Transportation Security Research: Coordination Needed in Selecting and Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments
Released: 2003-05-01T00:00:00

Letter

Background

On May 22, 1998, President Clinton issued a pair of directives to guide federal efforts to address critical infrastructure vulnerabilities. Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD 62) highlighted the growing threat of unconventional attacks against the United States. It described a new and more systematic approach to fighting terrorism through interagency efforts to prepare for response to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63) further directed federal agencies to conduct risk assessments and planning efforts to reduce exposure to attack. Specifically, the assessments were to consider attacks that could significantly diminish the abilities of (1) the federal government to perform essential national security missions and ensure the general public health and safety; (2) state and local governments to maintain order and to deliver minimum essential public services; and (3) the private sector to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy and the delivery of essential telecommunications, energy, financial, and transportation services. PDD 63 called for the government to complete these assessment efforts no later than May 2003. According to the Office of Intelligence and Security’s (OIS) Associate Director for National Security (hereafter referred to as the Associate Director), the Transportation Infrastructure Assurance (TIA) program is, in part, DOT’s effort to meet these Presidential Decision Directive requirements.

RSPA concentrates on multimodal issues (research that applies to more than one mode of transportation) that affect the entire U.S. transportation system rather than on a specific sector of the system. RSPA’s Office of Innovation, Research and Education is responsible for managing the TIA program. The Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, located in Cambridge, Massachusetts, is the research arm of RSPA and is conducting the program’s vulnerability assessments. OIS is the key transportation security stakeholder within DOT responsible for analyzing, developing, and coordinating departmental and national policies addressing national defense, border security, and transportation infrastructure assurance and protection issues. Other OIS responsibilities include: coordinating with the public and private sectors, international organizations, academia, and interest groups regarding issues of infrastructure protection; acting as the Secretary of Transportation’s liaison with the intelligence, law enforcement, and national defense communities and assisting departmental organizations in establishing and maintaining direct ties with those communities; and serving as the Secretary of Transportation’s primary advisor on significant intelligence issues affecting the traveling public, the transportation industry, and national security. According to OIS’s Associate Director, OIS has historically been involved in the department’s transportation security research efforts. He added that OIS’s lead role in fulfilling the department’s critical infrastructure responsibilities, including the implementation of Presidential Decision Directives addressing critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, is likely to change as the roles and responsibilities of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the newly created Department of Homeland Security are defined.

Congress established TSA in November 2001 to be responsible for ensuring transportation security, including identifying and undertaking research and development activities necessary to enhance transportation security. For fiscal year 2003, TSA received $110 million to fund transportation security research activities for all modes of transportation. Further, on November 25, 2002, the President signed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which established the Department of Homeland Security with the responsibility of, among other tasks, coordinating efforts in securing America’s critical infrastructure. On March 1, 2003, TSA became part of the newly created Department of Homeland Security.

TIA Program Is Scheduled to End in December 2003 with Completion of Four Vulnerability Assessments

The TIA program is scheduled to end in December 2003, resulting in the completion of four vulnerability assessments aimed at identifying and finding ways to mitigate threats against the nation’s transportation infrastructure. RSPA officials said that two of these assessments (the interdependency of the transportation system with other critical infrastructures and transportation and logistical requirements for emergency response teams in dealing with weapons of mass destruction) were selected, in part, to meet DOT’s PDD 62 and 63 requirements, and are scheduled for completion in mid-2003 to meet the deadlines outlined in the presidential directives. The other two assessments (the feasibility of alternative backup systems for the global positioning system, and an assessment of the options to transition from hazardous materials transportation security guidelines to security requirements) were selected based upon a perceived need for assessments in these areas as defined by officials from RSPA’s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety and the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, and are scheduled for completion in December 2003. RSPA’s Volpe Center is conducting the TIA program’s four assessments and has conducted research related to transportation infrastructure since 1996. (See app. I for a summary of the Volpe Center’s Workshops and Studies related to transportation infrastructure assurance from fiscal years 1996 to 2000.)

Figure 1 shows the TIA program’s beginning and completion dates by specific vulnerability assessment. RSPA officials told us that it has no plans to include any additional or future assessments under the TIA program.

The TIA program is assessing four vulnerabilities: Interdependency of the transportation system with other critical infrastructures: According to TIA program documentation, the development of alternative fuels, changes in telecommunication technologies, and the evolving financial role of the federal government in the security of privately operated transportation systems are affecting the relationship between the nation’s transportation infrastructure and some of the nation’s other critical infrastructures. The purpose of this assessment is to describe the current and evolving dependence between the nation’s transportation infrastructure and some of the nation’s other critical infrastructures including energy, electronic-commerce, banking and finance, and telecommunications. For example, the nation’s air traffic control system relies on telecommunications to manage the safety and efficiency of air transportation, as shown in figure 2. Researchers plan to determine the costs, in terms of economic disruption and loss of lives, associated with terrorists exploiting transportation infrastructure vulnerabilities.

