Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for Congress
Released: 2003-11-17T00:00:00

Introduction

Congress established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program inNovember 1991. A failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the subsequent disintegration of theSoviet Union had raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. Congressresponded by authorizing the use of $400 million in FY1992 Department of Defense funds to assistwith the safe and secure transportation, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear, chemical, and otherweapons. (1) Congress appropriated an additional $300to $400 million per year for the CTR programsbetween FY1993 and FY1998. It added $440.4 million in DOD funds for FY1999, $475.5 millionin FY2000, $443.4 million in FY2001, $403 million in FY2002, $416.7 million in FY2003 and$450.8 million in FY2004. (2) Most of these fundssupport projects in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus andKazakhstan -- the four nations that had Soviet nuclear weapons on their territories -- but Congresshas also authorized their use for projects in other former Soviet republics.

The CTR program seeks to reduce the threat to the United States from nuclear and other weapons in the former Soviet Union. Towards this end, the program has focused on four keyobjectives:

Destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction;

Transport, store, disable, and safeguard these weapons in connection with their destruction;

Establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of these weapons, their components, and weapons-usable materials; and

Prevent the diversion of scientific expertise that could contribute to weaponsprograms in other nations. (3)

While most Members of Congress support the central objectives of the Nunn-Lugar effort, some Members have questioned whether CTR programs truly enhance U.S. security. Some have objectedto specific projects while others have generally challenged the notion that the programs reduce thethreat to the United States. Many who hold this view believe that U.S. defense dollars could bebetter spent on U.S. defense programs. Others, however, believe that CTR programs can do moreto stem proliferation and enhance U.S. security. Those who hold this view have supported addingfunds to the budget requests for CTR.

These concerns are discussed in detail in the second half of this report. The report first offers an overview of the evolving rationale for the CTR programs and a brief description of processes usedto implement the programs, the types of projects supported by CTR funds, and congressional actionon these programs in past years.

Overview of the CTR Program

Evolving Rationale

Emergency Response to Potential Chaos. Initially, many in Congress saw U.S. assistance under the Nunn-Lugar amendment as an emergencyresponse to risks that could arise when the Soviet Union dissolved into its constituent republics. Some feared that the command and control structure for Soviet nuclear weapons would collapse,allowing leaders in the various republics, or even rogue commanders in the field, to take control ofthese weapons. Many were also concerned about the possibilities that, in an environment of politicaland economic chaos, nuclear weapons or materials might be lost, stolen, or sold on the black marketand that nuclear scientists and technicians might be tempted to sell their knowledge to nationsseeking to develop these weapons. Senator Nunn noted that "...the former Soviet Union, still anuclear superpower, is coming apart at the seams. The danger of proliferation of existing weapons,weapons materials, and weapons know-how is growing as both the Soviet economy and traditionalSoviet control mechanisms lose effectiveness." (4) Most acknowledged that the United States wouldnot be able to ensure complete control of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materialsin the former Soviet Union, but many hoped that U.S. interest and assistance might "provide focusand priority to the destruction of a large part of these weapons." (5)

Threat Reduction, Nonproliferation, and Cooperation. Even after the sense of impending chaos in the former Soviet Unionpassed in 1992 and 1993, many U.S. analysts and Members of Congress remained concerned aboutthe potential for diversion or a loss of control of nuclear and other weapons. Many began to viewCTR programs as part of a long-term threat reduction and nonproliferation effort. In this vein,former Secretary of Defense William Perry frequently referred to CTR as "defense by other means." (6) He and other Clinton Administration officials argued that CTR programs have reduced the threat tothe United States -- by assisting with deactivation of thousands of nuclear weapons in Russia,Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan -- for far less money than the United States has spent to maintainand operate nuclear forces to deter that threat. (7) And,by helping safeguard nuclear warheads,materials and components, the programs have reduced the risk that these materials would "leak out"of former Soviet republics. In addition, because projects funded by the CTR program requireextensive cooperation and because they touch on closely held secrets of the Cold War era -- nuclearweapons information -- many CTR supporters believe these efforts can also foster cooperation andbuild understanding between the United States and the recipient nations.

Nonproliferation and Anti-terrorism. By the latter half of the 1990s, Members of Congress and analysts outside government began to show increasingconcerns about proliferation risks posed by nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union. (8) Expertsnoted that the Soviet Union never instituted a comprehensive control and accounting system for thesematerials, relying instead on physical security and isolated facilities to protect against attacks fromthe outside and the control of the Communist regime to protect against subversion or theft from theinside. But they argued that these controls may no longer be sufficient to protect against theft ordiversion. (9) Experts point to the frequent reports ofsmugglers carrying nuclear materials (althoughmost have not been weapons-grade materials) into Europe for possible sale. These reports have notidentified specific nations who were seeking the materials, but experts fear they could end up inplaces such as Libya or Iran, or that they could be sold to representatives from terrorist organizations. Although these groups may lack the know-how to manufacture nuclear explosive devices, some havepostulated that they could combine radioactive materials with conventional explosives in a"radiological" weapon that would spread poisonous radiation over a wide area.

After experts testified that Russian nuclear and chemical facilities, with their crumbling security and lack of accounting procedures, could provide a source for terrorists seeking nuclear orchemical materials, Congress, in the FY1997 Defense Authorization Act, expanded the CTRprograms that focus on this threat. (10) Congressnot only added funds for security at facilities withnuclear materials, it also indicated that more attention should be paid to security at facilities withmaterials that could be used in chemical or biological weapons.

Concerns about proliferation from Soviet nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons facilitiesintensified in the wake of the financial crisis that began in Russia in August1998. Congressaddressed some these concerns in the FY1999 Defense Authorization Act, when it mandated thatthe Secretary of Defense provide Congress with a report on the number of individuals in the formerSoviet Union with expertise in weapons of mass destruction and the risks that might exist if theseindividuals sold their knowledge to other nations. The Clinton Administration also responded in itsFY2000 and FY2001 budgets, by requesting funds to expand several DOE and State Departmentprograms that sought to assist Russia in safeguarding weapons materials and finding alternativeemployment for weapons scientists. (11) Some inCongress, however, questioned whether theseprograms would be effective in stemming proliferation, and it reduced funding for many of them. (12)

In January 2001, a DOE task force called for increased funding for programs that sought to stem proliferation from Russia's nuclear facilities. This task force stated that "the most urgent unmetnational security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction orweapons-usable materials in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states andused against American troops abroad or citizens at home." (13) Although it focused only on thoseprograms funded through the Department of Energy, and not those funded by DOD through the CTRprogram, the task force concluded that the United States should expand its nonproliferation effortsin this area with a comprehensive strategic plan and $30 billion in funding over the next 10 years.

