Olympic Security: Better Planning Can Enhance U.S. Support to Future Olympic Games
Released: 2006-06-30T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Since the first Winter Olympic Games in 1924, the event has grown from 258 athletes representing 16 countries to, in the case of the 2006 Turin Olympics, approximately 5,000 athletes and coaches from 85 countries. In addition, an estimated 1.5 million spectators and 10,000 media personnel attended the 2006 Winter Olympic Games. While the stated goal of the Olympic movement is “to contribute to building a peaceful and better world,” its history includes tragedy and terror as well. At the 1972 Munich Games, Palestinian terrorists attacked the Israeli Olympic team, resulting in the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes. The 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games were marred by a pipe-bomb explosion that killed 1 person and injured 110 others.

One of the International Olympic Committee requirements for countries bidding to host the Games is to ensure the security of the participating athletes and spectators, which is an increasingly challenging task in today’s environment of terrorist threats. According to State documents, Italy spent approximately $110 million on security operations for the 2006 Winter Games. In addition, the Italian government designated 15,000 law enforcement personnel, along with military and intelligence support, to provide for overall security for the Winter Games. Italy’s Ministry of Interior designated the Prefect of Turin as the local government authority responsible for providing security inside the official venues of the Winter Games.

Italy faced the challenge of hosting an Olympics amid a heightened terrorist threat environment. Al-Qaeda has made threats to coalition partners in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past. Moreover, in March 2004, a terrorist attack on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, killed nearly 200 people, and, in July 2005, a terrorist attack on commuter trains and a bus in London, England, killed over 50 people and injured more than 700. In addition, there is a known presence of Italy-based international terrorist cells and domestic anarchist groups that actively target multinational corporations, critical infrastructure, and government facilities. Italy has highly advanced antiterrorism capabilities and has recently taken additional antiterrorism measures, such as enactment of improved antiterrorism laws and increased physical security measures. Since 2001, several extremist plots in Milan and Rome have been detected and prevented. In addition to these explicit terror threats, Italy has faced difficult security challenges at other recent major events, such as the meeting of the Group of Eight in Genoa in 2001, at which activists clashed violently with Italian police forces, and the funeral of Pope John Paul II in April 2005.

In planning for the 2006 Winter Games, winter conditions presented another set of challenges. The Winter Games were located in the remote, northwest corner of Italy, with venues spread over an extensive land area. Although smaller in scale than the 2004 Athens Summer Games, the 2006 Winter Olympic venues included mountain locations that were as far as 60 miles away from Turin, with limited access routes to these mountain sites. (See fig. 1 for locations of venues for the 2006 Winter Olympic Games in Turin, Italy.) Locating suitable lodging for U.S. security and support personnel near key venues was necessary. Furthermore, the distance from the nearest U.S. presence—the U.S. Consulate in Milan, which is located about a 90-minute drive from Turin—required the establishment of a temporary U.S. post in Turin to support U.S. security efforts and serve as a platform for U.S. activities.

Although the host government has the ultimate responsibility for providing security for the Olympics, the United States has a vested interest in ensuring the safety of its citizens in all Olympic locations. In 2001, the United States began planning its security assistance for the 2004 Athens Summer Olympics, responding both to the heightened worldwide anxiety following the September 11 attacks and to Greece’s request for international advice on its security plan. Despite widespread fears of a potential terrorist attack on the Olympics, Greece hosted a safe and secure event with no terrorist incidents. With the conclusion of the Athens Games, the United States began planning for security support to the 2006 Turin Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games. This security support is provided by the United States under general executive branch policy guidance and individual agency authorities. For example, State officials cited the use of Presidential Decision Directive 62, which extends the U.S. counterterrorism policy in Presidential Decision Directive 39 to the protection of Americans overseas. State is the lead agency for ensuring the protection of American citizens overseas. According to U.S. officials in Italy, up to 20,000 Americans attended the 2006 Turin Olympics daily.

The next Olympics will be the Summer Games in Beijing, China, August 8 to 24, 2008; followed by the Paralympics, September 6 to 17, 2008. Venues for these Games will be spread out across seven cities in China, presenting unique logistical and coordination challenges for security support efforts. According to State officials, over 1 million spectators are expected to attend the 2008 Beijing Games, including a large number of Americans. The next Winter Olympic Games will be held in Vancouver, Canada, February 12 to 28, 2010, followed by the Paralympics on March 12 to 21, 2010. The close proximity of these Games to the United States presents distinctive challenges, such as border security issues. In 2012, the United Kingdom will host the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games in London. Past terrorist incidents in London and an ongoing terrorist threat climate are likely to present security challenges for these Games.

U.S. Security Support Was Based on Italian Security Capabilities, Supported by Coordinated U.S. Government Effort

The security support that the United States provided for the 2006 Winter Games was largely based on an understanding of Italy’s advanced security capabilities gained through a long-standing, U.S.-Italian counterterrorism and military partnership. The U.S. Embassy in Rome led the coordinated governmentwide effort—delegating responsibility for the coordination of U.S. activities in Turin to the U.S. Consulate in Milan—and was supported by a Washington, D.C.-based interagency group.