Transportation and logistical requirements for emergency response teams in dealing with weapons of mass destruction: The purpose of this assessment is to evaluate the transportation and logistics assets required in responding to terrorist activities. The assessment will include an analysis of transportation operations and procedures, personnel, supplies, and transportation assets such as vehicles, containers, and pallets. Specifically, researchers plan to analyze the institutional and economic implications of terrorist activities involving weapons of mass destruction in order to develop emergency transportation action plans and compile emergency transportation procedure best practices. Emergency teams were transported to respond to the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, as shown in figure 3.

Feasibility of alternative backup systems for the global positioning system: The purpose of this assessment is to provide a continuation of the August 2001 report by the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, Vulnerability of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying On The Global Positioning System. The report concluded that the global positioning system is vulnerable to both intentional and nonintentional disruption, and identified a need for a backup for the global positioning system. To follow- up on the August 2001 report, researchers plan to analyze and describe the performance, cost, and practicality of backup systems and procedures. Figure 4 shows a picture of a global positioning satellite.

Options to transition hazardous materials transportation security guidelines to security requirements: The purpose of this assessment is to evaluate the tradeoffs in the transportation of hazardous materials that exist between security, economic, proprietary, and delivery factors. RSPA plans to provide an analysis and description of these tradeoffs in different threat scenarios for different modes of transportation. Figure 5 provides an overview of the types of transportation being assessed.

RSPA plans to work with OIS to disseminate the results of the program to private transportation system operators and to stakeholders in DOT and other federal agencies through 11 formal reports, presentations, workshops, and the Internet. Table 1 provides an overview of the program’s planned products and progress to date.

Congress appropriated $1 million each year to RSPA for the TIA program in fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003. Figure 6 provides an overview of the TIA program funding for fiscal years 2001 through 2003 for each of the four vulnerability assessments.

RSPA Has Not Fully Coordinated Their Activities with OIS in Selecting the Vulnerabilities to Be Assessed and in Implementing the Assessments for the TIA Program

RSPA has not fully coordinated their activities with OIS—DOT’s key transportation security stakeholder—in selecting the vulnerabilities to be assessed or in implementing the assessments for the TIA program. RSPA coordinated with OIS in selecting two vulnerability assessments in fiscal year 2001. Specifically, in fiscal year 2001, RSPA worked with OIS to select one vulnerability for assessment and notified OIS of its selection of a second vulnerability for assessment. RSPA, however, did not coordinate with OIS officials in the selection of two additional vulnerability assessments in fiscal year 2002. RSPA’s coordination with OIS during the program’s implementation has been limited to only one of the four vulnerability assessments under review.

RSPA’s Coordination with OIS in the Selection of the Vulnerabilities to Be Assessed in the TIA Program

RSPA coordinated with OIS and used various criteria, such as PDD 62 and 63, in selecting only two of the four vulnerabilities to be assessed in the TIA program. For example, RSPA consulted with OIS to select one of the two vulnerabilities for assessment in fiscal year 2001 and notified OIS of its selection of a second vulnerability. Specifically, in a memorandum dated March 6, 2001, OIS identified and proposed a list of critical infrastructure protection research requirements for assessment and requested that RSPA address them as a high priority. In this initial proposal, the Director of OIS said that significant OIS involvement would be required to effectively implement the program given its responsibilities for defining transportation security vulnerabilities, ensuring that vulnerability assessments are conducted, and implementing actions to mitigate those vulnerabilities. On April 9, 2001, RSPA issued a memorandum to OIS outlining its research agenda for fiscal year 2001 and stating that OIS’s involvement in assuring the program’s quality, credibility, and review was critical. This memorandum confirmed RSPA’s plans to assess the interdependency of the transportation system with other critical infrastructures, as suggested by OIS’s proposed list, and notified OIS of RSPA’s intention to conduct a second assessment—the transportation and logistical requirements for emergency response teams in dealing with weapons of mass destruction—that was not included on OIS’s list.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, RPSA issued a solicitation on behalf of all DOT modes for additional transportation security technology research and concepts to be included in the TIA program or related transportation security programs. OIS officials participated with RSPA in reviewing the proposals received in response to the solicitation. However, according to the Associate Administrator of RSPA’s Office of Innovation, Research, and Education (hereafter referred to as the Associate Administrator), DOT did not receive the funds to pursue any of these proposals.

During fiscal year 2002, RSPA did not coordinate with OIS to determine what additional assessments to select for inclusion in the program. Instead, RSPA selected two transportation vulnerabilities for assessment under the program after holding discussions with Volpe Center researchers and officials from RSPA’s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety. While the Associate Director of OIS said he was unaware that additional vulnerabilities had been selected for assessment in fiscal year 2002 prior to our discussions with him regarding the status of the program, he noted that both of these assessments—on the feasibility of alternative backup systems for the global positioning system, and an assessment on options to transition hazardous materials transportation security guidelines to security requirements—were valid and of high priority. According to OIS and RSPA officials, this lack of coordination resulted, in part, from disagreements and misunderstandings about the other’s respective role in the program. As indicated by a series of e-mail communications between OIS and RSPA officials during the period between October 2001 and January 2002, questions about the respective roles of OIS and RSPA in the program’s management, specific research areas, and the logistics of this research were raised on numerous occasions with no apparent resolution. Neither RSPA nor OIS were able to provide us with documentation to show that these issues were resolved. (See app. II for specific stakeholders involved and criteria used to select the vulnerabilities chosen for assessment under the TIA program in fiscal years 2001 and 2002.)

