401(K) Plans: Effects of Eligibility and Vesting Policies on Workers' Retirement Savings
Released: 2016-11-21T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Types of Contributions in a 401(k) Plan

A 401(k) plan provides eligible plan participants the opportunity to choose to contribute a portion of their earnings, commonly called elective contributions, to their own individual account in a retirement plan. These contributions may be taken out of an employee’s salary before taxes. Some employees affirmatively enroll in their plan and elect how much of their pay they want to contribute. These employee contributions can be a set dollar amount or a percentage of pay, within annual contribution limits set by the IRS. Some employees are automatically enrolled in employers’ plans and their contributions set at a default rate, though they can opt to adjust the contribution level later. Under federal law, an employee’s own contributions and any returns on those contributions always belong to the employee and are not forfeitable to the plan if they leave their employer.

An employer may also contribute to a participant’s account, though not every plan includes an employer contribution. Generally, employers’ contributions to participants’ 401(k) accounts are voluntary, though once incorporated into plan documents contributions must be made as described. Unless the plan is a “Safe Harbor 401(k)”, “SIMPLE 401(k)” plan, or a “SIMPLE IRA”, plan sponsors have flexibility to decide whether to provide employer contributions and how quickly these contributions become vested, to the extent permitted by federal law. Formulas used to calculate employers’ contributions vary across plans. One form of employer contribution is called a match, which is based on the amount that an employee contributes to the plan. Alternately, employers may provide non-matching contributions based on employer profits. Employer contributions may be made solely at the employer’s discretion or may be required by plan documents. Unlike an employee’s own contributions, employer contributions can be forfeited when an employee separates from their job if the employee is not vested in the plan.

Eligibility Policies and Relevant Laws

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides the legal framework for eligibility policies used by workplace retirement plans, including minimum-age and minimum-service policies. The rules were designed, in part, to help sponsors provide profit sharing contributions, but after 401(k) plans were introduced, employer matching contributions became common. Under ERISA, the maximum age that plans may require as a condition of plan eligibility is 21. The maximum period of service—or length of tenure with an employer—a 401(k) plan may require for plan eligibility is 1 year. (See table 1.)

In addition to using eligibility policies, plans can extend the waiting time by taking up to 6 months or until the end of the plan year, whichever comes first, to enroll a newly eligible worker.

Vesting Policies and Relevant Laws

A 401(k) plan’s vesting policy can require participants to work for a certain period of time with an employer before they can keep all or some of their employer’s contributions to their account and investment returns on that money when they leave their job. Federal laws require that a minimum percentage of employer contributions are vested after a certain period of time; however, plans can choose to allow employer contributions to vest faster or even immediately. The shorter the period of service required for 100 percent vesting, the “faster” the vesting. The minimum percentage that must be vested at a given time depends on the type of vesting policy used by the plan, either cliff or graduated (see table 2).

Employer contributions that are vested are considered “nonforfeitable,” which means a participant has an unconditional and legally enforceable right to keep that portion of their account if they separate from their job. When a vesting policy’s required period of service is not fully met, some or all of an employee’s account balance that is attributable to employer contributions is forfeited to the plan. (See figure 1.)

Forfeited money can be used by the plan to offset plan expenses and to offset employer contributions. Once the full vesting period is complete, all employer contributions made both before and after that point are fully vested and nonforfeitable. All of a participant’s own contributions, rollovers, and earnings on those contributions are always immediately vested and nonforfeitable.

Similarly, in addition to a minimum-service policy required to receive employer contributions, plans may use a “last day policy,” which can require up to an additional year of employment to earn the employer contribution for that year. When used, a last day policy applies to the employer contributions made each plan year, year after year (see fig. 2). According to recent industry data, plans offer matching contributions more commonly than non-matching contributions, which include profit sharing contributions.

ERISA also governs the timing of employer contributions. Employers may delay making contributions until their tax return due date for a given year, including extensions.

Plan Policy Information Provided to Participants

Under federal law, plan sponsors must provide participants with a basic description of the plan, called a summary plan description (SPD), that explains participants’ rights and responsibilities under the plan as well as the plan’s key features, including eligibility and vesting policies. Table 3 provides some key features of an SPD and other required plan documents.

Treasury, IRS, and DOL Oversight of Eligibility and Vesting Policies Used by 401(k) Plans

Treasury and IRS, an agency within Treasury, share responsibility for overseeing provisions of ERISA applicable to eligibility and vesting in 401(k) plans. IRS has primary responsibility for overseeing eligibility and vesting policies and has promulgated regulations in these areas. For example, IRS regulations state that plans risk losing their tax qualified status if they impose policies that 1) do not specifically refer to service but have the effect of requiring service as a condition for plan participation, and 2) ultimately result in employees being excluded from participating in the plan for a period of time that exceeds the plan’s stated minimum service policy. IRS has also promulgated regulations for rules relating to “year of service.” Additionally, IRS regulations and federal law address the timing of employer contributions–when they must be deposited into participants’ accounts in a defined contribution plan. Treasury is responsible for developing proposals for legislative changes, which could include changes regarding eligibility and vesting requirements. In fulfilling this duty, Treasury prepares the “General Explanations of the Administration’s Revenue Proposals,” referred to as the “Greenbook,” which accompanies the President’s annual budget submission and outlines the President’s tax-related legislative proposals.

DOL is responsible for prescribing regulations governing retirement plans in a variety of areas, including reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary requirements. According to DOL officials, DOL could issue guidance on best practices to plan sponsors to help them better communicate plan policies in the summary plan description (SPD). With regard to eligibility, vesting, and related policies, DOL regulations impose certain requirements, such as the requirements that plans:

Transmit employees’ own contributions into their account no later than the 15th day of the month following the month in which the money comes out of their pay.

Report and disclose certain information to participants regarding eligibility and vesting policies. ERISA specifically grants DOL the authority to prescribe the format and content of the SPD and other statements or documents which are required for plan participants and beneficiaries receiving benefits under a plan. In addition, DOL may prescribe regulations covering the format of these disclosures.

Mobility of the U.S. Labor Force

U.S. workers are likely to have multiple jobs throughout their careers. Each time an employee begins a new job where a 401(k) plan is offered, the plan’s eligibility policy may affect the employee’s ability to participate. Likewise, every time a plan participant leaves a job, the plan’s vesting policy may affect the participant’s ability to retain employer contributions to their account. According to workforce data collected by the federal government, from 1978 to 2012, the average number of total jobs held by men and women workers from age 18 to 48 was more than 11 (see table 4). The mobility of the U.S. workforce is also reflected by the median tenure, which was 4.1 years for private sector workers in January 2014, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data.

Since these data indicate that many U.S. workers switch jobs multiple times during their career, eligibility and vesting policies may affect their accumulated retirement savings multiple times as well. The President’s Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Proposal encourages efforts to better ensure that workers’ job changes do not harm their retirement savings in a package of proposals aimed at increasing workers’ access to retirement plans and increasing the portability of their retirement savings and benefits. The proposal tasks DOL with evaluating existing portable benefits models and examining whether changes are needed.

Many Plan Sponsors In Our Survey Use Policies that Determine Workers’ Eligibility to Save in 401(k) Plans and to Retain Employer Contributions, Often to Reduce Costs and Employee Turnover

Many Plan Sponsors In Our Survey Use Minimum- Age and Minimum-Service Policies to Determine Plan Eligibility

Information from our non-generalizable survey of 80 plan sponsors ranging in size from fewer than 100 participants to more than 5,000, and our review of industry data, show that many 401(k) plans have minimum- age policies that do not allow workers to save in plans until they reach age 21 instead of immediately upon employment. Our survey data found that 43 of 80 plans surveyed have minimum-age policies for plan eligibility, with 21 being the most frequently used minimum age, used by 33 plans. Industry data from the Plan Sponsor Council of America (PSCA), which primarily cover large plans, also show that 376 out of 613 plans have minimum-age policies, with 21 the most frequently used minimum age.

According to our analysis of 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data from the Census Bureau, an estimated 405,000 workers whose employers offer 401(k)-type plans said they were ineligible to participate in the plan because of a minimum-age policy. This is equal to about 2 percent of workers nationwide who were not participating in 401(k)-type plans offered by their employers that year.

Minimum-service eligibility policies require employees to work for an employer for a certain period of time before they can enroll and participate in a 401(k) plan. Fifty of the 80 plans we surveyed reported they have minimum-service eligibility policies. Twenty plans use a 1-year minimum. Industry data from Vanguard also show that about 40 percent of its plans have minimum-service eligibility policies, with a 1-year requirement the most prevalent policy among these plans. The Census Bureau’s SIPP data show that an estimated 16 percent of U.S. workers who do not participate in 401(k)-type plans offered by their employers said it is because they have not worked long enough. Projected to the total workforce nationwide, this would amount to about 3 million workers who are not able to save in their employers’ 401(k) plans because of a minimum-service eligibility policy.

Certain types of 401(k) plans may be more likely than others to have policies that require employees to complete a minimum period of service before they can save in the plan. Vanguard found, among its plan clients, that small plans are more likely than large plans to use minimum service eligibility policies. PSCA also found that small plans are more likely to use minimum-service policies, as their data show that the percentage of plans with a minimum-service eligibility policy decreases as plan size increases.

