Transportation Worker Identification Credential: Internal Control Weaknesses Need to Be Corrected to Help Achieve Security Objectives
Released: 2011-05-10T00:00:00

Letter

Background

TWIC History and Purpose

In November 2001, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) was enacted, requiring TSA to, among other things, work with airport operators to strengthen access control points to secured areas and to consider using biometric access control systems, or similar technologies, to verify the identity of individuals who seek to enter a secure airport area. In response to ATSA, TSA established the TWIC program in December 2001. In November 2002, MTSA was enacted and required the Secretary of Homeland Security to issue a maritime worker identification card that uses biometrics to control access to secure areas of maritime transportation facilities and vessels. In addition, the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act) of 2006 amended MTSA and directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to, among other things, implement the TWIC pilot project to test TWIC use with biometric card readers and inform a future regulation on the use of TWIC with electronic readers.

In requiring the issuance of transportation security cards for entry into secure areas of a facility or vessel as part of MTSA, Congress noted in the “Findings” section of the legislation that ports in the United States are a major location for federal crime such as cargo theft and smuggling, and are susceptible to large-scale acts of terrorism. For example, according to the Coast Guard’s January 2008 National Maritime Terrorism Threat Assessment, al Qaeda leaders and supporters have identified western maritime assets as legitimate targets. Moreover, according to the Coast Guard assessment, al Qaeda-inspired operatives are most likely to use vehicle bombs to strike U.S. cargo vessels, tankers, and fixed coastal facilities such as ports. Studies have demonstrated that attacks on ports could have serious consequences. For example, a study by the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorist Events on the impact of a dirty bomb attack on the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach estimated that the economic consequences from a shutdown of the harbors due to the contamination could result in significant losses in the tens of billions of dollars, including the decontamination costs and the indirect economic impacts due to the port shutdown.

As defined by DHS, the purpose of the TWIC program is to design and field a common credential for all transportation workers across the United States who require unescorted access to secure areas at MTSA-regulated maritime facilities and vessels. As such, the TWIC program, once implemented, aims to meet the following stated mission needs: Positively identify authorized individuals who require unescorted access to secure areas of the nation’s transportation system.

Determine the eligibility of individuals to be authorized unescorted access to secure areas of the transportation system by conducting a security threat assessment.

Ensure that unauthorized individuals are not able to defeat or otherwise compromise the access system in order to be granted permissions that have been assigned to an authorized individual. Identify individuals who fail to maintain their eligibility requirements subsequent to being permitted unescorted access to secure areas of the nation’s transportation system and immediately revoke the individual’s permissions.

TWIC Program Processes for Ensuring TWIC-Holder Eligibility

TSA is responsible for enrolling TWIC applicants and conducting background checks to ensure that only eligible individuals are granted TWICs. In addition, pursuant to TWIC-related regulations, MTSA- regulated facility and vessel operators are responsible for reviewing each individual’s TWIC as part of their decision to grant unescorted access to secure areas of their facilities. The Coast Guard is responsible for assessing and enforcing operator compliance with TWIC-related laws and regulations. Described below are key components of each process for ensuring TWIC-holder eligibility.

Enrollment: Transportation workers are enrolled by providing biographic information, such as name, date of birth, and address, and proof of identity documents, and then being photographed and fingerprinted at enrollment centers by trusted agents. A trusted agent is a member of the TWIC team who has been authorized by the federal government to enroll transportation workers in the TWIC program and issue TWIC cards. Appendix I summarizes key steps in the enrollment process.

Background checking: TSA conducts background checks on each worker who applies for a TWIC to ensure that individuals who enroll do not pose a security risk to the United States. A worker’s potential link to terrorism, criminal history, immigration status, and mental capacity are considered as part of the security threat assessment. Workers have the opportunity to appeal negative results of the threat assessment or request a waiver of certain specified criminal offenses, and immigration or mental capacity standards. Specifically, the TWIC background checking process includes two levels of review.

First-level review: Initial automated background checking. The initial automated background checking process is conducted to determine whether any derogatory information is associated with the name and fingerprints submitted by an applicant during the enrollment process. This check is conducted against the FBI’s criminal history records. These records contain information from federal and state and local sources in the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database and the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)/Interstate Identification Index (III), which maintain criminal records and related fingerprint submissions. Rather than positively confirming each individual’s identity using the submitted fingerprints, the FBI’s criminal history records check is a negative identification check, whereby the fingerprints are used to confirm that the associated individual is not on the FBI criminal history list. If an individual is identified as being on the FBI’s criminal history list, relevant information is to be forwarded to TSA for adjudication. The check is also conducted against federal terrorism information from the Terrorist Screening Database, including the Selectee and No-Fly Lists. To determine an applicant’s immigration/citizenship status and eligibility, TSA also runs applicant information against the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system. If the applicant is identified as a U.S.-born citizen with no related derogatory information, the system can approve the issuance of a TWIC with no further review of the applicant or human intervention.

Second-level review: TSA’s Adjudication Center Review. A second-level review is conducted as part of an individual’s background check if (1) the applicant has self-identified themselves to be a non-U.S. citizen or non-U.S.-born citizen or national, or (2) the first-level review uncovers any derogatory information. As such, not all TWIC applicants will be subjected to a second-level review. The second-level review consists of staff at TSA’s adjudication center reviewing the applicant’s enrollment file.

Card use and compliance: Once a TWIC has been activated and issued, the worker may present his or her TWIC to security officials when he or she seeks unescorted access to a secure area. Currently, visual inspections of TWICs are required for controlling access to secure areas of MTSA- regulated facilities and vessels. Approaches for inspecting TWICs using biometric readers at individual facilities and vessels across the nation are being considered as part of a pilot but are not yet required. Pursuant to Coast Guard policy, Coast Guard inspectors are required to verify TWIC cards during annual compliance exams, security spot checks, and in the course of other Coast Guard duties as determined by the Captain of the Port based on risk and resource availability. The Coast Guard’s primary means of verification is shifting toward the use of biometric handheld readers with the continued deployment of readers to each of its Sectors and Marine Safety Units. As of December 21, 2010, the Coast Guard reports to have deployed biometric handheld readers to all of its 35 Sectors and 16 Marine Safety Units.

TWIC Regulations and Cost

In August 2006, DHS officials decided, based on industry comment, to implement TWIC through two separate regulations, or rules. The first rule, issued in January 2007, directs the use of the TWIC as an identification credential, or flashpass. The second rule, the card reader rule, is currently under development and is expected to address how the access control technologies, such as biometric card readers, are to be used for confirming the identity of the TWIC holder against the biometric information on the TWIC. On March 27, 2009, the Coast Guard issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making for the card reader rule.

