The National Security Council: Background and Issues for Congress
Released: 2017-04-28T00:00:00

Introduction1

The National Security Council (NSC) was established by statute in 1947 to create an interdepartmental body to advise the President on matters of national security. More specifically, the NSC was created to integrate domestic, foreign, and military policies related to national security, and to facilitate cooperation among the military services and other government departments and agencies in matters of national security. Currently, statutory members of the NSC are the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and, since 2007, the Secretary of Energy. Other senior officials participate in NSC deliberations at the President's request. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of National Intelligence are statutory advisers.

The President clearly holds final decisionmaking authority in the executive branch. Over the years, however, the NSC staff has emerged as a major factor in the formulation (and at times in the implementation) of national security policy. Similarly, the head of the NSC staff, the National Security Adviser, has played an important, and occasionally highly public, role in policymaking. This report summarizes the evolution of the NSC from its creation to the present.

The organization and influence of the NSC have varied significantly from one Administration to another, ranging from highly structured and formal systems to loose-knit teams of experts. Although it is universally acknowledged that the NSC staff should be organized to meet the particular goals and work habits of an incumbent President, the history of the NSC provides ample examples of the advantages and disadvantages of different types of policymaking structures.

Congress enacted the statute creating the NSC and has altered the character of its membership over the years. Congress annually appropriates funds for its activities, but Congress does not, routinely, receive testimony on substantive matters from the National Security Adviser or from NSC staff. Proposals to require Senate confirmation of the Security Adviser have been discussed but not adopted.

Pre-NSC Coordination Methods

The Need for Interdepartmental Coordination

Successful national security policymaking is based on careful analysis of the international situation, including diplomatic, economic, intelligence, military, and morale factors. Based on a comprehensive assessment, effective government leaders attempt to attain their goals by selecting the most appropriate instrument of policy, whether it is military, diplomatic, economic, based on the intelligence services, or a combination of more than one. Although this approach has been an ideal throughout the history of international relations, prior to World War II, U.S. Presidents focused primarily on domestic matters and lacked organizational support to integrate national security policies. They relied instead on ad hoc arrangements and informal groups of advisers. However, in the early 1940s, the complexities of global war and the need to work together with allies led to more structured processes of national security decisionmaking to ensure that the efforts of the State, War, and Navy Departments were focused on the same objectives. There was an increasingly apparent need for an organizational entity to support the President in looking at multiple factors, military and diplomatic, that had to be faced during wartime and in the early postwar months, when crucial decisions had to be made regarding the future of Germany and Japan and many other countries.

In the postwar years, the United States' continuing worldwide responsibilities involved active diplomacy, sizable military forces, and sophisticated intelligence agencies, in addition to economic assistance in various forms. In response to these evolving responsibilities, the United States established organizational mechanisms to analyze the international environment, identify priorities, and recommend appropriate policy options. Four decades later, the end of the Cold War saw the emergence of new international concerns, including transnational threats such as international terrorism and drug trafficking, that have continued to require the coordination of various departments and agencies concerned with national security policies.

Past Modes of Policy Coordination

Coordinative mechanisms to implement policy are largely creations of the executive branch, but they directly influence choices that Congress may be called upon to support and fund. Congress thus takes interest in the processes by which policies and the roles of various participants are determined. Poor coordination of national security policy can result in calls for Congress to take actions that have major costs, both international and domestic, but an uncertain outcome. Effective coordination, on the other hand, can help achieve policy goals with minimal losses while providing the opportunity to devote material resources to other needs.

Until the 20 th century, most U.S. policy coordination centered on the President, who was virtually the sole means of such coordination. The Constitution designates the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Article II, Section 2) and grants him broad powers in the areas of foreign affairs (Article II, Section 2), powers that have expanded considerably in the 20 th century. Given limited U.S. foreign involvements for the first 100 or so years under the Constitution, the small size of the Armed Forces, the relative geographic isolation of the nation, and the absence of any proximate threat, the President, or his executive agents in the Cabinet, provided a sufficient coordinative base.

