Information Technology: Homeland Security Information Network Needs to Be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local Initiatives
Released: 2007-05-10T00:00:00

Letter

Background

DHS is the lead department involved in securing our nation’s homeland. Its mission includes, among other things, leading the unified national effort to secure the United States, preventing and deterring terrorist attacks, and protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the nation. As part of its mission and as required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the department is also responsible for coordinating efforts across all levels of government and throughout the nation, including with federal, state, tribal, local, and private sector homeland security resources.

As we have previously reported, DHS relies extensively on information technology (IT), such as networks and associated system applications, to carry out its mission. Specifically, in our recent report, we reported that the department identified 11 major networks it uses to support its homeland security functions, including sharing information with state and local governments. Examples of such DHS networks include the Homeland Secure Data Network, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Network, and the Customs and Border Protection Network. In addition, the department has deployed HSIN, a homeland security information- sharing application that operates on the public Internet. As shown in table 1, of the 11 networks, 1 is categorized as Top Secret, 1 is Secret, 8 are Sensitive but Unclassified, and 1 is unclassified. HSIN is considered Sensitive but Unclassified.

As the table shows, some of these networks are used solely within DHS, while others are also used by other federal agencies, as well as state and local governments. In addition, the total cost to develop, operate, and maintain these networks and HSIN in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, as reported by DHS, was $611.8 million. Of this total, the networks accounted for the vast majority of the cost: $579.4 million.

DHS Established HSIN to Provide Information-Sharing Capabilities

DHS considers HSIN to be its primary communication application for transmitting sensitive but unclassified information. According to DHS, this network is an encrypted, unclassified, Web-based communications application that serves as DHS’s primary nationwide information-sharing and collaboration tool. It is intended to offer both real-time chat and instant messaging capability, as well as a document library that contains reports from multiple federal, state, and local sources. Available through the application are suspicious incident and pre-incident information and analysis of terrorist threats, tactics, and weapons. The application is managed within DHS’s Office of Operations Coordination.

HSIN includes over 35 communities of interest, such as emergency management, law enforcement, counterterrorism, individual states, and private sector communities. Each community of interest has Web pages that are tailored for the community and contain general and community-specific news articles, links, and contact information. The community Web pages also provide access to other resources, such as the following: ● Document library. Users can search the entire document library within the communities they have access to. ● Discussion threads. HSIN has a discussion thread (or bulletin board) feature that allows users to post information that other users should know about and post requests for information that other users might have. Community administrators can also post and track tasks assigned to users during an incident. ● Chat tool. HSIN’s chat tool, known as Jabber, is similar to other instant message and chat tools—with the addition of security. Users can customize lists of their coworkers and send messages individually or set up chat rooms for more users. Other features include chat logs (which allow users to review conversations), timestamps, and user profiles.

State and Local Governments Have Also Established Similar Initiatives

State and local governments have similar IT initiatives to carry out their homeland security missions, including sharing information. A key state and local-based initiative is the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) program.

The RISS program helps state and local jurisdictions to, among other things, share information in support of their homeland security missions. This nationwide program, operated and managed by state and local officials, was established in 1974 to address crime that operates across jurisdictional lines. The program consists of six regional information analysis centers that serve as regional hubs across the country. These centers offer services to RISS members in their regions, including information sharing and research, analytical products, case investigation support, funding, equipment loans, and training. Funding for the RISS program is administered through a grant from the Department of Justice.

As part of its information-sharing efforts, the RISS program operates two key initiatives (among others): the RISS Secure Intranet (RISSNET) and the Automated Trusted Information Exchange (RISS ATIX): ● Created in 1996, RISSNET is intended as a secure network serving member law enforcement agencies throughout the United States and other countries. Through this network, RISS offers services such as secure e-mail, document libraries, intelligence databases, Web pages, bulletin boards, and a chat tool. ● RISS ATIX offers services similar to those offered by RISSNET to agencies beyond the law enforcement community, including executives and officials from governmental and nongovernmental agencies and organizations that have public safety responsibilities. RISS ATIX is partitioned into 39 communities of interest, such as critical infrastructure, emergency management, public health, and government officials. Members of each community of interest contribute information to be made available within each community.

According to RISS officials, the RISS ATIX application was developed in response to the events of September 11, 2001; it was initiated in 2002 as an application to provide tools for information sharing and collaboration among public safety stakeholders, such as first responders and schools. As of July 2006, RISS ATIX supported 1,922 users beyond the traditional users of RISSNET.

