Tax Compliance: Multiple Approaches Are Needed to Reduce the Tax Gap
Released: 2007-01-23T00:00:00

Letter

Background

The tax gap is an estimate of the difference between the taxes—including individual income, corporate income, employment, estate, and excise taxes—that should have been paid voluntarily and on time and what was actually paid for a specific year. The estimate is an aggregate of estimates for the three primary types of noncompliance: (1) underreporting of tax liabilities on tax returns; (2) underpayment of taxes due from filed returns; and (3) nonfiling, which refers to the failure to file a required tax return altogether or on time. IRS’s tax gap estimates for each type of noncompliance include estimates for some or all of the five types of taxes that IRS administers. As shown in table 1, underreporting of tax liabilities accounted for most of the tax gap estimate for tax year 2001.

IRS has estimated the tax gap on multiple occasions, beginning in 1979, relying on its Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP). IRS did not implement any TCMP studies after 1988 because of concerns about costs and burdens on taxpayers. Recognizing the need for current compliance data, in 2002 IRS implemented a new compliance study called the National Research Program (NRP) to produce such data for tax year 2001 while minimizing taxpayer burden.

IRS has concerns with the certainty of the tax gap estimate for tax year 2001 in part because some areas of the estimate rely on old data, IRS has no estimates for other areas of the tax gap, and it is inherently difficult to measure some types of noncompliance. IRS used data from NRP to estimate individual income tax underreporting and the portion of employment tax underreporting attributed to self-employed individuals. The underpayment segment of the tax gap is not an estimate, but rather represents the tax amounts that taxpayers reported on time but did not pay on time. Other areas of the estimate, such as corporate income tax and employer-withheld employment tax underreporting, rely on decades-old data. Also, IRS has no estimates for corporate income, employment, and excise tax nonfiling or for excise tax underreporting. In addition, it is inherently difficult for IRS to observe and measure some types of underreporting or nonfiling, such as tracking cash payments that businesses make to their employees, as businesses and employees may not report these payments to IRS in order to avoid paying employment and income taxes, respectively.

IRS’s overall approach to reducing the tax gap consists of improving service to taxpayers and enhancing enforcement of the tax laws. IRS seeks to improve voluntary compliance through efforts such as education and outreach programs and tax form simplification. IRS uses its enforcement authority to ensure that taxpayers are reporting and paying the proper amounts of taxes through efforts such as examining tax returns and matching the amount of income taxpayers report on their tax returns to the income amounts reported on information returns it receives from third parties. IRS reports that it collected over $48 billion in fiscal year 2006 from noncompliant taxpayers it identified through its various enforcement programs.

In spite of IRS’s efforts to improve taxpayer compliance, the rate at which taxpayers pay their taxes voluntarily and on time has tended to range from around 81 percent to around 84 percent over the past three decades. Any significant reduction of the tax gap would likely depend on an improvement in the level of taxpayer compliance.

Multiple Approaches Are Needed to Reduce the Tax Gap

No single approach is likely to fully and cost-effectively address noncompliance and therefore multiple approaches are likely to be needed. The tax gap has multiple causes; spans five types of taxes; and is spread over several types of taxpayers including individuals, corporations, and partnerships. Thus, for example, while simplifying laws should help when noncompliance is due to taxpayers’ confusion, enforcement may be needed for taxpayers who understand their obligations but decline to fulfill them. Similarly, while devoting more resources to enforcement should increase taxes assessed and collected, too great an enforcement presence likely would not be tolerated.