However, the advent of World War I, which represented a modern, complex military effort involving broad domestic and international coordination, forced new demands on the system that the President alone could not meet. In 1916, the Council of National Defense was established by statute (the Army Appropriation Act of 1916). It reflected proposals that went back to 1911 and consisted of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor. The statute allowed the President to appoint an advisory commission of outside specialists to aid the council. The Council of National Defense was intended as an economic mobilization coordinating group, as reflected by its membership, which excluded the Secretary of State. His inclusion would have given the council a much wider coordinative scope. Furthermore, the authorizing statute essentially limited the council's role to economic mobilization issues. The Council of National Defense was disbanded in 1921, but it set a precedent for coordinative efforts that would be needed in World War II.

The President remained the sole national security coordinator until 1938, when the prewar crisis began to build in intensity, presenting numerous and wide-ranging threats to the inadequately armed United States. The State Department, in reaction to reports of Axis activities in Latin America, proposed that interdepartmental conferences be held with War and Navy Department representatives. In April 1938, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt, formally proposed the creation of a standing committee made up of the second-ranking officers of the three departments, for purposes of liaison and coordination. The President approved this idea, and the Standing Liaison Committee, or Liaison Committee as it was also called, was established, the members being the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations. The Standing Liaison Committee was the first significant effort toward interdepartmental liaison and coordination, although its work in the area was limited and uneven. The Liaison Committee largely concentrated its efforts on Latin American problems, and it met irregularly. Although it did foster some worthwhile studies during the crisis following the fall of France, it was soon superseded by other coordinative modes. It was more a forum for exchanging information than a new coordinative and directing body.

An informal coordinating mechanism, which complemented the Standing Liaison Committee, evolved during the weekly meetings established by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, who took office in June 1940. Stimson arranged for weekly luncheons with his Navy counterpart, Frank Knox, and Cordell Hull, but these meetings also did not fully meet the growing coordinative needs of the wartime government.

In May 1940, President Roosevelt used the precedent of the 1916 statute and established the National Defense Advisory Council (NDAC), composed of private citizens with expertise in specific economic sectors. As with the earlier Council of National Defense, the NDAC was organized to handle problems of economic mobilization; by the end of the year, it had given way to another organization in a succession of such groups.

During the war, a number of interdepartmental committees were formed to handle various issues, and, while these did help achieve coordination, they suffered from two problems. First, their very multiplicity was to some degree counterproductive to coordination, and they still represented a piecemeal approach to these issues. Second, and more important, these committees in many cases were not advising the President directly, but were advising his advisers. Although their multiplicity and possible overlapping fit Roosevelt's preferred working methods, they did not represent coordination at the top. Roosevelt ran the war largely through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who were then an ad hoc and de facto group, and through key advisers such as Harry Hopkins and James F. Byrnes, and via his own personal link with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

The weekly meetings arranged by Stimson evolved, however, into a significant coordinative body by 1945, with the formal creation of the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). SWNCC had its own secretariat and a number of regional and topical subcommittees; its members were assistant secretaries in each pertinent department. The role of SWNCC members was to aid their superiors on political-military matters, and coordinating the views of the three departments. SWNCC was a significant improvement in civilian-military liaison, and it meshed well with the JCS system; it did not, however, concern itself with fundamental questions of national policy during the early months of the Cold War. SWNCC operated through the end of the war and beyond, becoming SANACC (State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee) after the National Security Act of 1947. It was dissolved in 1949, by which time it had been superseded by the NSC.

The creation of SWNCC, virtually at the end of the war, and its continued existence after the surrender of Germany and Japan, reflected the growing awareness within the federal government that better means of coordination were necessary. The World War II system had largely reflected the preferred working methods of President Roosevelt, who relied on informal consultations with various advisers in addition to the JCS structure. However, the complex demands of global war and the postwar world rendered this system inadequate, and it was generally recognized that a return to the simple and limited prewar system would not be possible if the United States was to take on the responsibilities thrust upon it by the war and its aftermath.

The Creation of the NSC7

Introduction

The NSC was not created independently, but rather as one part of a complete restructuring of the entire national security apparatus—civilian and military, including intelligence efforts—as accomplished in the National Security Act of 1947. Thus, isolating the creation of the NSC from the larger reorganization is difficult, especially as the NSC was much less controversial than the unification of the military and so attracted less attention.

