Aviation Security: TSA Has Completed Key Activities Associated with Implementing Secure Flight, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Mitigate Risks
Released: 2009-05-13T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Overview of Secure Flight

The prescreening of airline passengers who may pose a security risk before they board an aircraft is one of many layers of security intended to strengthen commercial aviation. In July 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, reported that the current system of matching passenger information to the No-Fly and Selectee lists needed improvements. The commission recommended, among other things, that watch-list matching be performed by the federal government rather than by air carriers. Consistent with this recommendation and as required by law, TSA has undertaken to develop a program—Secure Flight—to assume from air carriers the function of watch-list matching. Secure Flight is intended to eliminate inconsistencies in current passenger watch-list matching procedures conducted by air carriers and use a larger set of watch-list records when warranted, reduce the number of individuals who are misidentified as being on the No-Fly or Selectee list, reduce the risk of unauthorized disclosure of sensitive watch-list information, and integrate information from DHS’s redress process into watch-list matching so that individuals are less likely to be improperly or unfairly delayed or prohibited from boarding an aircraft.

Statutory requirements govern the protection of personal information by federal agencies, including the use of air passengers’ information by Secure Flight. For example, the Privacy Act of 1974 places limitations on agencies’ collection, disclosure, and use of personal information maintained in systems of records. The Privacy Act requires agencies to publish a notice—known as a System of Records Notice (SORN)—in the Federal Register identifying, among other things, the type of data collected, the types of individuals about whom information is collected, the intended “routine” use of the data, and procedures that individuals can use to review and correct personal information. Also, the E-Government Act of 2002 requires agencies to conduct Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA) that analyze how personal information is collected, stored, shared, and managed in a federal system. Agencies are required to make their PIAs publicly available if practicable.

Secure Flight Development and Watch-List Matching Process

According to TSA, the agency developed and is implementing Secure Flight’s domestic watch-list matching function in 3 releases: Release 1—Systems development and testing.

Release 2—First stages of parallel operations with airline operators during which both Secure Flight and air carriers perform watch-list matching.

Release 3—Continued parallel operations with airline operators and preparation for airline cutovers, in which Secure Flight will perform passenger watch-list matching for domestic flights.

Under the Secure Flight watch-list matching process (see fig. 1), air carriers submit passenger information, referred to as Secure Flight Passenger Data, electronically through a DHS router or eSecure Flight, a Web-based access system for air carriers that do not use automated reservation systems to send and receive the data. Secure Flight Passenger Data are matched automatically against watch-list records, with results provided to air carriers through a Boarding Pass Printing Result. Passengers are subject to three possible outcomes from the watch-list matching process: cleared to fly, selected for additional screening, or prohibited from flying. Individuals initially selected for additional screening and those prohibited from flying undergo additional review, which results in the final Boarding Pass Printing Result and may lead to law enforcement involvement.

TSA is to use discretion to determine what constitutes a possible match between passenger information and a watch-list record, based on matching settings made in the system. The matching settings include (1) the relative importance of each piece of passenger information (e.g., name versus date of birth); (2) the numeric threshold over which a passenger will be flagged as a potential match (e.g., a scoring threshold of 95 would result in fewer matches than a scoring threshold of 85); and (3) the criteria used to determine whether an element of passenger information is a potential match to the watch list (e.g., the types of name variations or the date-of-birth range that the system considers a match). The Secure Flight matching system will use this information to assign each passenger record a numeric score that indicates its strength as a potential match to a watch-list record.

Raising the scoring threshold would result in more names cleared and fewer names identified as possible matches, which would raise the risk of the subject of a watch-list record being allowed to board an airplane (false-negative matches). Conversely, lowering the scoring threshold would raise the risk of passengers being mistakenly matched to the watch list (false-positive matches). In October 2008, TSA issued the Secure Flight Final Rule, which specifies requirements for air carriers to follow as TSA implements and operates Secure Flight, including the collection of full name and date-of-birth information from airline passengers to facilitate watch-list matching.

In late-January 2009, TSA began to assume the watch-list matching function for a limited number of domestic flights for one airline, and has since phased in additional flights and airlines. TSA plans to complete assumption of the watch-list matching function for all domestic flights in March 2010 and to then assume from U.S. Customs and Border Protection this watch-list-matching function for international flights departing to and from the United States. According to TSA, since fiscal year 2004, it has received approximately $300 million in appropriated funds for the development and implementation of the Secure Flight program.

Related System Also Prescreens Airline Passengers

In addition to matching passenger information against terrorist watch-list records, TSA requires air carriers to prescreen passengers using the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS). Through CAPPS, air carriers compare data related to a passenger’s reservation and travel itinerary to a set of weighted characteristics and behaviors (CAPPS rules) that TSA has determined correlate closely with the characteristics and behaviors of terrorists. Passengers identified by CAPPS as exhibiting these characteristics—termed selectees—must undergo additional security screening. This system is separate from the Secure Flight watch- list matching process and thus Secure Flight has no effect on CAPPS selection rates.

TSA Has Completed Key Activities Associated with Implementing Secure Flight, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Mitigate Risks

In a January 2009 briefing to congressional staff, we reported that TSA had not demonstrated Secure Flight’s operational readiness and that the agency had generally not achieved 5 of the 10 statutory conditions (Conditions 3, 5, 6, 8, 10), although DHS asserted that it had satisfied all 10 conditions. Since then, TSA has made progress in developing the Secure Flight program and meeting the requirements of the 10 conditions, and the activities completed to date and those planned reduce the risks associated with implementing the program. Table 2 shows the status of the 10 conditions as of April 2009.

TSA Has Generally Achieved 9 of the 10 Statutory Conditions, but Additional Actions Would Help Mitigate Future Risks

Condition 1: Redress

Condition 1 requires that a system of due process exist whereby aviation passengers determined to pose a threat who are either delayed or prohibited from boarding their scheduled flights by TSA may appeal such decisions and correct erroneous information contained in the Secure Flight program.

TSA has generally achieved this condition. For the Secure Flight program, TSA plans to use the existing redress process that is managed by the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP). TRIP, which was established in February 2007, serves as the central processing point within DHS for travel-related redress inquiries. TRIP refers redress inquiries submitted by airline passengers to TSA’s Office of Transportation Security Redress (OTSR) for review. This process provides passengers who believe their travels have been adversely affected by a TSA screening process with an opportunity to be cleared if they are determined to be an incorrect match to watch-list records, or to appeal if they believe that they have been wrongly identified as the subject of a watch-list record. Specifically, air travelers who apply for redress and who TSA determines pose no threat to aviation security are added to a list that should automatically “clear” them and allow them to board an aircraft (the “cleared list”), thereby reducing any inconvenience experienced as a result of the watch-list matching process. After a review of the passenger’s redress application, if OTSR determines that an individual was, in fact, misidentified as being on the No-Fly or Selectee list, it will add the individual to the cleared list. If OTSR determines that an individual is actually on the No-Fly or Selectee list, it will refer the matter to the Terrorist Screening Center, which determines whether the individual is appropriately listed and should remain on the list or is wrongly assigned and should be removed from the list.

Although Secure Flight will use the same redress process that is used by the current air carrier-run watch-list matching process, some aspects of the redress process for air travelers are to change as the program is implemented. For example, individuals who apply for redress are issued a redress number by TRIP that they will be able to submit during future domestic air travel reservations that will assist in the preclearing process before they arrive at the airport. TSA expects this will reduce the likelihood of travel delays at check-in for those passengers who have been determined to pose no threat to aviation security. According to TSA officials, individuals who have applied for redress in the past and were placed on the cleared list will need to be informed of their new ability to use their redress number to preclear themselves under Secure Flight. These officials stated that they intend to send mailings to past redress applicants with information on this change.

TSA has also coordinated with key stakeholders to identify and document shared redress processes and to clarify roles and responsibilities, consistent with relevant GAO guidance for coordination and documentation of internal controls. In addition, Secure Flight, TSA OTSR, and TSA’s Office of Intelligence (OI) have jointly produced guidance that clarifies how the entities will coordinate their respective roles in the redress process, consistent with GAO best practices on coordinating efforts across government stakeholders.

See GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69. TSA OI is responsible for disseminating the cleared list. guidance clarifies the roles and responsibilities for each entity with respect to reviewing potential watch-list matches.

Furthermore, TSA is developing performance measures to monitor the timeliness and accuracy of Secure Flight redress, as we recommended in February 2008. TRIP and OTSR’s performance goals are to process redress applications as quickly and as accurately as possible. In February 2008, we reported that TRIP and OTSR track only one redress performance measure, related to the timeliness of case completion. We further reported that by not measuring all key defined program objectives, TRIP and OTSR lack the information needed to oversee the performance of the redress program. We recommended that DHS and TSA reevaluate the redress performance measures and consider creating and implementing additional measures, consistent with best practices that among other things address all program goals, to include the accuracy of the redress process.

In response to GAO’s recommendation, representatives from the TRIP office are participating in a Redress Timeliness Working Group, with other agencies involved in the watch-list redress process, to develop additional timeliness measures. According to DHS officials, the TRIP office has also established a quality assurance review process to improve the accuracy of redress application processing and will collect and report on these data.

Secure Flight officials are developing additional performance measures to measure new processes that will be introduced once Secure Flight is operational, such as the efficacy of the system to preclear individuals who submit a redress number.

Condition 2: Minimizing False Positives

Condition 2 requires that the underlying error rate of the government and private databases that will be used both to establish identity and assign a risk level to a passenger will not produce a large number of false-positives (mistakenly matched) that will result in a significant number of passengers being treated mistakenly or security resources being diverted.

TSA has generally achieved this condition by taking a range of actions that should minimize the number of false-positive matches. For example, the Secure Flight Final Rule requires air carriers to (1) collect date-of-birth information from airline passengers and (2) be capable of collecting redress numbers from passengers. Collecting date-of-birth information should improve the system’s ability to correctly match passengers against watch-list records since each record contains a date of birth. TSA conducted a test in 2004 that concluded that the use of date-of-birth information would reduce the number of false-positive matches. In addition, airline passengers who have completed the redress process and are determined by DHS to not pose a threat to aviation security can submit their redress number when making a flight reservation. The submission of redress numbers by airline passengers should reduce the likelihood of passengers being mistakenly matched to watch list records, which in turn should reduce the overall number of false-positive matches.

TSA has established a performance measure and target for the system’s false-positive rate, which should allow the agency to track the extent to which it is minimizing false-positive matches and whether the rate at any point in time is consistent with the program’s goals. TSA officials stated that they tested the system’s false-positive performance during Secure Flight’s parallel testing with selected air carriers in January 2009 and found that the false-positive rate was consistent with the established target and program’s goals.

Condition 3: Efficacy and Accuracy of the System and Stress Testing

Condition 3 requires TSA to demonstrate the efficacy and accuracy of the search tools used as part of Secure Flight and to perform stress testing on the Secure Flight system.

We addressed efficacy and accuracy separately from stress testing because they require different activities and utilize different criteria.

Efficacy and Accuracy of the System TSA has generally achieved the part of Condition 3 that requires TSA to demonstrate the efficacy and accuracy of the search tools used as part of Secure Flight. According to TSA, as a screening system, Secure Flight is designed to identify subjects of watch-list records without generating an unacceptable number of false-positive matches. To accomplish this goal, TSA officials stated that Secure Flight’s matching system and related search parameters were designed to identify potential matches to watch- list records if a passenger’s date of birth is within a defined range of the date of birth on a watch-list record. According to TSA officials, the matching system and related search parameters were designed based on TSA OI policy and in consultation with TSA OI, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and others.

TSA conducted a series of tests—using a simulated passenger list and a simulated watch list created by a contractor with expertise in watch-list matching—that jointly assessed the system’s false-negative and false- positive performance. However, in conducting these tests, the contractor used a wider date-of-birth matching range than TSA used in designing the Secure Flight matching system, which the contractor determined was appropriate to test the capabilities of a name-matching system. The tests showed that the Secure Flight system did not identify all of the simulated watch-list records that the contractor identified as matches to the watch list (the false-negative rate). Officials from TSA OI reviewed the test results and determined that the records not matched did not pose an unacceptable risk to aviation security. These officials further stated that increasing the date-of-birth range would unacceptably increase the number of false positives generated by the system.

Moving forward, TSA is considering conducting periodic reviews of the Secure Flight system’s matching capabilities and results (i.e., false positives and false negatives) to determine whether the system is performing as intended. However, final decisions regarding whether to conduct such reviews have not been made. Relevant guidance on internal controls identifies the importance of ongoing monitoring of programs, documenting control activities, and establishing performance measures to assess performance over time. By periodically monitoring the system’s matching criteria as well as documenting and measuring any results to either (1) confirm that the system is producing effective and accurate matching results or (2) modify the settings as needed, TSA would be able to better assess whether the system is performing as intended. Without such activities in place, TSA will not be able to assess the system’s false- negative rate, which increases the risk of the system experiencing future performance shortfalls. Given the inverse relationship between false positives and false negatives—that is, an increase in one rate may lead to a decrease in the other rate—it is important to assess both rates concurrently to fully test the system’s matching performance. In our January 2009 briefing, we recommended that TSA periodically assess the performance of the Secure Flight system’s matching capabilities to determine whether the system is accurately matching watch-listed individuals while minimizing the number of false positives. TSA agreed with our recommendation.

Separate from the efficacy and accuracy of Secure Flight search tools, a security concern exists. Specifically, passengers could attempt to provide fraudulent information when making an airline reservation to avoid detection. TSA officials stated that they are aware of this situation and are taking actions to mitigate it. We did not assess TSA's progress in taking actions to address this issue or the effectiveness of TSA’s efforts as part of this review.

The second part of Condition 3 requires TSA to perform stress testing on the Secure Flight system. In our January 2009 briefing to the Senate and House Appropriations Committees’ Subcommittees on Homeland Security, we reported that TSA had generally not achieved this part of the condition because despite provisions for stress testing in Secure Flight test plans, such stress testing had not been performed at the time DHS certified that it had met the 10 statutory conditions, or prior to the completion of our audit work on December 8, 2008. However, TSA has since generally achieved this part of the condition.

According to the Secure Flight Test and Evaluation Master Plan, the system was to be stress tested in order to assess performance when abnormal or extreme conditions are encountered, such as during periods of diminished resources or an extremely high number of users. Further, the Secure Flight Performance, Stress, and Load Test Plan states that the system’s performance, throughput, and capacity are to be stressed at a range beyond its defined performance parameters in order to find the operational bounds of the system. In lieu of stress testing, program officials stated that Release 2 performance testing included “limit testing” to determine if the system could operate within the limits of expected peak loads (i.e., defined performance requirements). According to the officials, this testing would provide a sufficient basis for predicting which system components would experience degraded performance and potential failure if these peak loads were exceeded. However, in our view, such “limit testing” does not constitute stress testing because it focuses on the system’s ability to meet defined performance requirements only, and does not stress the system beyond the requirements. Moreover, this “limit testing” did not meet the provisions for stress testing in TSA’s own Secure Flight test plans. Program officials agreed that the limit testing did not meet the provisions for stress testing in accordance with test plans and revised program test plans and procedures for Release 3 to include stress testing.

