Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions
Released: 1995-01-31T00:00:00

Letter

Introduction

In light of the significant changes in the international security environment resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and declining resources available for defense needs, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been reexamining U.S. defense strategy, force levels, and budgetary requirements for the post-Cold War era. In 1990, the President presented a defense plan reflecting a shift in U.S. strategy from preparing for a global war in Europe against the Soviet Union to preparing for major regional conflicts against uncertain adversaries. This plan proposed a significantly reduced force structure, or base force, but retained sufficient forces to counter a possible reemergence of the Soviet threat.

Following the change in administrations in 1993, the new Secretary of Defense reassessed U.S. defense requirements in an effort referred to as DOD’s bottom-up review. This review, completed in October 1993, examined the nation’s defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, foundations, and resources needed for the post-Cold War era. As a result of the bottom-up review, DOD continued to focus U.S. strategy on regional threats; however, it de-emphasized the possibility of a reemerging Soviet threat and reduced U.S. forces to levels smaller than the base force. According to DOD officials, the Secretary of Defense called for the bottom-up review to be completed in time to be considered in developing DOD’s fiscal year 1995 budget and Future Years Defense Program. Therefore, the review was completed in about 7 months. In the Report on the Bottom-Up Review, DOD stated that much more work had to be done.

The Bottom-Up Review Outlined a Defense Strategy and New Dangers in the Post-Cold War Era

According to DOD’s bottom-up review, the United States must pursue an overall defense strategy characterized by continued political, economic, and military engagement internationally. This strategy of engagement advocates (1) preventing the emergence of threats to U.S. interests by promoting democracy, economic growth, free markets, human dignity, and the peaceful resolution of conflict and (2) pursuing international partnerships for freedom, prosperity, and peace.

The bottom-up review outlined the new dangers facing U.S. interests in the post-Cold War era and a specific strategy for dealing with each one. These dangers included (1) the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; (2) regional dangers, posed primarily by the threat of large-scale aggression by major regional powers with opposing interests; (3) dangers to democracy and reform in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere; and (4) economic dangers to national security.

In the Report on the Bottom-Up Review, the Secretary of Defense cited regional aggression as chief among the new dangers. To deal with regional aggression and other regional dangers, DOD’s strategy is to (1) defeat aggressors in major regional conflicts; (2) maintain a presence overseas—the need for U.S. forces to conduct normal peacetime operations in critical regions—to deter conflicts and provide regional stability; and (3) conduct smaller-scale intervention operations, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.

DOD Judged That the United States Must Be Capable of Winning Two Nearly Simultaneous Regional Conflicts

To deal with the threat of regional aggression, DOD judged that it is prudent for the United States to maintain sufficient military power to be able to fight and win two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously. The bottom-up review determined the specific forces, capabilities, and improvements in capabilities for executing the two-conflict strategy. In reaching its conclusions, DOD examined various strategy and force options for major regional conflicts, as shown in table 1.1.

For assessment purposes, DOD focused on two specific scenarios involving regional aggression. In evaluating the strategy and force options, DOD also considered requirements for conducting (1) peace enforcement or intervention operations in smaller-scale conflicts or crises, (2) overseas presence, and (3) deterrence of attacks with weapons of mass destruction.

DOD, for various reasons, chose the strategy of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts and related forces with enhancements—the third option shown in table 1.1. For example, DOD believed that this option would possibly deter a second regional aggressor from attacking its neighbors while the United States was responding to another regional conflict. In addition, fielding forces sufficient to win two wars nearly simultaneously would provide a hedge against the possibility that a future adversary might one day confront the United States with a larger-than-expected threat.

Finally, DOD believed that this strategy option, forces, and enhancements were affordable within expected budget constraints. According to its Report on the Bottom-Up Review, DOD also estimated the cost of the bottom-up review program and matched it against the President’s objective for reducing the defense budget. DOD estimated that the program would achieve $91 billion in total savings and that additional savings would be identified during DOD’s normal program and budget review. DOD estimated that the projected force would be available by fiscal year 1999. DOD used the results of the bottom-up review to develop its fiscal year 1995 budget and Future Years Defense Program.

DOD Made Several Key Assumptions About Its Chosen Force Option

In concluding that the forces selected for the third option could implement its strategy, DOD made several key assumptions about the forces’ deployability and capabilities, including that forces involved in other operations, such as peacekeeping, would be redeployed to a regional conflict; certain specialized units or unique assets would be shifted from one sufficient strategic lift assets and support forces would be available;

Army National Guard enhanced combat brigades could be deployed within 90 days of being called to active duty to supplement active combat units; and a series of enhancements, such as improvements to strategic mobility and U.S. fire power, were critical to implementing the two-conflict strategy and would be available by about 2000.

The specific enhancements included improving (1) strategic mobility, through more prepositioning and enhancements to airlift and sealift; (2) the strike capabilities of aircraft carriers; (3) the lethality of Army firepower; and (4) the ability of long-range bombers to deliver conventional precision-guided munitions. Completing these enhancements, according to DOD, would both reduce overall ground force requirements and increase the responsiveness and effectiveness of its power projection forces.

In most cases, the projected enhancements involved ongoing programs to upgrade existing capabilities. For example, the bottom-up review cited the need for additional airlift and sealift assets to improve strategic mobility. DOD had previously identified this need in its 1991 mobility requirements study and had already programmed funds to procure some of the specific assets.

The Secretary of Defense’s Planning Guidance Implemented DOD’s Bottom-Up Review Conclusions

According to the Secretary of Defense, the bottom-up review was a comprehensive reassessment that set the framework for defense planning for the next 5 years and beyond. In September 1993 and May 1994, the Secretary issued his defense planning guidance for fiscal years 1995 to 1999 and fiscal years 1996 to 2001, respectively. This guidance formally directed the military services and defense agencies to implement the bottom-up review’s conclusions.

