site can reach nearby Hopi drinking water wells. Hopi tribal leaders, however, told us that although they appreciate the additional understanding that has been gained through the RI/FS, they are frustrated that the federal agencies have continued to dedicate resources to conducting additional assessments instead of cleanup actions, especially in light of the fact that, as of 2013, BIA had overseen assessment work at the site for more than 10 years.

Third, implementing the RI/FS has taken longer than expected by BIA under the 2008 5-year plan, in part because BIA conducted additional work under the work plan at EPA’s direction. In addition to the work EPA directed BIA to add in 2011, EPA subsequently required BIA to conduct additional field investigations. EPA officials explained that the scope of an RI/FS is often changed in response to conditions found on the ground, and that the Tuba City RI/FS has been typical in that respect. According to EPA and BIA documents, conducting this additional fieldwork contributed to BIA missing some of the work plan deadlines.

Moreover, project and contract management challenges faced by BIA have also contributed to the length of time spent on the RI/FS. BIA officials told us they had communication problems with the agency’s contractor for the RI/FS and performance problems regarding the quality and timeliness of the contractor’s deliverables. For example, in correspondence with the contractor, BIA noted multiple instances when the contractor was late in providing draft deliverables to BIA, which did not provide sufficient time for BIA to review the deliverables before they were due to EPA. In addition, when BIA completed its review of the deliverables, it found they did not all meet the terms and conditions of the contract. BIA also noted in its correspondence with the contractor that the contractor’s performance problems began soon after the contract was signed. After the problems continued to mount, according to BIA officials, they worked informally through phone calls and e-mails to correct the performance problems; however, BIA did not formally notify the contractor of the problems and require corrective action until about 16 months after the problems began. During that time period, BIA modified the contract four times, each time increasing the work to be performed in accordance with direction from EPA; these modifications totaled nearly $1.6 million, about an 80 percent increase above the value of the original contract. By adding work to the contract without correcting the contractor’s poor performance and adding stronger performance provisions, BIA was effectively rewarding the contractor for its poor performance. In hindsight, BIA officials responsible for managing the contract told us, had they known the problems would not improve, they would have initiated formal action against the contractor sooner; however, they were reluctant to further delay the project. Had they terminated the contractor for default, BIA would have had to award a new contract, taking a minimum of 90 days, plus the additional time it would take to bring a new contractor up to speed to perform the contract. The BIA officials said, instead, they prioritized meeting the deadlines in the work plan and avoiding the delay of awarding a new contract. These officials told us that the RI/FS contract, initially valued at approximately $2 million, is not typical for their region and is much larger than any other contract they manage. For example, the next largest environmental contract in BIA’s Western region is worth $300,000. Learning from its challenges in managing the RI/FS contract will become even more important to BIA in the next few years as the agency moves from assessment to cleanup work after a remedial action is selected. At that time, BIA officials said their agency will award and manage a new contract, one that is even larger and more complicated that will increase costs significantly. In August 2011, we reported that incorporating lessons learned from past contracts is an important element of successful acquisition planning when preparing to award a new contract. Through this process, agencies ensure that knowledge gained from prior acquisitions is used to refine requirements and acquisition strategies. Without examining lessons learned from managing the RI/FS contract and considering these lessons as part of the acquisition planning process for the remedial action contract, BIA could face contract management challenges on a larger scale.

Further, according to EPA and BIA officials, BIA’s management of the project also contributed to BIA’s missing some legally enforceable deadlines in the work plan within months of EPA approving it in July 2012. Specifically, BIA did not comply with the settlement agreement’s terms for requesting an extension to these deadlines in the work plan. As a result, BIA was subject to stipulated penalties under the settlement agreement for the deadlines it missed. EPA officials told us the agency held the penalties in abeyance; as a result, EPA did not calculate the total amount of the penalties. As EPA noted in correspondence to BIA, the missed deadlines only led to a few weeks of direct delays to the work plan schedule, but the missed deadlines used much of the contingency, or slack, in the schedule, meaning any future delays could not be absorbed without directly lengthening the project. In 2013, according to EPA officials, BIA notified EPA that it was going to miss another work plan deadline, however, BIA again did not submit the extension request before the deadline passed, potentially subjecting it to additional stipulated penalties.

Further complicating its management of the project, we found that the schedule BIA used to manage its responsibilities under the RI/FS was not created based on best practices for effective scheduling. We have reported that a sound schedule is comprehensive, well-constructed, credible, and controlled. The RI/FS schedule generated by BIA’s contractor and approved by EPA minimally met these criteria. For example, we could not verify that the schedule included all the actions needed to complete the RI/FS, which is an essential practice in ensuring that the schedule is comprehensive. If a project schedule does not fully reflect the scope of the project, it can result in unreliable estimated completion dates and delays. In another example, neither BIA nor EPA regularly updated the schedule based on actual progress, an important aspect of a controlled schedule. BIA officials explained that they do not keep a copy of the schedule file that they can update; BIA relies on its contractor to update the schedule, and EPA maintains control of the master schedule file for the RI/FS. Without an updatable version of the schedule, BIA cannot effectively monitor its contractor’s progress and cannot evaluate the quality of changes to the schedule proposed by the contractor, which BIA then proposes to EPA for approval. According to BIA officials, not having information about the basis for the proposed schedule changes contributed to the agency proposing a new RI/FS schedule to EPA in 2012 that contained errors and was not achievable. Appendix II contains additional details about our analysis.

A number of steps remain for BIA to meet the target of completing cleanup at the Tuba City Dump. As of February 2014, the full scope of remaining cleanup work—and an estimate of when it may be completed— had not been determined since the RI/FS was ongoing. BIA requested two extensions to the deadlines in the work plan in 2013; as a result, the current deadline for completion of the RI/FS is May 2014, more than 4 years after the completion date in the 2008 5-year plan. According to BIA officials, the May 2014 deadline may not be achieved. For example, BIA officials said they are expecting the schedule to change to allow for additional time for stakeholders’ review of a key draft document and for additional analysis requested by EPA in December 2013. In another example, BIA has continued to experience performance problems with its contractor related to timeliness and product quality. These performance problems prompted BIA to send a second formal notification to take corrective action to its contractor in January 2014. Nevertheless, in the short-term, EPA officials said they plan to conduct extensive outreach with local communities as they evaluate the remedial options for the site. Hopi officials we spoke with stressed the tribe’s concern over protecting their water sources in the area and told us that having a contaminated dump located on their land is affecting their ability to expand economic development. Because of these concerns, Hopi officials stated that the only acceptable solution is to remove the contamination from the site. DOE and EPA officials involved at the site told us, however, that the data collected thus far indicate the Hopi drinking water wells will not be affected by the dump, and there are other factors limiting development in the area, including the region’s scarcity of water.

Based on two potential remedial actions for the site identified by BIA, the agency has estimated that the range of probable future cleanup costs is from $22 million to $72 million. BIA created this estimate range in order to contribute to the Department of the Interior’s (Interior) environmental and disposal liability estimate, which is included in Interior’s annual financial statement, but we found the estimate was not generated according to the government and industry cost-estimating best practices identified in our 2009 cost estimating and assessment guide. According to BIA officials, the estimate was created according to Interior’s guidance. Nevertheless, according to best practices, cost estimates should be comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible, which are the four characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate of any type, and BIA’s estimate does not fully reflect these characteristics. For example, the estimate did not completely define the program, an important aspect of a comprehensive schedule. In response to our questions about some aspects of the work scope that were included in the estimate, including whether future groundwater treatment was included, BIA officials stated that such treatment should be included in the estimate. However, after checking with the contractor that created the estimate, one BIA official involved with managing the project discovered that costs for groundwater treatment were not included in the estimate. Without fully accounting for all future costs, management will have difficulty successfully planning program resource requirements. In response, BIA officials said that they directed the contractor to include these costs in a revised estimate. These officials also said they did not apply all of the best practices when developing the estimate, in part, because it would not have been appropriate for BIA to expend significant resources developing a detailed cost estimate since they have not completed the RI/FS, and that once EPA selects a final remedial action, BIA will work to apply cost estimating protocols when it develops a more detailed cost estimate for the site. Appendix III provides additional details of the results of our analysis of the cost estimate.

Agencies Have Not Estimated the Full Scope of Work, Time Frames, or Costs Needed to Address Uranium Contamination but Recognize That Significant Work Remains

The agencies that implemented the 2008 5-year plan have not identified the full scope of remaining work, time frames, or costs of fully addressing uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, especially at abandoned uranium mines, but have recognized that significant work remains for addressing such contamination beyond the targets in the plan. As a result, decision makers and stakeholders do not have sufficient information about the overall remaining work, time frames, and costs to assess the overall pace of the cleanup efforts. Given that significant work remains to address contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, it is likely that it will take many decades and cost at least hundreds of millions of dollars in additional funding to make significant progress in this area.