Proposals

As early as 1943, General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, had proposed that the prospect of a unified military establishment be assessed. Congress first began to consider this idea in 1944, with the Army showing interest and the Navy opposing the idea. At the request of the Navy, these investigations were deferred until 1945, although by then it was clear to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that President Truman, who had come to the White House upon the death of President Roosevelt in April 1945, favored some sort of reorganization. Forrestal believed that outright opposition would not be a satisfactory Navy stance. He also realized that the State Department had to be included in any new national security apparatus. Therefore, he had Ferdinand Eberstadt, a leading New York attorney and banker who had served in several high-level executive branch positions, investigate the issue.

With respect to the formation of the NSC, a key question posed by Forrestal to Eberstadt was,

What form of postwar organization should be established and maintained to enable the military services and other governmental departments and agencies most effectively to provide for and protect our national security?

Eberstadt's response to this question covered the military establishment, where he favored three separate departments and the continuation of the JCS, as well as the civilian sphere, where he suggested the formation of two new major bodies "to coordinate all these [civilian and military] elements." Eberstadt called these two bodies the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security Resources Board (NSRB).The NSC was composed of the President, the Secretaries of State and the three military departments, the JCS "in attendance," and the chairman of the NSRB. Eberstadt also favored the creation of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the NSC.

Eberstadt's recommendations clearly presaged the eventual national security apparatus, with the exception of a unified Department of Defense. The NSC was also a useful negotiating point for Forrestal with the Army, as Eberstadt had described one of its functions as being the "building up [of] public support for clear-cut, consistent, and effective foreign and military policies." This would appeal to all the service factions as they thought back on the lean and insecure prewar years.

War-Navy negotiations over the shape of the reorganization continued throughout 1946 and into 1947. However, some form of central coordination, temporarily called the Council of Common Defense, was not one of the contentious issues. By the end of May 1946, agreement had been reached on this and several other points, and by the end of the year the two sides had agreed on the composition of the new coordinative body.

Congressional Consideration

The creation of the NSC was one of the least controversial sections of the National Security Act and so drew little attention compared with the basic concept of a single military department, around which most of the congressional debate centered.

The concept of a regular and permanent organization for the coordination of national security policy was as widely accepted in Congress as in the executive branch. When the NSC was considered in debate, the major issues were the mechanics of the new organization, its membership, assurances that it would be a civilian organization and would not be dominated by the new Secretary of the National Military Establishment, and whether future positions on the NSC would be subject to approval by the Senate.

The NSC as Created in 1947

The NSC was created by the National Security Act, which was signed by the President on July 26, 1947. The NSC appears in Section 101 of Title I, Coordination for National Security, and its purpose is stated as follows:

(a) ... The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

(b) In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council

(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection there with; and

(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith....

(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require.

The following officers were designated as members of the NSC: the President; the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. The President could designate the following officers as members "from time to time": secretaries of other executive departments and the Chairmen of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board. Any further expansion required Senate approval. The NSC was provided with a staff headed by a civilian executive secretary, appointed by the President.

The National Security Act also established the Central Intelligence Agency under the NSC, but the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was not designated as an NSC member. The act also created a National Military Establishment, with three executive departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) under a Secretary of Defense.

Implicit in the provisions of the National Security Act was an assumption that the NSC would have a role in ensuring that the U.S. industrial base would be capable of supporting national security strategies. The Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, set up by the same act to deal directly with industrial base and civilian mobilization issues, was provided a seat on the NSC. Over the years, however, these arrangements proved unsatisfactory and questions of defense mobilization and civil defense were transferred to other federal agencies and the membership of the NSC was limited to the President, Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. Thus, the need for a coordinative entity that had initially been perceived to center on economic mobilization issues during World War I had evolved to one that engaged the more permanent themes of what had come to be known as national security policy.

The creation of the NSC improved past coordinative methods and organization, bringing together as it did the top diplomatic, military, and resource personnel with the President. The addition of the CIA, subordinate to the NSC, also provided the necessary intelligence and analyses for the NSC so that it could keep pace with events and trends. The changeable nature of its organization and its designation as an advisory body to the President also meant that the NSC was a malleable organization, to be used as each President saw fit. Thus, its use, internal substructure, and ultimate effect would be directly dependent on the style and wishes of the President.