U.S. Security Support Informed by an Understanding of Italian Security Capabilities, but without a Formal Assessment of Italy’s Olympic Security Plans

Following the Athens Games in the summer of 2004, the United States began planning for (1) the security support it would provide to the Italian government and (2) the protection of U.S. citizens who would be participating in or attending the 2006 Winter Games. In October 2004, the United States held a 3-day interagency conference in Milan for Italy- and U.S.-based officials who would be working on the 2006 Winter Games to share lessons learned from the U.S. effort in Athens and to begin determining U.S. security support for Turin.

The United States largely based its security support approach on its understanding of Italian security capabilities, gained from long-standing counterterrorism and military relationships with Italy. In particular, the United States and Italy have an established partnership as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, more recently, as coalition partners in Iraq. According to U.S. officials, the Italian government’s sensitivities about formally sharing certain information limited the United States’ ability to formally assess Italy’s operational plans for providing security for the 2006 Winter Games. Agency officials noted that this made U.S. efforts to plan security and emergency contingencies during the Games more difficult. However, the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator and other key officials were able to use established relationships with their Italian counterparts to develop a working knowledge of Italy’s plans and capabilities for providing security to the 2006 Winter Games and to plan U.S. security efforts. For example, U.S. officials met with their Italian security and law enforcement counterparts to receive information on Italy’s security structure and Olympic security integration plan.

In addition, over several months in 2005, State reported that more than 20 technical meetings were held between Italian authorities and U.S. representatives from the U.S. Mission in Italy and various federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies to coordinate bilateral cooperation during the Games. Moreover, Italian government representatives held meetings in 2005 with representatives from the United States and other interested governments to discuss Italy’s security plans for the Games. For example, in September 2005, the Italian government hosted an international seminar on security concepts for the management of major sporting events, with law enforcement representatives from 11 countries. Furthermore, in October 2005, U.S. representatives were invited by the Italian government to observe its antiterrorism drills testing the efficiency and response capability of the local law enforcement, emergency, and rescue systems in four Italian cities.

On the basis of its understanding of Italy’s security capabilities, the United States identified specific training and security support that could be provided to support Italy’s security efforts. In March 2005, the Italian government requested a consolidated list of the offers of U.S. security assistance, and the interagency working group in Washington identified the available sources and capabilities among the represented agencies to prevent duplication of efforts. In the spring of 2005, this interagency working group provided a comprehensive offer of security support for the 2006 Winter Games, comprising a variety of specific offers from several U.S. agencies. Italy accepted a number of these offers, including crisis management expertise, an assessment of Turin’s international airport, and mapping assistance.

In addition to direct security assistance to Italy, the United States conducted several exercises to test its own strategies for supporting Italy’s security efforts and ensuring the protection of U.S. citizens during the 2006 Winter Games. In November and December 2005, the United States conducted several tabletop exercises to test strategies for ensuring the protection of U.S. citizens, including a joint crisis management exercise that focused on a theoretical terrorist attack in Italy and a crisis management exercise held over several days in Rome, Milan, and Turin to test U.S. crisis planning and execution in preparation for the Games. Figure 2 provides a timeline of U.S. security support activities for the 2006 Winter Games.

U.S. Olympic Security Support Was Coordinated by the U.S. Embassy in Rome and Supported by Interagency Efforts

The U.S. Embassy in Rome—under the leadership of the U.S. Ambassador to Italy—led the coordinated interagency efforts in Italy under one centralized U.S. government mission. The U.S. Ambassador delegated the responsibility for coordinating and overseeing U.S. interagency efforts in Turin to the U.S. Consul General in Milan. Located approximately 90-minutes away from Turin, the Consulate in Milan oversaw the establishment of a temporary U.S. presence in Turin to centralize U.S. agency operations and the efforts of key U.S. officials serving as designated point persons for coordinating security and logistical arrangements.

To centralize all U.S. activities in Turin leading up to and during the Games, the U.S. Mission in Italy established a U.S. Olympic Coordination Office in Turin to coordinate U.S. security support activities. Under the direction of the U.S. Ambassador and through the U.S. Consul General in Milan, this office served as the center for U.S. security operations and other activities. In particular, during the Games, this office housed a U.S. Olympic command group, comprising senior representatives from State, DOD, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The U.S. command group was responsible for providing—in the event of a request for assistance by the Italian government—specialized expertise in a variety of areas, including security operations, crisis operations, terrorism investigations, consequence management, and intelligence collection and dissemination. In addition, this office provided limited consular services to American citizens and included a public diplomacy office to liaison with press and support VIP visits during the Games.

U.S. efforts in Italy were supported by a Washington, D.C.-based interagency working group—the International Athletic Events Security Coordinating Group—which included representatives from the intelligence community, State, DHS, DOD, DOE, and DOJ, among others. Specifically, State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism serve as cochairs of this interagency working group. Chaired by State, the interagency working group facilitated and coordinated, on the domestic side, agencies’ contributions for the 2006 Winter Games. While this interagency working group has been a useful forum for coordinating the domestic side of U.S. efforts in providing security support to overseas athletic events, it operates without written operational guidance and without the authority for tasking participating agencies in planning for future Olympic Games, according to State and DOJ officials. Specifically, the interagency working group does not have a charter or mission statement that establishes the roles and responsibilities of this group and its members.

