Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Improvements Needed in Continuity Planning and Involvement of Key Users
Released: 2010-10-01T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Since the 1960s, geostationary and polar-orbiting environmental satellites have been used by the United States to provide meteorological data for weather observation, research, and forecasting. NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS) is responsible for managing the civilian operational geostationary and polar- orbiting satellite systems as two separate programs, called GOES and the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites, respectively.

Unlike polar-orbiting satellites, which constantly circle the earth in a relatively low polar orbit, geostationary satellites can maintain a constant view of the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in space. NOAA operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is primarily focused on the United States (see fig. 1). These satellites are uniquely positioned to provide timely environmental data about the earth’s atmosphere, surface, cloud cover, and the space environment to meteorologists and their audiences. They also observe the development of hazardous weather, such as hurricanes and severe thunderstorms, and track their movement and intensity to reduce or avoid major losses of property and life. Furthermore, the satellites’ ability to provide broad, continuously updated coverage of atmospheric conditions over land and oceans is important to NOAA’s weather forecasting operations.

To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several satellites at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites every few years (see table 1). NOAA’s policy is to have two operational satellites and one backup satellite in orbit at all times.

Five GOES satellites—GOES-11, GOES-12, GOES-13, GOES-14, and GOES- 15—are currently in orbit. Both GOES-11 and GOES-13 are operational satellites, with GOES-11 covering the west and GOES-13 the east. GOES-14 is currently a backup for the other two satellites should they experience any degradation in service. The final satellite in the series, GOES-15, is undergoing a post-launch test period until October 2010, at which time it will also be put in on-orbit storage mode. GOES-12 is at the end of its service life, but is being used to provide coverage of South America. The GOES-R series is the next generation of satellites that NOAA is planning; the satellites are planned for launch beginning in 2015.

Each of the operational geostationary satellites continuously transmits raw environmental data to NOAA ground stations. The data are processed at these ground stations and transmitted back to the satellite for broadcast to primary weather services and the global research community in the United States and abroad. Raw and processed data are also distributed to users via ground stations through other communication channels, such as dedicated private communication lines and the Internet. Figure 2 depicts a generic data relay pattern from the geostationary satellites to the ground stations and commercial terminals.

Overview of the GOES-R Program

NOAA plans for the GOES-R program to improve on the technology of prior series, in terms of both system and instrument improvements. The system improvements are expected to fulfill more demanding user requirements by updating the satellite data more often and providing satellite products to users more quickly. The instrument improvements are expected to significantly increase the clarity and precision of the observed environmental data. NOAA originally planned to acquire six different types of instruments. Furthermore, two of these instruments—the Advanced Baseline Imager and the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite—were considered to be the most critical because they would provide data for key weather products. Table 2 summarizes the originally planned instruments and their expected capabilities.

However, in September 2006, NOAA decided to reduce the scope and technical complexity of the GOES-R program because of expectations that total costs, which were originally estimated to be $6.2 billion, could reach $11.4 billion. Specifically, NOAA reduced the minimum number of satellites from four to two, cancelled plans for developing the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite (which reduced the number of planned satellite products from 81 to 68), and divided the Solar Imaging Suite into two separate acquisitions. In light of the cancellation of the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite, NOAA decided to use the planned Advanced Baseline Imager to develop certain satellite data products that were originally to be produced by this instrument. The agency estimated that the revised program would cost $7 billion.

Subsequently, NOAA made several other important decisions about the cost and scope of the GOES-R program. In May 2007, NOAA had an independent cost estimate completed for the GOES-R program. After reconciling the program office’s cost estimate of $7 billion with the independent cost estimate of about $9 billion, the agency established a new program cost estimate of $7.67 billion. This was an increase of $670 million from the previous estimate. Further, in November 2007, to mitigate the risk that costs would rise, program officials decided to remove selected program requirements from the baseline program and treat them as contract options that could be exercised if funds allow. These requirements include the number of products to be distributed, the time to deliver the remaining products (product latency), and how often these products are updated with new satellite data (refresh rate). For example, program officials eliminated the requirement to develop and distribute 34 of the 68 envisioned products, including aircraft icing threat, turbulence, and visibility. Program officials included the restoration of the products, latency, and refresh rates as options in the ground system contract that could be acquired at a later time. Program officials later reduced the number of products that could be restored as a contract option (called option 2) from 34 to 31 because they determined that two products were no longer feasible and two others could be combined into a single product. See table 3 below for an overview of key changes to the GOES-R program.

