Unaccompanied Alien Children: Actions Needed to Ensure Children Receive Required Care in DHS Custody
Released: 2015-07-14T00:00:00

Letter

Background

DHS Processes to Screen, Care for, and Transfer UAC

Interviewing and screening. After Border Patrol, OFO, or ICE apprehends UAC, a CBP or ICE official interviews each child and collects personal information such as the child’s name, country of nationality, and age. DHS officials evaluate each child to determine if he or she meets certain criteria signifying that additional steps may have to be taken to ensure the child is safe from harm—a process known as screening. According to CBP policy, Border Patrol agents and OFO officers are to use CBP Form 93 and Form I-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, among other forms, to document that they collected personal information about each UAC and that each child is screened as required. In addition, TVPRA requires that, except in exceptional circumstances, UAC are transferred to the care and custody of HHS within 72 hours of determining a child is a UAC. However, TVPRA also provides special rules for UAC from Canada and Mexico who are apprehended at a land border or POE. On a case-by-case basis for UAC from Canada and Mexico, DHS may allow the child to withdraw his or her application for admission and return to his or her country of nationality or last habitual residence—referred to as repatriation for purposes of this report—without further removal proceedings if the officers screen the UAC within 48 hours of being apprehended and determine that 1. the UAC is not a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons,2. there is no credible evidence that the UAC is at risk of being trafficked 3. the UAC does not have a fear of returning to his or her country owing to a credible fear of persecution, and 4. the UAC is able to make an independent decision to withdraw the application for admission to the United States and voluntarily return to his or her country of nationality or last habitual residence.

For Mexican and Canadian UAC who do not meet all four of these screening criteria, TVPRA requires DHS to follow the same process established for UAC from other countries and transfer them to HHS within 72 hours of determining they are UAC, absent exceptional circumstances. Figure 1 shows CBP’s screening process for UAC.

Care and custody. While UAC are in DHS custody, DHS is required to meet certain minimum requirements for care and custody, as stipulated by TVPRA, the Flores Agreement, and DHS regulations. DHS must meet the following requirements for care and custody, at a minimum: maintain custody of UAC in the least restrictive setting appropriate to the children’s age and special needs, provided that such setting is consistent with the need to protect the juveniles’ well-being and that of others, as well as with any other laws, regulations, or legal requirements; provide safe and sanitary facilities for UAC, as well as adequate temperature control and ventilation; provide UAC with access to drinking water and food as appropriate, emergency medical care, and toilets and sinks; generally separate UAC from unrelated adults and adequately provide specialized training for care and custody of UAC to DHS personnel who have substantive contact with UAC; and transfer UAC to HHS within 72 hours of apprehension, except in exceptional circumstances.

Transfer of UAC. When ORR receives notice that DHS plans to transfer custody of UAC, ORR searches its database of shelters throughout the United States to locate one with space for a child before DHS transfers custody of UAC. When ORR confirms that space at a shelter has been reserved for an unaccompanied alien child, the office is to coordinate with Border Patrol, OFO, and ERO to transport the child to the assigned shelter. ERO provides long-distance travel for UAC within the United States via commercial airlines, charter aircraft, or bus. In some areas, CBP transports UAC to shelters that are within the local commuting area.

For UAC repatriated to Mexico or Canada, CBP is generally responsible for transporting UAC to POEs, where UAC custody is transferred to Mexican or Canadian officials.

DHS Apprehended Over 200,000 UAC during Fiscal Years 2009 through 2014

DHS apprehended more than 5 million adult and juvenile aliens during fiscal years 2009 through 2014, of which approximately 201,700 (4 percent) were UAC. Table 1 shows the number of UAC apprehensions by DHS component during fiscal years 2009 through 2014.

Over 90 percent of DHS’s apprehensions of UAC during fiscal years 2009 through 2014 were made by Border Patrol agents along the southwest border of the United States with Mexico. Of the 186,233 UAC whom Border Patrol apprehended, over 75 percent were apprehended in two Border Patrol sectors—about 52 percent in Rio Grande Valley, Texas, and about 25 percent in Tucson, Arizona. OFO apprehended 10,447 UAC during fiscal years 2012 through 2014.locations of UAC apprehensions by CBP during fiscal years 2009 through 2014.

CBP Has Developed Policies and Procedures for Screening UAC, but Has Not Consistently Implemented TVPRA Requirements

CBP Has Developed Policies and Procedures, Including a Standardized Tool, to Help Ensure Screening of UAC as Required

In March 2009, CBP issued a memorandum containing policies and procedures that Border Patrol agents and OFO officers are required to follow when screening UAC regardless of nationality. Consistent with TVPRA requirements, the memorandum states that Border Patrol and OFO are to transfer all UAC from countries other than Canada or Mexico to HHS shelters. In addition, the memorandum establishes separate procedures to screen UAC from Canada and Mexico to determine whether they should be transferred to an HHS shelter or allowed to return to these two countries. Specifically, agents and officers are required to assess the four criteria set forth in TVPRA for each unaccompanied Canadian or Mexican child when determining whether to allow that child to voluntarily return to these countries (that is, to be repatriated).

Further, CBP’s March 2009 memorandum requires that Border Patrol agents and OFO officers use CBP’s Form 93 to document that they conducted the required screening for all UAC against criteria set forth in TVPRA. For example, the Form 93 directs interviewing agents and officers to ask questions to determine whether the children have a fear of returning to their country of nationality or last habitual residence and if the UAC may be victims of trafficking. Form 93 also provides agents and officers with indicators of potential human trafficking. In addition, agents and officers are to use the Form I-213 to document, among other things, key results of the screening process, such as any claims of fear expressed by the UAC. According to our observations and interviews with Border Patrol agents and OFO officers at 13 of the 15 CBP facilities and POEs we visited, agents and officers generally interview UAC and complete these forms at computer terminals in open areas of the facilities. Although CBP agents and officers are to complete a Form 93 for all UAC, the children’s responses are only statutorily required for the purpose of determining whether to permit Canadian and Mexican UAC to voluntarily return, as TVPRA requires DHS to transfer all non-Canadian and non-Mexican UAC to an HHS shelter. Table 2 describes the purpose of these forms and their roles in the screening process.

On the basis of the information Border Patrol agents and OFO officers gather during the interviews and, in particular, on the basis of the children’s responses to questions on the Form 93, agents and officers are to determine whether to allow UAC from Canada and Mexico to return to their countries of origin. Table 3 shows the number of Canadian and Mexican UAC who were apprehended by CBP from fiscal years 2012 through 2014 and repatriated or transferred to HHS.

CBP Transferred Most Non-Canadian and Non- Mexican UAC to HHS as Required, but OFO Repatriated Some Who Were Apprehended at Airports

Our analysis of UAC apprehension data for fiscal years 2009 through 2014 shows that CBP transferred the majority of non-Canadian and non- Mexican UAC to HHS, as required by TVPRA and CBP’s March 2009 memorandum. Specifically, CBP’s data indicate that Border Patrol transferred 99 percent of such UAC whom agents apprehended from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, and OFO transferred about 93 percent of such UAC apprehended at land POEs from fiscal years 2012 through Further, officials at 13 of the CBP facilities and land POEs we 2014.visited stated that non-Mexican UAC are always transferred to HHS, indicating that the officials were aware of the policy. In addition, for all 5 non-Mexican UAC we observed being interviewed by Border Patrol agents during our visits, we noted that agents determined that these UAC were to be transferred to HHS, as required.

Although CBP transferred the majority of non-Canadian and non-Mexican UAC apprehended at land borders and land POEs to HHS, OFO did not transfer all such UAC apprehended at air POEs as required by TVPRA. Specifically, our analysis of CBP data shows that OFO repatriated about 45 percent (459 of 1,037) of such UAC apprehended at air POEs from fiscal years 2012 through 2014. OFO headquarters officials stated that they were aware that all non-Canadian and non-Mexican UAC are to be transferred to HHS, including those apprehended at air POEs, and initially stated that the officers at air POEs had entered incorrect data into OFO’s automated system, such as coding an accompanied child as an unaccompanied child. We analyzed a nongeneralizable random sample of Form I-213s for 19 cases in which OFO apprehended non-Canadian and non-Mexican UAC at air POEs and repatriated them. In general, we found that the documentation indicated that these were not data entry errors. Rather, the documentation indicated that these UAC who were repatriated, for example, had attended or were seeking to attend school without the correct visa, or seeking employment without the proper visa.

On the basis of our analysis, OFO officials stated that officers who screen UAC at air POEs may not fully understand TVPRA requirements or recall the details of their training on TVPRA because OFO officers at these locations apprehend far fewer UAC than those at land POEs. In addition, OFO officials stated that some of the cases in the database where OFO returned non-Mexicans and non-Canadians (162 of 459) were refusals of admission based on the child’s request to be admitted into the United States under the Visa Waiver Program. According to OFO officials and CBP guidance, UAC may be allowed to return to their home countries in this circumstance, but are first screened to assess the risk of trafficking or credible fear.officials stated that the officers had given thoughtful consideration to the outcomes of the UAC and generally contacted the children’s parents and worked through the appropriate consular office before repatriating them. However, OFO officials acknowledged that TVPRA requires OFO to transfer all non-Canadian and non-Mexican UAC to HHS shelters, regardless of the type of POE. These officials stated that developing face- to-face training for OFO officers at air POEs focused on TVPRA requirements would help improve those officers’ knowledge of the requirements. As of April 2015, OFO officials and attorneys from CBP’s Office of Chief Counsel stated that they had begun discussing developing such a training based on our data analysis. However, they did not provide documentation of specific actions they have taken or plan to take to address the issues we identified. Developing and implementing training for OFO officers at airports who have substantive contact with UAC could better position those officers to comply with TVPRA requirements.

CBP Has Not Consistently Implemented Its Screening Policies for Mexican UAC and Cannot Ensure It Is Meeting TVPRA Requirements

CBP has policies for screening Mexican UAC. However, CBP has not consistently implemented these policies related to assessing (1) UAC’s ability to make independent decisions, (2) UAC’s credible fear of persecution, (3) whether UAC were victims of a severe form of trafficking, and (4) any credible evidence of UAC’s risk of being trafficked upon return to their countries.

Ability to make an independent decision. It is unclear if Border Patrol agents and OFO officers are assessing whether Mexican UAC can make an independent decision, as required by TVPRA, because (1) the Form 93 does not include indicators or questions on how to implement the requirement regarding independent decisions, and (2) Border Patrol agents did not consistently document, as required, the basis for their determinations of independent decision-making ability among Mexican UAC.

First, the Form 93 instructs the agent or officer interviewing UAC to determine whether they meet any of the TVPRA criteria and provide signatures attesting to this determination. However, the form does not provide indicators or suggested questions for agents and officers to use to assess, in accordance with CBP policy, whether UAC from Canada and Mexico are able to make an independent decision to withdraw their application for admission to the United States and return to their countries of origin.should generally consider UAC who are 14 years of age or older to be able to make an independent decision about returning to their countries of nationality or last habitual residence and UAC under the age of 14 to be generally unable to make an independent decision. The memorandum also lists a number of exceptions. For example, it states that these age presumptions may be overcome based on factors such as the child’s intelligence, education level, and familiarity with the U.S. immigration process.

CBP’s 2009 memorandum states that agents and officers On the basis of our interviews with Border Patrol agents and OFO officers in Arizona, Texas, and California in July, September, and October 2014, respectively, we found that not all agents and officers were aware that CBP’s 2009 memorandum states that UAC under the age of 14 are presumed generally unable to make an independent decision. Further, Border Patrol agents and OFO officers at 5 of the 15 facilities we visited stated that they repatriate UAC under the age of 14 if the Mexican consulate is able to locate a family member in Mexico, and other Border Patrol officials stated that they seek approval from the Mexican consulate before returning any Mexican UAC. However, it is not the responsibility of the Mexican government to assess whether Mexican UAC who enter the United States merit international protection outside of Mexico. Rather, TVPRA provides DHS with the authority to make the determination as to whether a Mexican UAC can make an independent decision to withdraw his or her application for admission and return to Mexico when the UAC has met specified screening criteria, and provides no role for the Mexican government with respect to this decision. Further, our analysis of CBP apprehension data indicates that agents and officers may not have understood or followed CBP policy regarding the ability of UAC younger than 14 years old to make an independent decision. Specifically, we found that CBP repatriated about 95 percent of all Mexican UAC whom agents and officers apprehended during fiscal years 2009 through 2014, and 93 percent of Mexican UAC under the age of 14 during this time period. Further, eight of nine Border Patrol sectors along the southwest border repatriated at least 80 percent of Mexican UAC under age 14 from fiscal years 2009 through 2014. In addition, from fiscal years 2012 through 2014, OFO repatriated about 50 percent of Mexican UAC and 65 percent of Canadian UAC under age 14.