Under federal law, plans have discretion to require a period of minimum service for plan eligibility, and some discretion on how long that period will be and how service will be measured. Our survey found that of 80 plans, 20 required employees to work a certain number of hours per year to be credited with a year of service for the purpose of meeting a plan’s minimum-service eligibility policy. Of those 20, 12 required employees to work 1,000 hours during the year, which is the maximum number of hours that may be required under current law. PSCA data covering a larger number of plans show that the 1,000 hour minimum is a common service requirement, used by about 30 percent of plans. According to the most recently available SIPP data, an estimated 24 percent of U.S. workers who reported that they do not participate in their employer’s plan said they do not do so because they do not work enough hours during the year.

Many Plans Use Policies that Affect the Receipt and Timing of Employer Contributions

Minimum-service policies that govern the receipt of employer contributions can prevent plan participants from receiving them. In our survey of 80 plans, 34 reported minimum-service policies for employees to receive employer contributions. Vanguard data show that about 50 percent of plans have such policies, with a 1-year minimum-service policy being the most frequent. Employers can use these policies in addition to minimum-service policies for 401(k) plan eligibility—which determine a participant’s ability to save his or her own earnings in a plan—but ERISA caps the length of service needed to receive employer contributions at 2 years. Therefore, after a 1-year minimum-service policy for plan eligibility, a plan could only require 1 additional year of service prior to a participant receiving employer contributions.

The receipt of employer contributions can also be limited by “last day policies”, which are additional policies that can, in some cases, prevent a participant’s receipt of employer contributions. These policies require workers to be employed on the last day of the plan year to be eligible to receive an employer contribution for that year. Plans can use these policies alone or in combination with minimum-service policies. Whether a worker leaves a job voluntarily or is laid off or fired, the worker can be affected by a last day policy even after satisfying up to a 2-year service policy for employer contributions. Our survey of plans found that 19 of 80 plans have last day policies.

Delaying employer contributions to employees is another policy that can affect the receipt of employer contributions. Twenty-four plans we surveyed provide contributions, including all types of employer contributions, on an annual basis instead of quarterly or per pay period. With regard to matching contributions, PSCA’s survey found that 18 percent of plans make those contributions on an annual basis rather than on a more frequent schedule (see fig. 3). Our survey data also show that plans often use an annual schedule for contributing to participant accounts in concert with a last day policy. In total, 12 of the 24 plans we surveyed that provide contributions on an annual basis said they also have last day policies.

According to Treasury officials, delaying employer contributions so that they are non-concurrent with pay periods, such as making annual contributions, is a long standing practice put into place when employers with defined contribution plans made only profit sharing contributions. Under federal law, plans may make matching contributions as late as the date the plan files its tax return for the previous year, including any extensions, which means that a participant could receive matching contributions for the entire previous year as late as September of the following year. (See fig. 4.)

Many Plans Have Vesting Policies that Affect Participants’ Ability to Retain Employer Contributions

Based on our survey of 80 plans, we found that 57 have vesting policies that require employees to work for a certain period of time before the employer contributions in their accounts are vested. Among survey respondents, a 6-year graduated vesting schedule was used most frequently, meaning a worker must complete 6 years of employment before all of their employer contributions to their account would be retained if they left their job. Industry data from Vanguard show that more than 55 percent of its plans also have vesting policies for matching contributions. A 5-year graduated vesting policy was the most frequent. We also found that plans do not often change their vesting policies. For example, about 70 of the 80 plans we surveyed had not changed their vesting policies over the past 5 years. A retirement professional we interviewed concurred that vesting policies have remained stable in recent years.

Plans Use Eligibility and Vesting Policies to Lower Costs and Reduce Employee Turnover

Based on our survey of plan sponsors and interviews with academic researchers, retirement professionals, and government officials, we found that plans cited lowering costs and reducing employee turnover as the most important reasons for using eligibility, vesting, and other related policies. Our survey asked respondents to identify the importance of various reasons for having eligibility and vesting policies (see table 5).

According to retirement professionals, plans use policies that restrict plan eligibility to reduce administrative costs—which include maintaining accounts for separated, short-tenured workers—although these costs are often borne by participants and not by plans. A retirement professional we interviewed explained that after a worker separates from an employer, the plan sponsor must still keep track of the former worker’s account if the worker remains a participant in the plan, and provide the worker with plan communications and account statements, all of which are additional administrative costs. Several retirement professionals we interviewed noted that plan sponsors pay the administrative costs of maintaining small, dormant accounts after short-tenure workers leave their employer. Because young workers have shorter average tenure than older workers, according to federal workforce data, some plans may use a minimum-age policy to exclude the youngest workers and reduce the administrative costs of dealing with short-tenured employees joining the plan and then leaving. However, it is unclear the extent to which additional plan participants increase plans’ administrative costs. Our prior work found that participants generally paid part or all of administrative fees, and that regardless of who incurs added administrative costs for accounts left behind by workers, plans are not obliged to maintain those accounts. Plans can require account holders to transfer their savings out of the plan if their balances fall below a threshold set by federal law.

Reducing the direct costs of employer contributions was also cited by plans that we surveyed as an important reason for using eligibility policies, although savings for some plans may be minimal. Minimum- age policies reduce costs because employers do not need to make contributions to otherwise eligible workers. If plans do not use minimum- age policies they can incur some added direct costs in the form of employer contributions to additional workers. However, our projections suggest that the direct costs associated with including workers under age 21 in existing plans may be small because younger workers earn less, on average, than older workers, so the same percentage match from the employer costs less for younger workers. According to a retirement professional, plans may use a minimum-service policy for employer contributions to reduce costs for sponsors because the sponsor avoids making contributions to a participant account if that worker leaves their job before satisfying the policy.

Eligibility policies and policies that delay employers’ contributions until the end of the year are also used by some plans for administrative convenience, according to government officials we interviewed and plans we surveyed, though delayed enrollment is possible without delayed eligibility and today’s employer contribution formulas make delayed employer contributions often unnecessary. First, government officials said that some plans may use eligibility policies to delay workers’ enrollment because it takes administrators time to determine eligibility and to process workers’ enrollment in the plan. However, plans may delay a worker’s enrollment up to 6 months after eligibility, which can help plans to mitigate administrative concerns. According to PSCA’s survey, about 25 percent of 401(k) type plans delay the enrollment of newly eligible workers and the rest enroll workers “anytime” after they are eligible. Moreover, a retirement professional told us that, for medium and large-size plans, the payroll systems used to administer plan benefits can support the provision of employer contributions during the year as opposed to just at the end of the year. Second, some plans that we surveyed indicated they also delay employer contributions until the end of the year for administrative convenience. For example, one respondent reported that it is less work for the plan to make employer contributions once, at year’s end. However, a government official told us that the reason most plans make employer contributions each pay period is that doing otherwise would have adverse effects on the plan sponsor by requiring a large outflow of cash at the end of the plan year. By making employer contributions more frequently, a company can spread that cost over the year. A retirement professional told us a likely reason that some plans make delayed employer contributions is employer inertia in keeping a policy that is a remnant of the past, when employer contributions were based on the employers’ year-end profits. However, today, most plans are 401(k) plans and often provide matching employer contributions based on participants’ own contributions, which are typically made each pay period.

Vesting policies can also reduce costs for plan sponsors by resulting in forfeited employer contributions when participants separate without fully satisfying the vesting policy. Those forfeitures can offset employer expenses and contributions. According to retirement professionals we interviewed and plans we surveyed, vesting policies reduce the direct cost of employer contributions for shorter-tenure employees who do not stay employed long enough to satisfy the vesting policy and keep employers’ contributions. However, tax benefits to employers from making employer contributions can partially offset direct costs to employers of making contributions to participant accounts, because they reduce an employer’s taxable corporate income in proportion to the amount spent on contributions.

Finally, both eligibility and vesting policies were also used to reduce employee turnover by plans we surveyed. Retirement professionals and an academic researcher we interviewed explained that some plans see delayed eligibility in the 401(k) plan as an incentive that may convince new employees to stay longer in their job. Sponsors also use vesting policies to reduce turnover, according to government officials, retirement professionals, and an academic researcher we interviewed. For example, a retirement professional said that companies with a generous matching contribution and high employee turnover prefer to use a vesting schedule because it incentivizes employees to stay with the employer. However, the extent to which vesting policies are effective in changing behavior and reducing turnover depends in some measure on whether participants actually understand vesting policies. For example, if a participant incorrectly believes he or she is fully vested but is actually only partially vested, the vesting policy will not effectively incentivize the worker to extend tenure to fully vest.

GAO Hypothetical Projections Suggest Current Plan Eligibility, Employer Contribution, and Vesting Policies Can Result in Lower Retirement Savings

Plan sponsors use eligibility and vesting policies for a number of reasons. However, based on our projections, we found that although the effects on a worker’s retirement savings can initially be minimal from policies affecting plan eligibility, eligibility to receive employer contributions and the timing of those contributions, and vesting of employer contributions, the cumulative effects can potentially result in significantly lower retirement savings, depending on the policies used (see table 6). (Also see Appendix II for detailed information about the assumptions used in these hypothetical projections.)

Our Projections Suggest that Plans’ Use of Minimum-Age and Minimum-Service Policies Can Reduce Workers’ Access to Workplace Retirement Plans and Can Result in Foregone Retirement Savings

Currently, the law permits 401(k) plans to require a minimum age of 21 and at least 1,000 hours of service over 1 year for a worker to be eligible to join an employer’s 401(k) plan. As discussed earlier, we found that plan sponsors may use these policies to reduce the costs and challenges incurred when short-term workers enroll in the plan and leave behind small accounts. While the law gives plan sponsors flexibility in establishing plan eligibility policies that meet their needs, federal caps on minimum age and minimum service policies serve to balance plan sponsors’ needs with workers’ interests in accessing and saving for retirement in workplace plans. In addition, because of the potential for compound interest to grow savings over time, it is a widely accepted best practice for workers to start saving for retirement as early as possible, even if the amounts they save seem small. Our projections suggest that these eligibility policies can potentially reduce workers’ retirement savings.