The Bush Administration has also linked U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet States to U.S. efforts to keep weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists. Specifically, it has "expanded the strategic focus of the CTR program" to support the war onterrorism. (14) In its budget for FY2004, it increasedfunding for several export and border controlprograms, for programs designed to stem the leakage of knowledge out of the former Soviet Union,and for an effort to find and recover "radiological sources" -- a type of military device that couldprovide terrorists with nuclear materials for use in a "dirty bomb." (15) All of these initiatives focusmore on stemming proliferation than on eliminating nuclear weapons in the former Soviet states.

Program Implementation

When Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment in 1991, many Members and experts outside government expected a relatively simple program. They seemed to envision an effort where,using funds from the DOD budget, officials from the United States would travel to Russia, Ukraine,Belarus, and Kazakhstan to quickly safeguard and help dismantle nuclear, chemical, and otherweapons left vulnerable by the demise of the Soviet Union. But the process of programimplementation, both within the U.S. government and between the United States and the newlyindependent states of the former Soviet Union, was far slower and more complex than manyexpected.

The U.S. Interagency Process. Within the U.S. government, the CTR program is an interagency effort. Initially, most of the funds for CTR projectscame from the DOD budget, (16) but experts withthe knowledge and skills needed to implement theseprojects resided in several different agencies. For example, the Department of Defense has providedmost of the general policy direction, which essentially determined the types of projects funded bythe CTR program, and much of the expertise needed to implement programs focused on weaponssecurity and dismantlement. The State Department took the lead in negotiating the broad agreementsneeded before recipient nations could receive U.S. assistance under the CTR programs and inproviding for broad policy coordination among the U.S. agencies and between the United States andrecipient nations. It also manages funds for the International Science and Technology Centers inMoscow and Kiev. The Department of Energy plays a major role with its Materials Protection,Control and Accounting program which seeks to improve security and controls at facilities withnuclear materials, its Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program (IPP), which seeks to fundcommercial employment opportunities for weapons scientists, and its Nuclear Cities Initiative, whichis designed to assist Russia with the downsizing of its nuclear weapons complex and to promotealternative, commercial enterprises in Russia's nuclear cities. The Department of Commerce hasalso participated in projects that focus on establishing effective export controls in the recipientnations.

Within the Department of Defense, several organizations have responsibility for different aspects of the CTR program. For example, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Office, under theUndersecretary of Defense for Policy, takes the lead in developing broad U.S. policy objectives forthe CTR program and for identifying specific projects that will help achieve these objectives; thisoffice also participates in negotiations with recipient nations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and MilitaryServices also offer advice on the goals and direction of the CTR program. Until the end ofSeptember 1998, the CTR Program Office under the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition andTechnology had also helped plan future CTR programs, and, through the Defense Special WeaponsAgency (formerly the Defense Nuclear Agency), took the lead in contracting with U.S. firms thatwould provide technology and assistance to the former Soviet republics. This office also managedday-to-day interaction with representatives in recipient nations to make sure that U.S. assistance mettheir specific needs. (17)

In November 1997, Secretary of Defense Cohen announced that the CTR Program office, the Defense Special Weapons Agency, and a small program management staff from the Office of theSpecial Coordinator for Cooperative Threat Reduction would join with the On-Site InspectionAgency in a new Defense Threat Reduction Agency. This new entity, which began operations onOctober 1, 1998, is now responsible for managing the CTR program and implementing CTRprojects. (18)

International Negotiations. The United States hasnegotiated "umbrella agreements" with each recipient nation that set out the privileges andimmunities of U.S. personnel who work on CTR projects and establish the legal and customsframework for the provision of aid. The United States and recipient nations then negotiateagreements that identify specific projects, outline the amount of money that the United States wouldcommit to the particular project and identify each party's rights and responsibilities whenimplementing the projects.

Project Implementation. According to the legislation establishing the CTR programs, Administration officials must notify Congress at least 15days in advance of its intent to obligate funds for a specific project; this generally occurs before theUnited States and recipient nation have completed an agreement outlining the specific details of aproject. After completing the agreement, the United States can begin obligating funds for thatproject and expending those funds. It sets aside the amount of money that will be needed to paycontractor fees, equipment costs, and other U.S. agencies (such as DOE) during the implementationof the agreed project. DOD then contracts with the U.S. firms who will provide the assistance. Itcan take several years for the expenditures on a project to equal the amount of money obligated forthat project because funds are dispersed as work progresses and it can take several years forcontractors to complete their work. This complex implementation process has contributed to someof the delays in the CTR programs, but U.S. officials have recognized the problems and improvedimplementation efforts in recent years.

Focus of the CTR Projects

The Department of Defense divides the CTR program into three distinct project areas. (19) Theseinclude destruction and dismantlement, chain of custody, and demilitarization. Table 1, below,displays the amount of money allocated to projects in each of these three areas as of early January2002.

Table 1. Allocation of Funds Among CTR Program Areas (in millions of dollars)

Source: CTR Program Office, Department of Defense

This table divides funding into the three categories mentioned above -- the amount notified to Congress, the amount obligated in each area, and the expenditures that have occurred to date. TheAppendix at the end of this report provides a detailed list of the amount of money notified, obligated,and expended on specific projects in each of these categories.

Destruction and dismantlement projects are designed to help with the elimination of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and their delivery vehicles. To date, many of the projects in this areahave helped Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan remove warheads, deactivate missiles, andeliminate launch facilities for the nuclear weapons covered by the START I treaty. The UnitedStates is also helping Russia design a destruction facility for its chemical weapons stockpile. AsTable I indicates, more than half of the CTR funds currently obligated and notified to Congresssupport projects in this category.

Chain of custody activities include projects designed to enhance the safety, security, and control over nuclear weapons and fissile materials. Some of the first CTR projects provided Russia withbullet-proof Kevlar blankets, secure canisters, and improved rail cars to enhance the safety andsecurity of warheads as they were transported from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to storage anddismantlement facilities in Russia. The United States has also helped Russia construct a storagefacility that will house plutonium removed from nuclear warheads when they are dismantled. TheCTR program is also funding several projects that are attempting to improve the security andaccounting systems at storage facilities for nuclear weapons and materials to reduce the possibilityof theft or losses at those facilities.