Simplifying or reforming the tax code, providing IRS more enforcement tools, and devoting additional resources to enforcement are three major tax gap reduction approaches discussed in more detail below, but providing quality services to taxpayers plays an important role in improving compliance and reducing the tax gap. IRS taxpayer services include education and outreach programs, simplifying the tax process, and revising forms and publications to make them electronically accessible and more easily understood by diverse taxpayer communities. For example, if tax forms and instructions are unclear, taxpayers may be confused and make unintentional errors. Quality taxpayer services would also be a key consideration in implementing any of the approaches for tax gap reduction. For example, expanding enforcement efforts would increase interactions with taxpayers, requiring processes to efficiently communicate with taxpayers. Also, changing tax laws and regulations would require educating taxpayers of the new requirements in a clear, timely, and accessible manner. In 2006, we reported that IRS improved its two most commonly used services—telephone and Web site assistance— for the 2006 filing season. Increased funding financed some of the improvements, but a significant portion has been financed internally by efficiencies gained from increased electronic filing of tax returns and other operational improvements.

Although quality service helps taxpayers comply, showing a direct relationship between quality service and compliance levels is very challenging. As required by Congress, IRS is in the midst of a study that is to result in a 5-year plan for taxpayer service activities, which is to include long-term quantitative goals and to balance service and enforcement. Part of the study focuses on the effect of taxpayer service on compliance. A Phase I report was issued in April 2006 and a Phase II report is due in early 2007, which is to include, among other things, a multiyear plan for taxpayer service activities and improvement initiatives.

However, in deciding on the appropriate mix of approaches to use in reducing the tax gap, many factors or issues could affect strategic decisions. Among the broad factors to consider are the likely effectiveness of any approach, fairness, enforceability, and sustainability. Beyond these, our work points to the importance of the following: Measuring compliance levels periodically and setting long-term goals. A data-based plan is one key to closing the tax gap. To the extent that IRS can develop better compliance data, it can develop more effective approaches for reducing the gap. Regularly measuring the magnitude of, and the reasons for, noncompliance provides insights on how to reduce the gap through potential changes to tax laws and IRS programs. In July 2005, we recommended that IRS periodically measure tax compliance, identify reasons for noncompliance, and establish voluntary compliance goals. IRS agreed with the recommendations and established a voluntary tax compliance goal of 85 percent by 2009. Furthermore, we have identified alternative ways to measure compliance, including conducting examinations of small samples of tax returns over multiple years, instead of conducting examinations for a larger sample of returns for one tax year, to allow IRS to track compliance trends annually.

Considering the costs and burdens. Any action to reduce the tax gap will create costs and burdens for IRS; taxpayers; and third parties, such as those who file information returns. For example, withholding and information reporting requirements impose some costs and burdens on those who track and report information. These costs and burdens need to be reasonable in relation to the improvements expected to arise from new compliance strategies.

Evaluating the results. Evaluating the actions taken by IRS to reduce the tax gap would help maximize IRS’s effectiveness. Evaluations can be challenging because it is difficult to isolate the effects of IRS’s actions from other influences on taxpayers’ compliance. Our work has discussed how to address these challenges, for example by using research to link actions with the outputs and desired effects.

Optimizing resource allocation. Developing reliable measures of the return on investment for strategies to reduce the tax gap would help inform IRS resource allocation decisions. IRS has rough measures of return on investment based on the additional taxes it assesses. Developing such measures is difficult because of incomplete data on the costs of enforcement and collected revenues. Beyond direct revenues, IRS’s enforcement actions have indirect revenue effects, which are difficult to measure. However, indirect effects could far exceed direct revenue effects and would be important to consider in connection with continued development of return on investment measures. In general though, the impacts of tax gap reduction by improving voluntary tax compliance can be quite large. For example, if the estimated 83.7 percent voluntary compliance rate that produced a gross tax gap of $345 billion in tax year 2001 had been 85 percent, this tax gap would have been about $28 billion less; if it had been 90 percent, the gap would have been about $133 billion less.

Leveraging technology. Better use of technology could help IRS be more efficient in reducing the tax gap. IRS is modernizing its technology, which has paid off in terms of telephone service, resource allocation, electronic filing, and data analysis capability. However, this ongoing modernization will need strong management and prudent investments to maximize potential efficiencies.