The May 1994 guidance included an illustrative planning scenario reflecting DOD’s concept of how the United States would respond to two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously. Among other things, the scenario detailed the amount of time between the outbreak of hostilities in both conflicts, number and types of forces deployed to each conflict, timing of deployments, and projected time for completing various combat phases. DOD directed military planners to use this scenario, along with other guidelines in the September and May guidance, in developing program and budget requirements for DOD’s selected strategy and forces.

The Congress Is Requiring DOD to Reexamine the Bottom-Up Review

In considering DOD’s portion of the President’s budget for fiscal year 1995, Members of the Congress raised questions about the bottom-up review, including the accuracy of its assumptions and affordability of its projected force. As a result, in the Fiscal Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act, the Congress is requiring the Secretary of Defense to review the assumptions and conclusions of the President’s budget, the bottom-up review, and the Future Years Defense Program. The Secretary is required to submit a report on the results of its review to the President and the Congress in May 1995. Among other things, this report must describe the force structure required to execute DOD’s two-conflict strategy in light of other ongoing or potential operations and may also address possible adjustments to the strategy.

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

We examined DOD’s bottom-up review assumptions about key aspects of the two-conflict strategy to determine whether they reasonably supported DOD’s conclusion that the projected force, with enhancements, can execute the strategy. In conducting our assessment, we did not examine DOD’s rationale for selecting the two-conflict strategy, the capabilities of potential regional aggressors, and the extent to which allied support could reduce the need for U.S. forces.

To determine DOD’s assumptions and conclusions about executing the two-conflict strategy, we interviewed knowledgeable officials involved in the bottom-up review at the offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Resources, and Requirements; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps headquarters.

We also reviewed relevant documentation, including the final report on the bottom-up review and the Secretary of Defense’s planning guidance, and received briefings on regional dangers from DOD officials. We did not examine DOD’s rationale for selecting the two-conflict strategy; rather, we focused on examining DOD’s assumptions on key aspects of the strategy. DOD denied us access to specific information on the inputs and results of its analysis of force options. However, we obtained considerable information on DOD’s analysis through interviewing knowledgeable officials and reviewing available documentation.

To analyze whether DOD’s assumptions reasonably supported DOD’s conclusion that the projected force, with enhancements, can execute the two-conflict strategy, we interviewed officials at the headquarters of the four military services, the U.S. Army Forces Command, the U.S. Transportation Command, the Air Combat Command, the Army National Guard Bureau, and the U.S. Army Reserve Command. We also reviewed relevant documentation on (1) the use of U.S. forces engaged in peacekeeping operations, (2) Army support capability, (3) training of Army National Guard enhanced combat brigades, and (4) DOD plans for improving strategic mobility and the lethality of U.S. firepower.

We interviewed officials at two war-fighting commands to obtain their views on DOD’s assumptions in the bottom-up review, the feasibility of conducting the two-conflict strategy, and the defense planning guidance implementing the bottom-up review’s findings.

We conducted our review from October 1993 to October 1994 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

DOD Did Not Fully Analyze Key Bottom-Up Review Assumptions

Under the bottom-up review’s two-conflict strategy, military planners, for the first time, are required to plan to deploy forces to respond to two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts. However, in doing the review, DOD did not fully analyze its assumptions regarding key aspects of the strategy, such as the ability of forces to redeploy from other operations to regional conflicts or between conflicts, availability of strategic lift and support forces, and deployability of Army National Guard combat brigades.

Furthermore, we question some of DOD’s assumptions. For example, certain support forces needed in the early stages of a regional conflict could not immediately redeploy from peace operations because they would be needed to assist in redeploying other forces. The Army currently lacks sufficient numbers of certain support forces for a single conflict, and National Guard combat brigades are experiencing difficulty meeting peacetime training requirements that are critical to ensuring timely deployment in wartime. Finally, some enhancements may not be available as planned.

The Two-Conflict Strategy Changed the Basis of Military Planning for Responding to Regional Conflicts

The bottom-up review’s strategy of maintaining the capability to fight and win nearly simultaneous conflicts changed the basis for U.S. military planning. Specifically, the base force was required to be capable of conducting a decisive offense in response to one conflict and still be capable of mounting a credible defense against an aggressor in another region before the first crisis ended. As a result, war-fighting commanders prepared operational plans for regional conflicts with the assumption that no other conflict was ongoing or would occur after their conflict began. They therefore assumed that combat and support forces, strategic mobility assets, and other capabilities required to execute their plan would be available.

The bottom-up review’s strategy envisions that U.S. forces could be engaged in offensive operations in two conflicts nearly simultaneously. This strategy requires DOD to meet the requirements of two war-fighting commanders at the same time. DOD officials stated that extensive analysis, beyond that conducted during the bottom-up review, is required to consider the implications of responding to two nearly simultaneous conflicts. Since the bottom-up review, DOD has begun additional analyses.

Forces Involved in Other Operations May Not Be Immediately Available for a Regional Conflict

According to the bottom-up review, if a major regional conflict occurs, DOD will deploy a substantial portion of its forces stationed in the United States and draw on forces assigned to overseas presence missions. If DOD believes it is prudent to do so, it will keep forces engaged in smaller-scale operations, such as peacekeeping, while responding to a single conflict. If a second conflict breaks out, DOD would need to deploy another block of forces, requiring a further reallocation of overseas presence forces, any forces still engaged in smaller-scale operations, and most of the remaining U.S.-based forces.

In determining force requirements for the two-conflict strategy, DOD assumed that forces already engaged in other operations could redeploy to a regional conflict. However, DOD did not analyze the feasibility of or requirements for such a redeployment during the bottom-up review. For example, DOD did not consider (1) requirements for readiness upgrades for forces before redeployment, (2) requirements for diverting airlift and sealift assets to pick up personnel and equipment from the operation, and (3) the impact on the war-fighting commander involved in a regional conflict if combat and support forces engaged in other operations were not immediately available.