What Is the National Security Council Today?

According to Title 50, U.S.C. §3021, the National Security Council today has three primary functions:

1. advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the Armed Forces and the other departments and agencies of the U.S. government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security; 2. assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to the actual and potential military power of the United States, and make recommendations thereon to the President; and 3. make recommendations to the President concerning policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the U.S. government concerned with the national security.

Since its inception in 1947, the National Security Council, and the institutions that support it, has evolved from a statutorily mandated meeting of cabinet-level officials into a complex system of coordination, adjudication, and in some instances formulation (as in the case of Dr. Kissinger's tenure as National Security Advisor) of policies among relevant departments and agencies. As a result, when individuals refer to the "NSC," they variously refer to the decisionmaking body created in statute in the 1947 National Security Act, the staff that supports that decisionmaking body, or the processes used by the White House to discuss and adjudicate decisions across different agencies of the executive branch.

The National Security Council is the President's statutory advisory body on matters related to national and international security. Pursuant to Title 50 U.S.C §3021, the NSC's statutory members are the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Energy. Other senior officials, including the National Security Advisor, participate in NSC deliberations at the President's request. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of National Intelligence are the NSC's statutory advisors. The National Security Council is chaired by the President. The National Security Council Staff . The NSC's activities are coordinated and directed by the Presidentially appointed National Security Adviser (NSA). They are supported by a National Security Staff (NSS, or NSC staff) comprising permanent employees of the Executive Office of the President and detailees from other government agencies serving temporary assignments. It is organized into offices that focus on a variety of long-term strategic issues and ad hoc working groups that address emerging topics. Each President configures the NSC to address risks to U.S. global security interests according to prescribed policy priorities. The size of the NSC staff and ratio of political appointees to detailees have varied with each Administration. In P.L. 114-328 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Congress limited the number of policy-focused individuals serving on the NSC staff to 200 persons. During the Obama Administration, the Homeland Security Committee and National Security Council staffs were combined into an organization called the National Security Staff. Decisionmaking committees . Coordinating and managing U.S. national security affairs requires routine coordination and discussion among relevant departments and agencies. Most administrations have therefore set up a hierarchical system of committees designed to discuss, and when appropriate decide, national security matters. These committees meet as frequently as the White House deems necessary. The design and composition of the committee structure is the prerogative of the President, but the approach has often included some variant of the following: The Principals Committee (PC) is a level below the NSC, convened by the National Security Advisor. The PC does not need to include all statutory NSC members, but it generally includes the heads of departments or agencies involved with the subject matter being discussed at a given meeting. The Deputies Committee (DC) is convened by the Deputy National Security Advisor, and generally includes the deputy heads of departments (i.e., the Deputy Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of State) involved with the subject matter being discussed at a given meeting. Policy Coordination Committee s (PCC) are established by the Deputies Committee and are responsible for day-to-day management of national security matters on a given region or topic at the Assistant Secretary level from relevant agencies. These are chaired by members of the National Security Staff whose subject matter portfolios are relevant to the issue at hand. Different Administrations have used various titles for these committees; under President Obama, this forum was called the Interagency Policy Committee.

Overall, the NSC and its supporting processes and institutions are designed to be flexible, thereby affording the President maximum latitude to create a security advisory body that suits his unique decisionmaking style. Apart from appropriating the NSC annual budget, Congress has little oversight over the Executive Office of the President, and the National Security Council system in particular, due to the fact that most national security positions within the White House itself (as opposed to the senior levels of Departments and Agencies) are not currently subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Some observers over the years have argued that the position of National Security Adviser should be subject to Senate confirmation and available to testify before congressional committees, as are officials from other government departments and agencies. Others argue that the President is entitled to confidential advice from his immediate staff .

NSPM-4: What's Changed? What's Stayed the Same?