According to CBP headquarters officials, the Form 93 is a sufficient tool to conduct screening and Border Patrol officials and, in particular, these officials stated that the signatures on the Form 93 confirm that agents and officers considered whether the UAC were able to make an independent decision about whether to return to Canada or Mexico. CBP officials also stated that agents and officers use their training and experience to make independent decision determinations and are capable of making these determinations without a set of specific questions on the Form 93. However, based on our interviews and our review of CBP apprehension data, it is unclear if agents and officers assessed Canadian and Mexican UAC’s ability to make an independent decision before signing the Form 93 because there was no written documentation of this assessment other than the signatures.

In addition, other organizations have also identified limitations to CBP’s implementation of the independent decision-screening requirement. For example, a June 2014 UNHCR report identified concerns that CBP as a whole was not assessing whether Mexican UAC are able to make an independent decision to withdraw their applications for admission to the United States and return to Mexico. Specifically, UNHCR found that there are no questions or instructions built into CBP’s process for CBP officials to assess UAC’s ability to make the decision to return to Mexico. Further, UNHCR reported that, when presented with hypothetical examples of a child who is not able to make an independent decision about returning home and questioned about whether they would handle the processing of such a Mexican differently, a number of agents responded that the children would be returned to Mexico like the other Mexican UAC. In addition, the nongovernmental organization Appleseed reported in 2011 that its interviews with Border Patrol agents and OFO officers in the field indicated that no uniform guidelines or standards existed on how to ascertain whether a child is capable of making an independent decision to return to Mexico, and that this absence of direction led to inconsistent practices across different regions of the southwest border. Further, Appleseed reported that the repatriated Mexican UAC it interviewed seemed to have little understanding of what might happen to them if they did not agree to return to Mexico. CBP officials responsible for outreach with these organizations stated that while they have had discussions with nongovernmental organizations about the Form 93 and UAC screening, there were no plans, as of April 2015, to revise the form to include additional indicators or questions related to the ability of UAC to make an independent decision.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides that agencies should design and implement continuous built-in components of operations—in this case, indicators or questions agents and officers should ask related to independent decision making—to provide reasonable assurance of meeting agency missions, goals, and objectives. Revising the Form 93 to include indicators or questions that agents and officers should ask to better assess a child’s ability to make an independent decision would help ensure agents and officers obtain the necessary information to determine whether UAC can independently make a decision to withdraw their application prior to repatriation, in compliance with TVPRA requirements and CBP policy.

Second, although CBP repatriated most Mexican UAC under the age of 14 from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, we found that Border Patrol agents did not consistently document the basis for their decisions, as required. CBP’s 2009 memorandum specifically instructs agents and officers to document the basis for all determinations regarding independent decisions on the Form I-213. Our analysis of a random sample of 180 Border Patrol case files of UAC apprehended in fiscal year 2014 showed that agents did not document the rationales for their conclusions related to UAC’s independent decision-making ability. Specifically, on the basis of our review of Forms I-213 from our sample of cases, which included children of all ages, we estimate that none of the 15,531 forms for Mexican UAC nationwide from fiscal year 2014 included documentation of the agents’ basis for their determinations regarding the UAC’s ability to make an independent decision. In particular, in one case we reviewed, the Border Patrol agent documented that the unaccompanied alien child was “emotionally distraught” and “unable to speak clearly,” but determined that the child should be allowed to return to Mexico. Because the agent did not document the reason for deciding that the child should be repatriated, it was unclear whether or how the agent took into account the child’s physical and mental state, which, according to the 2009 memorandum, is one factor to consider when assessing UAC’s ability to make an independent decision. In addition, two of the five Border Patrol agents we observed conducting interviews in the Rio Grande Valley sector told us that the Mexican UAC they interview and repatriate generally have not understood the options available to them that would allow them to remain in the United States while they await removal proceedings. As discussed above, a child’s familiarity with the U.S. immigration process is to be a factor that agents and officers consider when determining the ability of the UAC to make an independent decision.

A Border Patrol headquarters official responsible for the UAC program stated that agents typically document the basis for the independent decision assessment only if the agent determines that the unaccompanied alien child is unable to make an independent decision because agents have typically not documented the decision in the past. Further, he stated that this course of action follows the spirit of the 2009 UAC policy memorandum. CBP officials also stated that agents and officers may not have adequately documented screening decisions because they were more focused on working to transfer custody of UAC to HHS as quickly as possible, particularly during the summer of 2014. However, the 2009 memorandum specifically states that Border Patrol agents and OFO officers are to document the basis for all determinations regarding independent decisions. Moreover, our review of Form I-213s from our sample of cases included apprehensions that occurred throughout fiscal year 2014, which accounts for time periods with high and low apprehension rates as well as sectors that did not experience a surge in UAC. Ensuring that Border Patrol agents document the basis for their determinations regarding independent decision making would better position CBP to ensure that such determinations are appropriate.

Credible fear of persecution. We found that Border Patrol agents and OFO officers are not making consistent decisions about whether Mexican UAC have a credible fear of persecution if they return to Mexico. According to TVPRA and CBP’s 2009 policy memorandum, CBP is to transfer to HHS all Canadian and Mexican UAC who have a fear of returning to their countries because of a credible fear of persecution. To implement this policy, agents and officers are to ask four credible fear determination questions on the Form 93, which solicit information from the UAC about why they left their home countries, if they have any fear of returning, or if they believe they would be harmed if returned. However, we found that agents’ and officers’ understanding varies as to what types of fear expressed by UAC and what types of responses to these fear questions should warrant transferring the UAC to HHS. In particular, our analysis of Border Patrol case files showed that agents made different screening decisions when presented with similar responses to the credible fear questions.claimed fear because her grandmother had abused her, and the agent transferred the child to HHS. However, in two other cases we reviewed, sisters told the interviewing agent that their aunt had mistreated them and the agent repatriated these UAC. In another case, a child claimed that he was fearful of gangs and transnational criminal organizations in his hometown and the interviewing agent decided to transfer him to HHS. However, one child claimed fear of gangs and another claimed fear of violence in Mexico, and the interviewing agents decided to repatriate both of these UAC.

We did not discuss UAC screening at two facilities we visited in Arizona. At the third remaining facility, CBP officials stated that they had never determined that a Mexican unaccompanied alien child had credible fear. some agents and officers these DHS officials interviewed stated that they needed to ask more questions than those on the Form 93 to know if fear claimed by UAC warranted protection (that is, being transferred to HHS). In addition, according to a June 2014 UNHCR report, more than half of the 96 CBP officials interviewed by the UNHCR officials in 2012 and 2013 stated that it was not their job to assess a child’s fear of returning to his or her country; instead, UNHCR reported that CBP officials said that they process the case so that the child’s claim can be heard by an appropriate adjudicator. However, some CBP officials told UNHCR officials that their definition of fear is that it must be fear of persecution or harm inflicted directly by the government and that UAC who fear gangs or cartels do not have fear of government persecution and are therefore returned home.

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. persecution would better help them assess and protect Mexican UAC consistent with TVPRA requirements and CBP policy, as well as consistently across the agency.

Victim of trafficking. CBP’s implementation of the TVPRA requirement related to assessing whether UAC are at risk of a severe form of trafficking in persons also has limitations. First, the Form 93 and the 2009 memorandum do not provide instructions on how agents and officers are to apply the questions and indicators on the Form 93 to assess a child’s trafficking risk. Second, Border Patrol agents did not document the rationales for some of their decisions related to whether Mexican UAC were victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons.

Regarding CBP’s trafficking guidance, we found inconsistencies in the information Border Patrol agents obtained from UAC for the same trafficking questions. The Form 93 provides examples of trafficking indicators and 12 questions to assist agents and officers in their assessments of whether UAC from Canada and Mexico have been trafficked. For example, one trafficking question on the Form 93 asks Border Patrol agents and OFO officers to determine if the UAC are engaged in labor. We analyzed a random sample of 180 Form 93s for Mexican UAC apprehended by Border Patrol in fiscal year 2014. On the basis of our analysis, we estimate that Border Patrol agents found 3 percent of these UAC were engaged in labor—a trafficking indicator— because they were acting as smugglers. However, we estimate that in another 4 percent of the apprehensions during this time period, the Border Patrol agents identified the UAC as smugglers but recorded on the Form 93 that they were not engaged in labor. According to Border Patrol agents in south Texas, agents have previously identified smugglers who were trafficking victims, and documenting that UAC are smugglers can be an important step in assessing if CBP should allow the children to return to Mexico. According to our review of the case files, Border Patrol agents did not always document whether Mexican UAC were smugglers. As a result, we do not know whether agents’ inconsistent classification of UAC smugglers as engaged in labor was a pervasive issue. However, given the potential consequences of child trafficking, it is important for agents to consistently apply the Form 93 trafficking questions for all UAC.

In addition, we found instances where interviewers did not apply the trafficking indicator from the Form 93 correctly. For example, according to the form, one indicator of trafficking is when a child is isolated from others, and the agent or officer is prompted to ask if the child has been able to freely contact friends or family. However, we estimate that, in 4 percent of the cases, Border Patrol agents incorrectly documented whether the UAC were able to contact someone while in custody at the Border Patrol station after they had been apprehended (instead of during their journey).charge of the UAC program, to determine if the child is a victim of trafficking, the interviewing agent would need information on whether the child was allowed to contact friends or family before, not after, apprehension.

According to a Border Patrol headquarters official in Other groups have also reported that CBP has not provided Border Patrol agents and OFO officers with sufficient guidance on how to implement the Form 93 screening tool with regard to trafficking. For example, Appleseed reported that the form lacks depth or detail sufficient to draw out the information for an agent to evaluate whether a child has been trafficked. In addition, UNHCR reported that the form does not provide the necessary guidance for the interviewing agents and officers in a clear, accurate, and user-friendly manner. For example, UNHCR found that one agent, who was observed conducting screening, did not understand that some trafficking questions applied to the period of time before an unaccompanied alien child’s apprehension. UNHCR reported that, with some guidance on the substance of what the agent is screening for, the agent could more effectively screen UAC for protection needs.

According to CBP officials, agents and officers are not authorized to make trafficking determinations, as agents refer UAC who may be victims of trafficking to either ICE or U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. These officials also stated that the trafficking questions on the Form 93 are intended as good questions to prompt UAC responses, but that agents and officers ultimately use their training and experience to make trafficking decisions. Although agents and officers must use their discretion, prior to repatriating a UAC from Mexico or Canada, CBP policy and TVPRA require them to assess whether the UAC has been a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons or is at risk of being trafficked upon return, and we found inconsistencies in how agents applied the trafficking questions designed to conduct that assessment. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides that effective communications should occur in a broad sense, with information flowing down, across, and up the organization to help ensure the agency meets its objectives.responsible for developing detailed practices to fit the agency’s operations and ensure that the practices are built into, and an integral part of, operations. Developing and implementing guidance on how Border Patrol agents and OFO officers are to implement the TVPRA requirement to transfer to HHS all Canadian and Mexican UAC who are victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons—such as the purpose of each trafficking question on the Form 93 and how to interpret UAC’s responses to the questions—would better ensure agents and officers can make consistent and informed screening decisions.

Further, these standards state that management is Second, Border Patrol agents did not document the rationale for some of their decisions related to whether Mexican UAC were victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons, as required. According to the Form 93, if a trafficking indicator is present during the screening process, the interviewing Border Patrol agent or OFO officer is to ask age-appropriate questions that will help identify the key elements of a trafficking scenario. Moreover, agents and officers are to use the Form I-213 to document the circumstances involving any potential trafficking. On the basis of the sample of Form 93s that we reviewed, we project that 7,832 of the about 15,500 (50 percent) Mexican UAC whom Border Patrol apprehended in fiscal year 2014 had at least one trafficking indicator present. However, agents determined that these 7,832 UAC were not trafficking victims but did not document any follow-up questions the agents may have asked or UAC responses to those questions to alleviate any trafficking concerns.