To inform the rulemaking process, TSA initiated a pilot in August 2008, known as the TWIC reader pilot, to test TWIC-related access control technologies. This pilot is intended to test the technology, business processes, and operational impacts of deploying TWIC readers at secure areas of the marine transportation system. As such, the pilot is expected to test the feasibility and functionality of using TWICs with biometric card readers within the maritime environment. After the pilot has concluded, a report on the findings of the pilot is expected to inform the development of the card reader rule. DHS currently estimates that a notice of proposed rulemaking will be issued late in calendar year 2011 and that the final rule will be promulgated no earlier than the end of calendar year 2012.

According to agency officials, from fiscal years 2002 through 2010, the TWIC program had funding authority totaling $420 million. In issuing the credential rule, DHS estimated that implementing the TWIC program could cost the federal government and the private sector a combined total of between $694.3 million and $3.2 billion over a 10-year period. However, these figures did not include costs associated with implementing and operating readers. Appendix II contains additional program funding details.

Standards for Internal Control

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government underscores the need for developing effective controls for meeting program objectives and complying with applicable regulations. Effective internal controls provide for an assessment of the risks the agency faces from both internal and external sources. Once risks have been identified, they should be analyzed for their possible effect. Management then has to decide upon the internal control activities required to mitigate those risks and achieve the objectives of efficient and effective operations. As part of this effort, management should design and implement internal controls based on the related cost and benefits.

In addition, internal control standards highlight the need for the following: capturing information needed to meet program objectives; designing controls to assure that ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of normal operations; determining that relevant, reliable, and timely information is available for management decision-making purposes; conducting reviews and testing of development and modification activities before placing systems into operation; recording and communicating information to management and others within the entity who need it and in a form and within a time frame that enables them to carry out their internal control and other responsibilities; and designing internal controls to provide reasonable assurance that compliance with applicable laws and regulations is being achieved, and provide appropriate supervisory review of activities to help provide oversight of operations. This includes designing and implementing appropriate supervisory review activities to help provide oversight and analyzing data to compare trends in actual performance to expected results to identify any areas that may require further inquiries or corrective action.

Internal control also serves as the first line of defense in safeguarding assets and preventing and detecting errors and fraud. An internal control weakness is a condition within an internal control system worthy of attention. A weakness, therefore, may represent a perceived, potential, or real shortcoming, or an opportunity to strengthen internal controls to provide a greater likelihood that the entity’s objectives will be achieved.

Internal Control Weaknesses in DHS’s Biometric Transportation ID Program Hinder Efforts to Ensure Security Objectives Are Fully Achieved

DHS has established a system of TWIC-related processes and controls. However, internal control weaknesses governing the enrollment, background checking, and use of TWIC potentially limit the program’s ability to provide reasonable assurance that access to secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities is restricted to qualified individuals. Specifically, internal controls in the enrollment and background checking processes are not designed to provide reasonable assurance that (1) only qualified individuals can acquire TWICs; (2) adjudicators follow a process with clear criteria for applying discretionary authority when applicants are found to have extensive criminal convictions; or (3) once issued a TWIC, TWIC holders have maintained their eligibility. To meet the stated program mission needs, TSA designed TWIC program processes to facilitate the issuance of TWICs to maritime workers. However, TSA did not assess the internal controls designed and in place to determine whether they provided reasonable assurance that the program could meet defined mission needs for limiting access to only qualified individuals. Further, internal control weaknesses in TWIC enrollment, background checking, and use could have contributed to the breach of selected MTSA-regulated facilities during covert tests conducted by our investigators.

TWIC Program Controls Are Not Designed to Provide Reasonable Assurance That Only Qualified Applicants Can Acquire TWICs

DHS has established a system of TWIC-related processes and controls that as of April 2011 has resulted in TWICs being denied to 1,158 applicants based on a criminal offense, criminal immigration offense, or invalid immigration status. However, the TWIC program’s internal controls for positively identifying an applicant, arriving at a security threat determination for that individual, and approving the issuance of a TWIC, are not designed to provide reasonable assurance that only qualified applicants can acquire TWICs. Assuring the identity and qualifications of TWIC-holders are two of the primary benefits that the TWIC program is to provide MTSA-regulated facility and vessel operators making access control decisions. If an individual presents an authentic TWIC acquired through fraudulent means when requesting access to the secure areas of a MTSA-regulated facility or vessel, the cardholder is deemed not to be a security threat to the maritime environment because the cardholder is presumed to have met TWIC-related qualifications during a background check. In such cases, these individuals could better position themselves to inappropriately gain unescorted access to secure areas of a MTSA- regulated facility or vessel.

As confirmed by TWIC program officials, there are ways for an unqualified individual to acquire an authentic TWIC. According to TWIC program officials, to meet the stated program purpose, TSA’s focus in designing the TWIC program was on facilitating the issuance of TWICs to maritime workers. However, TSA did not assess internal controls prior to implementing the program. Further, prior to fielding the program, TSA did not conduct a risk assessment of the TWIC program to identify program risks and the need for controls to mitigate existing risks and weaknesses, as called for by internal control standards. Such an assessment could help provide reasonable assurance that control weaknesses in one area of the program do not undermine the reliability of other program areas or impede the program from meeting mission needs. TWIC program officials told us that control weaknesses were not addressed prior to initiating the TWIC program because they had not previously identified them, or because they would be too costly to address. However, officials did not provide documentation to support their cost concerns and told us that they did not complete an assessment that accounted for whether the program could achieve defined mission needs without implementing additional or compensating controls to mitigate existing risks, or the risks associated with not correcting for existing internal control weaknesses.

Our investigators conducted covert tests at enrollment center(s) to help test the rigor of the TWIC enrollment and background checking processes. The investigators fully complied with the enrollment application process. They were photographed and fingerprinted, and asserted themselves to be U.S.-born citizens. The investigators were successful in obtaining authentic TWIC cards despite going through the background-checking process. Not having internal controls designed to provide reasonable assurance that the applicant has (1) been positively identified, and (2) met all TWIC eligibility requirements, including not posing a security threat to MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels, could have contributed to the investigators’ successes. Specifically, we identified internal control weaknesses in the following three areas related to ensuring that only qualified applicants are able to obtain a TWIC.

Controls to identify the use of potentially counterfeit identity documents are not used to inform background checking processes. As part of TWIC program enrollment, a trusted agent is to review identity documents for authenticity and use an electronic authentication device to assess the likelihood of the document being counterfeit. According to TWIC program officials, the trusted agent’s review of TWIC applicant identity documents and the assessment provided by the electronic authentication device are the two steps intended to serve as the primary controls for detecting whether an applicant is presenting counterfeit identity documents. Additionally, the electronic device used to assess the authenticity of identification credentials renders a score on the likelihood of the document being authentic and produces an assessment report in support of the score. Assessing whether the applicant’s credential is authentic is one source of information for positively identifying an applicant. Our investigators provided counterfeit or fraudulently acquired documents, but they were not detected.

