Tanzania: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Released: 2017-10-06T00:00:00

Introduction

The United Republic of Tanzania is an East African country of nearly 54 million people that is about twice as large as California. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates it to have been the 31 st -poorest country globally in 2016 when ranked by per capita gross domestic product (GDP), which stood at $970 in 2016. The country has substantial natural resource wealth and agricultural potential, however, and multiple socioeconomic development indicators have generally improved in recent years. Its relative political stability and government reforms have attracted substantial official development aid, although there are abiding concerns regarding corruption and a difficult business climate. Despite such challenges, some sectors of the economy, most notably the extractive industries, are attracting private investment. President John Magufuli was elected in 2015 and is serving his first five-year term in office.

U.S.-Tanzanian ties have generally been cordial and U.S. aid expanded significantly under the last two U.S. Administrations. Since the 2015 elections, however, U.S. concerns about Tanzania's governance have raised some tensions. Such concerns have centered on the nullification of the 2015 election results (and the subsequent rerun in 2016) in the semiautonomous coastal region of Zanzibar, restrictions on civil liberties, and similar issues. Citing such concerns, in March 2016, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Board announced it would suspend its partnership with Tanzania, deferring a vote on the country's continued eligibility for a potential second large development compact; this effectively ended, for the time being, the development of a second MCC compact with Tanzania, following its completion of an initial compact between 2008 and 2013. The MCC had previously authorized and helped fund initial research and concept design activities focused on the development of a second compact, which had been expected to center on the electrical power sector—and in mid-2015 had informed Congress of its intent to negotiate such a compact Tanzania.

These developments ran counter to a prior narrative of improving governance and economic development in Tanzania and closer U.S. ties, underscored by former President Obama's July 2013 visit to the country, during which he highlighted such progress, as well as growing U.S. trade and investment ties. Despite the later tensions, the Obama Administration described bilateral ties as being characterized by a "strong" partnership focused on a "shared vision of improving the quality of life for all Tanzanians" in its FY2017 State Department/U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) foreign aid budget submission to Congress. How bilateral ties may proceed under the Trump Administration and during the 115 th Congress has yet to be determined, but they appear likely to remain on a positive track. An April 26, 2017, press release issued under the name of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson characterized the U.S.-Tanzanian relationship as "strong," and "marked by a collaborative effort toward shared goals and close cooperation on a variety of programs and initiatives, from health and education, promoting economic growth and democratic governance, and advancing regional security," and projected similar trends in the future. Tanzania may also benefit from the fact that Mark Green, the new USAID Administrator, is a former U.S. ambassador to the country (2007 to 2009).

In recent years, Tanzania has been the second- or third-largest annual recipient of such aid in sub-Saharan Africa, with funding reaching a high of $634.1 million in FY2015 and a low of $546.6 million in FY2017 (provisional current estimate; see Table 1 ). The Trump Administration has requested $535 million for Tanzania in FY2018, the second-highest level requested for a country in the region and a minimal 2% drop relative to the current FY2017 estimate for Tanzania. This decrease would be modest compared to the roughly one-third decrease in overall global aid levels proposed by the Trump Administration.

The bulk of U.S. development aid for Tanzania in recent years has been provided under Obama Administration presidential development initiatives, including Feed the Future (FTF), the Global Health Initiative, the Global Climate Change Initiative, Power Africa, and Trade Africa. In 2014 Tanzania was selected as one of six initial partner countries under the Obama Administration's African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP). It was also chosen to be a Partnership for Growth (PFG) country, one of four worldwide. (See assistance section, below, for more on these efforts.) While most U.S. aid has focused on health and economic growth, bilateral security cooperation has also increased. Tanzania is a top African contributor of personnel to international peacekeeping operations.

While there is generally little Tanzania-focused congressional activity or legislation, some Members of Congress occasionally travel to the country and periodically host visits from Tanzanian leaders, such as that of former President Jakaya Kikwete during the August 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. Some Members have sponsored legislation advocating protections for albinos, who are the target of attacks, as discussed below.

Background

Tanzania, formed in 1964, is a union of Tanganyika, the mainland territory, which gained independence from Britain in 1961, and the Zanzibar archipelago. Zanzibar, which gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1963, remains semiautonomous, with its own government. Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's president from 1964 until 1985, remained influential until his death in 1999. Under Nyerere, Tanzania was governed as a socialist state, but maintained cordial, albeit sometimes tepid relations with the West. Nyerere advanced a set of national social policies known collectively as ujamaa ("socialism" in Swahili, the lingua franca), which centered on rural, village-based collectivism and self-reliance and the nationalization of key industries.

U jamaa had a decidedly mixed record. At a national level, central state control of economic policy failed to spur transformative growth and industrialization and inhibited market-based economic transaction efficiencies and private sector growth, while at the village level, collectivization faced increasing resistance. Such factors, together with a range of global ones (e.g., the oil crisis of the 1970s and poor commodity prices for Tanzania's core agricultural exports) led the country to seek credit and technical cooperation with international financial institutions in the mid-1980s. This led to the gradual liberalization of the economy and later of the state. In contrast to the economic effects of ujamaa , Nyerere's leadership and policies are widely seen as having united an ethnically and religiously diverse population under a strong shared national identity. His leadership, by many accounts, spared the mainland from the ethnic tensions that have inhibited national unity or destabilized some other African countries. Zanzibar, however, has experienced some internal ethnic and religious frictions.

Since the mid-1990s, successive governments have taken steps to further liberalize the economy, but Tanzania's business environment remains challenging, due, in part, to the enduring effects of state-centric policies and bureaucratization during the socialist period. A 2016 State Department assessment observed that "in certain sectors the legacy of socialist attitudes has not fully dissipated, sometimes resulting in suspicion of foreign investors and slow decision making." Despite a stated commitment to reform, corruption and poor service delivery have hampered Tanzania's efforts to curb widespread poverty and reduce reliance on subsistence agriculture. As is common in the region, Tanzania's aging infrastructure has suffered from chronic underinvestment. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration viewed the Tanzanian government as committed to development and governance reform, and provided substantial aid to spur progress in these areas, and to invest in infrastructure.