Our Estimates Suggest that Plans’ Use of Minimum-Age Policies Can Reduce Workers’ Access to Retirement Plans and Accumulation of Savings

Our estimates, which project hypothetical retirement savings, suggest that minimum-age policies can potentially reduce young workers’ future retirement savings. Minimum-age eligibility policies can lower workers’ potential retirement savings through the loss of compound interest as well as employer contributions, and the policies disproportionately affect some groups. Because minimum-age policies can prevent young workers from saving for retirement in their workplace 401(k) plan early in their careers, they miss the opportunity to accrue compound interest and grow their initial contributions over the remaining decades of their working life. For example, an 18-year-old worker earning $15,822 per year who is ineligible to enroll in an employer’s plan until age 21 may forego savings at retirement of $85,857 ($23,258 in 2016 dollars) if they had been able to save and invest 5.3 percent (the average contribution level for non- highly compensated employees reported by plans in PSCA’s 57th Annual Survey) of their salary over those 3 years.

Because of the effects of compound interest, saving for retirement at a young age is a one-time opportunity to optimize retirement savings despite making what is typically a low salary relative to lifetime earnings. An older worker has to save more to make the same gains over time, because the returns on savings made later have fewer years over which to compound. (See fig. 5.) (Also see Appendix II for detailed information about the assumptions used in these hypothetical projections.)

Minimum-age eligibility policies may have disproportionate effects for some groups. Based on our analysis of data and estimates, we found that certain groups can be disproportionately affected by a minimum-age eligibility policy for 401(k) plans. For example, many young people graduating from high school will not enroll in college but will enter the workforce, only to be potentially excluded from an employer’s 401(k) plan by a minimum age policy. Data from BLS’s Current Population Survey (CPS) show that of 3 million workers who graduated from high school in 2015, about 30 percent were not enrolled in college by October of that year. Recent high school graduates not enrolled in college are about twice as likely to be employed or looking for work as those who are enrolled. Young workers who do not attend college can expect less wage growth over their career, making early savings all the more important. Policies that prevent potential savings by young workers may also disproportionately affect women, who often earn lower wages and may benefit most from maximizing early savings. We have previously reported that women have less retirement income on average than men, partly because women are more likely than men to spend time outside the workforce when they are older. This is a time when income may be higher than earlier in their career and when they might otherwise be able to take advantage of “catch-up” savings opportunities in their workplace plan. A minimum-age policy may prevent some women from saving for retirement when they are fully participating in the workforce, before they may reduce work hours or leave the workforce to provide caregiving support to family members. A minimum-age policy also has implications for low-wage workers. Our projections suggest that the foregone savings of low-wage workers from age 18 to 20 can be an even larger percentage of their retirement savings than for higher earners because low-wage earners may realize less growth in their salary over time, so later contributions do less to make up for savings missed at a younger age. For example, based on our analysis, compared to the loss of 5 percent of retirement savings for a medium-level earner not saving from age 18 to 20, a lower- level earner with reduced wage growth over his or her career could lose 11.5 percent of retirement savings from not saving from age 18 to 20— more than twice the percentage lost by the medium-level earner with average wage growth.

Minimum-age eligibility policies may mean foregone contributions from an employer. The amount of foregone retirement savings due to minimum-age policies can be higher when matching employer contributions are considered. For example, based on analysis of our hypothetical scenario, the savings of an otherwise eligible 18-year-old earning $15,822 per year could have been $134,456 at retirement, or $36,422 in 2016 dollars, if that individual had also received an employer match of their contribution up to 3 percent of salary from age 18 to 20. An employer’s match of employee contributions is typically, in effect, a 50 to 100 percent return on the employee’s contributions; participants who receive an employer match can double the value of their contribution—a 100 percent return—if the employer makes a dollar for dollar match.

ERISA provides plan sponsors some flexibility to design plan policies that can restrict workers’ eligibility to enroll and save in plans. ERISA specifically permits sponsors to limit enrollment in 401(k) plans to workers age 21 and older. Over 8 million workers under the age of 21 are potentially subject to this policy. In passing ERISA, Congress supported the policy goal of increasing access to plans by allowing workers to save for retirement as early as possible. Increasing access to plans was also a policy goal supported by Congress more recently in passing the Pension Protection Act of 2006. The current minimum-age policy does not further that goal. Extending eligibility to workers at an age earlier than 21 would also give young workers an opportunity to build their private sector savings at the same time they are earning credits toward future Social Security retirement benefits. In addition, increasing workers’ access to workplace retirement plans is a current federal policy goal, reiterated by DOL guidance and recently in DOL’s fiscal year 2017 Budget Justification.

Employers may bear costs from enrolling additional workers in plans and administering their accounts after they leave their employ, but our prior work has shown that participants often bear the costs of administering their accounts and plans can use forced-transfers to eliminate small accounts left behind by separated employees. IRS officials told us that the minimum-age policy is unnecessary because the minimum-service eligibility policy permits plans to exclude short-term employees. By extending eligibility to workers at an age earlier than 21, private retirement plan coverage could expand for young workers who research shows lack access to 401(k) plans. We recently reported that when given the opportunity, young, low-income workers participate in workplace plans at high rates.

Allowing young people to contribute at the beginning of their careers would also help to mitigate the risk that potential unexpected events could reduce the length of their careers and the period to save for retirement and, thus, their retirement savings. For example, research shows that many workers retire sooner than they expect, due to physical limitations or the need to care for family members. Such individuals will not save for retirement for as long as they had planned or during years in which their contributions may have been highest. Extending eligibility to workers at an age earlier than 21 could help a significant number of workers to save at an earlier age and those who experience unforeseen absences from the workforce or premature retirement will be better positioned to maximize their retirement savings during their working years.

1-Year Minimum-Service Eligibility Policies Delay and May Prevent Plan Participation and Our Estimates Suggest they May Result in Lower Savings

Minimum-service eligibility policies of up to 1 year delay access to workplace 401(k) plans and can reduce potential retirement savings for workers of any age, according to our projections of retirement savings. For example, our projections suggest that for a 30-year-old worker earning a salary of $71,841 ($52,152 in 2016 dollars), a 1-year delay in plan eligibility could mean $51,758 less in savings at retirement ($14,021 less in 2016 dollars). That amounts to 3 percent of the worker’s total projected retirement savings from their own savings alone. Including the employer match of 3 percent not received during the 1-year period of ineligibility, the worker could have $81,055 less at retirement ($21,957 in 2016 dollars). A minimum-service eligibility policy also means that any workers excluded from participating in a plan also will not receive any employer contribution to which they might otherwise be eligible.

Additionally, the more often a worker changes jobs the larger the potential effect of a minimum-service eligibility policy on the worker’s retirement savings (see fig. 6). (See Appendix II, Table 5 for a similar table with values adjusted for inflation.) A longitudinal study by the BLS found that the average number of jobs for individuals born in the latter years of the baby boom was 11.7 jobs. The same study found that about half those jobs were held between ages 18 and 24. Being ineligible to save in a new employer’s plan for 1 year on 11 occasions, especially occurring more frequently early in a worker’s career, may result in $411,439 less retirement savings ($111,454 in 2016 dollars), based on our projections.

Lastly, under the current definition of a “year of service,” some types of workers are likely to remain ineligible to participate in their workplace 401(k) plan indefinitely. For example, long-term part-time workers can be excluded from their employers’ plans regardless of tenure if they work fewer than 1,000 hours during the year, or about 19 hours per week. According to March 2016 data from the CPS, 14.3 million workers said that they usually worked 20 or fewer hours per week over the previous month. Those data also show that more women than men worked 20 or fewer hours per week (making women more likely than men to be ineligible for their workplace plan as a result of the 1,000 hour rule). Even employees working more than 19 hours per week could be subject to ineligibility due to the 1,000-hour rule, if they work multiple part-time jobs. Moreover, under the current definition of a year of service, workers who remain employed on a part-time basis year after year may not be eligible to participate in their workplace savings plans.

In first establishing the rules for a minimum-service policy for plan eligibility, ERISA capped such policies at 1 year of service, defined as 1,000 or more hours worked over 1 year. While plans can require fewer hours or no hours of service for plan eligibility, they cannot require more than 1,000 hours. However, millions of part-time workers may never qualify for their employer’s plan with a 1,000-hour requirement. Some members of Congress and the current administration have proposed amending the law to ensure that long-term part-time workers can become eligible to save in their employer’s workplace plan. As part of its fiscal year 2017 budget submission, the current administration proposed amending federal law to require plans to expand eligibility to workers who have worked for their employer at least 500 hours per year for 3 consecutive years, allowing workers to contribute their own earnings, but not necessarily to receive employer contributions to their account. A 2015 Senate Finance Committee bi-partisan working group endorsed this proposal and legislation was introduced that incorporated it. Prior to the current administration’s proposal, legislation was introduced that also would have required plans to cover long-term part-time employees.