However, the TWIC program’s background checking processes are not designed to routinely consider the results of controls in place for assessing whether an applicant’s identity documents are authentic. For example, assessments of document authenticity made by a trusted agent or the electronic document authentication device as part of the enrollment process are not considered as part of the first-level background check. Moreover, TWIC program officials agree that this is a program weakness. As of December 1, 2010, approximately 50 percent of TWICs were approved after the first-level background check without undergoing further review. As an initial step towards addressing this weakness, and in response to our review, TWIC program officials told us that since April 17, 2010, the comments provided at enrollment by trusted agents have been sent to the Screening Gateway—a TSA system for aggregating threat assessment data. However, this change in procedure does not correct the internal control weaknesses we identified. Attempts to authenticate copies of documents are limited because it is not possible to capture all of the security features when copies of the identity documents are recorded, such as holograms or color-shifting ink. Using information on the authenticity of identity documents captured during enrollment to inform the background check could help TSA better assess the reliability and authenticity of such documents provided at enrollment.

Controls related to the legal status of self-reported U.S.-born citizens or nationals. The TWIC program does not require that applicants claiming to be U.S.-born citizens or nationals provide identity documents that demonstrate proof of citizenship, or lawful status in the United States. See appendix III for the list of documents U.S.-born citizens or nationals must select from and present when applying for a TWIC. For example, an applicant could elect to provide one document, such a U.S. passport, which, according to TSA officials, serves as proof of U.S. citizenship or proof of nationality. However, an applicant could elect to submit documents that do not provide proof of citizenship. As of December 1, 2010, nearly 86 percent of approved TWIC enrollments were by self-identified United States citizens or nationals asserting that they were born in the United States or a United States territory.

Verifying a U.S.-born citizen’s identity and related lawful status can be costly and is a challenge faced by U.S. government programs such as passports. However, reaching an accurate determination of a TWIC applicant’s potential security threat in meeting TWIC mission needs is dependant on positively identifying the applicant. Given such potential cost constraints, consistent with internal control standards, identifying alternative mechanisms to positively identify individuals to the extent that the benefits exceed the costs and TWIC program mission needs are met could enhance TSA’s ability to positively identify individuals and reduce the likelihood that criminals or terrorists could acquire a TWIC fraudulently.

Controls are not in place to determine whether an applicant has a need for a TWIC. Regulations governing the TWIC program security threat assessments require applicants to disclose their job description and location(s) where they will most likely require unescorted access, if known, and the name, telephone number, and address of the applicant’s current employer(s) if the applicant works for an employer that requires a TWIC. However, TSA enrollment processes do not require that this information be provided by applicants. For example, when applying for a TWIC, applicants are to certify that they may need a TWIC as part of their employment duties. However, the enrollment process does not request information on the location where the applicant will most likely require unescorted access, and enrollment processes include asking the applicant if they would like to provide employment information, but informing the applicant that employer information is not required.

While not a problem prior to implementing the TWIC program, according to TSA officials, a primary reason for not requiring employer information be captured by applicant processes is that many applicants do not have employers, and that many employers will not accept employment applications from workers who do not already have a TWIC. However, TSA could not provide statistics on (1) how many individuals applying for TWICs were unemployed at the time of their application; or (2) a reason why the TWIC-related regulation does not prohibit employers from denying employment to non-TWIC holders who did not previously have a need for a TWIC. Further, according to TSA and Coast Guard officials, industry was opposed to having employment information verified as part of the application process, as industry representatives believed such checks would be too invasive and time-consuming. TSA officials further told us that confirming this information would be too costly.

We recognize that implementing mechanisms to capture this information could be time-consuming and involve additional costs. However, collecting information on present employers or operators of MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels to be accessed by the applicant, to the extent that the benefits exceed the costs and TWIC program mission needs are met, could help ensure TWIC program mission needs are being met, and serve as a barrier to individuals attempting to acquire an authentic TWIC through fraudulent means. Therefore, if TSA determines that implementing such mechanisms are, in fact, cost prohibitive, identifying and implementing appropriate compensating controls could better position TSA to positively identify the TWIC applicant. Not taking any action increases the risk that individuals could gain unescorted access to secure areas of MTSA- regulated facilities and vessels.

As of September 2010, TSA’s background checking process had identified no instances of nonimmigration-related document or identity fraud. This is in part because of previously discussed weaknesses in TWIC program controls for positively identifying applicants, and the systems and procedures the TWIC program relies on not being designed to effectively monitor for such occurrences, in accordance with internal control standards. Though not an exhaustive list, through a review of Coast Guard reports and publicly available court records, we identified five court cases where the court documents indicate that illegal immigrants acquired, or in one of the cases sought to acquire, an authentic TWIC through fraudulent activity such as providing fraudulent identity information and, in at least one of the cases and potentially up to four, used the TWIC to access secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities. Four of these cases were a result of, or involved, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement efforts after individuals had acquired, or sought to acquire, a TWIC. As of September 2010, the program’s background checking process identified 18 instances of potential fraud out of the approximately 1,676,000 TWIC enrollments. These instances all involved some type of fraud related to immigration. The 18 instances of potential fraud were identified because the 18 individuals asserted themselves to be non-U.S.- born applicants and, unlike processes in place for individuals asserting to be U.S.-born citizens, TSA’s background checking process includes additional controls to validate such individuals’ identities. For example, TSA requires that at least one of the documents provided by such individuals at enrollment show proof of their legal status and seeks to validate each non-U.S.-born applicant’s identity with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

Internal control standards highlight the need for capturing information needed to meet program objectives; ensuring that relevant, reliable, and timely information is available for management decision-making purposes; and providing reasonable assurance that compliance with applicable laws and regulations is being achieved. Conducting a control assessment of the TWIC program’s processes to address existing weaknesses could enhance the TWIC program’s ability to prevent and detect fraud and positively identify TWIC applicants. Such an assessment could better position DHS in strengthening the program to ensure it achieves its objectives in controlling access to MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels.

TWIC Program Controls Are Not Designed to Require Adjudicators to Follow a Process with Clear Criteria for Applying Discretionary Authority When Applicants Are Found to Have Extensive Criminal Convictions

Being convicted of a felony does not automatically disqualify a person from being eligible to receive a TWIC; however, prior convictions for certain crimes are automatically disqualifying. Threat assessment processes for the TWIC program include conducting background checks to determine whether each TWIC applicant poses a security threat. Some of these offenses, such as espionage or treason, would permanently disqualify an individual from obtaining a TWIC. Other offenses, such as murder or the unlawful possession of an explosive device, while categorized as permanent disqualifiers, are also eligible for a waiver under TSA regulations and might not permanently disqualify an individual from obtaining a TWIC if TSA determines upon subsequent review that an applicant does not represent a security threat. Table 1 presents examples of disqualifying criminal offenses set out in statute and implementing regulations for consideration as part of the adjudication process.