Demilitarization efforts include projects that are encouraging Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to convert military efforts to peaceful purposes. These include the International Scienceand Technology Centers, which provide grants to scientists and engineers who had produced nuclearor other weapons of mass destruction so that they can pursue projects with peaceful objectives. Demilitarization funds also support projects that seek to convert defense facilities and factories inthe former Soviet Union to peaceful purposes. And they support military-to-military contactsbetween officers in the United States and those in the former Soviet republics. According to theDepartment of Defense, these contacts allow the United States to help train military officials in theother nations so that they can better protect weapons, technology, and weapons expertise. (20)

CTR Programs in Congress

This section will briefly describe trends that have characterized the funding history and legislative oversight of the CTR programs. A more detailed description of the program's legislativehistory from 1991 through 1995 can be found in CRS Report 94-985, The Nunn-Lugar Program forSoviet Weapons Dismantlement: Background and Implementation .

Congress has demonstrated continuing support for the CTR programs. Although some Members have sought to reduce or delay funding in response to concerns about specific programs,Congress has approved most of the funds that the Executive Branch requested for these efforts. TheSenate has generally supported higher funding levels and a broader mandate than has the House, inpart because the House has historically been less supportive of foreign assistance programs, but alsobecause the program's original sponsors, Senators Nunn and Lugar, and, more recently, SenatorDomenici, remained active in their support.

Funding. When Congress first passed the Nunn-Lugar Amendment, it authorized the transfer of $400 million in FY1992 funds from otherDOD accounts for threat reduction activities in the former Soviet Union. Few of these funds werespent in FY1992, so Congress extended the transfer authority for FY1992 funds and authorized the transfer of an additional $400 million from other DOD accounts in FY1993. In FY1994 andFY1995, the Clinton Administration requested and Congress approved new appropriations of $400million annually for CTR programs. (21) In FY1996,Congress approved $300 million of the $371million in Defense Department funds requested by the Clinton Administration. Congress alsoincluded $33 million in the State Department budget and $70 million in the Department of Energybudget to continue projects that had begun in the CTR program.

The Clinton Administration requested $327.9 million in DOD funds for the CTR program in FY1997. The House approved only $302.9 million in its version of the FY1997 DefenseAuthorization Bill ( H.R. 3230 ), but the Senate added $37 million, for a total of $364.9million in its version of the bill ( S. 1745 ). The Senate also added $57 million to theDepartment of Energy request of $95 million for materials control and accounting programs atfacilities in the former Soviet Union. The House accepted the Senate provisions and these additionswere included in the final version of the FY1997 Defense Authorization Act.

The Clinton Administration requested $382.2 million in DOD funds and $167 million in Department of Energy funds for FY1998. The House approved $284.7 million in DOD funds; itrejected funding that the Administration had requested for chemical weapons destruction, nuclearreactor core conversion, and nuclear weapons storage security. The House also rejected somefunding for DOE programs. The Senate, in contrast, approved the full request of $382.2 million forDOD and $167 million for DOE. The House accepted the Senate provisions and Congress approvedthe full request in the FY1998 Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 105-85 ).

The Clinton Administration requested $442.4 million in DOD funds and $167 million in DOE funds for FY1999. The Senate approved $440.4 million in DOD funds for CTR programs, but theHouse approved only $414.4 million. Among other changes, the House reduced the amountrequested for chemical weapons destruction activities by $53.4 million and added $31.4 million forstrategic arms elimination activities in Russia and Ukraine. In its report on the Bill ( H.Rept.105-532 ), the House National Security Committee noted that strategic offensive arms pose a directthreat to U.S. security, while Russia's chemical weapons pose more of an environmental problemthan a threat to U.S. security. (22) The ConferenceCommittee adopted the Senate's position, however,approving $440.4 million without reallocating funds from chemical weapons destruction to strategicoffensive arms destruction. Congress also approved a total of $172 million in DOE funds, adding$5 million to the $20 million request for the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program.

The Clinton Administration requested $475.5 million in DOD funds for CTR programs in FY2000. The Senate approved the full request but the House approved only $444.1 million andeliminated all funding for the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility. The HouseArmed Services Committee again expressed its concerns with U.S. funding for Russia's chemicalweapons destruction program, and cited a recent GAO study to question the nonproliferation benefitsof such a facility. It mandated, instead, that U.S. assistance seek to improve security at existingchemical weapons storage facilities. The Conference Committee on the FY2000 DefenseAuthorization Bill approved the Administration's request for $475.5 million for CTR programs, butit also approved House position precluding funding for the construction of a chemical weaponsdestruction facility.

The Clinton Administration also requested $205 million for the Department of Energy's programs in FY2000; Congress approved the full $145 million for DOE's MCP&A program. Butit reduced the requests for $30 million for the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) programand an additional $30 million for the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) to $25 million for IPP and only$7.5 million for NCI. These reductions reflected the concerns raised in the February 1999 GAOreport that questioned DOE's oversight and the effectiveness of the programs. (23)

The Clinton Administration requested $458.4 million for CTR in its FY2001 budget. The Senate Armed Services Committee approved the full amount in its version of the FY2001 DefenseAuthorization Bill. It did, however, limit the use of funds for the construction of the chemicalweapons destruction facility until the Secretary of Defense could certify that Russia was committedto providing at least $25 million per year to help construct and operate the facility; that Russia wascommitted to destroying all its remaining nerve agent; that other nations were committed toproviding funding for the social infrastructure around this facility; and that Russia was committedto destroying its chemical weapons production facilities. The House, in contrast, again eliminatedall funding for the chemical weapons destruction facility and provided only $433.4 million for CTR. The House prevailed and the Conference Report authorizes the appropriation of only $433.4 millionfor CTR and precludes any expenditures on the construction of a chemical weapons destructionfacility in Russia. Instead, it expresses the sense of Congress that the international communityshould do more to help Russia eliminate its chemical weapons in accordance with its obligationsunder the Chemical Weapons convention.

The Clinton Administration also requested $174 million for the Department of energy's MPC&A program, $22.5 million for the IPP program, and 17.5 million for the NCI program inFY2001. Congress approved the requested funding, and even added several million dollars to theIPP and NCI programs.

The Bush Administration requested $403 million for CTR funding FY2002. Although this represented a reduction of $40 million from FY2001, the funding request did not necessarilyrepresent a decline in support for the CTR program. Several projects, such as the construction of theplutonium storage facility at Mayak, had received the full amount of funding needed in previousyears. Therefore, the Administration did not request additional funds in FY2002. The House andSenate both approved the Administration's request, including the request for $50 million for thechemical weapons destruction in Russia. The House did, however, continue to express concernsabout this project (these are discussed below.)