DOD did not begin to analyze its assumption on redeploying forces from operations other than war until after completing the bottom-up review. In June 1994, the Army initiated a study of the impact of peace operations on Army requirements, including the implications of redeploying combat and support forces from such operations to regional conflicts. The Army does not expect to complete this analysis until early to mid-1995.

Our work on the impact of peace operations on U.S. forces suggests that it would be difficult for certain support and combat forces to disengage and quickly redeploy to a major regional conflict. For example, certain Army support forces and specialized Air Force combat aircraft, such as the F-4G and F-15E, deployed to peace operations are the same forces needed in the early stages of a regional conflict. However, some support forces, such as transportation units that move personnel and cargo through ports, could not immediately redeploy because they would be needed to assist in redeploying other forces. Furthermore, while Air Force aircraft and aircrews could easily fly from the peace operation to a regional conflict, the maintenance and logistics support needed to keep the aircraft flying—supplies, equipment, and personnel—would have to wait for available airlift. Obtaining sufficient airlift to redeploy forces from a peace operation would be challenging because already limited airlift assets committed to deploying forces to the regional conflict would have to be diverted to pick up these forces.

Finally, forces may need to upgrade their training, equipment, and supplies before redeploying. For example, according to Air Force officials, peace operations tend to degrade the overall combat readiness of Air Force flight crews. Similarly, naval aviators also find that they lose proficiency in some combat skills through prolonged participation in peace operations. We are reporting separately on the impact of peace operations on U.S. forces.

The Bottom-Up Review Did Not Assess Requirements for Shifting Assets Between Regional Conflicts

According to the bottom-up review, certain specialized units or unique assets would be dual-tasked—shifted from the first regional conflict to the second conflict. In prior years, the Air Force had enough fighter and bomber aircraft to meet the war-fighting requirements of two regional conflicts. DOD believes that it may not have certain assets, such as B-2 bombers, F-117 stealth fighters, and EF-111 aircraft, in sufficient quantities to support two conflicts, and it therefore may need to shift aircraft from one conflict to another.

Although DOD assumed that dual-tasking would occur, it did not analyze how assets would be shifted from one conflict to another. For example, in determining force requirements, DOD did not determine what specific types and numbers of assets would be required to be dual-tasked and when they could be redeployed, or whether sufficient logistical support, such as airlift, refueling aircraft, air crews, or spare parts kits, would be available for the redeployment.

DOD officials explained that because a model for two nearly simultaneous conflicts does not exist, the modeling to determine force requirements during the bottom-up review did not simulate the shifting of assets from one conflict to another. Rather, DOD identified the specific number of assets required for each conflict and assumed that dual-tasking would compensate for any shortfalls.

After the bottom-up review, the Air Force and its Air Mobility Command began analyzing the implications and requirements for dual-tasking based on assumptions contained in the Secretary of Defense’s May 1994 defense planning guidance. Among other things, these analyses—completed in August and May 1994, respectively—identified the specific assets that would be dual-tasked, the timing of redeployment, and refueling aircraft needed to support the redeployment from one conflict to another.

The Air Force is continuing to analyze the requirements for dual-tasking, including the availability of aircrews and spare parts kits. Furthermore, in November 1994, at the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD began a war game analysis of several variables of the two-conflict strategy, including requirements for dual-tasking. This analysis is expected to be completed sometime in 1995.

As discussed in chapter 3, war-fighting commands are analyzing the two-conflict strategy using a different scenario and deployment concept from those outlined in the defense planning guidance. They, too, are examining dual-tasking, including how many and what type of assets would need to shift and at what point in the conflict such a shift could reasonably occur. Until this analysis is completed, currently projected for sometime in 1995, and its results are reconciled with ongoing Air Force and DOD studies, the specific requirements for dual-tasking will not be known.

The Bottom-Up Review Did Not Fully Assess Mobility Requirements for the Two-Conflict Strategy

According to the bottom-up review, the illustrative planning scenarios that DOD used in determining force and strategy options for regional conflicts assumed that a well-armed regional power would initiate aggression thousands of miles from the United States. On short notice, U.S. forces from other areas would be rapidly deployed to the area and enter the battle as quickly as possible. Because DOD assumed that most of these forces would not be in the region when hostilities begin, it emphasized that sufficient strategic mobility—airlift, sealift, and prepositioning of equipment at forward locations—would be needed to successfully execute the two-conflict strategy.

The bottom-up review called for specific enhancements to DOD’s existing strategic mobility capability—most of which DOD had identified in its 1991 mobility requirements study. This congressionally required study determined future requirements for airlift, sealift, and prepositioning and recommended a program to improve DOD’s mobility capability. In conducting the study, DOD analyzed various scenarios involving single regional conflicts and a scenario involving two concurrent conflicts. Based on the requirements for the single conflict scenario deemed to be most demanding, the study recommended increasing sealift capacity for prepositioned equipment and rapid deployment of heavy Army divisions and other U.S. forces by (1) acquiring—through new construction and conversion—additional capacity equal to 20 large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships; (2) leasing two container ships; (3) expanding the Ready Reserve Force from 96 to 142 ships (an increase of 46 ships); and (4) increasing the overall readiness of the Ready Reserve Force;increasing U.S. capability to respond within the first few weeks of a regional conflict by prepositioning Army combat, support, and port-opening equipment aboard nine of the newly constructed or converted large, medium-speed ships (by fiscal year 1997);improving airlift by continuing the C-17 aircraft program, acquiring up to 120 aircraft; and improving the capability of the U.S. transportation system to move combat and support units from their peacetime locations to ports of embarkation by, among other things, purchasing 233 additional heavy-lift rail cars and developing an ammunition loading facility on the U.S. west coast.