For example, we estimate that in 45 percent of cases, the Border Patrol agent indicated that the child did not have possession of his or her identification documents but determined the child was not a trafficking victim. In the cases we reviewed, the agent did not document any responses to follow-up questions he or she may have asked, even though the Form 93 instructs the interviewing agent or officer to determine who has control of the documents. According to Border Patrol agents in one sector, not having an identification document should not be an indicator of someone being trafficked. However, the Form 93 states that the lack of possession or control of documents is a trafficking indicator and provides a suggested question specific to that situation. In other cases, Border Patrol agents determined UAC did not appear to be victims or potential victims of trafficking even though agents documented that there were trafficking indicators for these children, such as being isolated from others, engaging in labor, having restricted movements, being threatened with harm, being recruited for one purpose but forced to engage in some other job, or providing coached responses. As a result, it is unclear whether Border Patrol agents correctly applied CBP’s policies.

CBP officials stated that they may not have adequately documented screening decisions during the surge of UAC in the summer of 2014 because they were more focused on working to transfer custody of UAC to HHS as quickly as possible. Also, Border Patrol officials stated that it is not necessary to document responses to follow-up questions because (1) agents have latitude to use their judgment based on training and experience to make trafficking assessments based on the totality of responses to the trafficking questions; (2) agents and supervisors discuss the circumstances of each case, as appropriate; and (3) supervisors review and approve agents’ screening decisions. While an agent’s judgment is an important aspect of the screening process, it is unclear if agents are following TVPRA and CBP policy requirements to only repatriate Mexican UAC if CBP determines they have not been victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons. Moreover, on the basis of our review of Form 93s from our sample of cases, we estimate that Border Patrol agents did not complete the trafficking section of the Form 93 for 7 percent (1,077) of Mexican UAC they repatriated in fiscal year 2014. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides that internal controls and all transactions and other significant events need to be clearly documented, and the documentation should be readily available for examination.trafficking indicators whom Border Patrol repatriated, asking follow-up questions of UAC when trafficking indicators are present and documenting UAC responses would better position CBP to ensure that UAC who may be victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons are not repatriated. Further, recording the rationale for agents’ decisions to repatriate UAC who demonstrate a trafficking indicator would allow CBP to better assess on an agency-wide basis whether agents’ decisions were justified and consistent with TVPRA requirements and CBP policy.

Given the rate of Mexican UAC with Credible evidence of risk of being trafficked upon return. The Form 93 states that the trafficking questions will assist agents and officers in determining if the UAC may be victims of trafficking, but the form does not include indicators or questions for assessing whether there is credible evidence that the UAC are at risk of being trafficked upon return to their countries of origin—a screening requirement under TVPRA and CBP policy. CBP officials stated that the guidelines established in Form 93 outline indicators and suggested questions that could help show that UAC are victims of trafficking whether they are going to be repatriated or were subject to it prior to apprehension. However, none of the 12 trafficking questions prompts the interviewing agents and officers to ask the UAC about, for example, conditions in their homes or countries of origin that could help them assess whether the child would be a potential victim if repatriated. In addition, agents and officers at five facilities we visited stated that they focus on indicators of current trafficking victims—such as signs of abuse or fear of an adult in their group—rather than indicators of potential trafficking should the child return to his or her country of origin. Further, during our observations of five UAC interviews, Border Patrol agents did not ask any questions pertaining to the risk of a child being trafficked upon return to his or her country of origin. CBP officials also stated that before CBP would allow a Mexican unaccompanied alien child to return, Mexican consulate officials interview each child and question him or her regarding possible abuse or trafficking. If any of these factors are present, consulate officials notify CBP. However, Mexican consulate officials in two of the three states we visited stated that they do not influence CBP’s TVPRA screening decisions. Moreover, as previously stated, it is not the responsibility of the Mexican government to assess whether Mexican UAC who enter the United States merit international protection outside of Mexico.

Other organizations have reported on similar limitations in CBP’s Form 93. For example, a June 2014 UNHCR report found that the form did not provide instruction on whether UAC are potential trafficking victims. UNHCR reported that indicators for when a child may be at risk of being trafficked if returned to his or her country may be different from indicators of current trafficking victims, and that CBP agents and officers may need to ask different questions. UNHCR officials reported a lack of awareness among CBP officials about how to identify UAC who might be at risk of trafficking if returned to their countries of nationality. Similarly, Appleseed reported in 2011 that the Form 93 trafficking questions do not probe what Mexican UAC can expect to encounter if they are returned to Mexico.

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. ensure agents and officers obtain the necessary information to address all TVPRA screening criteria and protect UAC.

CBP Does Not Have Assurance That Agents and Officers Have Completed Required UAC Training

CBP does not know the extent to which Border Patrol agents and OFO officers, who have substantive contact with UAC, have completed required UAC training. TVPRA requires DHS to provide specialized training to all personnel who have substantive contact with UAC. According to CBP officials, in October 2012, CBP combined two virtual learning courses—one on TVPRA requirements and another on the care of UAC—and made the course mandatory. Since that time, Border Patrol agents and OFO officers have been required to complete this training annually. The course aims to familiarize agents and officers with the provisions of TVPRA, the screening of UAC, and other issues pertaining to the processing and care of UAC. However, our analysis indicates that CBP does not have reliable data on whether agents and officers completed the training. In particular, CBP officials stated that CBP’s training system tracks the number of agents and officers who have completed the course but it does not reflect the total number of those who should have taken the course. Furthermore, we interviewed CBP training, Border Patrol, and OFO officials regarding how agents and officers document completion of UAC training, and reviewed additional information these officials provided about these data. These officials stated that CBP’s training system does not contain accurate data on which agents and officers are required to take the mandated training or those who did not take it. Further, tracking completion of the UAC training course is a long-standing issue, as the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported in September 2010 that CBP has not developed a tracking system to verify that personnel responsible for processing and detaining UAC have completed the mandatory annual training.

CBP officials stated that it is the responsibility of local supervisors to ensure that all of their agents and officers who have substantive contact with UAC complete required training. According to CBP training officials, some agents and officers may be exempt from the training for a particular year, for example, if they are on a detail assignment overseas or on extended administrative leave. Also, Border Patrol and OFO headquarters officials stated that some supervisors are better than others at monitoring their agents’ and officers’ training requirements and may prioritize operational assignments over required training. For example, Border Patrol officials reported that the increase in apprehensions in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 could have led to below-optimal training completion percentages. Similarly, OFO officials stated that some officers were unable to complete the UAC training because operational needs took precedence. However, TVPRA requires all federal personnel who have substantive contact with UAC to receive specialized training, and completion of the annual UAC virtual learning course is a CBP requirement. Further, a March 2008 Border Patrol memorandum states that employees should be given adequate time to complete the course— about 1 hour in length—during their normal tour of duty. In addition, according to best practices in assessing training efforts, agencies should develop tracking and other control mechanisms to ensure that all employees receive appropriate training. Determining which agents and officers are required to complete the annual UAC training, and ensuring that they have done so, as required, would help CBP to meet training requirements under TVPRA and CBP policies and guidance.

CBP and ICE Have Developed Policies That Are Consistent with UAC Care Requirements, but Could Improve Data Collection, Interagency Coordination, and Repatriation Efforts

CBP and ICE Policies Generally Reflect Care Requirements for UAC, and CBP Follows These Policies in Practice

CBP and ICE have policies in place to implement the Flores Agreement and care for UAC, and CBP generally follows these policies. Under the Flores Agreement, DHS is generally required to, among other things, ensure the safety and well-being of the UAC; separate UAC from unrelated adults; adequately supervise UAC to protect them from others; and provide access to food, water, toilets, and sinks. CBP and its components, Border Patrol and OFO, have several policy documents that provide guidance for how agents and officers are to implement the Flores Agreement requirements to care for UAC. These documents are generally consistent with and address Flores Agreement requirements to care for UAC, and in some cases include more rigorous care requirements. For example, the Flores Agreement requires adequate supervision of UAC, but Border Patrol policy requires direct and constant supervision of UAC. ICE also has several policies that provide guidance on UAC care; these policies address all required elements of care, and in some cases include more rigorous care requirements.

At the 15 CBP facilities (11 Border Patrol and 4 OFO) we visited in July, September, and October 2014, we interviewed officials responsible for caring for UAC and observed the extent to which agents and officers at each facility were addressing the following eight required elements of care in Border Patrol and OFO policies: place UAC in the least restrictive setting appropriate for their age and separate UAC from unrelated adults and by gender, directly supervise UAC, keep facilities adequately ventilated and at appropriate temperatures, provide access to working and sanitary toilets and sinks, provide drinking water, provide food regardless of time in custody, provide access to medical treatment.

In addition, at the 11 Border Patrol facilities we visited, we evaluated the implementation of the following UAC care elements specific only to Border Patrol policy: provide clean blankets and mattresses, conduct physical checks of UAC hold rooms at regular intervals, and provide access to telephones.

We did not include ICE facilities in this analysis because UAC are rarely held in ICE facilities for more than a short period of time as they await transportation to an ORR shelter, according to ICE officials. seven of the eight elements of care at the time of our visits.according to our observations and interviews at the 11 Border Patrol facilities, agents were generally providing care consistent with the three Border Patrol-specific requirements at the time of our visit. Figure 5 shows a typical Border Patrol holding room in a station in south Texas. The photograph on the left shows a toilet and sink in the rear of the holding cell behind a half wall, and the photograph on the right shows a 5- gallon water jug that provided UAC with access to drinking water.

In July 2014, we visited CBP facilities in Arizona, at which time Border Patrol, OFO, ORR, and FEMA officials, among others, were caring for more than 900 UAC at the Nogales Placement Center (NPC). According to CBP officials, DHS had transferred most of these children to Arizona from south Texas—where Border Patrol agents and OFO officers had apprehended them—because CBP holding facilities in south Texas were overflowing with UAC and HHS shelters did not have the capacity at the time to accept all of the UAC whom agents and officers were apprehending each week. Figure 6 shows part of the NPC, including a number of portable toilets. At the NPC, we observed Border Patrol agents and OFO officers helping U.S. government public health volunteers provide basic care to UAC, including helping children as young as 2 and 3 years old eat and bathe. At the time of our visit, Border Patrol officials in Arizona were supplementing food supplied by a FEMA contractor with food purchased separately using Border Patrol funding. We also observed toiletries, toys, and other supplies that Border Patrol agents and OFO officers told us had been purchased with personal funds. In addition, we observed Border Patrol agents and OFO officers playing games with UAC.

For the remaining required element of care for Border Patrol and OFO— the requirement to separate UAC from unrelated adults and by gender— officials told us and we observed that mitigating circumstances made it challenging to meet the policy requirements at all times. Specifically, officials at 7 of 15 CBP facilities did not always meet the requirement to separate UAC from unrelated adults and by gender at the time of our visits. At these 7 facilities, we observed or were told that female and young male UAC would at times be placed in hold rooms with families. Border Patrol and OFO personnel told us that because of limited space in most of these facilities, they made decisions on how to segregate adults and children based on risk level. For example, some agents and officers stated that because of facility layouts, open areas are not a safe solution for lack of space, and determined that female and young male UAC were safer in hold rooms with families than in open areas with no physical barriers between UAC and adult males.

The DHS OIG has reported that CBP has generally met care requirements, but identified some isolated problems. Specifically, in 2010, the DHS OIG reported that CBP’s care of UAC met the requirements of the Flores Agreement. Inspections by OIG from July, August, and October 2014 also found that most facilities that OIG officials visited were adhering to care requirements, but there were isolated problems with the quantity of food provided, sanitation, and the temperature of facilities found during the July 2014 inspections. The subsequent inspections in August and October 2014 found that CBP had addressed these isolated problems. However, other organizations have reported on inconsistent compliance with the requirements for UAC care. For example, DHS’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties conducted an investigation of selected Border Patrol and OFO facilities in south Texas during July 2014—during the height of the increase in UAC apprehensions—and found issues pertaining to sanitation and holding room conditions. Specifically, in October 2014, DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties officials told us that, according to preliminary findings, some facilities had unsanitary conditions in holding room restroom areas, and some of the holding rooms lacked bathroom tissue, drinking cups, and readily available food.

In addition, as of April 2015, a complaint was filed in court concerning CBP’s adherence to specific provisions of the Flores Agreement related to care; in particular, plaintiffs have alleged that CBP has not met the requirement to hold UAC in facilities that are safe and sanitary and that are consistent with the concern for the particular vulnerability of minors.

