International Religious Freedom Act: State Department and Commission Are Implementing Responsibilities but Need to Improve Interaction
Released: 2013-03-26T00:00:00

Letter

Background

The Act Established International Religious Freedom as a U.S. Foreign Policy Objective

In passing the Act, Congress noted that, at that time, more than half of the world’s population lived under regimes that severely restricted or prohibited citizens from freely observing their religious beliefs. In addition, the Act describes government-sponsored and government-tolerated violations to religious freedom that people faced, including slander campaigns; confiscation of property; denial of the right to assemble; and prohibitions against publishing, distributing, or possessing religious literature. According to the Act, religious believers in many countries also faced severe and violent forms of religious persecution, such as imprisonment, torture, beatings, mass resettlement, and death for their peaceful belief in, change of, or practice of their faith.

In its findings on religious freedom, the Act refers to the U.S. Constitution and various principles of international law. The first amendment of the U.S. Constitution established the right to freely exercise religious beliefs, and according to the Act, “the right to freedom of religion undergirds the very origin and existence of the United States.” In addition, the Act highlights principles of international law, such as those outlined in the United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which identify religious freedom as a universal human right. For example, according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance.”

The Act states that it shall be the policy of the United States to condemn violations of religious freedom and to promote and assist other governments in the promotion of religious freedom. The Act describes several actions that the United States shall take in accordance with this policy objective, including the implementation of appropriate diplomatic, political, commercial, and other tools to promote respect for religious freedom by all governments and peoples. In July 2012, the Secretary of State reiterated the U.S. government’s commitment to promote religious freedom and said that the administration had elevated religious freedom as a diplomatic priority. She also discussed her personal diplomatic outreach around the world concerning religious freedom and the appointment of the first envoy to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

The Act Established Two Separate Entities and Outlined Their Responsibilities

The Act Established State’s Office and Ambassador-at- Large for International Religious Freedom and Outlined State’s Responsibilities

In accordance with the Act, State created the Office of International Religious Freedom (the Office) in 1999, headed by the Ambassador-at- Large for International Religious Freedom (the Ambassador). State placed the Office within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL). Three individuals have served in this position (see fig. 1).The position has been vacant for approximately 4.5 of the 14 years since the Act’s passage, primarily because of delays in the presidential nomination process.

The Act outlines four primary responsibilities for the Ambassador: (1) promote religious freedom, (2) serve as a principal adviser to the President and Secretary of State on religious freedom issues abroad, (3) represent the U.S. government diplomatically in matters relevant to religious freedom abroad, and (4) report on the status of international religious freedom annually. Although the Act directs that the Ambassador is the head of the Office, it does not explicitly outline responsibilities for the Office. State officials said that the primary responsibilities of the Office mirror those established for the Ambassador.

The Act also established USCIRF, comprising nine volunteer members (commissioners); the President, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives each appoints three members. Moreover, the Act established that the Ambassador would serve ex officio as a nonvoting member of the commission. USCIRF has a professional staff and an executive director, in addition to the commissioners.

Specifically, the Act states that of the three members of the commission that are appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, two shall be appointed upon the recommendation of the leader in the Senate of the political party that is not the political party of the President, and one shall be appointed upon the recommendation of the leader in the Senate of the other political party. Similarly, the Act states that of the three members of the commission that are appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, two shall be appointed upon the recommendation of the leader in the House of the political party that is not the political party of the President, and of which one of the members shall be appointed upon the recommendation of the leader in the House of the other political party. See Pub. L. No. 105-292, Sec. 201(b) and 22 U.S.C. § 6431(b)(1)(B). circumstances presented in State’s annual report and of information from other sources where appropriate. The Act authorized USCIRF to hold hearings, and a 1999 amendment to the Act authorized USCIRF to conduct travel and to secure information from any federal agency as necessary to carry out its duties. Since fiscal year 2000, Congress has appropriated more than $42 million for USCIRF’s activities.

The Act established USCIRF as a 4-year commission, and the 1999 amendment to the Act established that USCIRF would terminate on May 14, 2003. The Act established a 2-year term of office for each commissioner and also allowed for the reappointment of each commissioner to a second term. In 2002, Congress amended the Act again to extend USCIRF’s authority to September 30, 2011, but did not establish term limits for commissioners. In 2011, Congress extended the termination date to September 30, 2014, and implemented some additional changes, including placing a limit of two 2-year terms on commissioners. As a result of the term limits, 7 of the 9 commissioners at that time were required to leave the commission. Since 1999, 33 commissioners have served on USCIRF; 9 have served for 5 or more years, and 3 have served for 10 or more years.

State Is Implementing the Primary Responsibilities Established in the Act but Has Provided Inconsistent Reporting Policy and Guidance for the Ambassador

State, including the Ambassador and the Office, is implementing the primary responsibilities outlined in the Act. The Ambassador, with the support of the Office, promotes religious freedom, advises the President and Secretary of State, represents the United States diplomatically on international religious freedom issues, and annually publishes the International Religious Freedom Report. Other entities in State, such as other offices and embassies, also take actions to implement some of the responsibilities outlined in the Act. In addition, the Ambassador and the Office support the Secretary of State in implementing some of the responsibilities that the Act establishes for the Secretary. However, the Ambassadors-at-Large for International Religious Freedom have a lower organizational status than State’s other Ambassadors-at-Large, and State has provided inconsistent reporting policy and guidance to the Ambassadors-at-Large for International Religious Freedom.

State Is Implementing the Primary Responsibilities Established in the Act

Ambassador and Office Are Implementing Primary Responsibilities Independently and Through Efforts of Other State Entities

The Ambassador and the Office are implementing the primary responsibilities that the Act established—namely, promoting international religious freedom, advising the President and Secretary of State, diplomatically representing the United States with regard to religious freedom issues, and publishing an annual report on the status of religious freedom worldwide. The Ambassador carries out these responsibilities both independently and with the assistance of other State entities, including U.S. embassies abroad.

The Ambassador, the Office, and other State entities have undertaken actions, in accordance with both the Act and U.S. foreign policy objectives, to promote religious freedom. Examples of these activities include the following:

Hosting and participating in events. The Ambassador and the Office host, and participate in, events that promote religious freedom and tolerance through dialogue. For example, in October 2012, the Office and the U.S. Institute of Peace sponsored a public panel discussion titled “Religion, Violence, and Coexistence,” at which the Ambassador spoke. The event’s discussion focused on (1) civil society’s role in preventing and addressing statements of religious bias and (2) ways in which civil society and the U.S. government can collaborate to advance peaceful religious coexistence, freedom, and security.

Working directly with foreign governments. State officials said that the Ambassador and the Office work directly with foreign government officials to promote religious freedom by discussing concerns and assisting with the development of concrete steps a government might take to improve religious freedom or with legislative changes. For example, one Ambassador said that negotiations led to a formal public statement in which the government of Saudi Arabia clarified policies it had adopted and would pursue in order to improve religious freedom for minority faiths and eliminate religiously intolerant material from textbooks and other literature used in Saudi Arabia or exported abroad.

