Information Security: Federal Agency Efforts to Encrypt Sensitive Information Are Under Way, but Work Remains
Released: 2008-07-28T00:00:00

Letter

Background

Virtually all federal operations are supported by automated systems, mobile devices, and electronic media that may contain sensitive information such as Social Security numbers, medical records, law enforcement data, national or homeland security information, and proprietary information that could be inappropriately disclosed, browsed, or copied for improper or criminal purposes.

In our survey of 24 major federal agencies, 10 agencies reported having systems that contain sensitive medical information, 16 reported having systems that contain sensitive regulatory information, 19 reported having systems that contain sensitive personal information, and 20 reported having systems that contain sensitive program-specific information. It is important for agencies to safeguard sensitive information because, if left unprotected, the information could be compromised—leading to loss or theft of resources (such as federal payments and collections), modification or destruction of data, or unauthorized use of computer resources, including launching attacks on other computer systems.

Factors Placing Sensitive Information at Risk

Many factors can threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive information. Cyber threats to federal systems and critical infrastructures containing sensitive information can be intentional or unintentional, targeted or nontargeted, and can come from a variety of sources. Intentional threats include both targeted and nontargeted attacks. A targeted attack occurs when a group or individual specifically attacks an information system. A nontargeted attack occurs when the intended target of the attack is uncertain, such as when a virus, worm, or malware is released on the Internet with no specific target. Unintentional threats can be caused by software upgrades or maintenance procedures that inadvertently disrupt systems.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has identified multiple sources of threats to our nation’s critical information systems, including those from foreign nation states engaged in information warfare, domestic criminals, hackers, virus writers, and disgruntled current and former employees working within an organization. There is increasing concern among both government officials and industry experts regarding the potential for a cyber attack. According to the Director of National Intelligence, ‘‘our information infrastructure— including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries—increasingly is being targeted for exploitation and potentially for disruption or destruction by a growing array of state and non-state adversaries. Over the past year, cyber exploitation activity has grown more sophisticated, more targeted, and more serious. The intelligence community expects these trends to continue in the coming year.’’ Threats to mobile devices are posed by people with malicious intentions, including causing mischief and disruption as well as committing identity theft and other forms of fraud. For example, malware threats can infect data stored on devices, and data in transit can be intercepted through many means, including from e-mail, Web sites, file downloads, file sharing, peer-to-peer software, and instant messaging. Another threat to mobile devices is the loss or theft of the device. Someone who has physical access to an electronic device can attempt to view the information stored on it.

Incidents at Federal Agencies Demonstrate That Sensitive Information Is at Risk

The need for effective information security policies and practices is further illustrated by the increasing number of security incidents reported by federal agencies that put sensitive information at risk. Personally identifiable information about millions of Americans has been lost, stolen, or improperly disclosed, thereby potentially exposing those individuals to loss of privacy, identity theft, and financial crimes. Reported attacks and unintentional incidents involving critical infrastructure systems demonstrate that a serious attack could be devastating. Agencies have experienced a wide range of incidents involving data loss or theft, computer intrusions, and privacy breaches, underscoring the need for improved security practices.

When incidents occur, agencies are to notify the federal information security incident center—the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT). As shown in figure 1, the number of incidents reported by federal agencies to US-CERT has increased dramatically over the past 3 years, increasing from 3,634 incidents reported in fiscal year 2005 to 13,029 incidents in fiscal year 2007 (about a 259 percent increase).

Data breaches present federal agencies with potentially serious and expensive consequences; for example, a security breach might require an agency to fund the burdensome costs of notifying affected individuals and associated credit monitoring services or it could jeopardize the agency’s mission. Implementation of a risk-based framework of management, operational, and technical controls that includes controls such as encryption technology can help guard against the inadvertent compromise of sensitive information. While encrypting data might add to operational burdens by requiring individuals to enter pass codes or use other means to encrypt and decrypt data, it can also help to mitigate the risk associated with the theft or loss of computer equipment that contains sensitive data.

Workforce Mobility Introduces Additional Risks to Sensitive Information

Protecting information has become more challenging in today’s IT environment of highly mobile workers and decreasing device size. Using small, easily pilferable devices such as laptop computers, handheld personal digital assistants, thumb-sized Universal Serial Bus (USB) flash drives, and portable electronic media such as CD-ROMs and DVDs, employees can access their agency’s systems and information from anywhere. When computers were larger and stationary, sensitive information that was stored on mainframe computers was accessible by only a limited number of authorized personnel via terminals that were secured within the physical boundaries of the agency’s facility. Now, mobile workers can process, transport, and transmit sensitive information anywhere they work. This transition from a stationary environment to a mobile one has changed the type of controls needed to protect the information. Encryption technologies, among other controls, provide agencies with an alternate method of protecting sensitive information that compensates for the protections offered by the physical security controls of an agency facility when the information is removed from, or accessed from, outside of the agency location.

Encryption Can Help Protect Sensitive Information

Data breaches can be reduced through the use of encryption, which is the process of transforming plaintext into ciphertext using a special value known as a key and a mathematical process called an algorithm (see fig. 2).

Cryptographic algorithms are designed to produce ciphertext that is unintelligible to unauthorized users. Decryption of ciphertext—returning the encoded data to plaintext—is possible by using the proper key. Encryption can protect sensitive information in storage and during transmission. Encryption of data in transit hides information as it moves, for example, between a database and a computing device over the Internet, local networks, or via fax or wireless networks. Stored data include data stored in files or databases, for example, on a personal digital assistant, a laptop computer, a file server, a DVD, or a network storage appliance. Encryption may also be used in system interconnection devices such as routers, switches, firewalls, servers, and computer workstations to apply the appropriate level of encryption required for data that pass through the interconnection.

Commercially Available Encryption Technologies Can Help Agencies Reduce Risks

Commercially available encryption technologies can help federal agencies protect sensitive information and reduce the risks of its unauthorized disclosure and modification. These technologies have been designed to protect information stored on computing devices or other media and transmitted over wired or wireless networks.

Because the capability of each type of encryption technology to protect information is limited by the boundaries of the file, folder, drive, or network covered by that type of technology, a combination of several technologies may be required to ensure that sensitive information is continuously protected as it flows from one point, such as a remote mobile device, to another point, such as a network or portable electronic media.

For example, one product that encrypts a laptop’s hard drive may not provide any protection for files copied to portable media, attached to an e- mail, or transmitted over a network.

Encryption Technologies to Protect Stored Information Are Available

Agencies have several options available when selecting an encryption technology for protecting stored data. According to NIST guidance on encrypting stored information, these include full disk, hardware-based, file, folder, or virtual disk encryption. Through the use of these technologies, encryption can be applied granularly, to an individual file that contains sensitive information, or broadly, by encrypting an entire hard drive. The appropriate encryption technology for a particular situation depends primarily on the type of storage, the amount of information that needs to be protected, and the threats that need to be mitigated. Storage encryption technologies require users to authenticate successfully before accessing the information that has been encrypted. The combination of encryption and authentication controls access to the stored information.

Full Disk Encryption

Full disk encryption software encrypts all data on the hard drive used to boot a computer, including the computer’s operating system, and permits access to the data only after successful authentication to the full disk encryption software. The majority of current full disk encryption products are implemented entirely within a software application. The software encrypts all information stored on the hard drive and installs a special environment to authenticate the user and begin decrypting the drive. Users enter their user identification and password before decrypting and starting the operating system. Once a user authenticates to the operating system by logging in, the user can access the encrypted files without further authentication, so the security of the solution is heavily dependent on the strength of the operating system authenticator.