Motion to Enforce Settlement of Class Action, Flores v. Reno, No. 85-4544 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2015).

DHS Does Not Collect Complete or Reliable Data on Care of UAC or Their Time in the Department’s Custody

Within DHS, CBP and ICE have not collected complete or reliable data documenting (1) the care provided to UAC while in DHS custody and (2) the length of time UAC are in DHS custody.

Documentation of care provided to UAC. CBP does not collect complete or reliable data on actions Border Patrol agents and OFO officers take to care for UAC; therefore, DHS does not have reasonable assurance that it is meeting its care requirements for UAC. Since 2008, Border Patrol and OFO have required agents and officers to document certain care actions for UAC, such as physical checks and meals. However, in 2010, DHS OIG found that Border Patrol and OFO were not documenting care as required and recommended that CBP develop uniform documentation requirements for UAC care. Border Patrol and OFO have taken some steps to develop and implement automated data systems that can record and maintain data on UAC care. In particular, in 2012 and 2013, Border Patrol issued policies requiring all sectors and stations to fully capture information on UAC care in its automated system, which allows agents to record care provided to UAC across 20 different actions that agents might take.

In fiscal year 2014, Border Patrol fully implemented the automated system, which also allows agents to document the physical movements of UAC, including when UAC are transferred to another station. We analyzed available record-level data on care provided to 55,844 UAC apprehended by Border Patrol agents nationwide from January through September 2014, and found that data were not complete or reliable because agents did not routinely or accurately record actions in the system, as required by Border Patrol policy. Our analysis of data showed inconsistent data entry across sectors. For example, data showed the following:

Agents documented 14 of the 20 care actions for less than half of the 55,844 UAC (the remaining 6 actions were documented for more than 50 percent of the UAC).

Agents at 31 of 92 (34 percent) Border Patrol facilities nationwide did not document meals provided for at least half of the UAC in custody.

Agents at one station along the U.S. southwest border did not document meals provided for 9,201 of 13,574 UAC (68 percent) in custody. Of the 9,201 UAC that had no meal documented, 72 percent were in custody at that station for 12 hours or more.

Agents at 50 of 92 facilities (54 percent) did not document physical checks for at least half of the UAC in custody; those at 19 of 92 facilities did not document physical checks for any UAC in custody.

Agents at one station along the southwest U.S. border did not document physical checks for 4,694 of 5,229 (90 percent) UAC in custody. For the 4,694 UAC for whom agents did not document a physical check, 3,663 (78 percent) were in custody at that station for 12 hours or more.

There were 94 total facilities nationwide that had custody of at least 1 unaccompanied alien child from January through September 2014. However, 2 of the facilities are not included in this set of analyses because the records from those facilities were not completed. multiple entries were errors.may not have adequately recorded care actions because they were more focused on working to transfer custody of UAC to HHS as quickly as possible. Border Patrol officials in headquarters and California also told us that the multiple entries are likely a result of user error caused by lack of training or accidental entry, and officials in California and Texas told us that system error, such as the system freezing or not updating quickly, may also play a role. For example, data showed the following: Border Patrol officials stated that agents

Sixty-two percent (34,703) of the records we reviewed contained at least 1 likely error, and for each of those case files, the typical case had 12 likely errors.

Seventy of 94 facilities in the data had at least one care action recorded multiple times for a single child within a 10-minute period. At 29 of these 70 facilities, at least 25 percent of the actions recorded were likely errors, and at 10 of these 70 facilities, at least half of the actions recorded were likely errors. For example, 56 percent of all care actions that agents in the Rio Grande Valley sector documented consisted of the same action entered more than once within a 10- minute period. In particular, 49 percent of these likely errors were recorded within 2 minutes or less of one another.

In 1 case in the Rio Grande Valley sector, a meal for the same child was recorded 11 times within 11 minutes.

In fiscal year 2012, OFO implemented an automated database that allows officers to record care actions such as meals and medical care. However, unlike Border Patrol, as of April 2015, OFO did not yet have a policy requiring officers to use the automated database to record care provided to UAC, and OFO headquarters officials stated that officers at most POEs do not use the automated database. For example, at a POE we visited in south Texas, OFO officers told us that they document most custodial actions in the narrative of Form I-213 as opposed to recording care actions in the database. In contrast, at least one large land POE along the southwest U.S. border has been using the database to document care provided to UAC; however, OFO headquarters and port officials were unable to view data from the database for this POE until September 2014, when OFO upgraded its database to provide this capability. OFO officials said they have discussed developing a data review process and making use of the automated database mandatory, but officials did not have an expected implementation date or documentation of any plans as of February 2015.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that agencies should document transactions and events as they occur and in an accessible manner, and that management should review Because agents and officers do documentation to assess performance.not routinely document their actions taken to care for UAC, Border Patrol and OFO have limited data available to ensure they are meeting the requirements for care of UAC as set forth in TVPRA, the Flores Agreement, and agency policy. Furthermore, data that Border Patrol and OFO have collected since fiscal year 2014 are not reliable or available. Requiring OFO officers to record UAC care actions in an automated manner and ensuring that Border Patrol agents record UAC care actions in their automated system, as required, would help CBP to assess and better ensure compliance with all care requirements.

Documentation of UAC time in DHS custody. Border Patrol generally collects complete and reliable information on the dates and times during which UAC come into and leave its custody, but OFO and ICE do not collect such information. Therefore, DHS cannot accurately determine how long UAC have been in OFO and ICE custody, and if the length of time in custody before transfer to HHS is within the 72-hour limit established by TVPRA.

Border Patrol’s policy instructs agents to record the times that UAC enter custody—or are “booked in”—and leave their custody—or are “booked out.” Border Patrol’s system provides automated date and time stamps for each action that agents enter into the system when UAC are in their custody. Our analysis of fiscal year 2014 data shows that Border Patrol agents used the “transfer” field in over 99 percent of cases to document when UAC left Border Patrol custody. Using this system, agents can also differentiate the type of transfer, including UAC transfers to another Border Patrol facility or a POE, ICE, or HHS shelter. As a result, Border Patrol can produce regular reports to identify the number of UAC who have been in DHS custody greater than 72 hours. According to CBP officials, this information is disseminated to FEMA, DHS senior leadership, and additional stakeholders.

OFO’s data system automatically generates a book-in date and time when officers enter a UAC apprehension in the system. In July 2014, OFO officials told us that their system did not have a field to record when UAC left OFO custody. OFO has a “time out” field in its system, but as of April 2015, officers are not required to use it. OFO officials told us they have discussed requiring a book-out date and time; however, they do not have time frames or documentation of any plans for implementation of the updates.

An ICE user manual describes how to book in and book out subjects, including UAC, and ICE officials stated that they cover the proper use of these fields during monthly conference calls and annual training. However, ICE does not have a policy that requires officers to record book-in or book-out dates and times for UAC in its custody. Further, ICE headquarters officials told us officers often enter book-out dates and times into the system a day or more after UAC have been transferred to HHS because officers may wait to enter the data until after they travel back to their office. Therefore, ICE officials stated that this delayed data entry affects the precision of the book-out times recorded in the system and makes them unreliable. Further, officials in one ICE field office told us that they do not use the book-out field when a UAC leaves ICE custody. In addition, ICE officials told us that they use book-in and book-out records to count time in ICE custody, but they recognize that the limitations in the data make these calculations imprecise.

The Flores Agreement requires information on all UAC who were placed in removal proceedings and remained in DHS custody more than 72 hours in the prior 6-month period, among other things, to be submitted to plaintiffs’ counsel twice yearly.reports compiled by ICE and submitted to plaintiffs’ counsel by DOJ showed that a total of 1,280 UAC were in DHS custody for more than 72 hours. However, our analysis of the reports revealed data quality issues. For instance, the date of DHS’s transfer of the UAC to ORR is missing for 13 percent of the 1,280 cases, so the time in DHS custody for these children was not fully documented in the reports. Further, our analysis identified that the apprehension date for 19 percent of UAC apprehended by Border Patrol was recorded incorrectly by ICE in these reports. ICE ERO officials told us that because ICE’s data system does not provide reliable data on time in custody, the reports are compiled manually using weekly reports from ICE field offices—a method that ICE officials told us is also prone to data entry errors.

From fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that agencies should document transactions and events as they occur and in an accessible manner, and that management should review documentation to assess performance. Requiring officers to accurately record book-in and book-out times would help ensure that OFO and ICE have data necessary to determine UAC’s time in custody, and would better equip DHS to provide accurate data in reports to DOJ and ensure that it is complying with requirements to limit UAC’s time in custody to 72 hours, apart from the case of exceptional circumstances.

Interagency Process to Refer and Transfer UAC from DHS to HHS Shelters Is Inefficient and Does Not Have Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

ICE, which sends it on to ORR from certain locations, or directly to ORR officials in headquarters who are responsible for identifying available shelter beds. ORR officials check their data system to find available beds. Once ORR has identified and assigned a shelter bed for a child, an ORR official sends an e-mail to CBP or ICE, often with a list of several children who have been placed in shelters. After CBP or ICE officials examine the e-mails to identify which UAC are in their respective custody, they coordinate to transport the child to the shelter. Figure 7 depicts the referral and placement process as of April 2015, and identifies points in the process where DHS and HHS officials told us that potential errors or miscommunications have, at times, affected the efficiency of the referral and placement process.

UAC referral and placement process relies on e-mails and manual data entry. ORR officials in headquarters, as well as Border Patrol, OFO, and ICE officials in Arizona, Texas, and California, told us that the referral and placement process is inefficient and time and resource intensive. Each agency uses its own data system to manage and track UAC, and because the data systems do not automatically communicate information with one another, the agencies rely on e-mails and duplicative manual data entry when coordinating the placement of UAC in shelters. In some cases, ORR sent e-mails concerning the shelter placements for multiple UAC to an entire Border Patrol sector, and the POEs within it, making the e-mails time-consuming to search. For example, in September 2014, we observed a team of Border Patrol agents in Texas who had been reassigned from other duties to search through placement e-mails for all UAC in the sector to determine if any UAC in their custody had been placed in a shelter. HHS headquarters officials stated that ORR sends shelter placement information to the recipients indicated by DHS. Table 4 shows that this increase in apprehensions resulted in higher numbers of UAC transferred to HHS.

The reliance on e-mail and associated manual data entry also makes the referral and placement process vulnerable to error and possible delay in the transfer of UAC from DHS to HHS. We analyzed e-mail exchanges between ORR and Border Patrol in the Rio Grande Valley sector to place 593 UAC in shelters during a 3-day period in July 2014, during the influx of UAC, and 135 UAC during a 3-day period in November 2014, after the influx had ended. We identified miscommunications between agencies, as well as errors during both time periods, including UAC who had to be redesignated to different shelters after initial placements and UAC who were assigned to multiple shelters simultaneously. For example, in the e-mails we examined, we found that ORR staff recorded one UAC’s personal information incorrectly, which resulted in a Texas shelter holding an empty bed for 14 days while the child had been already placed in a shelter in Pennsylvania. The incorrect entry of this child’s personal information also meant that ORR and DHS had to exchange multiple e- mails to resolve the discrepancy between their records.

DHS components use different methods to refer UAC to HHS. DHS and ORR have identified the lack of compatible data systems as a challenge in the UAC referral and shelter placement process and, in fiscal year 2014, began exploring ways to automate communications to address inefficiencies. In summer 2014, ORR began allowing CBP and ICE to enter information directly into ORR’s UAC data system when referring UAC for placement in shelters. As of March 2015, ICE was using ORR’s system, while Border Patrol was developing an alternative approach, and OFO was using the process described in figure 5.

According to ORR officials, as well as ICE officials in Rio Grande Valley and San Diego, ICE inputs referral information directly into ORR’s system. However, ICE officials stated that using ORR’s system directly has increased data entry requirements without reducing reliance on e-mail and phone communication. ICE officials also told us that, despite the increased data entry requirements, they are continuing to use ORR’s system.