Elevating religious freedom issues within State. According to Office staff, the Office and the Ambassador continually work to elevate religious freedom issues within State. A State official explained that Office staff conduct numerous briefings for mid-level and executive department officials concerning religious freedom in various countries, as the situations warrant. In addition, another State official said that Office staff prepare talking points and briefing memorandums for senior State officials to use during meetings with foreign-government officials, although they told us they do not always know whether the officials use the talking points. According to a State official, the Ambassador also disseminates religious freedom-related information throughout DRL and across State.

Developing religious freedom–related grants. According to Office staff, since 2007, the Office has developed 27 religious freedom–related programs with $16.6 million in grants from DRL’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund. These programs include global initiatives and support the promotion of religious freedom across the six regions of the world, with a focus on changing societal perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. For example, one program supported in-country capacity building to establish teams to track, catalogue, and respond to religious tensions within the country. Our review of 7 of the 27 program grants found that, in general, the grantees reported that they are meeting their grant objectives, such as capacity building and public awareness. See appendix I for detailed information concerning our grant analysis.

Undertaking a variety of activities at U.S. embassies. U.S. embassies have undertaken a variety of activities to promote religious freedom, as indicated in our review of 178 cables that U.S. embassies sent from January 2009 to October 2012 addressing religious freedom in approximately 60 countries (see app. III for more detailed results of our analysis). In addition, embassy officials in the five countries where we conducted fieldwork described various embassy activities to promote religious freedom. For example, some officials told us that their embassies organized events to promote religious tolerance and dialogue, such as speaker panels; hosted religious holiday dinners and roundtable discussions; and met with foreign-government, NGO, and religious officials to discuss religious freedom. Embassy officials in two countries we visited stated that they do not receive funding specifically for religious freedom activities; rather, the embassy uses funds from its operational budget account when hosting events to promote religious freedom.

Developing other religious freedom–related programs. Other State offices have also undertaken activities to promote religious freedom. For example, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs funds and administers the International Visitor Leadership Program, which connects current and emerging foreign leaders with their U.S. counterparts through short-term professional-exchange programs. According to State officials, the program has supported the exchange of religious and civil society leaders. In addition, State’s Special Representative to Muslim Communities and former Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism launched a campaign, “2012 Hours Against Hate,” to promote respect across lines of culture, religion, tradition, class, and gender.requests, via social media, to young people asking them to pledge 1 hour or more of their time to stop hate by helping someone who does not look, live, or pray like them.

According to the Act, the Ambassador “shall be a principal adviser to the President and the Secretary of State regarding matters affecting religious freedom abroad.” The former Ambassadors and State officials told us that the three Ambassadors-at-Large for International Religious Freedom have served as a principal adviser to the President primarily by communicating with National Security Staff. For example, the Ambassadors and Office staff said that the Ambassadors communicated with National Security Staff to discuss religious freedom, including potential CPC designations. According to State officials, the current Ambassador also participates in the National Security Council’s Interagency Policy Committee meetings when religion is a topic of focus.

The three Ambassadors reported having advised the Secretary of State in a number of ways. For example, the first Ambassador said that, in addition to meeting with the Secretary of State in person, he provided her with notes from his trips to update her on religious freedom in the countries he visited. In addition, the Secretary of State occasionally asked him for specific advice on interacting with various religious communities. Similarly, the second Ambassador said he met occasionally with the Secretary of State to discuss religious freedom issues and at times participated in the Secretary’s meetings with foreign officials or religious leaders. The second and third Ambassadors told us that they also provided the Secretary of State with talking points and trip summaries. In addition, the current Ambassador said that she has served as an adviser to the Secretary of State through her role as a co-chair of the Religion and Foreign Policy Working Group, which was part of the former Secretary’s Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society.

See “Resolution adopted by the UN Human Rights Council, 16/18, Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against, persons based on religion or belief,” A/HRC/RES/16/18. officials of foreign governments, religious organizations, and NGOs to discuss religious freedom on behalf of State.

Furthermore, other State officials discuss religious freedom with foreign- government and NGO officials and with civil-society and religious leaders. For example, when visiting Turkey in 2011, the Secretary of State urged the Turkish government to reopen the Halki Seminary in Istanbul as a symbol of Turkey’s commitment to religious freedom. In addition, many of the 178 cables State provided to us described activities that the Ambassador or other embassy officials undertook to engage with foreign- government and NGO officials and with civil-society and religious leaders regarding religious freedom.

Although State has published the International Religious Freedom Report every year since 1999, the time period covered by the reports has changed over time. The 1999 report covered an 18-month period from January 1, 1998, to June 30, 1999. The subsequent 11 annual reports covered 12-month periods from July 1 of the year before the report was issued to June 30 of the year in which the report was issued. In 2010, to shift to a calendar-year reporting period, State published a second report covering the 6 months from July 1, 2010, through December 31, 2010. The 2011 report thus represented the first report to correspond to the full calendar year. State expects reports for 2012 and subsequent years to continue on the full-year schedule. significant additional resources in Washington, D.C., and in the field. For example, while other mandated reports are based largely on regular embassy reporting, embassies must obtain additional information to write the International Religious Freedom Report. State officials told us that the Office works with Foreign Service officers worldwide to write the report and that drafting and publication of the report involves a number of review phases. According to Foreign Service officers in our five fieldwork countries, they undertake a number of activities—such as monitoring court cases related to religious freedom and maintaining relationships with religious communities, religious leaders, civil society, NGOs, and foreign-government officials throughout the year—to gather information for the report. After they complete the initial drafts, numerous offices and bureaus in Washington review and revise the draft country reports through an iterative process. Before finalizing the report, embassies and various State offices approve each country report and relevant sections.

The Act establishes several responsibilities that the Secretary of State conducts with the assistance of the Ambassador and the Office. These include designating CPCs, developing religious freedom–related training for Foreign Service officers, including chiefs of mission, and establishing an international religious freedom website.

In response to the Act, the Secretary of State has reviewed the status of religious freedom in each foreign country and designated those countries whose government has engaged in, or tolerated, particularly severe violations of religious freedom as CPCs. State officials said that the Secretary of State tasks the Office with the development of CPC recommendations. State does not designate CPCs every year, and according to State officials, the Act does not require the agency to do so. A State official said that the Office develops the recommendations based on its assessment of many factors, including (1) whether the government is restricting rights or is complicit in allowing certain groups to be targeted and (2) whether issues are systematic, egregious, and ongoing. According to State officials, the Office reviews the International Religious Freedom Report and consults with the Ambassador, DRL management, and others within and outside State when developing recommendations for the CPC list. For example, the Office meets with USCIRF officials and considers their recommendations. The Office also discusses the CPC recommendations with National Security Staff. On the basis of the Office’s recommendations, the Ambassador and DRL management determine the final list of countries they will recommend for CPC designation to the Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State periodically designates CPCs after reviewing the recommendations that the Ambassador and DRL management provide. Since 1999, Secretaries of State have designated CPCs at least nine times, designating 10 countries as CPCs: Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Vietnam, and Uzbekistan (see fig. 2). In addition, the Secretary of State designated two regimes as particularly severe violators of religious freedom—the Milošević regime in Serbia and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. To date, Iraq, Vietnam, the Milošević regime, and the Taliban regime are the only entities that State has removed from the CPC list.CPC in 2004, the Ambassador negotiated an action plan with the Vietnamese government whereby the government, among other things, would pass a law to reduce religious persecution. On the basis of subsequent actions by the Vietnamese government, State removed Vietnam from the list in 2006. Similarly, the current Ambassador and her staff recently developed an action plan to help the government of another designated country identify actions that, if taken, could support the removal of the country from the CPC list.