Politics and Governance

Tanzania's ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, Swahili for Party of the Revolution), was created by Nyerere in 1977 through the merger of the ruling parties of the mainland and Zanzibar. It has dominated Tanzanian politics since its inception, a key point of criticism by opposition parties. In the first multiparty elections in 1995, the CCM won a landslide victory in voting marred by irregularities. The party has continued to enjoy considerable electoral success on the mainland, in part due to the powers of incumbency, but opposition parties have won a growing share of legislative seats in successive elections. Still, opposition parties reportedly face periodic harassment and de facto restrictions on their activities. Increased political pluralism may distribute political power more widely, but it may also hold the potential to spur increasing ethnic, regional, and/or religious divisions, which the CCM long sought to avert.

Recent years have seen a rise in the harassment of opposition political figures and restrictions on their activities. In September 2017, Tundu Lissu, a member of parliament and parliamentary chief whip of the opposition Chadema party ( Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo , the Party for Democracy and Progress), was shot by unknown assailants and seriously wounded. Lissu, who is also the president of the Tanganyika Law Society, is a fierce critic of President Magufuli and his government, but also a long-standing critic of corruption who may face hostility from many quarters. Lissu has often been arrested for his long-standing criticism of the government. The shooting was preceded by a firebombing of a local blue chip law firm, IMMMA Advocates, a local affiliate of the U.S. firm DLA Piper, which Lissu alleged police were involved in.

Other opposition parliamentarians also face frequent duress from police. In late September 2017, police arrested a Chadema MP after a party event, and another complained that police were prohibiting his meetings with constituents, as had another in August. Such events have been preceded by many similar ones in recent years, notably during electoral periods. Similarly, newspapers have faced suspension or other sanction for coverage seen as critical of the government. Most recently, in September 2017, the publication of two newspapers was banned, in one case for 90 days and in another for two years, three months after another publication was also shuttered for two years.

The strength of electoral challenges to the CCM has grown during the past two national elections, in 2010 and in 2015 (see below), notably from Chadema, which was formed prior to the 2000 elections. In 2014, opposition parties boycotted the process of drafting of a new constitution, claiming the CCM had refused to include opposition proposals to limit the power of the executive and establish a federal government system. The CCM-majority legislature then adopted a draft charter and the government scheduled a nationwide referendum for April 2015, but later postponed it indefinitely. Opposition parties had called for a referendum boycott and had legally challenged the reform process. Rivalry between the CCM and UKAWA (an opposition alliance made up of Chadema, the Civic United Front [CUF], and two smaller parties) remains a key focus of politics.

The 2015 Elections

Tanzania held national and Zanzibari elections on October 25, 2015. Key electoral issues included access to land, poverty and unemployment, state service provision, corruption, and political dominance of the state by the CCM, as well as energy sector development. Then-President Kikwete was constitutionally barred from running for a third term, but his CCM party was widely favored to win the polls, given its power of incumbency. The opposition, however, mounted a strong challenge, resulting in the closest presidential election in Tanzania's history. The CCM chose as its candidate, Dr. John Magufuli, a long-time government minister (see profile below), while the main UKAWA opposition coalition candidate was Edward Lowassa, of the Chadema party. Lowassa's candidacy was unusual, as he was a major CCM figure and former prime minister (2005-2008)—albeit a controversial one—who defected shortly before the election to become the main opposition candidate after not being selected in a contentious CCM nomination process, a major development in Tanzanian politics. Lowassa drew large crowds of supporters, and his challenge to the CCM was seen as energizing the 23 million-person electorate, especially among the large youth population, and as a credible threat to the CCM. The apparently close election contest raised tensions, and there was some limited campaign-period violence, notably between militant members of party youth wings and in Zanzibar, where opposition supporters were reportedly subject to intimidation. Opposition parties also complained of a few instances of police interference or limitations on assembly.

In the presidential race, Magufuli won a 58.5% vote share, while Lowassa won 40%. The CCM also won 74% of elected legislative seats for which results were announced, while Chadema won just under 13%, the CUF 12%, and two minor parties less than 1% each. Due to additional indirect elections and seat apportionment, the CCM holds 69% of parliamentary seats, Chadema just under 19%, the CUF just over 11%, and the two minor parties each old one seat.

Zanzibar Election Controversy and Implications for Mainland Election

An October 27, 2015, European Union (EU) Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) characterized the national election as "largely well administered" but asserted that "insufficient efforts at transparency meant that both the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) did not enjoy the full confidence of all parties." In Zanzibar, this finding was strongly substantiated the next day, when the ZEC chairman announced a unilateral decision to nullify the Zanzibari elections while vote-counting was underway. His action came after soldiers reportedly "stormed the collation centre" and evicted journalists and observers, and two days after CUF candidate Seif Sharif Hamad had announced that he had won the Zanzibar presidency with 52% of votes. The ZEC chair later announced that new elections would be held.

The ZEC chief's decision raised questions over the credibility of the Zanzibari vote and spurred electoral violence in Zanzibar. A string of small bombings using homemade devices occurred days after the annulment, along with some youth protests. The ZEC's actions also cast a shadow over the Union elections, as the latter took place in concert with the Zanzibar polls and at the same polling stations. Tanzania's NEC, however, did not take account of the Zanzibari poll nullification in its vote tallies, and coun ted Zanzibari votes in determining the outcome of the presidential election. The NEC decision also came despite opposition calls for a recount of the Union presidential vote, based on alleged voting irregularities and vote-tallying fraud. While the NEC's Union decision did not draw international concern, the ZEC's nullification did, along with criticism and calls for its reversal.

There were several late 2015 ad hoc dialogue and mediation efforts involving the CUF and parties interested in finding a resolution, including figures in the CCM and foreign missions. Details about the focus and outcomes of these efforts were not made public, however, and they resulted in no changes to the outcome. Instead, despite CUF opposition, on March 21, 2016, the ZEC held a rerun of the Zanzibar vote, which the CUF boycotted. The ZEC subsequently announced that the CCM candidate, Ali Mohamed Shein, had won the election—with 91% of votes—and that his party had also won a majority in the House of Representatives and local councils. In a joint declaration on the election, the United States, 14 European governments, and the European Union stated that

We regret the Zanzibar Electoral Commission's decision to hold a rerun of the 25 October 2015 election, without a mutually acceptable and negotiated solution to the current political impasse. In order to be credible, electoral processes must be inclusive and truly representative of the will of the people. We reiterate our call on the Government of Tanzania to exercise leadership in Zanzibar, and to pursue a negotiated solution ... with a view to maintaining peace and unity in ... Tanzania. We commend once again the population of Zanzibar for having exercised calm and restraint throughout this process, and call on all parties and their supporters to re-start the national reconciliation process to find an inclusive, sustainable and peaceful resolution.

