Combating Terrorism: U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed
Released: 2009-09-29T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is known as the birthplace of Islam and is the site of Islam’s two holiest shrines located in Mecca and Medina. (See figure 1 for a map of Saudi Arabia.) Millions of Muslims from all over the world visit Mecca to undertake the pilgrimages of hajj and umrah. Like hajj, charitable giving, or zakat, is one of the five pillars or duties of Islam. Zakat, a form of tithe or charity payable for those in need, is an annual flat rate of 2.5 percent of a Muslim’s assessable capital. Zakat is broader and more pervasive than Western ideas of charity, functioning as a form of income tax, educational assistance, and foreign aid.

Islam is a source of political legitimacy and guidance for the Saudi government, and the country is governed on the basis of Islamic law or Sharia. As far back as the mid-eighteenth century, the founder of the Saudi ruling dynasty, Muhammad bin Saud, allied himself with the conservative Muslim scholar, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. The teachings of Abdul Wahhab, which called for a strict interpretation of Islam, form the basis of Islam as practiced by the majority of people in Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi government is a monarchy headed by the king of Saudi Arabia, who also serves as the Prime Minister and the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques in Mecca and Medina. The current king is King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud. The king is expected to retain consensus of important elements in Saudi society, such as the Saudi royal family and religious leaders. The Saudi royal family consists of thousands of members, some of whom head government ministries.

In the mid-1940s, Saudi Arabia started large scale oil production, and by the 1970s an increase in oil prices led to a rapid increase in Saudi Arabia’s per capita income, making it comparable to that of developed countries during this time period. In part, this prosperity, combined with the Islamic religious obligation toward charitable giving or zakat, led to the establishment of charitable organizations headquartered in Saudi Arabia, known as multilateral charitable organizations. These organizations— which include the Muslim World League and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth—were established in the 1960s and 1970s by Saudi royal decree to spread Islam and provide humanitarian assistance around the world, and received funds from the Saudi government and citizens.

U.S.-Saudi Relations

Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia have a long historical context. Since the establishment of the modern Saudi state in 1932, and throughout the Cold War, the governments of the United States and Saudi Arabia developed a relationship based on shared interests, including energy production and combating communism. For instance, both Saudi Arabia and the United States became major supporters of the Afghan mujahideen’s struggle against the Soviet invasion in 1979. However, U.S. foreign policies related to the Middle East, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have at times tested U.S.-Saudi government relations and fueled a growing anti-American sentiment among some segments of the Saudi population, as well as in many countries with predominantly Muslim populations. (See figure 2 for more information on the historical development of U.S.-Saudi relations.) As we have reported previously, this negative perception of U.S. foreign policy, as well as other factors such as economic stagnation, a disproportionate youth and young adult population, and repressive and corrupt governments in certain Middle Eastern countries, have contributed to the global spread of an extremist ideology promoting hatred, intolerance, and violence that threatens U.S. national security interests.

According to the U.S. government and experts, some Saudi individuals and charitable organizations have knowingly or unknowingly provided financial assistance for terrorism and violent extremism. For example, according to a report by the 9/11 Commission, some charitable organizations, such as the Saudi-based Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, had been exploited by extremists as funding mechanisms to further their goal of violence against non-Muslims. U.S. government and other expert reports have linked some Saudi donations to the global propagation of religious intolerance and support to terrorist activities. For example, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda have Saudi roots and accumulated millions of dollars using legitimate charities, nongovernmental organizations, and mosques, as well as businesses such as banks and other financial institutions, to help raise and move their funds. However, experts agree that it is difficult to determine the extent to which donors are aware of the ultimate disposition of the funds provided.

Saudi Government Efforts to Combat Terrorism and Terrorism Financing, 2003- 2005

Although the Saudi government took actions to combat terrorists following the September 11, 2001, attacks, Al Qaeda’s attacks against Saudi and U.S. citizens in Saudi Arabia in 2003 and 2004 marked a turning point in the Saudi government’s efforts to combat terrorism and terrorism financing, as the Saudi government came to see Al Qaeda as a threat to the Saudi regime. Between 2003 and 2005, the Saudi government reported that it took a number of actions to combat terrorism and terrorism financing within the Kingdom, some with U.S. assistance, such as increasing the size, training, and professionalism of Saudi security forces. The Saudi and U.S. governments also undertook joint designations of several branches of the Al Haramain Foundation as financiers of terrorism under UN Security Council Resolution 1267. (See appendix III for key Saudi agencies involved in efforts to combat terrorism and terrorism financing within Saudi Arabia.)

U.S. Assistance to Saudi Arabia to Combat Terrorism and Terrorism Financing

Since 2005, several U.S. agencies have conducted training and provided technical assistance to improve the capacity of the Saudi government to combat terrorism and its financing. These efforts have included enhancing the investigative capability of Saudi ministries and assessing the security of Saudi oil installations, among others. U.S. agencies involved in these efforts include DOD, DOE, DHS, DOJ, State, and Treasury, as well as the intelligence community. (See appendix IV for U.S. agencies providing training and technical assistance to Saudi Arabia to counter terrorism and terrorism financing.)

Legislative Reporting Requirements

The Congress has enacted several laws that require U.S. agencies to report on terrorism and terrorism financing issues, including those related to U.S. collaboration with Saudi Arabia. (See table 1 for the selected legislation and its requirements.)

U.S. Government Strategy Is to Create an Active Antiterrorism Coalition with Saudi Arabia, but Some Targets to Measure Progress toward This Goal Have Been Removed

In January 2008, in response to the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, State submitted to the Congress a report on the U.S. strategy to collaborate with and assist Saudi Arabia in areas including countering terrorism and terrorism financing. The goals and objectives contained in the January 2008 document coincide with the plans for collaboration with Saudi Arabia contained in State’s Mission Strategic Plans (MSP) for Saudi Arabia for fiscal years 2006 to 2009. To measure progress toward the goal of building an active antiterrorist coalition, the MSPs contain a number of performance targets; however, some of the targets relating to countering terrorism financing were removed, even though U.S. agencies continue to work on those issues in collaboration with the Saudi government.

U.S. Government Strategy Is to Create an Active Antiterrorism Coalition with Saudi Arabia

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. mission in Saudi Arabia reported expanding its ongoing efforts to collaborate with the government of Saudi Arabia to combat terrorism. State’s MSPs, previously called Mission Performance Plans, for fiscal years 2006 to 2009 contain goals related to expanding the Saudi government’s ability to counter terrorism and preventing financial support to extremists.

According to State documents, the MSP is developed each year by the overseas missions to facilitate long-term diplomatic and assistance planning and provide a strategic plan to set country-level U.S. foreign policy goals, resource requests, and performance targets. State reports that its Washington-based bureaus draw on MSPs to gauge the effectiveness of policies and programs in the field and formulate requests for resources.

In January 2008, State submitted to the Congress a report on U.S. strategy for collaborating with Saudi Arabia on countering terrorism and terrorism financing in response to the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. According to this document, the goal of strengthening the U.S. government’s counterterrorism partnership with Saudi Arabia is to be achieved through bilateral cooperation to enhance the Saudi government’s ability to combat terrorists and to prevent financial support to extremists. The goals and objectives contained in the January 2008 document coincide with the plans for collaboration with Saudi Arabia contained in MSPs for Saudi Arabia. According to State officials, DOD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence approved the 2008 document. Moreover, officials from various agencies we met with—including Treasury, DOJ, and DHS—noted they are active participants in interagency strategic discussions on collaboration with Saudi Arabia regarding countering terrorism and terrorism financing.