USCIRF Is Implementing Its Primary Responsibilities as Outlined in the Act and Has Undertaken Other Activities

USCIRF is implementing its primary responsibilities as outlined in the Act by conducting an ongoing review of violations of religious freedom throughout the world and issuing policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State, and Congress. According to USCIRF officials, the culmination of these activities is the release of its own annual report on international religious freedom, which the Act also requires.Based on USCIRF’s ongoing reviews, the report discusses the 20 to 30 countries that USCIRF considers the worst offenders of religious freedom and presents policy recommendations to the U.S. government. In addition to performing these activities, USCIRF has at times provided technical assistance or recommendations to foreign officials through meetings, letters, press releases, or editorials.

USCIRF Conducts Ongoing Review of the Circumstances of Religious Freedom Violations

In accordance with the Act, USCIRF conducts an ongoing review of violations of religious freedom throughout the world by undertaking independent research and reviewing State’s annual International Religious Freedom Report. USCIRF staff members are responsible for specific regions of the world or thematic areas and information collection from a range of sources, including religious communities, NGOs, and U.S. and foreign-government officials as well as from documentation and media reports on those countries. USCIRF officials stated that they interact with a network of NGOs through various international religious freedom working groups, roundtables, seminars, and conferences as well as through State contacts. USCIRF officials also travel abroad to observe conditions and meet with U.S. embassy and foreign-government officials and NGO officials and members of religious communities. For example, according to USCIRF staff, at their request State officials in Turkey organized a roundtable of NGOs to brief USCIRF commissioners on religious freedom issues during their 2011 visit to the country. Similarly, in the United States, USCIRF officials meet with members of religious communities, including diaspora communities, NGOs, human rights activists, dissidents, victims of religious freedom violations, academics, experts, and U.S. and foreign-government officials. USCIRF staff engage with their counterparts in State’s Office of International Religious Freedom and the relevant officers in State’s regional bureaus to understand the conditions of religious freedom in various countries and U.S. government efforts to promote religious freedom in those countries. According to USCIRF staff, they also review and independently verify the characterization of facts and the status of religious freedom in State’s annual report.

USCIRF Provides Policy Recommendations

In accordance with the Act, USCIRF provides policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State, and Congress through various means. According to USCIRF officials, the primary mechanism for providing recommendations is its annual report. Specifically, the chapter for each country in the USCIRF report contains a list of recommendations for U.S. government action with regard to religious freedom in that country. For example, in the 2010 report’s chapter on Eritrea, USCIRF made 20 recommendations, including that the U.S. government should continue to designate Eritrea as a CPC, should impose targeted sanctions against individuals and institutions identified as responsible for, or complicit in, serious human rights abuses, and should prohibit any foreign company’s raising capital or listing its securities in the United States while engaged in developing Eritrea’s mineral resources. USCIRF also provides recommendations to the U.S. government through correspondence, congressional testimony, press releases, editorials, and policy briefs. In addition, USCIRF officials stated that they provide recommendations during meetings with State and other executive branch officials and their staff and members of Congress and their staff. For example, in a July 2012 letter to the Secretary of State, USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government work with the new Egyptian government to (1) ensure that a portion of U.S. military assistance is used to help Egyptian police assess security needs for protecting religious minority communities and (2) undertake reforms to promote religious freedom. USCIRF staff first draft these documents and recommendations, which the commissioners then review and approve with a majority vote.

USCIRF’s Annual Report Focuses on Countries That USCIRF Considers the Worst Offenders

According to USCIRF officials, the culmination of USCIRF’s primary responsibilities is the release of its annual report. The report, based on USCIRF’s ongoing reviews, discusses the 20 to 30 countries that USCIRF considers the worst offenders of religious freedom. The report also presents policy recommendations to the U.S. government with regard to religious freedom in each of those countries. USCIRF officials stated that the annual report covers a smaller number of countries than the State report because the USCIRF report focuses only on countries in which religious freedom violations occur and because USCIRF does not have the resources needed to report on the status of religious freedom in every country. According to USCIRF officials, staff first provide recommendations to the commissioners regarding the countries that should be included in the report, on the basis of (1) the staff’s ongoing monitoring of religious freedom and (2) trends or changes in countries that USCIRF observed in its prior-year report. Commissioners then discuss and vote on which countries to include, on the basis of the staff recommendations and the commissioners’ interests, knowledge, and deliberations. The report contains three sections that, respectively, highlight the countries that USCIRF recommends that the Secretary of State designate as CPCs for particularly severe violations of religious freedom; focus on the countries USCIRF has placed on a watch list for serious violations of religious freedom that do not meet the CPC threshold but require very close attention; and discuss other countries and issues of concern.

The CPC and watch list sections of the report are divided by country and includes a summary of religious freedom conditions in that country, U.S. government policies and actions taken in the country, and policy recommendations for the U.S. government.

USCIRF officials stated that the policy directors, the executive director, and commissioners review the report for accuracy and tone. USCIRF staff said that they verify information in the report with State officials, NGOs, and religious communities. Commissioners deliberate and vote on which countries they want to categorize as CPCs, place on the watch list, or identify as additional countries of concern. After commissioners make a determination for each country, staff members prepare the country chapters and circulate them to the commissioners for review. Commissioners’ dissenting opinions are included in the report when voting is not unanimous. For example, in USCIRF’s 2012 annual report, a commissioner dissented from the CPC recommendation for Iraq, stating that USCIRF’s report, among other things, did “not establish either that the government engaged itself in severe violations or that it tolerated them.” Further, the commissioner stated that USCIRF’s report “only establishes the existence of such violations and the inability of the government to prevent them always (or prevent them often).”

USCIRF Has Provided Technical Assistance and Recommendations to Foreign Officials

In addition to carrying out the primary responsibilities laid out in the Act, USCIRF at times has provided technical assistance and recommendations to foreign officials through meetings, letters, press releases, and editorials. Examples of these activities include the following.

Meetings with foreign officials. During meetings abroad, USCIRF has provided assistance to foreign governments and at times has called directly for policy changes. For instance, according to USCIRF’s 2011 annual report, USCIRF worked with members of the Indonesian House of Representatives and civil society groups to introduce measures to strengthen criminal code provisions regarding attacks on religious gatherings and to amend laws governing the building of religious venues. Further, during its 2011 visit to Saudi Arabia, USCIRF said that it called on high-level Saudi officials to release long- term religious prisoner Hadi Al-Mutif from prison and raised concerns about six young Shi’a Muslim prisoners.