NOAA’s original acquisition strategy was to award contracts for concept development of the GOES-R system to several vendors who would subsequently compete to be the single prime contractor responsible for overall system development and production. In keeping with this strategy, NOAA awarded contracts for concept development of the overall GOES-R system to three vendors in October 2005. However, in March 2007, NOAA revised its acquisition strategy for the development contract. In response to recommendations by independent advisors, the agency decided to separate the overall system development and production contract into two separate contracts—the spacecraft and ground system contracts.

In addition, to reduce the risks associated with developing technically advanced instruments, NASA awarded contracts for concept development for five of the planned instruments. NASA subsequently awarded development contracts for five instruments and, upon completion and approval by NASA, these instruments will be provided to the prime contractor responsible for the spacecraft of the GOES-R program. NASA will then work with the spacecraft contractor to integrate and test these instruments. The sixth instrument, the Magnetometer, is to be developed as part of the spacecraft contract.

Program Office Structure

NOAA is solely responsible for GOES-R program funding and overall mission success. However, since it relies on NASA’s acquisition experience and technical expertise to help ensure the success of its programs, NOAA implemented an integrated program management structure with NASA for the GOES-R program (see fig. 3). NOAA also located the program office at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. Within the program office, there are two project offices that manage key components of the GOES-R system. These are called the flight and ground system project offices. The Flight Project Office, managed by NASA, is responsible for awarding and managing the spacecraft contract and delivering flight-ready instruments to the spacecraft. The Ground System Project Office, managed by NOAA, oversees the Core Ground System contract and satellite data product development and distribution.

Prior Report Noted Challenges with Instrument Development and Recommended Steps to Improve Management and Oversight

In April 2009, we reported that a key instrument had experienced technical challenges that led to cost overruns and schedule delays. Specifically, the Advanced Baseline Imager experienced problems with the quality of components in the focal plane module, mirrors, and telescope. As of November 2008, the contractor had incurred a cost overrun of approximately $30 million and delayed $11 million worth of work. In addition, we found that the contractors for both the Advanced Baseline Imager and the Geostationary Lightning Mapper programs had not documented all of the reasons for cost and schedule variances in certain cost reports. At the time, we recommended that NOAA improve its ability to oversee contractor performance by ensuring that the reasons for cost and schedule variances are fully disclosed and documented. Over the past year, NOAA has improved its ability to oversee contractor performance by, for example, ensuring that the reasons for cost and schedule variances are fully documented in contractor monthly variance reports.

In that same report, we also found that NOAA had delayed key GOES-R program milestones, including the launch of the first satellite, which was delayed from December 2014 to April 2015. Program officials attributed these delays to providing more stringent oversight before releasing the request for proposals for the spacecraft and ground system, additional time needed to evaluate the contract proposals, and funding reductions in fiscal year 2008. We reported that, as a result of these delays, NOAA may not be able to meet its policy of having a backup satellite in orbit at all times. Specifically, in 2015, NOAA expected to have two operational satellites in orbit, but it would not have a backup satellite in place until GOES-R is launched. As a result, any further delays in the launch of the first satellite in the GOES-R program would increase the risk of gaps in satellite coverage.

GOES-R Is in Development, but Delays in Key Program Milestones Have Endangered Satellite Continuity

The GOES-R program has continued to make progress in the development of its major projects, but key instruments have experienced technical issues and significant work remains to be completed. Further, key program milestones, including the launch dates for the first two satellites in the series, have been further delayed. As a result, NOAA may not be able to meet its policy of having a backup satellite in orbit at all times, which could lead to a gap in satellite coverage if an existing satellite fails prematurely.

Progress Continues to Be Made on GOES-R Procurement, but Much Work Remains to Be Completed on the Flight and Ground Projects

NOAA and NASA have made progress on the procurement of its two major projects—the flight project and the ground project. The flight project includes contracts for the development of the five key instruments and spacecraft while the ground project includes contracts for the development of key systems needed for the on-orbit operation of the satellites, receipt and processing of information, and distribution of satellite data products to users.