When a computer is turned off, all the information encrypted by full disk encryption is protected, assuming that pre-boot authentication is required. After the computer is booted, full disk encryption provides no protection and the operating system becomes fully responsible for protecting the unencrypted information.

Hardware-Based Encryption

Full disk encryption can also be built into a hard drive. Hardware and software-based full disk encryption offer similar capabilities through different mechanisms. When a user tries to boot a device protected with hardware-based full disk encryption, the hard drive prompts the user to authenticate before it allows an operating system to load. The full disk encryption capability is built into the hardware in such a way that it cannot be disabled or removed from the drive. The encryption code and authenticators, such as passwords and cryptographic keys, are stored securely on the hard drive. Because the encryption and decryption are performed by the hard drive itself, without any operating system participation, typically there is very little performance impact.

A major difference between software- and hardware-based full disk encryption is that software-based full disk encryption can be centrally managed, but hardware-based full disk encryption can usually be managed only locally. This makes key management and recovery actions considerably more resource-intensive and cumbersome for hardware- based full disk encryption than for software-based. Another major difference is that because hardware-based full disk encryption performs all cryptographic processing within the hard drive’s hardware, it does not need to place its cryptographic keys in the computer’s memory, potentially exposing the keys to malware and other threats. A third significant difference is that hardware-based full disk encryption does not cause conflicts with software that modifies the master boot record, for example, software that allows the use of more than one operating system on a hard drive.

File, Folder, and Virtual Disk Encryption

File, folder, and virtual disk encryption are all used to encrypt specified areas of data on a storage medium such as a laptop hard drive. File encryption encrypts files, a collection of information logically grouped into a single entity and referenced by a unique name, such as a file name. Folder encryption encrypts folders, a type of organizational structure used to group files. Virtual disk encryption encrypts a special type of file— called a container—that is used to encompass and protect other files.

File encryption is the process of encrypting individual files on a storage medium and permitting access to the encrypted data only after proper authentication is provided. Folder encryption is very similar to file encryption, except that it addresses individual folders instead of files. Some operating systems offer built-in file and/or folder encryption capabilities, and many third-party programs are also commercially available. File/folder encryption does not provide any protection for data outside the protected files or folders such as unencrypted temporary files that may contain the contents of any unencrypted files being held in computer memory.

Virtual disk encryption is the process of encrypting a container. The container appears as a single file but can hold many files and folders that are not seen until the container is decrypted. Access to the data within the container is permitted only after proper authentication is provided, at which point the container appears as a logical disk drive that may contain many files and folders. Virtual disk encryption does not provide any protection for data created outside the protected container, such as unencrypted temporary files, that could contain the contents of any unencrypted files being held in computer memory.

Agency Information Can Be Encrypted while in Transit over a Network

Sensitive data are also at risk during transmission across unsecured— untrusted—networks such as the Internet. For example, as reported by NIST, transmission of e-mail containing sensitive information or direct connections for the purpose of processing information between a mobile device and an internal trusted system can expose sensitive agency data to monitoring or interception. According to both NIST and an industry source, agencies can use commercially available encryption technologies such as virtual private networks and digital signatures to encrypt sensitive data while they are in transit over a wired or wireless network.

Virtual Private Networks

According to NIST, a virtual private network is a data network that enables two or more parties to communicate securely across a public network by creating a private connection, or “tunnel,” between them.

Because a virtual private network can be used over existing networks such as the Internet, it can facilitate the secure transfer of sensitive data across public networks. Virtual private networks can also be used to provide a secure communication mechanism for sensitive data such as Web-based electronic transactions and to provide secure remote access to an organization’s resources.

Digital Signatures and Digital Certificates

Properly implemented digital signature technology uses public key cryptography to provide authentication, data integrity, and nonrepudiation for a message or transaction. As NIST states, public key infrastructures (PKI) can be used not only to encrypt data but also to authenticate the identity of specific users. Just as a physical signature provides assurance that a letter has been written by a specific person, a digital signature is an electronic credential created using a party’s private key with an encryption algorithm. When it is added to a document, it can be used to confirm the identity of a document’s sender since it also contains the user’s public key and name of the encryption algorithm. Validating the digital signature not only confirms who signed it, but also ensures that there have been no alterations to the document since it was signed.

Digital signatures may also be employed in authentication protocols to confirm the identity of the user before establishing a session. Specifically, digital signatures can be used to provide higher assurance authentication (in comparison with passwords) when establishing virtual private networks.

Digital signatures are often used in conjunction with digital certificates. A digital certificate is an electronic credential that guarantees the association between a public key and a specific entity, such as a person or organization. As specified by NIST, the signature on the document can be validated by using the public key from the digital certificate issued to the signer. Validating the digital certificate, the system can confirm that the user’s relationship to the organization is still valid. The most common use of digital certificates is to verify that a user sending a message is who he or she claims to be and to provide the receiver with a means to encode a reply. For example, an agency virtual private network could use these certificates to authenticate the identity of the user, verify that the key is still good, and that he or she is still employed by the agency.

Encryption Technologies Available for Handheld Mobile Computing Devices

NIST guidance further states that encryption software can be used to protect the confidentiality of sensitive information stored on handheld mobile computing devices and mirrored on the desktop computer. The information on the handheld’s add-on backup storage modules can also be encrypted when not in use. This additional level of security can be added to provide an extra layer of defense, further protecting sensitive information stored on handheld devices.

In addition, encryption technologies can protect data on handheld devices while the data are in transit. Users often subscribe to third-party wireless Internet service providers, which use untrusted networks; therefore, the handheld device would require virtual private network software and a supporting corporate system to create a secure communications tunnel to the agency.

Table 1 describes the types of commercial encryption technologies available to agencies.

While many technologies exist to protect data, implementing them incorrectly—such as failing to properly configure the product, secure encryption keys, or train users—can result in a false sense of security or even render data permanently inaccessible. See appendix II for a discussion of decisions agencies face and important considerations for effectively implementing encryption to reduce agency risks.

Key Laws Frame Practices for Information Protection, while Federal Policies and Guidance Address Use of Encryption

Although federal laws do not specifically require agencies to encrypt sensitive information, they give federal agencies responsibilities for protecting it. Specifically, FISMA, included within the E-Government Act of 2002, provides a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls over federal agency information and information systems. In addition, other laws frame practices for protecting specific types of sensitive information. OMB is responsible for establishing governmentwide policies and for providing guidance to agencies on how to implement the provisions of FISMA, the Privacy Act, and other federal information security and privacy laws. In the wake of recent security breaches involving personal data, OMB issued guidance in 2006 and 2007 reiterating the requirements of these laws and guidance. In this guidance, OMB directed, among other things, that agencies encrypt data on mobile computers or devices and follow NIST security guidelines. In support of federal laws and policies, NIST provides federal agencies with planning and implementation guidance and mandatory standards for identifying and categorizing information types, and for selecting adequate controls based on risk, such as encryption, to protect sensitive information.