Congress has been encouraging IRS to develop an overall tax gap reduction plan or strategy that could include a mix of approaches like simplifying code provisions, increased enforcement, and reconsidering the level of resources devoted to enforcement. Some progress has been made towards laying out the broad elements of a plan or strategy for reducing the tax gap. On September 26, 2006, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Office of Tax Policy released “A Comprehensive Strategy for Reducing the Tax Gap.” However, the document generally does not identify specific approaches that Treasury and IRS will undertake to reduce the tax gap, the related time frames for such steps, or explanations of how much the tax gap would be reduced. The document said that such additional details the would be part of the fiscal year 2008 IRS budget request that will be deliberated during early 2007 because of the resource implications associated with tax gap reduction.

Reducing the Tax Gap through Tax Simplification or Tax System Reform Depends on Their Design and May Have Effects Beyond Tax Compliance

Tax law simplification and reform both have the potential to reduce the tax gap by billions of dollars. The extent to which the tax gap would be reduced depends on which parts of the tax system would be simplified and in what manner as well as how any reform of the tax system is designed and implemented. Neither approach, however, will eliminate the gap. Further, changes in the tax laws and system to improve tax compliance could have unintended effects on other tax system objectives, such as those involving economic behavior or equity.

Simplification has the potential to reduce the tax gap for at least three broad reasons. First, it could help taxpayers to comply voluntarily with more certainty, reducing inadvertent errors by those who want to comply but are confused because of complexity. Second, it may limit opportunities for tax evasion, reducing intentional noncompliance by taxpayers who can misuse the complex code provisions to hide their noncompliance or to achieve ends through tax shelters. Third, tax code complexity may erode taxpayers’ willingness to comply voluntarily if they cannot understand its provisions or they see others taking advantage of complexity to intentionally underreport their taxes.

Simplification could take multiple forms. One form would be to retain existing laws but make them simpler. For example, in our July 2005 report on postsecondary tax preferences, we noted that the definition of a qualifying postsecondary education expense differed somewhat among some tax code provisions, for instance with some including the cost to purchase books and others not. Making definitions consistent across code provisions may reduce taxpayer errors. Although we cannot say the errors were due to these differences in definitions, in a limited study of paid preparer services to taxpayers, we found some preparers claiming unallowable expenses for books. Further, the Joint Committee on Taxation suggested that such dissimilar definitions may increase the likelihood of taxpayer errors and increase taxpayer frustration.

Another tax code provision in which complexity may have contributed to the individual tax gap involves the earned income tax credit, for which IRS estimated a tax loss of up to about $10 billion for tax year 1999. Although some of this noncompliance may be intentional, we and the National Taxpayer Advocate have previously reported that confusion over the complex rules governing eligibility for claiming the credit could cause taxpayers to fail to comply inadvertently.

Although retaining but simplifying tax code provisions may help reduce the tax gap, doing so may not be easy, may conflict with other policy decisions, and may have unintended consequences. The simplification of the definition of a qualifying child across various code sections is an example. We suggested in the early 1990s that standardizing the definition of a qualifying child could reduce taxpayer errors and reduce their burden. A change was not made until 2004. However, some have suggested that the change has created some unintended consequences, such as increasing some taxpayers’ ability to reduce their taxes in ways Congress may not have intended.

Another form of simplification could be to broaden the tax base while reducing tax rates, which could minimize incentives for not complying. This base- broadening could include a review of whether existing tax expenditures are achieving intended results at a reasonable cost in lost revenue and added burden and eliminating or consolidating those that are not. Among the many causes of tax code complexity is the growing number of preferential provisions in the code, defined in statute as tax expenditures, such as tax exemptions, exclusions, deductions, credits, and deferrals. The number of these tax expenditures has more than doubled from 1974 through 2005. Tax expenditures can contribute to the tax gap if taxpayers claim them improperly. For example, IRS’s recent tax gap estimate includes a $32 billion loss in individual income taxes for tax year 2001 because of noncompliance with these provisions. Simplifying these provisions of the tax code would not likely yield $32 billion in revenue because even simplified provisions likely would have some associated noncompliance. Nevertheless, the estimate suggests that simplification could have important tax gap consequences, particularly if simplification also accounted for any noncompliance that arises because of complexity on the income side of the tax gap for individuals.

