Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding
Released: 2011-11-04T00:00:00

Letter

Background

In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. CBP is the lead agency within DHS responsible for the development and deployment of SBI technology (e.g., cameras, sensors, radars, and tactical communications) and tactical infrastructure (e.g., pedestrian and vehicle fences, roads, and lighting). In July 2010, CBP announced the formation of OTIA, which was created to ensure all of CBP’s technology efforts are properly focused on the mission and are well integrated, and to strengthen CBP’s expertise and effectiveness in program management and acquisition. OTIA assumed the responsibilities of the former SBI program office that previously managed SBInet.

SBInet was intended to cover the entire southwest border with an integrated set of fixed sensor towers. These towers were to transmit radar and camera information into a centralized location that integrated information to create a Common Operating Picture (COP) at work stations manned at all times by Border Patrol Agents. SBInet’s initial deployment, known as Block 1, was deployed to 53 miles of the Arizona border where it continues to be used by the Border Patrol. Since its inception, SBInet had continued and repeated technical problems, cost overruns, and schedule delays, which raised serious questions about SBInet’s ability to meet Border Patrol’s needs for surveillance technology along the border. We have issued 26 reports and testimonies identifying operational and program management weaknesses that contributed to SBInet’s performance shortfalls, including cost overruns and schedule slippages. For example, in September 2008 and May 2010, we reported on deficiencies in CBP’s timely preparation and completion of key acquisition documents essential to setting operational requirements, identifying and mitigating risks, and establishing the cost, schedule, and performance of the project and the technology to be delivered. We also reported that key acquisition documents, such as a risk management plan, were not prepared and approved for SBInet prior to the start of the acquisition process, a lack that precluded a fully informed design for the system that would meet CBP’s needs within the expected time frame. In May 2010, we made a number of recommendations to enhance CBP’s acquisition of SBInet systems. DHS agreed with 10 of our recommendations and partially agreed with two of them and detailed actions planned to address each. This included a recommendation to respond to a departmentwide reassessment of the program.

In January 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security ordered a departmentwide reassessment of the SBInet program to consider options that may more efficiently, effectively, and economically meet the nation’s border security needs. The assessment focused on two key questions:  whether the SBInet program was viable and could be made to work effectively and fulfill the intent of the program and  whether SBInet was cost-effective.

After receiving the results of the assessment, in January 2011, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced that the department had concluded that SBInet systems were not appropriate for the entire southwest border and did not meet current standards for viability and cost-effectiveness. While the department would continue to use those elements of SBInet that were useful, the Secretary announced that the department was canceling further deployments of SBInet systems using the current contract.

In its place, DHS is implementing a new approach for acquiring and deploying border security technology called Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology. As the approach’s first step, CBP’s Plan is to deploy a mix of technologies to complete coverage of the Arizona border including integrated fixed-tower (IFT) systems, Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS), Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSS), hand-held equipment, and unattended ground sensors. CBP plans to deploy five IFT systems each comprising about 10 radar-and-camera- equipped towers and integrate their signals into a system command center. According to CBP officials, though similar, the IFT systems’ equipment will be simpler when compared with the equipment for the tower systems deployed under SBInet. Thus, CBP’s plans include the currently deployed SBInet system for 53 miles in Arizona along with the new Plan to acquire and deploy additional towers, mobile surveillance equipment, unattended ground sensors, and hand-held devices to secure the rest of the Arizona border. CBP estimates that the total life-cycle cost of the new Plan will be about $1.5 billion for Arizona. In fiscal year 2011, CBP allocated $185 million to procure border surveillance technologies contained in the Plan except for the new IFT systems. The agency has requested $242 million in fiscal year 2012 appropriations to procure the first three IFT systems also included in the Plan.

CBP Does Not Have the Information Needed to Fully Support and Implement Its Plan

CBP does not have the information needed to fully support and implement its Plan in accordance with DHS and OMB guidance. To develop this Plan, CBP conducted an analysis of alternatives (AOA) and outreach to potential vendors, and took other steps to test the viability of the current system. However, CBP has not  documented the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border surveillance technologies proposed in the Plan;  defined the mission benefits or developed performance metrics to assess its implementation of the Plan; or  developed a plan to assess and address operational issues with the continuing use of SBInet systems along the highest risk section of the border that could affect the new Plan’s implementation across the remainder of Arizona.

For these reasons, CBP’s newly proposed approach is at an increased risk of not accomplishing its goal in support of Arizona border security.

CBP, in Developing a Business Case for Its New Approach, Conducted an Analysis of Alternatives

At the Secretary of Homeland Security’s direction, CBP has adopted a new approach for developing a technology plan for surveillance at the border that includes development of a business case to justify the way forward. CBP officials told us their business case consists of the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan and a phased independent analysis of alternatives (AOA).

According to CBP officials, the development of the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan consisted of a two-step process. First, the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute (HSI) was enlisted to conduct a multipart AOA beginning with Arizona. Second, using the AOA, the Border Patrol conducted an operational assessment of border surveillance technologies to identify the appropriate mix of technologies required to gain situational awareness and manage the Arizona border area. HSI’s AOA considered four technology alternatives: (1) agent- centric hand-held devices, (2) integrated fixed-tower systems, (3) mobile surveillance equipment, and (4) unmanned aerial vehicles. These technology alternatives were analyzed in four representative geographic areas of Arizona. The AOA for Arizona found that integrated fixed-tower systems, like the other technology alternatives, represent the most effective choice only in certain circumstances and that there is no one technology alternative that is appropriate for the entire Arizona border. A summary of the conclusions reached for each of the four alternatives examined is presented in table 3.

Unattended ground sensors were not included in the analysis because they were considered part of the existing baseline of technology and would co-exist with all of the alternatives in the AOA. In the AOA, HSI noted that its analysis did not, among other things, identify the optimal combination of specific equipment and systems, measure the contribution of situational awareness to achieving control of the border, or quantify the number of apprehensions that may result from the deployment of any technology solution.