Writing letters to foreign officials. USCIRF provided policy recommendations to foreign officials through letters. In June 2010, USCIRF wrote a letter to the Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey about reports of Turkish government interference in the election of the Armenian Orthodox Patriarch, requesting additional information and urging the removal of governmental constraints on such internal church matters. In June 2011, USCIRF wrote to the Head of Mission of the Government of South Sudan, providing a review of the draft of the Government of South Sudan’s interim constitution and offering suggestions to strengthen the freedom of religion or belief provisions.

Writing press releases. According to USCIRF officials, it issues press releases in response to current events and at times has used press releases to urge foreign officials to take actions. For example, in a May 2011 press release, USCIRF provided recommendations to the government of Egypt. USCIRF recommended, among other things, that the government establish a special unit in the Office of the Public Prosecutor that would be dedicated to investigating acts of violence against Egyptian citizens on the basis of religion or belief, particularly Coptic Orthodox Christians; vigorously prosecuting, and bringing to justice, perpetrators of these acts; and ensuring compensation for victims. In addition, in a July 2012 press release, USCIRF urged China’s government to lift its restrictions on all peaceful religious activities in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, especially during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

Writing editorials. USCIRF commissioners have written editorials that also urge foreign officials to take actions related to religious freedom. For example in a November 2011 editorial, USCIRF commissioners stated that Pakistan’s government should replace current public school textbooks with ones that exclude messages of intolerance, hatred, or violence based on religious or other differences. Also, in a January 2012 editorial, USCIRF commissioners wrote that “Nigeria’s political establishment, including President Goodluck Jonathan and other leaders, should muster the will and courage not only to curb the strife but to bring all perpetrators to justice.”

State and USCIRF Have Not Defined How They Should Interact, Which Has at Times Created Foreign Policy Tensions

Although the Act, as amended, directs State and USCIRF to cooperate, they have not defined how they should interact. As a result, their level of interaction has fluctuated over the years, although it has recently increased after a period of little interaction. In addition, State and USCIRF have at times conveyed inconsistent information to foreign-government officials on U.S. foreign policy, creating tensions that State has had to mitigate.

Act Directs State Office and USCIRF to Cooperate, but Agencies Have Not Defined How They Should Interact

The Act created two separate entities that are to cooperate and work on behalf of international religious freedom, yet the Act does not prescribe how State and USCIRF should interact and coordinate their efforts. The Act establishes the Ambassador as an ex-officio member of USCIRF and states that the Ambassador is to consider USCIRF’s advice in making policy recommendations. In addition, the Act states that the Secretary of State is to consider USCIRF’s recommendations in preparing the annual report on international religious freedom. A 1999 amendment to the Act directs USCIRF to cooperate with State, stating that “he commission shall seek to effectively and freely cooperate with all entities engaged in the promotion of religious freedom abroad, governmental and nongovernmental, in the performance of the commission’s duties,” specifically listing State among those entities. At the same time, the Act originally directed that the commission would terminate four years after the initial appointment of all of the commissioners.

According to USCIRF, the commission is independent, bipartisan, and dedicated to defending the universal right to freedom of religion or belief abroad. of a country’s religious freedom situation can create a line of communication for State if, for instance, that country’s officials then decide they want to work with State to determine how they can stay off of the official CPC list. The Act also requires USCIRF to conduct an “annual and ongoing review of the facts and circumstances of violations of religious freedom presented ” as well as make policy recommendations to the Secretary of State, among others. At the same time, the Ambassador, as an ex-officio member of USCIRF, sits on a commission that gives recommendations to the Ambassador’s agency.

All of the Ambassadors and many of the commissioners we spoke with said that they have never jointly defined how they should interact. Former and current commissioners expressed various ideas about the ex-officio role of the Ambassador; for example, commissioners stated that the Ambassador should participate in every USCIRF meeting and share information, that the Ambassador’s role was irrelevant to USCIRF’s work, and that the Ambassador should not participate in USCIRF discussions. Some former commissioners said that without the Ambassador’s regular participation, USCIRF had difficulty getting access to State policymakers to discuss religious freedom. One former commissioner said that such access would have enriched USCIRF’s recommendations. At the same time, two of the current commissioners said that USCIRF could improve its efforts to understand State’s diplomatic efforts with regard to religious freedom.

The Ambassadors also provided varying interpretations of the ex-officio role. They said, for example, that the Ambassador should be an active participant at USCIRF meetings during every discussion, short of voting; that the Ambassador’s role was to explain State activities and actions to USCIRF and that USCIRF, conversely, should include the Ambassador on e-mails and other forms of internal communication; and that the Ambassador has no clear role on USCIRF but should try to attend as many USCIRF commissioner meetings as possible. One of the Ambassadors said that commissioners did not always include him in e- mail conversations and exchanges, resulting in a loss of communication. For example, he said that at times commissioners withheld documents and e-mail communications from the Ambassador’s office or only shared drafts of press releases at the last minute, thereby inhibiting the Ambassador’s ability to convey State’s perspective or correct factual errors.

State and USCIRF’s Interaction Has Fluctuated

The level of interaction between the Ambassador and USCIRF has varied greatly over the years. According to the first Ambassador and USCIRF officials, the first Ambassador attended USCIRF’s monthly meetings, participated in their monthly teleconferences, and traveled overseas with the USCIRF chair on one occasion. However, that Ambassador said he had discussed his ex-officio role with USCIRF only once, during a debate, when a commissioner told him he should not be participating. State and USCIRF officials told us that the second Ambassador began his tenure by regularly attending the monthly USCIRF meetings, but he attended less frequently over time. Former State officials and USCIRF officials said that both entities considerably decreased their official communication, in part because of disagreement over how they should work together.

As the level of interaction between the Ambassador and commissioners has varied over the years, so has the level of interaction between their staffs. According to State and USCIRF officials, when the Ambassador and commissioners had little official interaction, their staffs had little interaction as well, although they did try to maintain some informal collaboration. For example, according to one former Office staff member, during a period of little official interaction and even discouragement of staff interaction, he and the USCIRF executive director began meeting for lunch to maintain a line of communication. In addition, a former commissioner noted that when the Ambassador’s position was vacant for 2 ½ years, USCIRF’s contact with State was primarily at the staff level.

More recently, according to the current Ambassador and USCIRF officials, they have increased their interaction from its previously low level, with both a new Ambassador and a largely new commission in place. For example, from 2009 to 2011, USCIRF and State officials, including officials from the Office of International Religious Freedom, collaborated on efforts that led to the passage of UN Resolution 16/18 to combat religious intolerance. The Ambassador now participates in the lunchtime portions of discussions during some of the monthly meetings, although she generally does not participate in USCIRF’s monthly teleconferences. The Ambassador and the current USCIRF chair also have been joint presenters at various forums, both in the United States and abroad. In October 2012, for example, they gave a joint speech on religious freedom at Europe’s largest annual human rights and democracy conference, sponsored by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. In addition, staff from the Office and USCIRF staff stated that they share information with each other more now than in the past. State and USCIRF officials told us that this information sharing recently helped USCIRF determine whether to elevate a country from its watch list to its CPC recommendation list. State and USCIRF officials discussed the issues as well as actions that State would take with the country’s officials. Their interaction resulted in USCIRF’s keeping the country on its watch list rather moving it to the CPC list.