The Bush Administration's budget request for FY2002 sharply reduced the planned funding for the Department of Energy's MPC&A program. DOE had planned to request more than $200 millionat the end of the Clinton Administration, but the Bush Administration reduced the program to 138.8million. However, after the September 11 attacks renewed concerns about the possible leakage ofnuclear materials from Russia to terrorist organizations, Congress restored the funding to theFY2001 level of around $179 million and added an additional $120 million in the EmergencySupplemental Appropriations Bill. The Administration, in its budget, also reduced funding for theNCI program to only $6.6 million, and sought to eliminate the program by consolidating it with theIPP program. Congress did combine the two programs into a new Russian Transition Initiative, butit increased funding from the President's request for a total of around $30 million to $42 million, andadded $15 million more in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill.

The Bush Administration also conducted a comprehensive review of U.S. nonproliferation programs with Russia during 2001. (24) Manyanalysts and observers feared that this review wouldproduce sharp reductions in U.S. assistance to Russia. The President had pledged his support for theprograms during the campaign, but some in his Administration had questioned whether they werean efficient use of U.S. defense dollars and an effective way to reduce the threat to the United States. However, after completing the review, the Administration announced that it would increase fundingand expand some of the programs in FY2003. (25) Most of the increase, however, would affect theDOE programs. The request for the CTR Program is likely to increase by only around 10%.

The Bush Administration requested $416.7 million for CTR for FY2003. Within this budget, the Administration increased funding for the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons destruction facility to$133.6 million. The FY2003 budget also increased funding for biological weapons nonproliferationprograms. The House and Senate both approved the full amount for the Administration's request,although the House reduced funding for the chemical weapons destruction facility to $50 million. The House Armed Services Committee argued that this program could not absorb such a largeincrease in one year and, because Russia did not yet appear committed to the elimination of itschemical weapons, the United States should not accelerate its efforts. The final language in theFY2003 Defense Authorization Bill ( H.R. 4546 ) retained the reduction in funding forShchuch'ye. However, it stated that the Administration can use the $83.6 million removed from thisproject for a number of other projects related to the storage and elimination of nuclear weapons. Itcould also use the funds for chemical weapons destruction if Russia provides a "full and accurate"disclosure of its chemical weapons stockpile.

The Bush Administration requested $450.8 million for DOD's CTR program in FY2004. Much of the increase over the FY2003 total of $416.7 represents an increase in funding for Shchuch'yebecause the Administration would like to accelerate construction of this facility. The Administrationalso reduced funding for strategic offensive arms reduction, in part because much of the work iscomplete, but also because it has unexpended FY2003 funds, which were held up until Congressprovided the President with the authority to waive the certification requirements. The House andSenate Armed Services Committees both approved the President's request for $450.8 million,although the House reduced the funding for Shchuch'ye from $200.3 million to $171.5 million. TheHouse also linked U.S. funding for Shchuch'ye to funding commitments from Russia and from othernations. The Conference Committee adopted the Senate's position, approving the Administration'srequest for $200.3 million for Shchuch'ye without any restrictions on the U.S. contribution.

Legislative Mandate. Between 1992 and 1995, Congress expanded the mandate of CTR programs beyond the initial efforts to aid in the safe andsecure transportation, storage, and elimination of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons. Forexample, in the Defense Authorization Act for FY1993 ( P.L. 102-484 , Sec. 1412), Congressindicated that threat reduction programs should also seek to prevent diversion of scientific expertisefrom the former Soviet Union; facilitate demilitarization of defense industries; establish science andtechnology centers in Russia and Ukraine; and expand military-to-military contacts between officersin the United States and the former Soviet republics. The mandate expanded further in FY1994when Congress indicated, in P.L. 103-160 , that threat reduction funds could also be used to assistin environmental restoration at former military sites and provide housing for former military officerswho had been demobilized as a result of the dismantling of strategic offensive weapons. The ClintonAdministration had stated that these types of programs were needed to help convince officials inUkraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to eliminate the nuclear weapons on their territories. In FY1994,Congress also established the Defense Enterprise Fund to facilitate defense conversion efforts byproviding grants for joint ventures between U.S. industry and industrial concerns in the formerSoviet Union.

The 104th Congress reversed previous trends and reduced the mandate for CTR programs. In the FY1996 Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 104-106 , Congress stated that CTR funds could not beused for peacekeeping exercises or to provide housing for military officers. It also denied additionalfunding for the Defense Enterprise Fund. These restrictions expanded in FY1997 (and remained inFY1998) with added prohibitions on the use of CTR funds for environmental restoration at formermilitary sites, job retraining, and defense conversion. In the FY2000 Defense Authorization Bill,Congress made these prohibitions permanent.

Congress did, however, expand the mandate for threat reduction programs in other areas in the FY1997 Defense Authorization Act. During debate over that legislation, the Senate passed a newamendment sponsored by Senators Nunn, Lugar and Domenici that added $94 million to DOD andDOE budgets to expand U.S. efforts to contain and control nuclear, chemical and biological weaponsin the former Soviet Union. Most of these funds have been allocated to DOE programs that aredesigned to enhance the safety and security of nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union, andtherefore, are not technically a part of the CTR program. Nevertheless, this amendmentdemonstrated that Congress remained willing to extend U.S. assistance to former Soviet republicswhen it believed that the effort would ease proliferation risks and enhance U.S. security. Thispattern continued in the Defense Authorization Act for FY1999, when Congress allocated $2 millionfor biological weapons proliferation prevention activities in Russia and authorized the use of CTRfunds for emergency assistance to remove weapons of mass destruction or materials and equipmentrelated to these weapons from any of the former Soviet republics. (26)

In the FY2000 Defense Authorization Act, Congress again limited the mandate for the CTR program. For example, the conference committee adopted the House language that eliminatedfunding for the construction of a facility that would be used to destroy chemical weapons. TheHouse had questioned funding for this facility for several years; in FY2000, its position wasbolstered by a GAO report that questioned the cost of this facility and its contribution to U.S.nonproliferation objectives. (27) Congress furtherlimited the mandate for CTR in the FY2000legislation when it prohibited the use of CTR funds for the elimination of conventional weapons ordelivery vehicles intended for conventional weapons. The conferees noted that they believed theCTR program should remain focused on the eliminating the theat from weapons of mass destruction.