According to the mobility study, the recommended program reflected a moderate-risk and affordable mobility force for a single regional conflict that would enable DOD to move 4-2/3 Army divisions in 6 weeks. It also concluded that its recommended program was not sufficient to handle a second concurrent major regional conflict.

During the bottom-up review, DOD relied heavily on the results of the mobility study when considering mobility requirements for the two-conflict strategy. The bottom-up review endorsed the mobility study’s recommendations, and called for increasing the amount of equipment prepositioned on land in the Persian Gulf area. At the time of the bottom-up review, DOD had a battalion-sized set of equipment ashore in the Persian Gulf and planned to increase this prepositioning to two brigade sets. DOD believed that the prepositioning was necessary because the bottom-up review envisioned that forces would need to deploy more quickly than provided for in the 1991 study.

After completing the bottom-up review, DOD initiated a detailed analysis of mobility requirements for the two-conflict strategy to validate its recommendations in the 1991 mobility study and the bottom-up review. According to DOD, this study was required because of significant changes resulting from the bottom-up review and delays in DOD’s mobility program. For example, the bottom-up review and related defense planning guidance presented a new military strategy, changed the overall force structure, and called for enhancements in war-fighting capability. Furthermore, as discussed later, DOD experienced delays in acquiring C-17 aircraft.

By February 1995, DOD expects to complete its study, identifying any changes in mobility requirements and necessary adjustments to its mobility program. DOD will then identify the appropriate mix of specific airlift aircraft—C-17 and alternatives to the C-17. DOD plans to complete this mix analysis by November 1995. Until the two studies are complete, DOD will not know the overall mobility requirements and related costs for its two-conflict strategy.

The Army Would Be Challenged in Supporting Two Major Regional Conflicts

During the bottom-up review, DOD assumed that sufficient support units would be available to support combat operations in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. However, the Army currently does not have the units needed to support its overall combat force. Furthermore, analysis of current U.S. plans for responding to regional conflicts indicates that the Army lacks sufficient units for a particular conflict and would have even more difficulty supporting two conflicts.

The Bottom-Up Review Assumed That Sufficient Support Forces Would Be Available for Two Conflicts

The bottom-up review did not analyze the specific types and quantities of Army support units needed to execute the two-conflict strategy. In modeling force and strategy options, DOD used notional numbers to simulate the support forces that would typically deploy to support an Army division. It assumed that the Army would deploy with all of the specific support units needed to support its combat forces. According to DOD officials, they did not thoroughly analyze support requirements because of the short time frame to complete the bottom-up review.

In September 1994, the Army began analyzing support requirements for its two-conflict combat force of 10 active divisions and 15 Army National Guard enhanced brigades—existing Guard combat brigades with improved readiness. This analysis was part of its biennial process for determining support needs. The process, referred to as the Total Army Analysis, identifies the numbers and types of units needed to support a given combat force in a designated scenario and the personnel and equipment needed to fill these units. The Army then assesses other priorities, such as combat requirements, risks involved if support requirements are not fully met, and decides on how many support units to fill, given available funding. The Army planned to complete by mid-1995 its Total Army Analysis of support requirements for the two-conflict strategy based on the bottom-up review force.

Army Does Not Have Sufficient Forces to Support Its Current Combat Force

Although the bottom-up review assumed that the Army would have sufficient support forces, the Army cannot support its current active force of 12 divisions, and Army officials anticipate that shortfalls will also exist for the two-conflict combat force. In an earlier Total Army Analysis of support requirements for the 12-division force, the Army was unable to fill 838 support units, including engineer, medical, quartermaster, and transportation units. Although these 838 units, as a whole, represent a small portion of the Army’s total support units, they reflect key capabilities that the Army has determined are required to support combat operations.

While the number of active divisions in the two-conflict force is smaller than the current force, the total number of personnel allotted to the Army under the bottom-up review is also smaller, leaving fewer people to fill support units. Army officials involved in the ongoing Total Army Analysis therefore believe the analysis will reveal that the Army cannot fully fill all support units needed for the two-conflict strategy and force.

The Army Would Have Difficulty Providing All Required Support Even for a Single Conflict

In the past, the Army has had difficulty generating sufficient support units for deployed combat forces, and it currently does not have certain types of units called for in plans for a single regional conflict. In 1992, we reported that in trying to support a combat force of about eight divisions during the Persian Gulf War, the Army deployed virtually all of some types of support units and exhausted some units. For example, the Army deployed virtually all prisoner-handling, postal, and medium truck units and all graves registration, pipeline and terminal operation, heavy truck, and water supply units.

Because of favorable conditions, such as a long lead time for deployment, extensive host nation support from Saudi Arabia, a ground offensive of short duration, and the lack of a second conflict requiring a U.S. response, the Army was able to mitigate most of the adverse impact of its support shortfalls during the Gulf War. The bottom-up review strategy and force present a greater challenge because the Army may need to generate support forces for at least 10 active divisions deployed nearly simultaneously, with little warning time, to two major conflicts.

Analysis of current U.S. plans for two particular regional conflicts indicates that the Army would face the same types of difficulties it encountered during the Gulf War. Our examination of the requirements for 17 types of support units contained in the plans showed that the Army (1) lacks a total of 238 units to meet the requirements of a single conflict and (2) has tasked 654 units to support combat operations in both conflicts. Table 2.1 shows the number of units, by type, that the Army lacks for a single conflict and that are assigned to both plans.

As shown in table 2.1, the largest shortfalls in units required for a single conflict occurred in five types—medical (84 units), engineer (33 units), quartermaster (20 units), military police (40 units), and transportation (29 units), totaling 206 units. For two plans—each covering a different conflict—the shortfall would increase to 338 units. Table 2.2 shows a breakdown of this shortfall.