Border Patrol and ORR officials stated that efforts are under way to automate most of the steps in the referral process between these agencies. However, as of May 2015, Border Patrol is not entering referral information directly into ORR’s data system because Border Patrol officials said they do not want agents to have to enter the same data into its two separate systems (as ICE is doing) or train all of the agents on how to operate ORR’s system. Border Patrol and ORR have been unable to move forward with a fully automated referral and placement process because DHS has not accredited the security of ORR’s data system. In March 2015, CBP officials stated that DHS is waiting to begin its security accreditation process until HHS accredits ORR’s system. ORR officials told us in January and April 2015 that they are also working to update their data system to meet HHS security requirements. In the interim, Border Patrol and ORR are developing a temporary automated process that allows Border Patrol’s system to automatically fill out the referral form when agents create a new apprehension record. Agents are to send an encrypted referral form to ORR via e-mail, and ORR is to import the information directly into its system without ORR staff having to manually enter it. Border Patrol officials said that eliminating the duplicate data entry in the referral process will increase efficiency for Border Patrol. According to Border Patrol officials, automating most of the referral process will decrease UAC processing time by 5 minutes per case, which would have saved a total of about 5,000 hours of agents’ time during fiscal year 2014. Border Patrol officials stated that they would like to pilot the alternative system in one sector in May 2015 before fully implementing it in all sectors, but did not have a time frame for when they would have a fully automated way to communicate with ORR’s data system because of the security accreditation requirement.

OFO headquarters officials said that they were unaware that their officers could access ORR’s system and are not involved in or planning any efforts to link OFO’s data system with ORR’s system. In May 2015, ORR officials stated that there are no efforts under way with OFO to link the two data systems. OFO headquarters officials said they have not received feedback from the field about the current referral process. However, OFO officials in the Rio Grande Valley told us that the placement process has cost them time and resources. For example, one POE on the U.S. southwest border set up a port-wide e- mail specifically for ORR placements, which all officers on duty check regularly and which officials reported took significant amounts of time. However, we observed that these port officials continued to handle large quantities of e-mails despite having no UAC in custody at the time of our visit in September 2014. These officials also reported that placement errors had caused them to transport children to shelters that would not accept them, and that they were not always informed of travel itineraries.

Roles, responsibilities, and procedures are not documented. The roles and responsibilities of DHS components are not consistent during the referral and placement process, and DHS points of contact for ORR vary across Border Patrol sectors and ICE and OFO areas of operation. For example, the ICE San Diego field office coordinates placements with ORR on behalf of all Border Patrol stations and POEs in its area of operations, except for two stations in the El Centro sector. However, in the Rio Grande Valley and Tucson stations and POEs, CBP handles referral and placement communications with ORR. Border Patrol officials stated that they have a designated UAC coordinator for every sector along the southern border who is responsible for UAC placement and other tasks. However, ORR sends sector-wide placement e-mails on multiple UAC; CBP officials in the Rio Grande Valley, which has the highest volume of UAC apprehensions, told us that Border Patrol agents and OFO officers spend significant amounts of time searching e-mails for critical information.

Also, in e-mail exchanges we analyzed, ORR officials sent one e-mail with placements for 7 UAC to the wrong ICE and CBP region. We also found multiple instances in which different ORR officials sent duplicate placement e-mails for the same UAC. The inefficiencies in the placement process for UAC have been a long-standing challenge for DHS and HHS. In 2005, the DHS OIG found that, despite an initial effort to create a memorandum of understanding that would outline roles and responsibilities, the two departments had not delineated their respective organizational functions regarding UAC. In particular, the DHS OIG reported that clear roles and responsibilities across DHS components would help provide a point of contact for entities outside of DHS. Moreover, in 2008, after the HHS OIG recommended that ORR develop a memorandum of understanding with DHS on the shelter placement process, ORR stated that it was coordinating with DHS on a joint manual.departments never created such a manual.

However, ORR officials told us that, for unknown reasons, the In addition, ORR officials told us that from 2013 to 2014, ORR and DHS were developing a memorandum of understanding to outline agency responsibilities in the UAC process, but efforts were set aside during the increase in UAC apprehensions in fiscal year 2014 and efforts to develop such a document have not been renewed. In 2013, DHS developed an internal concept of operations to be used in the event of another large increase in UAC apprehensions; however, DHS policy officials told us that this document was never approved or implemented. As of January 2015, DHS has been working under an interim concept of operations while a DHS working group develops a land migration contingency plan that will include procedures for potential future surges in UAC apprehensions.

However, according to DHS policy officials, the plan will not address procedures and responsibilities for DHS components to refer and transfer UAC to HHS during normal operating conditions.

DHS and HHS have participated in interagency efforts to handle and plan for a potential surge in the apprehension of UAC who require transfer to HHS. In June 2014, the DHS Secretary directed FEMA to take the lead in managing interagency coordination for UAC issues as the head of the Unified Coordination Group, which includes CBP, ICE, the Department of Defense, and HHS. FEMA officials told us that, during the influx in 2014, they identified the UAC placement process as a challenge and helped facilitate ORR placement operations in Arizona as a temporary measure. As of April 2015, FEMA leads the Unified Coordination Group, which has created an emergency response plan for the Rio Grande Valley region that outlines steps to rapidly increase federal capacity if the number of UAC reaches extremely high levels again. However, the plan does not address the interagency referral and placement process that is in place during routine operations, nor does it address operations outside of the Rio Grande Valley.

Best practices of high-performing organizations include fostering collaboration both within and across organizational boundaries to achieve results; moreover, federal programs contributing to the same or similar results should collaborate to ensure that program efforts are mutually reinforcing, and should clarify roles and responsibilities for their joint and individual efforts. Further, agencies should work together to establish a shared purpose and shared goals; develop joint strategies or approaches that complement one another and work toward achieving shared goals; and ensure the compatibility of the standards, policies, procedures, and data systems to be used. We have reported on a range of mechanisms agencies can use to implement these practices for collaboration. These include interagency agreements and memorandums of understanding, as well as collaboration technologies such as shared databases and web portals that help facilitate collaboration. DHS and HHS have utilized some of these mechanisms under emergency operations during the large increase in UAC apprehensions in fiscal year 2014. However, DHS and HHS do not have a documented interagency process that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of each DHS component and ORR for UAC referrals and placements during normal operations. Having documented procedures and defined roles and responsibilities could prevent miscommunication and errors in disseminating placement decisions, reduce time spent on the referral and placement process, and help ensure that UAC are transferred from DHS to HHS within 72 hours under normal operations.

DHS-Negotiated Repatriation Arrangements with Mexico Reflect Some but Not All TVPRA Requirements

DHS has entered into local arrangements with Mexican consulates to ensure the safe and humane repatriation of Mexican nationals, including UAC. However, these arrangements do not reflect minimum TVPRA requirements for agreements with Canada and Mexico with respect to the repatriation of UAC. TVPRA requires that State negotiate agreements with contiguous countries for the repatriation of children. These agreements are to be designed to protect children from severe forms of trafficking in persons and must, at minimum, provide that (1) no child shall be returned unless to appropriate officials, including child welfare officials where available; (2) no child shall be returned outside of reasonable business hours; and (3) border personnel of countries who are parties to the agreements are to be trained in the terms of the agreements.

Officials from State’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs and Office of the Legal Advisor told us that the department has not entered into agreements regarding the repatriation of UAC with Mexico or Canada. Instead, DHS has negotiated and signed repatriation arrangements at the national and local levels with Mexico. According to officials, State has not acted in a formal advisory capacity during the negotiation and implementation of these arrangements in the past because they more directly relate to DHS’s operations. A senior official in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs told us that State’s role is generally to facilitate cooperation between the government of Mexico and DHS, as necessary. For example, bureau officials participate in a bilateral, interagency repatriation technical working group, which meets every other month to review repatriation practices. A senior official in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs told us that through this group, they are able to provide advice and input on DHS-negotiated arrangements and their implementation, such as hours during which UAC can be repatriated. The officials told us that they do not review the local repatriation arrangements to determine if they satisfy TVPRA requirements, but stated that it would be possible to provide such input through State’s role in the working group.

In 2004, DHS negotiated a memorandum of understanding with Mexico to ensure the safe and humane repatriation of all Mexican nationals, including UAC. This document contains a set of principles and practices that serve as the basis for 30 local repatriation arrangements negotiated and agreed upon by DHS and Mexican consulates throughout the United States from 2006 through 2009, which remain in effect. As these arrangements and the memorandum of understanding represented the primary agreements with Mexican officials for UAC repatriation, we reviewed them to determine whether they reflected minimum requirements for agreements with contiguous countries regarding UAC repatriation. Our analysis of the memorandum of understanding and local repatriation arrangements indicates that they reflect some, but not all, repatriation requirements in TVPRA. Specifically, the memorandum states that UAC should be returned during daylight hours, where possible to appropriate family welfare officials, but it does not identify appropriate officials or contain any provisions for the training of border personnel in the arrangements.

Further, our analysis of the 30 DHS-negotiated local repatriation arrangements shows that fewer than one-third contained provisions directing that no UAC be returned unless to appropriate employees or officials, for example, by providing titles of Mexican officials to whom Mexican nationals are to be returned; and only one arrangement identified child welfare representatives. In terms of prohibiting the return of UAC outside of reasonable business hours, fewer than half of arrangements identified the hours during which UAC could be returned to Mexico. Among those that identified the hours, the allowable hours for repatriation varied widely. In most cases, UAC could not be repatriated later than 6 p.m., but according to one arrangement, UAC can be repatriated until 10 p.m., and another permits UAC to be repatriated at any hour. According to officials from DHS’s policy office, reasonable business hours depend on the availability of Mexican government officials, with whom DHS officials in the field coordinate, to accept UAC. Last, none of the local repatriation arrangements addresses the requirement that border personnel be trained in the terms of the repatriation arrangements. As of February 2015, a DHS policy official said that DHS was updating all 30 arrangements, but that the department did not have plans to make any substantive changes to the provisions affecting the return of UAC.

DHS policy officials told us that although the local repatriation arrangements were not initially negotiated with the intent to fulfill TVPRA requirements because many were negotiated before TVPRA was enacted, the department considers these arrangements to broadly reflect TVPRA requirements. However, the officials stated that TVPRA repatriation requirements are not directly outlined in all local repatriation arrangements and acknowledged that none of them addresses the training requirement. The officials told us that they have not explicitly included TVPRA requirements in the arrangements because they did not deem it necessary to include specific U.S. legislative mandates in bilateral arrangements. Further, DHS headquarters officials told us that they defer to officials in the field when reviewing arrangements and do not generally request changes to a provision unless U.S. or Mexican officials identify a problem that needs to be addressed. However, given that DHS’s local repatriation arrangements serve as the primary agreements governing the repatriation of Mexican UAC, revising the arrangements to reflect minimum requirements of TVPRA, in consultation with State, would help better position DHS to ensure that minimum legislative requirements for agreements designed to protect children from severe forms of trafficking in persons are being met.

Total DHS Costs Associated with UAC Are Unknown, and HHS Costs Were Over $2 Billion for Fiscal Years 2009 through 2014

DHS Began Tracking Some Costs Associated with UAC in 2014

Total DHS costs associated with UAC apprehension, custody, and care are unknown for fiscal years 2009 through 2014. Prior to mid-fiscal year 2014, CBP did not collect data on costs specifically associated with UAC. According to Border Patrol and OFO officials, differentiating UAC costs from costs for accompanied children and adults is difficult because, for example, certain duties such as interviewing UAC are considered part of normal operations. Although ICE also did not collect costs specifically associated with UAC prior to fiscal year 2014, ICE estimated its costs for UAC custody, transfer, and repatriation were approximately $41 million for fiscal years 2009 through 2013.

In May 2014, following the DHS Secretary’s memorandum establishing a contingency plan for the large increase in apprehensions of UAC occurring at that time, CBP and ICE implemented project codes to begin tracking some UAC costs. Costs for these agencies from February through September 2014 totaled approximately $97 million—$67 million (69 percent) for CBP and about $30 million (31 percent) for ICE. Of CBP’s UAC project code costs, about 44 percent was for contracted services; about 23 percent was for construction, rent, and utilities for its UAC processing centers; and about 22 percent was for personnel travel, salaries, overtime, and benefits. Of ICE’s UAC project code costs, about 76 percent was to transport UAC and 18 percent was for ICE salaries, benefits, and overtime. Table 5 shows UAC costs charged to DHS project codes from February through September 2014.