Agencies Have Not Identified the Full Scope of Remaining Work, Time Frames, or Costs Needed to Fully Address Uranium Contamination, Especially at Abandoned Mines

The draft action plans do not clearly delineate a course of action for fully resolving the problem. Given the extent of the contamination that is already known, it is obvious that the contamination cannot and will not be cleaned up in the 3- to 9-month timeframes covered by the draft plans. We need a 5-year plan from each agency that sets out specific cleanup objectives, specific timeframes for achieving those objectives, and the new authorities and funding, if any, necessary to achieve those objectives. These plans will provide the Congress, the Navajo Nation, and the public with concrete benchmarks against which to measure the progress of the federal agencies in cleaning up the contamination.

In its critique of the short-term action plans, the committee requested of the agencies additional information to understand the full scope of the cleanup effort. The same critique is also generally applicable to the 2008 5-year plan because it too did not contain information on the full scope of the cleanup and instead provided targets for achieving incremental progress under the plan. For example, it is still unclear what percentage of the overall cleanup effort was expected to be achieved in the 2008 5-year plan or how many additional 5-year plans may be necessary to fully address the contamination. As we discussed above, the agencies stated that the 2008 5-year plan focused on addressing over the 5-year period what they identified as the most urgent uranium-related problems and was not intended to be a long-term plan for dealing with the entirety of the contamination. EPA officials involved with coordinating the development of the agencies’ 2014 5-year plan told us this plan also will not include the full scope of the cleanup work.

EPA officials cited a variety of reasons for not having identified estimates of the full scope, time frames, or costs of cleanup, including at the abandoned mines. These officials explained that providing such high- level, general estimates of required work, time frames, or costs is not consistent with how EPA cleans up contaminated sites under CERCLA. The agency typically develops detailed, site-specific information on a site- by-site basis, and then estimates costs and schedules based on that specific information. They said the agency generally does not create even rough estimates if cleanup actions have not been selected or if they do not know the total number of mines that will need cleanup. These officials also said that a number of other uncertainties remain. More specifically, Incomplete information about the extent of contamination. According to the January 2013 report summarizing the agencies’ accomplishments under the 2008 5-year plan, EPA and NNEPA’s actions resulted in an improved understanding of the scope of uranium contamination at the mines on the reservation, and the agencies identified and prioritized 43 mines that pose the highest risk to surrounding communities. EPA, however, does not know the full scope of cleanup actions that will be necessary to address these highest priority mines (see app. IV for more information about the status of each of the 43 mines), and EPA officials said they expect that some number of the rest of the 521 abandoned mines will also need cleanup, but they do not know what that number will be. EPA officials said that they need additional information about, for example, the location and volume of waste present at each site before they can identify the scope of cleanup actions. However, EPA officials told us they have begun making assumptions about what work may be needed at the highest priority mines based on the site-specific information they have already collected. These officials stated that they expect that most of the highest priority mines will need removal actions, involving excavating and disposing from a few thousand to hundreds of thousands of cubic yards of mine waste at each mine, and a few of these mines may warrant longer-term remedial actions where surface water and/or groundwater may be contaminated.

Uncertainty about potentially responsible parties. According to EPA officials, the total number of abandoned mines that will have a potentially responsible party to lead or contribute funding for assessment and cleanup work is unknown, and this number will affect the scope of work, time frames, and costs necessary to clean up abandoned mines using federal funds. As of February 2014, EPA had signed agreements with potentially responsible parties regarding 24 mines and received money from a bankruptcy settlement for use at another 49 mines—these actions covered 9 of the 43 highest priority mines. EPA Region 9 officials said they are continuing to pursue potentially responsible parties, but the total number of mines that could ultimately be subject to agreements with such parties may be limited, in part, because of difficulties associated with identifying parties more than 50 years after mines were abandoned. Further, there are other reasons why the government’s ultimate share of the cleanup costs is unknown. If the federal government is a potentially responsible party at a site, it is liable for the cleanup costs even if a viable nonfederal potentially responsible party is also identified. Also, in November 2013, the Navajo Nation formally stated its intent to file a claim against the United States, and DOE in particular, for reimbursement of its cleanup costs at the abandoned mines on the reservation if a cooperative approach is not successful, which could further affect the government’s share of those costs.

Uncertainty about disposal options. Another uncertainty that affects the scope, time frames, and costs of the remaining abandoned mine work is where the mine waste will ultimately be disposed. Currently, the Navajo Nation’s position is that all remaining contaminated materials from uranium mines and at processing sites should be excavated and disposed off of Navajo lands. As a result, it is unclear where the volumes of mine waste will be disposed. As of January 2014, the Navajo Nation was working on drafting legislation to create a Uranium Commission under Navajo law that is expected to recommend options for mine waste disposal. However, according to a Navajo Nation official involved with the process, this commission is not expected to make any disposal recommendations until sometime in the next few years.

Even when significant uncertainties regarding the scope of work and available funding remain, however, we have reported that agencies can create high-level estimates of costs and time frames that can be useful for decision makers and stakeholders. For example, EPA can base these estimates on the information it currently has regarding the removal actions that may be necessary at most of the highest priority mines. Specifically, according to our 2009 cost estimating and assessment guide of government and industry cost-estimating best practices, agencies can create high-level cost estimates—for example, rough order of magnitude estimates—for efforts, even with significant uncertainties, that can inform decision makers as they evaluate resource requirements. These cost estimates are often in the form of a range to correspond with the level of uncertainty associated with the estimate and can be developed in short time frames of weeks or months. Although not budget-quality estimates, these types of estimates can be used in planning and can be created before detailed requirements are known. Typically, according to our 2009 cost estimating and assessment guide, an estimate should be revised and contain more detail as the agency obtains more site-specific information and the effort becomes better defined, and the estimate should become more certain as actual costs begin to replace earlier estimates. For example, as EPA obtains more detailed information about the site-specific characteristics at each of the highest priority mines, it would be able to update the scope of its estimate, bringing more certainty. According to our 2009 cost estimating and assessment guide and our 2012 schedule assessment guide, agencies can also create high-level schedules that are linked to cost estimates, based on stated assumptions, and that incorporate uncertainties regarding future activities through a schedule risk analysis. The risk analysis provides agencies with a range of dates that correspond with levels of confidence in the ability to meet those dates.

As further evidence that it is possible to develop these types of high-level estimates, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 requires the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the EPA Administrator and the Secretary of the Interior, to undertake a review of and prepare a report on abandoned uranium mines across the United States that previously provided uranium ore for the nation’s nuclear defense activities. According to DOE documents, the agency plans to issue a report in July 2014 that will include information about the potential costs and feasibility of reclaiming or remediating abandoned uranium mines, including the mines on or near Navajo lands. According to a DOE presentation on the draft report, the report is expected to contain cost estimate ranges based on the amount of uranium ore produced at the mines, among other assumptions. A DOE official involved with developing the draft report told us that the cost estimate ranges are not specific to mines on the Navajo reservation but are based on production size categories of mines across the United States that provided ore to the Atomic Energy Commission. This work by DOE could be a good starting point for a high-level cost estimate to clean up the uranium mines on or near the Navajo reservation; however, based on the statutory requirements for the study, we neither anticipate that it will provide information on the full scope or costs of any other activities covered in the 2008 5-year plan nor any time frames.

Although EPA, DOE, BIA, IHS, and NRC provided some information on high-priority cleanup issues in their 2008 5-year plan, the agencies did not provide the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform with overall estimates of the remaining scope of work, time frames, and costs of fully addressing uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation as requested. Without an estimate of the remaining scope of work, time frames, and costs to fully address uranium contamination, especially at the abandoned mines, decision makers and stakeholders neither have the information they need to assess the overall pace of the cleanup efforts, nor do they have a basis to put the agencies’ accomplishments under the 2008 5-year plan into perspective. Navajo Nation officials and other stakeholders told us that they want the federal agencies to describe the full scope of work that remains to fully address the contamination.

Agencies Recognize That Significant Work Remains to Address Uranium Contamination

Although the agencies have not identified the full scope of work that remains to address uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, through implementing the 2008 5-year plan, federal and tribal agencies have compiled information that shows that significant work is needed. For some plan objectives, the agencies have developed a significant long-term scope of work, including the objectives of providing regulated, piped drinking water to Navajo residents in uranium-affected areas, treating groundwater contamination at the former processing sites, and at the abandoned mines. For example, to help lower the number of Navajo residents without access to regulated, piped drinking water in their homes and to continue reducing the use of unregulated and potentially contaminated water sources, IHS developed a list of 145 potential water infrastructure projects that would serve approximately 3,300 homes that do not have piped water. IHS, however, considers just 36 of the 145 projects—serving about 1,000 homes—as economically feasible to fund, according to IHS documents, so it is unclear how many of the 145 projects will ultimately be undertaken by IHS. In another example, according to DOE officials, the agency will continue its active groundwater remediation work at the Rare Metals and Shiprock processing sites, but the future scope of work at the sites is unclear. This is, in part, because the remediation systems that were designed to address contamination from millions of gallons of water contaminated by mill tailings that entered the ground at these sites are not performing as anticipated. As a result, DOE has not made as much progress toward meeting water quality standards as it originally projected. According to DOE officials, they plan to revise the two sites’ groundwater compliance action plans beginning in 2014 and 2015, and these revised plans will dictate the future scope of work at these sites.