We are reporting separately on the Army’s ability to provide support forces for the two-conflict strategy, including options for alleviating possible shortfalls. The bottom-up review called for 15 Army National Guard enhanced brigades to execute the two-conflict strategy and about 22 other National Guard brigades—now organized as 8 divisions—for other purposes, including providing the basis for rotational forces in extended crises and fulfilling domestic missions. We believe that these divisions include support units, personnel, and equipment that the Army may be able to draw upon to augment its support capability.

DOD Has Not Fully Defined the Concept of Enhanced Reserve Brigades, and Questions Remain About Their Deployability

The Army’s portion of the forces for the two-conflict strategy consists of 10 active divisions and 15 Army National Guard enhanced brigades. The bottom-up review stated that the enhanced brigades were needed to execute the two-conflict strategy and assigned them the broad mission of reinforcing active divisions in regional conflicts. For example, DOD envisioned that these brigades would deploy to one or both conflicts if operations did not go as planned or would replace overseas presence forces redeployed to a regional conflict.

The bottom-up review further stated that, in the future, Guard combat brigades would be organized and filled so that they could be mobilized, trained, and deployed more quickly. It committed the Army to focus on readiness initiatives directed toward the enhanced brigades and established a specific goal to have these brigades ready to begin deployment within 90 days of being called to active duty. In April 1994, the Army Chief of Staff approved the 15 Guard brigades selected—8 heavy brigades and 7 light brigades—as the enhanced brigades.

The Bottom-Up Review Did Not Fully Define the Concept of an Enhanced Brigade

Although DOD assumed that the enhanced brigades would deploy quickly to reinforce active divisions in a regional conflict, it did not analyze the specific wartime requirements for these brigades. DOD officials stated that in analyzing force options for responding to regional conflicts, they used active notional Army brigades and did not test the impact on the war fight of deploying reserve enhanced brigades. Furthermore, DOD did not determine basic factors such as the (1) specific wartime missions of the enhanced brigades and the timing for deploying the brigades, (2) ability of National Guard combat brigades to deploy quickly and fulfill combat missions given readiness problems experienced during the Gulf War, and (3) specific capability enhancements needed to improve the brigades’ readiness.

Because fundamental questions remained about the brigades, the Army formed a task force in November 1993 to do an in-depth study of alternatives for organizing, tasking, training, and equipping the brigades. In April 1994, the Army Chief of Staff confirmed, based on the task force’s findings, the bottom-up review’s assertion that the enhanced brigades would reinforce active forces. However, the brigades’ specific missions, such as whether the brigades would conduct combat maneuvers, provide security, or perform other tasks, are still undefined. As discussed in chapter 3, war-fighting commands are just beginning to analyze how and when the enhanced brigades might be used in a regional conflict.

The Army Chief of Staff also determined that the brigades would maintain personnel and equipment at the highest readiness level during peacetime and be ready to deploy at this level no later than 90 days after being called up; train with specific divisions or corps in peacetime, but maintain the flexibility to operate with any division or corps in wartime; focus their training on mission-essential tasks involving movement (maneuvering) to contact with the enemy, attacks on enemy positions, and defense against enemy attacks; be of standard Army design for heavy and light brigades and armored be equipped and modernized in a manner compatible with active divisions.

The U.S. Army Forces Command was tasked to develop and test a training strategy to ensure that the enhanced brigades meet the 90-day deployment goal. This strategy will include any necessary adjustments to the Army’s current training program for Guard combat brigades. Army headquarters elements were tasked to identify the requirements and costs associated with equipping the brigades. As of January 1995, the Army expected to complete the equipment study in February 1995 and the training strategy in mid-1995. Once the training strategy is completed, the Army envisions that by 1999 it will be tested on only 3 of the 15 brigades. Based on the test results, the Army will decide whether to apply the training strategy to the remaining brigades.

Ability of Enhanced Brigades to Meet 90-Day Deployment Goal Is Uncertain

The bottom-up review’s goal to have enhanced brigades ready to deploy within 90 days of being called to active duty is based on Army estimates that the brigades will need 90 days of post-mobilization training to achieve proficiency in more complex skills at higher echelons, such as companies and battalions. However, these estimates assumed that the brigades will have achieved proficiency in basic skills at the individual soldier, crew, and platoon level during peacetime training.

During the Persian Gulf War, three Guard combat brigades were activated, but the Army did not deploy any of these brigades. Instead, they remained in training status until the war was over. As we reported in November 1992,and testified in March 1994, the brigades experienced problems in achieving proficiency in basic skills at the time of mobilization. For example, many Guard soldiers were not completely trained to do their jobs, many tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews were not proficient in many commissioned and noncommissioned officers had not completed required leadership courses.

As a result, Guard brigades were trained to achieve proficiency in many basic skills, rather than more complex skills, after mobilization. Because the Army believed the brigades were not ready to deploy, it substituted active brigades. Contributing to the brigades’ training problems was the fact that reserve forces generally train only about 39 days each year, and a considerable portion of this time can be taken up by administrative matters or in traveling long distances to reach training ranges.

Because of the Gulf War experience, the Army significantly changed its strategy for training Guard combat brigades, including implementing an initiative called Bold Shift. This project, initiated in September 1991, was designed to focus brigade training during peacetime at the basic—individual, crew, and platoon—level. Prior to this initiative, peacetime training encompassed both basic and complex skills.

Our ongoing work on the Bold Shift program suggests that Guard combat brigades are still continuing to experience problems in achieving proficiency in basic skills. For example, as we stated in our March 1994 testimony, 1992 training data for seven existing Guard combat brigades showed that none had reached pre-mobilization training and readiness goals. Our analysis of 1993 training data confirmed that this trend is continuing. We are reporting separately on the specific training problems and progress of Guard combat brigades under Bold Shift.