RISS ATIX uses the technology of RISSNET to offer services through its Web pages. The pages are tailored for each community of interest and contain community-specific news articles, links, and contact information. The pages also provide access to the following features: ● Document library. Participants can store and search relevant documents within their community of interest. ● Bulletin board. The RISS ATIX bulletin board allows users to post timely threat information in discussion forums and to view and respond to posted information. Users can post documents, images, and information related to terrorism and homeland security, as well as receive DHS information, advisories, and warnings. According to RISS officials, the bulletin boards are monitored by a RISS moderator to relay any information that might be useful for other communities of interest. ● Chat tool. ATIXLive is an online, real-time, collaborative communications information-sharing tool for the exchange of information by community members. Through this tool, users can post timely threat information and view and respond to messages posted. ● Secure e-mail. RISS ATIX participants have access to e-mail that can be used to provide alerts and related information. According to RISS, this is done in a secure environment.

GAO Has Designated Information Sharing as High Risk

The need to improve information sharing as part of a national effort to improve homeland security and preparedness has been widely recognized, not only to improve our ability to anticipate and respond to threats and emergencies, but to avoid unnecessary expenditure of scarce resources. In January 2005, and more recently in January 2007, we identified establishing appropriate and effective information-sharing mechanisms to improve homeland security as a high-risk area. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has also issued guidance that stresses the importance of information sharing and avoiding duplication of effort. Nonetheless, although this area has received increased attention, the federal government faces formidable challenges in sharing information among stakeholders in an appropriate and timely manner.

As we concluded in October 2005, agencies can help address these challenges by adopting and implementing key practices, related to OMB’s guidance, to improve collaboration, such as establishing joint strategies and addressing needs by leveraging resources and developing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries. Based on our research and experience, these practices are also relevant for collaboration between federal agencies and other levels of government (e.g., state, local). Until these coordination and collaboration practices are implemented, agencies face the risk that effective information sharing will not occur.

Congress and the Administration have made several efforts to address the challenges associated with information sharing. In particular, as we reported in March 2006, the President initiated an effort to establish an Information Sharing Environment that is to combine policies, procedures, and networks and other technologies that link people, systems, and information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector. In November 2006, in response to congressional direction, the Administration issued a plan for implementing this environment and described actions that the federal government intends—in coordination with state, local, tribal, private sector, and foreign partners—to carry out over the next 3 years.

Efforts to Coordinate HSIN with Key State and Local Information- Sharing Initiatives Have Been Limited

DHS did not fully adhere to the previously mentioned key practices in coordinating its efforts on HSIN with key state and local information-sharing initiatives. The department’s limited use of these practices is attributable to a number of factors: in particular, after the events of September 11, 2001, the department expedited its schedule to deploy HSIN capabilities, and in doing so, it did not develop an inventory of key state and local information initiatives. Until the department fully implements key coordination and collaboration practices and guidance, it faces, among other things, the risk that effective information sharing is not occurring. DHS has efforts planned and under way to improve coordination and collaboration, including implementing the recommendations in our recent report.

Key Practices Were Not Effectively Implemented

In developing HSIN, DHS did not fully adhere to the practices related to OMB’s guidance. First, although DHS officials met with RISS program officials to discuss exchanging terrorism-related documents, joint strategies for meeting mutual needs by leveraging resources have not been fully developed. DHS did not engage the RISS program to determine how resources could be leveraged to meet mutual needs. According to RISS program officials, they met with DHS twice (on September 25, 2003, and January 7, 2004) to demonstrate that their RISS ATIX application could be used by DHS for sharing homeland security information. However, communication from DHS on this topic stopped after these meetings, without explanation. According to DHS officials, they did not remember the meetings, which they attributed to the departure from DHS of the staff who had attended.

In addition, although DHS initially pursued a limited strategy of exchanging selected terrorism-related documents with the RISS program, the strategy was impeded by technical issues and by differences in what each organization considers to be terrorism information. For example, the exchange of documents between HSIN and the RISS program stopped on August 1, 2006, because of technical problems with HSIN’s upgrade to a new infrastructure. As of May 3, 2007, the exchange of terrorism-related documents had not yet resumed, according to HSIN’s program manager. This official also stated that the program is currently working to fix the issue with the goal of having it resolved by June 2007.

Finally, DHS has yet to fully develop coordination policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries with the RISS program. DHS has not fully developed such means to operate with the RISS program and leverage its available technological resources. Although an operating agreement was established to govern the exchange of terrorism-related documents, according to RISS officials, it did not cover the full range of information available through the RISS program.

DHS’s Expedited Schedule Was Major Cause for Limited Coordination, Increasing the Risk of Ineffective Information Sharing and Duplication

The extent of DHS’s adherence to key practices (and the resulting limited coordination) is attributable to DHS’s expedited schedule to deploy an information-sharing application that could be used across the federal government in the wake of the September 11 attacks; in its haste, DHS did not develop a complete inventory of key state and local information initiatives. According to DHS officials, they still do not have a complete inventory of key state and local information- sharing initiatives. DHS’s Office of Inspector General also reported that DHS developed HSIN in a rapid and ad hoc manner, and among other things, did not adequately identify existing federal, state, and local resources, such as RISSNET, that it could have leveraged.