Beyond stress testing, our analysis at the time of our January 2009 briefing showed that TSA had not yet sufficiently conducted performance testing. According to the Secure Flight Test and Evaluation Master Plan, performance and load tests should be conducted to assess performance against varying operational conditions and configurations. Further, the Secure Flight Performance, Stress, and Load Test Plan states that each test should begin within a limited scope and build up to longer runs with a greater scope, periodically recording system performance results. These tests also should be performed using simulated interfaces under real-world conditions and employ several pass/fail conditions, including overall throughput. However, Secure Flight Release 2 performance testing was limited in scope because it did not include 10 of the 14 Secure Flight performance requirements. According to program officials, these 10 requirements were not tested because they were to be tested as part of Release 3 testing that was scheduled for December 2008. Moreover, 2 of the 10 untested performance requirements were directly relevant to stress testing. According to program officials, these 2 requirements were not tested as part of Release 2 because the subsystems supporting them were not ready at that time. Further, the performance testing only addressed the 4 requirements as isolated capabilities, and thus did not reflect real-world conditions and demands, such as each requirement’s competing demands for system resources. Program officials agreed and stated that they planned to employ real world conditions in testing all performance requirements during Release 3 testing.

In our January 2009 briefing, we recommended that TSA execute performance and stress tests in accordance with recently developed plans and procedures and report any limitations in the scope of the tests performed and shortfalls in meeting requirements to its oversight board, the DHS Investment Review Board. Since then, based on our analysis of updated performance, stress, and load test procedures and results, we found that TSA has now completed performance testing and significantly stress tested the vetting system portion of Secure Flight. For example, the stress testing demonstrated that the vetting system can process more than 10 names in 4 seconds, which is the system’s performance requirement. As a result of the performance and stress testing that TSA has recently conducted, we now consider this condition to be generally achieved and the related recommendation we made at our January 2009 briefing to be met.

Condition 4: Establishment of an Internal Oversight Board

Condition 4 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish an internal oversight board to monitor the manner in which the Secure Flight programs is being developed and prepared.

TSA has generally achieved this condition through the presence of five oversight entities that have met at key program intervals to monitor Secure Flight. In accordance with GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, a system of internal controls should include, among other things, an organizational structure that establishes appropriate lines of authority, a process that tracks agency performance against key objectives, and ongoing monitoring activities to ensure that recommendations made were addressed. Consistent with these practices, the internal oversight entities monitoring the Secure Flight program have defined missions with established lines of authority, have met at key milestones to review program performance, and have made recommendations designed to strengthen Secure Flight’s development. Our review of a selection of these recommendations showed that the Secure Flight program addressed these recommendations.

The oversight entities for the Secure Flight program are the following: DHS Steering Committee, TSA Executive Oversight Board, DHS Investment Review Board (IRB), TSA IRB, and DHS Enterprise Architecture Board (EAB).

The DHS Steering Committee and TSA Executive Oversight Board are informal oversight entities that were established to provide oversight and guidance to the Secure Flight program, including in the areas of funding, and coordination with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) on technical issues. According to TSA officials, the DHS Steering Committee and TSA Executive Oversight Board do not have formalized approval requirements outlined in management directives. The DHS IRB, TSA IRB, and DHS EAB are formal entities that oversee DHS information technology projects and focus on ensuring that investments directly support missions and meet schedule, budget, and operational objectives. (App. III contains additional information on these oversight boards.)

GAO has previously reported on oversight deficiencies related to the DHS IRB, such as the board’s failure to conduct required departmental reviews of major DHS investments (including the failure to review and approve a key Secure Flight requirements document). To address these deficiencies, GAO made a number of recommendations to DHS, such as ensuring that investment decisions are transparent and documented as required. DHS generally agreed with these recommendations. Moving forward, it will be critical for these oversight entities to actively monitor Secure Flight as it progresses through future phases of systems development and implementation and ensure that the recommendations we make in this report are addressed.

Conditions 5 and 6: Information Security

Conditions 5 and 6 require TSA to build in sufficient operational safeguards to reduce the opportunities for abuse, and to ensure substantial security measures are in place to protect the Secure Flight system from unauthorized access by hackers and other intruders.

TSA has generally achieved the statutory requirements related to systems information security based on, among other things, actions to mitigate high- and moderate-risk vulnerabilities associated with Release 3. As of completion of our initial audit work on December 8, 2008, which we reported on at our January 2009 briefing, we identified deficiencies in TSA’s information security safeguards that increased the risk that the system will be vulnerable to abuse and unauthorized access from hackers and other intruders.

Federal law, standards, and guidance identify the need to address information security throughout the life cycle of information systems.

Accordingly, the guidance and standards specify a minimum set of security steps needed to effectively incorporate security into a system during its development. These steps include categorizing system impact, performing a risk assessment, and determining security control requirements for the system; documenting security requirements and controls and ensuring that they are designed, developed, tested, and implemented; performing tests and evaluations to ensure controls are working properly and effectively, and implementing remedial action plans to mitigate identified weaknesses; and certifying and accrediting the information system prior to operation.

To its credit, TSA had performed several of these key security steps for Release 1, such as: categorizing the system as high-impact, performing a risk assessment, and identifying and documenting the associated recommended security control requirements; preparing security documentation such as a system security plan and loading security requirements into the developer’s requirements management tool; testing and evaluating security controls for the Secure Flight system and incorporating identified weaknesses in remedial action plans; and conducting security certification and accreditation activities.

However, as of December 8, 2008, TSA had not taken sufficient steps to ensure that operational safeguards and substantial security measures were fully implemented for Release 3 of Secure Flight. This is important because Release 3 is the version that is to be placed into production. Moreover, Release 3 provides for (1) a change in the Secure Flight operating environment from a single operational site with a “hot” backup site to dual processing sites where each site processes passenger data simultaneously, and (2) the eSecure Flight Web portal, which provides an alternative means for air carriers to submit passenger data to Secure Flight. While these changes could expose the Secure Flight program to security risks not previously identified, TSA had not completed key security activities to address these risks.

Further, we found that TSA had not completed testing and evaluating of key security controls or performed disaster recovery tests for the Release 3 environment. These tests are important to ensure that the operational safeguards and security measures in the production version of the Secure Flight operating environment are effective, operate as intended, and appropriately mitigate risks. In addition, TSA had not updated or completed certain security documents for Release 3, such as its security plan, disaster recovery plan, security assessment report, and risk assessment, nor had it certified and accredited Release 3 of the Secure Flight environment it plans to put into production. Further, TSA had also not demonstrated that CBP had implemented adequate security controls over its hardware and software devices that interface with the Secure Flight system to ensure that Secure Flight data are not vulnerable to abuse and unauthorized access.

Finally, TSA had not corrected 6 of 38 high- and moderate-risk vulnerabilities identified in Release 1 of the Secure Flight program. For example, TSA did not apply key security controls to its operating systems for the Secure Flight environment, which could then allow an attacker to view, change, or delete sensitive Secure Flight information. While TSA officials assert that they had mitigated 4 of the 6 uncorrected vulnerabilities, we determined the documentation provided was not sufficient to demonstrate that the vulnerabilities were mitigated. As a result of the security risks that existed as of December 8, 2008, we recommended that TSA take steps to complete its security testing and update key security documentation prior to initial operations.

After our January 2009 briefing, TSA provided documentation showing that it had implemented or was in the process of implementing our recommendation. For example, TSA had completed security testing of the most recent release of Secure Flight (Release 3), updated security documents, certified and accredited Release 3, received an updated certification and accreditation decision from CBP for its interface with the Secure Flight program, and mitigated the high- and moderate-risk vulnerabilities related to Release 1. In addition, TSA had prepared plans of actions and milestones (POA&M) for the 28 high-risk and 32 moderate-risk vulnerabilities it identified during security testing of Release 3. The POA&Ms stated that TSA would correct the high-risk vulnerabilities within 60 days and the moderate-risk vulnerabilities within 90 days. Based on these actions, we concluded that TSA had conditionally achieved this condition as of January 29, 2009.

Further, after we submitted our draft report to DHS for formal agency comment on March 20, 2009, TSA provided us updated information that demonstrated that it had completed the actions discussed above. Based on our review of documentation provided by TSA on March 31, 2009, we concluded that TSA had mitigated all 60 high- and moderate-risk vulnerabilities associated with Release 3. Therefore, we concluded that TSA had generally achieved the statutory requirements related to systems information security and we consider the related recommendation to be met.