U.S officials from State and DOJ indicated that, although U.S. support for Turin was coordinated through the interagency working group, the group’s lack of clear authority presents confusion over what direction and guidance it can provide for U.S. operations in support of future Olympic Games. This confusion has impacted the efforts of some subgroups formed, in late 2004, by the interagency working group to provide guidance in several key areas. For example, of the subgroups that focus on logistics, transportation security, law enforcement, and intelligence support, only the intelligence support subgroup meets on a regular basis. The subgroup for law enforcement support met only a few times, in part due to the lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities of participating members. According to a State official from DS, the interagency working group relied on U.S. officials in Italy to inform the group of what support was needed. The same official indicated that clearly defined authorities and responsibilities for the group’s participating agencies may support the implementation of effective subgroups in the future. In addition, DS established a major events coordination unit after the 2004 Athens Summer Games, in part to coordinate U.S. security support for major sporting events overseas, according to a State official. However, this unit does not have written guidance for implementing coordination responsibilities for future Olympic events and other major sporting events. Without formal guidance, planning for future Olympic events could be complicated, as roles and responsibilities will have to be redefined on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, given the regular turnover of key staff, such written guidance could facilitate the continuity of future planning efforts.

To plan and coordinate U.S. security support operations, State and DOJ officials in Turin worked closely with representatives from the interagency working group. However, these officials in Turin experienced difficulties in planning for interagency operations, in part due to problems in obtaining timely information and decisions from the agencies. For example, State and DOJ officials had difficulty identifying requirements for operations, such as space and classification requirements, due to communication challenges with the interagency community in Washington. According to State officials in Italy and Washington, the lack of proper communication capabilities in the U.S. Olympic Coordination Office in Turin made it difficult to obtain timely information from the agencies. The interagency working group worked to coordinate responses to these officials in Turin. However, State and FBI officials in Turin indicated that many of the agencies did not fully understand the communication infrastructure and logistical requirements until they sent representatives to Turin in the fall of 2005. FBI officials have stated that although the interagency working group works to support the needs of the U.S. effort overseas, it has no authority to task agencies to meet deadlines, which leads to confusion over what direction and guidance should be followed or given by this group.

Several U.S. Agencies Contributed to Security Support for 2006 Winter Games; United States Spent Millions on Security Support Activities, but Lacks Formal Mechanism for Coordinating Financial Requirements

Several U.S. agencies contributed to the U.S. security support effort in Turin, identifying more than $16 million in costs—over fiscal years 2005 and 2006—to arrange and provide for this support. State initially paid for agencies’ shared costs, which were reimbursed by funds from the participating agencies; however, no formal mechanism exists for coordinating financial requirements associated with providing security support.

Several U.S. Agencies Provided Security Support for the 2006 Winter Games

Approximately 20 U.S. agencies, or their component entities, contributed to security efforts for the 2006 Winter Games. These contributions ranged from crisis management and investigative expertise to the provision of equipment, training, and communications and logistical support. Key agencies that contributed to the U.S. effort in Turin included State, DHS, DOD, DOE, DOJ, and intelligence agencies. State coordinated the U.S. interagency efforts in both Italy and Washington, D.C., and also provided security advice and other assistance to U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors. See table 1 for key contributions of U.S. agencies for the 2006 Winter Games.

State operated under Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 39, which extend U.S. responsibility for protection of Americans overseas and direct State as the lead agency to ensure the protection of American citizens overseas. Furthermore, the Omnibus and Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 directs DS to develop and implement policies and programs for the security of U.S. government operations, including the protection of all U.S. government personnel (other than those under military command) on official duty abroad, and the establishment and operation of security functions at all U.S. government missions. DS is responsible for the establishment and operation of post security and protective functions abroad, and for liaisons with host nation officials to ensure the safety of official U.S. citizens. The Bureau of Consular Affairs is responsible for assisting private Americans traveling and residing abroad. Under State’s leadership, other agencies’ individual authorities were used to provide specific assistance to the Italian government. For example, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has the authority under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act to deploy federal air marshals on all select flights from the United States to Italy, and TSA did so for the 2006 Winter Games.

United States Spent Millions, but Lacks a Formal Mechanism for Coordinating Financial Requirements for Security Support

We surveyed the U.S. agencies identified as contributing security support in advance of and during the 2006 Winter Games. These agencies identified more than $16 million in costs in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 to arrange and provide security support activities for the 2006 Winter Games, with funds from multiple accounts. U.S. agencies did not receive specific Olympic- related appropriations during this period. Of the $16 million, agencies reported to us that they spent more than $5 million in travel costs, including airfare, lodging, and per diem costs for staff who traveled overseas in 2005 and 2006 to provide security support for the 2006 Winter Games. The reported costs during this period do not capture the entirety of costs for activities in support of the 2006 Winter Games. For example, while reported costs include the salaries of key personnel who filled Olympic-related coordination roles, they do not capture the salaries and benefits of other U.S. officials who worked to support the U.S. effort for the Games, as part of their regular duties.

State paid for lodging and other administrative support needs associated with establishing U.S. operations in Turin in advance, often to secure limited housing at a lower rate, and these costs were later reimbursed by the participating agencies. Specifically, the U.S. Embassy in Rome paid for initial deposits on hotels because some agencies in Athens had struggled to identify available funding—often, several years in advance of the Games—for their housing and logistics needs. For Turin, some agencies provided funds to State in advance of the Games, particularly for lodging deposits, while additional reimbursements were made after the Games. According to a State finance official in Rome, State provided $140,000 on lodging contracts and $720,000 on joint administrative services associated with U.S. interagency operations in Turin. The U.S. Embassy in Rome was later reimbursed by participating agencies, including State, for their portion of these joint administrative services.