Upon completion of the AOA, in July 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security directed the AOA study team to seek independent validation of its work. In response, HSI assembled an independent review team composed of senior subject matter experts with expertise in border security, operational testing, acquisition, performance measurement, and the management and execution of AOAs to evaluate the AOA for Arizona. In the results of the final report in March 2011, the review team concluded that the AOA for Arizona appeared to have successfully answered the questions asked and drew appropriate conclusions and insights that should be useful to DHS and CBP. CBP officials said they planned to conduct additional analysis of alternatives to incorporate additional technologies and Border Patrol Sectors.

Following the completion of the AOA, the Border Patrol conducted its operational assessment, which included a comparison of alternative border surveillance technologies and an analysis of operational judgments to consider both effectiveness and cost. According to CBP officials, they started with the results of the AOA for Arizona, noting that the AOA considered the technologies in terms of the trade offs between capability and cost—but did not document the quantities of each technology needed, the appropriate mix of the technologies, or how a proposed mix of technologies would be applied to specific border areas. CBP officials stated that a team of Border Patrol agents familiar with the Arizona terrain determined the appropriate quantity and mix of technologies by considering the terrain in each area under consideration and which mix of technologies appeared to work for that area and terrain. These officials also stated that they used an iterative process involving dialogue between trained engineers and Border Patrol agents based on the team’s understanding of topography and technology, considering the lowest dollar cost mix of technologies as a starting point to see if situational awareness provided by the mix sufficiently met the threat. As a result, according to CBP officials, if the least expensive technology, such as hand-held portable equipment, met the threat, then that technology would be chosen. If the threat was not addressed by the hand-held technologies, then officials said the team considered the next higher cost technology. The officials added that the IFT systems were the most expensive.

CBP Did Not Document How It Derived the Specific Types and Quantities of Technologies Contained in Its Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

CBP has taken a number of steps to develop the Plan; however, program officials developed and proposed the new Plan without documenting the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border surveillance technologies CBP proposed. While the AOA process itself was well documented, the Border Patrol’s operational assessment, a key analytical component leading to the Plan, was not transparent because of the lack of documentation.

The Plan includes quantities of various technologies, prioritized and planned for implementation on a yearly basis. Specifically, based on the Plan, CBP allocated $185 million to purchase border surveillance technologies including mobile and hand-held equipment as well as RVSS for fiscal year 2011, and has requested $242 million for fiscal year 2012 to acquire and deploy three IFT systems in Arizona, with two others to be deployed by 2015, depending on funding availability.

Without documentation of the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border surveillance technologies proposed in the Plan, an independent party cannot verify the process followed, identify how the AOA was used, determine whether CBP’s use of the AOA considered the limitations identified by HSI, assess the validity of the decisions made, or justify the funding requested. Given that the number of apprehensions of illegal border crossers is at the lowest level in 40 years, if threats in the southwest border environment continue to change and the Plan otherwise requires updating or revision, it will be difficult for CBP officials to reassess the rationale for and determine what, if any, changes are needed in the types, quantities, and deployment locations of border surveillance technologies called for in the Plan.

Internal and management control standards for the federal government call for agencies to promptly record and clearly document transactions and significant events to maintain their relevance and value to management in controlling operations and making decisions and to ensure that agency objectives are met. The standards also call for documentation to be readily available for examination. These standards apply to CBP’s development of the quantities and types of technology and their suitability to terrain to support the Plan; the expenditure of fiscal year 2011 funds on mobile, RVSS, and hand-held equipment; as well as the planned acquisition of IFT systems requested in the President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request.

A senior CBP official responsible for the program’s acquisitions told us that he believed the AOA and the process used to develop and support the plan justified acquisition decisions called for in the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan. According to CBP officials, the agency is in the process of drafting the acquisition-planning documents required for the DHS Acquisition Review Board to review and make a decision on acquiring the IFT systems. These acquisition-planning documents are required by DHS guidance for planning acquisitions, setting operational requirements, and establishing acquisition baselines to help ensure delivery of the required performance at acceptable levels of cost, schedule, and risk. CBP officials said that they expect the Acquisition Review Board to meet in November 2011 to consider the IFT acquisition. The Acquisition Review Board is to consider these documents prior to approving the program for acquisition and the issuance of a request for proposal for the new IFT systems.

Nonetheless, in the absence of documentation that describes how CBP integrated the operational assessments and technology deployment analyses and used the results of the AOA to develop the types and quantities of technology and their suitability to the terrain from the various alternatives, it is unclear whether and how the analyses conducted to develop the Plan demonstrated the cost and operational effectiveness of the selected mix of technology versus other less costly solutions, or whether the analyses determined the most appropriate technology for the terrain. As a result, CBP cannot demonstrate the validity of the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan and the acquisition approach and lacks reasonable assurance that the acquisition-planning documents will fully support future deployments of border surveillance technology in Arizona.

CBP Officials Have Not Yet Defined Expected Mission Benefits nor Quantified Metrics to Assess Progress in Implementing the Plan

Agency officials have not yet defined the mission benefits expected or quantified metrics to assess the contribution of the selected approaches in achieving their goal of situational awareness and detection of border activity using surveillance technology. Without defining the expected benefit or quantifying metrics, it will be difficult for CBP to assess the effectiveness of the Plan as it is implemented. Assessing the effectiveness of the program in Arizona will be essential as CBP works to develop a more comprehensive plan for the entire southwest border.

Our findings are particularly relevant considering similar deficiencies in SBInet systems. In May 2010, we reported that in the case of the deployment of SBInet systems along the first 53 miles of the Arizona border, CBP did not define or measure the expected mission benefits of the system. For example, while program officials reported that system benefits are documented in the SBInet Mission Need Statement dated October 2006, this document did not include either quantifiable or qualitative benefits. Rather, it provided general statements such as “the lack of a program such as SBInet increases the risks of terrorist threats and other illegal activities.” Moreover, we concluded that DHS had not demonstrated that its proposed SBInet solution was a cost-effective course of action, and thus whether the considerable time and money invested to acquire and deploy it was a prudent use of limited resources.