For EPA’s work at the abandoned uranium mines, although many uncertainties remain about the full scope of work needed to clean up the mines, EPA and Navajo Nation officials said that they recognize that the amount of work will be significant. During the 2014 5-year plan period, EPA officials said, in order to obtain additional information needed to select removal or remedial actions at the highest priority mines, the agency plans to conduct additional assessments at 41 of the 43 highest priority mines, beyond the initial screening information gathered during the 2008 5-year plan period, in cooperation with potentially responsible parties where applicable. EPA and NNEPA officials said these additional assessments range from, at a minimum, scanning the entire site to identify the likely boundaries of contamination and conducting tests to estimate the volume of waste present, to conducting more thorough assessments. These officials told us they do not anticipate conducting cleanups at any mines without potentially responsible parties that would require full funding from EPA during this time period. Appendix V contains additional information about the future work associated with the other 2008 5-year plan objectives not discussed here.

Full Scope of Additional Work Will Likely Take Many Decades to Complete

Given what is known about the significant scope of work that agencies have recognized as remaining to address uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, it is clear that, at current funding levels, it could take at least many decades to complete.

For example, at the abandoned uranium mines, EPA officials said that they are assuming that most of the remaining 42 of the 43 highest priority abandoned mines will need additional removal actions. For one of the highest priority mines—the Skyline mine—EPA has conducted a removal action to clean it up, but the waste remains on the reservation. In the absence of an EPA-estimated time frame, we roughly estimated time frames using information from EPA officials about the number of removal actions that they said they assumed EPA will need to fund and the costs of the agency’s removal action for the Skyline mine. Specifically, assuming viable nonfederal potentially responsible parties can be identified for about half of these highest priority mines, which EPA officials said is a reasonable early assumption, federal funds would be necessary to cover the full cost of removal actions at the other half of these mines, or 21 mines. Over the 2008 5-year plan period (i.e., 2008 through 2012), EPA funded the removal action at the Skyline mine from Region 9’s Superfund removal budget, spending about $7 million. Assuming Region 9’s Superfund removal budget funding levels from the 2008 5-year plan period continued, it would take EPA 105 years to fund the removal actions at 21 of the highest priority mines. According to our rough estimate, it would take even longer to also address the unknown number of mines without potentially responsible parties that will also need cleanup, but which have not been identified.

Moreover, during the decades-long time frames for conducting cleanup at the highest priority abandoned mines, the Navajo people living near these mines could continue to be exposed to elevated radiation levels that pose a high risk, either by visiting the abandoned mines or by inhaling or ingesting contaminated dust that migrates from the mines into communities. For example, as of February 2014, 38 of the 43 highest priority mines remained physically accessible and/or there were no signs communicating the radiation dangers present at the sites. We visited one such mine—the A&B #3 mine near Cameron, Arizona—in July 2013, where EPA measured radiation levels that were 37-times above background (see fig. 8). The mine is not signed or fenced and is located within one-quarter mile of nearby homes. According to a local government official and a Navajo agency official, they have seen evidence that people visit the mine site; they told us they have found children’s toys at the site and pointed out vehicle tracks.

In addition, the time frames associated with addressing contamination under other plan objectives are lengthy as well. For example, IHS officials estimated that it would take approximately 38 years to complete 36 of the 145 projects it identified as necessary to provide regulated, piped drinking water to residents of areas affected by historic uranium mining, assuming IHS were the sole contributor of funds and based on IHS’s Navajo Area water program budget for fiscal year 2013. During this time frame, residents may continue to be exposed to harmful constituents potentially found in unregulated drinking water sources. EPA and NNEPA officials told us that although the official position of the Navajo Nation is that unregulated water sources are not fit for human consumption, they continue to receive reports that Navajo residents use these sources, in part if there is no alternative, but for other reasons as well. In addition to health dangers posed by drinking uranium-contaminated water, which ATSDR and others have linked to kidney disease, IHS and EPA consider the general lack of regulated drinking water to be a health risk because contaminants often found in unregulated sources, such as E. coli bacteria, can pose an immediate health danger to people that consume them. Appendix V contains additional information about the potential future time frames associated with the other 2008 5-year plan objectives not discussed here.

The Scope of Additional Work Will Most Likely Cost Hundreds of Millions of Dollars

For the significant amount of remaining work to address uranium contamination that federal agencies recognize is needed, it appears that associated costs could exceed hundreds of millions of dollars. For example, in the absence of a cost estimate from EPA for work at the abandoned mines, our rough estimate based on previously incurred costs by EPA at the Skyline mine indicates that EPA’s costs to fund removal actions at just half of the highest priority mines, or 21 mines, could be a minimum of about $150 million. This is a conservative, low-end estimate for a number of reasons but, most importantly, because it does not include costs to transport and dispose of waste off-site. According to EPA officials, this is one of the most significant factors influencing cleanup costs; disposing of waste offsite is consistent with the Navajo Nation position that such waste be removed from Navajo lands.

Other federal agencies have developed cost estimates for addressing contamination under other plan objectives, and the costs for these efforts appear to reach into the hundreds of millions of dollars as well. For example, IHS officials estimated that the 36 economically feasible drinking water projects would cost about $35 million, and that all 145 projects would cost about $195 million to complete. In another example, DOE has estimated that its various actions at the former processing sites will cost about $193 million over the next 75 years, but DOE officials said that this estimate will need revision based on new groundwater remediation plans at the Rare Metals and Shiprock sites. Appendix V contains additional information about the potential future costs associated with the other 2008 5-year plan objectives not discussed here.

Agencies Face Challenges Meeting Funding Needs and Engaging Affected Communities, Though Opportunities Exist for Improving Relationships with the Navajo and Hopi People

Federal agencies face a variety of challenges in continuing to address uranium contamination on and near the Navajo reservation, including securing adequate funding and effectively engaging tribal communities. However, federal and Navajo agency officials and community members we spoke with identified opportunities for improving relationships with the Navajo and Hopi people, which could help the federal agencies more effectively engage these communities. In addition, other opportunities exist to enhance collaboration with federal agencies and with Navajo agencies.

Adequate Funding for Continued Efforts to Address Uranium Contamination Is a Key Challenge

One key challenge that federal agencies face is difficulty meeting funding needs with available federal resources. Specifically, according to EPA Region 9 officials, funding for EPA’s efforts to assess and clean up abandoned uranium mines under its Superfund removal program, especially those without viable private, potentially responsible parties, and to provide clean and safe drinking water is expected to decrease from funding levels that have been available from 2008 through 2012. EPA officials told us that reducing the human health risks associated with abandoned uranium mines on the Navajo reservation is a priority and that the agency intends to continue providing funding as resources allow. However, these officials stated that declining Superfund removal program resources nationally will likely result in a reduction in funding available to conduct removal actions at Navajo abandoned mines from the level available in previous years. An EPA Region 9 official familiar with funding tribal drinking water projects on the Navajo reservation also told us that federal resources available for drinking water infrastructure projects are expected to continue to decrease. In addition, as federal funding resources for abandoned mines and water projects become more constrained, such projects on the Navajo reservation may be less likely to receive federal funds because the programs by which they are funded prioritize projects based on risk. For example, under the EPA Superfund removal program, which EPA has used to pay for assessment and cleanup at the Navajo abandoned mines, projects that address emergency situations, such as toxic waste spills, are prioritized for funding over projects that generally are not considered emergencies, like the abandoned mine projects. EPA officials have prioritized the Navajo abandoned mine projects, but these officials told us that there is already a high demand for Region 9’s Superfund removal program funds with more projects that warrant selection than available funding.

Moreover, with few exceptions, federal agencies currently have limited options for other sources of federal funding for uranium-related work on the Navajo reservation. For example, according to EPA Region 9 officials, one possible source of funding for the typically longer-term remedial actions that may be warranted at a few of the highest priority mines without potentially responsible parties is the Superfund Trust Fund. Although the Superfund Trust Fund can be used for removal actions at all sites, it can only be used for remedial actions at sites that are included on the NPL. None of the Navajo abandoned mines are currently listed on the NPL, and, according to EPA Region 9 officials, only a few of the highest priority mines on the reservation may qualify for listing. In general, according to these officials, to score high enough in the Hazard Ranking System to be included on the NPL, an abandoned uranium mine would need to impact a sufficient number of people using a drinking water supply contaminated by the mine, expose a sufficient population to uranium through air or soil contamination, or impact a sensitive environment such as a wetland. However, given the locations and characteristics of the mines on the reservation and the population or environment affected, these officials said they believe most mines do not meet these criteria. For example, EPA officials told us that even the Navajo mines located near communities affect relatively small populations given the dispersed nature of the Navajo population, and the surrounding desert conditions mean that most of the mines do not appear to impact surface water. EPA officials said that community members in rural communities, including Navajo communities, have expressed a deep frustration with the ranking system used to determine sites’ inclusion on the NPL because they feel that the system unfairly discriminates against small communities. Nevertheless, EPA officials said they will continue to pursue including some of the mines on the NPL in order to use the Superfund Trust Fund to pay for remedial actions.