On April 4, 2017, the Trump Administration issued National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) - 4: Organization of the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and Subcommittees . NSPM-4 details how the executive branch intends to manage and coordinate national and homeland security issues among relevant departments and agencies. This NSPM augments an earlier articulation from the Trump Administration regarding the management of national security matters, as expressed in NSPM-2, which was issued on January 28, 2017. Based on the existing documentation, the following key observations can be made:

Role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) . NSPM-2 language on the role of CJCS at NSC and PC meetings was nearly identical to that defined by the George W. Bush Administration. In their roles as statutory advisors to the National Security Council, CJCS and DNI were invited to attend all National Security Council meetings. CJCS and DNI were also invited to attend meetings of the Principals Committee "where issues pertaining to their responsibilities and expertise are to be discussed." The Obama Administration departed from the George W. Bush Administration formula by making CJCS and DNI "regular members" of the Principals Committee." Under NSPM-2, it was not clear whether the Trump Administration's reversion to the Bush formulation amounted to an actual change to either the Chairman's or DNI's roles and participation in senior national security meetings, although the CJCS himself maintained that he would "remain a full participant" in the national security interagency process. Considerable controversy arose as a result of the Trump Administration's return to George W. Bush Administration formula, as it was widely perceived to be a diminution of the CJCS and DNI in senior-level national security policymaking. NSPM-4 therefore returned to the Obama Administration formula, inviting CJCS and DNI as regular attendees of NSC and PC meetings. NSPM-4 also establishes the Director of the CIA (D/CIA) as a regular attendee of NSC and PC meetings. It is unclear what effect this might have on DNI's status and role as statutory adviser to the NSC, due to the fact that D/CIA is subordinate to DNI in the current intelligence community organizational hierarchy established by P.L. 108-458 (Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004). Inclusion of the Assistant to the President and Chief Strategist as a regular NSC and PC attendee in NSPM - 2 . While previous Presidents have, on occasion, requested the attendance of their chief political strategist at NSC meetings, the Trump Administration appears to be the first to include a political adviser as a regular, permanent attendee of NSC and PC meetings. The law is silent on the inclusion of political advisors as NSC regular attendees. NSPM-4 does not list the Assistant to the President and Chief Strategist as a regular attendee of NSC and PC meetings, although it should be noted that the President may invite that individual to any specific NSC meeting, should he choose to do so. Role of the Secretary of Energy . The Secretary of Energy is a statutory member of the NSC and, as such, is invited to attend all NSC meetings. In contrast with the Obama Administration (although in keeping with the George W. Bush Administration structures), the Trump Administration initially excluded the Secretary of Energy from PC meetings, based on NSPM-2. This decision was reversed with NSPM-4; the Secretary of Energy is now invited as a regular attendee to NSC and PC meetings. The relationship between the NSC and Homeland Security Council (HSC). The HSC was created by President George W. Bush soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States with the responsibility of " ensuring coordination of homeland security-related activities of executive departments and agencies and effective development and implementation of homeland security policies ." Post-9/11 Administrations have undertaken different approaches to the interaction between the NSC and HSC. Under President Bush, the NSC and HSC focused separately on international and domestic security issues. Soon after taking office, President Obama merged the NSC and HSC into a National Security Staff with the focus of "support(ing) all White House policy-making activities related to international, transnational, and homeland security matters." The Trump Administration retains both an NSC, responsible for "advis(ing) the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security" and an HSC responsible for "advising the President on matters pertaining to homeland security." While no specific statement in the presidential memorandum discusses whether these two entities are organizationally combined or the hierarchy among the leaders of each Council, under NSPM-4, the following statement in the document suggests the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs has authority over both entities:

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (National Security Advisor) shall be responsible, as appropriate and at the President's direction, for determining the agenda for the NSC or HSC, respectively, ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared and recording Council actions and Presidential decisions in a timely manner. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (Homeland Security Advisor) may, at the sole discretion of the National Security Advisor, perform those functions.

Inclusion of the Director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) , and NSC Executive Secretary as regular attendees of NSC and PC meetings. Neither office had been included as regular attendees or members of these meetings in prior Administrations. With the issuance of NSPM-2, the Director of OMB was invited to attend both NSC and PC meetings. Further, according to NSPM-2, the Executive Secretary was also invited to attend PC meetings. Under NSPM-4, the role of the OMB Director remains the same, although the Executive Secretary is no longer invited to attend PC meetings. Retention of the Representative of the United States to the United Nations as a regular attendee of NSC meetings . The Representative of the United States to the United Nations (USUN) was first placed on the NSC by the Clinton Administration, removed from the NSC by the George W. Bush Administration, and placed back on the NSC by the Obama Administration. Under NSPM-2, the USUN representative was invited to attend PC meetings "as appropriate"; NSPM-4 invites the USUN representative to be a regular attendee of both NSC and PC meetings.