To provide additional insight into CBP’s UAC costs, we analyzed project code costs for each CBP office. Specifically, from March through September 2014, CBP charged $67 million to the project codes—about $46 million (69 percent) for Border Patrol, about $16 million (24 percent) for the Office of Administration, about $3.5 million (5 percent) for OFO, and about $1.5 million (2 percent) for other CBP offices. Of Border Patrol’s UAC project code costs, about 70 percent was for contracted services, including food, medical, sanitation, and decontamination, as well as FEMA flight assistance with UAC transport during the large UAC increase, and about 26 percent was for personnel travel, salaries, overtime, and benefits. Of CBP’s Office of Administration’s UAC costs, about 92 percent was for construction, rent, and utilities for UAC processing facilities and about 8 percent was for contracted services, such as temporary air conditioning, waste removal, and custodial services. Of OFO’s UAC costs, about 76 percent was for personnel travel, salaries, overtime, and benefits and about 18 percent was for equipment, supplies, and materials. Table 6 shows additional details of the costs charged to UAC project codes for CBP’s Border Patrol, Office of Administration, OFO, and other offices from March through September 2014.

The project codes are generally used to capture UAC costs that CBP and ICE officials can easily distinguish from costs for accompanied children and adults; however, such UAC costs vary by type across DHS components. For example, Border Patrol tracked costs for UAC custody, care, and transportation such as food, medical services, showers, and other contracts during the large UAC increase, as well as personnel salaries, benefits, and travel expenses for those assigned to provide UAC care and custody. Border Patrol also implemented a second project code to track costs for law enforcement activities to interdict or disrupt the flow of UAC into the United States. However, according to Border Patrol officials, they do not track UAC costs for general activities (such as overhead) because these costs cannot be easily differentiated from costs for other detainees. For OFO, the project code captures costs incurred specifically for UAC, including personnel overtime, procurements, and other direct costs, such as temporary duty travel for personnel to assist with the UAC increase. In general, according to OFO officials, their project code does not capture UAC operational costs, such as employee salaries and overhead, because OFO cannot easily distinguish these costs from costs for adults and accompanied children. For ICE, the project code captures costs for UAC care, transport, and detention as well as personnel, such as salaries and travel to escort UAC. According to CBP and ICE officials, CBP and ICE personnel are required to use the project codes when UAC costs are easily distinguished from costs for other detainees. However, OFO allows its program managers to decide whether it is practical to use the UAC project code. Therefore, DHS costs charged to the project codes represent the minimum UAC costs to the department from February through September 2014.

HHS Total UAC Costs and Average Daily Cost per Bed in Basic Shelters Have Increased since Fiscal Year 2009

HHS ORR’s costs for its UAC program totaled over $2 billion from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, with about $910 million (45 percent) of the costs incurred during fiscal year 2014. ORR’s UAC program costs consist of three categories: shelter costs, services to UAC, and administrative costs. Shelter costs include care and custody of UAC and account for about 84 percent of total program costs for fiscal years 2009 through 2014. Shelter costs vary by shelter type and location, and UAC length of stay. Services to UAC include medical care, legal services, background checks, and home assessment/post-release services provided by HHS or HHS-contracted organizations, and account for about 12 percent of overall program costs for fiscal years 2009 through 2014. Administrative costs include ORR UAC program staff salaries and benefits, as well as travel and supplies, and account for about 4 percent of overall program costs for fiscal years 2009 through 2014.

ORR’s UAC costs increased about 600 percent from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2014, primarily, because of the increase in the number of UAC apprehended and transferred to ORR shelters. As shown in table 7, total costs steadily increased during fiscal years 2009 through 2013, with a sharper increase of about 142 percent from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2014.

In fiscal years 2012 and 2014, ORR incurred a total of over $260 million in additional costs for temporary shelter beds to accommodate the unexpected increases in UAC.additional shelter grants and memorandums of agreement with Department of Defense facilities. Table 8 shows the total costs for UAC in temporary beds during fiscal years 2012 and 2014.

Conclusions

Every year, DHS apprehends tens of thousands of UAC, some of whom may be vulnerable to trafficking or other forms of abuse. TVPRA requires that DHS establish policies and programs to ensure that UAC in the United States are protected from traffickers and others seeking to victimize or engage such children in harmful activity. Developing and implementing training for OFO officers at airports, who have substantive contact with UAC, could better position those officers to comply with TVPRA requirements. DHS is also responsible for screening UAC and either safely repatriating them or referring them to an HHS shelter. Revising the Form 93 to include indicators or questions for all TVPRA screening criteria that Border Patrol agents and OFO officers are to assess before repatriating a child, and developing written guidance on how they are to implement the trafficking and credible fear criteria, would better ensure that agents and officers have the necessary information to determine outcomes for UAC that are consistent and in accordance with TVPRA requirements and CBP policy. In addition, ensuring that Border Patrol agents consistently document the rationales for their decisions regarding the independent decision and trafficking criteria would allow CBP management to assess on an agency-wide basis whether these decisions, which account for case-by-case factors, were justified and consistent with TVPRA and CBP policy. Determining which agents and officers are required to complete the annual UAC training and ensuring that they have done so, as required, would help CBP to meet training requirements under TVPRA and CBP policies and guidance.

In addition to screening responsibilities, Border Patrol agents and OFO officers are also required under TVPRA, the Flores Agreement, and CBP policy to protect and care for UAC while they are in DHS custody. In doing so, requiring and ensuring that agents and officers routinely record care actions provided to UAC in an automated manner, and accurately record the length of time the children spend in DHS custody, would better enable DHS managers to ensure they are caring for UAC in accordance with the law, including the 72-hour limit for a child to be in DHS custody once determined to be a UAC, except in exceptional circumstances. Furthermore, developing a documented interagency referral and transfer process with defined roles and responsibilities, as well as procedures to disseminate placement decisions, for each agency involved could better enable agencies to find shelters for UAC in an efficient and effective manner, and with minimal errors. Additionally, as DHS revises the local repatriation agreements it has with Mexico that govern the repatriation of UAC, ensuring that the revised agreements reflect all provisions of TVPRA concerning the repatriation process, in consultation with State, could better ensure that Mexican children are repatriated safely.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To better ensure that DHS complies with TVPRA requirements for training, screening, and transferring UAC to HHS, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection to take the following six actions: develop and implement TVPRA training for OFO officers at airports who have substantive contact with UAC; revise the Form 93 to include indicators or questions that agents and officers should ask UAC to better assess (1) a child’s ability to make an independent decision to withdraw his or her application for admission to the United States and (2) credible evidence of the child’s risk of being trafficked if returned to his or her country of nationality or last habitual residence; provide guidance to Border Patrol agents and OFO officers that clarifies how they are to implement the TVPRA requirement to transfer to HHS all Mexican UAC who have fear of returning to Mexico owing to a credible fear of persecution; develop and implement guidance on how Border Patrol agents and OFO officers are to implement the TVPRA requirement to transfer to HHS all Canadian and Mexican UAC who are victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons; ensure that Border Patrol agents document the basis for their decisions when assessing screening criteria related to (1) an unaccompanied alien child’s ability to make an independent decision to withdraw his or her application for admission to the United States, and (2) whether UAC are victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons; and determine which agents and officers who have substantive contact with UAC, complete the annual UAC training, and ensure that they do so, as required.

To help ensure that CBP has complete and reliable data needed to ensure compliance with care requirements under the Flores Agreement and CBP policies, we recommend that the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection take the following two actions: require that OFO officers record care provided to UAC in an automated manner, and ensure that Border Patrol agents record care provided to UAC in Border Patrol’s automated system, as required.

To help ensure that DHS has complete and reliable data needed to ensure compliance with the UAC time-in-custody requirement under TVPRA and for required reports on UAC time in custody under the Flores Agreement, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following two actions: require OFO officers to record data in their automated system when UAC leave OFO custody in order to track the length of time UAC are in OFO custody, and require ICE officers to record accurate and reliable data in their automated system when UAC leave ICE custody in order to track the length of time UAC are in ICE custody.

To increase the efficiency and improve the accuracy of the interagency UAC referral and placement process, we recommend that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services jointly develop and implement a documented interagency process with clearly defined roles and responsibilities, as well as procedures to disseminate placement decisions, for all agencies involved in the referral and placement of UAC in HHS shelters.

To ensure that minimum legislative requirements to protect UAC from severe forms of trafficking in persons are in repatriation agreements with Mexico and are met, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of State, ensure that TVPRA requirements for these agreements are reflected in local repatriation arrangements as DHS renegotiates these arrangements with Mexico.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, HHS, DOJ, and State for their review and comment. DHS and HHS provided formal, written comments, which are reproduced in full in appendixes V and VI, respectively. DHS and HHS also provided technical comments on our draft report, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOJ and State did not have formal comments on our draft report; DOJ provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

DHS concurred with our 12 recommendations and described actions underway or planned to address them. In particular, DHS indicated, among other things, that CBP will develop training on identifying and screening UAC for OFO officers at airports who have substantive contact with UAC, issue guidance to field personnel emphasizing TVPRA transfer procedures for Mexican UAC who have fear of returning to Mexico owing to a credible fear of persecution, and issue guidance clarifying TVPRA transfer procedures for UAC who are nationals or habitual residents of Canada or Mexico who are victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons. In commenting on our draft report, DHS also stated that CBP has established a working group to review and revise elements of the TVPRA-related questions on the Form 93 to better assess a child’s ability to make decisions and the risk of trafficking if the child is returned, as appropriate. DHS also stated that CBP will explore adding a mechanism in its automated system to document an unaccompanied alien child’s ability to make an independent decision to withdraw his or her application for admission to the United States. DHS indicated, among other things, that OFO will work with CBP’s Office of Information and Technology to make technological changes to its automated system to enable it to record appropriate care actions for all UAC and record when UAC enter into, and are transferred from, OFO’s custody. DHS also indicated that ICE plans to develop guidance, including time frames for data entry, on proper UAC book-in and book-out procedures for recording UAC’s time in ICE custody in its automated system. Regarding our recommendation that DHS and HHS jointly develop and implement a documented interagency process for the placement and referral of UAC in HHS shelters, DHS indicated that DHS’s Office of Policy will convene a meeting with appropriate agency officials to initiate a plan for close coordination, and that staff will work toward an institutionalized coordinating framework. Regarding our recommendation that DHS, in coordination with State, ensure that TVPRA requirements are reflected in agreements with the government of Mexico, DHS indicated that the departments have begun negotiations with Mexico on options for including in the arrangements additional and specific references to TVPRA requirements. DHS also noted, and we acknowledge, that the extent to which proposed changes to the agreements are accepted will be dependent on the binational negotiations with Mexico. These and other actions that DHS indicated are planned or under way should help address the intent of our recommendations if implemented effectively.

HHS concurred with our recommendation that DHS and HHS jointly develop and implement a documented interagency process for the placement and referral of UAC in HHS shelters. HHS stated that the department will fully support efforts to document the interagency process used in the UAC referral and placement process.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and State, as well as the Attorney General of the United States. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII.

Appendix I: Eligibility of Unaccompanied Alien Children for Federal Public Benefits

With certain exceptions, unaccompanied alien children (UAC) are generally not eligible to receive federal public benefits because these children lack lawful immigration status in the United States and are not considered qualified aliens. According to the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) officials, UAC cannot receive federal benefits because they do not meet the definition of a qualified alien as defined in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. ORR officials stated that, as a result, UAC in HHS custody are not eligible for the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, supplemental security income, Medicaid, or other federal benefit programs. However, under specific statutory exceptions, applicable to aliens generally, UAC may be eligible for certain federal public benefits regardless of alienage, even though they do not meet the definition of “qualified alien.” The exceptions are as follows: emergency medical assistance, short-term noncash in-kind emergency disaster relief, public health assistance for immunizations and treatment of programs such as soup kitchens that deliver in-kind services at the community level, and

U. S. Department of Agriculture’s school meals programs.

ORR officials stated that after UAC transition out of ORR custody and are placed with sponsors, eligibility for federal benefits would generally depend on whether or not the sponsors pursue immigration status on behalf of the UAC. benefits provided to children after they leave ORR custody.

If ORR is unable to locate sponsors for UAC, the UAC remain in ORR shelters until they turn 18 years of age and are then treated as adult aliens.

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to determine the (1) extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has developed and implemented policies and procedures to ensure that all unaccompanied alien children (UAC) are screened as required and (2) DHS and the Department of State (State) developed and implemented policies and procedures to ensure that UAC are cared for as required while in DHS custody and during repatriation; and (3) costs associated with apprehending, transporting, and caring for UAC in DHS and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) custody during fiscal years 2009 through 2014.