Another potential source of federal funding is Interior’s Central Hazardous Materials Fund (Fund), an appropriation available to pay for Interior’s CERCLA response actions. BIA received $162,000 from the Fund for the Tuba City Dump site, in 2008 and 2009. According to BIA officials, this money was used, in part, to search for another potentially responsible party at the site, pay for project oversight, and hire a technical consultant. In 2011, Interior issued a memorandum stating that CERCLA response actions on Indian trust lands were no longer eligible to receive money from the Fund. BIA officials told us, based on this memorandum, they believed that they were no longer eligible to obtain money for assessment or cleanup work at the Tuba City Dump. These officials said that they have not requested funding from the Fund to pay for assessment work and do not plan to request funding for the eventual remedial action at the site. However, Interior’s memorandum also stated that the Fund would continue to fund cleanup-related activities on Indian trust lands if BIA had received funding for cleanup-related activities, including those undergoing CERCLA assessments, in the past. According to a senior Fund official, because the Tuba City Dump site received Fund money prior to 2011, it is eligible to receive additional funds, including funding for the remedial action work. Pursuing this funding is important for two reasons: (1) once the remedial action has been selected, BIA’s funding requirements are likely to increase substantially (BIA estimated the remedial action could cost about 3- to 10-times as much as the RI/FS), and (2) federal standards for internal control encourage agencies to strive for efficiency in their use of resources. Since the Tuba City Dump is located in BIA’s Western region, the agency has paid for its work at the site out of that region’s budget. According to BIA officials, BIA has prioritized the Tuba City Dump project over other projects in the region that also need funding, which has resulted in some projects not receiving funding when BIA’s costs at the Tuba City site were especially high.

In addition, EPA is pursuing two other funding sources to contribute to the work at the abandoned mines. First, EPA and a potentially responsible party have reached an agreement to settle a pending lawsuit which, if approved by the judge presiding over the lawsuit, could result in approximately $1 billion for the agency’s and the Navajo Nation’s cleanup efforts at 50 mines and other contaminated sites. Second, EPA has sought to involve DOE in assessments and potentially cleanups at mines that do not have potentially responsible parties. In June 2013, EPA Region 9 corresponded with DOE, stating that DOE’s financial assistance with developing and implementing an approach to conducting assessments, interim actions, and cleanups at highest priority mines on the Navajo reservation is essential. Senior DOE officials told us they interpreted the letter as encouraging DOE to play a larger role in addressing the contamination from the mines on the reservation by funding assessment and cleanup at some of the mines. In January 2014, DOE responded to EPA that, although the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 required a DOE report on abandoned uranium mines, DOE was not given budget authority in fiscal year 2013 to remediate uranium mines, and its authority to take remedial actions under UMTRCA, which was limited to the former uranium processing sites and vicinity properties, has expired.

Engaging Tribal Communities Continues to Be a Key Challenge

Another key challenge faced by federal agencies is identifying ways of more effectively engaging with tribal communities. According to outreach plans prepared by DOE and EPA, and other documents prepared by various federal agencies, engaging with communities is important for a number of reasons, including soliciting feedback on the decision-making process, obtaining meaningful input into cleanup decisions, and working with community members to determine how best to limit exposures to uranium contamination. During the 2008 5-year plan period, federal agency officials increasingly recognized the importance of community engagement and began building bridges in the communities where they conducted work, both by developing relationships themselves, and by funding Navajo agency officials’ outreach work. Even with the federal agencies’ increased attention to outreach activities, agency officials and community members we spoke with said that the need for increased and improved outreach is great. Nevertheless, federal agencies face challenges in their ongoing efforts to effectively engage Navajo communities for at least four reasons: (1) building trust may require significant time and effort on the Navajo reservation, (2) the number of outreach staff is small compared with the size of the reservation, (3) commonly used tools for engaging communities may not be effective in Navajo communities, and (4) federal agencies have not coordinated their outreach efforts.

Building Trust

Agency officials and community members we spoke with said that although building trust among the Navajo people is necessary to effectively engage local communities, it will take significant time and effort. One reason for this is that many members of the Navajo community distrust outsiders—especially those representing the federal government—because of historical events, related to both uranium mining and the government’s treatment of Native people. The federal government’s inconsistent attention to uranium-related issues on Navajo lands in recent decades may also have contributed to a lack of trust among community members. For example, according to EPA Region 9 officials, EPA compiled a list of potentially contaminated houses on the Navajo reservation in the 1970s, but it did not take steps to ensure that all houses on the list were assessed for contamination until it began work under the 2008 5-year plan. Distrust of the federal government is also exacerbated by concerns about ongoing issues, such as fears that federal agencies will issue permits for new uranium mining near the Navajo reservation before contamination from previous mining is fully addressed.

Another reason why building trust will be a challenge is because Navajo community members are concerned that the federal agencies that worked on the 2008 5-year plan may not have a long-term commitment to addressing uranium contamination, according to Navajo Nation officials and some stakeholders. For example, Navajo community members have expressed disappointment that the 2008 plan encompassed just 5 years’ worth of work when, in their view, fully addressing the effects of contamination will take decades of commitment. A long-term commitment—along with completing cleanup work—could help build trust with Navajo communities. One challenge the federal agencies will continue to face in addressing these concerns, however, is that, in some cases, the agencies are limited in the types of long-term commitments that they can make. For example, EPA officials explained that the agency cannot commit to cleaning up even the 43 highest priority mines at this time because they do not have dedicated funding for addressing the highest priority mines that do not have potentially responsible parties and are not listed on the NPL. This is in contrast to the situation at the former uranium processing sites, where DOE must prepare and implement a long-term surveillance plan for disposal sites, in accordance with NRC regulations implementing UMTRCA.

In addition, building trust is a challenge because Navajo Nation officials and some stakeholders told us they are frustrated by what they see as examples of environmental injustice. These are instances when uranium contamination on the Navajo reservation appears to be treated differently than contamination on non-Indian lands, such as the community in Moab, Utah, where DOE is excavating a large mill tailings pile and disposing of it elsewhere. In another example of environmental injustice on the Navajo reservation, high-level Navajo officials and others have said that the release of radioactive materials from the uranium processing site near Church Rock, New Mexico, has received far less attention nationally than the radioactive release at Three Mile Island—which occurred 4 months earlier—although the amount of radioactive materials released in the later incident was significantly greater.

Finally, some tribal agency officials we spoke with told us they believe the federal agencies had fostered mistrust by sometimes overstating their progress in addressing uranium contamination on the Navajo reservation. Specifically, some high-level Navajo Nation officials have stated that they believe the federal agencies have understated the scope of the uranium contamination problem on the Navajo reservation and have overstated the federal agencies’ efforts in addressing the problem. For example, Navajo Nation officials said they were frustrated that the federal agencies’ January 2013 summary report, published at the end of the 2008 5-year plan period, highlighted the agencies’ accomplishments but did not identify or communicate the larger context: that, overall, significant progress has not been made in addressing uranium contamination on the reservation.

Limited Number of Outreach Staff

Federal and tribal agency officials we spoke with said that the number of federal and tribal agency outreach staff working on engaging Navajo communities about uranium-related issues is very small compared with the size of and conditions on the reservation. Outreach staff are responsible for engaging communities that are spread out over three states across the 24,000 square-mile reservation. Many of these communities are not only remote, but they are also difficult to access because of harsh terrain and rough roads.

Dedicated outreach staff. As of November 2013, EPA Region 9 had the full-time equivalent of 1.5 outreach staff working on Navajo uranium issues, including only one staff member who speaks Navajo. EPA outreach staff are not based on the Navajo reservation, and travel time between the reservation and Region 9 headquarters in San Francisco limits the amount of time that staff are able to spend engaging communities. In addition to EPA outreach staff, NNEPA has one outreach staff member dedicated to uranium issues, and one additional staff member who incorporates outreach in her work. NNEPA’s dedicated staff person, however, is responsible for activities in addition to community outreach, such as interfacing with the media on uranium-related issues, and this staff person told us that she cannot meet all the outreach needs put before her. For example, she said that coordinating with IHS on outreach events could be a full-time position, but that she is limited by other demands on her time.

Other staff conducting outreach. Other federal and tribal agencies that worked on the 2008 5-year plan conduct outreach as part of their activities, but they do not have dedicated staff working full-time on uranium-related outreach to Navajo communities. For example, IHS has two staff members who engage with communities on uranium issues, in addition to their other responsibilities, and DOE has one staff member who performs outreach activities in addition to her site management responsibilities. The Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation/UMTRA department’s public affairs staff, under the UMTRA program’s cooperative agreement with DOE, has engaged Navajo communities to discuss concerns about former processing sites located on the reservation. In addition, the Navajo Nation Division of Health has used ATSDR funding to hire staff who conduct outreach activities as part of their responsibilities related to implementing the Navajo Birth Cohort Study.