As discussed elsewhere in this report, due to the outcome of the Zanzibar vote and due to concerns over freedom of expression, in March 2016, the U.S. MCC Board voted to suspend the MCC's partnership with Tanzania. Since the vote there have been periodic acts of aggression against putative opposition supporters by so-called "Zombies," informal pro-CCM youth militia, and in the latter half of 2016, several opposition politicians were reportedly arrested. The CUF advocates the creation of a caretaker interim government of national unity and that it conduct new, fully legitimate elections.

Magufuli Administration

President Magufuli is a former MP who previously held several government ministerial posts, notably including two stints as public works minister. He came to office with a generally positive reputation for public service, based especially on his infrastructure project leadership. He also had a reputation as a loyal, mainstream party member not allied to any particular factions, rather than as a charismatic leader. Magufuli's running mate, Samia Hassan Suluhu, a former minister of state in the vice president's office, became Tanzania's first female vice president.

Upon taking office, Magufuli took a tough, proactive line against corruption and state agency inefficiency, promoted civic service, and advocated austerity and cost-saving measures. These actions initially drew a degree of public support—and humorous social media commentary centering on Magufuli's reputed penchant for thrift, frugality, and micromanagement—as well as provisional support from Western donors. His presidency has also been characterized by a more controversial form of populist, often top-down leadership by the president in diverse issue areas. While his emphasis on austerity has reportedly caused some apprehension within the political establishment and others who have traditionally influenced or benefitted from state funding, he reportedly has remained popular. His unilateral decisionmaking—often sans consultation with other relevant policymakers, absent the involvement of cabinet ministries and, in some cases, accompanied by procedural or legal irregularities—has, however, prompted observers to raise concerns about an autocratic, and even semiauthoritarian governance pattern under his presidency. Such concerns have deepened amid efforts by Magufuli's administration to prosecute critics, censor critical media outlets, and otherwise curtail freedom of expression.

Corruption Challenges

Corruption—a key Magufuli target—is a long-persistent problem in Tanzania. A 2012 public audit revealed widespread corruption in several ministries and state entities, and six cabinet ministers resigned in connection with the controversy that year. Other scandals have arisen since, including, notably, the illicit diversion by senior government officials of $122 million in central bank funds, ostensibly to pay for energy contracts, to overseas accounts—a finding which led international donors to suspend $490 million in budget support in October 2014 pending an investigation, and culminated in the resignation of three government ministers. Tanzania's ranking in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) has slipped in recent years (from 100 th in 2011 to 116 th in 2016, slightly up from its 119 th place ranking in 2014).

Security Challenges and Human Rights Trends

While Tanzania is generally stable and peaceful, there are periodic, usually generally limited threats to state and public security. There have been sporadic attacks on tourists in Zanzibar attributed to Islamist radicals, and there have been several unattributed armed attacks on police stations in which weapons have been looted, as in 2015, or on police personnel (with seven killed in April 2017 in the Pwani region). There have also been occasional bombings of Christian churches, among other targets, that analysts have speculatively attributed to Islamist radicals. Tanzania has occasionally arrested Islamic extremists, including 10 alleged members of the Somali Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group Al Shabaab, in April 2015. In May 2015, Tanzanian authorities also arrested Jamil Mukulu, the leader of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a rebel group of Ugandan origin that is made up of Islamist extremists whom Uganda claims have ties with Al Shabaab. In July 2015, Tanzania extradited Mukulu—who is also wanted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the ADF is currently based—to Uganda.

Tanzania has a mixed human rights record. Freedom House rates Tanzania as "partly free" due to various legal restrictions on the press and nongovernmental organization operations, media bias favoring the CCM, and crackdowns on opposition protests. According to Tanzania's independent, nonprofit Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) and other sources, key issues include a lack of capacity and institutional weakness in providing access to justice, as well as the conduct of security and law enforcement agencies. The U.S. State Department, in its 2016 Country Report on Human Rights on Tanzania, states:

The most widespread human rights problems in the country were use of excessive force by security forces, resulting in death and injury; restrictions on assembly and political expression; and gender-based violence, including rape, domestic violence, and female genital mutilation/cutting. Other major human rights problems included harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, lengthy pretrial detention, limits to freedom of expression on the internet, restrictions on religious freedom, restrictions on the movement of refugees, official corruption at many levels nationwide, child abuse, discrimination based on sexual orientation, mob killings and injuries, and societal violence against persons with albinism. Trafficking in persons, both internal and international, and child labor were also problems.

The State Department also reports that while the government took some steps to "investigate and prosecute officials who committed abuses ... generally impunity in the police and security forces was widespread"; and that while "security forces reported to civilian authorities ... there were instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of civilian control."

According to various reports, a particular human rights challenge faced by Tanzania is witchcraft-related killings and mutilation. Albinos are a notable target of such acts by attackers who reportedly harvest their body parts for use or sale in traditional witchcraft rites. There have been multiple reports of such albino murders and attacks in recent years. The problem has attracted the attention of some Members of Congress supportive of efforts to end such acts. In March 2017, four Tanzanian albino children who have lost limbs in attacks and had been living in so-called "safe houses" in Tanzania arrived in the United States to receive medical treatment and a "respite from a homeland where they are persecuted and feared."

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons also face discrimination. Homosexuality is illegal in Tanzania, and homosexuals and transgender persons have been the focus of threatening comments by government officials, as well as police harassment. In 2016 the Tanzanian government halted "U.S.-funded programs that provide testing, condoms and medical care to gays," according to the Washington Post , and in 2017 reportedly prohibited 40 private clinics from providing services HIV/AIDS "to 'key populations'—a category that includes gay men, transgender people and sex workers," according to National Public Radio.

The Economy

Tanzania's GDP stood at about $47.2 billion in 2016, and has grown at an estimated 6.6% annually, on average, over the past decade. This growth has been based largely on earnings from agricultural exports, such as coffee, tea, and cotton; tourism, which has steadily increased and is a key source of hard currency; and exports of gold, the price of which rose over the past decade and spiked in 2011, but has since declined. Gradual diversification into manufacturing is occurring, and development of uranium and gemstone mining is underway. Industry contributes about 26% of GDP. Tanzania also has coal, iron, and nickel resources, as well as a newly discovered massive reserve of helium, which remains critical to numerous technologies despite depleted worldwide supplies. The communications, transport, financial services, construction, and retail sectors are also growing rapidly. Services contribute about 43% of GDP. Agriculture, however, remains a mainstay of the economy, contributing about 31% of GDP. Roughly 68% and by some estimates up to 77% of the workforce engaged in agriculture in 2014, but agricultural growth has been relatively slow, at 3.1% between 2010 and 2015.