Given today’s workforce, determining whether the current definition of “year of service” is consistent with the goal of expanding access to workplace retirement savings plans would be beneficial to all workers. Without revising the definition of “year of service”, minimum-service eligibility policies may continue to reduce potential retirement savings for millions of workers who will remain ineligible to participate in a plan because their annual hours of service may fall below their plans’ requirement. Some retirement professionals we interviewed said that operating without a 1,000 hour rule could result in more small accounts left behind by short-term workers, but as we previously noted, forced transfers of small balances can help plans manage any associated burden or cost, and often those costs are borne by participants themselves.

Our Projections Suggest that Current Employer Contribution Policies Can Also Reduce Workers’ Retirement Savings in 401(k) Plans

Current law permits 401(k) plan sponsors to require participants to be employed on the last day of the plan year to be eligible to receive employer contributions to their account. Current law also permits 401(k) plan sponsors to delay the accrual of employer matching contributions until the end of the year. Information from our survey of 80 plan sponsors and plan professionals showed that plan sponsors often use these two requirements together. Based on our review of relevant statutes and interviews with retirement professionals and government officials, we found that these provisions were created decades ago when 401(k) plans did not exist and when profit sharing contributions were the norm. According to Treasury officials, the provisions met plan sponsors’ need to wait until the end of the year to identify what their profits were for the year and thus what the employer’s contribution would be for the year. However, today most employer-based plans are 401(k) plans, not traditional profit sharing plans, and based on our analysis of industry survey data, most 401(k) plans make matching contributions, which are based on participants’ contributions throughout the year. Although plan sponsors may have previously found these two policies to be beneficial, our projections suggest they may also potentially reduce workers’ retirement savings.

Last Day Policies Can Reduce Workers’ Retirement Savings, Based on Our Projections

The law permits plans to apply policies that limit a participant’s ability to receive employer contributions without additional service each year—last day policies—which can reduce participants’ potential retirement savings. Although last day policies can provide financial benefits to plan sponsors and may also ease plan administration, these policies can reduce potential retirement savings for workers. Given a relatively mobile workforce, the requirement to be employed on the last day of the plan year to receive an employer’s contributions for that year puts workers who separate from their job at risk of losing some of their potential retirement savings. For example, our projections suggest that for a 30-year-old earning $71,841 ($52,152 in 2016 dollars), the employer contribution not received due to an unmet “last day” policy is $2,155 in that year ($1,443 in 2016 dollars). But it could be worth $29,297 by retirement ($7,936 in 2016 dollars), which is 3 percent of the worker’s total projected savings from employer contributions of $969,674 ($262,673 in 2016 dollars) at retirement.

Our projections also suggest that a last day policy can reduce potential retirement savings to the same extent as a 1-year minimum-service policy for employer contributions, except the potential savings are lost in the last year rather than in the first. Last day policies can reduce potential retirement savings for even long-tenure, full-time workers who separate from their employers before the official last day of the year. For example, a 67-year-old employee who has worked for the same employer during his or her entire career and retires when eligible for full Social Security benefits could lose the employer’s $6,606 match for that last year ($1,837 in 2016 dollars) if it is before the end of the year. Moreover, the last day policy can affect workers repeatedly throughout their careers. If our hypothetical worker leaves three jobs without satisfying a last day requirement, at ages 20, 30, and 40, the worker could lose a total of $6,542, which could be worth $69,583 at retirement ($18,849 in 2016 dollars).

ERISA caps at 2 years the length of service that a plan sponsor can require before a participant is eligible to receive employer contributions. Given the mobility of the workforce, this provision ensures that workers who change jobs are eligible, just like long-tenured workers, to benefit from employer contributions for which employers receive a tax benefit.

Given that job turnover is greater among younger workers, ERISA’s cap on a service policy that delays employer contributions also helps to ensure that workers’ savings in these tax-advantaged accounts are not excessively diminished at a time when, our projections suggest, contributions have the greatest ability for compound earnings over time to improve retirement savings. However, because a last day policy requires an additional year of service to receive any employer contributions, year after year, a worker who has already satisfied a 2-year minimum-service policy would have to wait up to another year to receive an employer contribution. (See Appendix II Table 8 for examples of how a last day policy could potentially reduce retirement savings.)

IRS oversees provisions of federal law applicable to eligibility and vesting and Treasury is responsible for developing proposals for legislative change in these areas. However, according to an IRS official, the law permits 401(k) plans to use a last day policy and, as long as the law’s non-discrimination and coverage rules are satisfied, plans are generally free to structure their plans as they choose. In addition, according to that IRS official, the flexibility provided to plans by ERISA prevents IRS from prohibiting plans’ use of a last day policy. Considering whether an adjustment to the law’s provisions regarding plans’ use of a last day policy is needed could help to ensure that 401(k) plan policies reflect the current mobility and characteristics of today’s workforce.

ERISA Allows Employers to Delay Employer Contributions, Which Our Projections Suggest Also May Reduce Potential Savings

Plan policies that delay employer contributions so that they are paid at the end of the year rather than being paid in tandem with employee contributions throughout the year affect participants’ opportunities to earn compound interest on investment returns on the employer’s contribution to their account over the course of the year. Our projections suggest it may also reduce participants’ potential retirement savings. In contrast, regular employer contributions, such as those made bi-weekly, allow participants to potentially profit from the investment of that money and the reinvestment of those profits. Delayed employer contributions may seem negligible at first, but, if left to compound over time, our projections suggest that the return on that employer contribution can amount to significant savings. Moreover, while the immediate value of savings lost in a single year can be relatively small, the potential value of that lost opportunity compounds year after year. For example, our projections suggest that for a worker who remains with one employer throughout his or her career, the delay of the employer’s contribution until the end of the year, each year, could mean $35,636 less in total savings at retirement ($9,653 in 2016 dollars) than if the employer’s contribution was made on a per pay-period basis (bi-weekly), in concert with the worker’s own contributions. That is about 3.7 percent of our hypothetical worker’s total 401(k) retirement savings based on employer contributions alone.

ERISA establishes rules for the accrual of retirement benefits in workplace retirement plans. Those rules permit flexibility as to when an employer’s contributions go into—or accrue to—an individual’s retirement account. ERISA permits plan sponsors to delay making the employer contribution to participants’ accounts until as late as the end of the year or the date when the plan’s tax return is filed, including extensions. However, the law permitting delayed employer contributions is from a time when profit sharing plans were the norm and plans typically waited until the end of the year to calculate and distribute employer contributions. Those plans predate 401(k) plans and the matching contributions that are now commonplace. Treasury officials told us that, because plan sponsors today generally make contributions that match a participant’s own deferrals, delayed employer contributions are no longer necessary in most defined contribution plans. In addition, delayed employer contributions are inconsistent with the best practice of saving for retirement as early as possible. While IRS has primary responsibility for overseeing eligibility and vesting policies and Treasury is responsible for developing proposals for legislative change in these areas, the provision permitting delayed employer contributions can only be changed by statute and not by either agency. Considering whether the law’s provisions regarding the timing of matching employer contributions should be adjusted could be an opportunity to help ensure the provisions reflect the current mobility and characteristics of today’s workforce.

Vesting Policies That Our Projections Suggest May Affect Participants’ Retirement Savings when They Separate from a Job Have Not Been Recently Evaluated by Regulators

Our projections suggest that vesting policies can also reduce retirement savings when participants leave their job and the vesting policy is not satisfied in full. (See fig. 7.) For example, our projections suggest that for a worker who twice separates from employment (at age 20 and 40) after 2 years without satisfying a 3-year cliff vesting policy, forfeiting the employer contributions already in their account, the lost savings could have grown to $81,743 by retirement ($22,143 in 2016 dollars).

Caps for vesting policies are set by federal law and, over time, have been shortened to provide for faster vesting to make it easier for workers in a mobile labor force to keep employers’ contributions and to more easily build their savings for retirement. As noted earlier, Treasury is the federal agency that would be responsible for developing proposals for legislative change with regard to vesting. However, a Treasury official told us that the agency has not recently proposed any changes to the vesting rules and has not conducted an assessment to determine what vesting policies are appropriate today. Based on our survey of plan sponsors and plan professionals, vesting policies are often used to reduce employee turnover. In addition, according to retirement professionals we interviewed, vesting policies reduce the direct cost of employer contributions for shorter-tenure employees who do not stay long enough to satisfy the vesting policy and keep employer contributions. Nevertheless, current federal policies seek to improve retirement security for today’s mobile workforce, including increasing the portability of workplace retirement plan savings. However, our projections suggest that current vesting policies can potentially reduce a participant’s retirement savings when vesting requirements are not met in full. An evaluation of the effects of current vesting policies on participants’ retirement savings may help to identify if those policies remain appropriate for a mobile workforce increasingly dependent on their employer-based retirement accounts, and help determine how vesting policies affect the portability of retirement savings.

Clearer Policy Descriptions by 401(k) Plans Could Help Participants to Better Understand Eligibility and Vesting Policies GAO’s Nongeneralizable Survey Found that While Knowledge Varied, Some Plan Participants Lacked Knowledge on Eligibility, Employer Contribution, and Vesting Policies

To examine plan participants’ understanding of eligibility, employer contribution, and vesting policies, we analyzed 46 responses to an online survey administered to participants in four 401(k) plans in which they were asked about their own plans. Responses to the survey show that participants’ knowledge varied. (See table 7.) The accuracy of responses was highest regarding the frequency of the employer’s contribution, participants’ initial eligibility to join the plan and the types of employer contributions made. However, based on our evaluation, some participants surveyed lacked knowledge of their plans’ eligibility, employer contribution, and vesting policies that, as our projections discussed earlier suggest, can have important effects on retirement savings. Our survey results may reflect some degree of unwarranted confidence by plan participants regarding their understanding of plan policies. According to a behavioral finance expert, about one-quarter of people generally overestimate their understanding of finance-related terminology. An individual’s lack of understanding of their employer’s policies can result in suboptimal choices, such as choosing a job with a minimum-service eligibility policy over one offering immediate eligibility, when wages, working conditions, and other benefits are comparable.