Limitations of Common Outreach Tools

For a variety of reasons, commonly used tools for communicating with communities—such as disseminating written materials, including brochures or e-mails, and putting up signs and fencing off contaminated areas—may generally be less effective on the Navajo reservation. For example, written materials may be less effective because Navajo and Hopi are traditionally spoken languages—not written languages—and many community members learned English as a second language. Also, many residents are not connected by Internet or telephone in their homes. According to EPA and NNEPA officials, the most effective way to communicate with many members of Navajo communities is through face-to-face interactions, which requires trusted native speakers and is more time-consuming than written communications. Furthermore, although signs and fences may be used to communicate information about risks from contamination, they may be less effective on the Navajo reservation. In part because of differences in how Navajo people traditionally view the land, it is generally not acceptable to restrict the use of reservation lands, although there are some exceptions, such as those related to grazing uses and home sites. As a result, knowledgeable EPA officials told us they did not believe that signs and fences would be sufficient to limit access to contaminated areas because they felt signs and fences would be disregarded. As an example, these officials told us that a mining company had erected a fence to restrict access to an area contaminated by uranium, but, rather than staying out of the area, a community member had instead used the fence to contain his livestock, confining them in the very area to which the agency was trying to restrict access. Furthermore, according to these officials, physical structures such as signs and fences are difficult to maintain in remote areas of the reservation, where vandalism and theft pose challenges.

Moreover, providing information, regardless of delivery method, may itself be a limited tool for changing behavior because, in many cases, no acceptable alternatives are available. For example, according to Navajo agency officials and community members with whom we spoke, some community members—because they do not have a better alternative— continue to get their drinking water from unregulated livestock wells that may be contaminated with uranium and other toxins, even though some of these community members understand that doing so is unsafe. Some community members we spoke with said that they used unregulated water sources for domestic purposes, such as cooking and drinking, and that more education would not be effective in changing this behavior until better alternatives were made available.

Limited Federal Agency Collaboration on Outreach Efforts

Federal agencies that worked on the 2008 5-year plan have not generally coordinated their outreach efforts. Although the agencies began hosting joint workshops for stakeholders in 2008, according to agency officials, the agencies generally have conducted their own public meetings in communities without inviting other agencies to participate. Agency officials told us that not coordinating outreach poses a challenge to effectively engaging communities because community members often expect these meetings to cover a variety of uranium-related issues, regardless of whether those issues fell within the jurisdiction of the agency present. For example, according to an EPA official we spoke with, when EPA conducted outreach related to abandoned uranium mines, community members often had questions about other uranium-related topics, such as health effects. In some cases, the limited scope of issues covered in community meetings has caused significant frustration among community members, according to EPA and IHS officials. An EPA official told us that this may hamper the efforts of outreach staff to build relationships in tribal communities. Because the costs of attending community meetings can be high for both federal agencies and community members—many of whom travel significant distances to attend the meetings—EPA officials said they realized it is important to maximize each contact that they have with affected communities. Officials from multiple agencies told us they recognize the value in coordinating on outreach and have begun to coordinate their efforts by, for example, holding joint community meetings. For example, in March 2012, IHS and DOE met jointly with community members to discuss the Shiprock former uranium processing site, including concerns about health impacts. In another example, in 2013, EPA and IHS jointly hosted a health screening in one Navajo community for residents who had been living in contaminated homes that were being demolished through EPA’s actions to address and replace contaminated structures.

Opportunities Exist to Improve Federal Agencies’ Relationships with the Navajo and Hopi People

Federal and Navajo agency officials and community members we spoke with identified a number of opportunities that federal agencies could pursue to improve relationships with the Navajo people, as well as with the Hopi people affected by the Tuba City Dump. Opportunities identified for improving relationships with tribal communities include the following:

Provide information on long-term scope of work. Federal officials and community members identified opportunities for federal agencies to provide a more complete picture of the scope of the uranium contamination problem and their progress toward addressing the problem. For example, some community members, including participants at one of the agencies’ stakeholder workshops, told the agencies they would like to see the next interagency plan cover a period longer than just another 5 years because they believe it is clear that the amount of work remaining will take significantly longer than 5 years. Stakeholders said that including information about the long- term scope of work in the next plan would increase their ability to hold the agencies accountable and provide a benchmark against which they can measure the agencies’ progress.

Conduct in-person outreach. Federal officials and community members identified opportunities for federal agencies to improve their relationships with Navajo communities—and the Hopi people affected by the Tuba City Dump—by conducting in-person outreach where possible, although such methods are resource intensive. For example, in a community involvement plan created to guide its outreach related to the Tuba City Dump, EPA noted that distributing information in small group or door-to-door settings assists in developing trust and keeping misunderstandings of new materials and information to a minimum. According to the plan, the Hopi people have regularly requested that federal agencies rely on in-person outreach methods when feasible. The plan stated that although it is not feasible to distribute all information in person, doing so conveys to community members that they are important and are part of the process.

Establish agency offices on or near the reservation. One way agency officials identified to establish a more constant presence on the reservation would be for federal agencies that do not already have offices nearby, including EPA and DOE, to set up and assign technical and outreach staff to offices in the area. This would increase the amount of time that staff can interact with communities, since typically EPA and DOE staff travel to the reservation from California or Colorado. According to a Navajo Nation official we spoke with, having staff on or near the reservation would increase the federal agencies’ ability to connect with communities, especially since it would help increase their cultural awareness and sensitivity. One EPA staff member who spent 2 months working on-site during a mine cleanup said that his consistent presence during that time—as well as the extensive outreach he conducted over a longer period—allowed him to build strong relationships with community members, which in turn increased that community’s acceptance of the cleanup remedy.

Partner with community organizations. Some stakeholders we spoke with said that opportunities may exist for federal agencies to more effectively engage Navajo communities by partnering with trusted community organizations. For example, the president of a nonprofit community organization that works to ensure that the Navajo people—especially those affected by uranium contamination in a remote region of the reservation—have access to safe drinking water and economic development, among other things, told us that he would welcome a partnership with federal agencies to conduct outreach on uranium-related issues. Such a partnership would take full advantage of the organization’s existing connection with Navajo communities. Representatives from this organization and others told us that community organizations are often a trusted source of information, and their involvement would lend credibility to federal and tribal agencies’ engagement efforts.

Promote job creation and training. Navajo officials we spoke with also told us that the federal agencies could help improve relationships by identifying opportunities to promote job creation and training on the Navajo reservation as part of the efforts to address uranium contamination. Officials we spoke with said the federal government should provide more funding for new positions within the tribal agencies to address uranium contamination. They said that, in 2007, the Navajo Nation had identified the need for 20 new full-time employees within NNEPA to address uranium contamination, but that federal agencies awarded funding for just 2 additional employees from 2008 to 2012. Tribal officials also said that they would like to see the federal agencies provide job training programs similar to the one that EPA offered during the 5-year plan period.

Issue a formal apology. Some stakeholders, including Navajo community members, told us they felt that receiving an official apology from the federal government for failing to ensure that the companies conducting uranium mining to support U.S. nuclear weapons development were protective of the environment and public health would go a long way toward improving relationships.

Additional Opportunities Exist for Federal Agencies to Enhance Interagency Collaboration and Collaboration with Navajo Agencies

Agency officials we spoke with said that additional opportunities exist for the federal agencies to enhance both interagency collaboration at the federal level and collaboration with Navajo agencies. Specifically, EPA, IHS, and DOE officials identified a number of opportunities for increased interagency collaboration on efforts to engage tribal communities. For example, an IHS official involved with conducting uranium-related health screenings told us that the joint health screening event conducted with EPA in 2013 was a success and that, in addition to duplicating such efforts in other affected communities, there may be additional opportunities for enhanced interagency collaboration to help ensure that the Navajo people receive health screenings as well as information on how they can most effectively protect themselves from uranium contamination. More specifically, the IHS official told us that there may be opportunities to work with partners, including CDC and EPA, to develop informational videos on the health effects of uranium exposure that could be screened in IHS clinics. In addition, EPA officials told us that they have initiated a pilot effort to provide more coordinated outreach in the Cameron region of the reservation. In that region—where potentially responsible parties will be conducting extensive assessment and some cleanup of abandoned mines in the coming years—EPA and NNEPA plan to work with other partners, including other federal agencies, to provide a more coordinated approach to engaging the communities in discussions about, among other things, steps the federal agencies and community members can take to mitigate exposures to hazardous uranium contamination. Further, EPA officials involved in coordinating the 2014 5-year plan told us that they plan to engage the other federal agencies in developing and including a coordinated outreach strategy in the plan to better ensure that the agencies maximize each contact that they have with affected communities by, for example, providing the communities with information on a variety of uranium-related issues. Officials from the other agencies agreed that they would engage with EPA to develop or support such a strategy. This is consistent with one of the key practices that, in October 2005, we reported can help enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies—establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies—which can assist partner agencies in aligning their activities and resources, among other things. We have reported on other key practices to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration, including, for example, for collaborating agencies to define and agree on their respective roles and responsibilities. In doing so, collaborating agencies can identify how their collaborative efforts will be led, clarify who will do what, organize their joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision making.