The benefits of growth often have not reached the large rural population or been evenly distributed. Tanzania's per capita GDP, estimated at $970 in 2016, ranks low globally but higher than roughly half of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Nearly 47% of Tanzanians live on $1.90 or less per day. Key barriers to economic development include poor infrastructure, low productivity growth, a high population growth rate, and a cumbersome and uncertain regulatory environment that generally deters foreign investment. Tanzania ranked 132 nd out of 190 countries surveyed in the World Bank's 2017 Doing Business index, notwithstanding marked recent improvements in ensuring access to credit. Tanzania's overwhelmingly youthful population, 71% of which is under the age of 30, poses a major challenge, as growing demand for health and education services could stir unrest.

Energy and Mining Sectors

Since 2010, the discovery of large reserves of natural gas off the southern coast, in a region near far larger reserves in Mozambican territory, has increased foreign investment and raised the prospect of export revenue. The government estimates that the country has 57 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, and it may also have additional onshore resources. Key firms that have been active in exploring and/or developing Tanzania's reserves have included U.S.-based ExxonMobil and several European firms, including Statoil (Norway), Eni (Italy), and BG Group (United Kingdom), as well as several smaller ones .

Many Tanzanians have welcomed the discoveries, especially as the resources at issue, notably gas, are slated to be used in part for domestic electricity generation, potentially vastly increasing Tanzania's limited supply of power. There have been sometimes violent protests against a natural gas pipeline in the southern port city of Mtwara, however, due to local fears that gas revenues from the Mnazi Bay gas field along the shore zones south of the city may not benefit the gas-rich region. The sector has been the subject of substantial periodic political controversy. In 2015, for instance, the CCM-dominated parliament overwhelmingly passed an oil and gas development and regulation bill after the speaker of the parliament suspended 40 opposition MPs for shouting during an earlier debate on the matter. The bill was controversial because it has important implications for future revenue earnings, state-corporate relations, and the role of the sector in helping to spur development, and transparency advocates asserted that its passage was rushed without adequate public scrutiny.

Despite such controversies, many Tanzanians are generally likely to benefit from gas development and gas-fueled electricity generation. Transmission of gas has begun along a 330-mile natural gas pipeline run by Tanzania's state-run Petroleum Development Corp (TPDC). The line links gas reserves in Mnazi Bay area, along the southern coast, to gas-fired power plants near the commercial capital, Dar es Salaam. The government hopes to greatly expand gas-fired electricity generation capacity. Tanzania is also expanding its use of significant national coal reserves to fuel power production, and plans to construct a geothermal power plant within the next decade. A planned cross-border oil pipeline, which will carry crude oil from Western Uganda to a port in northern Tanzania, is scheduled to be completed by 2020. The expansion of gas-fueled, coal-fired, and geothermal power generation is in part intended to diversify the country's hydroelectricity-dependent energy mix, which is periodically hamstrung by recurrent droughts. In late 2015, for instance, drought conditions caused all of Tanzania's hydroelectric plants, which provide a reported 35% of power supplies, to temporarily suspend production.

The manner in which a key 2015 oil and gas bill was enacted may raise questions among some analysts regarding whether Tanzania has adequately developed its energy governance capacity, as may its mixed record of implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), an international effort to foster transparent and accountable governance in resource-rich countries. Under EITI, countries voluntarily agree to abide by EITI reporting guidelines, most notably including the public release of government revenues from extractive industry firm payments. Tanzania was suspended by the EITI Board in September 2015 for failing to issue a mandatory EITI transparency report; that suspension was lifted in late 2015. Tanzania has since complied with EITI reporting requirements, and began a new process of "validation" (i.e., proof of compliance with EITI standards) under the 2016 EITI Standard , an updated set of benchmarks that compliant countries must meet.

As noted earlier (see text box entitled "Magufuli: Priorities in Action"), increased national beneficiation from the mining sector is another key priority of the Magufuli administration. In July, the government extended the normal parliamentary session and successfully pushed through legislative changes fundamentally reshaping the mining sector. The changes allow the government to annul current contracts with firms if they are found to be detrimental to the national interest, abolish the use of international arbitration in dispute resolution, give the government a 16% ownership share in mining projects (with an acquisition option of up to 50% of a project's value), require local processing of minerals prior to export and the deposit of mining sector earnings in local banks, and marginally increase the royalty rate on multiple mined commodities. The changes come on the heels of several disputes between the government and foreign mining firms. Observers see the changes as likely to negatively affect levels of foreign investment in Tanzania's mining sector.

Foreign Affairs

Lake Malawi

Malawi and Tanzania have engaged in a long-standing dispute over competing sovereign claims to Lake Malawi (also known as Lake Nyasa); the dispute has periodically flared since the mid-1960s but never been resolved. The dispute reemerged in 2012, amid reports that the lake may contain deep-water fossil fuel reserves. Malawi has claimed the entire lake while Tanzania claims half, based on different interpretations of maps and the colonial administrative history of the lake. Regional efforts to mediate the dispute, which had stalled in recent years, have been facilitated by Mozambique's former president, Joaquim Chissano.

The dispute recommenced in early 2016, when Malawi lodged a diplomatic protest with Tanzania's government after the latter published an official map showing the international border equally splitting the lake zone between the two countries. In May 2017, despite earlier statements that mediation would resume, Malawian President Peter Mutharika announced that Malawi would take the dispute to the International Court of Justice in the Hague, though the Court's jurisdiction would require the consent of both parties. Meanwhile, Malawi's government has allowed exploration for oil and gas in the lake to continue, drawing criticism from environmentalists and UNESCO. Some analysts contend that economic plans for the lake, including oil development and shipping projects, may remain stymied by uncertainty linked to the ongoing border dispute.