For the flight project, between September 2004 and December 2008, the GOES-R program awarded contracts for the five key instruments and spacecraft. The contractors are making progress in completing key milestones in developing these components. However, due to bid protests of the award of the spacecraft contract in December 2008, work on the contract did not begin until August 2009. As a result of these delays, NOAA later approved a 6-month delay in the launch date for the first satellite (GOES-R), from April 2015 to October 2015, and the second satellite (GOES-S), from August 2016 to February 2017. Program officials stated that the estimated program life-cycle cost estimate remains steady at $7.67 billion. Table 4 describes the development contracts for the flight project, including their contract award date, and their cost and schedule estimates.

For the ground project, a contract for one of three key subcomponents, the Core Ground System, was awarded in May 2009, and contracts for the two other subcomponents are planned to be awarded in July 2010. The Core Ground System is of critical importance because it provides for command and control and ground processing capabilities for GOES-R satellites and instruments. Table 5 describes the development contracts for the ground project, including their contract award date, and their cost and schedule estimates, while figure 4 depicts the schedule for both the overall GOES-R program as well as the flight and ground projects.

The GOES-R program has continued to make progress on the development of the spacecraft and five key instruments. After starting work on the spacecraft contract in August 2009, the contractor worked to establish the initial cost and schedule baseline and completed a key program milestone intended to demonstrate that the spacecraft concept meets mission requirements. The contractor is currently conducting preliminary design activities and plans to assess the readiness of the program to proceed with detailed design activities in January 2011. In addition, three instruments, the Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor, the Solar Ultraviolet Imager, and the Space Environmental In-Situ Suite have recently completed critical design reviews. Completion of this review is intended to demonstrate that the instruments’ detailed design is appropriate to support proceeding to full- scale fabrication, assembly, integration, and testing.

Two other instruments—the Advanced Baseline Imager and the Geostationary Lightning Mapper—have experienced significant technical issues, which have resulted in cost increases and schedule delays to the contractors’ performance baselines. The Advanced Baseline Imager program has experienced technical issues primarily related to underestimating the design and development complexity of two components—the focal planes and telescope, which led to cost increases and delays in developing the prototype model. As a result, in September 2009, the program office rebaselined the cost and schedule targets of the Advanced Baseline Imager program. This increased contract costs from the most recent estimate of $375 million to $537 million, an increase of $162 million, and delayed the completion of the prototype model from March 2010 to December 2010. Program officials reported that the rebaseline did not affect the instrument’s completion date and that they have sufficient contingency reserves to address the cost overruns experienced to date, meaning that these system-specific cost overruns will not affect the overall GOES-R program’s cost. The program is currently testing the prototype model and plans to conduct an updated critical design review in January 2011 to validate any required design changes as a result of testing.

The Geostationary Lightning Mapper experienced technical issues primarily related to underestimating the design complexity of the instrument, as well as an architecture change that significantly increased the electronics design and fabrication cost. As a result, in March 2010, the program office rebaselined the cost and schedule targets of the Geostationary Lightning Mapper program, which increased contract costs from $71 million to $157 million, an increase of about $86 million, and delayed the contract completion from June 2012 to September 2012—a 3- month delay. According to GOES-R program officials, contingency funds are available to cover these changes and they will not affect the overall cost or schedule of the GOES-R program. In addition, the program replaced the development of a prototype model with an engineering development unit, which requires less rigorous development procedures and testing requirements. For example, the planned engineering development unit is not required to undergo comprehensive environmental testing to validate that the instrument will meet mission objectives in the launch and space environment. According to GOES-R program officials, this decision was made to reduce program risk because the schedule for development of the prototype model and production model would have otherwise overlapped—thus reducing the inherent benefits of a prototype model. However, the lack of a prototype model increases the risk that design issues that would have been identified during more comprehensive testing will surface in the production model, when it is too late to make changes.

The status and program-identified risk level of each of the components of the flight project is described in table 6.

Our analysis of contractor-provided earned value management data showed that most components of the flight project were on track between May 2009 and April 2010. Specifically, contractors for three instruments— the Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor, the Space Environmental In-Situ Suite, and the Solar Ultraviolet Imager—and the spacecraft are generally meeting cost and schedule targets. The other two instruments, the Advanced Baseline Imager and the Geostationary Lightning Mapper, are meeting their revised cost and schedule targets since completing their rebaselining efforts in September 2009 and March 2010, respectively.