Approximately two-thirds of respondents gave answers consistent with the eligibility rules in place at their plan when they started their job, which may reflect a fairly high level of education and long tenure among workers we surveyed, but about a third of the participants we tested were incorrect about their eligibility to join their employer’s 401(k) plan.

Among those not immediately eligible to join the plan and asked to identify the reason for their initial ineligibility, more than half provided incorrect answers. That result is generally consistent with a national survey on self-reported financial literacy, which asked about 5,000 current defined contribution plan participants to assess their own knowledge of “eligibility requirements,” among other topics. That survey found that while 85 percent felt they had a working knowledge of and understood the term “eligibility requirements,” nearly half (46 percent) were not confident enough in their understanding to teach others (see fig. 8).

Our survey results show that respondents had a good understanding of their employer’s contribution. The high number of correct answers to the question about how frequently employer contributions were made was consistent with information we heard from a retirement expert we interviewed who said that workers generally have a good understanding of their employer’s matching contribution to their 401(k) plan account. Workers who do not understand the significance of the timing of employer contributions may not be well prepared to weigh such policies before choosing to join or leave an employer. While more than half of participants we surveyed were correct about whether they are required to be employed on a specific day of the year to receive the employer’s contribution, which could indicate a last day policy, more than a third (18) did not know or did not answer the question. Understanding an employer’s last day policy is important because, as our projections suggest, the policy could potentially reduce retirement savings.

Lastly, understanding of vesting requirements was mixed. More than half of participants gave accurate answers regarding their vesting status, given their plans’ policies. Clearly written plan documents may also have helped those participants who understood their vesting status. Federal law requires that a plan’s summary plan description (SPD) be written in a clear manner and uses a table to describe the maximum vesting schedule for 2- to 6-year vesting, which some plans use as a model in their SPD. At one of the companies where the majority of participants gave correct responses, the plan documents clearly stated the plan’s 5-year graduated vesting policy and the calculation of vesting status based on different lengths of service by using a table (see fig. 9).

The national financial literacy survey found that respondents’ self- reported understanding was also high regarding the definition of a “vesting period.” The survey found that about three-quarters of individuals surveyed thought they had either a working knowledge of the term “vesting period” or understood it well. However, not all participants we surveyed understood their vesting status. Some respondents did not know if their employer contribution was fully vested, did not attempt to answer this question, or incorrectly believed that their employer contribution was already fully vested, when it was not. Describing the vesting policy that they had to meet or will have to meet to become vested was also difficult for some participants. For example, one participant we surveyed said that he was required to work for 5 years to be fully vested even though the plan had a 6-year vesting schedule.

Unclear Plan Documents May Hinder Participants’ Understanding of Their Employers’ Eligibility and Vesting Policies

We found evidence that some eligibility and vesting policies in summary plan descriptions (SPD) can be unclear. Our review of five SPDs found that some eligibility and vesting policies were written using complex technical language which may make them less likely to be easily understood by the average plan participant. (See text box.) Participants in two discussion groups comprised of plan sponsors and plan advisors which we convened in March 2015 also said that plan participants probably do not understand the eligibility and vesting requirements of their plan because the SPDs use complex legal terms. Furthermore, one retirement professional we interviewed said that employers’ own difficulty understanding their plans’ eligibility and vesting policies contributes to employees’ misunderstanding of these policies. According to a retirement professional, errors in interpretation can occur, making the clarity of plan documents more important.

Example of Complex Language in a 401(k) Summary Plan Description You will become a Participant eligible to make Elective Deferral Contributions and receive Safe Harbor Non-Elective Contributions and Profit Sharing Contributions on the a) first day of the first month of the Plan Year or b) first day of the seventh month of the Plan Year, coincident with or next following the date you attain age 21 and you complete one (1) Year of Eligibility Service, provided that you are an Eligible Employee on that date.

You have worked for your Employer four (4) years and have received Employer Contributions of $1,000. You terminate employment and request a distribution of your Employer’s Contributions. Because you have four (4) years of vesting service, you will receive 60% or $600.

While this example illustrates what happens as contributions become vested, it still cites what will be received rather than what could be lost. Instead of informing a participant of what they will receive if they are not fully vested when they leave their job, an employee may better understand the financial consequences of the vesting policy if the employer clearly informs them that they will lose a percentage of their account balance if they leave before becoming fully vested. However, according to a retirement professional we interviewed, employers seeking to attract employees have an incentive to make the plan sound generous.

Plans can also include information in their SPDs about provisions that are not used by the plan, a practice which is not explicitly prohibited by ERISA, making it difficult for participants to know which contribution is currently being offered and which eligibility and vesting policies apply. One plan sponsor explained that this is a common practice because plans want to avoid the time and expense of revising the plan documents later if they decide, for example, to change the type of employer contribution. One SPD we reviewed contained information about six employer contributions when only one contribution was offered (see fig. 10). This practice leaves participants with extraneous information and no clear way to tell what policies apply to them without additional information from their employer. Treasury officials said that it may be necessary for employers to describe contributions that they are not currently offering to employees, should they need to make these contributions at a later date in order to pass the Internal Revenue Code nondiscrimination tests. However, those officials agreed that the description of multiple employer contributions in SPDs can be confusing to participants as they may not be able to determine which contribution currently applies to them.

Employers can do more than the minimum required communication and look for innovative and effective ways to improve participant understanding of plan policies. Our survey of 80 plan sponsors found that the highest number reported using new employee orientation and a welcome packet (63 and 62, respectively) to communicate eligibility and vesting policies to employees. One participant advocate we interviewed suggested that discussing policies one-on-one is the best way to communicate rules to employees, but said that approach is costly. Another suggestion was to tailor plan information to participants. For example, that participant advocate suggested that a plan notice communicating eligibility policies could read: “as of (specific date), you are eligible to participate in the plan (or to get an employer match).” The advocate also suggested that communications could increase in frequency ahead of the eligibility event, like a countdown, referring to eligibility like a prize to build excitement. Specifically, messages such as, “congratulations, you are now eligible…” can be effective in triggering behavior, like enrollment in the plan. Several experts we interviewed generally agreed that employers should simplify communications about plan eligibility and vesting policies to increase employee understanding, which could mean presenting information in a more concise, manageable format. Figure 11 shows an example of a short summary of plan highlights, which was provided by one plan service provider we interviewed. The first page of the 2.5 page document summarizes the plan’s basic rules for eligibility and vesting, does so using short sentences, and does not require the reader to refer to other sections of the document to fully understand the rules.

ERISA requires that summary plan descriptions (SPD) be written in a manner that can be understood by the average plan participant and be sufficiently comprehensive to inform participants of their rights and obligations under the plan. In addition, SPDs must explain a plan’s provisions with respect to eligibility and vesting, but plans have discretion in how they present these provisions. Under ERISA, DOL is responsible for enforcing requirements pertaining to the disclosure of companies’ retirement plan policies, including that plan policies should be communicated clearly. To do this, DOL issues regulations, can make judgments about the clarity of plan documents, and can issue guidance to plans on how to best comply with the intent of the laws and regulations. While its regulations restate the requirements in ERISA and list specific policies that should be included in the plan description, the agency is not more specific about what constitutes clear communication of policies and what does not. Because ERISA and DOL’s regulations pertaining to SPDs are not prescriptive about how plan sponsors can explain their plans’ eligibility and vesting policies clearly, plan sponsors may provide information in a way that meets the necessary requirements rather than in a manner most likely to be clear and helpful to participants. DOL also has a policy that it will not make determinations about the clarity of plan documents. Agency officials told us that they have this policy because determining whether specific wording is clear is highly subjective. Currently, DOL has not issued guidance that identifies best practices for communicating information on eligibility and vesting, which could assist plan sponsors with improving the clarity of those policies in SPDs. By providing guidance with best practices to help plan sponsors clearly and accurately communicate eligibility and vesting requirements, DOL can help ensure that workers better understand the information necessary to make informed choices regarding their employment and savings behavior. In addition, such guidance could include encouraging plans to provide information only on contributions actually made by employers—a best practice which could help participants better understand the plan policies that affect them.

Conclusions

401(k) plans were created four years after ERISA was passed in 1974. Since that time, 401(k) plans have become the dominant employer- sponsored plan relied on by employees for retirement savings. Understanding the eligibility and vesting policies used by these plans has become increasingly important for workers, employers, and regulators. However, some of these policies were created to address issues when plans were more of a supplemental source of retirement income, in addition to a traditional pension, and reliant only on non-matching contributions from an employer rather than on a match of employee contributions. As 401(k) plans become the primary, and often sole, retirement savings vehicles for a large segment of the mobile workforce, there is a growing need to consider the effects of eligibility and vesting policies on workers, particularly those who are younger, less-educated, and with lower incomes. Moreover, one of the reported advantages of account-based plans like 401(k) plans is their enhanced portability over traditional pensions. Yet current rules and plan sponsor practices suggest some limitations on that portability, which can have potentially significant effects on retirement security.