Refugee Flows

Tanzania has for decades hosted refugees from various conflicts and political crises in the conflict-afflicted and densely inhabited countries in the Great Lakes region of central Africa—some for extended periods—and has played a mediational role in attempts to resolve such crises. In 2014, Tanzania also naturalized a large number of long-term Burundian refugees. In September 2016, Tanzania participated in the Leaders' Summit on Refugees, an event hosted by then-President Obama and intended to increase shared global efforts to aid refugees worldwide. At the summit, Tanzania agreed to "continue to receive persons running from wars, conflicts, political instability and persecution," as per its commitments under various international accords, among other related pledges. Observers have nonetheless periodically questioned Tanzania's commitment to these principles, noting that Tanzanian domestic sensitives over land access and the country's regional diplomatic ties have sometimes led the government to curtail protections for refugees and asylum seekers, and/or pressure them to return to their countries of origin.

Since 2015, Tanzania has faced a new influx of refugees from Burundi in connection with a political and security crisis rooted in that country's disputed 2015 elections. The number of refugees from both Burundi has grown steadily since the start of the Burundi crisis in April 2015, and stood at 358,600 in early September 2017. Almost all of the recently arrived Burundian refugee population resides in the Kigoma Region, adjacent to Burundi, in three large camps supported by Tanzanian and international public and nongovernmental humanitarian and social services agencies. Tanzania also hosts a smaller number of refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The United States and other donors provide funding to support these camps (see U.S. aid section below).

Despite its 2016 pledges at the Leaders' Summit on Refugees, in early 2017, the Tanzanian government stopped providing prima facie refugee recognition of Burundian refugees, according to UNHCR. In July 2017, during a visit to Tanzania—on his first foreign trip outside Burundi since a May 2015 putsch and his later controversial July 2015 reelection—Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza urged all Burundians in Tanzania to repatriate. President Magufuli mirrored his statement, calling on the refugees to "voluntarily return home," and later in the month suspended further registrations and naturalizations of Burundian refugees. In late August, Magufuli again called for the UNHCR to voluntarily repatriate thousands of Burundian refugees, and a Burundian-Tanzanian-UNHCR coordinating group met to discuss the purportedly voluntary repatriation of nearly 12,000 Burundians. These moves have sparked criticism from human rights advocacy groups, which assert that Burundi's crisis is far from settled; Amnesty International, for instance, called for a halt to what it called "mounting pressure" on Burundian refugees "to return to their country where they would be at risk of death, rape and torture."

Tanzania's Contribution to Mediation in Burundi

Tanzania facilitated the landmark peace settlement that helped end Burundi's decade-long civil war in the 1990s, and it is involved in halting regional mediation efforts aimed at resolving the current Burundian crisis. In March 2016, the East African Community (EAC) appointed former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa to facilitate an "inter-Burundian dialogue," though President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda technically remains the chief EAC mediator. After consultations, Mkapa set out a plan of action at an EAC summit in September 2016 and later presented Museveni with a more detailed roadmap. It provided for a series of engagements beginning in late 2016 and culminating in a "final agreement" in mid-2017, an outcome that was not achieved. Mkapa has so far been unable to convene fully representative government-opposition talks. This has been due to disagreements over who is entitled to participate and Burundian opposition doubts over Mkapa's credibility and neutrality, and what they see as his bias toward the Burundian government, based on Mkapa's repeated assertion that Nkurunziza's 2015 reelection—a highly contentious key factor driving the ongoing crisis—was "legitimate."

In May 2017, an EAC summit heard a progress report on Mkapa's efforts and the broader dialogue, but took no substantive actions to enhance its conflict mitigation approach. Individual EAC leaders, including President Magufuli, did, however, issue statements opposing U.S. and EU targeted sanctions on Burundi, angering the Burundian opposition. An EAC summit communiqué also tied the EU's sanctions on Burundi, among other issues of concern, to an ongoing EU-EAC negotiation over a proposed EU-EAC regional Economic Partnership Agreement. The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) has continued to endorse Mkapa's efforts and the overall "inter-Burundian dialogue"—which, in an August 2017 statement, the UNSC called "the only viable process for a sustainable political settlement." The council also, however, stated that it "remains deeply concerned over the lack of progress in this dialogue" and a range of related human rights, political, and other developments inside Burundi. It also reiterated its "intention to pursue targeted measures against all actors, inside and outside Burundi, who threaten the peace and security of Burundi." The council has previously outlined similar concerns.

China

China is among Tanzania's top international partners. The two countries have a long history of warm political relations and close trade and economic development cooperation, dating back to the early postcolonial period and, notably, China's construction in the 1970s of the Tanzania–Zambia Railway (TAZARA). China is Tanzania's largest trading partner, and several large Chinese firms are active there. China is also a key security partner for Tanzania; the two militaries share long ties and retain a close relationship. After Chinese President Xi Jinping took office in 2013, Tanzania was the first country he visited.

The natural gas pipeline project noted above was financed by a $1.23 billion Chinese loan. Construction is also underway on a $10 billion megaproject at Bagamoyo, former President Kikwete's home town, which includes a multipurpose deep water port, special economic zone, and linked railway. The multiyear project is financed by China Merchants Holdings-International (CMHI), China's largest port operator, and Oman's State General Reserve Fund. CMHI is the designated construction manager and, according to some reports, may have multidecade concession rights to the facility. The Bagamoyo development—with a planned annual 20 million container throughput capacity—is projected to dwarf ports in Dar es Salaam and Mombasa, Kenya, and provide access to multiple countries in East and Southern Africa. In mid-2016, Tanzania's government also reported that China's Export-Import Bank had agreed to provide Tanzania with a $7.6 billion loan to fund construction of a railroad to boost linkages between Tanzania to its EAC neighbors. Other major deals in recent years include a $500 million housing project between Tanzania's SOE National Housing Corporation and China Railway Jianchang Engineering signed in 2013; several power project deals signed in 2013 worth more than $828 million; an integrated coal mine and power plant project; and an integrated iron ore mine and steel mill project worth a total investment of up to $3 billion.

Tanzanian-Chinese bilateral trade reached a reported $4.67 billion in 2015, but fell to $4 billion in 2016. The balance of this trade varies considerably year to year, but in recent years has grown exponentially in favor of China (e.g., Chinese exports were almost 12 times larger than its imports from Tanzania in 2016). U.S.-Tanzanian trade, in comparison, is much lower, with U.S.-Tanzania trade totaling $278 million in 2015 and $309 million in 2016. Chinese-Tanzanian economic ties have periodically prompted domestic backlash among Tanzanians negatively affected by Chinese businesses, such as communities displaced during large construction projects or Tanzanian traders hurt by direct competition from Chinese retail rivals.