Ground Project—Development Is Under Way, but Important Work Remains to Be Done

Development of the ground project is under way. After awarding the contract for the Core Ground System in May 2009, the contractor has been conducting system definition activities and plans to conduct a preliminary design review in February 2011 to assess the readiness of the program to proceed with detailed design activities.

However, the awards of two additional ground project contracts have been delayed and important work remains to be completed. For example, contract award for the GOES-R Access Subsystem has slipped 6 months, from January 2010 to July 2010. These delays were due, in part, to delays in releasing the request for proposals. Award of the antennas contract has also been delayed by 3 months. Both contracts are critical to ensuring that GOES-R data are received, stored, and distributed to users. The status and program-identified risk level of each of the components of the ground project is described in table 7.

Our analysis of contractor-provided earned value management data for the Core Ground System indicates that cost and schedule performance were generally on track between June 2009 and April 2010. Between these dates, the contractor for the Core Ground System completed work slightly under budget.

Continued Delays in Launch Dates Put the Continuity of Satellite Operations at Risk

Over the last few years, NOAA has delayed the satellite launch dates several times. We previously reported that, since 2006, the launch of the first satellite had been delayed from September 2012 to April 2015—a slip of more than 30 months. These delays were due, in part, to delays in releasing the requests for proposals for the spacecraft and Core Ground System and additional time needed to evaluate the contract proposals. Since our last report, NOAA further delayed key GOES-R program milestones by 6 months, including the dates when the first two satellites in the series would be available for launch. These recent delays were due to bid protests of the award of the spacecraft contract in December 2008, which delayed the start of work until August 2009. In order to allow sufficient time for the 72-month development cycle required for the spacecraft, NOAA approved a 6-month delay in the launch dates for the first two satellites in the series. Table 8 identifies the delays in the satellite launch dates over time.

While NOAA’s policy is to have two operational satellites and one backup satellite in orbit at all times, continued delays in the launch of the first GOES-R satellite could lead to a gap in satellite coverage. This policy proved useful in December 2008, when NOAA experienced problems with GOES-12, but was able to use GOES-13 as an operational satellite until the problems were resolved. However, beginning in April 2015, NOAA expects to have two operational satellites in orbit (GOES-14 and GOES-15), but it will not have a backup satellite in place until GOES-R is launched and completes an estimated 6-month post-launch test period—resulting in a 12- month gap during which time a backup satellite would not be available. Figure 5 below depicts this gap in backup coverage.

If NOAA experiences a problem with either of its operational satellites before GOES-R is in orbit and operating, it will need to rely on older satellites that are beyond their expected operational lives and therefore may not be fully functional. Any further delays in the launch of the first satellite in the GOES-R program would likely continue to increase the risk of a gap in satellite coverage.

NOAA Has Not Established Adequate Continuity Plans for Its Geostationary Satellites

While federal policy and industry best practices call for the development of plans for continuing essential operations during a disruption or emergency, NOAA has not developed adequate continuity plans for its geostationary satellites for the period of time when there will be no backup in orbit. Planning for the continuity of operations facilitates the performance of an organization’s essential functions during emergency events or other situations that disrupt normal operations. Federal policy requires agencies to develop and document continuity of operations plans for essential functions that provide, among other things, a description of the resources, staff roles, procedures, and timetables needed for the plan’s implementation. NOAA has defined providing satellite imagery in support of weather forecasting as one of its essential functions.

NOAA has developed continuity plans for the ground systems used to operate and process data from geostationary satellites. Specifically, NOAA’s continuity plans for its Satellite Operation Control Center and its Environmental Data Processing Center describe plans to transfer critical functions to a backup facility during an emergency. Both of these continuity plans contain, among other things, descriptions of the alternate locations for performing key functions, resources, and implementation procedures.

In addition to planning for the continuity of its ground systems, NOAA has established a policy to ensure the continuity of its geostationary satellites—and high-level plans if that policy is not met. As previously mentioned, NOAA’s policy is to have two operational satellites and one backup satellite in orbit at all times. That way, if an operational satellite fails, the backup satellite would be moved into place to pick up operations. However, if there is no backup satellite in orbit—as is expected to be the case during the year leading up to when GOES-R becomes operational—NOAA officials stated that they would move the single remaining operational satellite to the middle of the continental United States. According to NOAA officials, this would provide sufficient coverage of the continental United States, but would provide limited coverage of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (see fig. 6). In addition, NOAA would contact other nations to request that a spare geostationary satellite, if available, be positioned to provide temporary coverage of the coastal regions, as well as the oceans.