Oversight and Reporting Requirements. Congress has expanded its oversight of expenditures on CTR projects over the years. In FY1992, Congressdid not specify how the Bush Administration should spend any of the $400 million that it hadprovided under the Nunn-Lugar Amendment. By FY1995, Congress had begun to approve or rejectfunding requests in each of the program areas identified in the Administration's budget. Congresshas also added many reporting requirements to the legislation over the years. For example, inFY1992, Congress indicated that the Administration should provide at least 15 days notice prior toobligation of funds to specific projects. By FY1995, Congress had mandated that the Administrationprovide, among other things, audit and accounting reports for U.S. assistance in the recipient nations,reports on compliance with arms control agreements, and a report on the multiyear plans for the CTRprogram. Furthermore, during debate over the FY2000 Defense Authorization Bill, the Senateexpressed concerns about Russia's financial commitment to the CTR programs and about other areasof Russia's nuclear weapons programs. As a result, it requested that the Administration informCongress whenever Russia asks the United States to absorb a greater portion of the costs for specificprojects. It also required the Administration re-submit certifications on arms control complianceand weapons modernization that had been required by earlier versions of the legislation.

Issues For Congress

Program Implementation

Pace of Implementation. The slow pace of implementation proved to be the key concern for Congress during the first few years of CTR efforts. The Bush Administration spent less than $30 million during the program's first year. After threeyears, the Bush and Clinton Administrations had obligated $434 million but spent only around tenpercent of the $1.2 billion that Congress had appropriated for CTR efforts. (28) Authority to spend$329 million of the original $1.2 billion had lapsed by the end of 1994.

Analysts have highlighted several factors that slowed the process of obligating funds for CTR projects during the program's early years. First, some have noted that the Bush Administration didnot support the program, believing it was premature and that U.S. defense funds would be betterspent on U.S. defense programs. Although the Bush Administration sent negotiating teams toMoscow for protracted discussions, it did little to identify specific projects until Congress grewrestless with the inaction. (29)

Another source of delay was the negotiation of umbrella agreements with the recipient nations, a process that took several years to complete. Congress authorized U.S. assistance in late 1991; theagreement with Russia was signed in June 1992, with Belarus in October 1992, with Ukraine inOctober 1993, and with Kazakhstan in December 1993. (30) Negotiations on agreements for specificCTR projects have also proven to be time consuming. The United States has had to identifyresponsible officials in newly independent states where lines of authority and responsibility have notalways been clear. In addition, the United States has had to overcome the suspicions of many ofthese officials to convince them that they should accept U.S. assistance. (31) In some cases, theseofficials were unwilling to allow U.S. access to sensitive nuclear facilities in Russia unless the U.S.allowed Russian officials reciprocal access at U.S. facilities.

Even after the United States completed agreements with the recipient nations, it was unable to accelerate the obligation and expenditure of CTR funds because most of the funds were to be usedto pay U.S. contractors who would then undertake the projects in the recipient nations. For severalyears, the Department of Defense used its standard contracting procedures to seek proposals andaward contracts for these projects. In early 1994, the Department of Defense established a separateCTR program office to expedite the contracting process.

Table 2. Allocation of CTR Funds by Recipient Nation (in millions)

Source: CTR Program Office, Department of Defense

This change, along with the political commitment expressed by the Clinton Administration and the completion of negotiations with the recipient nations, have accelerated the CTR program. Obligations have increased from around $100 million in early 1994 to over $3.5 billion in May 2003. The rate of expenditures has also accelerated, with nearly $2.9 billion expended through the middleof the year 2003. Table 2 summarizes the amount of money allocated to projects in each of therecipient nations as of May 2003.

Accountability. Congress has also expressed concerns about the U.S. ability to account for funds spent on CTR projects. Because Congress sawfew results in the early years, some worried that CTR funds were being squandered on airplanetickets and hotel rooms for U.S. delegations to Moscow. (32) In addition, in 1994, the GeneralAccounting Office reported that the United States had yet to conduct any audits or examinations toconfirm that CTR funds were being used in the intended manner. (33) As a result, in the FY1995Defense Authorization Act, Congress mandated that the Secretary of Defense submit a report on U.S.efforts to ensure that assistance provided under CTR programs "is fully accounted for and that suchassistance is being used for its intended purposes." (34)

In a study published in 1995, the General Accounting Office reported that the United States had begun to conduct audits and examinations of CTR projects in Russia and Ukraine. (35) But this samestudy raised new questions about the use of U.S. assistance when it reported that some scientists whoreceived grants from the International Science and Technology Centers (ISTC) "may also continueto be employed by institutes engaged in weapons work." (36) GAO interpreted this finding to mean thatthe centers had not succeeded in redirecting weapons scientists to peaceful endeavors. Other criticsof the CTR program claimed that GAO's findings indicated that, by supporting Russian weaponsscientists, U.S. funds were supporting Russian weapons programs.

The State Department disputed both of these conclusions, noting that the grants from the ISTC were intended to supplement, not replace the scientists income from work in other institutes. Thiswas a not a defense conversion project, but a nonproliferation program that sought to provideweapons scientists with added income from work on peaceful projects so that they would not selltheir knowledge and skills to nations outside the former Soviet Union. And the State Departmentclaimed that the United States could be sure that the scientists were not using ISTC grants to supporttheir work at defense-related institutes.

This issue reappeared in 2003. During the 1990s, the United States had spent nearly $100 million to build a facility to eliminate liquid rocket propellant in Russia. During the constructionperiod, Russia used the propellant in its space-launch program. This left the facility idle. Representative Duncan Hunter argued that the United States had wasted its money and that it shouldhave known the facility would not be used. In response, he included language in the FY2004Defense Authorization Bill mandating that the United States place managers on-site at CTR projectsto ensure that the projects meet their stated objectives.