International Security

Tanzania actively contributes to regional and international peace and security efforts. In addition to being a troop contributor to United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations, with personnel deployed in multiple African countries and Lebanon, Tanzania hosts large numbers of refugees from the region, including from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which tries Rwandan genocide suspects, is located in the northern Tanzanian city of Arusha, as is the African Union's African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, a continental court with a mandate to protect human rights.

In September 2017, Tanzania drew negative attention after U.N. sanctions investigators reported that they were "investigating information by a Member State" that North Korea's Haegeumgang Trading Corporation was "repairing and upgrading the surface-to-air missile Pechora (S-125) systems" of the Tanzanian military, which was also reported to be "repairing and upgrading its P-12 air defence radar." Both systems originate in the Soviet bloc. Such actions may violate various provisions in U.N. Security Council sanctions on North Korea, including arms and related materiel embargoes and proliferation-related and potentially financial-transaction-related sanctions. The investigators reported that the "prohibited military-related contracts" between Tanzania and North Korea were reportedly worth €10.5 million. Tanzania had not responded to the panel's enquiries as of the date of the report's publication.

U.S. Relations and Policy

U.S.-Tanzanian ties are robust and have grown in recent years, despite tensions since 2015 related to Tanzanian governance patterns, as discussed in this report's introduction. Another irritant in bilateral relations has been a contract dispute between TANESCO, the national power utility, and Symbion Power, a U.S. firm. Along with partners, Symbion received more than $110 million in MCC procurement awards to help improve Tanzania's electrical power sector and later reportedly expanded its business beyond its initial MCC contract. Notwithstanding these tensions, as of late 2016, the State Department portrayed the bilateral relationship as "an established partnership characterized by mutual respect, shared values, and aspirations for a more peaceful and prosperous future." Such sentiments had been reflected in cordial high-level engagements over several years. Former President Kikwete was the first African head of state to meet with former President Obama after Obama took office in 2009. Later, in 2013, then-President Obama visited Tanzania, and in 2014, President Kikwete attended the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. President Obama's 2013 trip followed prior high-profile visits (e.g., by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011 and then-President George W. Bush in 2008). How U.S.-Tanzanian relations may change under the Trump Administration, if at all, has yet to be determined but, as noted in the introduction of this report, they appear set to remain on a generally positive track.

Trade Issues

Tanzania is eligible for U.S. trade preferences, including apparel benefits, under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, reauthorized under P.L. 114-27 ) and is a member of the East African Community (EAC) along with Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda. The EAC has taken several steps to promote regional integration: a customs union was formed in 2005, followed by a common market in 2010 and, in 2013, an agreement to establish a monetary union within the next decade. The bloc seeks to adopt a single currency by 2024. Many of its trade integration efforts have been supported under an Obama Administration-initiated initiative called Trade Africa.

Tanzanian-U.S.-trade is moderate by global comparison. It hit a record $482 million in 2013, but later dropped. It stood at $310 million by 2016 (made up of nearly $153 million in U.S. imports from Tanzania and $157 million in U.S. exports). The proportion of U.S. imports from Tanzania that benefit from AGOA has risen markedly in recent years, reaching 24% in 2016. Top U.S. imports from Tanzania include precious stones, apparel, coffee, and cashews. U.S. exports are more diverse; top ones include machinery, used clothes, cereals, and aircraft and parts.

In June 2017, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) initiated an out-of-cycle review of Tanzania's eligibility for AGOA trade benefits. It was launched in response to a petition by the Secondary Materials and Recycled Textiles Association (SMART), a U.S. used clothes exporting trade group whose member firms source used clothes in the United States, mostly from charity or other donations, and export them, mostly to developing countries. SMART asserts that a March 2016 EAC decision to initiate a phased-in ban on imports of used clothing and footwear, preceded by the imposition of large tariffs, has imposed a significant and "untenable" economic hardship on the U.S. used clothing industry. SMART outlined its concerns about EAC's actions at an August 2016 USTR annual AGOA eligibility hearing. A July 2017 out-of-cycle hearing spurred SMART's petition; Tanzanian and other EAC member country officials and other parties also testified. One expert at the hearing, Stephen Lande, head of Manchester Trade (a consulting firm), contended that that AGOA eligibility should not be determined based upon individual objections to "each and every trade restriction a country has," and that any decision to entirely revoke Tanzania's AGOA eligibility based on the complaint of an single industry group might cause disproportionate damage to overall trade and investment.

USTR officials are to submit their out-of-cycle review recommendations to U.S. Trade Representative Robert E. Lighthizer, who is to then make his own recommendations to President Trump. USTR officials are also conducting a regular annual review of Tanzania's AGOA eligibility. They plan to announce the results of both reviews simultaneously, so that any resulting determinations on Tanzania's eligibility would come into effect in early January 2017, alongside the routine annual eligibility announcements for other AGOA-implementing countries.

In 2012, U.S. and EAC officials agreed to pursue a trade and investment partnership dialogue potentially leading to a U.S.-EAC Investment Treaty and discuss a possible Trade Facilitation Agreement, among other ends. Toward such ends, the U.S. Department of Commerce opened a new office in Tanzania in 2014. In 2015, the United States and the EAC signed a cooperation agreement on technical cooperation to advance EAC implementation a the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade Facilitation, sanitary and phytosanitary trade capacity-building, and the reduction of technical barriers to trade. In late 2016, U.S. officials also launched a $194 million, five-year grant in support of the EAC. It centers on institutional capacity-building for the EAC's Secretariat, and increasing regional economic integration and U.S.-EAC member state trade and investment, enhancing the sustainable management of natural resources in the Lake Victoria Basin and Mara River ecosystems, and increasing access to integrated healthcare in border areas. The grant complements Trade Africa, a U.S. trade capacity-building and related assistance initiative aimed at increasing U.S.-Africa and intra-African trade and investment. It was initially focused primarily on the EAC and its member states, but has been expanded to other regions of Africa.