TSA also has the authority to add to or modify the list of interim disqualifying crimes. Further, in determining whether an applicant poses a security threat, TSA officials stated that adjudicators have the discretion to consider the totality of an individual’s criminal record, including criminal offenses not defined as a permanent or interim disqualifying criminal offenses, such as theft or larceny. More specifically, TSA’s implementing regulations provide, in part, that with respect to threat assessments, TSA may determine that an applicant poses a security threat if the search conducted reveals extensive foreign or domestic criminal convictions, a conviction for a serious crime not listed as a permanent or interim disqualifying offense, or a period of foreign or domestic imprisonment that exceeds 365 consecutive days. Thus, if a person was convicted of multiple crimes, even if each of the crimes were not in and of themselves disqualifying, the number and type of convictions could be disqualifying.

Although TSA has the discretion and authority to consider criminal offenses not defined as a disqualifying offense, such as larceny and theft, and periods of imprisonment, TSA has not developed a definition for what extensive foreign or domestic criminal convictions means, or developed guidance to ensure that adjudicators apply this authority consistently in assessing the totality of an individual’s criminal record. For example, TSA has not developed guidance or benchmarks for adjudicators to consistently apply when reviewing TWIC applicants with extensive criminal convictions but no disqualifying offense. This is particularly important given TSA’s reasoning for including this authority in TWIC- related regulation. Specifically, TSA noted that it understands that the flexibility this language provides must be used cautiously and on the basis of compelling information that can withstand judicial review. They further noted that the decision to determine whether an applicant poses a threat under this authority is largely a subjective judgment based on many facts and circumstances.

While TSA does not track metrics on the number of TWICs provided to applicants with specific criminal offenses not defined as disqualifying offenses, as of September 8, 2010, the agency reported 460,786 cases where the applicant was approved, but had a criminal record based on the results from the FBI. This represents approximately 27 percent of individuals approved for a TWIC at the time. In each of these cases, the applicant had either a criminal offense not defined as a disqualifying offense or an interim disqualifying offense that was no longer a disqualification based on conviction date or the applicant’s release date from incarceration. Consequently, based on TSA’s background checking procedures, all of these cases would have been reviewed by an adjudicator for consideration as part of the second-level background check because derogatory information had been identified. As such, each of these cases had to be examined and a judgment had to be made as to whether to deny an applicant a TWIC based on the totality of the offenses contained in each applicant’s criminal report.

While there were 460,786 cases where the applicant was approved, but had a criminal record, TSA reports to have taken steps to deny 1 TWIC applicant under this authority. However, in the absence of guidance for the application of this authority, it is not clear how TSA applied this authority in approving the 460,786 applications and denying the 1. Internal control standards call for controls and other significant events to be clearly documented in directives, policies, or manuals to help ensure operations are carried out as intended.

According to TSA officials, the agency has not implemented guidance for adjudicators to follow on how to apply this discretion in a consistent manner because they are confident that the adjudicators would, based on their own judgment, identify all applicants where the authority to deny a TWIC based on the totality of all offenses should be applied. However, in the absence of criteria, we were unable to analyze or compare how the approximately 30 adjudicators who are assigned to the TWIC program at any given time made determinations about TWIC applicants with extensive criminal histories. Given that 27 percent of TWIC holders have been convicted of at least one nondisqualifying offense, defining what extensive criminal convictions means and developing guidance or criteria for how adjudicators should apply this discretionary authority could help provide TSA with reasonable assurance that applications are consistently adjudicated. Defining terms and developing guidance is consistent with internal control standards.

TWIC Program Controls Are Not Designed to Provide Reasonable Assurance That TWIC Holders Have Maintained Their Eligibility Once Issued TWICs

DHS’s defined mission needs for TWIC include identifying individuals who fail to maintain their eligibility requirements once issued a TWIC, and immediately revoking the individual’s card privileges. Pursuant to TWIC- related regulations, an individual may be disqualified from holding a TWIC and be required to surrender the TWIC to TSA for failing to meet certain eligibility criteria related to, for example, terrorism, crime, and immigration status. However, weaknesses exist in the design of the TWIC program’s internal controls for identifying individuals who fail to maintain their eligibility that make it difficult for TSA to provide reasonable assurance that TWIC holders continue to meet all eligibility requirements.

Controls are not designed to determine whether TWIC holders have committed disqualifying crimes at the federal or state level after being granted a TWIC. TSA conducts a name-based check of TWIC holders against federal wants and warrants on an ongoing basis. According to FBI and TSA officials, policy and statutory provisions hamper the program from running the broader FBI fingerprint-based check using the fingerprints collected at enrollment on an ongoing basis. More specifically, because the TWIC background check is considered to be for a noncriminal justice purpose, to conduct an additional fingerprint-based check as part of an ongoing TWIC background check, TSA would have to collect a new set of fingerprints from the TWIC- holder, if the prints are more than 1 year old, and submit those prints to the FBI each time they want to assess the TWIC-holder’s criminal history. According to TSA officials, it would be cost prohibitive to run the fingerprint-based check on an ongoing basis, as TSA would have to pay th FBI $17 .25 per check.

Although existing policies may hamper TSA’s ability to check FBI-held fingerprint-based criminal history records for the TWIC program, TSA has not explored alternatives for addressing this weakness, such as informing facility and port operators of this weakness and identifying solutions for leveraging existing state criminal history information, where available. For instance, state maritime organizations may have other mechanisms at their disposal for helping to identify TWIC-holders who may no longer meet TWIC qualification requirements. Specifically, laws governing the maritime environment in New York and New Jersey provide for credentialing authorities being notified if licensed or registered longshoremen have been arrested. Further, other governing entities, such as the State of Florida and the Alabama State Port Authority, have access to state-based criminal records checks. While TSA may not have direct access to criminal history records, TSA could compensate for this control weakness, for example, by leveraging existing mechanisms available to maritime stakeholders across the country to better ensure that only qualified individuals retain TWICs.

Controls are not designed to provide reasonable assurance that TWIC holders continue to meet immigration status eligibility requirements. If a TWIC holder’s stated period of legal presence in the United States is about to expire or has expired, the TWIC program does not request or require proof from TWIC holders to show that they continue to maintain legal presence in the United States. Additionally, although they have the regulatory authority to do so, the program does not issue TWICs for a term less than 5 years to match the expiration of a visa. Instead, TSA relies on (1) TWIC holders to self-report if they no longer have legal presence in the country, and (2) employers to report if a worker is no longer legally present in the country. As we have previously reported, government programs for granting benefits to individuals face challenges in confirming an individual’s immigration status. TWIC program officials stated that the program uses a United States Citizenship and Immigration Services system during the background checking process prior to issuing a TWIC as a method for confirming the legal status of non-U.S. citizens. TSA has not, however, consistent with internal control standards, implemented alternative controls to compensate for this limitation and provide reasonable assurance that TWIC holders remain eligible. For instance, the TWIC program has not compensated for this limitation by (1) using its authority to issue TWICs with shorter expiration dates to correspond with each individual’s legal presence, or (2) updating the TWIC system to systematically suspend TWIC privileges for individuals who no longer meet immigration eligibility requirements until they can provide evidence of continued legal presence.