Value of U.S. Assistance Under CTR

Relationship to U.S. National Security. The Clinton Administration stated that the CTR program helped the United States achieve "sometremendous gains ... toward ensuring our security by helping to eliminate weapons that could beaimed at us and by helping to prevent weapons proliferation to hostile countries." (37) To support thisconclusion, the Administration cited numerous developments, including the complete withdrawalof nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; the accelerated reductions of strategicoffensive weapons in Russia, the enhancement of safety, security, and control of fissile material andweapons in Russia; the transfer of 600 kilograms of enriched uranium from insecure facilities inKazakhstan to secure facilities in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and the increases in transparency andunderstanding afforded by the cooperation among military officials from all the participatingnations. (38)

Some supporters of the CTR have argued that the projects have not done as much as they could to advance U.S. national security interests because they focused more on security and control overnuclear weapons than on the security and control of materials that can be used to makenuclear,chemical, or biological weapons. They note that, in relative terms, these materials are in a far moreprecarious position than nuclear weapons and that proliferation resulting from the leakage ofmaterials out of the Soviet Union is a far more likely threat to the United States than proliferationfrom the illegal sale or transfer of warheads. They believe that terrorist groups or nations such asLibya and Iran might use these materials to develop their own weapons of mass destruction. (39) Inresponse to these concerns, Senators Nunn, Lugar, and Domenici sponsored an amendment to theFY1997 Defense Authorization Bill that would expand funding, through both the CTR programs andDepartment of Energy programs, for efforts to secure and control fissile and other materials that posea proliferation risk. (40) And, as was noted above,a recent report by a DOE Task Force called for afurther expansion of these efforts to address "the greatest unmet national security threat"to theUnited States.

On the other side of the debate, some observers, both in Congress and outside government, have argued that the CTR programs could diminish U.S. national security by subsidizing the Russiandefense establishment. During the debate over CTR funding for FY1997, Representative Solomonstated that "if we are giving them this money, it is freeing up other money" and he added that "weare subsidizing the Russian Government to dismantle old nuclear missiles while they are still in theprocess of modernizing and building up other nuclear missiles." Representative Hunter summarizedthis point of view when he asked, "does it make sense for us to subsidize the Soviet Union to thetune of some $300 million?" (41) Secretary ofDefense Rumsfeld appeared to share these concernsduring his confirmation process in January 2001 when he said that Russia should not requestadditional funding for weapons dismantlement while it continued to build new weapons.

Although the debate over this issue has calmed in recent years, some Members of Congress remain concerned. For example, in its report on the FY1999 Defense Authorization Act, the HouseNational Security Committee noted that it remained concerned about Russia's willingness toeliminate weapons systems without U.S. assistance, in spite of its START I Treaty obligations andin light of the fact that it continued to spend its own resources on strategic offensive armsmodernization programs. (42) In addition, Congressprohibited funding for a chemical weaponsdestruction facility in the FY2000 Defense Authorization Act, in large part because a GAO study hadraised questions whether that this facility would further U.S. nonproliferation objectives, and,therefore, enhance U.S. national security. The GAO study also raised questions about the plutoniumstorage facility at Mayak, and noted that the United States "lacked clear assurances" from Russia thatthis facility would house nuclear materials removed from weapons that had threatened the UnitedStates. As a result, Congress conditioned U.S. funding for a second wing at this facility onU.S.-Russian agreement on transparency measures that would provide these assurances.

Those who support the CTR programs have argued that U.S. funds are not supporting the Russian defense industry or other Russian military and foreign policy activities. They note that theUnited States does not provide Russia with cash that it can divert to these efforts; it providestechnology, expertise, and other in-kind assistance for specific projects. (43) These analysts alsocontend that, without U.S. assistance, Russia would simply choose not to pursue the safe and secureelimination of its older nuclear weapons while continuing to spend its own funds to modernize itsforces or pursue other military goals and foreign policy goals. (44) Hence, the CTR program hasprovided Russia and the other recipient nations with an incentive to pursue denuclearization effortsthat are a high priority for the United States.

Relationship to Key Program Objectives. Some observers dispute the Clinton Administration's positive assessment of the value of CTR assistanceby noting that the program has failed to result in the verified dismantlement of any nuclearwarheads. (45) The Clinton Administration and othersupporters of the CTR programs have respondedto this criticism by stating the "CTR program never set out to dismantle warheads directly." Thegoal was, instead, to facilitate in the "transportation, storage, safeguarding and destruction of nuclearand other weapons." (46) And officials in Russiahave repeatedly insisted that they have the means todismantle their warheads themselves and, therefore, do not need U.S. assistance with that effort.

Even those who do not use the single measure of dismantled warheads have questioned whether U.S. assistance has achieved the goals that the Clinton Administration attributed to the program. Forexample, the Clinton Administration argued that CTR assistance has resulted in the completedenuclearization of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. But others point out that most CTR projectswere in their early stages when these nations gave up the nuclear weapons on their territories, so theamount of CTR money actually expended (as opposed to the amount obligated to those projects) wastoo low to have produced significant results. Russia had also eliminated many of its strategicoffensive forces covered by the START I Treaty before it received much assistance from CTRprograms. The General Accounting Office highlighted this point in its 1995 report, stating that "todate, the material impact (emphasis added) of the aid actually delivered by the CTR program'sdestruction and dismantlement projects has generally been limited." (47)

The Clinton Administration contended that GAO's measure of material impact understated the effects of the CTR program because it does not measure the effect that U.S. assistance had indemonstrating the high priority the U.S. places on the safe and secure elimination of these weapons. It also did not measure the effect that promises of U.S. assistance might have had on politicaldecisions in recipient nations. For example, the Administration noted that the promise of U.S.assistance under the CTR program played a significant role in convincing leaders in Ukraine,Belarus, and Kazakhstan to eliminate all nuclear weapons on their territories. These three nationshad each agreed to return their nuclear weapons to Russia in the 1992 Lisbon Protocol to the STARTI Treaty, but each began to question this commitment and all voiced concerns about the costs ofeliminating the delivery vehicles and basing facilities for these weapons. (48) After the ClintonAdministration promised that the United States would provide assistance with the costs ofdeactivating and dismantling their weapons if the nations resumed their commitment to becomenuclear-free, each of these nations approved the START Treaty, joined the NPT as non-nuclearweapons states, and proceeded to return the warheads on their territories to Russia.

The Clinton Administration acknowledged, as GAO noted, that Russia began eliminating its strategic offensive weapons under START I even before it began receiving U.S. assistance. And itdid not dispute those who state that Russia probably has the resources to comply with START Iwithout U.S. assistance. But Clinton Administration officials noted that U.S. assistance can ensurethat the reduction process takes place in the "safest and most secure manner possible." (49) U.S.assistance can also accelerate the reduction process and help Russia reach the treaty limits earlierthan it could by itself.

Scope of the CTR Programs

As was noted above, the Clinton Administration has divided the CTR program into three distinct project areas: destruction and dismantlement; chain of custody; and demilitarization. (50) Earlyprojects -- such as the provision of storage containers, bullet-proof blankets, and secure rail cars --were chain of custody efforts. Many projects that received significant funding in recent yearsfocused on strategic offensive arms elimination and other dismantlement and destruction activities. To date, funding for demilitarization efforts has been relatively low and Congress has refused to fundsome projects in this area. This is discussed in more detail below.