State and USCIRF’s Limited Interaction Created Foreign Policy Tensions That State Had to Mitigate

All three Ambassadors and a few commissioners told us that the limited interaction between State and USCIRF, arising from a lack of a definition of how they should interact, had sometimes created tensions with foreign- government officials. For example, USCIRF recommended in its 2012 annual report that the Secretary of State designate Turkey as a CPC. The Ambassador was not regularly attending USCIRF meetings at the time, and State officials learned of USCIRF’s intent to recommend Turkey only shortly before USCIRF published its report in March 2012. State officials tried to engage the commissioners and explain State’s position against such a recommendation, but USCIRF proceeded to recommend Turkey for CPC designation. Turkish officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a press release that USCIRF’s report directly contradicted State’s annual report on religious freedom, and called the USCIRF report “null and void.” State officials told us that they had to resolve the resulting tensions with the Turkish government. In June 2012, a senior State official briefed USCIRF regarding State’s position on Turkey, namely, that because the Turkish government had taken actions to improve religious freedom in the country, Turkey did not deserve CPC designation.

In addition, according to State officials, because the Ambassador and commissioners have not defined how they should interact, they have at times communicated conflicting information to foreign governments on behalf of the United States. For example, 5 days after USCIRF recommended Turkey for CPC designation in March 2012, the President publicly congratulated the Turkish prime minister on efforts he had made to protect religious minorities in Turkey. In addition, one Ambassador said that in meetings with foreign-government officials, he sometimes not only had to explain the function of USCIRF, but—because some statements by commissioners were not in line with U.S. foreign policy—he also had to clarify that USCIRF did not speak for him, even as an ex-officio member of the commission, or for the U.S. government.

All three Ambassadors cited instances when USCIRF’s approach with foreign-government officials created bilateral tensions. For example, the first Ambassador recounted helping to bring a delegation of high-level Laotian officials to the United States to tour, meet with government officials and religious communities, and view examples of religious freedom.they freed 34 of 37 people imprisoned for their religious beliefs. The Ambassador told us that as a result, he had judged that Laos was making progress in instituting some real changes in the area of religious freedom; however, USCIRF recommended Laos for CPC designation shortly thereafter. The Ambassador said that USCIRF’s recommendation almost ruined State’s diplomatic efforts to address religious freedom in Laos. In another example, in 2005, the second Ambassador negotiated an action plan with the Vietnamese government including actions that, if taken by the government, could support its case for removal from the CPC list. According to State officials, Vietnam took the necessary steps and the Secretary of State removed the country’s CPC designation in 2006. However, when USCIRF commissioners visited Vietnam later that year, according to State and Vietnamese officials, they offended the Vietnamese officials by their conduct in high-level meetings. State officials told us that this was damaging to some of the progress made with Vietnamese officials and necessitated efforts to repair the U.S. relationship with Vietnam.

According to the Ambassador, when the delegation returned, Some State, USCIRF, and NGO officials we spoke with raised other concerns about the role USCIRF has played with respect to U.S. foreign policy. According to a former commissioner, during her tenure on USCIRF, commissioners became bolder in speaking out in letters or during meetings with foreign officials, and it was unclear to her whether these activities were within the bounds of the Act. Also, USCIRF officials told us that the commission has at times applied an expansive interpretation of the Act, questioning whether the responsibilities in the Act were a “floor or a ceiling.” They also said that, under USCIRF’s mandate to provide recommendations to the U.S. government on religious freedom, USCIRF has the obligation to help foreign governments take actions to address U.S. critiques. Some former commissioners said that foreign governments have at times requested advice or assistance from USCIRF and that, in general, USCIRF urged or made recommendations to foreign officials when it thought the recommendations were consistent with U.S. foreign policy. At the same time, some USCIRF officials noted that without active participation from the Ambassador, they risk not fully understanding U.S. foreign policy in a particular situation or country.

NGOs Generally Rated Overall U.S. Government Efforts Positively While Raising Some Concerns and Suggesting Several Improvements

The NGOs—religious organizations and other civil society groups—that we surveyed, as well as NGO representatives whom we interviewed, generally rated overall U.S. government, State, and USCIRF efforts to promote international religious freedom positively. At the same time, they raised some concerns and suggested several improvements, such as including more civil society and other nonstate actors and making the promotion of international religious freedom a higher foreign-policy priority. Likewise, NGOs that were familiar with State’s and USCIRF’s annual reports generally viewed both reports positively, although several raised concerns about a lack of objectivity in each report. Finally, NGOs generally viewed CPC designations positively, although some doubted the helpfulness of the designations to their own religious freedom work.

NGOs Generally Rated Overall U.S. Government Progress Positively While Suggesting Improvements

Overall Progress

The NGOs that we surveyed and NGO representatives whom we interviewed indicated that they generally rated overall U.S. progress in promoting international religious freedom positively, although most provided specific suggestions to improve U.S. government efforts. Among the 84 NGOs that responded to our survey, 63 NGOs (75 percent) said that the U.S. government had made at least some progress in promoting religious freedom overall. The responding NGOs also generally said that the U.S. government had made progress in promoting specific international religious freedom activities, such as engaging in dialogue with foreign governments to effect changes in policy (59 of 83 NGOs, or 71 percent) and engaging in dialogue with NGOs and civil society groups regarding international religious freedom (65 of 84 NGOs, or 77 percent). For additional survey results, see appendix IV.

One of the NGO survey responses stated, “I believe that it is very helpful that the U.S. government emphasizes religious freedom as a key foreign policy issue. This keeps the issue on the international agenda.” NGO representatives whom we spoke with on our field visits echoed these views, and a few told us that, in their opinion, the United States is the only country actively encouraging other governments to improve religious freedom. For example, some NGO representatives in four of our five fieldwork countries told us that they communicated with the U.S. embassy regularly, both on their own initiative and in response to information requests from the embassy’s human rights officer. Representatives of other NGOs, in Turkey and Vietnam, said that the U.S. embassies have invited them to interfaith discussions hosted by the embassies and that they were free to contact the embassies to raise specific issues regarding religious freedom situations. However, a representative from a religious group in Afghanistan told us that although he had met with U.S. officials on multiple occasions over the past few years and had described to them the various challenges facing his religious community, he had not seen any action taken.

While the NGO responses to our survey generally expressed positive views of U.S. government efforts to promote international religious freedom, they also raised some concerns and identified several areas where they believed the U.S. government could improve its efforts.