According to Saudi officials, the Saudi government agrees with U.S. goals to counter terrorism and terrorism financing in Saudi Arabia. Additionally, Saudi officials told us that generally there has been strong collaboration between U.S. and Saudi agencies, highlighting areas such as information sharing and training of security forces. However, Saudi officials noted some concerns related to U.S. implementation of certain efforts to counter terrorism financing. For example, Saudi officials expressed concern about some designations of individuals and organizations as supporters of terrorism, specifically suggesting that these designations may violate the right to a fair legal process. Additionally, Saudi officials noted concerns regarding past public statements by senior Treasury officials, such as those in April 2008, that individuals based in Saudi Arabia are a top source of funding for Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. However, according to Saudi officials, since Treasury placed a deputy attaché in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in December 2008, there has been a significant increase in information sharing and decrease in issues of concern.

In addition, the Saudi government has developed its own strategy to combat terrorism, which Saudi officials characterized as focusing on three areas or pillars: “men, money, and mindset.” The “men” pillar of the strategy focuses on arresting or killing terrorists. The “money” pillar of the strategy focuses on measures to counter terrorism financing, such as tightening controls on financial transactions and cash couriers, as well as imposing restrictions on Saudi-based charities. Finally, the “mindset” pillar of the strategy focuses on preventing extremism by addressing the ideology that is used to recruit and indoctrinate potential terrorists. Saudi officials stated that the “mindset” pillar is the most challenging aspect of its counterterrorism strategy and will be a long-term challenge. Nonetheless, Saudi officials told us the Saudi government is committed to combating extremist ideology through programs such as public information campaigns and terrorist rehabilitation programs.

The U.S. Mission Has Established Targets to Measure the Effectiveness of Efforts to Combat Terrorism and Its Financing; Some Performance Targets Related to Terrorism Financing Were Removed from the MSP

The MSP for Saudi Arabia contains goals, performance indicators, and performance targets for counterterrorism efforts in Saudi Arabia. While the MSP is a State document, officials from DOD, DHS, DOJ, and Treasury told us they were aware of relevant portions of the document. According to the fiscal year 2009 MSP for Saudi Arabia, the highest priority U.S. goal is to strengthen its antiterrorist coalition with Saudi Arabia. Performance of this goal is measured by the indicator “Saudi effectiveness on measures to combat terrorism and terrorism financing activities.” To build an active antiterrorist coalition with the government of Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Mission to Saudi Arabia focuses on objectives related to (a) enhancing the Saudi government’s ability to combat terrorists, and (b) preventing financial support to extremists. To measure progress toward the goal of building an active antiterrorist coalition, the MSP contains a number of performance targets each fiscal year. (See figure 3 for MSP objectives and targets for fiscal years 2006 to 2009.)

On an annual basis, the U.S. Mission in Saudi Arabia releases an updated MSP, which may contain revised performance targets related to building an active antiterrorist coalition with Saudi Arabia. State officials told us that MSP performance targets are periodically revised to ensure each fiscal year’s targets are most relevant to assessing progress toward U.S.- Saudi efforts to counter terrorism and terrorism financing. Specifically, between fiscal years 2006 and 2009, certain performance targets were added, removed, or updated to reflect the change in conditions in Saudi Arabia. For instance, new performance targets were added for fiscal year 2009 that did not exist in previous years, including enhancing Saudi- Yemeni cooperation and conducting trials for terror suspects. In addition, the fiscal year 2008 target related to the public condemnation of terrorism by the Saudi government and religious leaders was omitted in fiscal year 2009 because, according to State officials, it had been met.

However, some targets related to preventing financial support to extremists were removed from the MSP, even though U.S. agencies reported that efforts to address these issues are important and ongoing. Specifically, a performance target related to the establishment of a Saudi Charities Commission existed in the MSP from fiscal years 2006 to 2008, but was removed for fiscal year 2009. According to State officials, the performance target related to the Charities Commission was dropped because State determined that other strategies to regulate charitable organizations in Saudi Arabia might be more effective than a commission. Likewise, a target related to implementation of cash courier regulations was part of the MSP in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, but was removed in fiscal years 2008 and 2009. According to State, the performance target related to cash courier regulations was dropped because the Saudi government had made progress instituting and enforcing these regulations. However, according to officials from DHS—which takes the lead on issues such as cash couriers—they were not consulted on the decision to remove the target related to cash couriers and stated that this target should be reinstated in the MSP. As a result, the MSP lacks targets against which U.S. agencies can monitor and assess performance in certain areas of U.S. concern related to countering terrorism financing. According to State and Treasury officials, even though targets related to these activities were removed from MSPs, enforcement of regulations to prevent terrorism financing are still important U.S. goals, which U.S. agencies pursue through diplomatic or training activities.

U.S. Agencies and Saudi Officials Report Progress in Combating Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Challenges Persist, Particularly in Preventing Alleged Funding for Terrorism and Violent Extremism outside of Saudi Arabia

U.S. agencies and Saudi officials report progress countering terrorism and terrorism financing within Saudi Arabia, but noted challenges, particularly those related to preventing the flow of alleged financial support to extremists outside Saudi Arabia. In April 2009, the U.S. embassy assessed progress towards its goal of building an active antiterrorist coalition with Saudi Arabia as “on target.” With regard to counterterrorism efforts, U.S. and Saudi officials report progress enhancing the Saudi government’s ability to combat terrorists, and assess that these efforts have disrupted Al Qaeda’s terrorist network within Saudi Arabia. While citing progress, U.S. and Saudi officials noted Saudi Arabia’s neighbor, Yemen, is emerging as a base from which Al Qaeda terrorists can launch attacks against U.S. and Saudi interests. With regard to preventing financial support to extremists, U.S. and Saudi officials also report progress, citing, among other examples, the Saudi government’s implementation of cash courier regulations, ban on the transfer of charitable funds outside the Kingdom without government approval, and arrest and prosecution of individuals providing ideological or financial support to terrorism. Despite these gains, U.S. officials remain concerned about the ability of Saudi individuals and multilateral charitable organizations, as well as other individuals visiting Saudi Arabia, to support terrorism and violent extremism outside Saudi Arabia. Moreover, both Saudi and U.S. officials cited limited Saudi enforcement capacity and terrorist financiers’ use of cash couriers as challenges to Saudi efforts to prevent financial support to extremists.

U.S. and Saudi Officials Report Progress Combating Terrorists in Saudi Arabia

U.S. and Saudi officials report progress enhancing the Saudi government’s ability to combat terrorists and assess that Saudi efforts have disrupted Al Qaeda’s terrorist network within Saudi Arabia. The U.S. embassy’s MSP for fiscal year 2008 lists three performance targets related to enhancing the Saudi government’s ability to combat terrorists. These targets specifically pertain to (1) prevention of successful terrorist strikes in Saudi Arabia, (2) improved U.S.-Saudi cooperation on critical infrastructure protection, and (3) public condemnation of terrorist activities by Saudi government and religious leaders. U.S. officials report progress on these performance targets in fiscal year 2008, as well as the completion of related targets in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. While citing progress, U.S. and Saudi officials noted Saudi Arabia’s neighbor, Yemen, is emerging as a base from which Al Qaeda terrorists can launch attacks, which could challenge gains made in combating terrorists in Saudi Arabia. (See figure 4 for a summary of reported progress related to MSP performance targets.)

Officials from State report that there have been no successful terrorist strikes in Saudi Arabia since February 2007. Officials attributed this outcome, in part, to Saudi law enforcement actions. Experts we interviewed also cited decreased popular support for Al Qaeda, due to Muslim casualties caused by the organization, as a factor in the declining number of attacks. Both U.S. and Saudi officials cited strong intelligence and security cooperation between the U.S. and Saudi governments related to counterterrorism. Moreover, experts with whom we spoke generally agreed that the Saudi government is serious about combating terrorism.