Several factors have affected the balance of funding among CTR program areas. For example, the focus of U.S. efforts has shifted as time has passed. Early projects assisted the safe and securetransportation of warheads out of the non-Russian republics, a process that is now complete. Inrecent years, a significant portion of U.S. funding has assisted with elimination of the missiles andlaunchers that once carried these warheads. This effort may also wind down in a few years, whenall four recipient nations complete their reductions under the START I Treaty, but it could resumein the future if the Russian parliament approves the START II Treaty and the United States providesfunding to help Russia eliminate weapons covered by that agreement.

Some analysts argue that the funding outcomes reflect political and organizational, as much as policy priorities. (51) For example, although CTRprograms are an interagency effort, some analystsbelieve the Department of Defense has more influence than other agencies because its budgetcontains the funds for CTR programs. Because the Department of Defense preferred to focus ondismantlement and destruction activities, these efforts received the most CTR funding in recentyears. (52)

The preferences and priorities of officials in the recipient nations have also affected the funding for CTR programs. For example, officials in the non-Russian republics indicated that they could noteliminate the nuclear weapons on their territories unless they received financial assistance for thiseffort. As a result, CTR funding for strategic offensive arms and nuclear infrastructure eliminationhas grown in recent years. At the same time, although the United States would have liked to allocatemore funds for chain of custody efforts, officials in Russia did not share this priority. The UnitedStates experienced particular difficulties gaining cooperation from the Ministry of Atomic Energy(MINATOM), which is responsible for nuclear materials and facilities in Russia. Several analystshave noted that officials at MINATOM have been unwilling to give the United States access tosensitive facilities where most nuclear materials are stored. (53)

Officials in Russia have also taken steps that slowed the implementation of some projects. For example, the United States is helping Russia design and construct a facility at Mayak, near theRussian city of Chelyabinsk, to store materials and components from nuclear weapons. It hasallocated $15 million to help design the facility and $330 million for construction, but this projecthas been delayed several times. Officials in Russia altered the design plans and the two sides wereunable to agree on the details of the final design or construction schedules for the facility. In early1997, Clinton Administration officials noted that the two sides had resolved many of these issuesand construction was proceeding. However, they noted that the project could slow again becauseMINATOM had not been able to provide its full financial contribution to the project and becausethe two nations had not reached an agreement on transparency measures that would assure thatmaterials stored in the facility remained there.

The congressional debate over CTR funding in recent year has indicates that some in Congress disagree with the Clinton Administration and Bush Administration's priorities for CTR programs. For example, concerns about DOD's priorities were part of the reason that Congress expandedfunding for DOE programs directly in the FY1997 Defense Authorization Act. The followingdiscussion highlights some of the specific differences in priorities.

Dismantlement and Destruction Activities. Most Members of Congress continue to support U.S. assistance with the dismantlement and destructionof nuclear and other weapons in the former Soviet Union. Some, however, have questioned whetherthe United States needs to provide so much assistance on some projects that may not have directimplications for U.S. national security. Specifically, some Members have questioned whether theUnited States should help fund the elimination of Russia's chemical weapons. In FY1998 andFY1999, the House cut out funding for the chemical weapons destruction facility; the funds wererestored by the Conference Committee. In its report on the FY1999 Defense Bill ( H.Rept. 105-532 ),the House noted that it believed strategic offensive arms elimination should take priority overchemical weapons destruction because Russia's chemical weapons stockpile does not pose a directsecurity threat to the United States. (54) Memberswho support U.S. assistance for chemical weaponsdestruction note that it does contribute to U.S. security, both by reducing the threat from Russianweapons and by supporting Russian compliance with the international Chemical WeaponsConvention. Nevertheless, in FY2000and FY2001, the Conference Committee adopted the Houseposition and eliminated funding for the chemical weapons destruction facility. Congress did,however, approve the Bush Administration's request of $50 million for chemical weaponsdestruction activities, including $35 million for the construction of the chemical weapons destructionfacility in Russia, in the FY2002 budget. The House Armed Services Committee continued toexpress concerns about this project, but appeared willing to proceed as long as Russia maintainedits financial commitment to the effort and as long as the international community appeared willingto help with funding. The Bush Administration has indicated that requested an increase in fundingfor this effort in FY2003 and FY2004. Congress eventually approved the Administration's request,but the House, again, sought to reduce the funding level and to link it to funding from other nations.

Chain of Custody Activities. Most Members of Congress also believe that chain of custody projects generally serve U.S. interests by reducing therisks of proliferation. Some have, however, questioned the U.S. approach to implementing theseprojects, in part because large sums of money have been obligated with few apparent results. Inaddition, some questioned the need for added funds in these areas because the United States andRussia had not yet concluded agreements needed to implement some of the projects. Nevertheless,Congress approved the Administration's FY1998 request for $100.7 million for chain of custodyactivities. These funds will be used to support the design and construction of the fissile materialsstorage facility at Mayak, the provision of containers that will hold the stored fissile materials, and improvements in security at weapons storage areas.

Some in Congress believe that the Administration has devoted too few resources to ensuring the safety and security of materials that could be used to produce nuclear, chemical, or biologicalweapons. This concern, and questions about the U.S. ability to deter or respond to terrorist attackswith these weapons, prompted Senators Nunn, Lugar, and Domenici to sponsor the Defense AgainstWeapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996. Although Administration officials testified that they didnot need additional funds for CTR programs, this legislation added $37 million to the CTR budget. The added funds supported materials protection, control, and accounting projects and efforts todismantle facilities that had produced chemical and biological weapons. (55) Congress approved anadditional $20 million in DOD funds in FY1998 for the dismantlement of chemical and biologicalweapons facilities and $137 million in DOE funds in FY1998 for materials protection, control, andaccounting projects. In FY1997, Congress also mandated that DOD use $10 million to support aDOE project that will help Russia design a nuclear power reactor to replace a reactor that had bothgenerated power and produced plutonium for nuclear weapons. Although the House initially rejectedadded funding for this project, Congress eventually approved the requested $41 million for this effortin FY1998. The House also approved the Administration's request for $29.8 million for this projectin FY1999, although it noted that management had moved back to DOD and that it believedresponsibility for the program should reside in DOE.