As a result, we recommended that DHS should reconsider its proposed SBInet solution. In doing so, it should explore ways to both limit its near- term investment in an initial set of operational capabilities and develop and share with congressional decision makers reliable projections of the relative costs and benefits of longer-term alternatives. These longer-term alternatives would help meet the mission goals and outcomes that SBInet was intended to advance. DHS should also share with congressional decision makers the reasons why cost-benefit information was not available and the uncertainty and risks associated with not having it. DHS concurred with reconsidering its proposed SBInet solution and the Secretary cancelled the program in January 2011.

The Secretary of Homeland Security reported in January 2011 that the new Plan is expected to provide situational awareness for the entire Arizona border by 2014, but CBP officials have not yet defined the expected benefits or developed measurable and quantifiable performance metrics that would show progress toward achieving that goal. The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and OMB guidance emphasize the need to ensure that information technology investments, such as IFT systems, actually produce tangible, observable improvements in mission performance. We have previously reported that a solid business case providing an understanding of the potential return of large investments can be helpful to decision makers for determining whether continued investment is warranted. Additionally, according to the Government Performance and Results Act, as amended, activities need to be established to monitor performance measures and indicators.

The supporting documents CBP officials used to justify its allocation of fiscal year 2011 funds and its budget requests for fiscal year 2012 did not include any performance goals related to the expected outcome of the investment. CBP officials reported that the decision documents that informed their fiscal year 2012 budget request for $242 million (the AOA, the Plan, and the Department’s fiscal year 2012-2016 Resource Allocation Decision) did not contain any measurable and quantifiable performance metrics by which progress toward achieving performance goals could be determined. They said that the AOA contained four measures of effectiveness associated with the alternatives they assessed; however, these measures do not quantify the mission benefits associated with implementation of the Plan. Without measurable and quantifiable performance goals relating to expected outcomes, particularly for alternatives selected for CBP’s Plan, it will be difficult for decision makers to assess the costs and benefits provided by acquisition and deployment of these systems and, more broadly, to measure program performance and progress in achieving national homeland security goals for securing the southwest border.

We have previously reported on key attributes of successful performance measures that should be included in program performance metrics. In circumstances where complete information is not available to measure performance outcomes, agencies may need to use intermediate goals and measures to show progress or contribution to intended results. For example, Border Patrol may currently lack the capability to detect all illegal entries of people, drugs, and weapons along the southwest border. However, they may choose to establish performance measures that can track progress in terms of using technology to increase the probability of detection. Once CBP achieves an optimal level in terms of the probability of detection, or situational awareness, it may then transition to measures for reducing the flow of illegal activity and interdiction. In September 2011, CBP officials reported that they are developing new measures to determine whether and how technology investments impact border security. They acknowledged that since large investments have been made in border security, it is critical to assess the impacts these investments have had on improving border security as well as projecting the additional impact future investments will have on their ability to manage the borders. However, CBP officials have not yet determined the key attributes of these new measures. Measures and key attributes are generally defined as part of the business case in order to explain how they contribute to the mission’s benefits. Without a meaningful understanding and disclosure of the mission benefits of the Plan and related metrics to assess progress, it will be difficult for CBP to justify and make informed decisions about its investment as well as measure the extent to which implementation of the Plan will actually deliver mission value commensurate with costs, similar to the challenges faced by SBInet.

CBP Does Not Have a Plan to Assess and Address Operational Issues for Continuing Use of SBInet Technology for Surveillance

The new Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan does not include the 53 miles covered by previously deployed SBInet systems that have historically been at the highest risk for illegal crossing. CBP made its decision to continue using SBInet Block 1 systems in the Tucson sector before the results of operational testing were available, and CBP does not have a plan to assess and address operational issues with SBInet technology in use in this area. Effective use of existing SBInet systems is essential for a comprehensive and integrated approach for surveillance technology along the entire Arizona border.

The Secretary of Homeland Security’s January 2011 announcement stated that in DHS’s assessment, the issue of viability was evaluated within the context of the SBInet Block 1 deployments in the Tucson and Ajo Border Patrol Stations’ areas of responsibility—referred to as Tuscon- 1 and Ajo-1. It stated that testing and evaluation of the system was under way at those sites and that it was too early to quantify the effectiveness of the technology. However, based on qualitative assessments from the Border Patrol, which had begun using the systems, SBInet systems enhanced the Border Patrol’s ability to detect, identify, track, deter, and respond to threats along some parts of the border. The announcement further stated that SBInet contributed in part to increasing the likelihood of the apprehension of illegal entrants.

Since the Secretary’s announcement, CBP has received the U.S. Army’s Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) operational test results for the SBInet system at Tucson-1 that revealed challenges regarding the effectiveness and suitability of the technology for border surveillance. In its March 2011 report on operational testing conducted from October 2010 to November 2010, ATEC said that SBInet was “effective with limitations” because (1) the ability of the system to correctly detect, identify, and classify items of interest was below initial system acceptance benchmarks and was (2) further degraded by terrain and weather conditions, and (3) the radar system generated a high number of extraneous radar returns or “hits” that overwhelmed operators. ATEC found that the system was “not operationally suitable” because the reliability of the system was low.

Specifically, ATEC officials found that the rugged, restrictive terrain and weather conditions prevalent where SBInet is deployed affected the performance of the system’s radar, which impacted success in detecting, identifying, and classifying the items of interest. ATEC officials referred to this situation as a “terrain/technology mismatch.” ATEC also reported that the radar’s difficulties with terrain and weather resulted in a high number of extraneous radar hits’ being generated by the system, hits that presented a difficult-to-manage workload for operators for which SBInet’s technical filtering techniques could not compensate fully. Moreover, ATEC also noted that the system required operators to cull through thousands of extraneous radar hits (among a total average of 26,000 hits per day). This generated an unreasonable expectation given the lack of standardized procedures in how to manage the extraneous radar hits and lack of training in how to use the system tools to filter them out.