State officials report that, while there was a major terrorist incident in Saudi Arabia in August 2009, there have been no attacks on energy infrastructure since 2006 and no successful terrorist strikes in Saudi Arabia since February 2007. On August 27, 2009, a suicide bomber attempted to assassinate Saudi Arabia’s Assistant Minister of Interior for Security Affairs, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who is also the head of Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism efforts. While the bomber, a Saudi national who was on the Saudi government’s “most wanted” list, was killed during the attack, no one else suffered serious injuries. According to the Saudi embassy, the attacker was from a region bordering Yemen and had offered to coordinate the return of Saudi fugitives in Yemen. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for the attack. Officials from State and the Saudi embassy told us that, while a major attack, the strike was not successful, as the Prince was not seriously harmed. Similarly, a White House press release described the attack as unsuccessful. DOD noted, however, that Saudi authorities did not disrupt this plot. The White House press release also stated that the attack underscores the continued threat posed by Al Qaeda and the importance of strong counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia has also undertaken law enforcement activities, including arresting and prosecuting terror suspects. According to State reporting, since May 2003, the Saudi government has killed or captured Al Qaeda’s operational Saudi-based senior leadership, as well as most of the network’s key operatives and many of the Kingdom’s most wanted individuals. Between 2003 and 2008, U.S. and Saudi officials report the Saudi government arrested or killed thousands of terrorism suspects, including those suspected of planning attacks on Saudi oil fields and other vital installations. Further, the Saudi government has published three “most wanted” lists, and U.S. and Saudi sources report Saudi Arabia has captured or killed a number of suspects on these lists. In 2008, the Saudi government announced terrorism trials for approximately 1,000 individuals indicted on various terrorism-related charges. In July 2009, the Saudi government announced that 330 suspects had court trials, of whom seven were acquitted and the rest received jail terms ranging from a few months to 30 years. Saudi officials noted that the convictions can be appealed in the Saudi supreme court. U.S. and Saudi officials told us, and State reports, that such trials could help combat terrorist ideologies.

Moreover, the U.S. and Saudi governments have implemented joint activities to strengthen Saudi law enforcement capabilities, such as State- led training to strengthen the Saudi government’s antiterrorism investigative management and VIP protection capability. Apart from joint training courses, U.S. officials told us they have close working-level relationships with their Saudi counterparts and noted that Saudi security cooperation is significant. State, Treasury, FBI, DOD, and DHS officials told us that U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies have benefited and continue to benefit from Saudi information on individuals and organizations. The former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia described U.S.- Saudi counterterrorism cooperation as among the most productive in the world.

U.S. and Saudi Governments Report Extensive Cooperation on Critical Infrastructure Protection

U.S. and Saudi officials report progress in cooperation on protecting critical infrastructure targets, such as oil installations, in Saudi Arabia. Officials cited the signing of a technical cooperation agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia in May 2008, as well as activities to implement the agreement, as evidence of deeper cooperation.

U.S. officials told us that the protection of critical Saudi infrastructure, particularly energy production facilities, has been a priority since 2006, following an unsuccessful terrorist attack at the Abqaiq oil facility, one of the world’s largest oil processing facilities located in Saudi Arabia. According to State reporting, critical infrastructure protection is a vital national interest, as a successful terrorist attack that disrupts Saudi oil production would have a devastating impact on the U.S. and global economies.

In May 2008, the U.S. Secretary of State and the Saudi Arabian Minister of Interior signed a technical cooperation agreement to provide U.S. technical assistance to Saudi Arabia in the area of critical infrastructure protection. A joint operational entity called the Office of Program Management-Ministry of Interior (OPM-MOI) was established to implement the agreement, consisting of representatives from State, DOD, DOE, and the Saudi Arabian government. The Saudi Arabian government agreed to fully fund the agreement’s implementation, including all expenses incurred by U.S. agencies for services and contractor costs. OPM-MOI is assisting the Saudi government in identifying critical infrastructure vulnerabilities; developing security strategies to protect critical infrastructure; and recruiting and training a new MOI force, the Facilities Security Force, to protect its critical infrastructure. State is the lead agency for the implementation of the agreement, DOE is contributing expertise in conducting facility assessments and developing security strategies for Saudi energy production facilities, and DOD will contribute expertise in training and equipping the Facilities Security Force, which is intended to have more than 35,000 personnel when fully developed. According to U.S. officials, the current focus of OPM-MOI is protecting critical infrastructure related to oil production. However, officials told us OPM-MOI could expand to cooperate with the Saudi government in a number of other areas, including border security, maritime security, and cyber security. Other U.S. agencies, such as DHS and the Coast Guard, are expected to participate in OPM-MOI as the critical infrastructure mission expands.

Saudi Leaders Have Publicly Condemned Terrorist Activities and Implemented Programs to Combat Extremism

Saudi government and religious leaders have publicly condemned terrorism and terrorism financing. Several high-ranking Saudi government leaders have spoken out against terrorism and extremism. In his remarks at the UN’s Culture of Peace conference in November 2008, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz noted that “terrorism and criminality are the enemies of every religion and every culture.” In July 2008, the King made similar remarks at the World Conference on Dialogue in Madrid. Many other members of the Saudi government, including the Ministers of Islamic Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Interior, have issued statements against terrorism and extremism since 2001.

Moreover, religious leaders, such as the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, have issued a number of statements critical of terrorism. In the spring of 2008, the Grand Mufti issued a statement on the evils of terrorism and warned Saudi citizens not to listen to those who use religion to promote terrorism. In October 2007, he delivered a sermon cautioning young Saudis not to travel abroad to participate in jihad. In the same speech, he urged Saudi citizens not to finance terrorism and to be mindful of how their charitable contributions are distributed. Later that same year, the Grand Mufti stated that terrorists should be subject to severe punishment in accordance with Islamic law. According to State, other Saudi Islamic scholars and officials also voiced support for the Grand Mufti’s statement.

Further, in May 2009, the Second Deputy Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia organized the first national conference on “intellectual security,” which was to address the “intellectual abnormality” that, according to the Saudi government, is “the main reason for terrorism.” The conference resulted in a communiqué stressing the importance of moderation, tolerance, cross- cultural dialogue, nonviolence, and the establishment of national strategies for promoting those values. The declaration pointed out the moderate nature of Islam and warned against the dangers of embracing deviant ideologies. The Deputy Prime Minister also expressed hope that the small number of Saudis participating in deviant groups abroad would renounce their beliefs and return home, noting, Saudi Arabia “is ready to welcome its citizens if they decide to opt for the correct path.”

Saudi Activities to Combat Extremism

In addition to public statements by Saudi government and religious figures, the Saudi government has implemented a number of domestic activities designed to undermine extremist ideology within the Kingdom. These activities include the following: Initiating a media campaign: According to U.S. and Saudi officials, the Saudi government has implemented an extensive media campaign against extremist thought. State reports this campaign includes the use of advertisements, billboards, text messages and the Internet. (Figure 5 shows examples of Saudi Arabia’s public outreach campaign.)

See http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-883/ for a video of a Saudi government-sponsored TV advertisement designed to counter terrorism.

Distributing publications and other materials: Officials from the Saudi Ministries of Islamic Affairs and Interior told us Saudi Arabia had produced a variety of books and pamphlets designed to combat extremist ideology. Saudi officials estimate that approximately 1.8 million books have been prepared as part of this effort. (Figure 6 shows a sample of Saudi literature to combat extremism provided to GAO by Saudi officials.) Additionally, according to Saudi officials, the Saudi government distributes, via mosques and schools, CDs and cassette tapes with lectures and seminars addressing the issues of terrorism and extremism.