Key Laws Provide Framework for Protecting Sensitive Information

Although federal laws do not specifically address the use of encryption, they provide a framework for agencies to use to protect their sensitive information. FISMA, which is Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002, emphasizes the need for federal agencies to develop, document, and implement programs using a risk-based approach to provide information security for the information and information systems that support their operations and assets. Its purposes include the following: providing a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls over information resources that support federal operations and assets; recognizing the highly networked nature of the current federal computing environment and providing effective governmentwide management and oversight of the related information security risks, including coordination of information security efforts throughout the civilian, national security, and law enforcement communities; providing for development and maintenance of minimum controls required to protect federal information and information systems; acknowledging that commercially developed information security products offer advanced, dynamic, robust, and effective information security solutions, reflecting market solutions for the protection of critical information infrastructures important to the national defense and economic security of the nation that are designed, built, and operated by the private sector; and recognizing that the selection of specific technical hardware and software information security solutions should be left to individual agencies choosing from among commercially developed products.

This act requires agencies to provide cost-effective controls to protect federal information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction, and it directs OMB and NIST to establish policies and standards to guide agency implementation of these controls, which may include the use of encryption.

The E-Government Act of 2002 also strives to enhance protection for personal information in government information systems by requiring that agencies conduct privacy impact assessments. A privacy impact assessment is an analysis of how personal information is collected, stored, shared, and managed in a federal system.

Additionally, the Privacy Act of 1974 regulates agencies’ collection, use, and dissemination of personal information maintained in systems of records. In this regard, the Privacy Act requires agencies to establish appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure the security and confidentiality of records and to protect against any threats or hazards to their security or integrity that could result in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any individual on whom information is maintained.

Congress has also passed laws requiring protection of sensitive information that are agency-specific or that target a specific type of information. These laws include the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, which requires additional protections to sensitive health care information and the Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act, enacted in December 2006, which establishes information technology security requirements for personally identifiable information that apply specifically to the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Table 2 summarizes the laws that provide a framework for agencies to use in protecting sensitive information.

OMB Policy Requires Encryption of Sensitive Government Information on Mobile Devices

OMB is responsible for establishing governmentwide policies and for providing guidance to agencies on how to implement the provisions of FISMA, the Privacy Act, and other federal information security and privacy laws. OMB policy expands on the risk-based information security program requirements of FISMA in its 2002 and 2004 guidance and in the wake of recent security breaches involving personal data, outlines minimum practices for implementation of encryption required by federal agencies in guidance issued in 2006 and 2007. Specifically OMB memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies, requires that agencies implement specific security controls recommended by NIST, including the use of approved cryptographic techniques for certain types of electronic transactions that require a specified level of protection.

OMB memorandum M-06-16, Protection of Sensitive Agency Information, recommends, among other things, that agencies encrypt all agency data on mobile computers and devices or obtain a waiver from the Deputy Secretary of the agency that the device does not contain sensitive information. The memorandum also recommends that agencies use a NIST checklist provided in the memorandum that states agencies should verify that information requiring protection is appropriately categorized and assigned an appropriate risk impact category.

OMB memorandum M-07-16, Safeguarding Against and Responding to the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information, restated the M-06-16 recommendations as requirements, and also required the use of NIST- certified cryptographic modules.

These OMB memorandums significant to the use of encryption are briefly described in table 3.

NIST Provides Guidance and Standards for Encryption Use

In support of federal laws and policies, NIST provides federal agencies with implementation guidance and mandatory standards for identifying and categorizing information types and for selecting adequate controls based on risk, such as encryption, to protect sensitive information. Specifically, NIST Special Publication 800-53 instructs agencies to follow the implementation guidance detailed in supplemental NIST publications, including the following: NIST Special Publication 800-21, Guideline for Implementing Cryptography in the Federal Government, guides the implementation of encryption by agencies. It recommends that prior to selecting a cryptographic method, or combination of methods, agencies address several implementation considerations when formulating an approach and developing requirements for integrating cryptographic methods into new or existing systems, including installing and configuring appropriate cryptographic components associated with selected encryption technologies; monitoring the continued effectiveness and functioning of encryption technologies; developing policies and procedures for life cycle management of cryptographic components (such as procedures for management of encryption keys, backup and restoration of services, and authentication techniques); and training users, operators, and system engineers.

Special Publication 800-57, Recommendation for Key Management, provides guidance to federal agencies on how to select and implement cryptographic controls for protecting sensitive information by describing cryptographic algorithms, classifying different types of keys used in encryption, and providing information on key management.

Special Publication 800-60, Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories, provides implementation guidance on the assignment of security categories to information and information systems using FIPS 199.

Special Publication 800-63, Electronic Authentication Guideline, addresses criteria for implementing controls that correspond to the assurance levels of OMB memorandum M-04-04 such that, if agencies assign a level 2, 3, or 4 to an electronic transaction, they are required to implement specific security controls, including the use of approved cryptographic techniques.

Special Publication 800-77, Guide to IPsec VPNs, provides technical guidance to agencies in the implementation of virtual private networks, such as identifying needs and designing, deploying, and managing the appropriate solution, including the use of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)-compliant encryption algorithms.

NIST also issues FIPS, which frame the critical elements agencies are required to follow to protect sensitive information and information systems. Specifically FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules. Agencies are required to encrypt agency data, where appropriate, using NIST- certified cryptographic modules. This standard specifies the security requirements for a cryptographic module used within a security system protecting sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) and provides four increasing, qualitative levels of security intended to cover a wide range of potential applications and environments.

Several standards describe the technical specifications for cryptographic algorithms, including those required when using digital signatures.

FIPS 199 provides agencies with criteria to identify and categorize all of their information and information systems based on the objectives of providing appropriate levels of information security according to a range of risk levels.

FIPS 200 requires a baseline of minimum information security controls for protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of federal information systems and the information processed, stored, and transmitted by those systems. FIPS 200 directs agencies to implement the baseline control recommendations of NIST Special Publication 800-53. The following security-related areas in FIPS 200 whose controls are further detailed in Special Publication 800-53 pertain to the use of encryption: Access control—describes controls for developing and enforcing policies and procedures for access control including remote access, wireless access, and for portable and mobile devices using mechanisms such as authentication and encryption.

Contingency planning—includes controls to ensure that the organization protects system backup information from unauthorized modification by employing appropriate mechanisms such as digital signatures.

Identification and authentication—describes controls for developing and documenting identification and authentication policies and procedures.

Maintenance—includes remote maintenance control that addresses how an organization approves, controls, and monitors remotely executed maintenance and diagnostic activities including using encryption and decryption of diagnostic communications.

Media protection—describes developing policies and procedures for media protection including media storage (which may include encrypting stored data) and transport.

System and communications protection—includes controls to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of information in transit by employing cryptographic mechanisms if required, including establishing and managing cryptographic keys.

NIST publications pertaining to the use of encryption in federal agencies are briefly described in table 4.

Efforts to Encrypt Sensitive Information Varied among Agencies

The extent to which 24 major federal agencies reported that they had implemented encryption and developed plans to implement encryption varied across agencies. Although all agencies had initiated efforts to encrypt stored and transmitted sensitive agency information, none had completed these efforts or developed and documented comprehensive plans to guide their implementation of encryption technologies. Our tests at 6 selected agencies revealed weaknesses in the encryption implementation practices involving the installation and configuration of FIPS-validated cryptographic modules encryption products, monitoring the effectiveness of installed encryption technologies, the development and documentation of policies and procedures for managing these technologies, and the training of personnel in the proper use of installed encryption products. As a result of these weaknesses, federal information may remain at increased risk of unauthorized disclosure, loss, and modification.