Some Bottom-Up Review Enhancements May Not Be Completed When Planned or at All

As discussed in chapter 1, the bottom-up review described several specific enhancements to U.S. capabilities as key to the projected force’s ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous conflicts, including improving strategic mobility and the lethality of U.S. firepower. According to DOD, these improvements would compensate for the loss in capability resulting from reductions in forces required in the bottom-up review. Although DOD estimated that most enhancements would be done by about 2000, some may not come on line as planned or at all.

Availability of Certain Strategic Mobility Improvements and Prepositioned Equipment Is Uncertain

To improve strategic mobility, DOD’s plans included procuring C-17 airlift aircraft, increasing the number of sealift ships available, improving the responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Force, and prepositioning additional equipment on land. At the time of the bottom-up review, DOD assumed that by 1999, 80 of 120 C-17s and 21 additional Ready Reserve Force roll-on/roll-off ships would be available as planned. By the same time, DOD expected to preposition equipment on ships and increase the amount of equipment prepositioned on land in the Persian Gulf area from a battalion-sized set to two brigade sets, located in two different locations. War-fighting command officials stated that prepositioning this equipment is critical to executing the two-conflict strategy. As of January 1995, DOD, as we reported in November 1994, had made progress in improving the responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Fleet. It had also prepositioned a brigade set of equipment on ships and nearly completed prepositioning a brigade set of equipment on land in the Persian Gulf area.

DOD has encountered some problems or funding uncertainties in acquiring additional airlift and sealift and prepositioning the second brigade set on land. Specifically, DOD’s assumption that 80 C-17 aircraft would be available by fiscal year 1999 was overly optimistic. Since its inception, the C-17 program has been plagued with cost, schedule, and performance problems. We testified in April 1994 that total costs continued to grow, delivery schedules had slipped, and aircraft had been delivered with unfinished work or known deficiencies. In December 1993, the Secretary of Defense decided to limit the program to 40 aircraft unless the contractor significantly improved management and productivity. Furthermore, as discussed previously, the Secretary also decided to study alternatives for a mixed airlift force of C-17s and nondevelopmental—commercial or military—aircraft. DOD expects to complete the study in November 1995 and at that time will decide whether to procure additional C-17s. As of October 1994, the contractor had delivered 15 C-17 aircraft and planned to deliver the remaining 25 aircraft by September 1998.

As of October 1994, the Department of Transportation had acquired 14 of the 21 Ready Reserve Force ships planned to be available for DOD’s mobility program by fiscal year 1999. It planned to acquire the remaining seven ships with funds remaining from fiscal year 1994 and requested for fiscal year 1995. However, during fiscal year 1995 deliberations, the Congress rescinded $158 million in fiscal year 1994 funds programmed for the seven ships, but provided $43 million in fiscal year 1995 funds. DOD believes that this funding will be sufficient to procure two ships and plans to program funds for the remaining five ships in its budgets for 1996 to 1998.

DOD’s plans to preposition the second of two brigade sets of equipment ashore in the Persian Gulf are also uncertain. As of January 1995, the U.S. Central Command had identified a location for the second set of equipment and reached necessary agreements with the host country. However, according to DOD officials, the Army had obtained funding only for the site survey and the project’s design. The Army plans to request funding in its fiscal year 1996 budget submission for the remainder of the project over a 3-year period covering fiscal years 1996-98.

Certain Improvements to U.S. Firepower Have Not Been Funded as Expected

The bottom-up review called for various improvements to the lethality of U.S. firepower, including development of precision-guided munitions and the addition of air-to-ground attack capability to the Navy’s F-14 aircraft (referred to as the Block I upgrade). At the time of our review, these improvements were part of DOD’s ongoing programs and therefore reflected capabilities that were already planned. DOD assumed that sufficient quantities of precision munitions for the two-conflict strategy would be available by about the year 2000 and the Block I upgrade would be completed by the year 2003.

The bottom-up review emphasized that precision-guided munitions already in the U.S. inventory, as well as new types of munitions still under development, are needed to ensure that U.S. forces can operate successfully in future major regional conflicts and other operations. It noted that they hold the promise of dramatically improving the ability of U.S. forces to destroy enemy armored vehicles and halt invading ground forces, as well as destroy fixed targets at longer ranges, thus reducing exposure to enemy air defenses. Specific antiarmor precision munitions cited included the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile.

The Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile will not come on line as planned. Because of significant developmental difficulties and growth in the expected unit cost, DOD canceled the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile program. We reported extensively on cost, schedule, and performance problems with the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile. Furthermore, we concluded that the Navy did not adequately justify the need for the Block I upgrade. During deliberations on DOD’s fiscal year 1995 appropriation, the Congress canceled funding for the F-14 Block I upgrade because of questions about its affordability.

Conclusions

The strategy of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous conflicts will require a significant change in military planning for the deployment and use of U.S. forces. However, in the bottom-up review, DOD determined the strategy, forces, capability enhancements, and estimated costs for accomplishing the strategy without sufficiently analyzing key assumptions to ensure their validity. Until DOD fully analyzes basic factors, such as whether forces engaged in other operations that are needed in the early stages of a regional conflict can quickly redeploy, sufficient mobility and support forces exist, reserve brigades can deploy when needed or improvements in capabilities will be available, it will not have a firm basis for determining the forces, supporting capabilities, and funding needed for the two-conflict strategy or if the strategy should be changed.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

DOD disagreed with our overall conclusion that DOD did not adequately analyze the assumptions used in the bottom-up review. DOD said that DOD’s leadership recognized practical limitations on the scope of analysis that could be done in the time available and fully considered these limitations in making decisions about key aspects of the long-term defense program.

DOD further stated that, in raising questions about the bottom-up review’s assumptions, we did not recognize the difference between broad conceptual force planning and detailed operational planning. DOD said that it did not develop actual war plans, but rather identified broad, but comprehensive, requirements that U.S. forces should be able to meet to carry out crucial elements of DOD’s defense strategy. DOD also stated that to ensure adequate force planning, it recognized the need to continually refine and update its assessments. DOD noted that, to date, follow-on analyses have upheld the basic tenets and findings of the bottom-up review. We were unable to confirm DOD’s statement regarding the results of the follow-on analyses because DOD will not make these results available until the studies are completed.