Workers who must meet minimum-age eligibility policies to begin participating in a workplace plan miss out not only on contributing to 401(k) accounts, but also on the opportunity to receive employer matching contributions, which can significantly increase the amount contributed to their accounts. Saving early is particularly important for those who join the workforce out of high school and may never pursue higher education, with its associated higher wages. Our projections show that the inability to save in a 401(k) plan from ages 18 to 21 can result in tens of thousands of foregone retirement savings. While turnover among young workers can create administrative costs for an employer, these costs often are borne by participants in the form of fees. Extending plan eligibility to allow otherwise eligible workers to at least save their own contributions in their employers’ 401(k) plans at an age earlier than 21 could help young workers improve their retirement security by saving through their workplace plan at a time when those savings have the most to gain.

Minimum-service eligibility policies can also affect employees’ ability to save for retirement. Re-examining the legal definition of “year of service” used in minimum-service eligibility policies can help to ensure that the rules are consistent with today’s mobile workforce and use of 401(k) plans. Opening 401(k) plans to more workers could result in additional small accounts, which are sometimes abandoned by their owner. But that challenge can be mitigated in ways that do not reduce savings. At the same time, opening 401(k) plans to more workers could help many who now lack coverage to access a workplace retirement plan and make tax- deferred contributions toward their retirement security.

Last day policies can also affect employees’ retirement savings. Given the mobility of today’s workforce, all workers are potentially affected by these policies. Further, policies that allow employers to delay making matching contributions to participants until the end of the year can also result in foregone savings. This type of policy can affect not only employees who separate from a job after a year or two, but also those who spend their entire career with the same employer. The policy is a remnant of the profit sharing plan era, when employers typically calculated benefits at the end of the year. Few employers rely on profit sharing contributions alone these days, so delayed employer contributions may be unnecessary. Considering whether these provisions should be adjusted could help ensure they reflect today’s mobile workforce and use of matching contributions in 401(k) plans.

Vesting policies also present missed opportunities to improve savings for workers who are mobile. Given that the median length of stay with a private sector employer is currently about 4 years, the rule permitting a 6- year vesting policy may be outdated. Employees who forfeit employer contributions to their account when they leave a job prior to the end of the plan’s vesting period lose the opportunity to have those funds grow in the plan or to transfer those contributions into their new employer’s plan, reducing their retirement savings. A re-examination by Treasury of the appropriateness of current maximum vesting policies could help determine whether they unduly reduce the retirement savings of workers who change jobs.

Finally, having clear and concise information about their retirement plan’s eligibility and vesting policies helps employees make informed decisions affecting their retirement savings. Guidance from DOL can help plan sponsors better inform participants about the plan policies that they must understand to make optimal decisions.

Matters for Congressional Consideration

To help increase plan participation and individuals’ retirement savings, Congress should consider updating ERISA’s 401(k) plan eligibility provisions to: extend plan eligibility to otherwise eligible workers at an age earlier amend the definition of “year of service,” given the prevalence of part- time workers in today’s workforce.

In addition, Congress may wish to consider whether ERISA’s provisions related to last day policies and the timing of employer matching contributions need to be adjusted to reflect today’s mobile workforce and workplace plans, which are predominantly 401(k) plans offering matching employer contributions.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To ensure that current vesting policies appropriately balance plans’ needs and interests with the needs of workers to have employment mobility while also saving for retirement, Treasury should evaluate the appropriateness of existing maximum vesting policies for account-based plans, considering today’s mobile labor force, and seek legislative action to revise vesting schedules, if deemed necessary. The Department of Labor could provide assistance with such an evaluation.

To help participants better understand eligibility and vesting policies, DOL should develop guidance for plan sponsors that identifies best practices for communicating information about eligibility and vesting policies in a clear manner in summary plan descriptions. For example, DOL could discourage plans from including in documents information about employer contributions or other provisions that are not actually being used by the plan sponsor.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of the Treasury and Labor, and the Internal Revenue Service. Treasury provided technical comments, including those of IRS, which we have incorporated where appropriate, and oral comments, as discussed below. DOL provided written comments, which are summarized below and reproduced in Appendix III.

With respect to our recommendation that Treasury evaluate existing maximum vesting policies, Treasury had no formal comment. As we detail in our report on pages 44-46, given the effect that vesting policies can have on the retirement savings of mobile workers, we believe that it would be beneficial for Treasury to evaluate current vesting policies. Treasury may be able to incorporate an evaluation of these policies into the analysis it conducts in preparing the annual “Greenbook,” highlighted in our report on page 12, and which accompanies the President’s annual budget submission and outlines the President’s tax-related legislative proposals. DOL, in its written comments, stated that substantive provisions of Title I of ERISA governing eligibility and vesting provisions in 401(k) plans are under the interpretive and regulatory jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury. DOL also stated that Treasury and IRS generally consult with DOL on subjects of joint interest and it expects they will do so regarding our report.

With regard to our recommendation to develop guidance for plan sponsors that identifies best practices for communicating information about eligibility and vesting policies in a clear manner in summary plan descriptions, DOL agreed that disclosures explaining these policies are important to participants’ ability to make informed choices about retirement savings. DOL also stated that under current law and regulations, this information must be written in a manner that can be understood by the average participant. DOL described planned actions that GAO believes are consistent with the intent of our recommendation. For example, DOL noted that an evaluation of best practices regarding eligibility and vesting should consider other disclosures provided to plan participants. DOL highlighted a long-term project on its current regulatory agenda relating to individual benefit statements, another type of disclosure provided to participants. DOL said that additional input from a broader range of plan sponsors and plan fiduciaries, possibly obtained through a Request for Information published in the Federal Register, could supplement the information we highlight in our report on pages 52- 58 and contribute to an informed development of best practices guidance.

DOL stated that it did not agree that implementing the recommendation allows the best use of its limited resources. DOL stated it would not be appropriate at this time to reallocate resources away from its existing priority projects to a new best practices project focused on our recommendation, especially given the regulatory requirements that currently apply to summary plan discrimination disclosures on eligibility and vesting. However, DOL stated it would review its existing outreach materials on plan administration and compliance for opportunities to highlight the issues we raised in our report, as well as consider our recommendation in the ongoing development and prioritization of its agenda for regulations and sub-regulatory guidance. We agree with DOL that the efforts it plans to take in response to our recommendation, if fully implemented, will meet the intent of the recommendation and help plan sponsors more clearly communicate eligibility and vesting policies to plan participants without developing guidance.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of Labor and the Treasury, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or jeszeckc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Overview of Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report examines: (1) what is known about the prevalence of 401(k) plans’ eligibility and vesting policies and why plans use them, (2) the potential effects of eligibility and vesting policies on workers’ retirement savings, and (3) participants’ understanding of these policies. We did not examine the use of these policies by defined benefit plans or by public retirement plans.

We reviewed survey data, industry data, and conducted interviews to determine what is known about the prevalence of eligibility and vesting policies and why plans use them. To identify what is known about the prevalence of eligibility and vesting policies, we conducted a non- generalizable survey of plan sponsors and plan professionals with plans ranging in size from less than 100 participants to more than 5,000. We received 80 responses to this survey. We also reviewed nongeneralizable data from Plan Sponsor Council of America’s (PSCA) annual survey of defined contribution plans, which covered 613 plans with 8 million participants and $832 billion in plan assets. PSCA’s dataset represents plans of varying sizes and industries, but includes a greater proportion of large plans based on participant numbers and assets and disproportionately represents the financial, insurance, and real estate industries when compared to the total population of plans, as measured by 2013 Form 5500 filings. In addition, we reviewed non-generalizable data from Vanguard’s 2015 report on the 1,900 qualified plans for which it serves as record keeper. These two were the only datasets we identified with detailed information on eligibility and vesting policies. We evaluated another large dataset and determined that it was not reliable enough for our purposes. We also analyzed generalizable Census Bureau survey data to identify which eligibility policies affect workers, as reported by the workers themselves.

To assess the reliability of these data, we interviewed staff from Vanguard and the Census Bureau who are responsible for producing the data. We also reviewed documentation related to these data sources, such as descriptions of their methodology. We also performed various tests on the data. For the PSCA data, we compared selected data from PSCA’s 2013 survey—the survey we used—to data from PSCA’s 2012 survey to assess the consistency of the data. Specifically, we reviewed basic survey respondent demographic data (respondents by plan type, amount of plan assets, and industry) and key data on eligibility and vesting (the percentage of plans with service restrictions for plan eligibility, the percentage of plans with age restrictions for plan eligibility, and the percentage of plans that have vesting policies that require a service period for the vesting of matching employer contributions). We also evaluated the makeup of the plans included in PSCA’s survey by comparing selected demographic data from PSCA’s survey to Department of Labor Form 5500 plan demographic data. For the Vanguard data, we asked a Vanguard official who is responsible for the data questions about the scope of the data, how the data are collected and maintained, and whether they have any limitations. We also compared the eligibility and vesting data to the data from PSCA’s survey and our own survey of plan sponsors. For the Census Bureau data, we performed electronic testing for missing data, outliers, and obvious errors. Based on these steps, we determined that the PSCA, Vanguard, and Census Bureau data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also interviewed government officials from the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Department of Labor, as well as retirement professionals, to determine whether they were aware of any data sources regarding the prevalence of eligibility and vesting policies and to obtain their perspectives on the policies’ prevalence. See “Selection and Categorization of Interviewees” later in this section for more information on our interviews.