U.S. Bilateral Assistance

U.S. assistance to Tanzania has focused primarily on health, food security, agricultural development, infrastructure, and environmental conservation. The State Department and USAID administer most of this aid. In addition, Tanzania implemented an MCC Compact between 2008 and 2013 (see below). Under the Obama Administration, the bulk of U.S. aid for Tanzania was channeled through several global presidential development initiatives—most of which were launched under the Obama Administration, most notably Feed the Future (FTF), the Global Health Initiative, and the Global Climate Change Initiative—as well as two initiatives launched by former President George W. Bush: the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI). Tanzania was also a focus country under the Obama Administration's African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP, see below) and its Partnerships for Growth (PFG) initiative.

In practice, Tanzania's applied PFG goals largely centered on and have largely been subsumed under Power Africa, a presidential initiative launched under President Obama to vastly increase access to electricity in Africa. Power Africa is expected to continue under the Trump Administration. Tanzania is also a beneficiary of the regional Trade Africa initiative (see above). In mid-2016, Tanzania and USAID signed a five-year strategic agreement for continued development assistance to support Tanzania's transition toward middle income status by 2025, including through programs in the areas of health, agriculture, natural resource management, education, energy, and democratic governance. Like most African countries, Tanzania is also a participant in the U.S. Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), initiated during the Obama Administration. YALI has been retained by the Trump Administration, albeit potentially at a reduced level. Tanzanians also participate in several other educational or professional State Department exchange programs, and there is a Peace Corps program in Tanzania with roughly 220 volunteers, who work in various areas, such as agriculture, education, and health, as of September 2017.

Focus on Healthcare Assistance

Health funding has comprised the bulk of State Department/USAID aid, and accounted for $480.1 million, or nearly 88% of a total of $546.6 million (provisional estimate) in FY2017 bilateral aid. Health aid would be funded at $511.5 million (95.5% of total aid) under the Trump Administration's total bilateral $535.3 million FY2018 aid request. Such health aid has been largely devoted to fighting HIV/AIDS under PEPFAR, and HIV/AIDS-centered aid would make up about 92% of all FY2018 total health spending under the Trump Administration's FY2018 proposal. Antimalaria programs carried out under the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) are another key focus of U.S. health programs, as are maternal and child health efforts, although both are funded at far lower levels than are HIV/AIDS programs. Tanzania is also a partner country under the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), which seeks to mitigate the impact of disease outbreaks, notably those that threaten global health.

According to UNAIDS, in 2016 Tanzania had an adult HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 4.7% and a total population of 1.4 million people living with the disease, and suffered 55,000 new infections but averted 1.1 million additional ones. The State Department's U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator reports that Tanzania's HIV/AIDS epidemic varies greatly by region (between 0.1% and 14.8%) and is higher in urban areas (7.2%) than in rural ones (4.3%) and by gender (male prevalence stands at 3.8% and that for females at 6.2%). Tanzania is making efforts to achieve the UNAIDS "90-90-90" target—the goal of ensuring that by 2020, 90% of people living with HIV are diagnosed, 90% of those diagnosed receive antiretroviral treatment (ART), and 90% of those in treatment have fully suppressed viral loads. It is making fair progress toward the "first 90" goal, as 70% of those with HIV are diagnosed, and is quickly progressing toward the second, as 88% of those diagnosed are in treatment. The overall estimated treatment rate (including those who are estimated to be HIV-positive but may not be diagnosed) is lower, at 62%. Data were insufficient to determine progress toward the third goal. Tanzania has also made substantial progress toward prevention of mother-to-child HIV transmission; 84% of pregnant women who needed antiretroviral therapy were receiving it.

According to PEPFAR, key challenges relating to improved HIV/AIDS responses include "weak health infrastructure, shortages of health and social workers, high levels of stigma, and cumbersome government procurement systems." PEPFAR efforts support HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment and related health systems and governance programs, and center on helping Tanzania to meet the UNAIDS 90-90-90 targets and diverse related goals outlined under its national HIV/AIDS multisectorial framework and other plans. Tanzania is one of 13 focus countries under the Trump Administration's PEPFAR Strategy for Accelerating HIV/AIDS Epidemic Control (2017-2020) , released by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in September 2017. Key PEPFAR foci to date have included prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) through antiretroviral therapy throughout pregnancy and breastfeeding for affected women. Others have included efforts to scale up ART coverage, expand access to and participation in voluntary medical male circumcision (VMMC), increase HIV counseling and testing (HCT), and enhance prevention through the provision of condoms. PEPFAR programs prioritize gender-differentiated strategies, given the higher female rate of infection, and pediatric treatment is another special priority. To decrease new infections and enhance epidemic control, PEPFAR efforts are also being shifted toward prioritizing responses in high-prevalence and high-burden geographic areas and population sub-groups facing high HIV/AIDS infection risks or prevalence rates. PEPFAR also supports efforts to counter cervical cancer through a public-private partnership called Pink Ribbon Red Ribbon (PRRR). Between FY2011 and 2015, an average of 29% of PEPFAR funds in Tanzania went to prevention, 21% to care, 34% to treatment, and 16% to health governance and system support.

Development Assistance

Agriculture development aid, which constituted $54 million of the Obama Administration's FY2017 request, has been the second-largest target of U.S. support in recent years, but funding would fall to $10 million under the Trump Administration's FY2018 request. Such aid has been channeled primarily through Feed the Future, a major global U.S. food security and agricultural economic growth initiative. In Tanzania, it has focused on improving agricultural productivity and rural infrastructure, including roads and irrigation; bolstering staple food and horticulture commodity value chain and marketing efficiency; improving access to nutrition for children and mothers; and improving private- and public-sector policymaking, including regarding land tenure. Roughly 80% of FTF resources are focused on southern Tanzania, an area that the government sees as having great untapped agricultural potential, while much of the balance is devoted to work in the Zanzibar region and selected areas of central and northern Tanzania. FTF activities have also involved collaboration with U.S. global health programming. Tanzania is also a participant in the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, a Feed the Future-supported, G8-led global agricultural investment initiative in Africa. It has also received U.S. support under the Scaling Seeds and Other Technologies Partnership, a project of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, an international multistakeholder effort to boost African farm production. The future of FTF is uncertain.

U.S. assistance has also supported strengthening of governance; infrastructure building (roads, power, water, and sanitation); economic growth; primary education; law enforcement capacity-building (see below); and biodiversity preservation.