In response to our survey’s request for elaboration on ratings of progress made, the NGOs’ most common concern was that international religious freedom was not as high a priority for the U.S. government as it should be and that this hindered overall efforts to promote international religious freedom (9 of the 27 NGOs that elaborated on their responses expressed this view). For example, one NGO stated, “Too often, religious freedom appears to be an afterthought.” Other NGOs commented that State has not made international religious freedom a priority and that the Office is not valued within State’s structure. Other NGOs expressed in the survey the perception that the U.S. government has had limited success in promoting international religious freedom in general, including through the use of the CPC designation, or in obtaining the release of prisoners of conscience. When asked to list their organization’s top suggestions to improve U.S. government efforts to promote international religious freedom, 27 of the 69 NGOs (39 percent) that responded to the question suggested greater inclusion of, and consultation with, civil society and nonstate actors, both in the United States and abroad. One NGO responding to the survey pointed to State’s Religious Freedom and Foreign Policy Working Group as a positive development toward addressing this concern.

Other frequently suggested improvements included making international religious freedom a higher priority in U.S. foreign policy and empowering State—and to a lesser extent, USCIRF—with greater resources and authority to promote international religious freedom. For example, an NGO responding to our survey suggested that the U.S. government “include the promotion of international religious freedom as a greater aspect of formulating foreign policy toward a particular country or region.” Another NGO responded that “funding should be substantially increased for both the Office and USCIRF. They have a tiny amount of resources with which to investigate an issue affecting billions of individuals.”

NGOs Generally Rated Both State’s and USCIRF’s Annual Reports Positively but Raised Some Concerns about Lack of Objectivity

State’s Annual Report

Most of the NGOs that responded to our survey questions about State’s annual report on international religious freedom rated the report positively. The NGOs responding to the survey and the NGO representatives we interviewed in Indonesia, Turkey, Vietnam, and Uzbekistan were largely familiar with the State report. Of the 84 NGOs that responded to our survey, 70 (83 percent) stated that they were familiar with the report. Representatives from several NGOs and religious organizations whom we met with in Indonesia, Turkey, Vietnam, and Uzbekistan told us that State’s annual report raises awareness of religious freedom issues in their countries and around the world. For example, one NGO representative told us that the report is a useful tool for disseminating information about the situation in her country and helps raise awareness of the issues to the government of her country and to the world. A leader of a religious organization in another country explained that the publication of the State report proves to his country’s government that the U.S. government is aware of the restrictions placed on his religious community. He said that this knowledge has influenced his government’s decision making in some cases, such as in the early release of a prisoner, jailed for conscientious objection to military service, whom State listed in its report.

These results reflect NGO responses rating State’s annual report as extremely or very useful and as useful or somewhat useful. groups we met with during our field visits tended to identify State as the U.S. actor most responsible for promoting international religious freedom.

Additionally, of the 70 NGOs that were familiar with State’s annual report, 61 NGOs (87 percent) said that the report was credible overall and 58 NGOs (83 percent) said that it was accurate. Several NGO representatives whom we spoke with overseas said that they could vouch only for information they provided to the embassy and were hesitant to judge the reports’ degree of accuracy and comprehensiveness.

However, 16 of the 70 NGOs familiar with the State report (23 percent) rated its objectivity as only fair or poor. In addition, 11 of 28 NGOs that elaborated on their responses to questions about State’s report raised concerns about a perceived lack of objectivity in State’s report. One NGO noted, “There is a perception of the report, by the international civil society, American NGOs, and State Department personnel that the conclusions of the report are politically predetermined.” NGOs had a similar concern when responding about the usefulness of State’s report. Five of the 11 survey respondents who elaborated on their response said that they perceive State’s report to be influenced by U.S. policy. One NGO wrote, “The State Department tends to undervalue religious freedom issues in countries where there are significant U.S. economic or security interests.”

Most of the NGOs that responded to our survey expressed positive views of USCIRF’s annual report on international religious freedom. Of the 84 respondents, 64 NGOs (76 percent) were familiar with the USCIRF report. Fifty-one of the 64 NGOs familiar with the report (80 percent) said that it was at least somewhat useful in affecting religious freedom in a country and 49 of the 64 NGOs (77 percent) said that it was at least somewhat useful in affecting U.S. policy.representatives whom we interviewed in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam were not aware of USCIRF’s report—for example, none of the 9 representatives of NGOs, religious or in civil society, whom we interviewed in Uzbekistan were familiar with the report.

Many of the NGO Of the 64 respondents that were familiar with USCIRF’s annual report, 59 NGOs (92 percent) said the report was credible and 57 NGOs (89 percent) said it was accurate. One NGO commented further that “the IRF report is a credible source of information which accurately highlights challenges in countries.” Another NGO commented, “USCIRF made an effort to talk directly to victims of religious persecution and to verify the facts they presented.”

Nine of the 64 respondents that were familiar with the USCIRF report rated its objectivity as “fair” or “poor,” and 5 of 14 NGOs that elaborated on their responses about USCIRF’s annual report reported a perceived lack of objectivity of the report. For example, one NGO commented, “The USCIRF report can feel more overtly steered by U.S. diplomatic and political interests.” Another stated that the report has, “in some cases, been more representative of individual concerns of the appointed commissioners, rather than a comprehensive and evenhanded analysis of IRF concerns and abuses worldwide.” An additional 4 of the 14 NGOs commented that USCIRF’s report was not always comprehensive, omitting some countries and focusing on CPC countries, and said that it reflected individual commissioners’ concerns. This observation was further echoed when NGOs were asked to provide suggestions for improving the USCIRF report. Other groups echoed one NGO’s suggestion of “more global coverage and better documentation of incidents reported.”

NGOs Had Generally Positive Views about CPC Designations, but Some Questioned the Designations’ Usefulness to Their Work

State’s CPC Designations

NGOs expressed somewhat mixed opinions about whether the Secretary of State’s CPC designations helped or hindered their work. Of the 84 respondents to our survey, 38 NGOs (45 percent) said that the CPC designation helped their work, 26 NGOs (31 percent) said that it neither helped nor hindered, and 6 NGOs (7 percent) said that it hindered their work. The remaining 14 NGOs (17 percent) had no opinion. For example, one NGO explained, “Other nations take notice of U.S. government religious freedom concerns raised in the report but since there are few negative consequences even if given a CPC designation, those nations may be inclined to ignore U.S. human rights criticisms.” Other government-sanctioned groups, such as those we spoke with in Uzbekistan, said the CPC designation of their country was not justified and did not affect them or their communities. In contrast, several NGO representatives whom we interviewed in Vietnam said that the CPC designation of the country from 2004 through 2006 put pressure on the Vietnamese government to institute religious freedom reforms. Further, some said that the removal of Vietnam from the CPC list had slowed progress and had lessened pressure on the Vietnamese government to protect religious freedom. However, some also said that redesignating Vietnam as a CPC was unwarranted, given the progress that the country has made.

Similarly, NGOs expressed somewhat mixed opinions about whether USCIRF’s CPC or watch list recommendations helped or hindered their work. Of the 84 respondents to our survey, 40 NGOs (48 percent) said that USCIRF’s CPC recommendations had helped their work, 21 NGOs (25 percent) said that the designations neither helped nor hindered, and 5 NGOs (6 percent) said the designations hindered their work. The remaining 16 NGOs (19 percent) expressed no opinion.perceptions of the watch list that USCIRF compiles, in addition to providing its CPC recommendations, were similar to respondents’ perceptions of both the State and USCIRF CPC lists. Of the 84 survey respondents, 37 NGOs (44 percent) said that USCIRF’s watch list recommendations helped their work, 26 NGOs (31 percent) said that the designations neither helped nor hindered, and 5 NGOs (6 percent) said The NGOs’ that the designations hindered their work. The remaining 15 NGOs (18 percent) expressed no opinion.