TWIC program officials stated that implementing these compensating measures would be too costly, but they have not conducted an assessment to identify the costs of implementing these controls, or determined if the benefits of mitigating related security risks would outweigh those costs, consistent with internal control standards. Not implementing such measures could result in a continued risk of individuals no longer meeting TWIC legal presence requirements continuing to hold a federally issued identity document and gaining unescorted access to secure areas of MTSA- regulated facilities and vessels. Thus, implementing compensating measures, to the extent that the benefits outweigh the costs and meet the program’s defined mission needs, could provide TSA, the Coast Guard, and MTSA-regulated stakeholders with reasonable assurance that each TWIC holder continues to meet TWIC-related eligibility requirements.

Internal Control Weaknesses in TWIC Enrollment, Background Checking, and Use Could Have Contributed to Breach of MTSA-Regulated Ports

As of January 7, 2011, the Coast Guard reports that it has identified 11 known attempts to circumvent TWIC requirements for gaining unescorted access to MTSA-regulated areas by presenting counterfeit TWICs. The Coast Guard further reports to have identified 4 instances of individuals presenting another person’s TWIC as their own in attempts to gain access. Further, our investigators conducted covert tests to assess the use of TWIC as a means for controlling access to secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities. During covert tests of TWIC at several selected ports, our investigators were successful in accessing ports using counterfeit TWICs, authentic TWICs acquired through fraudulent means, and false business cases (i.e., reasons for requesting access). Our investigators did not gain unescorted access to a port where a secondary port specific identification was required in addition to the TWIC.

In response to our covert tests, TSA and Coast Guard officials stated that, while a TWIC card is required for gaining unescorted access to secure areas of a MTSA-regulated facility, the card alone is not sufficient. These officials stated that the cardholder is also required to present a business case, which security officials at facilities must consider as part of granting the individual access. In addition, according to DHS’s Screening Coordination Office, a credential is only one layer of a multilayer process to increase security. Other layers of security might include onsite law enforcement, security personnel, cameras, locked doors and windows, alarm systems, gates, and turnstiles. Thus, a weakness in the implementation of TWIC will not guarantee access to the secure areas of a MTSA-regulated port or facility.

However, as our covert tests demonstrated, having an authentic TWIC and a legitimate business case were not always required in practice. The investigators’ possession of TWIC cards provided them with the appearance of legitimacy and facilitated their unescorted entry into secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities and ports at multiple locations across the country. If individuals are able to acquire authentic TWICs fraudulently, verifying the authenticity of these cards with a biometric reader will not reduce the risk of undesired individuals gaining unescorted access to the secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels.

Given existing internal control weaknesses, conducting a control assessment of the TWIC program’s processes to address existing weaknesses could enhance the TWIC program’s ability to prevent and detect fraud and positively identify TWIC applicants. Such an assessment could better position DHS in strengthening the program to ensure it achieves its objectives in controlling unescorted access to MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels. It could also help DHS identify and implement the minimum controls needed to (1) positively identify individuals, (2) provide reasonable assurance that control weaknesses in one area of the program would not undermine the reliability of other program areas or impede the program from meeting mission needs, and (3) provide reasonable assurance that the threat assessments are based on complete and accurate information. Such actions would be consistent with internal control standards, which highlight the need for capturing information needed to meet program objectives; determining that relevant, reliable, and timely information is available for management decision-making purposes; and designing internal controls to provide reasonable assurance that compliance with applicable laws and regulations is being achieved, as part of implementing effective controls. Moreover, our prior work on internal controls has shown that management should design and implement internal controls based on the related costs and benefits and continually assess and evaluate its internal controls to assure that the controls being used are effective and updated when necessary.

TWIC’s Effectiveness at Enhancing Security Has Not Been Assessed, and the Coast Guard Lacks the Ability to Assess Trends in TWIC Compliance

The TWIC program is intended to improve maritime security by using a federally sponsored credential to enhance access controls to secure areas at MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels, but DHS has not assessed the program’s effectiveness at enhancing security. In addition, Coast Guard’s approach for monitoring and enforcing TWIC compliance nationwide could be improved by enhancing its collection and assessment of related maritime security information. For example, the Coast Guard tracks TWIC program compliance, but the processes involved in the collection, cataloguing, and querying of information cannot be relied on to produce the management information needed to assess trends in compliance with the TWIC program or associated vulnerabilities.

TWIC Has Not Been Assessed to Measure Effectiveness at Enhancing Security

DHS asserted in its 2009 and 2010 budget submissions that the absence of the TWIC program would leave America’s critical maritime port facilities vulnerable to terrorist activities. However, to date, DHS has not assessed the effectiveness of TWIC at enhancing security or reducing risk for MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels. Such assessments are consistent with DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan, which recognizes that metrics and other evaluation procedures should be used to measure progress and assess the effectiveness of programs designed to protect key assets. Further, DHS has not demonstrated that TWIC, as currently implemented and planned with readers, is more effective than prior approaches used to limit access to ports and facilities, such as using facility specific identity credentials with business cases. According to TSA and Coast Guard officials, because the program was mandated by Congress as part of MTSA, DHS did not conduct a risk assessment to identify and mitigate program risks prior to implementation. Further, according to these officials, neither the Coast Guard nor TSA analyzed the potential effectiveness of TWIC in reducing or mitigating security risk— either before or after implementation—because they were not required to do so by Congress. Rather, DHS assumed that the TWIC program’s enrollment and background checking procedures were effective and would not allow unqualified individuals to acquire and retain authentic TWICs.

The internal control weaknesses that we discuss earlier in the report, as well as the results of our covert tests of TWIC use, raise questions about the effectiveness of the TWIC program. According to the Coast Guard official responsible for conducting assessments of maritime risk, it may now be possible to assess TWIC effectiveness and the extent to which, or if, TWIC use could enhance security using current Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) data. Since MSRAM’s deployment in 2005, the Coast Guard has used its MSRAM to help inform decisions on how to best secure our nation’s ports and how to best allocate limited resources to reduce terrorist risks in the maritime environment. Moreover, as we have previously reported, Congress also needs information on whether and in what respects a program is working well or poorly to support its oversight of agencies and their budgets, and agencies’ stakeholders need performance information to accurately judge program effectiveness. Conducting an effectiveness assessment that evaluates whether use of TWIC in its present form and planned use with readers would enhance the posture of security beyond efforts already in place given costs and program risks could better position DHS and policymakers in determining the impact of TWIC on enhancing maritime security.