Further, DHS did not fully understand the RISS program. Specifically, DHS officials did not acknowledge the RISS program as a state and local based program with which to partner, but instead considered it to be one of many vendors providing a tool for information sharing. In addition, DHS officials believed that the RISS program was solely focused on law enforcement information and did not capture the broader terrorism-related or other information of interest to the department.

Because of this limited coordination and collaboration, DHS is at increased risk that effective information sharing is not occurring. The department also faces the risk that it is developing and deploying capabilities on HSIN that duplicate those being established by state and local agencies. There is evidence that this has occurred with respect to the RISS program. Specifically: ● HSIN and RISS ATIX currently target similar user groups. DHS and the RISS program are independently striving to make their applications available to user communities involved in the prevention of, response to, mitigation of, and recovery from terrorism and disasters across the country. For example, HSIN and RISS ATIX are being used and marketed for use at state fusion centers and other state organizations, such as emergency management agencies across the country. ● HSIN and RISS applications have similar approaches for sharing information with their users. For example, on each application, users from a particular community—such as emergency management—have access to a portal or community area tailored to the user’s information needs. The community-based portals have similar features focused on user communities. Both applications provide each community with the following features: ● Web pages. Tailored for communities of interest (e.g., law enforcement, emergency management, critical infrastructure sectors), these pages contain general and community-specific news articles, links, and contact information. ● Bulletin boards. Participants can post and discuss information. ● Chat tool. Each community has its own online, real-time, interactive collaboration application. ● Document library. Participants can store and search relevant documents.

DHS Has Improvements Planned and Under Way, Including Implementing Our Recent Recommendations

According to DHS officials, including the HSIN program manager, the department has efforts planned and under way to improve coordination. For example, the department is in the process of developing an integration strategy that is to include enhancing HSIN so that other applications and networks can interact with it. This would promote integration by allowing other federal agencies and state and local governments to use their preferred applications and networks—such as RISSNET and RISS ATIX—while allowing DHS to continue to use HSIN.

Other examples of improvements either begun or planned include the following: ● The formation of an HSIN Mission Coordinating Committee, whose roles and responsibilities are to be defined in a management directive. It is expected to ensure that all HSIN users are coordinated in information-sharing relationships of mutual value. ● The recent development of engagement, communications, and feedback strategies for better coordination and communication with HSIN, including, for example, enhancing user awareness of applicable HSIN contact points and changes to the system. ● The reorganization of the HSIN program management office to help the department better meet user needs. According to the program manager, this reorganization has included the use of integrated process teams to better support DHS’s operational mission priorities as well as the establishment of a strategic framework and implementation plan for meeting the office’s key activities and vision. ● The establishment of a HSIN Advisory Committee to advise the department on how the HSIN program can better meet user needs, examine DHS’s processes for deploying HSIN to the states, assess state resources, and determine how HSIN can coordinate with these resources.

In addition to these planned improvements, DHS has agreed to implement the recommendations in our recent report. Specifically, we recommended that the department ensure that HSIN is effectively coordinated with key state and local government information-sharing initiatives. We also recommended that this include (1) identifying and inventorying such initiatives to determine whether there are opportunities to improve information sharing and avoid duplication, (2) adopting and institutionalizing key practices related to OMB’s guidance on enhancing and sustaining agency coordination and collaboration, and (3) ensuring that the department’s coordination efforts are consistent with the Administration’s recently issued Information Sharing Environment plan. In response to these recommendations, DHS described actions it was taking to implement them. (The full recommendations and DHS’s written response to them are in the report.)

In closing, DHS has not effectively coordinated its primary information-sharing system with two key state and local initiatives. Largely because of the department’s hasty approach to delivering needed information-sharing capabilities, it did not follow key coordination and collaboration practices and guidance or invest the time to inventory and fully understand how it could leverage state and local approaches. Consequently, the department faces the risk that effective information sharing is not occurring and that its HSIN application may be duplicating existing state and local capabilities. This also raises the issue of whether similar coordination and duplication issues exist with the other federal homeland security networks and associated systems and applications under the department’s purview.

DHS recognizes these risks and has improvements planned and under way to address them, including stated plans to implement our recommendations. These are positive steps and should help address shortfalls in the department’s coordination practices on HSIN. However, these actions have either just begun or are planned, with milestones for implementation yet to be defined. Until all the key coordination and collaboration practices are fully implemented and institutionalized, DHS will continue to be at risk that the effectiveness of its information sharing is not where it needs to be to adequately protect the homeland and that its efforts are unnecessarily duplicating state and local initiatives.

Madame Chair, this concludes my testimony today. I would be happy to answer any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have.

Contacts and Acknowledgements

If you have any questions concerning this testimony, please contact David Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues, at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. Other individuals who made key contributions include Gary Mountjoy, Assistant Director; Barbara Collier; Joseph Cruz; Matthew Grote; and Lori Martinez.

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