Monitoring religious leaders: According to State reporting and Saudi officials, the Saudi government continues to monitor the preaching and writings of religious leaders, and to reeducate those who advocate extremist messages. Saudi officials from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs told us their monitoring has covered approximately 20,000 of Saudi Arabia’s estimated 70,000 mosques, including all of the large mosques that hold Friday prayers.Additionally, Saudi officials told us they have held hundreds of seminars and lectures in mosques to help ensure that religious leaders preach a moderate message to the public.

Monitoring school teachers: According to officials from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, the Saudi government monitors for school teachers who teach extremism. Once identified, such teachers are put through reeducation programs.

Monitoring Internet sites: According to Ministry of Interior officials, Saudi authorities are monitoring Internet chat rooms that could be sources of militant recruitment. In September 2008, Saudi authorities reported the arrest of three Saudi citizens and two expatriates for promoting militant activities on Internet forums, engaging online users in dialogue, spreading misleading information, and recruiting youth to travel abroad for inappropriate purposes. According to Saudi reports, the Ministry of Interior called on all Saudis to be vigilant and urged them not to listen to those who promote corruption and sedition. In addition, the Ministry published the online usernames utilized by the suspects.

Encouraging dialogue: The Saudi government reports that it supports the activities of the Sakinah (or Tranquility) Campaign, which is an independent nongovernmental organization that engages in dialogue, via the Internet, with Internet users who have visited extremist Web sites. Additionally, in 2008, the King of Saudi Arabia also initiated a series of conferences to promote interfaith dialogues. The first conference was hosted by the Muslim World League in Mecca in June 2008 and consisted of 500 Muslim scholars from around the world. The second conference was held in Madrid, Spain, in July 2008 and included 300 delegates representing different faiths, including Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Judaism. Finally, the King of Saudi Arabia was joined by other heads of states at a Special Session of the UN General Assembly on interfaith dialogue in November 2008.

Saudi Rehabilitation Programs

The Saudi government operates rehabilitation programs to reeducate those arrested for supporting terrorism or extremism, as well as those returning from the U.S. detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay, to reintegrate them into society. Rehabilitation programs take place both in Saudi prisons and in halfway houses outside of prisons, known as aftercare centers. In March 2009, we visited the aftercare center—called the Mohammed bin Nayef Center for Advisory and Care—in Riyadh and spoke with staff members as well as participants of the program, including those arrested for terrorism and violent extremism in Saudi Arabia and those formerly detained at Guantanamo Bay. Staff members told us the rehabilitation center seeks to “reeducate” its participants by engaging them in religious debates and providing psychological counseling. The program generally consists of one-on-one and group sessions between an offender and religious scholars, psychiatrists, and psychologists about their beliefs. Program officials attempt to persuade the offenders that their religious justification for their actions is based upon a corrupted understanding of Islam. Psychological counseling includes traditional methods as well as activities such as art therapy. Staff members told us the program draws heavily on participants’ family and tribal relations. Family members can visit and telephone the rehabilitation center, and rehabilitation participants are allowed leave to attend family events such as weddings and funerals. For instance, when we visited the center, we spoke with family members visiting their relatives. Those who complete the program, and are deemed eligible for release, are provided social support to assist with their reintegration into society, such as counseling, job opportunities, and stipends. Moreover, these social services are extended to the family and tribal members of released participants, as a way to involve participants’ larger social network in their rehabilitation. Saudi officials told us that individuals generally participate in the program for 6 to 8 months.

Saudi officials report such rehabilitation programs, including those in prisons and an aftercare center, have treated 4,300 individuals overall. Specifically, Saudi officials told us that, as of March 2009, the aftercare center had served approximately 250 individuals, with a recidivism rate of about 20 percent. Experts with whom we spoke generally praised the Saudi rehabilitation program, but offered some caution on the methodology used to measure its results. State reports it is monitoring these rates closely. Saudi officials told us that former Guantanamo detainees account for most of the individuals who have recidivated from the aftercare center. For example, in January 2009, two former participants at the center appeared in an Al Qaeda recruiting video filmed in Yemen. One of the individuals in the video has since turned himself in to Saudi authorities. Saudi officials acknowledge such cases illustrate the difficulties associated with assessing which participants should be released from the rehabilitation center, but told us they are working to refine their assessment criteria. U.S. and Saudi officials with whom we spoke told us that, despite the challenges associated with recidivism, Saudi rehabilitation programs have demonstrated some positive results. Moreover, U.S. officials told us these activities, among others, demonstrate the Saudi government’s commitment to undermining extremist ideology within the Kingdom. (See http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-883/ for a video of GAO’s visit to a Saudi government operated rehabilitation center.)

Despite Significant Gains in Combating Terrorists in Saudi Arabia, Instability in Yemen Is a Concern

While U.S. and Saudi officials told us that Saudi Arabia had made progress in enhancing its ability to combat terrorists, they assessed that political instability in Yemen, Saudi Arabia’s neighbor, could create challenges to counterterrorism efforts. U.S. and Saudi officials expressed concern that Yemen, due in part to lack of government control and proximity to Saudi Arabia, is emerging as a base from which Al Qaeda terrorists can launch attacks against Saudi and U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia. For example, as noted previously, in August 2009, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula— which is based in Yemen—claimed responsibility for the failed assassination attempt against Saudi Arabia’s Assistant Minister of Interior for Security Affairs. State has listed Yemen as a terrorist safe haven in its Country Reports on Terrorism since 2005. In April 2009, in its Country Reports on Terrorism, State reported that, despite some successes against Al Qaeda, the response of the government of Yemen to the terrorist threat was intermittent due to its focus on internal security concerns. Moreover, State noted that border security between Saudi Arabia and Yemen remained a problem. Saudi officials also cited political instability in Yemen, as well as the porous border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, as challenges to their counterterrorism efforts. To address this issue, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia told us that the Saudi government is providing Yemen assistance in a number of areas, including counterterrorism, education, and health. Saudi officials also stated that Saudi Arabia is building an electronic fence on the Saudi-Yemen border.

U.S. and Saudi Officials Report Progress in Preventing Financial Support to Extremists, but Concerns Remain about Individuals’ and Multilateral Charitable Organizations’ Ability to Support Terrorism and Violent Extremism outside of Saudi Arabia

U.S. and Saudi officials report progress in preventing financial support to extremists, citing improved Saudi regulation and enforcement capacity. Between fiscal years 2006 and 2008, the U.S. embassy’s MSP listed a number of performance targets related to preventing financial support to extremists, which include (1) the United States providing additional training and Saudi banks increasing reporting to the Saudi Financial Investigation Unit, (2) the Saudi government providing accounting of assets seized from individuals and organizations designated as terrorists by the United Nations (UN) 1267 Committee and taking legal action against nationals and groups providing financial or ideological support to terrorists, (3) the Saudi Charities Commission naming senior staff and beginning operations, and (4) the Saudi government implementing and enforcing cash courier regulations. U.S. officials report progress on several of these performance targets. However, U.S. officials remain concerned about the ability of Saudi individuals and multilateral charitable organizations, as well as other individuals visiting Saudi Arabia, to support terrorism and violent extremism outside of Saudi Arabia. U.S. officials also noted that limited Saudi enforcement capacity and terrorist financiers’ use of cash couriers pose challenges to Saudi efforts to prevent financial support to extremists. (For a summary of reported progress related to MSP performance targets from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2008, see figure 7.)

In 2005, the government of Saudi Arabia established the Saudi Financial Investigation Unit, which acts as Saudi Arabia’s financial intelligence unit (FIU). Located in the Ministry of Interior, the Saudi FIU receives and analyzes suspicious transaction reports and other information from a variety of sources, such as banking institutions, insurance companies, and government departments.

Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, which is the FIU for the United States, and the FBI have provided training to the Saudi FIU since its establishment in 2005. According to Treasury officials, these training activities were designed to build the capacity of the Saudi FIU and assist it in meeting international standards, with the ultimate goal of having the Saudi FIU attain membership in the Egmont Group, an international body of financial intelligence units. Saudi officials told us that the capacity of the Saudi FIU has increased since 2005. For instance, they noted the number of suspicious transaction reports they analyze grew from approximately 38 per month in 2006 to 110 per month in 2008, while the staff of the FIU has grown from approximately 80 individuals in 2006 to 130 individuals in March 2009. Moreover, since 2005, Saudi officials told us the Saudi FIU had conducted information exchanges with FIUs in the United States and a number of countries in the region, and said they expected these exchanges to increase once the Saudi FIU becomes a member of the Egmont Group. Similarly, Treasury officials told us Saudi Arabia’s membership in the Egmont Group would assist in preventing financial support to extremists by facilitating information exchanges between the Saudi FIU and its counterparts. In May 2009, the Saudi FIU met the requirements for membership and became an official member of the Egmont Group.

The Saudi Government Has Initiated Legal Action against Terrorist Financiers, but the United States Has Reported the Need for Further Action

According to U.S. officials and State reporting in 2007 and 2008, the Saudi government has taken legal action against terrorist financiers, based on its laws and regulations related to combating terrorist financing. In 2003, the Saudi Arabian government enacted an anti-money laundering law, which provided a statutory basis for considering money laundering and terrorism financing as criminal offenses. That same year, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) issued updated anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing guidelines for the Saudi banking and nonbank financial system. The guidelines contain a number of provisions, such as requiring that banks (1) have mechanisms to monitor all types of “Specially Designated Nationals” as listed by SAMA, (2) strictly adhere to SAMA guidance on opening accounts and dealing with charity and donation collection, and (3) use software to monitor customers to detect unusual transaction patterns. Additionally, SAMA has also issued “know your customer” guidelines, requiring banks to freeze accounts of customers who do not provide updated account information. In July 2004, members of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Gulf Cooperation Council assessed Saudi Arabia’s legal and regulatory practices with respect to countering terrorism financing. They found Saudi Arabia to be compliant or largely compliant with most FATF benchmarks—a set of internationally recognized legal and regulatory benchmarks on money laundering and terrorism financing.

Since 2007, U.S. and Saudi officials report that the government of Saudi Arabia has arrested and prosecuted a number of individuals suspected of financing terrorism. For instance, State reports that the Saudi government arrested 56 suspected terrorist financiers in 2008 and prosecuted 20 of them. According to Saudi embassy reports, over 40 people were arrested in 2007 for providing financial support to terrorists. As noted earlier in this report, in July 2009, the Saudi government announced the convictions of 330 terrorism suspects who were charged with crime, including affiliation with terrorist organizations as well as facilitating and financing terrorism. U.S. officials we spoke with cited these arrests, as well as those against terrorist cells more generally, as having a disruptive effect on financing networks. Despite these gains, State notes in its most recent Country Report on Terrorism that the United States continues to “urge the government of Saudi Arabia to pursue and prosecute terrorist financiers more vigorously.”

Moreover, State’s 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) cited the Saudi government as “partially compliant” on obligations related to UN Security Council resolutions on terrorism financing. UN 1267 requires its signatories to impose certain restrictions on individual or entities associated with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, such as freezing their assets and preventing their entry or transit through signatories’ territories (travel ban). In April 2009, State reported that the Saudi government had taken action against individuals designated by the UN 1267 Committee by freezing their accounts and seizing their assets. Moreover, State reports that SAMA provides the names of suspected terrorists and terrorist organizations designated by the UN 1267 Committee to all financial institutions under its supervision. Related to the UN 1267 travel ban provision, State officials told us that the Saudi government’s enforcement of this provision had not been consistent, particularly during hajj. According to Saudi officials, the Saudi government’s policy is to allow all Muslims to visit the Kingdom during hajj to fulfill their religious obligations and to not arrest individuals during their pilgrimage. However, Saudi officials noted they would share information with the United States about certain individuals, such as those designated under UN 1267, visiting the Kingdom for religious obligation.

The Saudi Charities Commission Is Not Yet Operational, but the Saudi Government Has Issued New Regulations Targeting Saudi Charities and Multilateral Charitable Organizations

State and Treasury have reported that some Saudi charitable organizations have been a major source of financing to extremist and terrorist groups. In 2002, the Saudi government announced its intention to establish a National Commission for Relief and Charitable Work Abroad, commonly known as the Charities Commission, to oversee all private Saudi charitable activities abroad. U.S. officials told us, and Saudi officials confirmed, that the Saudi Charities Commission is not operational. Although the Charities Commission is not operational, the Saudi government has established regulations barring Saudi charitable organizations from sending contributions abroad via banks and other formal financial channels without first receiving the approval of the Saudi government. Saudi officials told us these regulations are preferable to a Charities Commission, as they more effectively prevent the flow of funds outside of Saudi Arabia. Similarly, some U.S. officials and experts with whom we spoke stated that the current ban might be preferable to a Saudi Charities Commission, as a ban may be more effective in preventing financial support from reaching extremist groups. Other U.S. officials noted that while more effective oversight of charitable organizations is needed, it is not necessary that such oversight take the form of a Charities Commission.

Rules related to the banking activities of charitable organization in Saudi Arabia were first adopted in 2003, and updated in 2008. However, there is some disagreement over whether these rules apply to all Saudi charitable organizations. According to U.S. officials, and State reporting, charitable organizations in Saudi Arabia include organizations termed “charities”— which tend to operate within the Kingdom—and organizations dubbed “multilateral” charitable organizations—which are based in Saudi Arabia but have branches in other parts of the world. Multilateral charitable organizations based in Saudi Arabia include the Muslim World League, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The 2003 rules applied to charitable organizations and prohibited them from making cash disbursements and transferring money outside of Saudi Arabia. U.S. officials have testified that the 2003 regulations did not apply to multilateral organizations. While State reported in the 2006, 2007, and 2008 INCSRs that the government of Saudi Arabia stated the 2003 regulations applied to international charities, each report also contained language recommending the Saudi government enhance its oversight of charities with overseas operations.

Despite the ban on charities transferring money outside of Saudi Arabia enacted in 2003, a number of charitable organizations with links to Saudi Arabia have been designated by Treasury since 2005 as financing terrorist activities. In August 2006, Treasury designated branches of the IIRO in Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as a Saudi national employed as the Executive Director of the Eastern Province Branch of IIRO, for facilitating fundraising for Al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups. Further, from 2002 to 2004, the United States designated 13 branches of the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Al Haramain), including several branches that were designated by both the U.S. and Saudi governments. In 2004, the Saudi government announced that Al Haramain was being dissolved. In June 2008, Treasury noted that despite Saudi government efforts, which had largely prevented Al Haramain from operating in its own name, the organization’s leadership had attempted to reconstitute itself and parts of Al Haramain continued to operate. Thus, in June 2008, Treasury designated all branches of Al Haramain, including its headquarters in Saudi Arabia, for having provided support to Al Qaeda as well as other terrorists and terrorist organizations.