Condition 7: Oversight of the Use and Operation of the System

Condition 7 requires TSA to adopt policies establishing effective oversight of the use and operation of the Secure Flight system.

As of the completion of our initial audit work on December 8, 2008, TSA had generally achieved this condition, but we nevertheless identified opportunities for strengthening oversight and thus made a recommendation aimed at doing so. According to GAO’s best practices for internal control, effective oversight includes (1) the plans and procedures used to meet mission goals and objectives, and (2) activities that ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, safeguard assets, prevent and detect errors and fraud, and provide reasonable assurance that a program is meeting its intended objectives. To its credit, TSA had finalized the vast majority of key documents related to the effective oversight of the use and operation of the system as of the completion of our initial audit work on December 8, 2008. For example, TSA had established performance measures to monitor and assess the effectiveness of the Secure Flight program; provided training to air carriers on transitioning their watch-list matching functions to TSA; developed a plan to oversee air carriers’ compliance with Secure Flight program requirements; and finalized key standard operating procedures. However, TSA had not yet finalized or updated all key program documents or completed necessary training, which was needed prior to the program beginning operations. Accordingly, we recommended that TSA finalize or update all key Secure Flight program documents—including the agreement with the Terrorist Screening Center for exchanging watch-list and passenger data and standard operating procedures—and complete training before the program begins operations. In response, TSA finalized its memorandum of understanding with the Terrorist Screening Center on December 30, 2008, and completed program training in January 2009. Based on these actions, we consider this recommendation to be met. Appendix IV contains additional information on Condition 7.

Condition 8: Privacy

Condition 8 requires TSA to take action to ensure that no specific privacy concerns remain with the technological architecture of the Secure Flight system.

TSA has generally achieved the statutory requirement related to privacy based on progress the agency has made in establishing a privacy program as well as recent actions taken to address security vulnerabilities related to conditions 5 and 6. In our January 2009 briefing, we identified deficiencies in TSA’s information security safeguards that posed a risk to the confidentiality of the personally identifiable information maintained by the Secure Flight system.

The Fair Information Practices, a set of principles first proposed in 1973 by a U.S. government advisory committee, are used with some variation by organizations to address privacy considerations in their business practices and are also the basis of privacy laws and related policies in many countries, including the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as the European Union. The widely-adopted version developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 1980 is shown in table 3.

At the time of our January 2009 briefing, TSA had established a variety of programmatic and technical controls for Secure Flight, including involving privacy experts in major aspects of Secure Flight development, developing privacy training for all Secure Flight staff and incident response procedures to address and contain privacy incidents, tracking privacy issues and performing analysis when significant privacy issues are identified, instituting access controls to ensure that data are not accidentally or maliciously altered or destroyed, filtering unauthorized data from incoming data to ensure collection is limited to predefined types of information, establishing standard formats for the transmission of personally identifiable information (PII) in order to reduce variance in data and improve data quality, and maintaining audit logs to track access to PII and document privacy incidents.

In addition, TSA had issued required privacy notices—including a Privacy Impact Assessment and System of Records Notice—that meet legal requirements and address key privacy principles. These notices describe, among other things, the information that will be collected from passengers and airlines, the purpose of collection, and planned uses of the data. Through its privacy program, TSA had taken actions to implement most Fair Information Practice Principles. For information on the actions TSA has taken to generally address Fair Information Practices, see appendix V.

However, at our January 2009 briefing, we also concluded that the weaknesses in Secure Flight’s security posture—as described in our earlier discussion of information security—created an increased risk that the confidentiality of the personally identifiable information maintained by the Secure Flight system could be compromised. As a result, we recommended that TSA take steps to complete its security testing and update key security documentation prior to initial operations.

After our January 2009 briefing, TSA provided documentation that it had implemented or was in the process of implementing our recommendation related to information security and we concluded that this condition had been conditionally achieved as of January 29, 2009. Further, after we submitted our draft report to DHS for formal agency comment on March 20, 2009, TSA provided us updated information that demonstrated that it had completed the actions to implement our recommendation. Based on our review of documentation provided by TSA on March 31, 2009, we believe TSA has generally achieved the condition related to privacy.

Condition 9: CAPPS Rules

Condition 9 requires that TSA—pursuant to the requirements of section 44903(i)(2)(A) of title 49, United States Code—modify Secure Flight with respect to intrastate transportation to accommodate states with unique air transportation needs and passengers who might otherwise regularly trigger primary selectee status.

TSA has generally achieved this condition. TSA is developing the Secure Flight program without incorporating the CAPPS rules and, therefore, Secure Flight will have no effect on CAPPS selection rates. According to TSA, the agency has modified the CAPPS rules to address air carriers operating in states with unique transportation needs and passengers who might otherwise regularly trigger primary selectee status. However, our review found that TSA lacked data on the effect of its modifications on air carrier selectee rates. We interviewed four air carriers to determine (1) the extent to which the CAPPS modifications and a related security amendment affected these carriers’ selectee rates and (2) whether TSA had outreached to these carriers to assess the effect of the modifications and amendment on their selectee rates. The carriers provided mixed responses regarding whether the modifications and amendment affected their selectee rates. Further, three of the four air carriers stated that TSA had not contacted them to determine the effect of these initiatives. According to GAO best practices for internal control, agencies should ensure adequate means of communicating with, and obtaining information from, external stakeholders that may have a significant effect on achieving goals. Without communications with air carriers, and given the agency’s lack of data on carrier selectee rates, TSA cannot ensure that the CAPPS modifications and related security amendment have their intended effect. In our January 2009 briefing, we recommended that TSA conduct outreach to air carriers—particularly carriers in states with unique transportation needs—to determine whether modifications to the CAPPS rules and security amendment have achieved their intended effect. TSA agreed with our recommendation.

TSA Has Conditionally Achieved 1 of the 10 Conditions, but Further Actions Are Needed to Mitigate the Risk of Cost and Schedule Overruns

Condition 10: Life-Cycle Cost and Schedule Estimates

Condition 10 requires the existence of appropriate life-cycle cost estimates and expenditure and program plans.

TSA has conditionally achieved this statutory requirement based on our review of its plan of action for developing appropriate cost and schedule estimates and other associated documents submitted after we provided a copy our draft report to DHS for formal comment on March 20, 2009. The plan includes proposed activities and time frames for addressing weaknesses that we identified in the Secure Flight program’s cost estimate and schedule and was the basis for our reassessment of this condition.

At the time of our January 2009 briefing, we reported that this condition had generally not been achieved. Specifically, while TSA had made improvements to its life-cycle cost estimate and schedule, neither were developed in accordance with key best practices outlined in our Cost Assessment Guide. Our research has identified several practices that are the basis for effective program cost estimating. We have issued guidance that associates these practices with four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate: comprehensive, well documented, accurate, and credible. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) endorsed our guidance as being sufficient for meeting most cost and schedule estimating requirements. In addition, the best practices outlined in our guide closely match DHS’s own guidance for developing life-cycle cost estimates. Reliable cost and schedule estimates are critical to the success of a program, as they provide the basis for informed investment decision making, realistic budget formulation, program resourcing, meaningful progress measurement, proactive course correction, and accountability for results.

As we reported at our January 2009 briefing, Secure Flight’s $1.36 billion Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) is well documented in that it clearly states the purpose, source, assumptions, and calculations. However, it is not comprehensive, fully accurate, or credible. As a result, the life-cycle cost estimate does not provide a meaningful baseline from which to track progress, hold TSA accountable, and provide a basis for sound investment decision making. In our January 2009 briefing, we recommended that DHS take actions to address these weaknesses. TSA agreed with our recommendation.

The success of any program depends in part on having a reliable schedule specifying when the program’s set of work activities will occur, how long they will take, and how they relate to one another. As such, the schedule not only provides a road map for the systematic execution of a program, but it also provides the means by which to gauge progress, identify and address potential problems, and promote accountability. As we reported in January 2009, the November 15, 2008, TSA’s Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) for Secure Flight—which provided supporting activities leading up to the program’s initial operations in January 2009—was a significant improvement over its February 2008 version. For example, after meeting with GAO and its schedule analysis consultant, TSA took actions to improve the Secure Flight schedule, including adding initial efforts for domestic and international cutover activities, removing constraints that kept its schedule rigid, and providing significant status updates.