According to State officials in Italy, although the U.S. Embassy in Rome was able to fund these expenses, it struggled to cover them, particularly as costs rose due to the changing requirements of the agencies in outfitting suitable space for their operations. These changing requirements made it difficult for budget personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Rome to identify total joint administrative costs in order to obtain funds from State and other agencies in a timely manner. Although the interagency working group coordinates the domestic side of agency support for U.S. efforts at major international sporting events, it does not have a formal mechanism for addressing funding issues associated with providing this support. State and DOJ officials told us that it would be easier to plan and budget for future Olympic-security support activities overseas, which often begin several years in advance of the Games, if a framework were available for identifying costs and determining how these costs will be funded as early as possible. Such a framework would also be useful for anticipating resource needs, coordinating budgetary requests, and addressing potential funding issues associated with providing U.S. security support to future overseas Games.

Agencies have reported their expenditures associated with providing security support for both the 2004 Summer Games in Athens and the 2006 Winter Games in Turin. Although the total reported expenditures for providing security support to these overseas Games are not directly comparable, in part due to the differing sizes of the Games and the differing nature of U.S. security support, they can be helpful in identifying future costs. For both Games, State and DOD reported the two largest portions of costs associated with providing U.S. security support. For the 2004 Summer Games, State and DOD spent $15 million and $12.2 million, respectively. For the 2006 Winter Games, State and DOD spent $6.9 million and $6.6 million, respectively. See figure 3 for key agencies’ reported expenditures for security support to the 2004 Summer Games and the 2006 Winter Games.

The nature of U.S. security support provided by key agencies differed between the 2004 Summer Games in Athens and the 2006 Winter Games in Turin. For the Athens Games, the majority of costs identified by the agencies were travel costs for U.S. personnel supporting the Games and for training programs provided to Greek officials and security personnel. Agencies reported that they spent more than $9 million on training programs provided to Greek officials and security personnel, including the costs for building and executing the consequence management military exercises and FBI forensics training as well as for translating training materials and providing translators at the training sessions. For the Turin Games, U.S. agencies reported that they spent $95,000 on training programs for Italian officials and security personnel. As previously mentioned, the majority of the Turin Games costs identified by the agencies were for U.S. personnel travel and salary, benefits, and related expenditures for staff who were hired to fill Olympic-related coordination roles.

Security Planning Lessons Learned Were Applied in Turin and Additional Lessons Were Identified for the Beijing and Other Future Games

Key lessons learned from the 2004 Summer Games were applied in the planning efforts for Turin, including (1) planning early for U.S. security support, (2) designating key U.S. officials to lead and deliver unified messages, and (3) centralizing U.S. resources and interagency operations. U.S. agencies are currently collecting lessons learned from the Turin Games, for distribution to agencies involved in security planning for the Beijing Games and other future Olympic Games. According to U.S. officials involved in the Turin Games, these lessons include the importance of (1) establishing a fully equipped, temporary operations center at the location of the Olympics when a U.S. presence is not nearby; (2) establishing clear roles and responsibilities for U.S. agencies in event planning and crisis response efforts; and (3) planning for Olympic-related expenditures over several fiscal years.

U.S. Government Agencies Applied Key Lessons Learned from the Athens Games to the Turin Games

As we reported in 2005, key lessons learned from the Athens Games that were highlighted in numerous agency after-action reports and in an interagency “lessons learned” conference in Milan were applied to the security planning for the Turin Games. These lessons included the importance of (1) planning early for U.S. security support, (2) designating key U.S. officials to lead efforts and deliver unified messages, and (3) centralizing U.S. agency operations and intelligence activities.

Planning Early for U.S. Security Support Activities

Many agency after-action reports from Athens and U.S. officials’ comments indicated the importance of planning early—for providing crisis response support, counterterrorism and intelligence support, and other capabilities—coupled with an understanding of host country security capabilities that an existing and cooperative bilateral relationship affords. Such early insight enables advance planning of baseline support, including logistics as well as training and military exercises to enhance the host country’s capabilities. Furthermore, early planning of baseline U.S. support enables agencies to coordinate their efforts and plan more efficiently and effectively, including arranging accommodations, vehicle rentals, and communications infrastructure. For example, advance notification of the expected U.S. agency presence would allow for planning of support infrastructure, including the operations and intelligence center. U.S. officials planning for the Turin Games identified the importance of this lesson and began planning immediately after the Athens Games, almost 1½ years in advance of the Turin Games.

This lesson is being applied to the 2008 Beijing Games as the United States has already begun its planning efforts over 2 years in advance of the Games. According to U.S. officials in Beijing, U.S. officials in Greece; Italy; and Washington, D.C., have shared this lesson with their counterparts in Beijing. The U.S. Mission in Beijing is taking steps to plan for baseline support and identify the types of security support that the United States may provide for the Beijing Games. While U.S. agencies are focusing on the Beijing Games, they also are beginning to assess potential roles for U.S. security support for the 2010 Vancouver Winter Games. These plans are still in the early stages, although bilateral U.S.-Canada state and federal security and transportation officials have already met to discuss Canada’s Olympic planning process. The Vancouver Games, located in close proximity to the U.S. border, will present new and different challenges for U.S. security support, such as cross-border security issues.