In response to ATEC’s findings, CBP said that problems with using SBInet to detect, identify, and classify items of interest are less significant now than when they began using the system since the operators, through their continued experience with the system, better understand what causes extraneous radar hits and are better able to deal with them. Similarly, CBP stated that ATEC’s reliability findings have been mitigated by the fact that many of the system failures were because of routine system reboots that are being addressed by enhancements to SBInet currently in process.

Notwithstanding the findings of the ATEC testers, Border Patrol SBInet operators and field agents who participated in this testing and completed questionnaires during and at the end of testing responded favorably about a number of aspects of the system, including responding that the system significantly enhanced both agent safety and overall situational awareness during day-to-day operations for tracking and apprehending illegal border crossers. Further, in our March 2011 work reviewing the status of SBInet, all the Border Patrol officials we spoke with told us the system provided them with capability they did not have previously and was considerably better than the technology that was available to them prior to SBInet’s deployment. Nonetheless, based on the factors mentioned above, ATEC concluded that because of the limitations of the SBInet radar, the system does not significantly reduce the need for traditional field agents’ role in the operating environment. ATEC also concluded that, despite receiving high questionnaire ratings from test participants who completed questionnaires, actual performance of SBInet in terms of interdiction was only slightly different than if the system had not been present in the areas where it is deployed.

According to DHS guidance, project managers are required to conduct a Post Implementation Review to evaluate the impact of an investment’s deployment on customers, the mission and program, and technical and/or mission capabilities. Similarly, OMB’s Capital Programming Guide, a supplement to OMB Circular A-11, identifies a Post-Implementation Review as a tool to evaluate an investment’s efficiency and effectiveness to determine how well an investment achieved the planned functionality and anticipated benefits. Moreover, as the next step in the evaluation phase for any major information technology investment, like SBInet, DHS policy requires that an operational analysis be undertaken to measure the performance and cost of the asset against the established baseline. According to the guidance, operational analyses measure how close the investment is to achieving the project’s expected cost, schedule, and performance goals. When performance is found deficient, the project manager must identify and schedule suitable corrective actions.

DHS guidance further states that the Post-Implementation Review should occur when a system has been in operation at least 6 months or immediately following investment termination, and the Operational Analysis should be performed annually for information technology investments in the steady-state or operations and maintenance phase like SBInet. Such reviews would be prudent and provide a baseline for CBP to decide whether to continue the system without adjustment, to modify the system to improve performance—to the extent that addressing the operational issues identified by the Army’s operational testing are cost beneficial—or, if necessary, to consider alternatives to the implemented system. The reviews could also provide CBP with an opportunity to more quantitatively determine and document the SBInet system’s ability to satisfy the agency’s operational requirements, given that CBP plans to continue to operate the SBInet system along the highest risk 53 miles of the Arizona border and will be faced with funding operation and maintenance costs over the remaining 10-year life of the system. (For example, CBP has requested $10 million for fiscal year 2012 to support the continuing operation of SBInet systems.)

A Post-Implementation Review and Operational Analysis could also help inform CBP’s decisions about whether future technology deployments of similar ground-based radar technologies that are to make up the IFT systems being used for the next step in its plan to deploy border surveillance technology in Arizona are necessary where SBInet systems are currently being used.

CBP program officials initially told us they did not intend to develop an action plan that addressed ATEC deficiencies and recommendations. They said that the Secretary of Homeland Security’s decision to cancel further procurements of SBInet systems was a basis for their decision not to commit resources to resolve technical, logistical, and operational issues identified during the Army’s operational testing of the system. However, in response to our inquiries related to the applicability of this guidance, CBP told us in August 2011 that the Border Patrol was considering, but had not yet developed, a plan for reviewing and addressing the results of the ATEC tests for SBInet.

CBP officials said they had not developed a plan to address SBInet operational test outcomes or conducted a post-implementation review because of the Secretary’s cancellation of the program. They said they were confident that the technology was now available to acquire and deploy a non-developmental system as part of the new Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan. However, CBP plans to continue using SBInet for surveillance along the highest risk corridor in Arizona. The impact of the use of SBInet systems could affect the deployment and use of other surveillance technologies along the Arizona border. For example, if SBInet systems are particularly effective, illegal border- crossing traffic may decrease in the area where the systems are in use. Conversely, if SBInet is less effective, illegal border crossings may increase in the area surveilled. Thus, conducting an assessment of SBInet operational test results and the potential cost- effective resolution of the issues identified could better position CBP in determining analyses of alternative technologies for future systems’ deployments in the areas of the Arizona Border covered by SBInet.

CBP’s Cost Estimate Reflects Some but Not All Key Cost- Estimating Best Practices

CBP officials have taken steps to develop a cost estimate for the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan consistent with some best practices. However, the officials did not determine a level of confidence around their rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimate, inconsistent with best practices.

CBP’s Cost Estimate Is Substantially Comprehensive and Accurate but Partially Documented and Minimally Credible

Our analysis of CBP’s 10-year life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) for the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) found that CBP did not fully follow best practices for developing a reliable LCCE, which is at the core of successfully managing a project within cost and affordability guidelines. CBP’s estimate for the Plan is $1.5 billion. The estimate includes approximately $750 million in acquisition costs and approximately $800 million for operations and maintenance costs to procure and deploy a range of border surveillance technology across Arizona.

Our guide and OMB guidance emphasize that reliable cost estimates are important for program approval and continued receipt of annual funding. DHS policy similarly provides that life-cycle cost estimates are essential to an effective budget process and form the basis for annual budget decisions. Reliable LCCEs reflect four characteristics. They are (1) well- documented, (2) comprehensive, (3) accurate, and (4) credible. These four characteristics encompass 12 best practices for reliable program life- cycle cost estimates. (See app. III that describes the 12 steps of high- quality cost estimates.) The results of our analysis of CBP’s cost estimate against these four best practice characteristics are summarized in table 4.