Despite the potential benefits that simplification may yield, these credits and deductions serve purposes that Congress has judged to be important to advance federal goals. Eliminating them or consolidating them likely would be complicated, and would likely create winners and losers. Elimination also could conflict with other objectives such as encouraging certain economic activity or improving equity.

Similar trade-offs exist with possible fundamental tax reforms that would move away from an income tax system to some other system, such as a consumption tax, national sales tax, or value added tax. Fundamental tax reform would most likely result in a smaller tax gap if the new system has few tax preferences or complex tax code provisions and if taxable transactions are transparent. However, these characteristics are difficult to achieve in any system and experience suggests that simply adopting a fundamentally different tax system may not by itself eliminate any tax gap. Any tax system could be subject to noncompliance, and its design and operation, including the types of tools made available to tax administrators, will affect the size of any corresponding tax gap. Further, the motivating forces behind tax reform likely include factors beyond tax compliance, such as economic effectiveness, equity, and burden, which could in some cases carry greater weight in designing an alternative tax system than ensuring the highest levels of compliance.

Providing IRS with Additional Enforcement Tools Potentially Could Improve Compliance Significantly, but Identifying and Designing Such Tools Can Be Challenging

Changing the tax laws to provide IRS with additional enforcement tools, such as expanded tax withholding and information reporting, could also reduce the tax gap by many billions of dollars, particularly with regard to underreporting—the largest segment of the tax gap. Tax withholding promotes compliance because employers or other parties subtract taxes owed from a taxpayer’s income and remit them to IRS. Information reporting tends to lead to high levels of compliance because income taxpayers earn is transparent to them and IRS. In both cases, high levels of compliance tend to be maintained over time. Also, withholding and information reporting help IRS to better identify noncompliant taxpayers and prioritize contacting them, which enables IRS to better allocate its resources. However, designing new withholding or information reporting requirements to address underreporting can be challenging given that many types of income are already subject to at least some form of withholding or information reporting, underreporting exists in varied forms, and the requirements could impose costs and burdens on third parties.

Taxpayers tend to report income subject to tax withholding or information reporting with high levels of compliance, as shown in figure 1, because the income is transparent to the taxpayers as well as to IRS. Additionally, once withholding or information reporting requirements are in place for particular types of income, compliance tends to remain high over time. For example, for wages and salaries, which are subject to tax withholding and substantial information reporting, the percentage of income that taxpayers misreport has consistently been measured at around 1 percent over time.

In the past, we have identified a few specific areas where additional withholding or information reporting requirements could serve to improve compliance: Require more data on information returns dealing with capital gains income from securities sales. Recently, we reported that an estimated 36 percent of taxpayers misreported their capital gains or losses from the sale of securities, such as corporate stocks and mutual funds. Further, around half of the taxpayers who misreported did so because they failed to report the securities’ cost, or basis, sometimes because they did not know the securities’ basis or failed to take certain events into account that required them to adjust the basis of their securities. When taxpayers sell securities like stock and mutual funds through brokers, the brokers are required to report information on the sale, including the amount of gross proceeds the taxpayer received; however, brokers are not required to report basis information for the sale of these securities. We found that requiring brokers to report basis information for securities sales could improve taxpayers’ compliance in reporting their securities gains and losses and help IRS identify noncompliant taxpayers. However, we were unable to estimate the extent to which a basis reporting requirement would reduce the capital gains tax gap because of limitations with the compliance data on capital gains and because neither IRS nor we know the portion of the capital gains tax gap attributed to securities sales.