Reported Efforts to Encrypt Stored Information Lagged behind Efforts to Encrypt Transmitted Information

All 24 major federal agencies reported varying degrees of progress in their efforts to encrypt stored and transmitted sensitive agency information. While most of the agencies reported that they had not completed efforts to encrypt stored sensitive information, they reported being further along with efforts to encrypt transmitted sensitive information. Preparing for the implementation of encryption technologies involves numerous considerations. In response to our survey, agencies reported that they had encountered challenges that hinder the implementation of encryption. See appendix III for a discussion of the hindrances identified by agencies.

Few Agencies Have Encrypted All Sensitive Information Stored on Mobile Devices

OMB requires agencies to encrypt all agency data on mobile computers and devices or obtain a waiver from the Deputy Secretary of the agency stating that the device does not contain sensitive information. Of 24 agencies that reported from July through September 2007 on the status of their efforts to encrypt sensitive information stored on their laptops and handheld mobile devices, 8 agencies reported having encrypted information on less than 20 percent of these devices and 5 agencies reported having encrypted information on between 20 and 39 percent of these devices (see fig. 3). Overall, the 24 agencies reported that about 70 percent of laptop computers and handheld devices had not been encrypted.

In addition, 10 of 22 agencies reported having encrypted information on less than 20 percent of portable storage media taken offsite, and 3 of 22 reported having encrypted between 20 and 39 percent. Further, 9 of 17 agencies reported encrypting sensitive information on less than 20 percent of offsite backup storage media. However, while agencies were encrypting sensitive data on mobile computers and devices such as laptop computers and handheld devices (e.g. personal digital assistants), 6 agencies reported having other storage devices, such as portable storage media, that could contain sensitive data. Of the 6 agencies, 4 had not encrypted these additional devices. Further, officials at 1 agency had no plans to encrypt sensitive data contained on their portable media.

In response to our query in April 2008, OMB officials stated that the term “mobile computers and devices” was intended to include all agency laptops, handheld devices, and portable storage devices such as portable drives and CD-ROMs that contain agency data. Nevertheless, this description is not clear in any of its memorandums. Until OMB clarifies the applicability of the encryption requirement so that agencies can complete encrypting sensitive agency information stored on applicable devices, the information will remain at risk of unauthorized disclosure.

Most Agencies Are Encrypting Sensitive Transmitted Information

Most agencies reported that they had encrypted sensitive information transmitted over wired and wireless networks. Of 23 agencies reporting on their efforts to encrypt wired Internet transmissions of sensitive information, 18 agencies reported encrypting nearly all or all (80 percent to 100 percent), of their transmissions over wired Internet networks. In addition, of 21 agencies reporting on their efforts to encrypt wireless transmissions of sensitive information, 12 reported having encrypted all or nearly all such transmissions (see fig. 4).

Encryption Efforts Had Not Been Adequately Planned at Most Agencies

Although 24 major federal agencies reported having encryption efforts under way, none of the agencies had documented a comprehensive plan that considered the security control implementation elements recommended by NIST. According to NIST, cryptography is best designed as an integrated part of a comprehensive information security program rather than as an add-on feature and it suggests that implementing technical approaches without a plan to guide the process is the least effective approach to making use of cryptography. Specifically, as part of an effective information security program, NIST Special Publication 800-53 requires agencies to inventory and categorize information and systems according to risk as well as to document the baseline security controls— such as encryption—selected to adequately mitigate risks to information. However, of the 24 agencies we surveyed, 18 reported that they had not completed efforts to inventory sensitive information that they hold.

Further, NIST recommends that agencies follow NIST Special Publication 800-21 guidance when formulating their approach for integrating cryptographic methods into new or existing systems and documenting plans for implementing encryption, such plans consist of the following minimum elements: installing and properly configuring FIPS-validated cryptographic modules associated with selected encryption technologies; monitoring the continued effectiveness of installed cryptographic controls, including the proper functioning of encryption technologies; documenting and implementing policies and procedures for management of cryptographic components, such as the effective implementation and use of FIPS-compliant encryption technologies and the establishment and management of encryption keys; and providing training to users, operators, and system engineers.

Although several agencies had developed ad hoc encryption technology acquisition or deployment plans, none of the agencies had documented comprehensive plans that addressed the elements recommended by NIST.

In response to our query, OMB officials stated that they monitor agencies’ progress toward implementing encryption through quarterly data submitted by the agencies as part of the President’s Management Agenda scorecard. However, OMB did not provide us with evidence to demonstrate monitoring of the agencies’ efforts to inventory the sensitive information they hold or to develop implementation plans. As previously noted, agencies did not have such plans and often did not have inventories. Until agencies develop and document comprehensive plans to guide their approach for implementing encryption, including completing an inventory of the sensitive information they hold, agencies will have limited assurance that they will be able to effectively complete implementation and manage life cycle maintenance of encryption technologies, as we observed at selected agencies and discuss later in this report.

Weaknesses in Encryption Implementation Practices Exist at Selected Agencies

Practices for implementing encryption displayed weaknesses at the 6 federal agencies we reviewed for testing. Specifically, 2 of the 6 agencies had not installed FIPS-validated cryptographic modules encryption technologies and 4 had not configured installed encryption technologies in accordance with FIPS 140-2 specifications. In addition, all of the 6 agencies had not either developed or documented policies and procedures for managing encryption implementation, and 3 of these agencies had not adequately trained personnel in the effective use of installed encryption technologies. Protection of information and information systems relies not only on the technology in place but on establishing a foundation for effective implementation, life cycle management, and proper use of the technologies. Until agencies resolve these weaknesses, their data may not be fully protected.

FIPS-Compliant Encryption Products Had Not Been Installed on All Agency Devices

OMB requires agencies to protect sensitive agency data stored on mobile devices by installing a FIPS-validated cryptographic modules product, and NIST Special Publication 800-53 recommends that agencies install FIPS- compliant products when the agency requires encryption of stored or transmitted sensitive information. Agencies can now acquire FIPS- validated cryptographic module products for encrypting stored information through the General Services Administration’s (GSA) SmartBUY program (see app. IV for a description of this program). Use of encryption technologies approved by NIST as compliant with FIPS 140-2 provides additional assurance that the product implemented—if configured correctly—will help protect sensitive information from unauthorized disclosure.

Laptop computers. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had not installed encryption products on any of its laptop computers despite an agency official’s assertions to the contrary. HUD officials explained that they had planned to implement FIPS-compliant encryption in fiscal year 2008 but that implementation was delayed until late in fiscal year 2008 due to lack of funding and it is now part of their fiscal year 2009 budget request. In addition, the Department of Education had not installed a FIPS-validated cryptographic modules product to encrypt sensitive information on any of the 15 laptop computers that we tested at one of its components. Of the 4 remaining agencies, 3—the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the State Department, and GSA—had installed FIPS-compliant technologies on all 58 of the laptop computers that we tested at specific locations within each agency. At the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) location we tested, we confirmed that the agency’s selected FIPS-compliant encryption software had been installed on 27 of 29 laptop computers. Although the agency asserted that it had installed it on all 29 laptops, officials explained that they did not have a mechanism to detect whether the encryption product was successfully installed and functioning.

Handheld devices. All 6 of the agencies had deployed FIPS-compliant handheld mobile devices (specifically, BlackBerry® devices) for use by personnel. BlackBerry software and the BlackBerry enterprise server software enable users to store, send, and receive encrypted e-mail and access data wirelessly using FIPS-validated cryptographic modules encryption algorithms.

Virtual private networks. One of three virtual private networks installed by the Department of Education was not a FIPS-compliant product. The remaining 5 agencies had installed FIPS-validated cryptographic modules products to protect transmissions of sensitive information.