CBP’s life-cycle cost estimate for the Plan substantially met best practices in terms of being both comprehensive and accurate. For example, in terms of comprehensiveness, the estimate included technical data that was documented at a sufficient level of detail. This included specific technology requirements anticipated to provide situational awareness for each of the focus areas along the Arizona border such as the number of integrated fixed-t-ower systems, mobile surveillance systems, or other technologies. However, detailed technical data related to shared IT infrastructure was missing, and risk information on the technologies, assumptions, and estimating were not provided. As a result, our analysis concluded that CBP’s cost estimate substantially, but not fully, reflected best practices for comprehensiveness. In terms of accuracy, the cost estimate was continually updated and refined as more information became known; this helps to provide decision makers with accurate and current information. Specifically, there were 10 changes documented that clearly showed what updates were made to the cost estimate. These changes included new technology quantities, learning-curve adjustments, and incurred cost adjustments. However, the estimate also relied on historical data from earlier SBInet deployment, and the accuracy and the reliability of that data were questionable because some data were still pending. As a result, CBP’s estimate substantially, but not fully, met criteria for accuracy.

Moreover, the Plan’s estimate partially met best practices in terms of being well-documented and minimally met best practices for being credible. Cost estimates are well-documented when they can be easily repeated and can be traced to original sources. The documentation should explicitly identify the primary methods, calculations, assumptions, and sources of the data used to generate each cost element. However, according to our review of data provided to us by CBP, while many data sources were discussed, the actual data used to determine the estimate were not always shown. Therefore, it is not possible for an unfamiliar analyst to recreate the estimate with the provided documentation. As a result of insufficient documentation, the validity and reliability of the CBP’s life-cycle cost estimate for the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan cannot be verified. For that reason, we assessed CBP’s cost estimate as partially meeting criteria for being well-documented.

In terms of credibility, we found that CBP officials did not conduct a sensitivity analysis, and a cost-risk and uncertainty analysis, to determine a level of confidence in the $1.5- billion life-cycle cost estimate for Arizona. Therefore, CBP’s estimate provides an incomplete basis for management decisions because without a level of confidence, it will be difficult for decision makers to identify a range of possible costs, higher and lower, corresponding to the associated risks involved with the acquisition and deployment of technology across Arizona. A sensitivity analysis of all cost estimates examines the effects of changing one assumption or cost driver at a time while holding all other variables constant. Since uncertainty cannot be avoided, it is necessary to identify the cost elements that represent the most risk and, if possible, cost estimators should quantify the risk.

In addition to sensitivity analysis, which looks at the effects of changing one parameter or cost driver at a time, a cost risk and uncertainty analysis should be performed to capture the cumulative effect of multiple variables changing, such as schedules slipping, or proposed solutions’ not meeting user needs, allowing for a known range of potential costs. Because CBP officials did not perform a cost-risk, and uncertainty analysis, the estimate for the Plan is likely to be unrealistic because it does not assess the variability in the cost estimate from such effects as schedules slipping, missions changing, and proposed solutions’ not meeting users’ needs. Without this type of analysis for example, it will be difficult for CBP decision makers to determine a defensible level of contingency reserves necessary to cover increased costs resulting from uncertainties associated with the Arizona plan.

Another way to reinforce the credibility of the cost estimate would be for CBP to commission an independent cost estimate and then reconcile any differences between the two. This process is considered one of the best and most reliable estimate validation methods. However, because CBP officials did not compare their estimate with an independent estimate, agency decision makers may lack insight regarding the plan’s range of potential costs because independent cost estimates frequently use different methods and are less burdened with organizational biases. Despite these deficiencies, we assessed CBP’s cost estimate as minimally meeting best practices for credibility rather than not meeting them because CBP did identify some cost drivers that could be used as a basis for conducting a sensitivity analysis.

Responding to the results of our cost analysis, CBP officials reported that their approach was to develop and report a rough order of magnitude (ROM) cost estimate for the portfolio of technology projects contained in the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan. Because CBP officials considered the $1.5-billion estimate an initial ROM estimate, they reported that it lacked some elements of the technology costs and complete supporting documentation, and was not subjected to an independent or corroborating cost-estimating effort.

Based on a Rough Order of Magnitude Analysis, CBP’s Budget Request for IFT Systems May Not Be Realistic and Is Not Sufficient

CBP officials reported that while they believed the $1.5 billion cost estimate to complete the Arizona border was reasonable, they cautioned that they considered it to be a ROM estimate rather than a LCCE. According to cost-estimating best practices, a ROM cost estimate is developed when a quick estimate is needed and few details are available. It is usually based on historical ratio information and typically developed to support what-if analyses and can be developed for a particular phase or portion of an estimate to the entire cost estimate, depending on available data. It is helpful for examining differences in high-level alternatives to see which are the most feasible. However, according to cost- estimating best practices, because a ROM is developed from limited data and in a short time, a ROM analysis should never be considered a budget-quality cost estimate. However, CBP used the ROM estimate to support its $242-million budget request for fiscal year 2012 because it lacked the time needed to develop a more robust estimate.

CBP officials said the request reflected relevant operational information from authoritative CBP sources as well as comprehensive program technical descriptions for both the acquisition and sustainment life-cycle phases. Officials plan to use the fiscal year 2012 appropriations to purchase IFT systems technology for future deployments in Arizona. The three initial deployments are planned for the Nogales, Douglas, and Casa Grande station areas of operation followed by two additional deployments planned in Sonoita and Wellton station areas. According to OTIA and Border Patrol officials, depending on the availability of funding, the deployments of the IFT system component of the Plan are expected to begin around March 2013 and be completed by the end of 2015 (or possibly early 2016), with other sector deployments sequentially following the Arizona sector. CBP estimated that the entire IFT system acquisition for Arizona would cost about $570 million, including funding for design and development, equipment procurement, production and deployment, systems engineering and program management, and a national operations center.

Nonetheless, there is significant uncertainty regarding the cost of IFT systems stemming from assumptions made as part of the cost-estimating process. For example, when developing the ROM estimate, CBP officials expected that IFT systems would be able to access existing commercial communication networks in target deployment areas. CBP officials said that this assumption is no longer valid in all cases and additional communication relay equipment will likely be necessary. While CBP officials believe they have adequate risk contingency funds to address this issue, because they did not undertake a risk and uncertainly analysis to quantify the impact on the cost estimate of these kinds of risks, it will be difficult for them to determine whether the contingency funds will be sufficient to cover this or other risks.