Federal and Navajo agency officials also identified opportunities for the federal agencies to enhance collaboration with Navajo agencies, some of which also present opportunities to enhance capacity building. For example, an EPA official we spoke with said that the agency could potentially train NNEPA staff to perform the more detailed assessments that EPA has been conducting to determine whether houses are contaminated and warrant replacement. In addition, Navajo Nation officials told us that they would like the federal agencies to work with them to identify as many opportunities as possible for the federal agencies to partner with the Navajo agencies on uranium-related work. These officials pointed to the partnership between DOE and NNEPA at the Highway 160 site—where NNEPA led the implementation of the cleanup work—as a particular success that they would like to see replicated in other areas. EPA Region 9 officials also pointed to the partnership between EPA and the Navajo Community Housing and Infrastructure Department, a Navajo agency that is helping to replace some of the contaminated houses on the reservation.

According to both federal and tribal agency officials, federal agencies could also enhance their collaboration with Navajo agencies by including additional tribal agencies in future efforts. For example, EPA and DOE identified potential opportunities for enhanced collaboration with the Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program, which was not involved in the abandoned mine work conducted under the 2008 5-year plan, although the UMTRA program under the same department has been working with DOE at the former uranium processing sites. The Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program was active in abandoned uranium mine-related efforts during the plan period by, among other things, maintaining reclamation work previously conducted to mitigate physical hazards at the mines. According to Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program officials, they plan to continue this maintenance work at reclaimed mine sites in the future. According to both federal and tribal agency officials we spoke with, EPA could potentially collaborate with that program and NNEPA to help ensure that, where feasible, any additional maintenance work on reclaimed uranium mines is done in coordination with NNEPA and EPA to help further reduce radiological hazards. EPA officials told us that they have begun talking with Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program staff to identify ways to work together, whereas in the period of the 2008 5-year plan, the program and NNEPA each generally operated independently from one another. According to DOE, EPA and DOE have agreed to invite officials from NNEPA and both programs within the Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation/UMTRA Department to participate in activities of either federal agency. In another example, a CDC official told us there may be opportunities for CDC to increase its collaboration with the Navajo Division of Health to improve available data on how cancers impact the Navajo people.

Conclusions

From 2008 through 2012, six federal agencies increased their overall efforts to address the legacy of uranium contamination that remained on the Navajo reservation after uranium mining and processing ceased, spending more than $120 million on various actions, including assessments of abandoned mines and cleanups of contaminated homes and other sites. However, nearly 30 years since the last active uranium mine on the Navajo reservation ceased production, federal agencies do not have comprehensive information about the extent of the contamination or the total scope of work—and associated time frames and costs—required to fully address it, especially the contamination found at the abandoned mines. When requesting the 2008 5-year plan, policymakers were looking for a comprehensive course of action for fully resolving the problem of uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation. Given that the scope of the 2008 5-year plan focused on addressing the most urgent problems, and the agencies’ next 5-year plan is not expected to identify the full scope of work that remains, it is unclear how many 5-year plans at this rate would be needed to estimate the remaining scope of work, time frames, and costs for fully addressing the contamination. While many uncertainties exist, it is possible to generate useful, high-level estimates of the work, time frames, and costs in a short period of time based on the information the federal agencies currently possess. However, absent a statutory requirement to develop such a comprehensive estimate, it appears unlikely that the agencies will undertake such an effort. Without more comprehensive information about the overall remaining scope of work, time frames, and costs needed to address contamination across the reservation, including at the abandoned mines, stakeholders and decision makers do not have a basis on which to assess the overall pace of the cleanup efforts; and without this information cannot put the accomplishments of the 2008 5-year plan—or any future plans—into perspective, and cannot make effective resource allocation decisions.

Effectively engaging with tribal communities is a key challenge facing federal agencies in the efforts to address contamination on Navajo and Hopi lands. The 2008 5-year plan did not contain information about how the federal agencies would coordinate their outreach efforts to these communities. While the agencies began to integrate their outreach activities over the course of the 5-year plan period, community members continued to express frustration with the agencies’ efforts. Creating a coordinated outreach strategy is consistent with the key practice of establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies that we have reported can help enhance and sustain interagency collaboration and help agencies better align their activities and resources. Such an effort should also identify how the collaborative effort will be led, clarify who will do what, organize their joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision making.

In addition, assessment work conducted by BIA at the Tuba City Dump has yielded information about the contamination at the site that has provided significant value to decision makers. In doing so, however, BIA has experienced a number of challenges, some concerning contract management. BIA has missed enforceable deadlines, subjecting BIA to stipulated penalties under its settlement agreement with EPA. Moreover, BIA continued to increase the value of the contract while the contractor was not performing according to the contract’s terms and conditions. BIA is nearing the end of its management of the current RI/FS contract; these contract management challenges, however, if left unaddressed, will become even more pertinent in the next few years as BIA moves into the cleanup phase after a remedial action is selected. At that point, the agency will award and manage an even larger and more complicated contract that will increase costs significantly. Without examining lessons learned from managing the RI/FS contract and considering these lessons as part of the acquisition planning process for the remedial action contract, BIA could face contract management challenges on a larger scale. Further, BIA did not fully follow best practices in estimating the schedule for the RI/FS, which was not fully comprehensive or controlled. Without control over the schedule, BIA cannot effectively monitor its contractor’s progress and cannot evaluate the quality of changes proposed by the contractor. BIA’s estimate of probable future costs for the cleanup at the Tuba City Dump also did not always reflect the characteristics of a comprehensive high-quality cost estimate. Without fully accounting for all future costs, management will have difficulty successfully planning program resource requirements. Further, significantly more funds will likely be needed to implement the remedial action that will be selected for the Tuba City Dump site. Given this increased need and other competing interests for BIA’s limited resources, other funding sources for remedial actions, such as Interior’s Central Hazardous Materials Fund, become more important. The Tuba City Dump site is eligible to receive funds from the Fund for the RI/FS, as well as the selected remedial action, although BIA officials have not applied for such funding and do not plan to do so. Without leveraging the Fund, BIA will have difficulty meeting the funding needs for the remedial action cleanup phase of the project.

Matter for Congressional Consideration

To develop an estimate of the scope of work remaining to address uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, Congress should consider requiring that the Environmental Protection Agency take the lead and work with the other federal agencies to develop an overall estimate of the remaining scope of the work, time frames, and costs.

Recommendations for Executive Action

We are making the following four recommendations in this report: To ensure that agencies working on the 2014 5-year plan better align their activities and resources, we recommend that the Administrator of EPA; the Secretaries of Energy, the Interior, and Health and Human Services; and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as they develop a coordinated outreach strategy to include in the 2014 5-year plan, take action to incorporate key practices in their collaborative effort, such as defining and agreeing on the agencies’ respective roles and responsibilities.

In light of the problems BIA has encountered in managing the cleanup at the Tuba City Dump site, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs to take the following three actions: identify and examine any lessons learned from managing the RI/FS contract and consider these lessons as part of the acquisition planning process for the remedial action contract, employ best practices in creating the schedule and cost estimates for the remedial action cleanup phase, and apply for funding from Interior’s Central Hazardous Materials Fund in order to help meet the funding needs for the remedial action cleanup phase of the project.

Agency and Third Party Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Environmental Protection Agency; the Departments of Energy, the Interior, and Health and Human Services; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the Office of Management and Budget; and the Navajo Nation and Hopi Tribe. EPA, DOE, BIA (responding on behalf of Interior), the Department of Health and Human Services, and NRC generally agreed with our recommendations, and their written comments are reproduced in appendixes VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X, respectively. Each of these agencies also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The Navajo Nation also provided written comments (reproduced in app. XI) and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The Office of Management and Budget and the Hopi Tribe did not comment on our report.

DOE was the only agency that commented on our Matter for Congressional Consideration. Specifically, DOE acknowledged the need to identify the remaining scope of work, time frames, and costs of fully addressing uranium contamination on the Navajo reservation. However, the agency expressed concern about the difficulty of quantifying the full scope of work at this time, given the number of uncertainties that remain. We agree that attempting to quantify, in a detailed manner, the full scope of remaining work is not possible at this time because of the uncertainties we describe in this report, as well as those identified by DOE in its comments. However, we believe that the agencies’ estimates can be improved and, for the reasons detailed in our report, consider it essential for Congress to have more comprehensive information about the remaining scope of work in order to assess the overall pace of the cleanup and to make informed resource allocation decisions. In addition, DOE commented on (1) our use of the term “Rare Metals” site instead of the “Tuba City Mill Site” or the “Tuba City Former Processing Site” and (2) an observation in the report about the cleanup of the former processing sites on the Navajo reservation versus another site near Moab, Utah. Regarding the comparison of the former processing sites on the Navajo reservation to the Moab site, DOE provided comments on the unique nature of each site. Regarding the Rare Metals site, we clarified our report to indicate that our use of the term “Rare Metals site” was solely to prevent it from being confused with other contaminated sites in the Tuba City area, including BIA’s Tuba City Dump site.

In agreeing with our recommendation that the federal agencies incorporate key practices for enhancing and sustaining interagency collaborative efforts into their coordinated outreach strategy, EPA, DOE, and the Department of Health and Human Services provided additional details about the contents of the draft outreach strategy that they intend to include in their 2014 5-year plan. We are encouraged by elements of the draft strategy, which appear to include some of the key practices for enhancing and sustaining interagency collaboration. For example, the agencies plan to leverage resources to fund a shared coordinator who will direct a community outreach network composed of representatives from the federal and tribal agencies.