After these designations, in rules dated December 2008, the government of Saudi Arabia updated its banking regulations to include specific language related to multilateral organizations, including Muslim World League, IIRO, and World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The rules state that transfers from the accounts of these multilateral organizations to any party outside of the Kingdom shall not be allowed without approval from SAMA, and that any contributions approved for transfer may only be used in ways as specified by SAMA. Saudi officials from SAMA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with whom we spoke told us that no charitable contributions, including those from multilateral charitable organizations, can be sent abroad through bank accounts without the approval of the Saudi government. Moreover, Saudi officials told us that, as of July 2009, the Saudi government had not approved any transfer of funds from charities and multilateral charitable organizations to support charitable activities outside of Saudi Arabia. While the Saudi government has not approved the transfer of funds, they have approved overseas transfers of in-kind humanitarian assistance, such as medical supplies or blankets, through the Saudi Red Crescent Society. State reporting acknowledges the Saudi government tightened controls on charitable giving in September 2008. Officials from World Assembly of Muslim Youth confirmed that the ban on charitable contributions leaving Saudi Arabia through a formal financial network applies to their activities, and that contributions to their organization have declined as a result. While the Saudi government has regulations related to the transfer of charitable contributions through the formal financial system, World Assembly of Muslim Youth officials stated they have moved money out of Saudi Arabia by providing cash to individuals or contractors to implement charitable projects outside the Kingdom. State and Treasury officials noted that, despite the tightened regulations on the formal financial system, they are still concerned about the ability of multilateral charitable organizations to move money out of the country, and in the 2009 INSCR, State reports that multilateral organizations operate “largely outside of the strict Saudi restrictions covering domestic charities.”

According to U.S. officials and State reporting, a proposal for the Charities Commission is still under review by Saudi officials. However, the most recent MSP for Saudi Arabia no longer contains a performance target related to the operation of a Saudi Charities Commission. U.S. officials told us that, even in the absence of this target, the regulation of charitable organizations is still a priority that U.S. agencies pursue through diplomatic and information-sharing activities with the Saudi government.

Saudi Arabia Has Issued Cash Courier Regulations, but Concerns Remain about Implementation of These Regulations

In late 2005, the Saudi government enacted stricter customs declaration laws that regulate the cross-border movement of cash, jewels, and precious metals. The regulations state that money and gold in excess of 60,000 Saudi riyals (equivalent to $16,000 U.S. dollars) must be declared upon entry and exit from Saudi Arabia using official customs forms.

That same year, representatives from DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) conducted training for 46 Saudi officials on topics related to bulk cash smuggling. ICE officials told us the goal of this training was to introduce Saudi officials to interdiction and investigative techniques designed to support enforcement of the Saudi customs regulations.

In 2007, State reported concerns related to the enforcement of Saudi Arabia’s customs declaration laws. For example, Saudi customs had not issued the necessary declaration forms. State officials with whom we spoke told us that the Saudi government had improved its enforcement of the laws, including distributing declaration forms and posting signs, which we observed during our visit to the Kingdom (see figure 8). Additionally, State has reported that the Saudi government’s new cash courier regulations have resulted in the investigations of several individuals.

According to ICE officials, although they have tried to persuade the Saudi government to conduct operational training related to preventing bulk cash smuggling, the Saudi government did not express interest in undertaking such an exercise until 2008. ICE officials noted that, in addition to classroom training, it considers operational training necessary to ensure proper enforcement of customs declaration laws designed to prevent bulk cash smuggling. Moreover, ICE officials said that they do not have information—such as the number of seizures and prosecutions—that would allow them to assess progress with regard to the Saudi government’s efforts to prevent bulk cash smuggling. In its 2009 INCSR, State reported that the Saudi government has adopted stricter regulations; however, information collected by Saudi customs on cash declarations and smuggling is not shared with other governments, and the implementation and effectiveness of the customs regulations remain in question.

Despite concerns about the Saudi government’s enforcement of customs declaration laws that include cash courier regulations, the MSP performance target related to cash couriers was removed from the MSP after fiscal year 2007. U.S. officials told us that, despite the omission of the target from the MSP, Saudi implementation and enforcement of cash courier regulations are important U.S. objectives that U.S. agencies pursue through training and diplomatic activities with the Saudi government.

Further, in the 2008 and 2009 INCSRs, State reported that, in addition to bulk cash, some instances of terrorist financing in Saudi Arabia have allegedly involved informal mechanisms, such as hawala. U.S. and Saudi officials told us, and State reports, that hawala and money services businesses apart from banks and licensed money changers are illegal in Saudi Arabia. In 2005, State reported that SAMA consolidated the eight largest money changers into a single bank. Further, State notes that Saudi banks have created fund transfer systems that have attracted customers accustomed to using hawala. According to State, this creates an advantage for Saudi authorities in combating terrorism financing, as senders and recipients of fund transfers through this formal financial sector are required to clearly identify themselves.

Despite Progress, U.S. Officials Remain Concerned about the Ability of Saudi Individuals and Multilateral Charitable Organizations to Support Terrorism and Violent Extremism Outside of Saudi Arabia

Despite reporting progress in Saudi Arabia’s efforts to combat terrorism financing, U.S. officials expressed concern regarding the ability of Saudi individuals and multilateral charitable organizations, as well as other individuals visiting Saudi Arabia, to support terrorism and violent extremism outside Saudi Arabia. Officials stressed this funding allegedly comes from individuals or multilateral charitable organizations, not from the Saudi government, and that the government of Saudi Arabia is pursuing terrorism financiers and cooperating with the United States to counter terrorism financing. Further, experts we spoke with agreed that there is no indication that the Saudi government is providing funding for terrorism.

Officials from State, Treasury, and DHS stated that alleged support from some Saudi individuals and multilateral charitable organizations for terrorism and violent extremism outside of Saudi Arabia remains a cause for concern. According to the 2009 INCSR, Saudi individuals and Saudi- based charitable organizations continue to be a significant source of financing for terrorism and extremism outside of Saudi Arabia. For example, Treasury officials have noted that Saudi-based individuals are a top source of funding for Al Qaeda and associated terror groups, such as the Taliban. Moreover, there have been concerns that during hajj—when an estimated 2 to 3 million Muslims visit Saudi Arabia—non-Saudi individuals associated with extremists groups could exchange funds to support terrorism and violent extremism outside of Saudi Arabia. Saudi government officials acknowledged that Saudi individuals could potentially fund terrorism, but, according to these officials, such individuals do so in violation of Saudi laws and regulations. Related to charitable contributions, Saudi officials told us that no funds have been approved for overseas transfer. Saudi officials also told us that if a Saudi- affiliated multilateral charitable organization raises funds abroad, it is the host country government’s responsibility to ensure such funds are used appropriately, and stated that they have directed their embassies abroad to cooperate with host country governments in this effort.

U.S. and Saudi officials cited challenges associated with efforts to prevent financial support to extremists, including limited Saudi enforcement capacity and the use of cash couriers by terrorist financiers. First, U.S. and Saudi officials noted enforcement capacity presents a challenge to U.S.- Saudi efforts to prevent financial support to extremists. While noting progress, U.S. and Saudi officials told us that key Saudi enforcement agencies, particularly those agencies that enforce financial regulations, could benefit from increased training and technical assistance to build their capacity. For instance, U.S. and Saudi officials stated that, while the Saudi FIU has expanded its capacity since its creation in 2005, more training in financial analysis could be beneficial to the organization.

Second, U.S. and Saudi officials told us that preventing financial support to extremists is made more challenging by terrorist financiers’ use of cash couriers. According to U.S. and Saudi officials, some individuals and multilateral charitable organizations have allegedly increased their use of more informal financial transaction methods, such as couriering cash across borders, in response to Saudi Arabia’s adoption of regulations making transactions in the formal financial sector more challenging. Though Saudi Arabia has implemented cash courier regulations, Saudi officials noted that motivated individuals can circumvent such regulations by moving amounts of cash that are below legal declaration limits. U.S. officials concurred, noting circumvention of regulations as an inherent challenge in regulating the use of cash couriers in any country. U.S. and Saudi officials also cited the prevalent use of cash for transactions as a challenge, particularly in Saudi Arabia. According to these officials, because large numbers of people in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region use cash, an individual traveling with or declaring large amounts of cash may not raise suspicion. Moreover, challenges associated with preventing the circumvention of cash courier regulations increase during hajj, which, despite efforts by the Saudi government, presents logistical enforcement challenges because of the large number of people involved. Dealing with the challenges inherently associated with the use of cash, according to Saudi officials, requires using intelligence to target specific individuals who may be using cash to fund terrorism or violent extremism and educating the public not to give cash to individuals they do not know, even for allegedly worthy causes.