The findings of our analysis are particularly relevant considering that similar deficiencies were identified with the life-cycle cost estimate for the SBInet Block 1 deployment. In May 2010, we reported that the life-cycle cost estimate for the Block 1 deployment was not credible because risk and uncertainty were not adequately assessed. For example, the risks associated with software development were not examined, even though such risks were known to exist. In fact, the only risks considered were those associated with uncertainty in labor rates and hardware costs, and instead of being based on historical quantitative analyses, these risks were expressed by assigning them arbitrary positive or negative percentages. In addition, the estimate did not specify contingency reserve amounts to mitigate known risks, and an independent cost estimate was not used to verify the estimate. Our program assessments have too often revealed that not integrating cost estimation, system development oversight, and risk management—three key disciplines, interrelated and essential to effective acquisition management—has resulted in programs’ costing more than planned and delivering less than promised.

In discussing this issue, CBP officials said they attempted to establish as much fidelity as possible with the Arizona technology cost estimate and associated budget requests. However, the officials reported that they knew that several of their planning and estimating assumptions were broad and that they lacked some desired details. For those reasons, the officials continue to call their Arizona technology cost estimates ROM estimates. CBP officials stated that they used the best information available to establish budget quality estimates and plan to provide updated, comprehensive, and thoroughly documented cost estimates in fall 2011 related to the Plan.

CBP officials said they consider the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan to be a grouping of multiple projects that will proceed as independent acquisitions rather than a unified capital asset acquisition. As such, CBP officials reported that they are preparing LCCE for the individual acquisition projects in the Plan, initially for the IFT systems and the Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) with other projects to follow. CBP officials reported that OTIA will request baseline approval for the projects in the Plan later this year from the appropriate department or CBP acquisition oversight board. They said that this process will further examine respective cost and schedule estimates, technical performance and program risks, as well as contracting and related management concerns. Prior to the major acquisition reviews, CBP officials said that OTIA is developing detailed program management plans and supporting documentation for each of the Arizona technology projects within the portfolio. CBP officials do not expect to release a cost estimate for technology acquisition and deployment beyond Arizona until February 2012. However, without a complete LCCE that contains all cost estimating best practices for the Arizona Plan, CBP could experience the same kind of problems as the ones it encountered in the acquisition of SBInet.

Conclusions

CBP has not yet demonstrated the effectiveness and suitability of its new approach for deploying surveillance technology in Arizona. By taking steps to document how, where, and why it plans to deploy specific combinations of technology prior to its acquisition and deployment, CBP could be better positioned to minimize performance risks associated with the new approach. Given that apprehensions along the southwest border are at their lowest levels since the 1970s and, in light of the difficulties CBP has faced in its efforts to procure and deploy surveillance technology, documenting the underlying analysis used to justify the technology types, quantities, and suitability to terrain contained in the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan could help CBP make its decisions more transparent. Further, better defining the mission benefits to be gained from planned procurements and quantifying performance metrics to assess the effectiveness of technologies selected for Arizona would help justify program funding and assist CBP in measuring its progress toward securing the southwest border. Given that CBP plans to spend $1.5 billion for technologies to enhance surveillance across the remainder of the Arizona border, conducting a post-implementation review and operational assessment of the SBInet systems that includes a review of operational test results, and then weighing costs and benefits of taking action on the results could give CBP the opportunity to maximize the effectiveness of the system it has already deployed in the highest risk area in Arizona. It could also help CBP in making decisions for future technology deployments along the southwest border and provide a sound basis for assessing and deploying alternative technologies.

Fully documenting the data used in the cost model could help ensure that the validity and reliability of the CBP’s life-cycle cost estimate for the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan can be verified. Because CBP officials did not conduct a sensitivity analysis and a cost-risk and uncertainty analysis to determine a level of confidence in the $1.5-billion life-cycle cost estimate for the Plan, it will be difficult for decision makers to determine what levels of contingency funding may be needed to cover risks associated with implementing new technologies along the remaining Arizona border. Until CBP officials accurately quantify the impacts of the risks, the budget requests for fiscal year 2012 and beyond may not be realistic and sufficient to achieve program aims. Because CBP officials do not expect to release a cost estimate for technology acquisition and deployment beyond Arizona until February 2012, until that time, the cost visibility of the total investment required to deploy technology across the southwest border is unclear. Verification of the new life-cycle cost estimate with an independent cost estimate and reconciliation of any differences could further help ensure the credibility of the cost estimate.

Recommendations

To increase the likelihood of successful implementation of the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan and maximize the effectiveness of technology already deployed, we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP take the following three steps in planning the agency’s new technology approach:  ensure that the underlying analyses of the Plan are documented in accordance with DHS guidance and internal controls standards;  determine the mission benefits to be derived from implementation of the plan and develop and apply key attributes for metrics to assess program implementation; and conduct a post-implementation review and operational assessment of SBInet, including consideration of the ATEC test results, and assess the costs and benefits of addressing the issues identified to help ensure the security of the 53 miles already covered by SBInet and enhance security on the Arizona border.

To increase the reliability of CBP’s Cost Estimate for the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP update its cost estimate for the Plan using best practices, so that the estimate is comprehensive, accurate, well-documented, and credible. Specifically, the OTIA program office should (1) fully document data used in the cost model; (2) conduct a sensitivity analysis and risk and uncertainty analysis to determine a level of confidence in the estimate so that contingency funding can be established relative to quantified risk; and (3) independently verify the new life-cycle cost estimate with an independent cost estimate and reconcile any differences.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We requested comments on a draft of this report from DHS and DOD. DHS provided written comments which are reprinted in appendix IV. In commenting on the draft report, DHS concurred with our recommendations and identified steps officials planned to take to implement them, along with estimated dates for their completion. DHS also stated that there were several issues raised in the report that could not be addressed at present. In an email received on October 14, 2011, the DOD liaison indicated that DOD had no comments on the report.