Designating Key U.S. Officials to Lead Efforts and Present Unified Message

The designation of certain U.S. officials to serve as point persons for U.S. security support efforts is another key lesson from Athens that was applied in Turin. In Athens, the U.S. Embassy had designated individuals to be responsible for political, security, and logistics arrangements, which helped to avoid separate requests for assistance from U.S. agencies and minimized overlap among and overreach by participating U.S. agencies. Athens- and Washington-based officials recommended this strategy for future use. In September 2004, the U.S. Ambassador to Italy delegated organizational responsibility and overall coordination authority for U.S. efforts in Turin to the U.S. Consul General in Milan. In November 2004, State appointed an U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator to serve in Turin as a U.S. focal point for contacts with the host government and to work with the Consul General to develop and communicate a coordinated U.S. message, specifically on matters related to security support. This individual was tasked with crafting and ensuring a consistent message and setting consistent expectations for the host country and multilateral community regarding planned U.S. security support efforts. In addition, in January 2005, an FBI liaison arrived in Italy to serve as the FBI’s point of contact for its security support efforts in Turin. According to State and FBI officials, the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator and FBI liaison worked closely together in Turin to plan for and coordinate U.S. security support operations in Turin.

To coordinate the logistical arrangements and needs for U.S. operations in Turin, State appointed a U.S. Olympic Coordinator who arrived in April 2005. This individual served as a U.S. focal point for contacts with the host government, the Turin Olympic Organizing Committee, and the U.S. Olympic Committee and worked with the U.S. Consul General in Milan to develop and communicate interagency information in a coordinated and understandable way. In addition, a dedicated Web site was developed as a ready source of information for Americans on security matters, while also offering helpful advice on other matters, such as how to replace lost passports and locate English-speaking pharmacies.

This lesson is being applied to the 2008 Beijing Games through State’s appointment of an Olympic Coordinator in June 2005, a Minister Counselor for Olympic Coordination in December 2005, a Deputy Olympic Security Coordinator in January 2006, and the U.S. Ambassador’s designation of an Olympic Coordination Office at the U.S. Mission in Beijing to coordinate all arrangements—including political, security, and logistical—for U.S. security support to the 2008 Summer Games. According to U.S. officials involved in planning for the 2008 Summer Games, providing consistent, clear, and targeted information for Beijing is needed to avert possible confusion within the Chinese government regarding which U.S. agency to speak with to obtain specific assistance. The strategy also will help ensure that U.S. citizens and interests receive consistent information on security and other critical issues.

Centralizing U.S. Activities in One Location

Many U.S. officials noted that the key lesson from Athens that was applied in Turin was the centralization of all U.S. activities in one location. U.S. officials involved in the Athens Games recommended that operations and intelligence centers for future Olympics be colocated to ensure the efficient delivery and dissemination of information among U.S. agencies. U.S. officials planning for Turin identified the importance of this lesson and planned to better centralize resources by colocating all participating U.S. agencies and their functions in one facility in Turin, including operations and intelligence activities and consular services for U.S. citizens. According to U.S. officials who worked on the Turin Games, the colocation of all U.S. agencies and activities in one facility resulted in good coordination, and eliminated many planning and operations problems that had been experienced in Athens.

This lesson has been communicated by Washington-, Athens-, and Italy- based personnel to their counterparts in China and has been incorporated into planning efforts for the Beijing Games. According to U.S. officials in Beijing, they are following the Turin model of centralizing U.S. resources, to coordinate interagency needs that will be specific to the Beijing Games and to identify any training or security support that may be provided to the Chinese government. By July 2006, U.S. officials in Beijing plan to have established a U.S. Olympic Coordination Office outside of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing to coordinate U.S. operations leading up to and during the Beijing Games.

U.S. Agencies Identified Additional Lessons Learned in Turin

U.S. agencies have begun to collect lessons learned from the Turin Games and disseminate them to their Beijing Games counterparts. According to U.S. officials involved in the Turin Games, key lessons from Turin included the importance of (1) establishing a temporary, fully equipped, operations center at the location of the Olympics when a U.S. presence is not nearby; (2) establishing clear roles and responsibilities for U.S. agencies in event planning and operations; and (3) planning early for Olympic-related costs. Officials at State, DOJ, and other key agencies are currently completing after-action reports that are expected to highlight aspects of security support that went well and should be replicated in the future, where feasible, and what aspects could be improved upon. At the time of our review, State and DOJ expected to complete their after-action reports in June 2006. In addition, the Washington-based interagency working group is completing an after-action report that is expected to discuss issues specific to the support provided by this group. According to State, the interagency working group’s after-action report is expected to be completed later this year.

Establishing a U.S. Operations Center at the Location of Games

The lack of a U.S. presence in Turin demonstrated the importance of establishing a fully equipped operations center at the location of the Games. Acquiring and outfitting suitable space for an interagency operations center require advance planning, particularly when a U.S. presence is not nearby. In Turin, which is a 90-minute drive from the nearest U.S. Consulate, the U.S. Mission faced unique challenges in establishing a temporary but suitable space for centralizing interagency operations, particularly those related to logistics, communications, and resources. For example, the U.S. Consulate in Milan used its staff to provide logistical support to the U.S. coordinators in Turin, such as the establishment of work space and other administrative support services. Since the U.S. Olympic Coordination Office was not established until July 2005, the U.S. coordinators in Turin worked from their homes and traveled between Milan and Turin to coordinate the U.S. efforts.