Our research has identified nine practices associated with effective schedule estimating, which we used to assess Secure Flight. These practices are: capturing key activities, sequencing key activities, establishing duration of key activities, assigning resources to key activities, integrating key activities horizontally and vertically, establishing critical path, identifying float time, performing a schedule risk analysis, and distributing reserves to high risk activities. In assessing the November 15, 2008, schedule against our best practices, we found that TSA had met one of the nine best practices, but five were only partially met and three were not met. Despite the improvements TSA made to its schedule for activities supporting initial operational capability, the remaining part of the schedule associated with implementing Secure Flight for domestic and international flights was represented as milestones rather than the detailed work required to meet milestones and events. As such, the schedule was more characteristic of a target deliverable plan than the work involved with TSA assuming the watch-list matching function. Moreover, likely program completion dates were not being driven by the schedule logic, but instead were being imposed by the program office in the form of target dates. This practice made it difficult for TSA to use the schedule to reflect the program’s status. Without fully employing all key scheduling practices, TSA cannot assure a sufficiently reliable basis for estimating costs, measuring progress, and forecasting slippages. In our January 2009 briefing, we recommended that DHS take actions to address these weaknesses. TSA agreed with our recommendation.

In January 2009, TSA provided us with a new schedule, dated December 15, 2008. Our analysis showed that this new schedule continued to not follow best practices, did not correct the deficiencies we previously identified, and therefore could not be used as a reliable management tool. For example, a majority of the scheduled activities did not have baseline dates that allow the schedule to be tracked against a plan moving forward. In addition, best practices require that a schedule identify the longest duration path through the sequenced list of key activities—known as the schedule’s critical path—where if any activity slips along this path, the entire program will be delayed. TSA’s updated schedule did not include a critical path, which prevents the program from understanding the effect of any delays. Further, updating the Secure Flight program’s schedule is important because of the significant cost and time that remains to be incurred to cutover all domestic flights to operations as planned by March 2010 and to develop, test, and deploy the functionality to assume watch- list matching for international flights.

After we submitted a copy of our draft report to DHS for formal agency comment on March 20, 2009, TSA provided us its plan of action, dated April 2009, that details the steps the Secure Flight program management office intends to carry out to address weaknesses that we identified in the program’s cost and schedule estimates. With regard to the program’s cost estimate, TSA’s plan has established a timeline of activities that, if effectively implemented, should result in (1) a more detailed work breakdown structure that would define the work necessary to accomplish the program’s objectives; (2) the cost estimate and schedule work breakdown structures being aligned properly; (3) an independent cost estimate performed by a contractor; (4) an assessment of the life-cycle cost estimate by the DHS Cost Analysis Division; and (5) cost uncertainty and sensitivity analyses. In addition, TSA’s plan has estimated government costs that were originally missing from its cost estimate. According to TSA, these costs will be addressed in its life-cycle cost estimate documentation.

With regard to the Secure Flight program’s schedule, TSA’s plan of action has established a timeline of activities that, if effectively implemented, should result in, most notably: (1) a sequenced and logical schedule that will accurately calculate float time and a critical path; (2) a fully resource- loaded schedule based on subject-matter-expert opinion that does not overburden resources; (3) a schedule that includes realistic activity duration estimates; and (4) a schedule risk analysis that will be used by TSA leadership to distribute reserves to high-risk activities. According to TSA, this revised schedule will forecast the completion date for the project based on logic, duration, and resource estimates rather than artificial date constraints.

The plan of action provides the Secure Flight program management office with a clearer understanding of the steps that need to be taken to address our concerns regarding the Secure Flight life-cycle cost estimate and schedule. Based on our review of the plan and the associated documentation provided, we therefore now consider this legislative requirement to be conditionally achieved and the related recommendations that we made at our January 2009 briefing to be met. It should be noted that a significant level of effort is involved in completing these activities, yet the actions—with the exception of the independent cost estimate—are planned to be completed by June 5, 2009. According to TSA, the independent cost estimate is to be completed by October 2009.

While TSA’s ability to fully meet the requirements of Condition 10 does not affect the Secure Flight system’s operational readiness, having reliable cost and schedule estimates allows for better insight into the management of program resources and time frames as the program is deployed. We will continue to assess TSA’s progress in carrying out the plan of action to address the weaknesses that we identified in the program’s cost estimate and schedule and fully satisfying this condition. Appendix VI contains additional information on our analysis of TSA’s efforts relative to GAO’s best practices.

Conclusions

TSA has made significant progress in developing the Secure Flight program, and the activities completed to date, as well planned, reduce the risks associated with implementing the program. However, TSA is still in the process of taking steps to address key activities related to testing the system’s watch-list matching capability and cost and schedule estimates, which should be completed to mitigate risks and to strengthen the management of the program.

Until these activities are completed, TSA lacks adequate assurance that Secure Flight will fully achieve its desired purpose and operate as intended. Moreover, if these activities are not completed expeditiously, the program will be at an increased risk of cost, schedule, or performance shortfalls. Specifically, the system might not perform as intended in the future if its matching capabilities and results (that is, false positives and false negatives) are not periodically assessed. In addition, cost overruns and missed deadlines will likely occur if reliable benchmarks are not established for managing costs and the remaining schedule.

In addition to the issues and risks we identified related to the Secure Flight program, our work revealed one other TSA prescreening-related issue that should be addressed to mitigate risks and ensure that passenger prescreening is working as intended. Specifically, the effect that modifications to the CAPPS rules and a related security amendment have had on air carriers—particularly carriers in states with unique transportation needs—will remain largely unknown unless TSA conducts outreach to these air carriers to determine the effect of these changes.

Recommendations for Executive Action

We are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following two actions:

To mitigate future risks of performance shortfalls and strengthen management of the Secure Flight program moving forward, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration to periodically assess the performance of the Secure Flight system’s matching capabilities and results to determine whether the system is accurately matching watch-listed individuals while minimizing the number of false positives—consistent with the goals of the program; document how this assessment will be conducted and how its results will be measured; and use these results to determine whether the system settings should be modified.

To ensure that passenger prescreening is working as intended, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration to conduct outreach to air carriers—particularly carriers in states with unique transportation needs—to determine whether modifications to the CAPPS rules and related security amendment have achieved their intended effect.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment on March 20, 2009. Subsequently, TSA provided us additional information related to several of the conditions, which resulted in a reassessment of the status of these conditions. Specifically, in the draft report that we provided for agency comment, we had concluded that Conditions 5 and 6 (information security) and Condition 8 (privacy) were conditionally achieved and Condition 10 (cost and schedule) was generally not achieved. Based on our review of the additional documentation provided by TSA, we are now concluding that Conditions 5, 6, and 8 are generally achieved and Condition 10 is conditionally achieved.

In addition, in the draft report we provided to DHS for agency comment, we made five recommendations, four of which were related to the Secure Flight program. The fifth recommendation was related to Condition 9 (CAPPS rules), which is not related to the Secure Flight program. Based on the additional information that TSA provided during the agency comment period, we now consider three of these recommendations to be met (those related to information security, the cost estimate, and the program schedule). The other two recommendations have not been met and, therefore, are still included in this report (those related to monitoring the performance of the system’s matching capability and assessing the effect of modifications on CAPPS rules). We provided our updated assessment to DHS and on April 23, 2009, DHS provided us written comments, which are presented in appendix VII. In its comments, DHS stated that TSA concurred with our updated assessment.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and other interested parties. We are also sending a copy to the Secretary of Homeland Security. This report will also be available at no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Should you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact Cathleen A. Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov; Randolph C. Hite at (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov; or Gregory C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244 or wilshuseng@gao.gov.