Certain Agencies Did Not Consistently Configure or Install Encryption Technologies in Accordance with NIST Requirements

Although most agencies had installed FIPS-compliant products to encrypt information stored on devices and transmitted across networks, some did not monitor whether the product was functioning or configure the product to operate only in a FIPS-validated cryptographic modules secure mode. Until agencies configure FIPS-compliant products in a secure mode as directed by NIST—for example, by enabling only FIPS-validated cryptographic module encryption algorithms—protection against unauthorized decryption and disclosure of sensitive information will be diminished.

Laptop computers. Of the 4 agencies with FIPS-compliant products installed on laptop computers, 3 had configured the product to operate in a secure mode as approved by NIST on all devices that we examined. However, a component of the Department of Agriculture had not effectively monitored the effectiveness and continued functioning of encryption products on 5 of the 52 laptop computers that we examined. Agency officials were unaware that the drives of these devices had not been correctly encrypted. The drives, while having the encryption software installed, did not encrypt the data on the drive. This agency’s system administrator attributed the noncompliance to the failure of a step in the installation process; specifically, the laptop had not been connected to the agency’s network for a sufficient period of time to complete activation of the user’s encryption key by the central server, and the agency had no mechanism in place to monitor whether the installed product was functioning properly.

Handheld devices. Three of the 6 agencies—the Department of Education, HUD, and NASA—had not configured their handheld BlackBerry devices to encrypt the data contained on the devices. All six of the agencies encrypted data in transit because FIPS-validated cryptographic modules encryption was built into the BlackBerry device software. However, agencies must enable the encryption to protect information stored on the device itself by making a selection to do so and requiring the user to input a password. Officials at these 3 agencies stated that they had not enabled this protective feature on all their BlackBerry devices due to operational issues with enabling content protection and that they are awaiting a solution from the vendor.

Virtual private networks. Two of the 6 agencies—the Department of Education and HUD—had not configured their virtual private networking technologies to use only strong, FIPS-validated cryptographic modules encryption algorithms for encrypting data and to ensure message integrity. The use of weak encryption algorithms—ones that have not been approved by NIST or that have explicitly been disapproved by NIST— provides limited assurance that information is adequately protected from unauthorized disclosure or modification.

Agencies Had Not Developed or Documented Encryption Policies and Procedures

The weaknesses in encryption practices identified at the 6 selected agencies existed in part because agencywide policies and procedures did not address federal guidelines related to implementing and using encryption. NIST Special Publication 800-53 recommends that agencies develop a formal, documented policy that addresses the system and communications controls as well as a formal, documented procedure to facilitate implementation of these controls. While policies should address the agency’s position regarding use of encryption and management of encryption keys, the implementation procedures should describe the steps for performance of specific activities such as user registration, system initialization, encryption key generation, key recovery, and key destruction. However, 4 of the 6 agencies did not have a policy that addressed the establishment and management of cryptographic keys as directed by NIST, and none of the 6 agencies had detailed procedures for implementing this control.

Furthermore, according to NIST guidance, agency policies and procedures are to address how agencies will install and configure FIPS-compliant encryption products. All agencies’ policies addressed how the agency planned to comply with these requirements. However, 4 agencies did not have detailed procedures requiring installation and configuration of FIPS- compliant cryptography (see table 5).

Policies and procedures for installing and configuring encryption technologies and for managing encryption keys provide the foundation for the effective implementation and use of encryption technologies and are a necessary element of agency implementation plans. Until these agencies develop, document, and implement these policies and procedures, the agencies’ implementation of encryption may be ineffective in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive information.

Three Agencies Had Not Adequately Trained Personnel to Use Installed Encryption Products

Also contributing to the weaknesses at 3 of 6 agencies was the failure to adequately train personnel in the proper use of installed encryption technology. Specifically USDA officials stated that users had not been trained to check for continued functioning of the software after installation but that they were in the process of including encryption concepts in its annual security awareness training required for all computer users. At the conclusion of our review, USDA had not yet completed this effort.

At the component of the Department of Education where testing was conducted, some users were unaware that the agency had installed encryption software on their laptop computers. These users, therefore, had never used the software to encrypt sensitive files or folders. Further, while an agency official asserted that encryption training was provided, the training documents provided pertained only to the protection of personally identifiable information and did not provide specifics on how to use the available encryption products. Users we spoke with were unaware of any available training.

At NASA, several users stated that they had refused to allow the encryption software to be installed on their devices, while other users said they were unfamiliar with the product. Although NASA requires users to receive training when encryption is installed and has developed a training guide, there was no mechanism in place to track whether users complete the necessary training.

Until these agencies provide effective training to their personnel in the proper management and use of installed encryption technologies, they will have limited confidence in the ability of the installed encryption technologies to function as intended.

Conclusions

Despite the availability of numerous types of commercial encryption technologies and federal policies requiring encryption, most federal agencies had just begun to encrypt sensitive information on mobile computers and devices. In addition, agencies had not documented comprehensive plans to guide activities for effectively implementing encryption. Although governmentwide efforts were under way, agency uncertainty with OMB requirements hampered progress. In addition, weaknesses in encryption practices at six selected federal agencies— including practices for installing and configuring FIPS-validated cryptographic modules products, monitoring the effectiveness of these technologies, developing encryption policies and procedures, and training personnel—increased the likelihood that the encryption technologies used by the agencies will not function as intended. Until agencies address these weaknesses, sensitive federal information will remain at increased risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or loss.

Recommendations for Executive Action

We are making 20 recommendations to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and six federal departments and agencies to strengthen encryption of federal systems.

To assist agencies with effectively planning for and implementing encryption technologies to protect sensitive information, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget take the following two actions: clarify governmentwide policy requiring agencies to encrypt sensitive agency data through the promulgation of additional guidance and/or through educational activities and monitor the effectiveness of the agencies’ encryption implementation plans and efforts to inventory the sensitive information they hold.

To assist the Department of Agriculture as it continues to deploy its departmentwide encryption solutions and to improve the life cycle management of encryption technologies, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the chief information officer to take the following three actions: establish and implement a mechanism to monitor the successful installation and effective functioning of encryption products installed on devices, develop and implement departmentwide procedures for encryption key establishment and management, and develop and implement a training program that provides technical support and end-user personnel with adequate training on encryption concepts, including proper operation of the specific encryption products used.

We also recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Education direct the chief information officer to take the following five actions to improve the life cycle management of encryption technologies: evaluate, select, and install FIPS 140-compliant products for all encryption needs and document a plan for implementation that addresses protection of all sensitive information stored and transmitted by the agency; configure installed FIPS-compliant encryption technologies in accordance with FIPS-validated cryptographic modules security settings for the product; develop and implement departmentwide policy and procedures for encryption key establishment and management; develop and implement departmentwide procedures for use of FIPS- develop and implement a training program that provides technical support and end-user personnel with adequate training on encryption concepts, including proper operation of the specific encryption products used.

To ensure that the Department of Housing and Urban Development is adequately protecting its sensitive information and to improve the life cycle management of encryption technologies at the department, we recommend that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development direct the chief information officer to take the following three actions: evaluate, select, and install FIPS 140-compliant products for all encryption needs and document a plan for implementation that addresses protection of all sensitive information stored and transmitted by the agency; configure installed FIPS-compliant encryption technologies in accordance with FIPS-validated cryptographic modules security settings for the product; and develop and implement departmentwide procedures for the use of FIPS- compliant cryptography and for encryption key establishment and management.