However, NOAA has not established continuity plans for its geostationary satellites that describe the resources, staff roles, procedures, and timetables needed for the plan’s implementation. This is important because there are many procedures and coordinating activities that NOAA would need to perform to ensure the continuity of geostationary satellite data in the event of a satellite failure with no backup available. For example, the transition to a single satellite would require NOAA, at a minimum, to inform users of changes to the in-orbit configuration through various methods, including users groups and Web site postings. Alternatively, the transition to an international satellite would require modifications to the software code of several processing systems to account for expected differences in spectral channels, refresh rate, resolution, and coverage areas due to the repositioning of the satellites. Further, all geostationary satellite data products would need to be reverified and validated to account for differences in product coverage. Lastly, NOAA would have to notify GOES data users of differences in satellite capabilities, such as the loss of space weather instruments and data, and changes to viewing angles caused by satellite positions that are different from current GOES locations. For example, the orbital location of an international satellite positioned in a backup configuration may provide a less comprehensive view due to the more severe observing angle over the United States.

In addition, NOAA’s lack of continuity plans has precluded the agency from documenting and communicating the operational impact of its plans to reduce to a single satellite and rely on an international satellite. For example, a single satellite configuration would reduce coverage of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans where satellite data provide critical warnings of approaching severe weather, such as tropical cyclone and hurricane activity. According to air traffic officials from the Federal Aviation Administration, the reduction to a single satellite would have a significant impact on the agency’s ability to make informed aviation planning decisions over the ocean areas surrounding the continental United States. In addition, transitioning to an international satellite would be dependent on the availability of foreign satellites and it could take several months to reposition an international satellite to provide backup coverage. Furthermore, foreign satellites lack capabilities currently available to GOES users, such as instruments that provide space weather information. For example, the National Weather Service’s (NWS) Space Weather Prediction Center relies solely on space weather data from GOES for two- thirds of its data products, which are critical to providing warnings of severe space weather that may impact airline and maritime communication, satellite operations, and astronaut safety.

According to the Deputy Director of the Office of Satellite Operations, continuity plans for geostationary satellites have not been established because the transition to single satellite and to an international satellite has been done previously. Specifically, in 1989, after the failure of GOES-6, NOAA repositioned GOES-7 to the middle of the continental United States. Subsequently, in 1991, the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites and the European Space Agency repositioned the Meteosat-3 satellite to backup NOAA’s aging GOES-7 satellite in order to provide coverage of the Atlantic Ocean in case GOES-7 failed before a replacement could be launched and placed into operation. While this accomplishment has merit, current GOES and their related ground processing systems are increasingly complex and have enhanced capabilities as compared to earlier satellites, such as ability to capture and process higher resolution images of weather patterns and atmospheric measurements. In addition, there are likely new staff who will not be able to rely on the 1989 and 1991 experiences. Establishing continuity plans that describe the resources, staff roles, procedures, and timetables needed for the plans’ implementation (as required by federal policy) would better ensure that NOAA can continue to provide these critical capabilities in the event of a satellite failure.

Without continuity plans, NOAA may not be able to fully meet its mission- essential function of providing satellite imagery in support of weather forecasting. This could have a devastating affect on the ability of meteorologists to observe the development of severe storm conditions, such as hurricanes and tornados, and track their movement and intensity to reduce or avoid major losses of property and life. In addition, the loss of a single satellite could affect many satellite data users outside NOAA, including the Federal Aviation Administration, which use satellite- provided weather data for air traffic management, and the U.S. Forest Service (within the U.S. Department of Agriculture), which uses satellite- provided weather data to predict and prevent wildfires and mitigate their damage.

NOAA’s Efforts to Involve External GOES Data Users, Prioritize Their Data Needs, and Communicate Program Status Have Shortfalls

NOAA has identified key GOES data users and involved internal users in defining and prioritizing the GOES-R program requirements, but lacks a comprehensive approach for eliciting and prioritizing the satellite data needs of external users. Further, while NOAA has taken steps to communicate program status and changes to all GOES data users, important changes to currently available GOES data products have not been adequately communicated to external users. Until these weaknesses are addressed, NOAA faces the increased risk that its satellite acquisitions may not meet the needs of key GOES data users.