In addition, proper space and classification requirements of participating agencies were difficult to identify in early planning efforts, in part due to the lack of proper communication capabilities between U.S. officials in Turin and U.S. agencies in Washington, D.C. Agency officials in Italy and Washington attributed this difficulty, in part, to this being the first time that the United States had attempted to establish a temporary U.S. facility to coordinate security support provided by all participating U.S. agencies. Although these challenges were resolved in time for the Turin Games, U.S. officials in Italy and Washington stated that authoritative decision making is necessary for budgeting and identifying requirements for setting up an interagency operation center.

Due to the presence of a U.S. Embassy in Beijing and three U.S. Consulates near other Olympic venues, U.S. operations in Beijing will not require the establishment of a fully equipped U.S. operations center. However, shortage of space at the U.S. Mission requires the establishment of a U.S. Olympic Coordination Office outside of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. U.S. officials in Beijing and at the interagency working group in Washington have begun discussing the communication, infrastructure, and other logistical requirements for centralizing and coordinating U.S. agency security support efforts before and during the Beijing Games. In addition, U.S. officials have held preplanning discussions for the 2010 Vancouver Games regarding work space and operating requirements.

Establishing Clear Roles and Responsibilities for U.S. Agencies

The Turin Games and, to some degree, the Athens Games demonstrated the importance of establishing clear roles and responsibilities for U.S. agencies in the planning and operational stages of U.S. security support efforts. While security support for the Turin Games was generally well- coordinated, U.S. agency officials at State and DOJ have stated that the overall U.S. effort lacks a clear strategy for security support operations at future overseas sporting events. These officials indicated that clear guidance for U.S. agencies’ roles and responsibilities would identify authorities for decision making and responsibilities during both the planning and operational stages of the U.S. efforts. U.S. officials in Turin prepared an operational plan that was approved by the U.S. Mission in Rome, which outlined the missions of all participating agencies and identified reporting authorities for U.S. operations. However, according to State and DOJ officials, although State is the lead agency for ensuring the protection of American citizens overseas, the United States does not have a strategy that clearly outlines the authorities responsible for planning operations at future Olympic Games.

Planning Early for Several Years of Olympic-Related Costs

U.S. support for the Turin Games demonstrated the importance of planning early for Olympic-related costs. In particular, State and DOJ officials noted the importance of identifying early funding sources to make advance payments on housing and logistical needs. In Turin, State struggled to identify funds to secure space, communication, and transportation arrangements, among other expenses, for interagency operations. Although U.S. officials in Italy were able to secure funding for housing and space for U.S. operations, they indicated that it was difficult to obtain timely decisions from the interagency to budget and identify requirements for the establishment of a U.S. presence in Turin. State officials in Italy indicated that they were unable to address these issues until the fall of 2005, when agency representatives came to Italy for operational planning meetings. According to a State finance official in Italy, funds for the joint administrative costs were easier to obtain once the U.S. coordinators in Turin and the interagency were able to identify operational requirements. In addition, several U.S. officials in Italy and Washington, D.C., stated that, for future overseas Games, it would be easier for agencies to identify and plan for their portion of Olympic-related expenditures if a framework were available for identifying costs and addressing funding issues associated with providing security support.

U.S. officials in Italy and Washington, D.C., have shared this lesson with their counterparts in Beijing. According to U.S. officials in Beijing, they have already begun to address housing and logistics needs, such as planning to make initial deposits on hotels early to avoid high costs for accommodations as the Games draw nearer. However, these officials indicated potential problems with identifying funds early enough to cover expenditures for this fiscal year.

Planning Efforts Are Under Way to Identify U.S. Security Support for 2008 Beijing Games; Efforts Face Unique Challenges

The United States is currently taking steps to coordinate a U.S. security presence and identify the types of security support that the United States may provide for the 2008 Beijing Games. U.S.-Chinese counterterrorism cooperation is limited, and U.S. officials have stated that they lack knowledge of China’s capabilities to handle security for the Olympics. In addition, technology transfer and human rights issues present new and different challenges for U.S. security support to these Games.

The U.S. government, led by State, is actively working to identify and establish a U.S. security presence to support the interests of its athletes, spectators, and commercial investors during the Games. The U.S. Ambassador to China has designated a U.S. Olympic Coordination Office to be responsible for all arrangements—including political, security, and logistical—of U.S. efforts for the Beijing Games. In January 2006, State appointed a U.S. Deputy Olympic Security Coordinator to serve—in this new office—as a U.S. government point person for U.S. security support for the Beijing Games. In addition, the U.S. Olympic Coordinator and the Minister Counselor for Olympic Coordination, appointed by State in June and December 2005, respectively, serve as the point persons for logistic arrangements of U.S. efforts. Both the U.S. Deputy Olympic Security Coordinator and the U.S. Olympic Coordinator were in Turin to participate in U.S. security support for the 2006 Winter Games and to learn from their counterparts in Turin. To ensure the safety of U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors, State has taken steps to identify and secure logistical support. To help identify necessary housing and mitigate high prices on accommodations, State has begun to identify housing options for U.S. personnel, coordinating through the interagency group for estimates of personnel to be temporarily assigned to Beijing during the Games.