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are acknowledged in appendix VIII.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Objectives

In accordance with section 513 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008, our objective was to assess the extent to which the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) met the requirements of 10 statutory conditions related to the development and implementation of the Secure Flight program and the associated risks of any shortfalls in meeting the requirements. Specifically, the act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to certify, and GAO to report, that the 10 statutory conditions have been successfully met before TSA implements or deploys the program on other than a test basis. Pursuant to the act, after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) certified that it had satisfied all 10 conditions—which it did on September 24, 2008—we were required to report within 90 days on whether the 10 conditions had been successfully met. It further requires GAO to report periodically thereafter until it determines that all 10 conditions have been successfully met.

Scope and Methodology

Our overall methodology included (1) identifying key activities related to each condition; (2) identifying federal guidance and related best practices, if applicable, that are relevant to successfully meeting each condition (e.g., GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government); (3) analyzing whether TSA has demonstrated through verifiable analysis and documentation, as well as oral explanation, that the guidance has been followed and best practices have been met; and (4) assessing the risks associated with not fully following applicable guidance and meeting best practices. Based on our assessment, we categorized each condition as generally achieved, conditionally achieved, or generally not achieved.

Generally achieved—TSA has demonstrated that it completed all key activities related to the condition in accordance with applicable federal guidelines and related best practices, which should reduce the risk of the program experiencing cost, schedule, or performance shortfalls.

Conditionally achieved—TSA has demonstrated that it completed some key activities related to the condition in accordance with applicable federal guidelines and related best practices and has defined plans for completing remaining key activities that, if effectively implemented as planned, should result in reduced risk that the program will experience cost, schedule, or performance shortfalls.

Generally not achieved—TSA has not demonstrated that it completed all key activities related to the condition in accordance with applicable federal guidelines and related best practices and does not have defined plans for completing the remaining activities, and the uncompleted activities result in an increased risk of the program experiencing cost, schedule, or performance shortfalls.

In conducting this review, we worked constructively with TSA officials. We provided TSA with our criteria for assessing each of the 10 conditions and periodically met with TSA officials to discuss TSA’s progress and our observations. To meet our 90-day reporting requirement, we conducted audit work until December 8, 2008, which included assessing activities and documents that TSA completed after DHS certified that it had met the 10 conditions. We reported the initial results of our review to the mandated reporting committees in two restricted briefings, first on December 19, 2008, and then on January 7, 2009. Because we concluded that TSA had not successfully met all 10 conditions, we conducted additional work from January through April 2009, the results of which are also included in this report. Further, after we submitted a copy of our draft report to DHS for formal agency comment on March 20, 2009, TSA provided us additional information related to Conditions 5, 6, 8, and 10 which resulted in our reassessment of the status of these conditions. The report has been updated to include the additional information and reassessments.

Condition 1: Redress

To assess Condition 1 (redress), we interviewed program officials and reviewed and assessed agency documentation to determine how, once Secure Flight becomes operational, the DHS redress process will be coordinated with the Secure Flight program, based upon GAO best practices for coordination; as well as whether the process was documented, consistent with GAO best practices on documenting internal controls. We also reviewed performance measures for the Secure Flight redress process as well as TSA’s progress in addressing a February 2008 GAO recommendation that DHS consider creating and implementing additional measures for its redress process.

Condition 2: Minimizing False Positives

To assess Condition 2 (minimizing false positives), we interviewed program and TSA Office of Intelligence (OI) officials and reviewed and assessed Secure Flight performance objectives, tests, and other relevant documentation to determine the extent to which TSA’s activities demonstrate that the Secure Flight system will minimize its false-positive rate. Additionally, we interviewed program and TSA OI officials and reviewed and assessed Secure Flight documentation to determine how the program established performance goals for its false-positive and false- negative rates. We also interviewed a representative from the contractor that designed a dataset that TSA used to test the efficacy and accuracy of Secure Flight’s matching system to discuss the methodology of that dataset. Our engagement team, which included a social science analyst with extensive research methodology experience and engineers with extensive experience in systems testing, reviewed the test methodologies for the appropriateness and logical structure of their design and implementation, any data limitations, and the validity of the results. Our review focused on steps TSA is taking to reduce false-positive matches produced by Secure Flight’s watch-list matching process, which is consistent with TSA’s interpretation of the requirements of this condition. We did not review the Terrorist Screening Center’s role in ensuring the quality of records in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB).

Condition 3: Efficacy and Accuracy of the System and Stress Testing

To assess the first part of Condition 3 (efficacy and accuracy of the system), we interviewed program and TSA OI officials and reviewed and assessed Secure Flight performance objectives, tests, and other documentation that address the type and extent of testing and other activities that demonstrate that Secure Flight will minimize the number of false positives while not allowing an unacceptable number of false negatives. We also interviewed a representative from the contractor that designed a dataset that TSA used to test the efficacy and accuracy of Secure Flight’s matching system to discuss the methodology of that dataset. Our engagement team, which included a social science analyst with extensive research methodology experience and engineers with extensive experience in systems testing, reviewed the test methodologies for the appropriateness and logical structure of their design and implementation and the validity of the results. However, we did not assess the appropriateness of TSA’s definition of what should constitute a match to the watch list. We did not assess the accuracy of the system’s predictive assessment, as this is no longer applicable to the Secure Flight program given the change in its mission scope compared to its predecessor program CAPPS II (i.e., Secure Flight only includes comparing passenger information to watch-list records whereas CAPPS II was to perform different analyses and access additional data, including data from commercial databases, to classify passengers according to their level of risk).

To assess the second part of Condition 3, stress testing, we reviewed Secure Flight documentation—including test plans, test procedures, and test results—and interviewed program officials to determine whether TSA has defined and managed system performance and stress requirements in a manner that is consistent with relevant guidance and standards. We also determined whether the testing that was performed included testing the performance of Secure Flight search tools under increasingly heavy workloads, demands, and conditions to identify points of failure. For example, in January 2009, we met with the Secure Flight development team and a program official to observe test results related to the 14 Secure Flight performance and stress requirements. We walked through each of the 14 requirements and observed actual test scenarios and results.

Condition 4: Establishment of an Internal Oversight Board

To assess Condition 4 (internal oversight), we interviewed DHS and TSA program officials and reviewed and analyzed documentation related to various DHS and TSA oversight boards—the DHS and TSA Investment Review Boards, the DHS Enterprise Architecture Board, the TSA Executive Oversight Board, and the DHS Steering Committee—to identify the types of oversight provided to the Secure Flight program. We also reviewed agency documentation to determine whether the oversight entities met as intended and, in accordance with GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, the extent to which the Secure Flight program has addressed a selection of recommendations and action items made by the oversight bodies. We evaluated oversight activities related to key milestones in the development of the Secure Flight system.

Conditions 5 and 6: Information Security

Condition 7: Oversight of the Use and Operation of the System

In regard to Condition 7 (oversight of the system), for purposes of certification, TSA primarily defined effective oversight of the system in relation to information security. However, we assessed DHS’s oversight activities against a broader set of internal controls for managing the program, as outlined in GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, to oversee the Secure Flight system during development and implementation. We interviewed Secure Flight program officials and reviewed agency documentation—including policies, standard operating procedures, and performance measures—to determine the extent to which policies and procedures addressed the management, use, and operation of the system. We also interviewed program officials at TSA’s Office of Security Operations to determine how TSA intends to oversee internal and external compliance with system security, privacy requirements, and other functional requirements. We did not assess the quality of documentation provided by TSA. Our methodology for assessing information security is outlined under Conditions 5 and 6.

Condition 8: Privacy

To assess Condition 8 (privacy), we analyzed legally-required privacy documentation, including systems-of-record notices and privacy impact assessments, as well as interviewed Secure Flight and designated TSA privacy officials to determine the completeness of privacy safeguards. In addition, we assessed available systems development documentation to determine the extent to which privacy protections have been addressed based on the Fair Information Practices. We also assessed whether key documentation had been finalized and key provisions, such as planned privacy protections, had been clearly determined. We reassessed the status of Condition 8 based on our review of documentation provided by TSA on March 31, 2009, showing that it had mitigated all high- and moderate-risk information security vulnerabilities associated with the Secure Flight program’s Release 3.