Key GOES Data Users Have Been Identified, but Efforts to Involve Other Federal Agencies and Prioritize Their Data Needs Are Not Sufficient

Leading organizations routinely identify relevant operational users and involve these users in key program activities, including requirements definition. Moreover, best practices call for eliciting the needs of operational users and developing these needs into prioritized requirements. Prioritized requirements should serve as the basis for determining project scope and can help to ensure that requirements critical to key users are addressed quickly.

Key GOES data users can be categorized into three tiers. The first tier includes internal NOAA users that depend on GOES data for their primary mission, such as NWS. The second tier includes other federal agencies that depend on GOES data for their primary mission, such as the Department of Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration. The third tier includes all other users that receive GOES data, including private industry and universities. See table 9 below for descriptions and examples of each tier of GOES data users.

In formulating the GOES-R program, NOAA primarily involved internal NOAA users (tier 1) in requirements definition activities, but did receive input from one other federal agency, the Department of Defense. Beginning in 1998, NOAA collected high-level system requirements from NWS. Over the next few years, NOAA continued to collect and refine these requirements by including input from other NOAA offices, including NESDIS, NOAA Ocean Service, NOAA Research, NOAA Fisheries, and NOAA Marine and Aviation Operations. Also, in February 2003, the Department of Commerce requested that the Department of Defense provide a consolidated list of its environmental information needs, including those data needs that could be met by geostationary satellites. This input, combined with that of NOAA’s offices, served as the basis for the 2004 GOES-R Program Requirements Document, which represented a preliminary set of GOES-R requirements.

In June 2007, prior to entering the development phase of the GOES-R program lifecycle, the Deputy Undersecretary for Commerce Oceans and Atmosphere approved a baseline set of prioritized GOES-R requirements (known as the Level 1 Requirements). Efforts to prioritize the Level 1 Requirements were led by a working group of representatives from various NOAA organizations. This working group categorized the requirements into four priority levels according to the importance of each requirement to NOAA, as well as the requirements contribution to the GOES-R series.

However, other than the Department of Defense’s input into the 2004 version of the requirements, external users that rely on GOES data were not adequately involved in the GOES-R requirements definition or prioritization process. According to NOAA officials, input to the requirements from other federal agencies (tier 2) and other interested users (tier 3) was collected via casual conversations between NOAA offices and these users, as well as during GOES User Conferences, which were held to educate and obtain input from prospective GOES-R users. While these methods are reasonable for eliciting input from tier 3 users, federal agencies that rely on GOES data to meet unique mission requirements warrant documented input to the GOES-R requirements. For example, the U.S. Forest Service relies on GOES for fire monitoring and detection capabilities to sustain an estimated 193 million acres of the nation’s forests and grasslands. According to U.S. Forest Service officials, the lack of a structured process for their agency to provide input into the requirements definition process has made it difficult to ensure that its requirements have been and will be implemented.

Further, NOAA did not account for the priority data needs of other federal users in prioritizing the Level 1 requirements. As previously mentioned, the priorities of the requirements were established by the GOES-R requirements working group. However, this group only includes membership from NOAA offices, such as NWS and NESDIS, and does not include membership from other federal agencies. According to GOES-R program officials, the Level 1 Requirements are intended to reflect the priorities of NOAA users, primarily those of NWS, and the assumption is that other users will adapt to the data provided by NOAA. However, given the unique missions of other federal agencies and their reliance on GOES data to meet their missions, input into the prioritization of GOES-R requirements is critical to ensure that GOES-R will meet the needs of their organizations.

The lack of involvement by federal agencies in GOES-R requirements definition and prioritization is due to weaknesses in NOAA’s processes for defining and prioritizing satellite data requirements. Specifically, the lack of a structured process for eliciting the data needs of key operational users inhibits NOAA’s ability to produce prioritized requirements that reflect the needs of other federal agencies that depend on these satellites. Without improvements in these processes, NOAA’s satellite acquisitions may not fully meet the needs of important GOES data users.

NOAA Has Not Effectively Communicated with Other Federal Agencies

While NOAA has taken steps to communicate program status and changes to internal and external GOES data users, important changes to currently available GOES data products have not been communicated to key external users. According to industry best practices, programs should regularly communicate program status to relevant operational users. Moreover, best practices call for identifying and documenting deviations from plans and communicating significant issues to relevant operational users.