In its written comments, BIA asserted that our report disproportionately focuses on the agency’s management of the Tuba City Dump site, a site that BIA described as comprising a very small part of the overall problem of uranium contamination across the Navajo reservation. Although we agree that cleaning up the Tuba City Dump is but one part of the agencies’ broader efforts to address uranium contamination on the Navajo reservation, we believe that our detailed examination of BIA’s and EPA’s management of the assessment work at the site was appropriate.

As explained in our report, the Tuba City Dump site was one of the two objectives where the federal agencies did not meet the targets in the 2008 5-year plan. In order to identify reasons why BIA did not meet those targets, we analyzed the agency’s management of the Tuba City Dump site, including its project and contract management approaches. In addition, BIA commented that it believes the management of the cleanup has been handled responsibly but that circumstances beyond its control have contributed to delays. We acknowledge in this report that circumstances beyond BIA's control contributed to delays in the Tuba City Dump cleanup; however, BIA's own actions also contributed to these delays. For example, BIA had communication problems with its RI/FS contractor and performance problems regarding the quality and timeliness of the contractor’s deliverables. These problems and others led BIA to miss several legally enforceable deadlines in the RI/FS work plan and resulted in BIA failing to complete the RI/FS for the site, an objective of the 2008 5-year plan and a work plan requirement. In its comments, BIA appears to fault EPA and the contractor for the delays and associated stipulated penalties, but BIA did not explain how, if at all, EPA’s and the contractor’s actions would relieve BIA of its legal obligation to meet the work plan deadlines, or of the consequences of failing to do so.

While agreeing with our recommendations, BIA disagreed with our findings regarding the agency’s cost and schedule estimating at the Tuba City Dump. These findings were the basis for our recommendation that BIA employ best practices in creating the schedule and cost estimates for the forthcoming CERCLA remedial action at the Tuba City Dump. BIA asserted that its approach to developing the cost and schedule estimates was reasonable, and did not believe that the best practices found in our cost estimating and assessment guide were applicable, at least in part, because the details of the remedial action to be conducted at the site have not been identified. As explained in this report, the best practices in our cost estimating and assessment guide can be used for projects with significant unknowns, such as the Tuba City Dump, and include specific steps for properly taking those unknowns into account. For example, the guide discusses how every cost estimate is uncertain because of the assumptions that must be made about future projections. It also states that because many of the assumptions made at the start of a project turn out to be inaccurate, it is important to assess the risk associated with changes in assumptions. As described in our report, we found that BIA did not assess such risks when creating its cost estimate. In addition, although BIA concurred with our recommendation to use best practices when creating cost and schedule estimates for the forthcoming remedial action, BIA stated that it does not intend to use these best practices when developing future estimates at the site because it does not believe that they are applicable to environmental cleanup projects. To the contrary, these guides offer best practices that are directly relevant to a wide range of government projects, including environmental cleanups, and we have previously assessed such projects using the criteria in the guides. BIA’s refusal to apply cost and schedule estimating best practices is troublesome, especially since, as we note in the report, the remedial action at the site will represent a more significant undertaking than the RI/FS. As such, it is important that BIA have reliable cost and schedule estimates in order to effectively manage the project.

In written comments, the Navajo Nation stated that, overall, our report represented a good start toward illuminating the nature and extent of the damage uranium mining and processing has caused to Navajo lands and people. However, the Navajo Nation also noted some instances where it felt the report fell short. For example, the tribe noted that our projection of the need for hundreds of millions of dollars to address the remaining scope of work that has been identified by the agencies was a significant underestimation of the total projected costs for future remediation at all uranium-related sites on Navajo lands. The tribe stated that it believes that these total costs will be in the billions of dollars rather than hundreds of millions of dollars. As noted in our report and recognized by the Navajo Nation in its comments, our estimate related to the cleanup of highest priority abandoned mines represents a conservative, low-end estimate. While we cannot comment on the accuracy of the tribe’s characterization of total future costs, the tribe’s estimate further illuminates the need for the federal agencies involved to generate a high-level estimate, as discussed in our report, based on their most current information regarding the remaining scope of work. In addition, the Navajo Nation noted the absence of any discussion of potential groundwater contamination in the draft report, especially at the Northeast Church Rock mine. In response, we have made changes to include information about the status of federal agencies’ groundwater assessment efforts.

We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; the Secretaries of Energy, the Interior, and Health and Human Services; the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the President of the Navajo Nation; the Chairman of the Hopi Tribe; the appropriate congressional committees; and other interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or gomezj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to the report are listed in appendix XII.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

In this report, we examined: (1) the extent to which federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Department of Health and Human Services’ Indian Health Service (IHS), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) achieved the targets identified in the 2008 5-year plan, and the reasons why or why not; (2) what is known about the scope of work, time frames, and estimated costs of fully addressing uranium contamination on the Navajo reservation; and (3) the key challenges, if any, faced by federal agencies in completing this work and the opportunities, if any, which may be present to help overcome these challenges.

To determine the extent to which federal agencies achieved the targets identified in the 2008 5-year plan, we compared the agencies’ targets as laid out in the 5-year plan with the actions taken by the agencies and their partners over the 5-year plan period from 2008 through 2012. We identified these actions by reviewing key documents, including the summary report issued by the federal agencies in January 2013. We corroborated information in the documents by interviewing relevant federal agency officials and Navajo and Hopi tribal officials from relevant tribal government agencies—the Navajo Nation Department of Justice, Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency, the Navajo Nation Division of Natural Resources’ Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation/Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action Department, and the Hopi Tribe Department of Natural Resources’ Water Resources Program—and by obtaining additional documentation and visiting relevant sites across the Navajo and Hopi reservations where federal and tribal agencies have been conducting their work. In addition to the five federal agencies listed above, other relevant federal agencies we spoke with included the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), the Office of Management and Budget, and the Department of the Interior’s Office of Environmental Policy and Compliance, which manages the Central Hazardous Materials Fund, and the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, which provides funding to the Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program. In April 2013 and July 2013, we visited key sites, including the Northeast Church Rock, Quivira, and Skyline mines, as well as abandoned uranium mines and mine-related sites near the communities of Cameron, Cove, and Teec Nos Pos, Arizona; and Haystack, and Casamero Lake, New Mexico; the former uranium processing site in Shiprock, New Mexico; the Highway 160 site near Tuba City, Arizona; and the Tuba City Dump, located on both the Hopi and Navajo reservations and near the Hopi Villages of Moenkopi and the Navajo town of Tuba City, Arizona. We selected these sites based on the level of activity that federal and tribal agencies conducted there during the 5-year plan, and in order to see some of the sites that the agencies have identified as needing cleanup work in the near future.

To identify the reasons why the agencies met or did not meet the targets in the 5-year plan, we reviewed agency documents and interviewed federal and tribal agency officials. We also reviewed federal agency expenditure data for the 2008 5-year plan period (fiscal years 2008 through 2012) and compared it with expenditure data from the previous 5 years (fiscal years 2003 through 2007). These data represent obligations or direct outlays by the agencies and represent the agencies’ direct costs and did not include intramural costs, such as staff salaries. We received data from ATSDR, BIA, CDC, DOE, EPA, and IHS; NRC did not provide expenditure data because NRC did not incur any direct obligations during the time period, although it did expend resources for staff time. In order to determine costs in constant 2013 dollars, we adjusted the amounts reported to us for inflation by applying the fiscal year chain-weighted gross domestic product price index, with fiscal year 2013 as the base year. To evaluate the reliability of these data and determine their limitations, we reviewed the data obtained from each agency. For each data source, we analyzed related documentation, examined the data to identify obvious errors or inconsistencies, and compared the data we received with other published data sources, where possible. We also interviewed officials from each agency to obtain information on the internal controls of their data systems. On the basis of our evaluation of these sources, we concluded that the expenditure data we collected and analyzed were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

To identify what is known about the scope of work remaining to fully address uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, we reviewed available documents and interviewed knowledgeable federal agency and tribal officials. To identify what is known about time frames and costs, we reviewed documentation containing schedule and/or cost estimates or general information about time frames or costs, where available. To create estimates of time frames and costs to clean up the highest priority abandoned mines, we gathered information about the costs associated with the Skyline mine cleanup, which was the one cleanup EPA conducted during the 5-year plan period with the agency’s funds, the pace of work conducted under the 5-year plan, and the number of mines that would need full funding from EPA. In addition, we analyzed the extent to which the schedule generated by BIA for the remedial investigation and feasibility study at the Tuba City Dump reflected the four general characteristics for sound schedule estimating, as outlined in our schedule assessment guide: comprehensive, well-constructed, credible, and controlled. We selected this schedule to review because it was the most robust of the available schedules, and it represented an entirely federal effort. We also examined the extent to which BIA’s estimate of probable future costs for Tuba City Dump reflected the four characteristics of high-quality cost estimates, as outlined in our cost estimating and assessment guide: comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. We selected this cost estimate to review since the cleanup will be paid for entirely with federal funds, and it represented a distinct cleanup project rather than an ongoing level of effort. In reviewing BIA’s schedule and cost estimates, we analyzed supporting documentation submitted by BIA and conducted interviews with BIA and EPA project managers and staff. We shared our cost and schedule guides and the criteria against which we would be evaluating the estimates with BIA staff. We then compared BIA’s methods and approaches for preparing the estimates with the best practices contained in the guides.