To improve the life cycle management of encryption technologies at the Department of State, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the chief information officer to take the following two actions: develop and implement departmentwide policy and procedures for encryption key establishment and management and develop and implement departmentwide procedures for use of FIPS- compliant cryptography.

To improve the life cycle management of encryption technologies at the General Services Administration, we recommend that the Administrator of the General Services Administration direct the chief information officer to take the following two actions: develop and implement departmentwide policy and procedures for encryption key establishment and management and develop and implement departmentwide procedures for use of FIPS- compliant cryptography.

As the National Aeronautics and Space Administration continues to plan for a departmentwide encryption solution and to improve the life cycle management of encryption technologies, we recommend that the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration direct the chief information officer to take the following three actions: establish and implement a mechanism to monitor the successful installation and effective functioning of encryption products installed on devices, develop and implement departmentwide policy and procedures for encryption key establishment and management, and develop and implement a training program that provides technical support and end-user personnel with adequate training on encryption concepts, including proper operation of the specific encryption products used.

Agency Comments

We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Administrator, Office of E-Government and Information Technology at OMB (reproduced in app. V). OMB generally agreed with the report’s contents and stated that it would carefully consider our recommendations. We also received written comments from Education’s Chief Information Officer (reproduced in app. VI), from HUD’s Acting Chief Information Officer (reproduced in app. VII), from the Department of State (reproduced in app. VIII), from the Acting Administrator of the GSA (reproduced in app. IX), and from the Deputy Administrator of NASA (reproduced in app. X). We received comments via email from the Department of Agriculture.

In these comments, the Departments of Agriculture, Education, HUD, and State; the GSA; and NASA agreed with our recommendations to their respective departments. Agencies also stated that they had implemented or were in the process of implementing our recommendations. In addition, NIST and the Social Security Administration provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.

As we agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested congressional committees and the agency heads and inspectors general of the 24 major federal agencies. We will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions or wish to discuss this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6244 or wilshuseng@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix XI.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of our review were to determine (1) how commercially available encryption technologies could help federal agencies protect sensitive information and reduce risks; (2) the federal laws, policies, and guidance for using encryption technologies to protect sensitive information; and (3) the extent to which agencies have implemented, or planned to implement, encryption technologies to protect sensitive information.

To address the first objective, we reviewed prior GAO reports and reviewed documentation regarding products validated by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cryptographic Module Validation Program to identify commercially available encryption technologies. Additionally, we met with a vendor of an encryption product and interviewed NIST encryption experts regarding the characteristics of products that can reduce risks to agencies.

To address the second objective, we reviewed prior GAO and agency inspector general reports to identify relevant laws and guidance such as the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) and the Privacy Act of 1974 to identify mandatory and optional practices for protecting sensitive information (including personally identifiable information but excluding classified national security information) that federal agencies collect, process, store, and transmit. We examined the laws to identify federal agencies responsible for promulgating federal policies and standards on the use of encryption. Additionally, we researched official publications issued by the Office of Management and Budget and NIST and interviewed officials from these agencies to identify the policies, standards, and guidance on encryption that have been issued.

To address the third objective, we collected and analyzed agency-specific policies, plans, and practices through a data request and also conducted a survey of the 24 major federal agencies. A survey specialist designed the survey instrument in collaboration with subject matter experts. Then, the survey was pretested at 4 of these agencies to ensure that the questions were relevant and easy to comprehend. For each agency surveyed, we identified the appropriate point of contact, notified each one of our work, and distributed the survey along with a data request to each via e-mail in June 2007. In addition, we discussed the purpose and content of the survey and data request with agency officials when requested. All 24 agencies responded to our survey and data request from June to September 2007; results are reported as of this date. We contacted agency officials when necessary for additional information or clarification of agencies’ status of encryption implementation. We did not verify the accuracy of the agencies’ responses; however, we reviewed supporting documentation that agencies provided to corroborate information provided in their responses. We then analyzed the results from the survey and data request to identify: the types of information encrypted in data when stored and in transit; technologies used by the agency to encrypt information; whether the technologies implemented by the agency met federal the extent to which the agency has implemented, or plans to implement, encryption; and any challenges faced and lessons learned by agencies in their efforts to encrypt sensitive but unclassified information.

Conducting any survey may introduce errors. For example, differences in how a particular question is interpreted, the sources of information that are available to respondents, or how the data are entered or were analyzed can introduce variability into the survey results. We took steps in the development of the survey instrument, the data collection, and the data analysis to minimize errors.

In addition, we tested the implementation of encryption technologies at 6 agencies to determine whether each agency was complying with federal guidance that required agencies to use NIST-validated encryption technology. Out of 24 major federal agencies, we selected 6 that met one or more of the following conditions: they (1) had not been tested under a recent GAO engagement, (2) had reported having initiated efforts to install FIPS-validated cryptographic modules encryption technologies, (3) had experienced publicized incidents of data compromise, or (4) were reasonably expected to collect, store, and transmit a wide range of sensitive information. Specifically, we tested the implementation of encryption for BlackBerry servers, virtual private networks, or a random selection of laptop computers at specific locations at the following 6 agencies within the Washington, D.C. area: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Department of Housing and Urban Development, General Services Administration, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration At each of these agencies, we requested an inventory of laptop computers that were located at agency facilities in the Washington, D.C., metro area and that were encrypted. For each agency, we nonstatistically selected one location at which to perform testing, and thus the encryption test results for each agency cannot be projected to the entire agency. We performed the testing between September and December 2007. At each location where laptop computers were tested, there were a small number of laptop computers that were requested as part of our sample but which were not made available to us for testing. Department officials cited several reasons for this, including that the user of the device could not bring it to the location in time for our testing.

In testing the laptop computers, we determined whether encryption software had been installed on the device and whether the software had been configured properly to adhere to federally required standards. Although we identified unencrypted laptop computers at each agency, we were not able to make statistical estimates of the percentage of unencrypted devices at each location. The small number of devices in each sample not made available to us for our testing compromised the randomness of each sample.

Additionally, for each of the selected locations among the 6 agencies, we requested information on their BlackBerry servers, chose the server with the greatest number of users for testing, and reviewed through observation the specific security configuration settings. We also requested and examined agency-provided information for their virtual private networks to determine if encrypted networks were using products validated by NIST. Finally, we interviewed agency officials regarding their practices for encrypting stored data as well as data in transit, and for encryption key establishment and management.

Furthermore, we reviewed and analyzed data on the General Services Administration’s SmartBUY program to determine the extent of savings the program provides to federal agencies and how certain agencies have already benefited from the program.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2007 through June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Important Considerations for Implementing Encryption to Effectively Reduce Agency Risks

Encryption technology may help protect sensitive information from compromise; however, there are several important implementation and management considerations when selecting and implementing this technology. Encryption can be a powerful tool, but implementing it incorrectly—such as by failing to properly configure the product, secure encryption keys, or train users—can, at best, result in a false sense of security and, at worst, render data permanently inaccessible. Designing, building, and effectively implementing commercially available cryptographic technologies involves more than installing the technology. Decisions must be made for managing encryption keys and related cryptographic components, as well as for managing mobile devices and using public key infrastructure (PKI) technologies. Ultimately, the effectiveness of the encryption technologies used to protect agency information and reduce risk depends on how an agency implements and manages these technologies and the extent to which they are an integral part of an effectively enforced information security policy that includes sound practices for managing encryption keys.