NOAA has taken steps to communicate program status and changes to GOES data users. For example, the GOES-R requirements working group was established to identify and represent NOAA user requirements and serves as a forum for communication of GOES-R requirements status and changes with internal NOAA users. Another initiative, known as the GOES- R Proving Ground, engages the NWS forecast and warning community in preoperational demonstrations of selected capabilities anticipated from GOES-R. Through this program, NWS users are given the ability to test and evaluate expected GOES-R capabilities, such as lightning detection, before the satellites are operational. Lastly, GOES User Conferences are held to educate and obtain input from any prospective GOES users, including other agencies, universities, and industry.

However, the GOES-R program has undergone significant changes over the course of its acquisition lifecycle, and these changes have not been communicated to GOES data users outside of NOAA. As previously mentioned, in 2007, program officials removed requirements from the baseline program to treat them as a contract option that could be exercised if funds allow (known as Option 2). These changes resulted in a baseline program of 34 satellite data products and 31 Option 2 products. However, NOAA did not communicate the removal of these products to external federal agencies. In addition, 9 Option 2 products are currently available to GOES data users, which means that users may lose access to these products if the contract option is not exercised. These 9 products are critical to measuring cloud properties, infrared radiation, and sulfur dioxide in the atmosphere. However, NOAA did not inform external federal agencies about the potential loss of these products. See figure 7 for a description of the 9 currently available products removed from the GOES-R program baseline.

According to GOES-R program officials, the decision to make these products part of the contract option was based on NOAA’s input and was approved by the requirements working group. However, key GOES data users at other federal agencies that currently rely on these products have not been involved in, nor told of, these changes. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture uses cloud-based products (such as cloud liquid water) to develop weather forecasts used by farmers and radiation-based products (such as upward longwave radiation) for streamflow simulation modeling. In addition, the Department of Defense relies on the cloud- based products (such as cloud type and cloud heights) as input into weather prediction models for forecasting of high-altitude winds, which are used to navigate ships and planes.

If the contract option is not exercised, these agencies will not have access to these GOES data products that they currently utilize. If this occurs, GOES-R program officials stated that GOES data users may be able to get these products via the Internet from NESDIS, but added that the details for this alternative have not been determined because the program expects to receive approval from NESDIS to exercise this contract option by December 2010. Given that these products are currently available to GOES data users, any significant changes to these products should be communicated to these users to ensure that they have sufficient time to implement workarounds or determine other sources for the data. Without communicating significant changes, other federal agencies may lose access to critical data products needed to meet mission requirements.

Conclusions

Over the last few years, the GOES-R program has continued to make progress on key development efforts, but much work remains to be completed. While the GOES-R program has awarded most development contracts, two instruments have experienced technical challenges that led to contract cost increases, and significant work remains on the program’s flight and ground projects. In addition, continued delays in the launch date of the first two satellites in the GOES-R series have endangered satellite continuity because these delays extend the time in which there will not be a backup satellite in orbit. Any further delays in the launch of the first satellite in the GOES-R program increases the risk of a gap in satellite coverage.

The risk of a gap in coverage is further exacerbated because NOAA has not established adequate continuity plans. While NOAA plans to reduce to a single satellite and, if available, rely on an international satellite, these plans have weaknesses, including a lack of continuity plans needed to support geostationary satellite operations during an emergency. Until these weaknesses are addressed, NOAA faces a potential 12-month gap where it may not be able to provide critical geostationary data needed for predicting global and local weather events in the event of a satellite failure.

Finally, NOAA has taken steps to identify GOES data users, prioritize their data needs, and communicate program changes, but has not adequately involved or communicated with key external users. For example, while NOAA involved internal users in its process for defining and prioritizing the GOES-R requirements, improvements are needed in these processes to ensure that other federal agencies that rely on GOES data have a means to provide documented input to the requirements and the prioritization of those requirements. Further, while NOAA has taken steps to communicate with GOES data users, it has not established processes to notify other federal agencies of GOES-R program status and significant changes. Until these improvements are made, important GOES users may lose access to critical data products and future GOES acquisitions may not meet the mission requirements of these users.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve NOAA’s ability to maintain geostationary satellites continuity and improve efforts to involve key GOES data users, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator to ensure that the following three actions are taken: Develop and document continuity plans for the operation of geostationary satellites that include the implementation procedures, resources, staff roles, and timetables needed to transition to a single satellite, an international satellite, or other solution.