Focus on Wildlife Conservation

A range of U.S. bilateral and regional programs support Tanzanian efforts to combat wildlife trafficking. In mid-2015, the U.S. embassy in Tanzania launched a five-year project called the Promoting Tanzania's Environment, Conservation, and Tourism (PROTECT) Project, a $14.5 million, five-year contractor-implemented project. Its aim is to enhance conservation and combat wildlife poaching and trafficking nationwide by supporting capacity building centered on wildlife resource management policymaking and institutions and trafficking law enforcement and prosecution. It also aims to enhance cooperation between civil society and the government and support development of community capabilities relating to the management of wildlife management areas (WMAs, locally controlled natural areas). PROTECT activities are accompanied by $2.75 million in natural resource small grants supporting wildlife management innovation, incentives for private investment, and other purposes. A second, $14 million, five-year program called "Endangered Ecosystems Northern Tanzania Project," launched later in the year, aims to increase antipoaching incentives and directly support WMAs, communities, and tourism operations in order to improve wildlife management in northern Tanzania. Another is the Southern Highlands and Ruaha-Katavi Protection Program (SHARPP), an $8.5-million, five-year program launched by USAID in 2014, centering on Support for WMAs; livelihoods; habitat management; and elephant monitoring and protection. These efforts follow on similar ones in prior recent years.

Other Assistance

The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) Bureau of International Labor Affairs also funds projects aimed at combatting child labor in Tanzania, particularly in agricultural and domestic service contexts. U.S. assistance to support Tanzania's hosting of refugees is administered by the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), which reports that U.S. funding for refugee support in Tanzania totaled roughly $1.2 million in FY2014, $16.7 million in FY2015, $36.2 million in FY2016, and $12 million in FY2017 to date, with more planned.

Millennium Challenge Corporation

In September 2013, Tanzania completed a $698 million, five-year MCC compact. Awarded in 2008, this compact sought to reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth through targeted investments in roads and access to electrical services and potable water. In late 2014, the MCC agreed to provide an additional $9.78 million to support further feasibility studies and other work linked to the development of a second compact focused on the power sector.

In June 2015 the MCC Board stated that a second compact "will not be considered for approval until, among other pending items," Tanzania's government "makes progress on energy sector reform commitments made in 2014." The agency stated that once a compact was prepared, the MCC would again "scrutinize the government's track record on good governance, including control of corruption and freedom of expression."

In March 2016, the MCC suspended negotiations toward a second compact that would reportedly have been worth $472 million. It did so on the basis that Tanzania had "moved forward with a new election in Zanzibar that was neither inclusive nor representative, despite the repeated concerns of the U.S. Government and the international community." Another issue was that Tanzania had "not taken measures to ensure freedom of expression and association are respected in the implementation of the Cybercrimes Act," which had also been the focus of repeated U.S. expressions of concern. In addition to stating that the elections in Zanzibar had not been credible, the Board stated that "Tanzania has taken no measures to ensure freedom of expression and association are respected in the implementation of the Cybercrimes Act."

Security Cooperation

U.S. security cooperation and assistance has grown since the 1998 Al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, but it remains limited compared to that pursued with Tanzania's East African neighbors. Peacekeeping support is a top main focus of military cooperation and aid ties, and expanded in FY2014-FY2016 under APRRP. That initiative's future is uncertain, as the Trump Administration has not requested funding to continue it. Tanzanian troops have also received training under the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and its train-and-equip African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, which seeks to increase available international peacekeeping troops. Such assistance is complemented by a U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which supports military professionalization and institutional reform in the Tanzanian military.

Tanzania receives some counterterrorism assistance through the State Department-led, multicountry Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT). It also hosts the regional East and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, in which the United States has observer status, and receives U.S. regional funding to combat terrorist financing. Smaller U.S. security aid programs center on strengthening border security and improving police capacity to deter crime and terrorism. Some recent military-to military or U.S. military activities, all in 2016, have included the following:

U.S. and Tanzanian participation, with other partner nations, in Eastern Accord 2016, an annual, combined, joint military exercise that took place in Tanzania and centered on a simulated peacekeeping operation command post exercise. The Tanzania military's hosting of the U.S.-aided African Land Forces Summit (ALFS), a seminar of land military chiefs from across Africa focused on developing cooperative solutions to regional challenges and threats. Specialized training of Tanzanian game scouts by U.S. military personnel on "surveillance and patrol techniques, arrest and detention procedures, search and seizure, crime scene investigation, first aid, human rights and rules of engagement" aimed at enhancing their ability to counter wildlife poaching and trafficking.

Law Enforcement Cooperation

The United States and Tanzania have increasingly cooperated in a limited number of criminal cases and with respect to joint efforts to build Tanzania's law enforcement capabilities. Among the most notable recent cases, cooperation occurred between 2016 and 2017. In May 2017, a Tanzanian named Ali Khatib Haji Hassan (a.k.a. "Shkuba") and two associates were extradited to the United States to face a U.S. federal indictment brought against them by a Houston, TX, grand jury charging them with conspiracy to possess and then distribute heroin between 2010 and 2015. In March 2016, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) had designated Hassan and his trafficking organization as significant foreign narcotics traffickers under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act).

Recent U.S. law enforcement capacity training has focused on such activities as the following:

canine training by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) aimed at detecting illegal drugs and ivory at ports and airports, as well as related investigations and prosecutions; anticorruption training of Tanzanian prosecutors and investigators by the U.S. Embassy's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT); and wildlife crime scene investigations and evidence collection training by USAID and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), in at least one case facilitated by the conservation and antipoaching organization the PAMS Foundation, whose cofounder was murdered in 2017 (see above).

Outlook

Tanzania is likely to remain a generally stable but poor developing country for the foreseeable future. Increasing multiparty competition may contribute to gradual growth in demand for political change, democratic accountability, improved governance, and greater political pluralism—but potentially also to increased political tension. Growing access to information, notably via mobile phones, may spur similar trends by increasing exposure to information on current events, and global social and governance norms. It may also contribute to market growth through increased information to pricing data and improved social services. Such changes, along with continuing infusions of foreign assistance, including from the United States, and gradually improving public infrastructure and government services, are likely to spur increasing economic activity, production, and trade, thus improving quality of life for the Tanzanian people. The United States, while expressing periodic concern over issues such as corruption, appears likely—as suggested by bilateral relations trends and aid levels in recent years—to continue to support the strengthening of Tanzania's democratic system and the socioeconomic development of its people, and to look to Tanzania as a key development partner in East and Southern Africa.