Encryption Key Management Considerations

Policies and procedures. Comprehensive policies for the management of encryption and decryption keys—the secret codes that lock and unlock the data—are an important consideration. Providing lifetime management of private keys and digital certificates across hundreds of applications and thousands of servers, end-users, and networked devices can quickly strain an agency’s resources. For example, if a key is lost or damaged, it may not be possible to recover the encrypted data. Therefore, it is important to ensure that all keys are secured and managed properly by planning key management processes, procedures, and technologies before implementing storage encryption technologies. According to NIST, this planning would include all aspects of key management, including key generation, use, storage, and destruction. It would also include a careful consideration of how key management practices can support the recovery of encrypted data if a key is inadvertently destroyed or otherwise becomes unavailable (for instance, because a user unexpectedly resigns or loses a cryptographic token containing a key). An example of recovery preparation is storing duplicates of keys in a centralized, secured key repository or on physically secured removable media. Additional considerations for the encryption of removable media are how changing keys may affect access to encrypted storage on the media and what compensating controls could be developed, such as retaining the previous keys in case they are needed.

Key storage location. Another consideration that NIST describes is deciding where the local keys will be stored. For some encryption technologies, such as full disk encryption and many file/folder encryption products, there are often several options for key location, including the local hard drive, a flash drive, a cryptographic token, or a trusted platform module chip. Some products also permit keys to be stored on a centralized server and retrieved automatically after the user authenticates successfully. For virtual disk encryption, the main encryption key is often stored encrypted within the disk or container itself.

Access to encryption keys. Another consideration is properly restricting access to encryption keys. According to NIST, storage encryption technologies should require the use of one or more authentication mechanisms, such as passwords, smart cards, and cryptographic tokens, to decrypt or otherwise gain access to a storage encryption key. The keys themselves should be logically secured (encrypted) or physically secured (stored in a tamper-resistant cryptographic token). The authenticators used to retrieve keys should also be secured properly.

Managing cryptographic components related to encryption keys. In addition to key management, NIST describes several other considerations when planning a storage encryption technology. Setting the cryptography policy involves choosing the encryption algorithm, mode of cryptographic operation, and key length. Federal agencies must also use NIST-validated cryptographic modules configured for FIPS-compliant algorithms and key lengths. In addition, several FIPS-compliant algorithms are available for integrity checking. Another consideration for managing cryptographic components is how easily an encryption product can be updated when stronger algorithms and key sizes become available in the future.

Other Implementation Considerations

Centralized management of mobile devices. NIST recommends centralized management for most storage encryption deployments because of its effectiveness and efficiency for policy verification and enforcement, key management, authenticator management, data recovery, and other management tasks. Centralized management can also automate these functions: deployment and configuration of storage encryption software to end user devices, distribution and installation of updates, collection and review of logs, and recovery of information from local failures.

PKI technology. Because PKI technology uses a public key as part of its encryption system, PKI systems with key management can be used to avoid the problem of lost keys. Data encrypted with PKI relies on one public key, so the private key of the person encrypting the data isn’t necessarily required to decrypt it. However, if an unauthorized user is able to obtain a private key, the digital certificate could then be compromised. Agencies considering PKI technology must ensure that the key systems of different agencies are compatible for cross-agency collaboration on tasks such as security incident information sharing. Further, users of certificates are dependent on certification authorities to verify the digital certificates. If a valid certification authority is not used, or a certification authority makes a mistake or is the victim of a cyber attack, a digital certificate may be ineffective.

Ongoing maintenance of encryption technologies. Systems administrators responsible for encryption technology maintenance should be able to configure and manage all components of the technology effectively and securely. According to NIST, it is particularly important to evaluate the ease of deployment and configuration, including how easily the technology can be managed as the technology is scaled to larger deployments. Another consideration is the ability of administrators to disable configuration options so that users cannot circumvent the intended security. Other maintenance considerations NIST describes include the effects of patching/upgrading software, changing software settings (changing cryptographic algorithms or key sizes), uninstalling or disabling encryption software, changing encryption/decryption keys, and changing user or administrator passwords.

Appendix III: Hindrances Faced by Agencies when Implementing Encryption

Preparing an agency for encryption presents numerous challenges to agencies, including selecting an adequate combination of cost-effective baseline security controls, properly configuring the networks and user devices within the information technology (IT) infrastructure to accommodate selected encryption technologies, providing training to personnel, and managing encryption keys. In response to our survey, agencies reported several conditions that hinder their ability to encrypt sensitive information as required by the Office of Management and Budget.

In response to our survey, all 24 agencies reported hindrances with implementing encryption. These hindrances included prohibitive costs; user acceptance; user training; data backup and recovery; data archival and retrieval; interoperability; infrastructure; vendor support for encryption products acquired; availability of FIPS-compliant products to meet the needs of uncommon or unique devices, applications, or environments within the agency’s IT infrastructure; and management support for migration to encryption controls. Agencies noted the level of hindrance caused by these challenges ranged from little or no hindrance to great or very great hindrance. The most challenging conditions are discussed below.

Prohibitive costs. Nine agencies reported that the cost of acquiring and implementing encryption was their greatest hindrance, and 13 agencies cited this condition as somewhat of a hindrance or a moderate hindrance. As reported in appendix IV, a governmentwide initiative (SmartBUY) has been established to assist agencies with overcoming this hindrance.

User acceptance and training. Some encryption technologies can be burdensome to users and can require specialized training on encryption concepts and proper installation, maintenance, and use of encryption products. Sixteen agencies reported facing somewhat of a hindrance or a moderate hindrance in obtaining user acceptance of encryption implementations and in training personnel. Four agencies reported a great or very great hindrance from lack of user acceptance, and 2 agencies reported a great hindrance from insufficient training.

Data backup, recovery, archiving, and retrieval. Agencies must establish policies and procedures for management of encryption keys, which are necessary to recover data from back-ups in the event of a service interruption or disaster, or to retrieve data in archived records, perhaps many years in the future. For example, if the key is not properly backed up and is on a server that has been destroyed in a fire or the key used to encrypt archived records changes over time, data encrypted with the key may be irretrievably lost. Sixteen agencies reported facing somewhat of a hindrance or a moderate hindrance with backup and recovery, and 15 agencies reported the same level of hindrance with data archiving and retrieval.

Interoperability. Key systems and technologies of different agencies need to be compatible with each other for cross-agency collaboration. Five agencies reported that lack of interoperability was a great or very great hindrance, and 13 reported somewhat of a hindrance or a moderate hindrance.

Infrastructure considerations. Six agencies reported facing a great or very great hindrance in readying their IT infrastructure for encryption and 11 reported this was somewhat of a hindrance or a moderate hindrance.

Table 6 summarizes the number of agencies reporting the extent to which 10 conditions affect their agency’s ability to implement encryption.

Although agencies reported facing hindrances to implementing encryption, a new program (GSA SmartBUY specific to encryption products) established after we started our review, offers agencies options to overcome key hindrances. For example, prohibitive costs and acquiring FIPS-compliant products are two hindrances that agencies may be able to address through SmartBUY. As discussed in appendix IV, discounted pricing is available for data-at-rest encryption software. In addition, all products available through SmartBUY use cryptographic modules validated under FIPS 140-2 security requirements.