To determine why plans use eligibility and vesting policies, we surveyed plan sponsors and plan professionals by including a link to our survey in four industry publications (80 responded). The questions asked respondents to identify and rank the importance of multiple factors in their decision to use specific eligibility and vesting policies. To supplement our survey, we interviewed government officials, retirement professionals, and academic researchers to obtain their perspectives on why plans use eligibility and vesting policies. For additional context and perspectives, we also held two structured group interviews at a regional defined contribution plan conference with an open invitation to plan sponsors and plan service providers to discuss the reasons why plans use these policies.

To examine the policies’ potential effects on retirement savings over time, we developed hypothetical scenarios to illustrate what the effect could be for an individual based on a number of assumptions. For the hypothetical projections, we made a number of assumptions regarding salary levels, employee deferrals, employer matches, and investment returns drawn from federal and industry data sources, including Bureau of Labor Statistics data, PSCA’s annual defined contribution plan sponsor survey on plan policies used, and the Social Security Trustees’ report (2015 Trustees Report, long range projections, intermediate assumptions). (See Appendix II for a detailed explanation of the assumptions used and additional tables providing more projections for comparison as well as inflation-adjusted values.) We also interviewed officials from the Department of Labor, Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as a total of 21 retirement professionals and academic researchers to discuss what is known about these policies’ effects on savings over time.

To assess participants’ understanding of eligibility and vesting policies, we used data from the National Association of Retirement Plan Participants’ (NARPP) Participant Survey: Study of Financial Empowerment Literacy and Trust (FELT survey) to identify participants’ understanding of financial terms, and generalizable data from a Defined Contribution Plan 2015 Study of Participant Satisfaction and Loyalty (DCP) to identify the decisions that participants would make about their employment based on their understanding of their companies’ 401(k) policies. NARPP’s FELT surveys approximately 5,000 current 401(k) and 403(b) participants yearly, and was administered in April 2015. To assist us with our work, NARPP agreed to include the terms “eligibility requirement” and “vesting period” to the list of terms already included in their financial literacy survey. The DCP surveys an internet panel of over 5,000 respondents and was administered during the month of April 2015. NARPP provided the surveys’ summary responses to us for our analysis. To assess the reliability of the data from the DCP and FELT surveys, we interviewed an official from Boston Research Technologies who is responsible for managing the two surveys. We also independently conducted manual tests of the DCP survey data and compared selected survey responses to similar data from other samples of defined contribution plan participants. We found the data to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We did not perform separate tests on the FELT survey, which uses the same sampling frame and procedures as the DCP survey.

We further assessed participants’ understanding of eligibility and vesting policies by administering a questionnaire to individuals testing their knowledge of the eligibility and vesting policies used by their 401(k) plans and comparing their answers to the actual policies in their plans’ summary plan descriptions (SPD), summaries of material modification, and exchanges with plan administrators . This allowed us to determine the accuracy of their knowledge rather than rely on their self-reported knowledge. We analyzed the accuracy of the 46 responses by reviewing plan documents provided by the sponsors or their service providers and emailed the sponsors directly to confirm that we understood the plan policies correctly, as necessary. See Survey Data Sources below for details on the survey design and implementation. To further assess the clarity of plans’ eligibility and vesting policies, we reviewed the SPDs of five companies, including those we surveyed regarding participant understanding. One SPD was provided by a third-party plan administrator who we interviewed. Additionally, we conducted online searches for relevant literature and asked interviewees to advise us regarding relevant studies and papers. We then assessed the relevance of the studies to our research questions to include those findings, as appropriate. Also, to understand what sources of information on eligibility and vesting policies participants typically have, we held two discussion groups with plan sponsors and plan advisors and asked them to identify the methods plans use to communicate their policies. Results of our review of the SPDs and discussion groups are not generalizable, but provide additional context and perspective. Finally, we interviewed retirement professionals and academic researchers, as discussed below, to get their perspectives on participants’ understanding of eligibility and vesting policies and to invite their suggestions on how this information can be more effectively presented to improve participant understanding. For example, we spoke to several financial literacy experts who made observations about financial decision making more generally and what that could tell us about eligibility and vesting policies specifically.

Survey Data Sources

Plan Sponsor and Plan Professional Questionnaire

Design and implementation. We developed a web-based questionnaire for plan sponsors and plan professionals to collect information on eligibility and vesting policies. The questionnaire included questions on the types of eligibility and vesting policies plans use and the reasons they use these policies. In addition, the questionnaire included questions on the timing of employer contributions, including whether plan participants have to be employed on the last day of the year to receive employer contributions and the schedule for making employer contributions. Throughout the questionnaire, our questions focused on employer contributions and did not distinguish between matching and non-matching contributions. To inform our understanding of participants’ understanding of eligibility and vesting policies, the questionnaire also included questions regarding their views on the degree to which participants understand these policies and how they are informed of the policies.

To minimize errors arising from differences in how questions might be interpreted and to reduce variability in responses that should be qualitatively the same, we conducted pretests with three individuals external to GAO. The individuals included: an academic researcher, a retirement professional, and a benefits coordinator for a manufacturing company. Further, two GAO staff with expertise in the retirement area and two staff with expertise in survey design reviewed the survey for content and consistency. Based on feedback from these pretests, we revised the questionnaire in order to improve question clarity. For instance, in response to the benefits coordinator’s suggestion to clarify the language used in a question focused on whether certain types of employees are excluded from the plan, we modified the question to clarify that we were asking whether employees in certain job classifications are excluded from the plan.

After completing the pretests, we administered the survey. Starting in May 2015, we asked three industry groups to announce – through their publications – an invitation for plan sponsors to complete our survey. These groups included a link to our survey in their publications. Those publications were: an email newsletter published by PLANSPONSOR, Plan Sponsor Council of America’s annual survey of plans, and Pensions & Investments’ Plan Sponsor Digest and Pensions & Investments Daily, which are two publications directed at plan sponsors. We also included a link to the survey in an online forum for American Society of Pension Professionals and Actuaries (ASPPA) members who are owners or senior managers of plan administration firms. We directly received responses through August 31, 2015. We received 80 completed surveys. We cannot report a response rate as it is possible that respondents submitted multiple surveys or individuals responded who were not plan sponsors. Sponsors and plan professionals could respond anonymously, and some respondents did not provide contact information.

Analysis of responses and data quality. We used standard descriptive statistics to analyze responses to the questionnaire. Because this was not a sample survey, there are no sampling errors. To minimize other types of errors, commonly referred to as non-sampling errors, and to enhance data quality, we employed recognized survey design practices in the development of the questionnaire and in the collection, processing, and analysis of the survey data. For instance, as previously mentioned, we pretested and reviewed the questionnaire with individuals internal and external to GAO to enhance the clarity of our questions, which minimizes the likelihood of errors arising from differences in how questions might be interpreted and helps to reduce the variability in responses that should be qualitatively the same. To help reduce nonresponse, another source of non-sampling error, we asked the industry groups that publicized the survey to re-publicize it to further encourage respondents to complete the survey. In reviewing the survey data, we performed automated checks to identify inappropriate answers. We further reviewed the data for missing or ambiguous responses and followed up with respondents when necessary to clarify their responses. On the basis of our application of recognized survey design practices and follow-up procedures, we determined that the data were of sufficient quality for our purposes.

Plan Participant Questionnaire

Design and implementation. We developed a web-based questionnaire directed at plan participants to collect information on their understanding of their companies’ 401(k) eligibility and vesting policies. The questionnaire included questions about the individual’s own eligibility and vesting status. In addition, the questionnaire included questions on the timing of employer contributions, including whether plan participants have to be employed on the last day of the year to receive employer contributions. The participants’ responses and our analysis of their accuracy are not generalizable.

To minimize errors arising from differences in how questions might be interpreted and to reduce variability in responses that should be qualitatively the same, we conducted pretests with two subject matter experts and conducted pretests with three plan participants from external companies. We also reviewed the survey with internal survey experts. Based on feedback from these pretests, we revised the questionnaire to improve question clarity. After completing the pretests, we administered the survey using an online platform. To identify participants to test, we first invited every plan sponsor who had provided contact information to us when completing a separate plan sponsor survey to distribute a separate questionnaire to their plan participants. Four plans agreed to distribute a hyperlink to our participant questionnaire. We sent a link to the survey to the participating sponsors and asked them to disseminate the link and invite their plan participants to complete the questionnaire. Starting on December 8, 2015, we made the survey available for the participants to complete. While we asked the plans to send periodic reminders, we did not have direct access to the participant groups and we were not included on those communications. We did not select the participants in any way or have input into who responded to the survey. The survey closed on January 27, 2016. We received 50 completed questionnaires and analyzed 46 of them. In the process of comparing the survey responses to the plan descriptions, we manually reviewed each survey response for outliers or errors in skip patterns. We excluded two surveys because the respondents had no 401(k) account but said they were eligible so they were not asked any further substantive questions. Two others were excluded because they began employment on a date before which we had a record of plan policies, so we could not analyze the accuracy of their responses. Some respondents did not click the “completed” button at the end of the survey and were not included in our analysis. We cannot report a response rate as it is possible that respondents submitted multiple surveys. In addition, most respondents did not provide contact information. Evaluating the accuracy of participant responses was the purpose of this survey, so our findings in that regard are an assessment of data quality.