Further, pursuant to executive branch requirements, prior to issuing a new regulation, agencies are to conduct a regulatory analysis, which is to include an assessment of costs, benefits, and associated risks. Prior to issuing the regulation on implementing the use of TWIC as a flashpass, DHS conducted a regulatory analysis, which asserted that TWIC would increase security. The analysis included an evaluation of the costs and benefits related to implementing TWIC. However, DHS did not conduct a risk-informed cost-benefit analysis that considered existing security risks. For example, the analysis did not account for the costs and security risks associated with designing program controls to prevent an individual from acquiring an authentic TWIC using a fraudulent identity and limiting access to secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels to those with a legitimate need, in accordance with stated mission needs. As a proposed regulation on the use of TWIC with biometric card readers is under development, DHS is to issue a new regulatory analysis. Conducting a regulatory analysis using the information from the internal control and effectiveness assessments as the basis for evaluating the costs, benefits, security risks, and needed corrective actions could better inform and enhance the reliability of the new regulatory analysis. Moreover, these actions could help DHS identify and assess the full costs and benefits of implementing the TWIC program in a manner that will meet stated mission needs and mitigate existing security risks, and help ensure that the TWIC program is more effective and cost-efficient than existing measures or alternatives at enhancing maritime security.

Coast Guard’s Approach for Monitoring and Enforcing TWIC Compliance Could Be Improved by Enhancing Its Collection and Assessment of Maritime Security Information

Internal control standards state that (1) internal controls should be designed to ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of normal operations, and (2) information should be communicated in a form and within a time frame that enables management to carry out its internal control responsibilities. Further, our prior work has stated that Congress also needs information on whether and in what respects a program is working well or poorly to support its oversight of agencies and their budgets, and agencies’ stakeholders need performance information to accurately judge program effectiveness. The Coast Guard uses its Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) database to meet these needs by recording activities related to MTSA-regulated facility and vessel oversight, including observations of TWIC-related deficiencies. The purpose of MISLE is to provide the capability to collect, maintain, and retrieve information necessary for the administration, management, and documentation of Coast Guard activities. In February 2008, we reported that flaws in the data in MISLE limit the Coast Guard’s ability to accurately portray and appropriately target oversight activities.

In accordance with Coast Guard policy, Coast Guard inspectors are required to verify TWIC cards during annual compliance exams and security spot checks, and may do so in the course of other Coast Guard duties. As part of each inspection, Coast Guard inspectors are, among other things, to: (1) ensure that the card is authentic by examining it to visually verify that it has not been tampered with; (2) verify identity by comparing the photograph on the card with the TWIC holder to ensure a match; (3) check the card’s physical security features; and (4) ensure the TWIC is valid—a check of the card’s expiration date. Additionally, Coast Guard inspectors are to assess the proficiency of facility and vessel security personnel in complying with TWIC requirements through various means including oral examination, actual observation, and record review. Coast Guard inspectors randomly select workers to check their TWICs during inspections. The number of TWIC cards checked is left to the discretion of the inspectors.

As of December 17, 2010, according to Coast Guard data, 2,135 facilities have undergone at least 2 MTSA inspections as part of annual compliance exams and spot checks. In reviewing the Coast Guard’s records of TWIC- related enforcement actions, we found that, in addition to verifying the number of inspections conducted, the Coast Guard is generally positioned to verify that TWIC cards are being checked by Coast Guard inspectors and, of the card checks that are recorded, the number of cardholders who are compliant and noncompliant. For instance, the Coast Guard reported inspecting 129,464 TWIC holders’ cards from May 2009 through January 6, 2011. The Coast Guard reported that 124,203 of the TWIC holders, or 96 percent, were found to be compliant—possessed a valid TWIC. However, according to Coast Guard officials, local Coast Guard inspectors may not always or consistently record all inspection attempts. Consequently, while Coast Guard officials told us that inspectors verify TWICs as part of all security inspections, the Coast Guard could not reliably provide the number of TWICs checked during each inspection.

Since the national compliance deadline in April 2009 requiring TWIC use at MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels, the Coast Guard has not identified major concerns with TWIC implementation nationally. However, while the Coast Guard uses MISLE to track program compliance, because of limitations in the MISLE system design, the processes involved in the collection, cataloguing, and querying of information cannot be relied upon to produce the management information needed to assess trends in compliance with the TWIC program or associated vulnerabilities. For instance, when inspectors document a TWIC card verification check, the system is set up to record the number of TWICs reviewed for different types of workers and whether the TWIC holders are compliant or noncompliant. However, other details on TWIC-related deficiencies, such as failure to ensure that all facility personnel with security duties are familiar with all relevant aspects of the TWIC program and how to carry them out, are not recorded in the system in a form that allows inspectors or other Coast Guard officials to easily and systematically identify that a deficiency was related to TWIC. For example, from January 2009 through December 2010, the Coast Guard reported issuing 145 enforcement actions as a result of annual compliance exams or security spot checks at the 2,135 facilities that have undergone the inspections. These included 57 letters of warning, 40 notices of violation, 32 civil penalties, and 16 operations controls (suspension or restriction of operations). However, it would be labor-intensive for the Coast Guard to identify how many of the 57 letters of warning or 40 notices of violation were TWIC related, according to a Coast Guard official responsible for TWIC compliance, because there is not an existing query designed to extract this information from the system. Someone would have to manually review each of the 97 inspection reports in the database indicating either a letter of warning or a notice of violation to verify whether or not the deficiencies were TWIC related. As such, the MISLE system is not designed to readily provide information that could help management measure and assess the overall level of compliance with the TWIC program or existing vulnerabilities.

According to a Coast Guard official responsible for TWIC compliance, Coast Guard headquarters staff has not conducted a trend analysis of the deficiencies found during reviews and inspections and there are no other analyses they planned to conduct regarding enforcement until after readers are required to be used. According to the Coast Guard, it can generally identify the number of TWICs checked and recorded in the MISLE system. However, it cannot perform trend analysis of the deficiencies as it would like to do, as it requires additional information. In the interim, as of January 7, 2011, the Coast Guard reported deploying 164 handheld biometric readers nationally to units responsible for conducting inspections. These handheld readers are intended to be the Coast Guard’s primary means of TWIC verification. During inspections, Coast Guard inspectors use the card readers to electronically check TWICs inthree ways: (1) verification—a biometric one-to-one match of the fingerprint; (2) authentication—electronically confirming that the certificates on the credential are authentic; and (3) validation— electronically check the card against the “hotlist” of invalid or revoked cards. The Coast Guard believes that the use of these readers during inspections will greatly improve the effectiveness of enforcement efforts and enhance record keeping through the use of the readers’ logs.

As a result of limitations in MISLE design and the collection and recording of inspection data, it will be difficult for the Coast Guard to identify trends nationwide in TWIC-related compliance, such as whether particular types of facilities or a particular region of the country have greater levels of noncompliance, on an ongoing basis. Coast Guard officials acknowledged these deficiencies and reported that they are in the process of making enhancements to the MISLE database and plan to distribute updated guidance on how to collect and input information into MISLE to the Captains of the Port. However, as of January 2011, the Coast Guard had not yet set a date for implementing these changes. Further, while this is a good first step, these enhancements do not address weaknesses related to the collection process and querying of MISLE information so as to facilitate the Coast Guard performing trend analysis of the deficiencies as part of its compliance reviews. By designing and implementing a cost- effective and practical method for collecting, cataloging, and querying TWIC-related compliance information, the Coast Guard could be better positioned to identify and assess TWIC-related compliance and enforcement trends, and to obtain management information needed to assess and understand existing vulnerabilities with the use of TWIC.

