Elections in Kashmir
Released: 2002-12-05T00:00:00

RS21300 -- Elections in Kashmir

Updated December 5, 2002

The Events of September and October 2002

Domestically, Indian efforts to defeat an armed insurrection in the predominantly Muslim Kashmir valley and to obtain greater political participation in the statehave been hindered by the position taken by both hardline Muslim and Hindu groups. Hardline Kashmiri Muslimmilitant groups refused to participate in theelections and threatened to violently disrupt them. This threat was made good during the elections, especially inthe third stage where the state witnessedseveral attacks by militant groups. More moderate groups, most notably the 23-party All Parties HurriyatConference (APHC), refused to participate in the pollsbecause they questioned the fairness of the process and the refusal of the Indian government, in their eyes, to makemore significant concessions on the futurestatus of the state. The Hurriyat had considered participating in the elections but only if its elected officials did nothave to take an oath of allegiance to theIndian constitution. What the Hurriyat seeks is a series of substantive, tripartite talks with the Indian and Pakistanigovernments to determine a final status forKashmir.

Part of the problem remains the divided nature of the Hurriyat. The Hurriyat leadership also remain under threat from the violent militant groups, and most ofthem, while espousing independence from India, have bodyguards provided by the Indian government. As oneKashmiri separatist leader, Shabir Shah, put it,the 23-party amalgam had failed to provide a "unified" command for holding talks with the Kashmir Committee(a nongovernmental organization seeking asolution to the Kashmir problem). (3) Thus, anenvironment of fear, coupled with the lack of a coherent agenda, placed some domestic constraints on theelectoral process.

The U.S. position was outlined by Secretary of State Powell during his July 2002 visit to South Asia, where the Secretary stated,

We are looking to both India and Pakistan to take steps that begin to bring peace to the region and to ensure a betterfuture for the Kashmiri people. The problems with Kashmir cannot be resolved through violence, but only througha healthy political process and a vibrantdialogue. ... Elections alone, however, cannot resolve the problems between India and Pakistan, nor can they erasethe scars of so many years of strife. Elections can however, be a first step in a broader process that begins to address Kashmiri grievances and leads Indiaand Pakistan back to dialogue. (4)

(5)

(6)

The United States has sought to reconcile Indian and Pakistani concerns to its own security interests in the region. Numerous reported links between Afghanijihadi groups, domestic terrorist groups in Pakistan, and the militant groups in Kashmir provide a policy rationalefor combating them as part of a generalanti-terror campaign. At the same time, bringing about a peaceful settlement of outstanding issues between Indiaand Pakistan appears important to long-termU.S. interests in the region.

Election Results and Political Consequences

For security purposes, the polls were held in four stages, but still were marred by militant violence. Press reports estimate at least 700 killings in the state --including those of 84 political workers and two candidates -- between New Delhi's announcement of elections onAugust 2nd and the polling's October 8thconclusion. (7) In some districts, most notably thosein the Kashmir valley, the turnout was quite low -- in the single digits, even -- while in others it was closeto 60%. The average turnout overall was just below 44%. (8)

The ruling National Conference party was ousted from power in the 2002 elections, though it did win a plurality of seats in the state assembly (28 of a total 87). The Indian National Congress won 20 seats, and party leader Sonia Gandhi agreed to a first-ever power-sharingarrangement with the regional People'sDemocratic Party (PDP), itself the winner of 16 seats, all of them from the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley. Thealliance of several smaller parties provides aworking majority. PDP leader and veteran politician Mufti Mohammed Sayeed will serve as Chief Minister forthree years, after which time he is to be replacedby a Congress Party member as per the coalition agreement. Most top ministerial positions have gone to Congressmembers.

The Congress-PDP coalition has agreed to a "common minimum program" (CMP) for the governance of Jammu and Kashmir. Several of the CMP policies arehighly controversial in their "softened" approach to militancy in the state. These include launching investigationsinto the deaths of prisoners and the fate ofthousands who have disappeared following their arrest; the disbanding of the feared Special Operations Group, acounterinsurgency police unit; the release ofpolitical prisoners; the opening of a dialogue with militant groups; and the scrapping of the national Prevention ofTerrorism Act that has been criticized asabusive of human rights.