NSC Functions: Theory vs. Practice

As noted earlier, the 1947 National Security Act established the NSC in order to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security." Presidents have latitude to structure and use the NSC as they see fit. In practice, the NSC staff's activities now extend somewhat beyond providing policy advice. First, as one former NSC official notes , "White House involvement is often needed for precise execution of policy, especially when secrecy is required to perform delicate tasks." Second, the rise in strategic importance of transnational threats such as terrorism and narco-trafficking, along with post-Cold War military campaigns in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, has increasingly necessitated "whole of government" responses that leverage diplomatic, military, and development tools from a variety of different U.S. government agencies. The NSC often coordinates such responses, and as the international security environment has become more complex , whole-of-government responses to individual crises have become more frequent, translating into even greater NSC involvement. This expanding role is leading many scholars and practitioners to question the appropriate size, scope and role for the NSC.

NSC Reform?

Currently, two primary schools of thought exist regarding what types of reforms are necessary. One view reflects the U.S. experience during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and maintains that interagency coordination issues prevented the United States from consolidating gains after achieving tactical military successes. Greater synchronization and integration of the instruments of national power are required to achieve desired campaign effects. According to this view, much of the needed policy synchronization is now occurring at the NSC rather than at lower levels due to insufficient interagency coordination mechanisms. In the absence of meaningful interagency reform, the size of the NSS has grown in order to help manage U.S. policy in an era of greater complexity and to mitigate policy "immobilization" in the interagency. Under this school of thought, right-sizing and scoping the NSC therefore requires legislation akin to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act , to promote better coordination among executive branch departments (see CRS Report R44474, Goldwater-Nichols at 30: Defense Reform and Issues for Congress , by Kathleen J. McInnis).

Others believe that the enlarged NSC staff itself is what drives the organization to take on "operational" roles that are inappropriate, given the NSC's mandate to help the President formulate strategy and monitor its implementation. These observers point to the fact that the NSC staff in the early 1990s under the George H.W. Bush Administration averaged approximately 50 persons ; by contrast, the current NSC comprises between 300-400 people , although during the final years of the Obama Administration, NSA Rice reduced its size by 10%. According to this view, the comparatively large staff (relative to prior Administrations) has resulted in the "micromanagement" of the activities of the Departments in the executive branch, often by relatively junior personnel . Some therefore believe that in order to force the National Security Staff to focus on its core, strategic responsibilities , its size should be limited .

Recent Legislative Proposals

As part of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act debates, both the Senate and House introduced provisions limiting the size of the NSC staff. H.R. 4909 §921 (114 th Congress) would have required the Trump Administration to choose whether the NSC would to continue addressing operational tasks, or whether it should focus on more strategic matters (e.g., by capping the number of professional staff members, including detailees, at 100). Should the NSC exceed that cap, the appointment of a National Security Adviser would have become subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. By contrast, S. 2943 §1089 ( P.L. 114-328 ) limits the size of the NSC staff to not more than 150 professional staff members, including detailees.

Critics of these proposals argue that subjecting the NSA to Senate confirmation—and creating the possibility for routine appearances before congressional committees—could undermine the NSA's primary purpose to provide confidential advice to the President. Others counter that, much like the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, if the NSA is overseeing an operationally oriented staff, congressional oversight is necessary. Further, they contend the proposals do not interfere with the President's ability to appoint other confidential advisors.

P.L. 114-328 amended Title 50, U.S.C. § 3021 , in order to limit the number of professional staff, including persons employed by, assigned to, detailed to, under contract to serve on, or otherwise serving or affiliated with the staff, to a maximum of 200 persons. The limitation does not apply to personnel serving substantially in support or administrative positions . It is not clear whether the executive b ranch intends to adhere to this provision .