We recognize that DOD was faced with time limitations in doing the bottom-up review, and was therefore restricted in the extent of analyses that could be done. We also agree that the bottom-up review was a broad force planning and programming effort rather than a war-planning effort. In fact, in chapters 1 and 3, we clearly distinguish between the bottom-up review and detailed future operational planning.

However, in the bottom-up review, DOD made a specific judgment that the United States would maintain the capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts and decided the specific size and composition of the force capable of meeting this strategy. In making these decisions, DOD made critical assumptions about factors that are key to the successful execution of the two-conflict strategy without performing sufficient analyses to test the validity of its assumptions. In fact, DOD and the war-fighting commands are now exploring basic questions about DOD’s assumptions, such as whether forces involved in smaller-scale operations can actually be available when needed to deploy to a regional conflict, whether the same combat forces would be needed at the same time in both regional conflicts and whether the Army has sufficient support for nearly simultaneous combat operations in two conflicts.

DOD also disagreed with our specific findings that (1) it did not assess requirements for shifting assets between regional conflicts, (2) it did not fully assess mobility requirements, and (3) the Army would be challenged in supporting two major regional conflicts. First, DOD stated that it has ample experience in rapidly deploying forces, particularly combat and support aircraft, from one theater to another. DOD said that in its bottom-up review analysis, it made judgments about its future ability to shift assets based on that experience.

We agree that DOD has ample experience in redeploying forces from one theater to another. We note, however, that DOD’s experience has not included redeployments from one major regional conflict to another, as envisioned in the bottom-up review and defense planning guidance scenario. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 3, the war-fighting commands’ study has raised questions about shifting assets between conflicts. For these reasons, we continue to believe that the bottom-up review did not adequately assess requirements for shifting assets between conflicts.

Second, DOD stated that in assessing mobility requirements during the bottom-up review, it relied heavily on its 1991 mobility requirements study. DOD believes that it understands the vast majority of its basic lift requirements and capabilities for responding to two nearly simultaneous conflicts. We agree that the 1991 study provided a useful baseline; however, the bottom-up review resulted in significant changes in mobility assumptions. DOD did not begin to analyze these changes until after the bottom-up review. Furthermore, the 1991 study concluded that its recommended mobility program was not sufficient for two concurrent conflicts. Until DOD’s reassessment of mobility requirements is complete, we continue to believe that DOD will not know the extent of strategic airlift, sealift, and prepositioning needed to support two major regional conflicts.

Finally, DOD stated that the Army demonstrated, as recently as Operation Desert Storm in 1991, that it can fully support large-scale combat operations in a single major regional conflict. DOD also believes that it is premature to draw conclusions regarding Army support shortfalls until the Army completes its ongoing analysis of support requirements for the two-conflict strategy. We recognize that the Army was able to support combat operations during Operation Desert Storm; however, as discussed in chapter 2, the Army did encounter difficulties. Also, the operation was conducted under several favorable circumstances; for example, there was no second conflict at the same time. Furthermore, we did not conclude that the Army could not support two major regional conflicts. Rather, we showed that DOD did not analyze the validity of its assumption that sufficient support forces would be available and that various factors suggest that the Army would be challenged in meeting this requirement. We agree that the Army’s ongoing analysis will identify specific requirements and shortfalls.

Additional annotated evaluations of DOD’s comments are presented in appendix I.

War-Fighting Commands Question DOD’s Concept for Responding to Two Nearly Simultaneous Conflicts

War-fighting command officials believe that DOD’s concept for responding to two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts—detailed in defense planning guidance that is being used to develop program and budget requirements—may not be the best approach. Their estimates of key characteristics of a situation involving two nearly simultaneous conflicts and the deployment of forces differ significantly from DOD’s estimates, including the amount of warning time for both conflicts and time between the onset of each conflict, mix of combat forces needed to respond to each conflict, and timing of force deployments. As a result, the commands are examining options they believe may maximize the use of U.S. capabilities. Command officials emphasized that they are not suggesting the United States cannot accomplish the two-conflict strategy. Their study is analyzing many of the variables that DOD made assumptions about during the bottom-up review, such as shifting assets between conflicts and the sufficiency of strategic lift.

The May 1994 Defense Planning Guidance Outlines DOD’s Concept for Responding to Two Nearly Simultaneous Conflicts

In May 1994, the Secretary of Defense issued his defense planning guidance for the 5-year planning period 1996 to 2001. This guidance provided several illustrative planning scenarios depicting the challenges U.S. forces might face during the planning period and generic force packages representing the types of military capability needed to address these challenges. The specific scenarios covered single regional conflicts, two nearly simultaneous conflicts, and various smaller-scale operations. They included a detailed summary of the situation, enemy objectives and forces, U.S. objectives and forces, projected warning times of enemy attack, a schedule for the deployment of U.S. forces to the conflict area, and assumptions governing the circumstances depicted in the scenario.

According to the defense guidance, the illustrative scenarios, among other things, (1) provide a “technical yardstick” to help focus, develop, and evaluate defense forces and programs in further detail and (2) enable service components to formulate detailed programs that provide levels of readiness, sustainability, support, and mobility appropriate to the bottom-up review’s two-conflict strategy. For example, DOD is using the defense planning guidance scenario for two nearly simultaneous conflicts as a basis for its study of mobility requirements, and the Air Force and its Air Mobility Command used the scenario in examining requirements for dual-tasking assets and refueling aircraft (see chap. 2). The Joint Chiefs of Staff will use the defense planning guidance and scenario in apportioning specific forces, strategic lift, prepositioning, and other assets to war-fighting commanders for accomplishing assigned missions, including responding to regional conflicts.