Appendix IV: GSA SmartBUY Program for Data-at-Rest Encryption Products

To help agencies comply with OMB requirements for encrypting information on mobile devices, a governmentwide acquisition vehicle was established for encryption products for stored data. Through a governmentwide program known as SmartBUY (Software Managed and Acquired on the Right Terms), agencies can procure encryption software at discounted prices. According to the General Services Administration (GSA), SmartBUY is a federal government procurement vehicle designed to promote effective enterprise-level software management. By leveraging the government’s immense buying power, SmartBUY could save taxpayers millions of dollars through governmentwide aggregate buying of commercial off-the-shelf software products.

SmartBUY officially began in 2003, when OMB issued a memo emphasizing the need to reduce costs and improve quality in federal purchases of commercial software. The memo designates GSA as the executive agent to lead the interagency initiative in negotiating governmentwide enterprise licenses for software. SmartBUY establishes strategic enterprise agreements with software publishers (or resellers) via blanket purchase agreements.

OMB Memorandum 04-08, Maximizing Use of SmartBUY and Avoiding Duplication of Agency Activities with the President’s 24 E-Gov Initiatives, requires agencies to review SmartBUY contracts to determine whether they satisfy agency needs—such as for products to encrypt stored data—and, absent a compelling justification for doing otherwise, acquire their software requirements from the SmartBUY program.

The issuance of OMB’s May 2006 recommendation to encrypt mobile devices contributed to the addition of 11 SmartBUY agreements for stored data encryption products established in June 2007. The products offered fall into one of three software and hardware encryption product categories: full disk encryption, file encryption, or integrated full disk/file encryption products. All products use cryptographic modules validated under FIPS 140-2 security requirements.

Volume discounts on encryption products are available when purchasing in tiers of 10,000, 33,000, and 100,000 users. Each of the 11 agreements has its own pricing structure, which may include maintenance and training in addition to licenses for users. Discounts on volume pricing can range up to 85 percent off GSA schedule prices.

Table 7 provides an example of the discounted pricing available from 1 of the 11 SmartBUY agreements for encryption software.

As of January 2008, 10 agencies had purchased encryption products—such as software licenses, annual maintenance services, and training—from the stored data SmartBUY list, realizing significant cost savings. One of those agencies—the Social Security Administration—purchased 250,000 licenses of one of the stored data products at a savings of $6.7 million off the GSA schedule prices. Additionally, USDA negotiated an agreement for 180,000 licenses at $9.63 each, as opposed to the GSA unit price of $170 per license. The large number of licenses acquired allowed USDA to negotiate the low price. Several agencies noted that considering an enterprisewide deployment of encryption can be helpful with issues of standardization, interoperability, and infrastructure readiness. While 10 agencies have already acquired encryption products through the SmartBUY program, several agencies are still in the process of assessing which encryption products (including those available under the SmartBUY program) will best suit agency needs.

Appendix V: Comments from the Office of Management and Budget

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Education

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Housing and Urban Development

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of State

Appendix IX: Comments from the General Services Administration

Appendix X: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Appendix XI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Nancy DeFrancesco (Assistant Director), James Ashley, Debra Conner; Season Dietrich, Neil Doherty, Nancy Glover, Joel Grossman, Ethan Iczkovitz, Stanley J. Kostyla, Lowell Labaro, Rebecca Lapaze, Anjalique Lawrence, Harold Lewis, Lee McCracken, and Tammi L. Nguyen made key contributions to this report.

Glossary

Process of determining the permissible activities of users and authorizing or prohibiting activities by each user.

Authentication

Process of confirming an asserted identity with a specified or understood level of confidence.

Authorization

Granting the appropriate access privileges to authenticated users.

Card Management System

A system that manages life cycle maintenance tasks associated with the credentials, such as unlocking the personal identity verification cards during issuance or updating a personal identification number or digital certificate on the card.

Certificate

A digital representation of information that (1) identifies the authority issuing the certificate; (2) names or identifies the person, process, or equipment using the certificate; (3) contains the user’s public key; (4) identifies the certificate’s operational period; and (5) is digitally signed by the certificate authority issuing it. A certificate is the means by which a user is linked—or bound—to a public key.

Ciphertext

Data in an encrypted form.

Container

The file used by a virtual disk encryption technology to encompass and protect other files.

Credential

An object, such as a smart card, that identifies an individual as an official representative of, for example, a government agency.

Digital Signature

The result of the transformation of a message by means of a cryptographic system using digital keys, so that a relying party can determine (1) whether the transformation was created using the private key that corresponds to the public key in the signer’s digital certificate and (2) whether the message has been altered since the transformation was made. Digital signatures may also be attached to other electronic information and programs so that the integrity of the information and programs may be verified at a later time.

Electronic Credentials

The electronic equivalent of a traditional paper-based credential—a document that vouches for an individual’s identity.

End-to-End Encryption

The encryption of information at its origin and decryption at its intended destination without any intermediate decryption.

File

A collection of information that is logically grouped into a single entity and referenced by a unique name, such as a file name.

Folder

An organizational structure used to group files.

Full Disk Encryption

The process of encrypting all the data on the hard drive used to boot a computer, including the computer’s operating system, that permits access to the data only after successful authentication with the full disk encryption product.

Hardware Based Encryption

Encryption that is normally performed by dedicated hardware in the client/host system.

Identification

The process of determining to what identity a particular individual corresponds.

Key

A value used to control cryptographic operations, such as decryption, encryption, signature generation, or signature verification.

Malware

A program that is inserted into a system, usually covertly, with the intent of compromising the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the victim’s data, applications, or operating system or of otherwise annoying or disrupting the victim.

Master Boot Record

A computer’s master boot record is a reserved sector on its bootable media that determines which software (e.g., operating system, utility) will be executed when the computer boots from the media.

Operating System

The program that, after being initially loaded into the computer by a boot program, manages all the other programs in a computer. Examples of operating systems include Microsoft Windows, MacOS, and Linux. The other programs are called applications or application programs. The application programs make use of the operating system by making a request for service through a defined application program interface. In addition, users can interact directly with the operating system through a user interface such as a command language or a graphical user interface.

Private Key

The secret part of an asymmetric key pair that is typically used to digitally sign or decrypt data.

Public Key

The public part of an asymmetric key pair that is typically used to verify signatures or encrypt data.

Public Key Infrastructure

A system of hardware, software, policies, and people that, when fully and properly implemented, can provide a suite of information security assurances—including confidentiality, data integrity, authentication, and nonrepudiation—that are important in protecting sensitive communications and transactions.

Risk

The expectation of loss expressed as the probability that a threat will exploit a vulnerability with a harmful result.

Senstitive Information

Any information that an agency has determined requires some degree of heightened protection from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction because of the nature of the information, e.g., personal information required to be protected by the Privacy Act of 1974, proprietary commercial information, information critical to agency program activities, and information that has or may be determined to be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act.

Standard

A statement published on a given topic by organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, the International Organization for Standardization, and others specifying characteristics—usually measurable ones—that must be satisfied to comply with the standard.

Trusted Platform Module Chip

A tamper-resistant integrated circuit built into some computer motherboards that can perform cryptographic operations (including key generation) and protect small amounts of sensitive information such as passwords and cryptographic keys.

Virtual Disk Encryption

The process of encrypting a container, which can hold many files and folders, and of permitting access to the data within the container only after proper authentication is provided. In this case, the container is typically mounted as a virtual disk; it appears to the user as a logical disk drive.

Virtual Private Network

A virtual private network is a logical network that is established, at the application layer of the open systems interconnection model, over an existing physical network and typically does not include every node present on the physical network.