Condition 9: CAPPS Rules

To assess Condition 9 (CAPPS rules), we reviewed TSA documentation to identify modifications to the CAPPS rules and a related security program amendment to address air carriers operating in states with unique transportation needs and passengers who might otherwise regularly trigger primary selectee status. In addition, we interviewed TSA officials to determine the extent to which TSA assessed the effect of these activities on air carriers’ selectee rates—either through conducting tests or by communicating with and obtaining information from air carriers—in accordance with GAO best practices for coordinating with external stakeholders. We also interviewed officials from four air carriers to obtain their views regarding the effect of CAPPS changes on the air carriers’ selectee rates. These carriers were selected because they operate in states with unique transportation needs or have passengers who might otherwise regularly trigger primary selectee status as a result of CAPPS rules.

Condition 10: Life-Cycle Cost and Schedule Estimates

To assess Condition 10 (cost and schedule estimates), we reviewed the program’s life-cycle cost estimate, integrated master schedule, and other relevant agency documentation against best practices, including GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs. We also interviewed key program officials overseeing these activities and consulted with a scheduling expert to identify risks to the integrated master schedule. We reassessed the status of Condition 10, based on TSA’s plan of action provided to us on April 3, 2009. The Plan of Action, dated April 2009, details the steps the Secure Flight program management office intends to carry out to address weaknesses that we identified in the program’s cost and schedule estimates. Appendix VI contains additional information on our analysis of TSA’s efforts relative to GAO’s best practices.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2008 to May 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Details on TSA’s Testing of the Efficacy and Accuracy of Secure Flight’s Matching System (Condition 3)

Appendix II: Details on TSA’s Testing of the Efficacy and Accuracy of Secure Flight’s Matching System (Condition 3)

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) hired a contractor with expertise in matching systems to construct a dataset against which to test the Secure Flight matching system and assess the system’s false-positive and false-negative performance. Given the inverse relationship between false positives and false negatives—that is, a decrease in one may lead to an increase in the other—it is important to assess both rates concurrently to fully test the system’s matching performance. The contractor developed the dataset specifically for Secure Flight using name-matching software and expert review by analysts and linguists.

The dataset consisted of a passenger list and a watch list using name types that were consistent with those on the actual No-Fly and Selectee lists. Each record included a passenger name and date of birth. The passenger list consisted of about 12,000 records, of which nearly 1,500 were “seeded” records that represented matches to the simulated watch list. According to the contractor, the seeded records were plausible variations to passenger names and dates of birth based on the contractor’s analysis of real watch-list records.

The passenger list was run through Secure Flight’s automated matching system to determine its ability to accurately match the passenger records against the simulated watch list. The system used name-matching criteria outlined in the TSA No-Fly List security directive, and a defined date-of- birth matching criteria that TSA officials state was consistent with TSA Office of Intelligence policy.

According to TSA, Secure Flight officials reviewed the test results to determine whether the system was accurately applying its matching criteria for passenger name and date of birth. TSA officials concluded that all matches and nonmatches made by the system were in accordance with these criteria. The test results for the system’s default matching rules showed that the system produced a number of false-negative matches— that is, of the passenger records deemed by the contractor to be matches to the watch list, Secure Flight did not match a number of those records. TSA officials stated that the false-negative rate in the test was primarily due to the Secure Flight system’s criteria for a date-of-birth match, which differed from the contractor’s criteria.

TSA determined a criteria range for a date-of-birth match that was consistent with TSA Office of Intelligence policy. According to TSA officials, these matching criteria are consistent with Secure Flight’s responsibilities as a screening program—that is, the system must process high passenger volumes and quickly provide results to air carriers—and that those responsibilities were considered when balancing the risk presented by the system’s false-positive and false-negative rates. The contractor’s date-of-birth criteria range, however, was wider than the range used by TSA, which the contractor stated was established based on expert analysis of an excerpt from the watch list.

According to TSA officials, officials from TSA’s Office of Intelligence reviewed the test results and determined that the records identified as false negatives by the contractor— that is, the records that were matched by the contractor but not by the Secure Flight system—did not pose an unacceptable risk and should not have been flagged, and that these nonmatches were designated as such in accordance with Office of Intelligence policies and TSA’s No Fly list security directive. These officials further stated that increasing the date-of-birth range would unacceptably increase the number of false positives generated by the system.

TSA officials stated that the Secure Flight system’s matching setting could be reconfigured in the future to adjust the system’s false-positive and false- negative matching results should the need arise—for example, due to relevant intelligence information or improvements in the system’s matching software.

Appendix III: Secure Flight’s Oversight Entities (Condition 4)

Appendix III: Secure Flight’s Oversight Entities (Condition 4)

Table 4 shows the entities responsible for overseeing the development of the Secure Flight program and a sample of activities that had been completed.

Appendix IV: TSA’s Activities Related to the Effective Oversight of System Use and Operation (Condition 7)

Appendix IV: TSA’s Activities Related to the Effective Oversight of System Use and Operation (Condition 7)

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) completed several internal control activities related to the management, use, and operation of the Secure Flight system. For example: TSA developed 21 standard operating procedures related to Secure Flight’s business processes. In addition, TSA incorporated additional programmatic procedures into various plans and manuals that will provide support for the program once it becomes operational. According to a Secure Flight official, all 21 standard operating procedures were finalized as of December 12, 2008.

TSA released its Airline Operator Implementation Plan, which is a written procedure describing how and when an aircraft operator transmits passenger and nontraveler information to TSA. The plan amends an aircraft operator’s Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program to incorporate the requirements of the Secure Flight program.

TSA finalized its plan to oversee air carrier compliance with Secure Flight’s policies and procedures. All domestic air carriers and foreign carriers covered under the Secure Flight rule will be required to comply with and implement requirements set forth in the final rule.

The Airline Operator Implementation Plan and the Consolidated User Guide will provide air carriers with the requirements for compliance monitoring during the initial cutover phases.

The Airline Implementation Team, which assists air carriers’ transition to Secure Flight, will ensure that air carriers are in compliance with program requirements prior to cutover.

TSA developed performance measures to monitor and assess the effectiveness of the Secure Flight program, such as measures to address privacy regulations, training requirements, data quality and submission requirements, and the functioning of the Secure Flight matching engine. TSA will also use performance measures to ensure that air carriers are complying with Secure Flight data requirements.

TSA developed written guidance for managing Secure Flight’s workforce, including a Comprehensive Training Plan that outlines training requirements for users and operators of the system and service centers.

According to TSA officials, TSA completed programmatic training, which includes privacy and program-related training, for the entire Secure Flight workforce.

TSA provided stakeholder training for covered U.S. air carriers and foreign air carriers on the Secure Flight program. This training, while not required of stakeholders, provided air carriers with information on changes to the Secure Flight program after the Final Rule was released and technical and operational guidance as outlined in the Consolidated User Guide. The Airline Implementation, Communications, and Training Teams will support requests from air carriers for additional training throughout deployment.

According to TSA, the agency planned to pilot its operational training, which is necessary for employees and contractors to effectively undertake their assigned responsibilities, during the week of December 8, 2008. TSA officials stated that piloting this training would allow them to make any needed updates to Secure Flight’s standard operating procedures. However, TSA officials said that updates to the Standard Operating Procedures as a result of training were expected to be minimal and would not have an effect on initial cutover in their view.

Appendix V: TSA’s Actions to Address Fair Information Practices (Condition 8)

Appendix V: TSA’s Actions to Address Fair Information Practices (Condition 8)

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken actions that generally address the following Fair Information Practices.