Requiring tax withholding and more or better information return reporting on payments made to independent contractors. Past IRS data have shown that independent contractors report 97 percent of the income that appears on information returns, while contractors that do not receive these returns report only 83 percent of income. We have also identified other options for improving information reporting for independent contractors, including increasing penalties for failing to file required information returns, lowering the $600 threshold for requiring such returns, and requiring businesses to report separately on their tax returns the total amount of payments to independent contractors.

Requiring information return reporting on payments made to corporations. Unlike payments made to sole proprietors, payments made to corporations for services are generally not required to be reported on information returns. IRS and GAO have contended that the lack of such a requirement leads to lower levels of compliance for small corporations. Although Congress has required federal agencies to provide information returns on payments made to contractors since 1997, payments made by others to corporations are generally not covered by information returns. Information reporting helps IRS to better allocate its resources to the extent that it helps IRS better identify noncompliant taxpayers and the potential for additional revenue that could be obtained by contacting these taxpayers. For example, IRS officials told us that receiving information on basis for taxpayers’ securities sales would allow IRS to determine more precisely taxpayers’ income for securities sales through its document matching programs and would allow it to identify which taxpayers who misreported securities income have the greatest potential for additional tax assessments. Similarly, IRS could use basis information to improve both aspects of its examination program—examinations of tax returns through correspondence and examinations of tax returns face to face with the taxpayer. Currently, capital gains issues are too complex and time consuming for IRS to examine through correspondence. However, IRS officials told us that receiving cost basis information might enable IRS to examine noncompliant taxpayers through correspondence because it could productively select tax returns to examine. Also, having cost basis information could help IRS identify the best cases to examine face to face, making the examinations more productive while simultaneously reducing the burden imposed on compliant taxpayers who otherwise would be selected for examination.

Although withholding and information reporting lead to high levels of compliance, designing new requirements to address underreporting could be challenging given that many types of income, including wages and salaries, dividend and interest income, and income from pensions and Social Security are already subject to withholding or substantial information reporting. Also, challenges arise in establishing new withholding or information reporting requirements for certain other types of income that are extensively underreported. Such underreporting may be difficult to determine because of complex tax laws or transactions or the lack of a practical and reliable third-party source to provide information on the taxable income.

For example, while withholding or information reporting mechanisms on nonfarm sole proprietor and informal supplier income would likely improve their compliance, comprehensive mechanisms that are practical and effective are difficult to identify. As shown in figure 1, this income is not subject to information reporting, and these taxpayers misreported about half of the income they earned for tax year 2001. Informal suppliers by definition receive income in an informal manner through services they provide to a variety of individual citizens or small businesses. Whereas businesses may have the capacity to perform withholding and information reporting functions for their employees, it may be challenging to extend withholding or information reporting responsibilities to the individual citizens that receive services, who may not have the resources or knowledge to comply with such requirements.

Finally, implementing tax withholding and information reporting requirements generally imposes costs and burdens on the businesses that must implement them, and, in some cases, on taxpayers. For example, expanding information reporting on securities sales to include basis information will impose costs on the brokers who would track and report the information. Further, trying to close the entire tax gap with these enforcement tools could entail more intrusive recordkeeping or reporting than the public is willing to accept.

Devoting Additional Resources to Enforcement Likely Could Reduce the Tax Gap, but to What Extent Is Difficult to Predict

Devoting more resources to enforcement has the potential to help reduce the tax gap by billions of dollars, as IRS would be able to expand its enforcement efforts to reach a greater number of potentially noncompliant taxpayers. However, determining the appropriate level of enforcement resources to provide IRS requires taking into account many factors, such as how effectively and efficiently IRS is currently using its resources, how to strike the proper balance between IRS’s taxpayer service and enforcement activities, and competing federal funding priorities. If Congress were to provide IRS more enforcement resources, the amount of the tax gap that could be reduced depends in part on the size of any increase in IRS’s budget, how IRS would manage any additional resources, and the indirect increase in taxpayers’ voluntary compliance that would likely result from expanded IRS enforcement.