Conclusions

As the TWIC program continues on the path to full implementation—with potentially billions of dollars needed to install TWIC card readers in thousands of the nation’s ports, facilities, and vessels at stake—it is important that Congress, program officials, and maritime industry stakeholders fully understand the program’s potential benefits and vulnerabilities, as well as the likely costs of addressing these potential vulnerabilities. Identified internal control weaknesses and vulnerabilities include weaknesses in controls related to preventing and detecting identity fraud, assessing the security threat that individuals with extensive criminal histories pose prior to issuing a TWIC, and ensuring that TWIC holders continue to meet program eligibility requirements. Thus, conducting an internal control assessment of the program by analyzing controls, identifying related weaknesses and risks, and determining cost- effective actions to correct or compensate for these weaknesses could better position DHS to provide reasonable assurance that control weaknesses do not impede the program from meeting mission needs.

In addition, conducting an effectiveness assessment could help provide reasonable assurance that the use of TWIC enhances the posture of security beyond efforts already in place or identify the extent to which TWIC may possibly introduce security vulnerabilities because of the way it has been designed and implemented. This assessment, along with the internal controls assessment, could be used to enhance the regulatory analysis to be conducted as part of implementing a regulation on the use of TWIC with readers. More specifically, considering identified security risks and needed corrective actions as part of the regulatory analysis could provide insights on the full costs and benefits of implementing the TWIC program in a manner that will meet stated mission needs and mitigate existing security risks. This is important because, unlike prior access control approaches which allowed access to a specific facility, the TWIC potentially facilitates access to thousands of facilities once the federal government attests that the TWIC holder has been positively identified and is deemed not to be a security threat. Further, doing so as part of the regulatory analysis could better assure DHS, Congress, and maritime stakeholders that TWIC program security objectives will be met. Finally, by designing and implementing a cost-effective and practical method for collecting, cataloging, and querying TWIC-related compliance information, the Coast Guard could be better positioned to identify trends and to obtain management information needed to assess and understand existing vulnerabilities with the use of TWIC.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To identify effective and cost-efficient methods for meeting TWIC program objectives, and assist in determining whether the benefits of continuing to implement and operate the TWIC program in its present form and planned use with readers surpass the costs, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following four actions: Perform an internal control assessment of the TWIC program by (1) analyzing existing controls, (2) identifying related weaknesses and risks, and (3) determining cost-effective actions needed to correct or compensate for those weaknesses so that reasonable assurance of meeting TWIC program objectives can be achieved. This assessment should consider weaknesses we identified in this report among other things, and include: strengthening the TWIC program’s controls for preventing and detecting identity fraud, such as requiring certain biographic information from applicants and confirming the information to the extent needed to positively identify the individual, or implementing alternative mechanisms to positively identify individuals; defining the term extensive criminal history for use in the adjudication process and ensuring that adjudicators follow a clearly defined and consistently applied process, with clear criteria, in considering the approval or denial of a TWIC for individuals with extensive criminal convictions not defined as permanent or interim disqualifying offenses; and identifying mechanisms for detecting whether TWIC holders continue to meet TWIC disqualifying criminal offense and immigration-related eligibility requirements after TWIC issuance to prevent unqualified individuals from retaining and using authentic TWICs.

Conduct an effectiveness assessment that includes addressing internal control weaknesses and, at a minimum, evaluates whether use of TWIC in its present form and planned use with readers would enhance the posture of security beyond efforts already in place given costs and program risks.

Use the information from the internal control and effectiveness assessments as the basis for evaluating the costs, benefits, security risks, and corrective actions needed to implement the TWIC program in a manner that will meet stated mission needs and mitigate existing security risks as part of conducting the regulatory analysis on implementing a new regulation on the use of TWIC with biometric card readers.

Direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to design effective methods for collecting, cataloguing, and querying TWIC-related compliance issues to provide the Coast Guard with the enforcement information needed to assess trends in compliance with the TWIC program and identify associated vulnerabilities.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security for review and comment on March 18, 2011. DHS provided written comments on behalf of the Department, the Transportation Security Administration, and the United States Coast Guard, which are reprinted in full in appendix IV. In commenting on our report, DHS stated that it concurred with our four recommendations and identified actions planned or under way to implement them.

While DHS did not take issue with the results of our work, DHS did provide new details in its response that merit additional discussion. First, DHS noted that it is working to strengthen controls around applicant identity verification in TWIC, but that document fraud is a vulnerability to credential-issuance programs across the federal government, state and local governments, and the private sector. DHS further noted that a governmentwide infrastructure does not exist for information sharing across all entities that issue documents that other programs, such as TWIC, use to positively authenticate an individual’s identity. We acknowledge that such a government-wide infrastructure does not exist, and, as discussed in our report, recognize that there are inherent weaknesses in relying on identity documents alone to confirm an individual’s identity. However, positively identifying individuals—or confirming their identity—and determining their eligibility for a TWIC is a key stated program goal. Issuing TWICs to individuals without positively identifying them and subsequently assuring their eligibility could, counter to the program’s intent, create a security vulnerability. While we recognize that additional costs could be imposed by requiring positive identification checks, taking actions to strengthen the existing identity authentication process, such as only accepting documents that TSA can and does confirm to be authentic with the issuing agency, and verifying an applicant’s business need, could enhance TWIC program efforts to prevent and detect identity fraud and enhance maritime security.

Second, DHS stated that it is working to continually verify TWIC-holder eligibility after issuance but also noted the limitations in the current process. While TSA does receive some criminal history records information when it sends fingerprints to the FBI, the information is not provided recurrently, nor is the information necessarily complete. DHS stated that to provide the most robust recurrent vetting against criminal records, TSA would need access to additional state and federal systems, and have additional authority to do so. As we reported, FBI and TWIC officials stated that because the TWIC background check is considered to be for a noncriminal justice purpose, policy and statutory provisions hamper the program from running the broader FBI fingerprint-based check using the fingerprints collected at enrollment on an ongoing basis. However, we continue to believe that TSA could compensate for this weakness by leveraging existing mechanisms available to maritime stakeholders. For example, other governing entities—such as the Alabama State Port Authority—that have an interest in ensuring the security of the maritime environment, might be willing to establish a mechanism for independently sharing relevant information when warranted. Absent efforts to leverage available information sources, TSA may not be successful in tempering existing limitations.