To determine the extent to which DHS developed and implemented policies and procedures to ensure that all UAC are screened as required, we reviewed U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) policies, procedures, and training to screen UAC, including the March 2009 memorandum Implementation of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), the CBP Form 93 UAC Screening Addendum—the primary tool Border Patrol agents and Office of Field Operations (OFO) officers use to make trafficking and credible fear determinations, and document screening assessments—and CBP’s human trafficking and UAC virtual learning course. Our scope did not include the screening of UAC apprehended by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) because ICE does not conduct TVPRA screenings. We obtained available fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2014 Border Patrol and OFO data on the percentage of agents and officers who completed the annual UAC training. On the basis of interviews with CBP officials and written responses these officials provided to explain how they document completion of UAC training, we determined that the data were not sufficiently reliable to report training completion rates. We assessed CBP training efforts against TVPRA training requirements and training best practices. We also analyzed fiscal year 2009 through 2014 Border Patrol and fiscal year 2012 through 2014 OFO UAC apprehension data—the most recent years for which complete UAC data were available—to determine the outcome of the screening process for UAC from Canada and Mexico, as well as UAC from other countries. In addition, we obtained and analyzed Border Patrol data on UAC who claimed fear of return to their country for fiscal year 2014, the most recent year for which data were available. Further, we analyzed Border Patrol’s, OFO’s, and ICE’s fiscal years 2009 through 2014 apprehension data to determine whether DHS transferred UAC to an HHS shelter or repatriated them, as well as demographic trends, such as the age, gender, and country of origin of UAC.reliability of the data by (1) reviewing related documentation, such as data fields, the database schema, and database training materials; (2) interviewing CBP officials responsible for ensuring data quality; (3) reviewing the data for missing data or obvious errors; (4) comparing selected data fields with information from UAC case files and HHS data; and (5) tracing certain data fields to source documents. During our We assessed the assessment, we found some inconsistencies in the disposition, or outcome, data field when conducting internal checks of the data. We rounded this information to the nearest hundred for reporting purposes. We found Border Patrol and OFO’s apprehension data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining whether CBP transferred UAC to an HHS shelter or repatriated them to their countries of nationality or last habitual residence. We also found the DHS apprehension data to be sufficiently reliable for the purpose of reporting UAC demographic trends, such as age, gender, and country of nationality.

Further, we reviewed 21 OFO and 20 Border Patrol nongeneralizable, randomly selected cases of non-Canadian and non-Mexican UAC apprehended at land borders and ports of entry (POE) during fiscal year 2014 that CBP databases indicated were repatriated to determine if the disposition for each child was correct.

Because neither Border Patrol nor OFO has complete information on screening decisions in its database stored in an aggregate manner, we analyzed fiscal year 2014 case files of Mexican UAC Border Patrol apprehended. We selected this population because Mexican UAC apprehended by Border Patrol account for 90 percent of the Canadian and Mexican UAC whom CBP apprehended that year. Specifically, we drew a stratified random sample of 180 Mexican UAC from a study population of 15,531 Mexican UAC who were recorded in Border Patrol’s database as having been apprehended in fiscal year 2014. We selected these 180 UAC with probabilities proportionate to the number of Mexican UAC from two strata defined by the outcome of the UAC screening process—repatriation to Mexico or transfer to an HHS shelter. With this random sample, each member of the study population had a nonzero probability of being included, and that probability could be computed for any unaccompanied alien child. The sample size for the stratum of UAC that Border Patrol repatriated to Mexico was 97 out of the 14,931 that the Border Patrol database show were repatriated in fiscal year 2014. The sample size for the stratum of UAC that Border Patrol transferred to HHS was 84 of the 600 Mexican UAC who Border Patrol’s database showed were transferred to HHS that year. In reviewing the case file information for these UAC, we found that the outcome listed for one child did not match the outcome information in the CBP database, and we excluded that case. As a result, the sample for the stratum of UAC that Border Patrol transferred to HHS decreased from 84 to 83 cases. We analyzed case file information, including CBP Form 93s to determine if CBP screening complies with relevant TVPRA requirements and CBP policies and procedures. Because we followed a probability procedure based on random selections, our sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have drawn. Since each sample could have provided different estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample’s results as a 95 percent confidence interval. This is the interval that would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. All percentage estimates from the case file review have margins of error at the 95 percent confidence level of plus or minus 10 percentage points or less. All numerical estimates other than percentages in this report are presented along with their margins of error at the 95 percent confidence level.

Further, we visited 11 Border Patrol facilities and four land POEs for a total of 15 CBP facilities in three regions—Arizona (July 2014), south Texas (September 2014), and southern California (October 2014)—to, among other things, observe DHS screening operations and interview Border Patrol agents, OFO officers, and Mexican consular officials regarding implementation of UAC screening policies and procedures. We selected Arizona and south Texas because they have historically had the most UAC apprehensions by Border Patrol, while southern California has had the most UAC encounters by OFO. The locations were also chosen for geographic variability. During our visit to south Texas, we observed the screening of 8 UAC by Border Patrol agents. The results from our visits to these three regions cannot be generalized; however, the visits provided us with first-hand observations on UAC screening practices, and insights regarding how Border Patrol agents and OFO officers implement screening policies and procedures. In addition, we interviewed headquarters Border Patrol, OFO, and Office of Training and Development officials to discuss CBP’s UAC screening policies, procedures, and training. We compared CBP’s UAC screening efforts discussed during these visits and interviews and the screening information obtained from our analyses of CBP information with TVPRA screening requirements and CBP policy, as well as standards in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.

In addition, we reviewed studies on the screening of Mexican UAC completed by the nongovernmental organization Appleseed in 2011 and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in June 2014. Our analysis included reviewing the reports’ methodologies and discussing the reports with both the organizations, as well as with CBP. Further, we reviewed a September 2010 DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) report on the treatment of UAC in CBP custody, which discussed CBP’s UAC training efforts. Our analysis included reviewing the report’s methodology. We also met with the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties officials who conducted visits to south Texas CBP facilities in July 2014 to investigate civil rights complaints submitted by UAC and discussed their methodology and findings regarding the screening of UAC. As a result of our review and analysis, we determined that the conclusions in these studies and their results were valid and reasonable for use in our report.

To determine the extent to which DHS and State developed and implemented policies and procedures to ensure that UAC are cared for as required while in DHS custody and during repatriation, we reviewed CBP and ICE policies and procedures on how to care for UAC, which included the March 2009 memorandum Implementation of the TVPRA, Border Patrol’s June 2008 Hold Rooms and Short Term Custody memorandum, and the August 2008 OFO Directive, Secure Detention, Transport, and Escort Procedures. We also evaluated ICE policies, such as ICE Directive 11087.1, Operations of Holding Facilities, September 2014, among others. We compared these against TVPRA and Flores Agreement requirements related to care. Further, we reviewed DHS UAC training documents, including CBP’s human trafficking virtual learning course and ICE’s UAC and Field Office Juvenile Coordination training. In addition, we reviewed September 2005 and September 2010 DHS Office of Inspector General reports on DHS’s responsibilities for juveniles and the treatment of UAC in CBP custody respectively, which discussed DHS and CBP’s care of UAC.

During our site visits to Arizona, southern California, and south Texas, we observed the care of UAC at 15 CBP facilities and discussed care of UAC with officials at each facility. The results from our visits are specific to the care observed at facilities in these three regions at a specific point in time and cannot be generalized; however, the visits provided us with first-hand observations of the care provided to UAC and the conditions of facilities in which UAC are held during various operating conditions, including surge and normal operations. To ensure that we observed and discussed care systematically at each facility, we developed a care checklist with the eight elements of care required by Border Patrol and OFO policy as well as three additional elements required only by Border Patrol policy. We evaluated these elements of care at each facility we visited based on the totality of our observations and interviews. For example, we observed and discussed with relevant officials the presence or absence of elements, such as access to drinking water, food, toilets, and sinks. On the basis of our observations and interviews, we determined that CBP had implemented its care policies at these facilities if at least 80 percent of the facilities we visited were generally providing care consistent with policy requirements at the time of our visits. However, to assess CBP implementation of the requirement that UAC be “held in the least restrictive setting appropriate for their age and special needs,” we evaluated our observations and interviews to determine whether there was (1) no less restrictive environment available, and if there was a less restrictive environment, why the child was not placed in the least restrictive setting and (2) evidence that agents and officers considered requisite factors, including the child’s age, special needs, and particular vulnerability as a minor. However, we did not discuss every element at each facility we visited in Arizona because we developed the checklist after the visit to Arizona.

We analyzed several data sets of information on DHS’s care of UAC. OFO and ICE do not collect data on the care of UAC in their custody in an accessible format, so we analyzed only Border Patrol data on the care of UAC in Border Patrol custody. We examined the Border Patrol policy on documentation of care, OBP 50/10.9-C Use of the e3 Juvenile Detention Module, April 2012, which requires agents to document all care of UAC in their automated system, the e3 Detention Module. Border Patrol officials told us they could not provide us with complete care data prior to fiscal year 2014 because they did not fully implement their data system until then. We analyzed data on the care of 55,905 UAC in Border Patrol custody from January through September 2014. To assess the reliability of these data, we interviewed Border Patrol officials in headquarters and in Arizona, Texas, and California, who are responsible for managing or entering the data, and examined the data for completeness and potential errors. Because our initial analysis of the data showed potential errors, and because Border Patrol officials told us that they were unsure about the consistency with which agents in the field used Border Patrol’s automated system, we determined that the Border Patrol custody data were not sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining if Border Patrol agents cared for UAC as required. However, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining how consistently agents used the automated system to document care of UAC and the frequency and type of potential errors, if any, in the data. To determine how consistently agents entered care information into Border Patrol’s automated system, we analyzed the completeness of the custody data by cross-checking the data with Border Patrol apprehension data from January through September 2014. We measured if, and how often, meals and welfare checks were entered for each child in custody. We used meals and welfare checks because both actions are required by policy for all UAC in custody, and must be performed at frequent enough intervals that agents should perform each action at least once for every child in custody, according to policy. We also analyzed how frequently agents used each care action that is available in the system. We also interviewed Border Patrol officials in Arizona, Texas, and California on their use of the automated system.

In our initial data analysis, we found that agents were entering the same care action multiple times in a short time period. Therefore, in our full data analysis, we measured the frequency of these potential errors in the data by measuring how often a care action was entered more than once within a short time period. When agents entered an action more than once, they did not record them simultaneously, and so we did not identify these actions as duplicates and definite errors. However, these actions, such as meals, phone calls, or showers, were unlikely to have taken place more than once in a short time period. Therefore, we measured the frequency with which actions were entered within three time intervals: 10 minutes, 5 minutes, and 2 minutes. We selected these intervals because, while it is possible that an action could, on occasion, be performed more than once within a 10-minute period, it is unlikely that any of the actions would be performed more than once within a 2-minute interval. Thus, the 2-minute interval most strongly suggests error. However, because the volume of likely errors made it prohibitive for us to verify if each likely error was in fact an error, our analysis identifies those actions that we determined to be likely errors. We also interviewed Border Patrol officials in Texas, California, and headquarters to understand why these likely errors may be occurring. We compared these care efforts against the Flores Agreement, DHS policies, and standards in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.

With regard to time in custody, Border Patrol provided us with the dates and times that UAC were booked in to Border Patrol custody for UAC in custody from January 2014 through September 2014, which also contained information on book outs and transfers. OFO provided us with the dates and times that UAC were booked in and ICE provided book in dates, but neither DHS component was able to provide the dates and times that UAC were booked out. Additionally, we examined documentation about system requirements regarding time in custody for all components, and interviewed Border Patrol, OFO, and ICE officials about the reliability of the time-in-custody fields in their systems. On the basis of our analysis of Border Patrol data, and interviews with Border Patrol officials, we found Border Patrol time-in-custody data to be reliable. On the basis of interviews with OFO and ICE officials, we found the OFO and ICE time-in-custody data to be unreliable. As a result, we could not report the time UAC spent in DHS custody.

We also reviewed reports listing the UAC that were in DHS custody longer than the statutorily required 72 hours, which ICE compiles and submits to the Department of Justice every 6 months to be submitted to plaintiffs’ counsel as required by the Flores v. Reno Stipulated Settlement Agreement. Our analysis of the reports from 2009 to 2013 showed missing fields, dates that indicated children were in custody for less than 72 hours, and apprehension dates that occurred after the transfer to HHS’s Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Additionally, for UAC apprehended by Border Patrol, we compared the dates of apprehension documented in the reports with Border Patrol’s apprehension data and found that many of the apprehension dates were entered incorrectly by ICE in the reports. We also interviewed ICE officials in headquarters and the field about the reports, and officials at the Department of Justice who receive the reports. According to our analysis and our interviews, we found the reports unreliable for determining the number of UAC that were in DHS custody for longer than 72 hours. We compared these efforts against the TVPRA requirement for transferring UAC and standards in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.