While China has not yet requested U.S. security assistance as of May 2006, State officials have received inquiries from Chinese officials regarding Olympic security. As of April 2006, discussions between the United States and China were under way for an assessment to identify security needs and U.S. security support for the Beijing Games, according to U.S. officials in Beijing and Washington, D.C. In addition, a working group has been established between U.S. and Chinese counterparts to discuss issues related to the operational and intelligence side of security. U.S. officials have stated that the Chinese have recognized the large size of the U.S. team and its associated security risks and concerns.

Although recent steps have been taken, U.S. officials have stated that they lack knowledge of China’s advanced capabilities to handle security for the 2008 Summer Games. In addition, U.S. officials from State and DOJ have stated that they are uncertain about the extent of assistance China may request or permit from outside sources. Moreover, U.S. and Chinese counterterrorism cooperation is limited, and military relations have only recently resumed. In July 2003, China joined the U.S. Container Security Initiative, and, in November 2005, the United States and China signed an agreement related to the U.S. Megaports Initiative, allowing for the installation of special equipment at Chinese ports to detect hidden shipments of nuclear and other radioactive materials. The United States has recently resumed, under the current administration, military-to- military contacts with China.

In planning for the 2008 Summer Games in Beijing, logistical challenges and technology transfers and human rights issues present unique challenges for U.S. security support. The location of the Beijing Games presents unique logistical challenges in coordinating U.S. security support. Whereas past Summer Games have been centered in and around the host city, the venues for the Beijing Games will be spread across seven Chinese cities along the country’s eastern border, presenting potential communication challenges for interagency operations between the U.S. Embassy Beijing and U.S. Consulates located near Olympic venue sites. Figure 4 presents the seven venue cities for the Beijing Games—Beijing, Qingdao, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tianjin, Shenyang, and Qinhuangdao—and the U.S. embassy and three consulates located at Olympic venue cities. Unlike the 2004 Summer Games in Athens, U.S. officials have stated the Chinese are much further ahead in planning for the 2008 Summer Games, and these officials anticipate that the venues will be completed on time or ahead of schedule. To prepare for the 2008 Beijing Games, China is planning to host several events in 2007 to test its preparations for major event operations.

In addition, any requests for equipment or technology to support security efforts in China must be addressed under U.S. requirements for the protection against sensitive technology transfers, because U.S. sanctions deny the export of defense articles/services, crime control equipment, and satellites to China. A presidential waiver for exports of equipment for security of the Beijing Olympics may be considered. U.S. policy makers and human rights groups have also expressed concern with several human rights issues in China, including freedom of information, freedom of religion, and protection of ethnic and minority groups.

Conclusions

In a climate of increased concerns about international terrorism, ensuring the protection of U.S. interests at future Olympic Games overseas will continue to be a priority for the United States. For such future Games, U.S. agencies are likely to continue providing support to host governments in identifying potential security threats and developing strategies to protect U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors several years in advance of and throughout the Olympics. Although each Olympic Games has its own set of unique security requirements, future coordination of U.S. security support efforts for Games—under the leadership of State— should efficiently and effectively capture the expertise, knowledge, and resource requirements of all U.S. agencies. However, there is currently no formal framework for guiding the development and implementation of U.S. security support for such Games, particularly the coordinated financing of U.S. security support and operations.

Recommendations

To enhance planning and preparations for future overseas Olympic and Paralympic Games, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with members of the International Athletic Events Security Coordinating Group, take the following two actions: Develop written guidance for providing U.S. government security support to future Games. This guidance should identify key personnel and target dates for their assignment and roles and responsibilities, and key steps for the U.S. Mission and regional bureau to undertake in preparing for and leading the U.S. efforts at future Games. To formalize the process for providing security support overseas, we also recommend that State, in consultation with members of the International Athletic Events Security Coordinating Group, consider establishing a charter and mission statement for this group that identifies authorities and responsibilities for coordinating and supporting U.S. security efforts at future Games.

Develop a finance subgroup as part of the International Athletic Events Security Coordinating Group, which would bring together budgetary personnel from the various agencies or component entities that contribute to security efforts for overseas Games. A formal mechanism, such as a finance subgroup with established responsibilities, would help the agencies plan for anticipated resources needs, coordinate their budget requests, and address potential funding issues for U.S. security support at future Games.

Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and State and to the Attorney General for their review and comment. The Department of State provided written comments on the draft report, which are reprinted in appendix II. State said that it agreed with our findings and recommendations, and that it is working to develop a more efficient plan for coordinating the planning and implementation of U.S. security support at future major events overseas—including the development of written guidance and identified roles and responsibilities for interagency working group members—through an after-action review of the International Athletic Events Security Coordinating Group and by working with the National Security Council, Counterterrorism Security Group. Furthermore, State said that the interagency working group has expanded its working subgroups and is considering the inclusion of a budget subgroup to address potential funding issues for U.S. security support at future Olympic Games. State also provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.