Given resource constraints, IRS is unable to contact millions of additional taxpayers for whom it has evidence of potential noncompliance. With additional resources, IRS would be able to assess and collect additional taxes and further reduce the tax gap. In 2002, IRS estimated that a $2.2 billion funding increase would allow it to take enforcement actions against potentially noncompliant taxpayers it identifies but cannot contact and would yield an estimated $30 billion in revenue. For example, IRS estimated that it contacted about 3 million of the over 13 million taxpayers it identified as potentially noncompliant through its matching of tax returns to information returns. IRS estimated that contacting the additional 10 million potentially noncompliant taxpayers it identified, at a cost of about $230 million, could yield nearly $7 billion in potentially collectible revenue. We did not evaluate the accuracy of the estimate, and as will be discussed below, many factors suggest that it is difficult to estimate reliably net revenue increases that might come from additional enforcement efforts.

Although additional enforcement funding has the potential to reduce the tax gap, the extent to which it would help depends on several factors. First, and perhaps most obviously, the amount of tax gap reduction would depend in part on the size of any budget increase. Generally, larger budget increases should result in larger reductions in the tax gap. The degree to which revenues would increase from expanded enforcement depends on many variables, such as how quickly IRS can ramp up efforts, how well IRS selects the best cases to be worked, and how taxpayers react to enforcement efforts. Estimating those revenue increases would require assumptions about these and other variables. Because actual experience is likely to diverge from those assumptions, the actual revenue increases are likely to differ from the estimates. The lack of reliable key data compounds the difficulty of estimating the likely revenues. To the extent possible, obtaining better data on key variables would provide a better understanding of the likely results with any increased enforcement resources.

With additional resources for enforcement, IRS would be able to assess and collect additional taxes, but the related tax gap reductions may not be immediate. If IRS uses the resources to hire more enforcement staff, the reductions may occur gradually as IRS is able to hire and train the staff. Also, several years can elapse after IRS assesses taxes before it actually collects these taxes.

Similarly, the amounts of taxes actually collected can vary substantially from the related tax amounts assessed through enforcement actions by the type of tax or taxpayer involved. In a 1998 report, we found that 5 years after taxes were assessed against individual taxpayers with business income, 48 percent of the assessed taxes had been collected, whereas for the largest corporate taxpayers, 97 percent of assessed taxes had been collected.

Over the last 2 years, IRS has requested and received additional funding targeted for enforcement activities that it estimated will result in additional revenue. In its fiscal year 2007 budget request, IRS requested an approximate 2 percent increase in funding from fiscal year 2006 to expand its enforcement efforts, including tax return examination and tax collection activities, with the goal of increasing individual taxpayer compliance and addressing concerns that we and others have raised regarding the erosion of IRS’s enforcement presence. In estimating the revenue that it would obtain from the increased funding, IRS accounted for several factors, including opportunity costs because of training, which draws experienced enforcement personnel away from the field; differences in average enforcement revenue obtained per full-time employee by enforcement activity; and differences in the types and complexity of cases worked by new hires and experienced hires. IRS forecasted that in the first year after expanding enforcement activities, the additional revenue to be collected is less than half the amount to be collected in later years. This example underscores the logic that if IRS is to receive a relatively large funding increase, it likely would be better to provide it in small but steady amounts.

The amount of tax gap reduction likely to be achieved from any budget increase also depends on how well IRS can use information about noncompliance to manage the additional resources. Because IRS does not have compliance data for some segments of the tax gap and others are based on old data, IRS cannot easily track the extent to which compliance is improving or declining. IRS also has concerns with its information on whether taxpayers unintentionally or intentionally fail to comply with the tax laws. Knowing the reasons for taxpayer noncompliance can help IRS decide whether its efforts to address specific areas of noncompliance should focus on nonenforcement activities, such as improved forms or publications, or enforcement activities to pursue intentional noncompliance. To the extent that compliance data are outdated and IRS does not know the reason for taxpayer noncompliance, IRS may be less able to target resources efficiently to achieve the greatest tax gap reduction at the least taxpayer burden.