Fifty-two of the 84 NGOs that responded to our survey (62 percent) said that they agreed with USCIRF’s recommendations to designate 25 to 30 countries as CPCs or for its watch list. neither agreed nor disagreed, 5 of the NGOs (6 percent) disagreed, and 17 of the NGOs (20 percent) had no opinion. An additional 26 NGOs responded with specific suggestions for improving the USCIRF annual report—for example, taking a more comprehensive approach to reporting globally, soliciting additional input from other sources, and providing constructive examples of how countries can improve religious freedom.

Ten of the 84 NGOs (12 percent)

Conclusions

Both State and USCIRF have implemented their primary responsibilities outlined in the Act, and each has undertaken a variety of activities in response to increased restrictions on religious freedom around the world. In general, NGOs that we surveyed and NGO representatives whom we interviewed expressed positive perceptions of these activities, including State’s and USCIRF’s annual reports on international religious freedom. However, the lack of a definition regarding how the two entities are to interact has created foreign policy tensions that State has had to mitigate. These tensions have resulted in part from the fact that the Ambassadors and USCIRF have not defined the Ambassador’s role as an ex-officio member of the commission. Guidance that would clarify how State and USCIRF are to cooperate would strengthen each entity’s unique contribution to promoting international religious freedom. It would also institutionalize their information sharing and help ensure that the U.S. government presents a more consistent foreign policy message with respect to religious freedom.

Recommendation for Executive Action

These results reflect NGO responses of “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree” to USCIRF’s annual CPC recommendations. ex-officio role of the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom as a nonvoting USCIRF member.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the State and USCIRF for comment. We received written comments from both entities, which are reproduced in full in appendices V and VI, respectively. State and USCIRF agreed with our recommendation and both expressed willingness to take action. We also received technical comments from each, which we incorporated throughout our report as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of State, and the Chair of USCIRF. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9601 or MelitoT@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2011 mandated that we report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on several matters related to U.S. promotion of international religious freedom. In addition, the mandate included a specific requirement that we consult with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) in preparing the report. In response to the mandate, this report assesses (1) the Department of State’s (State) implementation of its primary responsibilities established in the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (the Act); (2) the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom’s (USCIRF) implementation of its primary responsibilities established in the Act; (3) State’s and USCIRF’s interaction in their efforts to promote religious freedom; and (4) NGOs’ views on U.S. efforts to promote international religious freedom. The mandate also directed us to compare USCIRF with other advisory commissions; for this analysis, we summarized a previous Congressional Research Service report (see app. II).

To address our four objectives, we conducted fieldwork in five countries— Afghanistan, Indonesia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. We selected these countries on the basis of their meeting at least two of the following criteria: (1) State had funded international religious freedom programs in the country; (2) the country was on USCIRF’s watch list; (3) USCIRF had recommended the country for designation as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) or State had designated it as a CPC; and (4) the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom (the Ambassador) or USCIRF had visited the country in the previous 3 years. Specifically:

Afghanistan. State had funded international religious freedom programs in the country. In addition, USCIRF had included Afghanistan on its watch list for several years and visited the country in 2010.

Indonesia. State had funded international religious freedom programs in the country, and USCIRF had included Indonesia on its watch list for several years.

Turkey. USCIRF recommended Turkey for CPC designation for the first time in 2012, but according to State officials, State did not agree with the recommendation. The Ambassador and USCIRF had both traveled to Turkey in the previous 3 years.

Uzbekistan. State had designated Uzbekistan as a CPC for several years and had waived sanctions against it. The Ambassador had traveled to Uzbekistan in the last year.

Vietnam. State had funded an international religious freedom program in the country. State removed Vietnam from the CPC list in 2006, making it one of only two countries that State had ever removed from the CPC list. The Ambassador had traveled there in the last year.

While in each country, we interviewed State embassy officials, including the U.S. Ambassador to the country and the International Religious Freedom officer. We also interviewed representatives from host governments, NGOs, and religious communities. In two countries we visited, we also met with officials from third-country embassies.

To address our first objective, we reviewed the provisions of the Act and identified the primary responsibilities that the Act established for State. We also analyzed State documents, including cables, grant materials, State’s annual International Religious Freedom Report, the 2003 State Inspector General’s Report of Inspection: Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and the Inspector General’s 2005 Compliance Follow- up Review on the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. We also met with State officials, including staff from the Office of International Religious Freedom, all three Ambassadors-at-Large for International Religious Freedom—two former and one present—and senior level officials such as an Assistant Secretary and two Under Secretaries in Washington, D.C. We requested that State provide us with cables to demonstrate the type of activities it undertook from January 2009 through October 2012 to (1) promote or improve international religious freedom and (2) document international religious freedom issues. State provided us with 183 unclassified cables, five of which were duplicates. State also identified more than 100 additional classified cables that pertained to CPCs, but State did not provide those cables to us in time for us to analyze them for this report. This analysis does not provide a full list of all religious freedom–related activities that State conducted worldwide during this time period, because (1) not all activities are reported in cables; (2) State may not have located all the relevant cables sent during this time period; and (3) we did not receive the classified cables in time for us to analyze them for this report. See appendix III for a summary of our analysis of the cables.

In response to our request that State identify all of its grants related to international religious freedom, State provided us with a list of 27 grants that it had grouped either globally or by region of the world. For our analysis, we selected seven grants that generally represented the largest award amount in each region of the world and that included both ongoing and completed grants as well as a grant in one of our fieldwork countries. We also selected a seventh grant that was not country specific from the global programs category. For each of these seven grants, we reviewed the grant’s goals and objectives, how the grant implementer measured progress toward those goals, and whether the implementer reported meeting the goals.

To address our second objective, we reviewed the provisions of the Act, identified the primary responsibilities that the Act established for USCIRF, and analyzed USCIRF documents such as its annual report on international religious freedom, letters to U.S. government officials, editorials, and press releases. To determine how USCIRF implemented its primary responsibilities, we also interviewed USCIRF staff and 20 of the 33 commissioners appointed to USCIRF, including all of the current commissioners. In addition, we also interviewed all three Ambassadors- at-Large—two former and one present—who serve as ex-officio members of USCIRF. We conducted these interviews in or near Washington, D.C.

To address our third objective, we met with officials from State and USCIRF, including all three Ambassadors-at-Large—two former and one present—and all of the current and approximately half of the former USCIRF commissioners. We also interviewed State and foreign- government officials in our fieldwork countries, as well as NGO officials both in the United States and abroad who have worked closely with both entities. In addition, we analyzed State cables as well as documents from USCIRF, including press releases, editorials, and their annual reports.