In general, the defense planning guidance scenario for nearly simultaneous conflicts depicted a situation in which a second conflict breaks out while the United States is engaged in and preoccupied with a major regional conflict a considerable distance away. The scenario envisioned that U.S. combat and supporting capabilities, including strategic mobility, would first be focused on responding to the first conflict until indications of a second conflict were recognized. It made several key assumptions, including the anticipated warning time, number of days separating the two conflicts, forces sufficient to respond to each conflict, additional forces available to the war-fighting commanders if adverse conditions developed, and the timing of various combat phases. Specific details about the scenario and assumptions are classified.

War-Fighting Commands Question Several Aspects of the Defense Planning Guidance Scenario

Two war-fighting commands with responsibility for responding to major regional conflicts question whether the defense planning guidance scenario being used to develop program and budgetary requirements for the two-conflict strategy reflects the best approach. Specifically, they believe that the guidance may not best reflect how two nearly simultaneous conflicts would evolve and how the United States should respond. Their overall concern is that the scenario focuses on responding to the first conflict and then the second conflict and does not sufficiently recognize the value of taking significant action to deter the second conflict when the first conflict occurs. The specific details of the commands’ concerns are classified.

The commands are also concerned about specific aspects of the scenario and its assumptions, including the following:

The warning time for both conflicts and the separation time between the two conflicts are likely to be shorter than DOD envisions.

DOD’s concept for deploying forces may not provide the mix of combat and supporting capability that the two commands believe is necessary to successfully respond to two nearly simultaneous conflicts.

The scenario does not recognize that both commands have operational requirements for some of the same air, ground, and naval forces and prepositioned equipment that if deployed to the first conflict may not be available when needed for the second conflict.

The apportionment of strategic airlift and sealift assets is inadequate and should be based on a different concept for deploying forces.

Both commands will likely require many of the same support forces; however, the scenario only addresses combat forces.

A higher level of mobilization of reserve forces than called for in the scenario will likely be required.

Because of these concerns, the two commands, in February 1994, initiated a joint study to assess the feasibility of responding to two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts with the bottom-up review force. They are using a scenario and deployment concept that differs from the defense planning guidance scenario. Command officials emphasized that, by initiating the study, they are not suggesting that the United States cannot accomplish the two-conflict strategy. Rather, they are examining options that they believe (1) lessen the possibility that U.S. forces will be required to engage in two major regional conflicts at the same time and (2) put U.S. forces in a better position to be successful in both conflicts if deterrence fails. This study will examine various aspects of the two-conflict strategy, including the number and type of assets required to shift between conflicts and at what point such a shift could reasonably occur.

As of January 1995, the commands had reached preliminary conclusions and did not expect to complete the study until sometime later in 1995. However, according to command officials, the study thus far has validated many of their concerns about the defense planning guidance scenario and raised questions about DOD’s bottom-up review assumptions, including the availability of strategic airlift and support forces, shifting assets between conflicts, and how and when enhanced brigades would be needed. Based on their preliminary study results, the commands hope to influence DOD and Joint Staff thinking in apportioning forces and preparing future defense planning guidance for developing program and budgetary requirements.

Command officials emphasized that their study will not address detailed operational planning for executing the two-conflict strategy or determine specific operational requirements. This process will occur after the Joint Staff formally apportions forces and missions in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan—expected to be issued in early 1995. Command officials expect the plan to task them to develop plans and deployment schedules for a single regional conflict scenario in their respective areas, assuming no other conflicts are occurring, and for two nearly simultaneous conflicts, assuming that their command is involved in the second of the two conflicts. In the past, commands have been tasked only to prepare a concept summary on how they would respond if they were in the second conflict.

Based on the tasking, the commands will develop operational plans followed by detailed deployment schedules for their respective regional conflicts. As part of this process, the commands will determine their specific requirements for executing the plans and schedules, such as combat forces, mobility, sustainability, and munitions. The commands estimate that it would take about 18 months, from the time the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is issued, to complete the plans and deployment schedules.

DOD officials agreed that the commands’ concept of executing the two-conflict strategy differs from the defense planning guidance and that the commands’ study could generate a different baseline for determining defense requirements, budgets, and plans. They stated that reconciling the differences when the study becomes available may be necessary, but until then, the defense planning guidance remains the basis of DOD planning for the two-conflict strategy.

Conclusions

In developing the defense planning guidance scenario that military planners will use to develop program and budget requirements for the two-conflict strategy, DOD used a specific concept for deploying forces and supporting capabilities. Key war-fighting commands believe that the scenario may not reflect the most effective deployment and use of U.S. capabilities and are analyzing alternatives. Their analysis is addressing many of DOD’s key bottom-up review assumptions regarding key aspects of the two-conflict strategy and could provide useful insights for determining the validity of these assumptions.

Recommendations

We recommend that in the congressionally mandated examination of the bottom-up review, the Secretary of Defense thoroughly examine the assumptions related to the (1) redeployment of forces from other operations to major regional conflicts, availability of strategic mobility assets and Army support forces, deployability of Army National Guard enhanced brigades, and planned enhancements to strategic mobility and U.S. firepower and (2) consider the options being examined by the war-fighting commands.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

DOD agreed with our recommendations and noted that it is conducting detailed studies to address many of the issues raised. DOD stated that it will reflect the results of these studies in its response to the congressionally mandated report on the bottom-up review. As discussed in chapter 2, DOD stated that in raising questions about the bottom-up review’s assumptions, we did not recognize the difference between broad conceptual force planning and operational planning for using specific forces to undertake specific operations. We note that DOD’s comments imply that the war-fighting commands’ study is similar to detailed operational planning. As discussed in chapter 3, the commands are examining options for executing the strategy on a macro scale rather than developing specific detailed plans and requirements.