NSC Executive and Congressional Liaison

As part of the Executive Office of the President, the NSC does not have the same relationship with Congress and its committees that the member departments and agencies have. Most briefings on intelligence matters are undertaken by the CIA and DIA or by the DNI; information on diplomatic and military matters comes primarily from the Departments of State and Defense. As noted above, the National Security Adviser is not subject to confirmation by the Senate.

Over the years, there have been a considerable number of congressional hearings and reports relating to the NSC. However, many have had to do with topics peculiar to a given period: wiretaps against NSC staff members allegedly ordered by Henry Kissinger, the unauthorized transfer of NSC documents to officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and information on Al Qaeda prior to 9/11. More recently, as part of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act deliberations, Congress examined the appropriate size of the National Security Council Staff, and whether it was inappropriately "micromanaging" the operations of the departments it oversees.

Annual hearings are held concerning the NSC budget, and occasional hearings have been held concerning NSC organization and procedures. Very few of these hearings and reports have served as briefings for Congress on current issues that the NSC might have been considering. NSC appropriations are handled by the Subcommittees on Financial Services and General Government of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.

Congress's role in NSC matters and its relationship with the NSC are limited. As noted above, the Senate does not approve the appointment of the National Security Adviser, although it does confirm statutory NSC members. Congress does have authority over the designation of those positions that are to have statutory NSC membership, as well as budgetary authority over the NSC. In 2007, as part of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-140 , §932), Congress added the Secretary of Energy to the NSC. However, notwithstanding the legislative provisions enacted as part P.L. 114-328 , Congress has little direct say in matters of NSC organization, procedure, role, or influence, although a number of hearings on these topics have been held.

The NSC is not a primary and regular source of national security information for Congress. National security information is for the most part provided by those departments and agencies that are represented on the NSC. The NSC, as a corporate entity, rarely testifies before or briefs Congress on substantive questions, although in some Administrations informal briefings have been provided.

Conclusion

The NSC is an organ devoted to the workings of the executive branch in the broad area of national security. Its role is basically that of policy analysis and coordination and, as such, it has been subject to limited oversight and legislative control by Congress. Both in its staff organization and functioning, the NSC is extremely responsive to the preferences and working methods of each President and Administration. It would be difficult to design a uniform NSC structure that would meet the requirements of chief executives, who represent a wide range of backgrounds, work styles, and policy agendas; however, some observers believe that the general pattern that has been followed since the George H.W. Bush Administration will continue into the future.

Appendix A. Comparative Charts of Individuals Named as Members or Attendees of NSC and/or PC Meetings

Table A-1 depicts the membership of the NSC, from the Reagan Administration through the Trump Administration. Positions are listed in the order they are presented in the respective executive orders issued by each Presidential Administration. This report uses the following categories to classify NSC membership:

Statutory Members —positions specifically designated as comprising the NSC by 50 U.S.C. §3021 during the indicated Administration. Statutory Advisors —positions designated by law as principal advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council during the indicated Administration. Currently, 50 U.S.C. §3023 designates the Director of National Intelligence as the principal adviser to the President, to the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is designated by 10 U.S.C. §151 as the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Other Members or Regular Attendees —positions not statutorily designated as comprising the NSC by 50 U.S.C. §3021 during the indicated Administration, but explicitly identified as a "member" or "regular attendee" of the NSC in the presidential directive establishing the structure and function of the NSC for the indicated Administration. Named Attendees —positions not statutorily designated as comprising the NSC by 50 U.S.C. §3021 during the indicated Administration, but explicitly identified as an invited or required attendee of the NSC in the presidential directive establishing the structure and function of the NSC for the indicated Administration. Situational Attendees —positions not statutorily designated as comprising the NSC by 50 U.S.C. §3021 during the indicated Administration, but explicitly identified as an invited or required attendee of the NSC in certain specific circumstances in the presidential directive establishing the structure and function of the NSC for the indicated Administration.

The table also reflects how the Trump Administration organized itself to manage national security matters in its two National Security Presidential Memorandums –NSPM-2 and 4 –and notes the differences between the two NSPMs.

Table A-2 depicts the membership of the PC, from the George H.W. Bush Administration through the Trump Administration.

Appendix B. National Security Advisers, 1953-Present