Conclusion

According to State, goals and performance targets in country-specific Mission Strategic Plans (MSP) are used to assess effectiveness of U.S. policies and programs in the field and to formulate requests for resources. According to U.S. officials, since 2005, several targets to assess progress of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism and antiterrorism financing collaboration with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have been met. However, some performance targets, specifically those related to combating financing of terrorism, were removed from the MSP for Saudi Arabia even though U.S. agencies remain concerned about the ability of Saudi individuals and multilateral charitable organizations to fund terrorist organizations in other countries. U.S. agencies stated that, despite the omission of these targets, they continue to engage with the government of Saudi Arabia on efforts to prevent financial support to extremists. Given that State uses MSP targets to assess progress in countering terrorism and terrorism financing in Saudi Arabia, it is important that the U.S. mission include targets related to key areas of concern to more effectively prioritize U.S. efforts and to formulate resource requests for these activities.

Recommendation for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of State direct the U.S. mission in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to reinstate, in consultation with relevant U.S. agencies, performance measures related to preventing the flow of alleged financial support, through mechanisms such as cash couriers, to terrorists and extremists outside Saudi Arabia.

Agencies Comments, Third-Party Views, and Our Evaluation

State and DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reproduced in appendices V and VI, respectively. State concurred with our recommendation and committed to instructing the U.S. Embassy, Riyadh, in consultation with key interagency partners, to ensure that the Mission Strategic Plan reflect the continued importance of cooperation to combat terrorism financing, including by reinstating performance indicators related to Saudi enforcement of cash courier regulations. DOD also concurred with the report. In addition, we received technical comments from DOD, DOE, NSC, State, Treasury, and the intelligence community. Additionally, consistent with our protocols, we provided a copy of the draft report to Saudi officials, who described the report as a fair and detailed review of U.S. and Saudi efforts and also offered technical comments. We incorporated technical comments as appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 5 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, the intelligence community, and the National Security Council. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology

In this report, we were asked to report on (1) the U.S. government strategy to collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to counter terrorism and terrorism financing, and (2) U.S. government agencies’ assessment of and the Saudi government’s views on progress toward the goals of the U.S. strategy to collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Our work focused on the efforts of the intelligence agencies; the Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), State (State), and the Treasury (Treasury); and the National Security Council (NSC) to collaborate with Saudi Arabia to combat terrorism and terrorism financing since 2005. Within these agencies and executive offices, we met with officials from several relevant components that are monitoring or working with the Saudi government on efforts to combat terrorism and its financing, including DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); State’s bureaus of Coordinator of Counterterrorism; Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; and Near Eastern Affairs; and Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and the Internal Revenue Service. We focused on these agencies and components as a result of previous work undertaken by GAO regarding efforts to address violent extremism, our review of information since GAO’s previous work indicating which agencies were involved in efforts to collaborate with Saudi Arabia, and discussions with U.S. agency officials regarding the agencies with which they collaborate.

To examine the U.S. government strategy to collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to counter terrorism and terrorism financing, we reviewed relevant U.S. strategic documents, including the U.S. Strategy Toward Saudi Arabia, Report Pursuant to Section 2043(c) of the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and Mission Strategic Plans (MSP) for Saudi Arabia (previously called Mission Performance Plans) for fiscal years 2005 to 2011. While we did not assess these documents for key elements of a strategy as identified by GAO, we used the performance targets stated in these documents as criteria against which we assessed progress. In addition to documents from U.S. agencies, we obtained documents detailing the Saudi government’s approach to combating terrorism and terrorism financing from Saudi officials, and reviewed public information available on the embassy Web site. We discussed the U.S. government strategy to collaborate with and assist Saudi Arabia with officials from DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, and Treasury, as well as representatives from the Saudi embassy, including the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. Furthermore, while in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, we discussed the U.S. strategy to collaborate with Saudi Arabia with officials from the U.S. embassy, including the then ambassador, as well as representatives from the Saudi government, including representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Islamic Affairs. We met with Saudi officials from these ministries as they are involved in efforts to combat terrorism and extremism.

To report U.S. government agencies’ assessment of progress toward the goals of the U.S. strategy to collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we reviewed relevant U.S. planning and evaluation documents, including MSPs for Saudi Arabia, Country Reports on Terrorism, and International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, among others. Additionally, we developed and administered a data collection instrument to agencies providing training and technical assistance to the Saudi government— including State, Treasury, DOJ, DHS, DOD, and DOE—to obtain information on programs and activities, including goals, description, indicators, assessments, and associated funding. We corroborated information reported to us in the data collection instrument with information obtained during interviews with agency officials and reported in agency evaluation documents. Further, we obtained and examined documentation from Saudi officials regarding their domestic efforts to counter terrorism and terrorism financing, including Rules Governing the Opening of Bank Accounts and General Operational Guidelines in Saudi Arabia, Third Update, December 2008, and reviewed public information available on the embassy Web site. Although we report on Saudi efforts to combat extremism, we did not independently verify all of these activities. In Washington, D.C., we discussed progress on U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism efforts with U.S. officials from DOD, DOE, DHS, DOJ, State, Treasury, and the intelligence community; as well as with Saudi officials from the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. We also interviewed subject matter experts from a variety of academic institutions and nongovernmental organizations to obtain their assessments of progress. We selected experts who met at least one of the following criteria: (1) produced research focusing on Saudi Arabia; (2) traveled to Saudi Arabia; and, (3) were recognized as experts in the professional community, as determined by the recommendation of other experts. State concurred with our list of experts. Additionally, we traveled to Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where we visited the Prince Mohammed bin Nayef Center for Advisory and Care—a counseling program designed to reeducate violent extremists—in Riyadh, and met with U.S. officials from DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, and Treasury; Saudi officials from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Islamic Affairs; and representatives from World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The information on foreign laws in this report is not a product of our original analysis, but is based on interviews and secondary sources.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 through September 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Time Line of Key Events in U.S. and Saudi Relations, 1750-2004

Alliance between Muhammad bin Saud and a conservative Muslim leader

Muhammad bin Saud, founder of the precursor to the modern Saudi state, strikes an alliance with the conservative Muslim leader, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. This marks the start of the close association between Saudi political and religious establishment.

Abdul Aziz Al Saud expands Saudi power to other regions of the Arabian Peninsula, including Riyadh and the holy Muslim city of Mecca.

The modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is formally established under the reign of King Abdul Aziz Al Saud with a system of government based on Islamic law.

United States and Saudi Arabia establish diplomatic relations.

Saudi Arabia starts large scale oil production after World War II.

The meeting between King Abdul Aziz and President Franklin D. Roosevelt to discuss oil and security is considered the start of more robust U.S.-Saudi relations.

In 1948, Israel is established with support from the United States and overwhelming Arab opposition.

U.S. and Saudi governments pursue some common national security objectives, including combating the global spread of communism. U.S. administrations consider the Saudi monarchy as an ally against nationalist and socialist governments in the Middle East.

United States provides military training assistance to Saudi Arabia under the terms of the Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

The Muslim World League, one of several multilateral charitable organizations, is established with headquarters in Saudi Arabia to promote Islam and extend economic aid to Muslim nations.