The CMP proposals, while fulfilling an election promise to address Kashmiri grievances against separatist militants and Indian security forces alike, have comeunder fire from Hindu nationalists and top officials in New Delhi, many of whom believe that they will onlyencourage militancy and are contrary to India'sinterests. (9) Moreover, the national status of theCongress Party requires that it avoid appearing "soft on militancy" and so may add to the obstacles facingSayeed's government. (10) From the oppositequarter, the commander of a leading militant group, the Hizbul Mujahideen, called the proposals "cosmetic" andfarshort of what Kashmiris seek. (11) Pakistan-basedmilitants threatened Sayeed and the PDP with "forceful action" if they entered into a coalition with whatopponents describe as an "Indian puppet government." (12) Many ordinary Kashmiris, meanwhile, are reported to be pleased with many aspects of the newgovernment's approach. (13)

The decision to release several well-known political prisoners has spurred heightened debate and accusations. During November 2002, the Jammu and Kashmirgovernment freed at least 11 top-ranking activists of both pro-Pakistan and pro-independence militant groups afterthey were granted bail by courts. (14) The NewDelhi leadership, including Prime Minister Vajpayee and Deputy PM Advani, expressed dismay at the moves andurged caution. Sayeed responded byquestioning the political motives of the BJP, but in his first official meetings with top national officials in earlyDecember 2002, Sayeed stated that, "There iscomplete understanding between New Delhi and the state government over vital issues relating to Kashmir andnegotiations with various Kashmiri groups." (15)

The PDP is not politically strong in the Hindu-majority Jammu or heavily Buddhist Ladakh regions of the state. For this reason, analysts believe Sayeed mustgive attention to placating all constituencies, not merely his traditional base in the Srinagar area. The continued andincreased flow of development aid fromNew Delhi to Jammu and Kashmir is central to this effort, and Sayeed has vowed to ensure that all regions of thestate are treated equally in this regard. (16)

From a political perspective, the elections strengthened somewhat the Indian government's position on Kashmir. With the people of the state reportedlyviewing the results as mostly credible, the Hurriyat apparently missed a chance to demonstrate its claims to beingthe genuine representative of the Kashmiripeople. The unexpectedly high voter turnout weakened Pakistan's position on Kashmir, to a large extent belyingIslamabad's claim that the elections were"farcical." With a representative government in place there may be a stronger push to end militancy in the state asKashmiri leaders see the value of the ballotbox over the rifle in accomplishing political change.

Congressional Interest

The United States welcomed the successful conclusion of elections in Jammu and Kashmir while condemning terrorist attacks "aimed at disrupting ademocratic process and intimidating the Kashmiri people." It urged India and Pakistan to make a "strenuous effort"to resume a dialogue on all outstandingissues, including Kashmir. (17)

Given New Delhi's insistence that such dialogue cannot begin until Islamabad halts the infiltration of militants into Jammu and Kashmir, it is the continuationof separatist violence in the state that appears to be the core obstacle to diplomatic progress between India andPakistan. On an October 2002 visit to India, atop U.S. diplomat urged the opening of dialogue despite ongoing infiltration. (18) Robert Blackwill, the U.S. envoy to New Delhi,believes that the problem inKashmir is "cross-border terrorism" that is "almost entirely externally driven." (19) He has indicated that the global fight against terrorism will remainincomplete so long as terrorism continues in Kashmir. (20)

Formal congressional hearings have discussed, among other issues, the political situation in Kashmir and the problem of cross-border infiltration. (21) No majoraction with respect to Kashmir is being taken at this juncture, although U.S. aid and military cooperation programswith India and Pakistan are ongoing. Futureissues that Congress may face include whether or not there is a role for U.S. assistance in securing the Line ofControl between Pakistani- and Indian-heldKashmir. Some observers believe that U.S. assistance with the physical installation of sensors and monitoringdevices could help curb infiltration into theIndian state. (22) The Congress also faces issuesrelated to levels of more general economic and security assistance, including arms sales to both India andPakistan, along with the possibility of greater U.S. diplomatic involvement in the specific issue of Kashmir. (23)