To address our fourth objective, we conducted a survey of NGOs that we identified from five sources: (1) State’s Office of International Religious Freedom’s list of 30 most-consulted NGOs; (2) USCIRF’s list of NGOs that the commission has worked, or been in contact, with; (3) members of the Secretary of State’s Religion and Foreign Policy Working Group; (4) a list of NGOs participating in the International Religious Freedom Roundtable in Washington, D.C.; and (5) the Pew Online Directory of Religious Advocacy Groups, which the Pew Research Center’s Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life developed. These sources produced a list of 317 unique NGOs. To determine the universe of NGOs from our five sources, we contacted each NGO and identified 137 that had conducted work related to international religious freedom. We developed a web-based survey instrument in August 2012 and pretested it with 6 NGOs. The survey contained closed- and open-ended questions in four general areas: (1) demographics, (2) State’s international religious freedom activities, (3) USCIRF’s international religious freedom activities, and (4) general U.S. policy on international religious freedom. We sent the web-based survey to all 137 NGOs via e-mail in September 2012. However, we removed six NGOs from our universe of 137, resulting in a universe of 131 NGOs, after 5 NGOs responded that they did not conduct work related to religious freedom and we determined that one NGO was a duplicate. We received 84 responses to our survey, or a 64 percent response rate. The results of the survey reflect the views of only the respondents to our survey and cannot be generalized either to the universe of 131 organizations or to any other organizations that are involved in these types of issues. See appendix IV for selected survey results.

We administered the web-based survey from September 5 to October 18, 2012. We sent each NGO an e-mail invitation to complete the survey on a GAO web server using a unique username and password. During the data collection period, we sent reminder e-mails and made phone calls to nonresponding NGOs. Because this was not a sample survey, it had no sampling errors; however, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce nonsampling errors, such as difficulties in interpreting a particular question, which can introduce unwanted variability in the survey results. We took steps to minimize nonsampling errors by pretesting the questionnaire with six NGOs representing different religious traditions or no religious affiliation. We conducted pretests to ensure that the questions were clear and unbiased, that the data and information were readily obtainable, and that the questionnaire did not place an undue burden on respondents. Additionally, a senior GAO methodologist independently reviewed a draft of the questionnaire prior to its administration. We made appropriate revisions to the content and format of the questionnaire after the pretests. All data analysis of survey results were independently verified for accuracy.

In addition, we conducted a limited content analysis of open-ended responses to five survey questions. We developed initial categories for selected questions with open-ended responses, to characterize the general theme of the response. For responses to questions asking about the credibility of each report, we developed the following categories: Timeliness (described as the frequency and/or timing of the reports); Effectiveness; Specific; CPC; Lack of Objectivity (initially coded as “Bias”); Lack of Input; Composition/Format; Contrast; and Lack of Resources. For questions elaborating on the perception of the usefulness of each report, we developed the following categories: Specific; Policy (regarding the formulation/motivation of U.S. international religious freedom policy); CPC; Contrast; Limited (meaning the State or USCIRF report has a circumscribed impact); and Not Applicable. For the question asking NGOs to provide their suggestions on ways to improve U.S. promotion of international religious freedom, we developed the following categories: Inclusion; Measurement; Enforcement; Empowerment; Awareness; Prioritize; Specific; and Not Applicable. One analyst coded the responses with at least one category, with an optional second category. After the initial coding, a second analyst independently assigned categories to the same responses. The analysts then reconciled the two sets of coding, assigning a final determination to each response. A methodologist then reviewed the categories, making language changes as needed. These results were then tabulated.

We conducted this performance audit from March 2012 to March 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Comparison of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom with Other Select Congressional Commissions

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2011 directed us to, among other things, conduct a comparative analysis of the structure of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) in relation to other U.S. advisory commissions. To conduct this analysis, we relied on the Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) compilation of Congressional Advisory Boards and Commissions to which Congress has a direct appointing role.

In 2013, CRS reported on the 85 permanent and temporary congressional commissions whose members Congress participates in appointing. CRS defines a congressional commission as a multi-member independent entity that (1) is established by Congress, (2) exists temporarily, (3) serves in an advisory capacity, (4) is appointed in part or whole by members of Congress, and (5) reports to Congress. CRS grouped the current 85 congressional commissions in four categories: (1) policy advisory bodies, (2) commemorative advisory bodies, (3) operational advisory bodies, and (4) diplomatic advisory bodies. Given that CRS categorized USCIRF as a policy advisory body, we focused our comparative analysis on the 26 advisory bodies that CRS classified as policy advisory bodies.

Our analysis shows that USCIRF does not appear to be unique among policy advisory bodies in duration limit, membership numbers, or appointment terms. USCIRF comprises 10 members known as commissioners, with 2-year appointments and a limit of two terms. Following are characteristics of the 26 policy advisory bodies:

Seven of the advisory bodies had a statutory duration limit, while 19 did not.

Membership ranged from 4 to 37 members.

Appointments ranged from 1 to 6 years for advisory bodies that had delineated term limits; five of the advisory bodies had term limits for the life of the body; two of the advisory bodies had term limits for the duration of the Congress from which they were appointed; and one advisory body had a statutorily unclear term of appointment.

Appendix III: Analysis of Department of State Cables Concerning International Religious Freedom

We asked the Department of State (State) to provide us with cables concerning international religious freedom sent from January 2009 through October 2012. State provided 183 cables, 5 of which were duplicates. We analyzed the cables to obtain information on the activities U.S. embassies and other U.S. government entities conduct to promote religious freedom. However, because not all activities are reported in cables, and because State might not have located all the relevant cables sent during this time period, this analysis does not provide a full list of all religious freedom–related activities that State performed globally during this time period. We developed 10 categories to analyze, or code, the activities described in the cables. We included a category for duplicate cables within the list of 10 categories and a category titled “other” for cables that did not fit into any one of the 9 categories. Because many of the cables covered a variety of topics, our coding rules allowed multiple codes to be applied to each cable. Two analysts independently coded each cable and then reconciled any differences in their coding.

Appendix IV: Selected Results from Survey of Nongovernmental Organizations

We conducted a survey of 131 nongovernmental organizations (NGO) that we identified as having conducted work related to international religious freedom. Of the 131 NGOs, 84 responded to the survey. The survey addressed the Department of State’s (State) and the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom’s (USCIRF) international religious freedom activities, including their respective annual reports; State’s designations, and USCIRF’s recommendations for designations, of Countries of Particular Concern (CPC); overall U.S. government progress on international religious freedom; and U.S. international religious freedom policy. For a full description of the survey’s methodology, see appendix I. Figures 4 through 11 summarize selected results of the NGO responses to our survey. We selected these survey results because they add additional detail to the information summarized in the report.

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State

Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Cheryl Goodman and Michael Rohrback (Assistant Directors), Judith Williams, Sushmita Srikanth, Juan P. Avila, Amanda Bartine, and Kathryn Crosby made key contributions to this report. Jessica Bull, Lynn Cothern, Martin De Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Rachel Girshick, Heather Hampton, David Hancock, Brandon Hunt, Jill Lacey, Reid Lowe, Mary Moutsos, Elizabeth Repko, and Jeremy Sebest also provided substantial assistance.