Regarding the first recommendation that CBP ensure that the underlying analyses of the Plan are documented in accordance with DHS guidance and internal controls standards, DHS concurred. DHS stated that CBP plans to work with the DHS Internal Control Program Management Office to ensure Plan documentation is in accordance with DHS guidance and internal controls and anticipates completing this action by May 31, 2012. Such actions should address the intent of the recommendation.

Regarding the second recommendation that CBP determine the mission benefits to be derived from implementation of the Plan and develop and apply key attributes for metrics to assess the program’s implementation, DHS concurred and stated that CBP plans to develop a set of measures by April 30, 2012, that will assess the effectiveness and mission benefits of future technology investments. Such action should address the intent of the recommendation.

With regard to the third recommendation that CBP conduct a post- implementation review and operational assessment of SBlnet, DHS concurred and stated that CBP's Office of Border Patrol (OBP) is working with Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory on a Block I after-action review (AAR), which will address the operational test and evaluation results and offer recommendations on tactics, techniques, and procedures. DHS also said that OTlA and the Border Patrol will conduct a post-implementation review and operational assessment required in light of the OBP AAR, consistent with departmental policy and procedures for recurring reporting of fielded systems. DHS states that CBP plans to complete these actions by June 30, 2012. Such actions should address the intent of the recommendation.

Regarding the three recommendations related to CBP’s life-cycle cost estimate—that CBP fully document data used in the cost model; conduct a sensitivity analysis and risk and uncertainty analysis to determine a level of confidence in the estimate so that contingency funding can be established relative to quantified risk; and independently verify the new life-cycle cost estimate with an independent cost estimate and reconcile any differences—DHS concurred. DHS stated that OTIA is preparing individual RVSS and IFT project cost estimates consistent with the GAO’s guidelines and is fully documenting all assumptions, data structures and sources, methods and calculations, as well as risks and sensitivities for the two largest elements of the Plan that will enable CBP to refine contingency funding as needed. Officials plan to submit the appropriate project documentation, including the projects' Cost Estimating Baseline Document and the updated life-cycle cost estimate, to the department for independent review and verification of the respective projects' methodology and data sources. The department commented that it plans to determine the need for an independent cost estimate at a later time but will complete these actions by April 30, 2012. While these actions are positive steps, they do not fully address the recommendation that DHS implement best practices for cost estimates for the entire Plan. Instead, DHS’s response indicates that it plans to implement these best practices for the two largest projects within the Plan. To fully understand the impacts of integrating these separate projects, DHS should update the life-cycle cost estimate for the entire Plan.

DHS also noted that there were three issues in the draft that it did not feel, at present, it could address. First, regarding the need to document analytical steps taken to develop the Plan, the department stated that DHS relies on Border Patrol field agents' expert judgment to select the types and quantities of technologies best suited for their respective geographic areas of responsibilities. According to DHS, in all cases, technology selections were verified for consistency with the major findings of the AoA. In some cases, however, the Border Patrol determined that operational priorities justified a technology mix that was not necessarily the lowest cost—for example, the Border Patrol said a higher cost integrated fixed tower (IFT) solution would be operationally superior to deploying lower cost mobile systems. According to DHS, CBP is not planning further analyses or additional documentation given that they consider their analyses to be sufficiently documented in the final Plan.

We recognize the value of Border Patrol agents’ expert judgment in selecting the types and quantities of technologies best suited for their respective geographic areas of responsibility. Nonetheless, internal control standards call for documentation to support decision making to be available for examination. In the Plan, CBP officials documented the results of their analyses in terms of their planned deployments of technologies but did not include documentation of the supporting operational assessment done by the Border Patrol justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border surveillance technologies, a key analytical component leading to the Plan. Documentation of the underlying analyses, not just the results, would enable the analyses supporting the Plan to be independently assessed. As noted in the report, it is unclear whether and how the analyses conducted to develop the Plan demonstrated the cost and operational effectiveness of the selected mix of technology, including whether the most appropriate technology for the terrain was selected. CBP cannot demonstrate the validity of the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan and its acquisition approach in the absence of documentation that describes how CBP developed the operational assessments and technology deployment analyses and used the results of the AoA to develop the types and quantities of technologies and their suitability to the terrain from the various alternatives. Further, in the light of the significant difficulties faced by CBP in its prior efforts to develop and implement the nearly $1 billion SBInet system to provide unquantified improvements in border surveillance along 53 miles of the Arizona border after 5 years of program efforts, we remain concerned that CBP lacks reasonable assurance that its Plan will fully support its future deployments of border surveillance technology in Arizona.

The second issue DHS raised regarded the report’s observations about limitations of SBInet systems currently fielded in Arizona and the need for CBP to address operational test results. DHS did concur with the recommendation that CBP conduct a post-implementation review and operational assessment of SBInet. However, DHS said that, because of the Border Patrol’s ongoing mitigation efforts and a planned system enhancement to address these limitations, they are unable to address this issue at this time. DHS added that they plan to continue to use the system to maintain enhanced situational awareness while gaining additional experience with the system until the planned system enhancement can be implemented in 2012 to address operational concerns.

The third issue regarded the report’s observations about limitations of the Plan’s cost estimates and the potential sufficiency of contingency funds to accommodate unforeseen cost growth. DHS said that CBP program officials “are mindful” of this concern, were conservative in their budget requests, and believe this issue has been largely addressed by their prior efforts to accommodate reasonable cost contingencies. However, DHS added that, in response to the related recommendation, it is preparing updated life-cycle cost estimates, consistent with the GAO’s best practice guidelines, for two projects in the Plan that account for 90 percent of the estimate. But to fully address this recommendation, DHS will need to implement best practices for the entire Plan, not just for the two largest projects, so that the impacts of integrating the separate projects can be fully understood. DHS and DOD provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commissioner of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and interested congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or at StanaR@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to determine the extent to which (1) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has the information needed to fully support and implement its Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan in according with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, and (2) CBP’s life-cycle cost estimate for the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan reflects best practices.