To determine the effectiveness of the process to transfer UAC from DHS to HHS, we examined e-mails between ORR intake and Border Patrol in the Rio Grande Valley sector to place UAC in shelters. We analyzed 111 e-mails to place 593 UAC from July 6 to 8, 2014, and 65 e-mails to place 135 UAC from November 17 to 19, 2014. We chose these dates so we could analyze communications during the surge of UAC (in July) and after the surge of UAC (November), and we chose the Rio Grande Valley sector because (1) over 70 percent of all UAC apprehended by Border Patrol in fiscal year 2014 were apprehended in that sector, and (2) Rio Grande Valley officials had an in-box e-mail account set up for ORR placement e-mails that allowed the officials to easily extract them. We analyzed the e-mails for cancellations, redesignations, and multiple placements and, on the basis of the rationales in the e-mails, identified and categorized the reasons for cancellations, redesignations and multiple placements. Our conclusions are not generalizable but provide important insight into the placement process.

We observed and discussed the interagency transfer process in Arizona, Texas, and California, and interviewed DHS Policy, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Border Patrol, OFO, ICE, and ORR officials in headquarters about the interagency process. In addition, we reviewed September 2005 and September 2010 DHS OIG reports on DHS’s responsibilities for juveniles and the treatment of UAC in CBP custody respectively, which discussed roles and responsibilities for UAC within DHS, and the interagency process to transfer UAC to HHS. Our analysis included reviewing the reports’ methodologies. We also reviewed a 2008 HHS OIG report on ORR’s efforts that discussed interagency coordination with DHS for UAC and reviewed the report’s methodology. Additionally, we analyzed plans developed by DHS to respond to a UAC influx, which included provisions for interagency coordination, such as an interim 2015 concept of operations developed for internal use by DHS. We also reviewed an emergency response plan created by the Unified Coordination Group, which includes both DHS and HHS. We compared these efforts at interagency coordination, and information contained in the IG reports about the prior efforts to coordinate, against best practices and We also visited two HHS mechanisms for interagency collaboration.shelters in Arizona and spoke with grantees and shelter employees at these sites to better understand the transfer process.

To understand the repatriation process, we interviewed Border Patrol, OFO, and Mexican consular officials in Arizona, Texas, and California, as well as DHS policy and ICE officials in Washington and officials from the Department of State’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. We also analyzed all 30 DHS-negotiated local repatriation arrangements and the 2004 memorandum of understanding between DHS and Mexico regarding the repatriation of Mexican nationals. We compared provisions for UAC in the arrangements with TVPRA requirements for the content of agreements with contiguous countries regarding the repatriation of UAC. Where there were not provisions in the arrangements specific to UAC, but were provisions that would reasonably apply to UAC, we evaluated the more general provisions against these TVPRA requirements; for example, provisions that applied to all aliens being repatriated.

To identify costs associated with apprehending, transporting, and caring for UAC in DHS custody, we obtained and analyzed financial data from CBP and ICE for fiscal year 2014. Because CBP and ICE did not collect data on UAC costs prior to fiscal year 2014, we analyzed available financial data collected using UAC project codes from February through To determine the September 2014 to determine DHS’s UAC costs.extent to which UAC costs were identified, we reviewed policies and procedures for tracking UAC costs and interviewed CBP and ICE officials. Additionally, we analyzed UAC transportation cost estimates developed by ICE to determine the estimated UAC transportation costs from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. These estimates were derived by ICE using fiscal year 2013 average costs and applied throughout fiscal years 2009 through 2013, adjusting for average annual inflation. We assessed the reliability of the cost data by (1) reviewing related documentation, such as financial statement audits and prior GAO work; (2) interviewing CBP and ICE officials responsible for ensuring cost data quality; and (3) looking for missing cost items or obvious errors. We determined that CBP’s and ICE’s financial project code costs were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining a minimum UAC cost for apprehending, transporting and caring for UAC while in DHS custody. We also determined that ICE’s transport cost data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining an estimate of ICE’s UAC transport costs for fiscal years 2009 through 2013.

To identify costs associated with UAC in HHS custody, we obtained and analyzed financial summary data for HHS ORR’s UAC program. Specifically, we analyzed UAC program cost data reported by ORR as of April 23, 2015—the most recent data available—to determine the total shelter, administrative, and UAC services costs. These data include summary information on end-of-year obligations by cost category compiled by ORR for fiscal years 2009 through 2014. We assessed the reliability of the data by (1) reviewing related documentation, such as prior GAO work; (2) comparing data against data in published sources, such as ORR’s Annual Report to Congress; and (3) interviewing ORR officials knowledgeable about the data. We asked the officials about the reliability of their data—including questions about the purpose for which the data were collected, the source of the data, and how the data were compiled. We determined that ORR’s financial summary data for its UAC program were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting total program costs based on end-of-year obligations.

To determine the average cost per bed for basic shelters, we analyzed cost data for fiscal years 2009 through 2014 for UAC shelters by type of shelter, which was compiled by ORR and reported as of April 23, 2015— the most recent data available. We also analyzed the average monthly funded bed capacity for basic shelters reported by ORR as of April 7, 2015—the most recent data available. Since bed capacity fluctuates throughout the year, we averaged the average monthly funded bed capacity data to determine the average annual number of beds. We then calculated the average annual cost per bed for basic shelters by dividing the shelter costs by the average annual number of beds for basic shelters. For the average daily costs, we divided the average annual cost per bed by 365 days. According to ORR officials, actual cost per bed varies based on shelter type, location, actual number of beds, and actual number of days for which beds were contracted. We assessed the reliability of the data by (1) reviewing related documentation, such as prior GAO work; (2) comparing data against data in published sources, such as ORR’s Annual Report to Congress; and (3) interviewing ORR officials who were knowledgeable about the data. We asked them data reliability questions, including questions about the purpose for which the data were collected, the source of the data, and how the data were compiled. We determined that ORR’s shelter costs and average monthly funded bed capacity data for basic shelters were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting the average cost per bed for basic shelters. On the basis of information provided by HHS, we are unable to report on the average cost per bed for secure and therapeutic shelters because the annual cost and bed capacity data were not comparable across these shelter types. As a result, we focused on average cost per bed in basic shelters.

In addition to analyzing UAC costs for DHS and HHS, we analyzed grant funding documentation for 5 of HHS ORR’s 34 UAC shelter grantees for fiscal year 2013. We selected the 5 grantees to reflect a variety of shelters based on the number of beds, dollar amount of the grant, type of shelter, and geographic location. We analyzed the federal financial report (White House Office of Management and Budget Standard Form 425) filed at the end of fiscal year 2013 for each grant to determine the total amount authorized and expended for each grantee. Further, we analyzed each grantee’s funding application (White House Office of Management and Budget Standard Forms 424 and 424A) to determine the budgeted costs for each cost category. In some cases, a grantee may have had multiple grants or multiple funding requests within a single grant, which we included in our analysis. Additionally, we obtained data, reported by ORR as of April 7, 2015—the most recent data available—for the total number of beds by shelter type for fiscal year 2013 for each of the 5 grantees. We assessed the reliability of the data by comparing the data with shelter types identified in source documentation and interviewing ORR officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining the maximum funded bed capacity for each sampled grantee.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2014 to July 2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix III: Summary Statistics for Unaccompanied Alien Children Apprehended by the Department of Homeland Security during Fiscal Years 2009 through 2014

Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) U.S. Border Patrol and Office of Field Operations (OFO), and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) apprehend, process, detain, and temporarily care for unaccompanied alien children (UAC)—individuals less than 18 years old with no lawful immigration status and no parent or legal guardian in the United States available to provide care and physical custody. Border Patrol apprehends UAC at U.S. borders between ports of entry (POE) and OFO apprehends UAC at POEs. ICE apprehends UAC within the Border Patrol United States at locations other than borders or POEs.accounted for 186,233 (about 90 percent) of DHS’s UAC apprehensions during fiscal years 2009 through 2014, and Border Patrol apprehended over 75 percent of these UAC in two sectors—about 52 percent in Rio Grande Valley, Texas, and about 25 percent in Tucson, Arizona. Figure 8 shows the number of UAC apprehensions by Border Patrol on a year-by- year basis in its Rio Grande Valley and Tucson sectors and all other sectors for fiscal years 2009 through 2014. Figure 8 also illustrates that the Rio Grande Valley’s share of all Border Patrol apprehensions continually increased and accounted for most of the increase in Border Patrol apprehensions in the past 6 years.

OFO has apprehended fewer UAC than Border Patrol during fiscal years 2012 through 2014, and about one-third of OFO’s apprehensions occurred in its San Diego, California, field office, which includes the San As shown in figure 9, the number of UAC Ysidro and Otay Mesa POEs.apprehensions in the Tucson, Arizona, and Laredo, Texas, field offices continually increased each year from fiscal year 2012 through 2014.

As shown in table 10, most of the increase in DHS apprehensions of UAC from fiscal year 2009 through 2014 has come from three Central American countries: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. UAC from Mexico continued to account for a significant number of apprehensions— between 12,000 and 19,000 a year—during this 6-year time period. However, starting in fiscal year 2013, the total number of UAC from these three Central American countries surpassed the number of UAC from Mexico and, in fiscal year 2014, far surpassed the number of UAC from Mexico.

During fiscal years 2009 through 2014, UAC from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador whom DHS apprehended were generally younger than UAC from Mexico. Specifically, as shown in figure 10, over 25 percent of UAC from Honduras and El Salvador, and 12 percent of UAC from Guatemala, were younger than 14 years old compared with 8 percent for UAC from Mexico.

Further, the percentage of younger UAC whom DHS apprehended has increased in numbers and as a percentage of total apprehensions since fiscal year 2009. For example, figure 11 shows that the percentage of apprehended UAC under the age of 14 increased from 11 percent in fiscal year 2009 to 23 percent in fiscal year 2014.

In addition, the composition of UAC males and females changed during fiscal years 2012 through 2014. Specifically, as shown in figure 12, the percentage of male UAC decreased from 82 percent in fiscal year 2012 to 70 percent in fiscal year 2014, while the percentage of female UAC apprehended by DHS increased from 18 percent in fiscal year 2011 to 30 percent in fiscal year 2014.

Appendix IV: Costs for Unaccompanied Alien Children at Five Shelter Grantees

In addition to analyzing costs associated with apprehending and caring for unaccompanied alien children (UAC) for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), we analyzed financial records for 5 of HHS’s Office of Refugee Resettlement’s (ORR) 34 UAC shelter grantees for fiscal year 2013. We selected the 5 grantees to reflect a variety of shelters based on the number of beds, dollar amount of the grant, type of shelter, and Types of shelter costs include administrative; geographic location.shelter personnel salaries, benefits, training and travel; operational expenses, such as building maintenance and utilities; and services and supplies provided to UAC, such as food, clothing, first aid, and education. Additionally, some grantees incur costs associated with foster care, such as foster parent reimbursements and training.

Table 11 shows budgeted costs by cost category for each of the 5 sampled grantees as well as consolidated actual costs based on each grantee’s year-end financial status reports. As shown in the table, total budgeted and actual costs varied among the 5 grantees from about $3 million to about $86 million for fiscal year 2013. Labor costs (personnel salaries and fringe benefits) for each grantee accounted for 58 to 66 percent of overall budgeted costs, and supplies such as clothing, household, and educational materials accounted for 2 to 8 percent of overall budgeted costs.

During fiscal year 2013, there were three “mega grantees” that operated shelters in multiple states and had more than one type of shelter, whereas other grantees operated only one type of shelter. As shown in table 12, the number of beds per grantee varied from 30 to over 1,400 in our sample. Shelter locations in our sample also varied from the larger “mega grantees” concentrated in the southwest and Illinois to smaller grantees in New York and Virginia.

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet (Assistant Director); Tracy Abdo; Katherine Blair; Chuck Bausell, Jr.; Frances Cook; Joseph E. Dewechter; Michele Fejfar; Eric Hauswirth; Paul Hobart; Susan Hsu; Catherine Hurley; Connor Kincaid; Sasan J. Najmi; and Janet Temko-Blinder made key contributions to this report.