The Departments of Defense and Justice did not provide written comments on the draft report; however, they provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. The Departments of Energy and Homeland Security did not provide written or technical comments.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Energy, and the Attorney General. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128 or ford@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

To fulfill our objectives in identifying U.S. security strategies in providing security support for the 2006 Winter Games, the various roles and additional costs of the U.S. agencies involved, and the lessons they learned in supporting the Games, we specifically obtained and reviewed several documents, such as available operations and mission plans, security situation reports, and monthly activity reports. In addition, we interviewed officials at the Departments of State (State), Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Energy (DOE) and at certain intelligence agencies. We also conducted fieldwork in Rome, Milan, and Turin, Italy.

At State, we interviewed officials in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Coordinator for Counterterrorism office; Overseas Security Advisory Council; Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs; Consular Affairs; and Public Affairs. We also interviewed the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator and the U.S. Olympic Coordinator. At DOJ, we interviewed officials in the Criminal Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Counterterrorism Division, including the FBI’s Olympic coordinator who served as its liaison in Turin through the operational period of the Games. At DHS, we met with officials from the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Secret Service, and the Federal Air Marshal Service. At DOD, we spoke with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and European Command. At DOE, we spoke with officials from the National Nuclear Security Administration. Finally, we regularly attended and met with the interagency working group—the International Athletic Events Security Coordinating Group—that includes all agencies involved in providing support to international sporting events overseas.

During our fieldwork in Italy in November 2005, we obtained documents and interviewed key U.S. officials from the previously mentioned agencies. We obtained and reviewed key documents, such as operational and mission plans. In Rome, we interviewed U.S. officials, including the Deputy Chief of Mission, Regional Security Officer, Minister Counselor for Management Affairs, Financial Management Officer, Information Management Officer, Legal Attaché, Public Affairs Officer, Immigration and Customs Enforcement Attaché, Transportation and Security Administration representative, Defense Attaché, and Consular officer. Additionally, we attended an interagency operations and capabilities presentation for the Chief of Mission. Also, we met with representatives from the Italian Ministry of Interior to obtain the Italian government’s perspective on the security support provided by the United States. During our fieldwork in Milan, we interviewed U.S. officials, including the Consul General, Milan; Management Officer; Vice Consul; Public Affairs Officers; and Consular Officer. In Turin, we interviewed the U.S. Olympic Coordinator and the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator. We also visited the U.S. Olympic Coordination Center in Turin and observed preparations for outfitting the center for the planned operations and intelligence center. Additionally, to understand the challenges associated with providing security support to the distant Olympic venues, we visited several of the Olympics venue sites in Turin, including in Palavela, Pragelato, Sestriere, and Bardonecchia, Italy.

To determine cost estimates of U.S. security support to the 2006 Winter Games, we developed a data collection instrument (DCI), based on the previous DCI we used to obtain cost estimates for the 2004 Athens Games, to survey agencies identified as contributing to the U.S. effort. A draft DCI was pretested on two U.S. government agencies. In November 2005, we sent a preliminary DCI to agencies identified by State as being involved in the U.S. security support effort and obtained 11 responses. In March 2006, we sent a final DCI to the agencies previously identified and obtained 20 responses. Except for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the intelligence community entities did not provide a response to our final DCI on costs for the 2006 Winter Games. Our DCI requested agencies to identify how they collected and tracked the data on costs. We conducted follow-ups with the agencies to clarify information in their responses. We observed that not all agency components collect and track data in a consistent manner. Furthermore, the DCI did not attempt to gather information on the costs of personnel salaries, which are presumed to be a significant outlay for the agency components involved. To assess the reliability of the estimates provided, we compared the preliminary results with the final results and compared this year’s 2006 results with those for 2004. In addition, we considered the cost factors cited by the agencies in relation to the sums they reported and conducted follow-ups with the agencies to clarify any questions that arose. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to be reported in aggregated form, rounded to millions, and attributed to the agencies, as estimated cost outlays and by category of expenditure, but not in precise, detailed form.

To assess how lessons learned in supporting Greece were applied to the Turin Games, we gathered information from the various agencies previously mentioned; reviewed operations plans; attended meetings of the State-chaired interagency working group in Washington, D.C.; and conducted fieldwork in Rome, Milan, Turin, and mountain areas of Italy. To identify lessons learned from the Turin Games, we gathered information from the various agencies and attended meetings of the interagency working group. Although after-action reports were not completed and available at the time of our audit, to identify lessons learned, we interviewed key officials at State, DOJ, the U.S. Consulate Milan, and the U.S. Coordination Center in Turin and attended the interagency working group meetings. To identify how lessons learned in Turin are being applied to the 2008 Beijing Games, we interviewed U.S. officials from State and DOJ and the U.S. Olympic Coordinator and U.S. Deputy Olympic Security Coordinator at the U.S. Mission in Beijing.

To identify efforts under way for providing support to the 2008 Summer Games in Beijing, we gathered information from the various agencies previously mentioned; reviewed China’s Mission Performance Plan; attended meetings of the State-chaired interagency working group in Washington, D.C.; and interviewed the Deputy Olympic Security Coordinator and Olympic Coordinator at the U.S. Mission in Beijing.

We conducted our work from September 2005 to May 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

Key contributors to this report included Diana Glod, Monica Brym, and Dorian L. Herring. Technical assistance was provided by Jason Bair, Joe Carney, Martin de Alteris, Etana Finkler, Ernie Jackson, Jena Sinkfield, George Taylor, and Mike TenKate.