Establish processes for satellite data requirements definition and prioritization to include documented input from external federal agencies that rely on GOES data on future satellite acquisitions.

Establish and implement processes to notify these agencies of GOES-R program status and changes.

Agency Comments

We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of Commerce, who transmitted NOAA’s comments. The department agreed with our recommendations and identified plans to implement them. For example, the department stated that NOAA will develop a plan for transitioning to a single satellite that leverages existing contingency agreements with its international partners. In addition, the department stated that NOAA will document a process to define and prioritize the requirements of other federal agencies and provide these users with updates on GOES-R program status and changes. The department’s comments are provided in appendix II.

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If you or your staffs have any questions on the matters discussed in this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to (1) determine the status of the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) series acquisition, including cost, schedule, and performance trends; (2) evaluate whether the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has established adequate contingency plans in the event of delays; and (3) assess NOAA’s efforts to identify GOES data users, prioritize their data needs, and communicate with them about the program’s status.

To determine GOES-R acquisition status, we evaluated various programmatic and technical plans, management reports, and other program documentation. We reviewed the cost and schedule estimates (including launch dates), planned system requirements, and monthly executive-level management briefings. We also interviewed agency officials from NOAA and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to determine key dates for future GOES-R acquisition efforts and milestones and progress made on current development efforts. Furthermore, we analyzed the earned value data on development efforts contained in contractor performance reports obtained from the program. To perform this analysis, we compared the cost of work completed with budgeted costs for scheduled work for a 12-month period to show trends in cost and schedule performances. To assess the reliability of the cost data, we compared it with other available supporting documents (including monthly program management reviews); electronically tested the data to identify obvious problems with completeness or accuracy; and interviewed program officials about the data. For the purposes of this report, we determined that the cost data were sufficiently reliable. We did not test the adequacy of the agency or contractor cost-accounting systems.

To evaluate whether NOAA has established adequate contingency plans, we analyzed relevant continuity planning documentation, agreements with international partners, and meeting reports from the Coordination Group for Meteorological Satellites. In addition, we compared NOAA’s continuity of operations plans to federal policy and industry best practices to determine the extent to which the plans will ensure the continuity of critical functions related to geostationary satellites in the event of a satellite failure. We met with NOAA officials responsible for continuity of operations planning and coordination with international partners, as well as GOES data users within NOAA and at other federal agencies to determine the potential impact of NOAA’s plans on their data needs.

To determine the adequacy of NOAA’s efforts to identify GOES users, prioritize their data needs, and communicate program status, we analyzed relevant program documents, including acquisition plans, user requirements, and GOES user group meeting minutes. We compared NOAA’s efforts to industry best practices to determine the extent to which users were appropriately identified and involved in program activities. We also interviewed key users of GOES data to determine whether NOAA’s efforts to identify and prioritize their data needs and communicate program status and changes were adequate. In consultation with NOAA officials, we identified key GOES users at organizations within NOAA and other federal agencies that depend on GOES data for their primary mission. We selected three organizations within NOAA that are primarily responsible for environmental satellite data acquisition, processing and exchange, and environmental research. These organizations include the National Weather Service, National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service, and the Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research. We also identified federal government users outside of NOAA with the largest funding levels for meteorological operations in fiscal year 2009. These agencies were the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation (including the Federal Aviation Administration). On the basis of discussions with GOES-R program officials and the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology, we then selected additional federal agencies that rely extensively on GOES data to meet their mission requirements. These agencies include the Department of the Interior (including the U.S. Geological Survey and Bureau of Reclamation), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (including the U.S. Forest Service).

We primarily performed our work at the Department of Defense, Department of the Interior, Department of Transportation, NOAA, NASA, and U.S. Department of Agriculture offices in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. In addition, we conducted work at Department of Defense weather agencies in Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska and Stennis Space Center, Mississippi. We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to September 2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact name above, individuals making contributions to this report included Colleen Phillips (Assistant Director), Clayton Brisson, William Carrigg, Neil Doherty, Rebecca Eyler, Franklin Jackson, Jonathan Ticehurst, and Adam Vodraska.