Lastly, DHS sought clarification on the reporting of our investigators’ success at breaching security at ports during covert testing. Specifically, in its comments, DHS noted that it believes that our report’s focus on access to port areas rather than access to individual facilities can be misleading. DHS noted that we do not report on the number of facilities that our investigators attempted to gain access to within each port area. DHS stated that presenting the breaches in terms of the number of port areas breached rather than the number of facilities paints a more troublesome picture of the actual breaches that occurred. We understand DHS’s concern but continue to believe that the results of our investigators’ work, as reported, fairly and accurately represents the results and significance of the work conducted. The goal of the covert testing was to assess whether or not weaknesses exist at ports with varying characteristics across the nation, not to define the pervasiveness of existing weaknesses by type of facility, volume, or other characteristic. Given the numerous differences across facilities and the lack of publicly available information and related statistics for each of the approximately 2,509 MTSA-regulated facilities, we identified covert testing at the port level to be the proper unit of analysis for our review and reporting purposes. Conducting a detailed assessment of the pervasiveness of existing weaknesses by type of facility, volume, or other characteristics as suggested by DHS would be a more appropriate tasking for the Coast Guard as part of its continuing effort to ensure compliance with TWIC-related regulations.

In addition, with regard to covert testing, DHS further commented that the report does not distinguish among breaches in security using a counterfeit TWIC or an authentic TWIC card obtained with fraudulent documents. DHS noted that because there is no “granularity” with the report as to when a specific card was used, one can be left with the unsupported impression that individual facilities in all cases were failing to implement TWIC visual inspection requirements. For the above noted reason, we did not report on the results of covert testing at the facility level. However, our records show that use of counterfeit TWICs was successful for gaining access to more than one port where our investigators breached security. Our investigators further report that security officers never questioned the authenticity of TWICs presented for acquiring access. Our records show that operations at the locations our investigators breached included cargo, containers, and fuel, among others.

In addition, TSA provided written technical comments, which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration, the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, and appropriate congressional committees. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4379 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII.

Appendix I: Key Steps in the TWIC Enrollment Process

Appendix II: TWIC Program Funding

Range based on a reduced fee of $105.25 per TWIC for workers with current, comparable background checks or a $132.50 fee per TWIC for those without. 010. ral security grant funding subtotal for fiscal year 2007 includes $19.2 million in fiscal year Port ecurity Grant Program funding, $10.8 million in supplemental funding, and $1.5 million in Transit S Security Grant Program funding.

Appendix III: List of Documents U.S.-Born Citizens or Nationals Must Select from to Present When Applying for a TWIC

TWIC applicants who are possessions) and were born inside the United States (or its outlying possessions), must prov e one document from list A or two documents from list B. If two documents from list B are presented, at least one of them must be a government-iss issued driv r’s license, m ilitary citizens of the United States (or its outlying ued photo ID card, ntification, su state identificat .

List

List B

Appendix IV: Criminal Offenses That May Disqualify Applicants from Acquiring a TWIC

Listed below are criminal offenses that can prevent TWIC applicants from being issued a TWIC. Pursuant to TSA implementing regulations, permanent disqualifying offenses are offenses defined in 49 C.F.R. 1572.103(a). Permanent disqualifying offenses that can be waived are those offenses defined in 49 C.F.R. 1572.103(a) for which a waiver can be granted in accordance with 49 C.F.R. 1515.7(a)(i). Interim disqualifying offenses are offenses defined in 49 C.F.R. 1572.103(b) for which the applicant has either been (1) convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, within a 7-year period preceding the TWIC application, or (2) incarcerated for within a 5-year period preceding the TWIC application. Applicants with certain permanent criminal offenses and all interim disqualifying criminal offenses may request a waiver of their disqualification. In general, TSA may issue such a waiver and grant a TWIC if TSA determines that an applicant does not pose a security threat based upon the security threat assessment.

Permanent disqualifying criminal offenses for which no waiver may be granted. 1. Espionage, or conspiracy to commit espionage. 2. Sedition, or conspiracy to commit sedition. 3. Treason, or conspiracy to commit treason. 4. A federal crime of terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g), or comparable state law, or conspiracy to commit such crime.

Permanent disqualifying criminal offenses for which a waiver may be granted. 1. A crime involving a transportation security incident. A transportation security incident is a security incident resulting in a significant loss of life, environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption in a particular area, as defined in 46 U.S.C. § 70101. The term economic disruption does not include a work stoppage or other employee-related action not related to terrorism and resulting from an employer-employee dispute. 2. Improper transportation of a hazardous material under 49 U.S.C. § 5124, or a state law that is comparable. 3. Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution, manufacture, purchase, receipt, transfer, shipping, transporting, import, export, storage of, or dealing in an explosive or explosive device. An explosive or explosive device includes, but is not limited to, an explosive or explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 232(5), 841(c) through 841(f), and 844(j); and a destructive device, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4) and 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f). 4. Murder. 5. Making any threat, or maliciously conveying false information kno the same to be false, concerning the deliverance, placement, or detonation of an explosive or other lethal device in or against a place of public use, a state or government facility, a public transportations system, or an infrastructure facility. 6. Violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations A 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. , or a comparable state law, where one of the predicate acts found by a jury or admitted by the defendant, consists one of the crimes listed in paragraph 49 C.F.R. § 1572.103 (a). 7. Attempt to commit the crimes in paragraphs listed under 49 C.F.R. § 1572.103 (a)(1) through (a)(4). 8. Conspiracy or attempt to commit the crimes in 49 C.F.R. § 1572.103 (a)(5) through (a)(10).

The interim disqualifying felonies. 1. Unlawful possession, use, sale, manufacture, pu receipt, transfer, shipping, transporting, delivery dealing in a firearm or other weapon. A firea includes, but is not limited to, firearms as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) or 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), or items contained on the United States Munitions Import List at 27 CFR § 447.21. rchase, distribution, , import, export of, or . Extortion. 2 3. Dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation, including identity fraud and money laundering where the money laundering is related to a crime described bad checks do not constitute dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation for purposes of this paragraph. in 49 C.F.R. § 1572.103 (a) or (b). Welfare fraud and passing 4. Bribery. 5. Smuggling. 6. Immigration violations. 7. Distribution of, possession with intent to distribute, or importa controlled substance. 8. Arson. 9. Kidnapping or hostage taking. 10. Rape or aggravated sexual abuse. 11. Assault with intent to kill. 12. Robbery. 13. Fraudulent entry into a seaport as described in 18 U.S.C. § 1036, or a comparable state law. 14. Violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq., or a comparable state law, other than the violations listed in paragraph 49 C.F.R. § 1572.103 (a)(10). 15. Conspiracy or attempt to commit the interim disqualifying felonies.

Appendix V: Comparison of Authentic and Counterfeit TWICs

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments Error! No text of specified style in document.

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, David Bruno (Assistant Director), Joseph P. Cruz, Scott Fletcher, Geoffrey Hamilton, Richard Hung, Lemuel Jackson, Linda Miller, Jessica Orr, and Julie E. Silvers made key contributions to this report.