To ascertain the key challenges faced by federal agencies in completing this work and the opportunities that may be present to help overcome these challenges, we reviewed key documents, including the January 2013 summary report, written materials from the federal agencies’ Navajo uranium stakeholder workshops, agency reports, and Navajo Nation laws and position papers. We corroborated and supplemented information in the documents by interviewing relevant federal agency officials and Navajo and Hopi tribal officials. We also interviewed knowledgeable stakeholders, including community members living in areas affected by uranium mining or contamination. For example, we worked with the federal and tribal agencies and others to hold meetings in seven affected communities, which were attended by 50 local government officials and community members. We also spoke with other knowledgeable stakeholders, such as university researchers and representatives of nonprofit and community organizations active on Navajo uranium issues. We met with most of these stakeholders during our July 2013 site visits and at the April 2013 Navajo Uranium Stakeholder Workshop held in Gallup, New Mexico, and spoke with other stakeholders by telephone. We identified stakeholders by performing an Internet and literature search for individuals and organizations involved in relevant issues, attending the stakeholder workshop and identifying participating stakeholders, and requesting referrals from agency officials and stakeholders with whom we spoke. The views of the stakeholders we spoke with are not representative of and cannot be generalized to all stakeholders.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2013 to May 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Detailed Results of GAO Assessment of the Schedule for the Tuba City Dump Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study Work Plan

Our prior work has identified 10 best practices associated with effective scheduling. These are (1) capturing all activities; (2) sequencing all activities; (3) assigning resources to all activities; (4) establishing the duration of all activities; (5) verifying that the schedule is traceable horizontally and vertically; (6) confirming that the critical path is valid; (7) ensuring reasonable total float; (8) conducting a schedule risk analysis; (9) updating the schedule with actual progress and logic; and (10) maintaining a baseline schedule. These practices are summarized into four characteristics of a reliable schedule—comprehensive, well- constructed, credible, and controlled. We assessed the extent to which the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (BIA) January 2013 schedule for the remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS) at the Tuba City Dump met each of the 10 best practices, and characterized whether the schedule met each of the four characteristics of a reliable schedule. We found that the schedule minimally met each of the four characteristics of a reliable schedule. As a result, we are concerned about the validity of the dates that were forecasted by the schedule, as well as the identification of the critical path. Without an accurate critical path, management cannot focus on the activities that will be most detrimental to the project’s key milestones and finish date if they slip. Table 3 provides the detailed results of our analysis.

Appendix III: Detailed Results of GAO Assessment of the Tuba City Dump 5-Year Cost Estimate

To analyze the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (BIA) 5-year cost estimate, dated April 2013, for the Tuba City Dump, we determined the extent to which BIA followed the best practices outlined in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. The guide identifies 12 practices that are the basis for effective cost estimation, including cost estimation for annual budget requests. The guide associates these practices with four characteristics: accurate, well-documented, comprehensive, and credible. The Office of Management and Budget endorsed this guidance as being sufficient for meeting most cost-estimating requirements, including for budget formulation. If followed correctly, these practices should result in reliable and valid budgets that (1) can be easily and clearly traced, replicated, and updated; and (2) enable managers to make informed decisions. BIA created this cost estimate to contribute to the Department of the Interior’s (Interior) environmental and disposal liability estimate as part of Interior’s annual financial statement. Since a remedial action has not been selected for the site, BIA estimated two options, a low-cost option and a high-cost option. In accordance with Interior’s guidance, BIA submitted the low-cost option as part of the liability estimate. We assessed the extent to which the Tuba City Dump 5-year cost estimate from April 2013 met each of the four characteristics associated with cost-estimating best practices. As table 4 illustrates, we found that the Tuba City Dump April 2013 cost estimate minimally met each of these four characteristics.

Appendix IV: The 43 Highest Priority Mines, Their Locations, and the Status of Assessment and Cleanup Efforts

Removal actions conducted at these sites were done as time-critical removal actions and are listed as interim because they did not constitute the final cleanup actions at the mines. Detailed assessments listed here include remedial action assessments (preliminary assessment and/or site investigation) and removal action assessments (engineering evaluation/cost analysis). The Skyline mine cleanup is included here because the Navajo Nation considers it to be temporary, given its current position regarding removing all mine waste from the reservation. EPA considers the cleanup complete.

Appendix V: Additional Information about the Remaining Scope of Work, Time Frames, and Costs to Address Uranium Contamination on or Near the Navajo Reservation

The following is a discussion of what is known about the remaining scope of work, time frames, and costs to assess and clean up contaminated structures and to assess and treat health conditions and conduct health research.

Assess and Clean Up Contaminated Houses and Other Structures

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency (NNEPA) have not identified a full scope of work because there is no comprehensive source of information regarding the number of houses that may be contaminated; the agencies do not have an end date for this work nor an overall cost estimate.

Scope of work: EPA Region 9 officials told us they believe living in contaminated homes continues to be the greatest uranium-related health risk to people on the Navajo reservation today. To continue mitigating this risk, EPA and NNEPA officials told us they plan to continue the work they conducted under the 2008 5-year plan, but they do not know how many homes they will ultimately need to assess and replace since there is no comprehensive source for this information. According to NNEPA officials, the agency has a backlog of more than 100 homes where residents have requested testing. A NNEPA official familiar with the work told us the agency expects to address this backlog in the 2014 5-year plan period. The official also told us that the number of requests continues to increase significantly as more people become aware of the agencies’ efforts to assess houses and structures, in part, through outreach conducted by NNEPA. NNEPA is also responsible for communicating the results of completed assessments to residents when those results indicated homes were safe. A NNEPA official told us that, as of February 2014, the agency had communicated the results of fewer than half of the completed assessments, in some cases, because the agency was waiting for EPA to provide the results, and that the agency will continue to address this backlog moving forward. Overall, EPA officials said that they expect the total number of homes needing replacement will decrease in the 2014 5-year plan period since they believe the homes most likely to be contaminated have been addressed through earlier efforts.

Time frame: According to EPA officials involved, there is no end date for this work. They expect that the work assessing and potentially cleaning up contaminated houses to continue into the future as long as NNEPA continues to receive requests.

Cost: Given the unknown number of homes needing assessment and cleanup, EPA has not developed an overall cost estimate. However, EPA officials told us they typically spend $6,000 on a detailed assessment and from $80,000 to $300,000 to demolish a home and either provide financial compensation or a replacement home.

Assess and Treat Health Conditions and Conduct Health Research

Federal agencies do not have concrete plans or available funds to begin additional health studies on the Navajo reservation, but the Indian Health Service (IHS) will continue its work and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) and its partners will continue the Navajo Birth Cohort Study, spending up to $10 million from 2013 to 2018.

Scope of work: IHS and ATSDR officials told us they intend to include short-term health treatment and assessment efforts in the 2014 5-year plan, and they are developing overall goals for health research related to exposure to uranium on the Navajo reservation as well. In the short-term, beyond health care delivery to patients, IHS plans to continue its efforts under the uranium health-screening program that it established under the 2008 5-year plan. With 3.5 staff members, however, this is a small-scale effort. In addition, the Navajo Birth Cohort Study is expected to continue. Regarding other long-term research studies, ATSDR officials told us they do not have specific plans or funding to initiate additional uranium-related health research studies at this time. Members of the Navajo Nation, researchers, and other stakeholders have repeatedly called for a long- term epidemiological study of the effects of nonoccupational exposures to uranium in the communities that have lived closest to former mines and processing sites in order to gain a better understanding of how these communities have been and continue to be affected. IHS officials told us they have been limited in their ability to identify or plan potential studies because conducting research studies is not a part of IHS’s mission, and dedicated funding is not available for such efforts. ATSDR officials told us that their agency infrequently funds such studies; for example, it is currently conducting two long-term epidemiological studies across the country in addition to the Navajo study.

Time frame: IHS officials said they expect to extend the uranium health screening program into the future, at least through the 2014 5-year plan period. In 2013, ATSDR extended its agreement with the University of New Mexico and the Navajo Nation for the Navajo Birth Cohort Study by 5 years, until 2018.

Cost: ATSDR has committed to spending up to $10 million on the Navajo Birth Cohort Study from 2013 to 2018, but overall costs for potential future studies are unknown.

Appendix VI: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Energy

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of the Interior

Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services

Appendix X: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Appendix XI: Comments from the Navajo Nation

Appendix XII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Jeffery D. Malcolm (Assistant Director), Juaná Collymore, John Delicath, Tisha Derricotte, Emily Hanawalt, John Krump, Leslie Kaas Pollock, Karen Richey, Dan Royer, Kelly Rubin, Jeanette Soares, Kiki Theodoropoulos, and Sarah Veale made significant contributions to this report.