To answer our first objective, we reviewed key program-planning documents CBP relied on to support its new approach to identifying, acquiring, and deploying surveillance technology applicable to specific types of terrain along the Arizona border. We also interviewed CBP officials responsible for assessing the need for and documenting the cost- and operational effectiveness and suitability of proposed systems to support its Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan and for identifying appropriate metrics to assess progress in border security. Specifically, we reviewed the announcement of the Secretary of Homeland Security and her vision of CBP’s new approach to identifying, acquiring, and deploying surveillance technology to the Arizona border in support of Border Patrol’s mission, principle goal, and objective. We also reviewed CBP’s analysis of alternatives (AOA) for Arizona, the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan informed by the AOA, the final report of the independent peer review team on the AOA, CBP’s request for information on integrated fixed-tower technology, its Industry Day announcement and answers to industry questions, and CBP’s comparison of the similarities and differences between integrated fixed towers and SBInet technology.

In relation to operational test results, we reviewed what the independent evaluation of SBInet and discussed with officials the extent CBP is using these findings to inform future investments as well as the continuing operation of SBInet. We largely focused on the elements of SBInet known as Block 1, developed and deployed in Arizona’s Tucson sector between 2005 and 2010 and CBP’s plans for its operation and maintenance over its life-cycle. In doing so, we reviewed program documentation, including the Army Test and Evaluation Command’s reports and briefing to CBP, and interviewed the key officials involved in the design and implementation of the operational test and evaluation of test results in order to determine the reliability of the information we used to support our finding. We compared CBP’s program management plans and activities with requirements in DHS acquisition regulations including Acquisition Regulation 102-01 and OMB guidance A-11. We also interviewed CBP officials from its Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition (OTIA) on how they intended to use the operational test findings and recommendations to inform the continuing operation of existing SBInet technology. Specifically, we reviewed the Army’s operational test plans, the initial and final test and evaluation reports, and their “Quick Look” briefing to OTIA officials. We also interviewed CBP and Army officials about the results of those tests and discussed the soundness of the test design process, its sampling methodology, and its implementation in order to determine whether we could rely on test results data. We found the test results to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We also observed the SBInet systems in operation in the Tucson sector, and discussed the systems’ performance with Border Patrol Agents in the Tucson and Ajo station SBInet command centers. We reviewed our body of work on SBInet since 2005 as a basis for assessing CBP’s proposed approach for developing and implementing its new Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan.

To answer our second objective, we reviewed cost and budget documents CBP relied on to support cost estimates for technology alternatives contained in the AOA for Arizona and in the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2012. We also interviewed program officials and contractors responsible for estimating the cost of future investments in surveillance technology, specifically the life-cycle approach, requirements development and management, test management, and risk management. We then compared this information to relevant federal guidance derived from leading industry practices. To assess the reliability of the cost data for the rough order-of-magnitude estimate for implementation of the Plan, which assumed a 10-year life-cycle for the acquisition, we relied on data for fiscal year 2010 and beyond to support the findings in the report. We also reviewed relevant program documentation to substantiate evidence obtained through interviews with knowledgeable agency officials, where available, regarding the integrity of the data. We determined that the data used in this report are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We compared CBP cost estimating practices and budget documents to our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, which contains best practices compiled from cost- estimating organizations throughout the federal government and industry.

We conducted this performance audit from March 2011 through October 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Photographs of Technologies Contained in the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan

Appendix III: Aspects of High-Quality Cost Estimates

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

Chris Keisling, Assistant Director, and Ron Salo, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. David Alexander, Seto Bagdoyan, Charles Bausell, Justin Dunleavy, Mike Harmond, Richard Hung, Karen Richey, and Sean Seales made important contributions to this report. Frances Cook provided legal assistance, and Tina Cheng provided graphics assistance. Katherine Davis contributed to report preparation.

Related GAO Products

Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and Development of New Technologies. GAO-11-829T (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2011).

Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and Northern Borders. GAO-11-508T (Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2011).

Border Security Preliminary Observations on the Status of Key Southwest Border Technology Programs. GAO-11-448T (Washington, D.C March 15, 2011).

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Strengthen Management and Oversight of Its Prime Contractor. GAO-11-6 (Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2010).

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2010 Expenditure Plan, GAO-10-877R (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2010).

Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex Acquisitions, GAO-10-588SP (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010).

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program. GAO-10-340 (Washington, D.C.: May, 5, 2010).

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, GAO-10-651T (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010).

Secure Border Initiative: Testing and Problem Resolution Challenges Put Delivery of Technology Program at Risk. GAO-10-511T (Washington, D.C.: March 18, 2010).

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk. GAO-10-158 (Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2010).

Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-1013T (Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2009).

Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-896 (Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009).

Customs and Border Protection’s Secure Border Initiative Fiscal Year 2009 Expenditure Plan. GAO-09-274R (Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2009).

Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Costs. GAO-09-244R (Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2009).

Northern Border Security: DHS’s Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities. GAO-09-93 (Washington, D.C.: November 25, 2008).

Department of Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major Programs Lack Appropriate Oversight. GAO-09-29 (Washington, D.C.: November 18, 2008).

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment. GAO-08-1086 (Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2008).

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment. GAO-08-1148T (Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2008).

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges. GAO-08-1141T (Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2008).

Secure Border Initiative Fiscal Year 2008 Expenditure Plan Shows Improvement, but Deficiencies Limit Congressional Oversight and DHS Accountability. GAO-08-739R (Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2008).

Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Oversight Needed to Improve Complex Service Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-08-765T (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2008).

Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Assessment Needed to Improve Outcomes for Complex Service Acquisitions. GAO-08-263 (Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2008).

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of Applying Lessons Learned to Future Projects. GAO-08-508T (Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2008).

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet Program Implementation. GAO-08-131T (Washington, D.C.: October 24, 2007).

Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Planning and Management Improvements Needed to Control Risk. GAO-07-504T (Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2007).

Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to Better Support Oversight and Accountability. GAO-07-309 (Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2007).