Oil production in the 1970s makes Saudi Arabian per capita income comparable to that of other developed countries. As the price of oil rises, Saudi Arabia’s wealth and political influence increase.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is established after the ouster of the Shah, signaling the rise of political Islam as a challenge to existing regimes in the region.

The Soviet army invades Afghanistan in December, prompting opposition from some Arab governments as well as from the United States and its allies.

Religious extremists seize the Grand Mosque of Mecca; the Saudi government regains control and executes the perpetrators.

Volunteers from some Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, join the Afghan mujahideen (the name given to Afghan resistance fighters) in their fight against the Soviets. The United States and Saudi Arabia play a leading role in supporting the mujahideen.

The United States establishes military installations in Saudi Arabia during the U.S.-led and Saudi-supported ouster of the Iraqi army from Kuwait. The bases draw intense opposition from Al Qaeda, which was founded 3 years earlier.

Terrorists, some with links to Al Qaeda, use a car bomb to attack the World Trade Center in New York City killing 6 people and injuring 1,042.

Citing his support of extremist movements, Saudi Arabia strips Osama bin Laden of Saudi citizenship.

Saudi authorities arrest hundreds of Islamists who have been openly critical of the Saudi government.

Saudi terrorists use a truck bomb to attack the Riyadh headquarters of the U.S.-operated training center of the Saudi National Guard resulting in the death of 5 Americans, among others.

Terrorist bombings at U.S. military complex in Khobar, eastern Saudi Arabia, kill 19 Americans and wound many others. The attack is conducted by Saudi Hizaballah.

The Taliban rise to power in Afghanistan in 1996, imposing a strict interpretation of Islamic law on Afghan society. In 1997, Saudi Arabia becomes one of three countries to recognize the Taliban regime.

The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 1267 imposing financial and other sanctions applying to individuals and entities associated with Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and/or the Taliban.

Dissatisfaction in Saudi Arabia and many parts of the Arab world with U.S. policies related to the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising). Frustrated by a lack of U.S. response to Israeli- Palestinian violence, in a letter to President Bush in 2001, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah warns of a serious rift between the two governments.

Al Qaeda attack on the USS Cole harbored in Yemen kills 17 American soldiers.

On September 11th, the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. are the targets of terrorist attacks, and a hijacked plane crashes in Pennsylvania. The attacks are carried out by 19 Al Qaeda hijackers, including 15 Saudi nationals.

Saudi Arabia condemns the attack and withdraws its official recognition of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, which is an ally of Al Qaeda.

U.S. forces, along with those of several allies and Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance, topple the Taliban regime and remove the safe haven for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Some Al Qaeda survivors return to their countries of origin, including Saudi Arabia.

The United States and its coalition of allies begin military operations in Iraq in March. Saudi Arabia publicly opposes the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, but reportedly allows the U.S.-led forces the use of military facilities in the Kingdom in support of operations in Iraq. However, virtually all U.S. troops are withdrawn from the Kingdom by August.

Several terrorist incidents in Saudi Arabia, including attacks in May and November on residential compounds, kill dozens of people.

Iraqi insurgency attracts foreign fighters, including Saudi nationals.

A series of terrorist attacks throughout Saudi Arabia results in dozens of victims. The targets include Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure and the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah. Saudi security forces intensify their antiterrorist campaign, with casualties on both sides, including Abdulaziz al-Mughrin, the head of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia.

Appendix III: Saudi Ministries and Agencies that Have Functions Related to Countering Terrorism and Terrorism Financing

Primary ministry responsible for efforts to combat terrorism and terrorism financing. It has issued “most wanted” list of terrorists and its security forces have killed or arrested terrorist suspects. The ministry also includes investigative units and oversees the Saudi rehabilitation program for terrorism suspects. The ministry oversees public security, coast guards, civil defense, fire stations, border police, and special security and investigative functions, including criminal investigation.

This unit, which is within in the Ministry of Interior, was created in 2005 and tasked with handling money laundering and terror finance cases. All banks are required to file suspicious transaction reports with this unit. It collects and analyzes these reports and other available information and makes referrals to relevant Saudi agencies, including the Mabahith for further investigation and prosecution.

Also referred to as the General Investigation Directorate, it investigates cases related to terrorism, among other activities.

Serves as the central bank of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It plays a central role in overseeing all anti-money laundering and combating financing of terrorism programs and supervises all banking, securities, and insurance activities in the country.

Oversees political, cultural, and financial international relations; monitors diplomatic relations. Signs bilateral agreements, including those related to counterterrorism, and coordinates efforts with other governments.

Oversees government finance, including budgeting and expenditure of all ministries and agencies; controls national economic growth, zakat, income tax, and customs.

Oversees all Islamic affairs, including maintenance of mosques and monitoring of clerics. The ministry is reported to have dismissed a large number of extremist clerics and sent them to be reeducated.

Oversees all schools, including physical infrastructure and curriculum. One of its priorities is to increase awareness and religious tolerance among teachers.

Appendix IV: U.S. Agencies Providing Training and Technical Assistance to Saudi Arabia, 2005-2008

Appendix IV: U.S. Agencies Providing Training and Technical Assistance to Saudi Arabia, 2005-2008 Along with State and DOE, assists the Saudi government with the protection of critical infrastructure assets, such as oil installations, through the Office of Program Management-Ministry of Interior (OPM-MOI)—a U.S.-Saudi joint organization.

Along with DOD and State, assists the Saudi government with the protection of critical infrastructure assets, such as oil installations, through OPM-MOI. DOE has provided training to Saudi officials on conducting facilities assessments, as well as performed joint assessments of key facilities.

Provided training to Saudi Customs officials on interdiction and investigation related to bulk cash smuggling.

Provided training to Saudi officials, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on financial investigation techniques.

Leads the U.S. Mission in Saudi Arabia.

Provided training to Saudi government officials related to building investigative capability and consulted on oil installation security.

Along with DOD and DOE, assists the Saudi government with the protection of critical infrastructure assets, such as oil installations, through OPM-MOI.

Through the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, provided training to, and conducted assessments of, the Saudi Arabian Financial Investigation Unit.

Through Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigations, provided training to Saudi officials on financial investigation techniques.

Engages in information sharing with Saudi ministries.

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the person named above, Jason Bair (Assistant Director), Ashley Alley, Alexandra Bloom, Joe Carney, Tom Costa, Martin de Alteriis, Mark Dowling, Jonathan Fremont, Etana Finkler, Phillip Farah, Joel Grossman, Julia Jebo, Charles M. Johnson, Jr., Bruce Kutnick, Elizabeth Repko, Mona Sehgal, and James Strus made key contributions to this report. Elizabeth Curda, Davi D’Agostino, Muriel Forster, Barbara Keller, Eileen Larence, Armetha Liles, Sarah McGrath, and Theresa Perkins also provided technical assistance.

Related GAO Products

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. GAO-08-860. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008.

Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. GAO-08-622. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2008.

Combating Terrorism: State Department’s Antiterrorism Program Needs Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes. GAO-08-336. Washington, D.C.: February 29, 2008.

Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists. GAO-07-697. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2007.

Terrorist Financing: Agencies Can Improve Efforts to Deliver Counter- Terrorism-Financing Training and Technical Assistance Abroad. GAO-06-632T. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.

Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate U.S Efforts to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing Training and Technical Assistance Abroad. GAO-06-19. Washington, D.C.: October 24, 2005.

International Affairs: Information on U.S. Agencies’ Efforts to Address Islamic Extremism. GAO-05-852. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2005.

Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing. GAO-05-859. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2005.

Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Department of Homeland Security’s Visa Security Program. GAO-05-801. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005.

Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use of Alternative Financing Mechanisms. GAO-04-163. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2003.

Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat. GAO-03-165. Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2003.