RSPA’s Coordination with OIS in the Implementation of the Assessments in the TIA Program

RSPA’s coordination with OIS, DOT’s security stakeholder, during the implementation of the TIA program has been limited to one of the four vulnerability assessments. While OIS has participated in meetings regarding the assessment of the options to transition hazardous materials transportation security guidelines to security requirements, RSPA did not similarly involve OIS in the program’s three other vulnerability assessments. OIS and RSPA officials said that this lack of coordination during the implementation of the program resulted, in part, from continued disagreements and misunderstandings about the other’s respective role in the program. Further, OIS’s Associate Director said that because of OIS’s lack of involvement in the TIA program, he was not aware of the program’s progress to date and therefore expressed uncertainty about whether the program’s research is meeting the requirements of PDD 62 and 63.

OIS’s Associate Director also said that OIS’s working relationships with private industry stakeholders might have helped RSPA obtain industry- sensitive information for the program’s assessments. RSPA officials acknowledged that a primary challenge of the TIA program involves obtaining information on industry-specific, competition-sensitive issues. For example, RSPA officials said that private sector owners and operators, such as those from the oil industry, are cautious about releasing proprietary information because of the possibility that this information could be used by (1) business rivals to gain a competitive advantage, (2) terrorists to harm and destroy critical infrastructure, and (3) the federal government to pursue further regulations of the industry. As a result, TIA program researchers told us that they are limited in their ability to identify specific threats and weaknesses relating to some of the specific vulnerabilities under assessment. According to RSPA’s Associate Administrator, because of these limitations, the TIA program is, in some instances, examining vulnerability issues on a conceptual level rather than through specific case studies of industry infrastructure. For example, instead of assessing the vulnerabilities of specific privately owned infrastructures, such as oil refineries, RSPA is addressing some critical details of crude oil transport using ports in Louisiana and Texas to illustrate the complexities in defining the interdependency vulnerabilities between the nation’s transportation and energy infrastructures. (See app. III for a summary of OIS involvement in the implementation of the TIA program, as well as a listing of all of the significant stakeholders reported by RSPA who were consulted during the implementation of the TIA program.)

We discussed our findings about the lack of coordination with RSPA’s Associate Administrator and OIS’s Associate Director and suggested they take steps to increase their coordination efforts. They agreed that increased coordination would be beneficial. Specifically, they agreed to hold bi-monthly updates on the progress of each of the vulnerability assessments, discuss program task methodologies and approaches, and identify options for addressing the challenges facing program researchers in conducting the program’s vulnerability assessments. The first update was held in March 2003. Furthermore, RSPA’s Associate Administrator agreed to provide TSA’s Director for Threat Assessment and Risk Management with information on the TIA program’s findings, challenges, and lessons learned. In our discussions with TSA’s Director for Threat and Risk Assessment, she said that such information regarding the TIA program would be helpful in guiding TSA’s future efforts in planning and conducting transportation security research. Because of actions taken by RSPA and OIS to improve coordination we are making no recommendations at this time.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a copy of the draft report to DOT and RSPA officials who agreed with the contents of the report and provided technical clarifications that we incorporated into the report. They did not provide written comments on the report.

We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Transportation, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have questions about this report, please call me on (202) 512-2834 or Chris Keisling on (404) 679-1917. Other key contributors included Colin Fallon, Bert Japikse, Steve Morris, and Jason Schwartz.

Appendix I: Volpe National Transportation System Center Studies Related to Transportation Infrastructure Assurance

Fiscal year 1996

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Vulnerabilities (1997) National Air Space Vulnerabilities (1997) Traffic (Surface) Central Systems Vulnerabilities (1997)

White Papers: Electromagnetic Threats to Rail/Transit Operations (1997)

Criminal Use of Transportation Infrastructure (1997) Railroad Bridges and Tunnels Vulnerability (1998) Railroad Signaling and Control Vulnerability (1998)

Intermodal Cargo Security Best Practices (1999)

Transportation Infrastructure Assurance Research and Development Plan (1999 and 2000)

Workshops: Emerging Issues in Transportation Information Infrastructure Security (1996)

Global Positioning Study Interference and Mitigation (1998) Chemical/Biological Incidents (1998) Marine Safety and Port Security (2000)

Intermodal Cargo Security Best Practices (1999)

Transportation Infrastructure Assurance Research and Development Plan (1999 and 2000)

DOT Communications (Security) Reports (2001) Updated Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)

Study (2002)

Global Positioning System Vulnerability Study (2001)

Appendix II: Stakeholders Involved and Criteria Used in Selecting the Vulnerabilities Assessed Under the TIA Program

Appendix III: Entities Reported by RSPA Who Were Involved during the Implementation of the TIA Program