Analysis of participant responses and data quality. To describe what is known about participants’ understanding of their companies’ 401(k) plan eligibility and vesting requirements, we reviewed participant responses at the four companies we surveyed. We compared the employee responses regarding the eligibility and vesting requirements that applied to them when they began working to information in the respective summary plan description (SPD), and obtained clarification from plan officials, as needed. Plans may issue new plan documents and change policies over time, so to test individuals’ knowledge of the eligibility policies that affected them when they were hired, we used the policies in place at that time rather than the eligibility policies in place most recently, when they differed. For example, to determine the employee’s eligibility to join the plan, we identified the employee’s start date and determined if there were any factors that would have prevented them from immediately enrolling in the plan. In cases where we did not have the plan document for the year the participant was hired, we reviewed the plan document published before and after their hire date and reviewed summaries of material modifications. If the information about the plan policies in the two plan documents from before and after their date of hire were the same, we used it to determine the accuracy of the participant’s answer. However, when we could not determine the plan policy for the relevant time period, we excluded the participant response from our analysis of that question. For policy questions regarding current plan policies (like frequency of employer contributions, and if the participant is required to work on a particular day to receive employer contributions) we used the current plan policy to determine the accuracy of responses. We reviewed the plan details to identify information about the vesting schedule. Three of the four companies we surveyed currently offer automatic enrollment to eligible workers. Automatic enrollment is a plan feature by which eligible workers are enrolled in the plan by default and can opt-out if they do not wish to participate in the plan.

Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)

Administered by the Census Bureau, the SIPP is a household-based survey designed as a continuous series of national panels. The Census Bureau uses a two-stage stratified design to produce a nationally representative panel of respondents who are interviewed over a period of approximately 3 to 4 years. Within a SIPP panel, the entire sample is interviewed at various intervals called waves (from 1983 through 2013, generally 4-month intervals). In addition to income and public program participation, the SIPP includes data on other factors of economic well- being, demographics, and household characteristics. We used data from the most recent relevant data set, the 2008 SIPP.

Plan Sponsor Council of America’s (PSCA) 57th Annual Survey of Plans

PSCA’s survey, which includes data for plan year 2013, covers a total of 613 profit sharing, 401(k), and combination 401(k)/profit sharing plans. Only 2 percent of plans included in the survey are profit sharing plans and therefore we determined the data are sufficiently representative of the 401(k) plan experience. PSCA, established in 1947, is a national, non- profit trade association of 1,200 companies and over six million plan participants. PSCA has conducted an annual survey of plans for nearly 60 years.

Selection and Categorization of Interviewees

As part of our approach for obtaining information on why plans use eligibility and vesting policies and participant understanding of these policies, we interviewed government officials and a total of 21 retirement professionals and academic researchers. We identified interviewees based on our prior work examining 401(k) plans and recommendations from initial interviewees. We selected interviewees who reflect a range of perspectives, from those with a focus on plan participants to those with a focus on plan sponsors. We selected federal government officials with a role in overseeing eligibility and vesting policies: officials of the Department of Labor, the Department of the Treasury, and the Internal Revenue Service. We also interviewed an official from the Securities and Exchange Commission, an agency that has a role in regulating the investment options into which plan participants direct their contributions. We categorized interviewees as retirement professionals if they provide retirement plan-related services (such as those who serve as consultants to plans), represent the interests of retirement plans or plan participants, or otherwise perform work in the retirement area. We categorized interviewees as academic researchers if they teach at an institution of higher education and focus on conducting scholarly research relevant to the retirement area. The views of those interviewed are not generalizable.

Appendix II: Explanation of Hypothetical Scenarios and Projected Retirement Savings

Explanation of Assumptions Used

Employee salary and retirement age. We assume that the worker starts working at age 18 in 2016, and is continuously employed through retirement at age 67 in 2065. We modeled lifetime earnings using medium scaled earnings factors developed by the Social Security Administration’s Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) (see table 8). These factors express hypothetical earnings at each age as a percent of the Social Security Administration’s national average wage index. The scaled factors are based on average work and earnings of actual insured workers over their careers. This approach has the advantage of reflecting actual earnings histories, with steeper wage growth earlier in early- and mid-career work years, and flatter wage growth in late-career work years. Nominal wage increases an average of 5.6 percent per year. However, this approach does not reflect the possibility that less-skilled workers and lower earners may have flatter wage growth over their lifetime than higher-skilled workers. For this reason, we ran an alternative scenario for low earners featuring a constant nominal wage growth of 4.6 percent (see table 9). This alternative scenario demonstrates that the loss of early savings has a bigger effect on total savings at retirement for workers with flatter earnings growth than for workers with steeper earnings growth. We assume a retirement in 2065 at age of 67 because that is the Social Security full retirement age for workers starting their careers in 2016.

Inflation. To report adjusted salaries and other figures we indexed to 2016 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) projected under intermediate assumptions from the 2015 Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Trustee’s report.

Employee deferrals. We assume that the individual in our hypothetical projections makes contributions continuously through their continuous employment from age 18 to 66, except where contributions are suspended to illustrate the effect of an eligibility policy. PSCA survey data from the 2013 plan year show that the average pre-tax salary deferral by participants was 5.3 percent for non-highly compensated employees. We referred to data from the 2013 plan year in PSCA’s report summarizing results of its annual survey of 401(k) and profit sharing plans. Plans reported on policies for the 2013 plan year. The survey includes 613 defined contribution plans with 8 million participants representing a wide range of industries and plan sizes. The plans surveyed are 252 401(k) plans, 13 profit sharing plans, and 348 combination 401(k)/profit sharing plans. As noted in Appendix I, the PSCA population for 2013 includes a greater proportion of large plans based on participant numbers and assets and disproportionately represents the financial, insurance, and real estate industries when compared to the total population of plans, as measured by 2013 Form 5500 filings. The finance/insurance/real estate industry was the predominant industry reflected in the PSCA data (36 percent of plans were in this industry), while over half of the plans included in the Form 5500 filings (53 percent) represented the services industry.

Employer matching contributions. We assume that the individual in our hypothetical projections receives employer contributions through their continuous employment from age 18 to 66, except where employer contributions are delayed or forfeited to illustrate the effect of an eligibility or vesting policy. We again referred to the PSCA survey data from the 2013 plan year. The average employer contribution among 401(k) plans is 2.90 percent, which we rounded to 3 percent for our hypothetical calculations. Similarly, the most commonly used match formula is 50 percent of employee deferrals up to 6 percent of salary (a max of 3 percent) used by 26.2 percent of plans. The next most common levels of employer contribution are a 100 percent match up to 4 percent of employee pay and a 100 percent employer match up to 5 percent, used by 10.9 percent and 9.9 percent of plans, respectively. The hypothetical projected amounts of retirement savings from employer contributions that is foregone from delayed eligibility and forfeited contributions from unmet vesting policies could be even larger if one assumed a higher, though not uncommon, level of employer matching contributions. We also assume that employer contributions are made on a per-pay-period basis, unless calculated otherwise for comparison.

Returns. To set an annual return for each of the years of the worker’s career for our hypothetical scenarios we formulated a composite return based on Social Security Trustee projections. For the fixed income portion of the return, we used the Social Security Trustees’ projected annual trust fund real interest rate of 2.90 percent, and the projected consumer-price index for urban wage earners and clerical workers (CPI- W) of 2.70 percent, both published in the 2015 OASDI Trustee’s Report intermediate long range economic assumptions, for a nominal interest rate of 5.6 percent. For the equity portion of the return, we added an estimated long-term equity risk premium of 3.5 percentage points to the annual trust fund nominal interest rate, for a nominal rate of return on stocks of 9.1 percent. We changed the ratio slightly each year to reduce equities exposure and investment risk as the worker approaches retirement. The ratio corresponds to a “100 minus age” rule, which means that the percentage of assets invested in equities is set at 100 minus the worker’s current age. For example, when the worker is 50 years old, we assume that just half of their assets are invested in equities and assign the nominal return on stocks to just 50 percent of their retirement savings, while the remaining portion is calculated to earn the nominal interest rate on bonds. The “100 minus age” rule for portfolio diversification is relatively conservative, thus the projected value at retirement that we report is less than it would be if we had assumed a rule using a higher equities allocation. For example, another rule used for portfolio diversification is “120 minus age,” which would mean a higher equities allocation and higher projected returns, because over time equities tend to produce a higher average annual return than corporate bonds. A lower return assumption would result in lower projected savings lost or forfeited from the policies discussed in this report.

Leakage and fees. We assumed no leakage from the worker’s account over time and did not apply any plan fees to the account balance. Both of these factors could decrease the rate of the account balance’s growth over time.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Tamara Cross (Assistant Director), Angie Jacobs (Analyst in Charge), Sherwin Chapman, Katherine D. Morris, Rhiannon Patterson, and Stacy Spence made significant contributions to this report. Additional support was provided by Jessica Artis, Deborah Bland, Julianne Cutts, Laura Hoffrey, Saida Hussain, Gene Kuehneman, Jill Lacey, Sheila McCoy, Mimi Nguyen, Dae Park, Joe Silvestri, Frank Todisco, Walter Vance, Kate Van Gelder, Adam Wendel, Jill Yost, and Chris Zbrozek.

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Retirement Security: Most Households Approaching Retirement Have Low Savings. GAO-15-419. Washington, D.C.: May 12, 2015. 401(k) Plans: Greater Protections Needed for Forced Transfers and Inactive Accounts. GAO-15-73. Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2014.

Private Pensions: Pension Tax Incentives Update. GAO-14-334R. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2014.

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