The Purpose Specification principle states that the purposes for a collection of personal information should be disclosed before collection and upon any change to that purpose. TSA addressed this principle by issuing privacy notices that define a specific purpose for the collection of passenger information. According to TSA privacy notices, the purpose of the Secure Flight Program is to identify and prevent known or suspected terrorists from boarding aircraft or accessing sterile areas of airports and better focus passenger and baggage screening efforts on persons likely to pose a threat to civil aviation, to facilitate the secure and efficient travel of the public while protecting individuals’ privacy.

The Data Quality principle states that personal information should be relevant to the purpose for which it is collected, and should be accurate, complete, and current as needed for that purpose. TSA addressed this principle through its planned use of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP), collecting information directly from passengers, and setting standard data formats. More specifically, TSA is planning to use DHS TRIP as a mechanism to correct erroneous data. TSA also believes that relying on passengers to provide their own name, date of birth, and gender will further help ensure the quality of the data collected. Moreover, TSA has developed a Consolidated User Guide that provides standard formats for air carriers to use when submitting passenger information to reduce variance and improve data quality. We reported previously that the consolidated terrorist watch list, elements of which are matched with passenger data to make Secure Flight screening decisions, has had data- quality issues. However, this database is administered by the Terrorist Screening Center and is not overseen by TSA.

The Openness principle states that the public should be informed about privacy policies and practices, and that individuals should have a ready means of learning about the use of personal information. TSA addressed this principle by publishing and receiving comments on required privacy notices. TSA has issued a Final Rule, Privacy Impact Assessment, and System of Records Notice that discuss the purposes, uses, and protections for passenger data, and outline which data elements are to be collected and from whom. TSA obtained and responded to public comments on its planned measures for protecting the data a passenger is required to provide.

The Individual Participation principle states that individuals should have the following rights: to know about the collection of personal information, to access that information, to request correction, and to challenge the denial of those rights. TSA addressed this principle through its planned use of DHS TRIP and its Privacy Act access and correction process. As previously mentioned, TSA plans to use DHS TRIP in order to allow passengers to request correction of erroneous data. Passengers can also request access to the information that is maintained by Secure Flight through DHS’s Privacy Act request process. As permitted by the Privacy Act, TSA has claimed exemptions from the Privacy Act that limit what information individuals can access about themselves. For example, individuals will not be permitted to view information concerning whether they are in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). However, TSA has stated that it may waive certain exemptions when disclosure would not adversely affect law enforcement or national security.

The Use Limitation principle states that personal information should not be used for other than a specified purpose without consent of the individual or legal authority. TSA addressed this principle by identifying permitted disclosures of data and establishing mechanisms to ensure that disclosures are limited to those authorized. The Secure Flight system design requires that data owners initiate transfers of information, a provision that helps to assure that data is being used only for specified purposes. According to TSA privacy notices, the Secure Flight Records system is intended to be used to identify and protect against potential and actual threats to transportation security through watch-list matching against the No-Fly and Selectee components of the consolidated and integrated terrorist watch list known as the Terrorist Screening Database. TSA plans to allow other types of disclosures, as permitted by the Privacy Act. For example, TSA is permitted to share Secure Flight data with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, foreign, or international agencies responsible for investigating, prosecuting, enforcing, or implementing a statute, rule, regulation, or order regarding a violation or potential violation of civil or criminal law or regulation; and international and foreign governmental authorities in accordance with law and formal or informal international agreements.

The Collection Limitation principle states that the collection of personal information should be limited, should be obtained by lawful and fair means, and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the individual. TSA addressed this principle by conducting a data-element analysis, developing a data retention schedule, and establishing technical controls to filter unauthorized data and purge data. TSA has performed a data element analysis to determine the least amount of personal information needed to perform effective automated matching of passengers with individuals on the watch list. As a result, TSA has limited collection by only requiring that passengers provide their full name, gender, and date of birth. In addition, TSA requires air carriers to request other specific information, such as a passenger’s redress number, and to provide TSA with other specific information in the airline’s possession, such as the passenger’s passport information. TSA established a data- purging control to rid the system of data according to its data-retention schedule. Further, TSA established technical controls to filter unauthorized data to ensure that collection is limited to authorized data fields. TSA is also developing a data-retention schedule which was issued for public comment and is in accordance with the Terrorist Screening Center’s National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)—- approved record-retention schedule for TSDB records.

The Accountability principle states that individuals controlling the collection or use of personal information should be accountable for taking steps to ensure the implementation of these principles. TSA addressed the Accountability principle by designating a program privacy officer and a team of privacy experts working on various aspects of the Secure Flight program, and by planning to establish several oversight mechanisms: TSA implemented a system for tracking privacy issues that arise throughout the development and use of Secure Flight, and TSA is conducting follow-up analysis of significant privacy issues and providing resolution strategies for management consideration.

TSA developed privacy rules of behavior, which require that individuals handling personally identifiable information (PII) only use it for a stated purpose.

TSA is planning to maintain audit logs of system and user events to provide oversight of system activities, such as access to PII and transfer of PII in or out of the system.

TSA is planning to issue periodic privacy compliance reports, intended to track and aggregate privacy concerns or incidents, but it has not finalized the reporting process.

TSA developed general privacy training for all Secure Flight staff and is developing role-based privacy training for employees handling PII.

While TSA has also taken steps related to the Security Safeguards principle, this principle had not been fully addressed at the time of our January 2009 briefing. The Security Safeguards principle states that personal information should be protected with reasonable security safeguards against risks such as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. TSA actions to address the Security Safeguards principle include planning to prevent unauthorized access to data stored in its system through technical controls including firewalls, intrusion detection, encryption, and other security methods. Although TSA had laid out a plan to protect the confidentiality of sensitive information through various security safeguards, our security review—discussed in more detail under conditions 5 and 6 on information security—identified weaknesses in Secure Flight’s security posture that create an increased risk that the confidentiality of the personally identifiable information maintained by the Secure Flight system could be compromised. As a result of the security risks we identified and reported on at our January 2009 briefing, and their corresponding effect on privacy, we recommended that TSA take steps to complete its security testing and update key security documentation prior to initial operations. TSA agreed with our recommendation.

Since our January 2009 briefing, TSA provided documentation that it has implemented our recommendation related to information security. In light of these actions, we believe TSA has now generally achieved the condition related to privacy and we consider the related recommendation we made at the briefing to be met.

Appendix VI: GAO Analyses of Secure Flight’s Life-Cycle Cost Estimate and Schedule against Best Practices (Condition 10)

Appendix VI: GAO Analyses of Secure Flight’s Life-Cycle Cost Estimate and Schedule against Best Practices (Condition 10)

After submitting a copy of our draft report to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for formal agency comment on March 20, 2009, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) provided us its plan of action, dated April 2009, that details the steps the Secure Flight program management office intends to carry out to address weaknesses that we identified in the program’s cost and schedule estimates. We reviewed TSA’s plan and associated documentation and reassessed the program against our Cost and Schedule Best Practices. The following tables show our original assessment and reassessment of TSA’s cost and schedule against our best practices.

Table 5 summarizes the results of our analysis relative to the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate based on information provided by TSA as of March 20, 2009.

Table 6 summarizes the results of our reassessment of the Secure Flight program’s cost estimate relative to the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate based on information provided by TSA as of April 3, 2009.

Table 7 summarizes the results of our analysis relative to the nine schedule-estimating best practices based on information provided by TSA as of March 20, 2009.

Table 8 summarizes the results of our reassessment of the Secure Flight program’s schedule relative to the nine schedule estimating best practices based on information provided by TSA as of April 3, 2009.

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contacts listed above, Idris Adjerid, David Alexander, Mathew Bader, Timothy Boatwright, John de Ferrari, Katherine Davis, Eric Erdman, Anthony Fernandez, Ed Glagola, Richard Hung, Jeff Jensen, Neela Lakhmani, Jason Lee, Thomas Lombardi, Sara Margraf, Vernetta Marquis, Victoria Miller, Daniel Patterson, David Plocher, Karen Richey, Karl Seifert, Maria Stattel, Margaret Vo, and Charles Vrabel made key contributions to this report.