IRS has taken important steps to better ensure efficient allocation and use. For example, the NRP study has provided better data on which taxpayers are most likely to be noncompliant. IRS is using the data to improve its audit selection processes in hopes of reducing the number of audits that result in no change, which should reduce unnecessary burden on compliant taxpayers and increase enforcement staff productivity (as measured by direct enforcement revenue).

As part of an effort to make the best use of its enforcement resources, IRS has developed rough measures of return on investment in terms of tax revenue that it assesses from uncovering noncompliance. Generally, IRS cites an average return on investment for enforcement of 4:1, that is, IRS estimates that it collects $4 in revenue for every $1 of funding. Where IRS has developed return on investment estimates for specific programs, it finds substantial variation depending on the type of enforcement action. For instance, the ratio of estimated tax revenue gains to additional spending for pursuing known individual tax debts through phone calls is 13:1, versus a ratio of 32:1 for matching the amount of income taxpayers report on their tax returns to the income amounts reported on information returns. In addition to returns on investment estimates being rough, IRS lacks information on the incremental returns on investment from pursuing the “next best case” for some enforcement programs. It is the marginal revenue gain from these cases that matters in estimating the direct revenue from expanded enforcement. Developing such measures is difficult because of incomplete information on all the costs and all the tax revenue ultimately collected from specific enforcement efforts. Because IRS’s current estimates of the revenue effects of additional funding are imprecise, the actual revenue that might be gained from expanding different enforcement efforts is subject to uncertainty.

Given the variation in estimated returns on investment for different types of IRS compliance efforts, the amount of tax gap reduction that may be achieved from an increase in IRS’s resources would depend on how IRS allocates the increase. Although it might be tempting to allocate resources heavily toward areas with the highest estimated return, allocation decisions must take into account diverse and difficult issues. For instance, although one enforcement activity may have a high estimated return, that return may drop off quickly as IRS works its way through potential noncompliance cases. In addition, IRS dedicates examination resources across all types of taxpayers so that all taxpayers receive some signal that noncompliance is being addressed. Further, issues of fairness can arise if IRS focuses its efforts only on particular groups of taxpayers.

Beyond direct tax revenue collection, expanded enforcement efforts could reduce the tax gap even more, as widespread agreement exists that IRS enforcement programs have an indirect effect through increases in voluntary tax compliance. The precise magnitude of the indirect effects of enforcement is not known with a high level of confidence given challenges in measuring compliance; developing reasonable assumptions about taxpayer behavior; and accounting for factors outside of IRS’s actions that can affect taxpayer compliance, such as changes in tax law. However, several research studies have offered insights to help better understand the indirect effects of IRS enforcement on voluntary tax compliance and show that they could exceed the direct effect of revenue obtained.

Concluding Observations

When taxpayers do not pay all of their taxes, honest taxpayers carry a greater burden to fund government programs and the nation is less able to address its long-term fiscal challenges. Thus, reducing the tax gap is important, even though closing the entire tax gap is neither feasible nor desirable because of costs and intrusiveness. All of the approaches I have discussed have the potential to reduce the tax gap alone or in combination, and no single approach is clearly and always superior to the others. As a result, IRS needs a strategy to attack the tax gap on multiple fronts with multiple approaches.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my testimony. I would be happy to answer any question you may have at this time.

Contact and Acknowledgments

For further information on this testimony, please contact Michael Brostek on (202) 512-9110 or brostekm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Tom Short, Assistant Director; Jeff Arkin; and Elizabeth Fan.

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