Demilitarization Programs. Congress added demilitarization programs to the CTR mandate in FY1993. Most Members continue to supportfunding for the International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and Kiev (56) . But, manyhave been critical of projects designed to convert plants in Russia's defense industry to peacefulendeavors. Some believe that this funding will simply subsidize the Russian defense industry andwould rather use the funds for defense conversion or other projects in the United States. In addition,in its 1995 report, the General Accounting Office found that most CTR defense conversion effortswere "converting dormant facilities that once produced items related to weapons of massdestruction," rather than eliminating current production capacity. (57)

The Clinton Administration responded to these criticisms by noting that defense conversion projects at dormant facilities would reduce pressure on Russia to reopen these plants and either rearmitself or sell high-tech weapons abroad. In addition, U.S. assistance was never designed to convertall of Russia's defense industry to civilian purposes, but, instead, to promote conversion byencouraging U.S. investment in Russian enterprises. Congress was not swayed by these arguments. The FY1998 Defense Authorization Act contains an amendment that prohibits the use of funds inthe CTR budget for defense conversion in the former Soviet Union. But ongoing projects that useprivate corporate funds or are funded through the Defense Enterprise Fund or DOE's IndustrialPartnering Program will continue.

Congress has also strongly opposed the use of CTR funds for housing construction and environmental restoration projects. In support of these projects, Secretary Perry noted that severalformer Soviet republics have laws that prohibit the demobilization of military units unless there iscivilian housing for the officers retiring from that unit. But these new nations suffer from severehousing shortages. So, without assistance in the construction of housing, the recipient nations wouldnot have been able to complete the deactivation and elimination of nuclear weapons on theirterritories. (58) Secretary Perry noted similar reasonsfor U.S. assistance with environmental restorationat former nuclear weapons facilities. Both Ukraine and Belarus claimed that the Soviet Union hadseriously undermined the environment when establishing nuclear missile bases in their nations. Asa result, these nations sought U.S. assistance with both weapons deactivation and environmentalrestoration as a part of the effort to eliminate those bases.

Many in Congress were not convinced by these arguments. They have argued that the funds could be better used for projects in the United States; some suggested that the funds could providehousing for U.S. veterans who lack sufficient resources. As a result, Congress banned the use ofCTR funds for housing construction or environmental restoration in the FY1996, FY1997, andFY1998 Defense Authorization Acts. (59)

Russia's Financial Commitment to CTR Projects

Both supporters and critics of the CTR program have noted that final costs of some projects could grow as the projects proceed. In addition, they have noted that, in many cases, Russia seemsless willing, or able, to commit resources to these projects than does the United States. As a result,some have expressed concerns that the United States could end up paying far more than it intendedto complete projects that were initiated with the expectation that Russia would contribute asubstantial portion of the funding. The Clinton Administration has acknowledged that Russia'seconomic weakness may limit its contribution to some CTR projects, but it does not agree that theUnited States will end up footing Russia's portion of the bill.

Nevertheless, Congress included several provisions in the FY1998 Defense Authorization Act that are designed to limit the size of the U.S. contribution to some projects and to ensure that Russiacontributes its own resources. For example, Section 1404 of the FY1998 Defense Authorization Actstates that no FY1998 CTR funds can be obligated or expended on strategic offensive armselimination projects in Russia that are related to the START II Treaty until the Secretary of Defensecertifies that Russia has agreed to share the costs for the projects. This provision responded not onlyto concerns about Russia's willingness to commit its own resources to the arms elimination process,but also to lingering concerns about Russia's strategic modernization programs. (60) As was notedabove, some Members of Congress believe that U.S. dismantlement assistance is "subsidizing"Russia's modernization programs because Russia can direct its resources towards modernizationwhile the United States pays to eliminate its older weapons systems.

Congress has also sought to limit the U.S. contribution to the construction of the plutonium storage facility at Mayak. The United States had stated that it planned to limit its contribution to$275 million, but Russia has not agreed on that amount and Russia has been unable to provide itsportion of the funding thus far. (61) As a result,Section 1407 of the FY1998 Defense AuthorizationAct states that FY1998 CTR funds cannot be obligated or expended on this project until the UnitedStates and Russia reach an agreement that specifies the total cost to the United States for thisproject. (62)

Linkage Between U.S. Assistance and Russian Policies

Virtually all supporters and critics of the CTR programs agree that U.S. assistance should be linked, in some way, to policies in the recipient nations. Many disagree, however, on whichactivities should be linked to U.S. assistance and how high the standards for behavior should be.

Requirements in Current Legislation. When Congress first passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment in 1991, it mandated that the President certifyannually that each of the recipients is committed to:

making a substantial investment of its own resources for dismantling or destroying nuclear, chemical, and other weapons;

forgoing any military modernization that exceeds legitimate defense requirements or is designed to replace destroyed weapons of mass destruction;

forgoing the use of fissile materials and other components from destroyed nuclear weapons in new nuclear weapons;

facilitating U.S. verification of weapons destruction that uses U.S. money;

complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and

observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection of minorities.

Through FY1997, the Clinton Administration consistently certified that each of the recipient nations -- Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan -- met these conditions. The Administrationwithdrew its certification for Belarus for FY1998 because that nation has demonstrated a pattern ofhuman rights abuses. (63) Some observers have,nonetheless, questioned the Administration'scertifications. The debate results, in part, from the fact that the President must certify that each ofthe recipient nations is committed to the actions specified in the conditions. Some observers arguethat this formulation leaves too much room for interpretation because the Clinton Administration canbase its certification on statements by Russian leaders, rather than actual events or activities.

For example, the Clinton Administration acknowledged that some Russian activities raise questions about compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention and the bilateral ChemicalWeapons Data Exchange and Destruction Agreements. (64) But the Administration certified that Russiahad satisfied the condition that it comply with all relevant arms control agreements by highlightingthe extensive steps Russia has taken to comply with START I and other treaties and by referring tostatements that President Yeltsin had made, both publicly and privately, about his commitment toresolve outstanding questions on the other treaties. The Bush Administration, however, refused tocertify Russian compliance with these agreements in 2002. Instead it sought, and received,permission from Congress to waive the certification requirements. (65)

In some cases, critics argue that the United States does not have enough information to draw the conclusions needed in the certifications. For example, the Clinton Administration certified thatRussia was not using fissile materials from dismantled weapons in new weapons because Russia hasagreed to sell the United States 500 metric tons of uranium from nuclear weapons. But manyobservers have noted that this represents a small proportion of the highly enriched uranium that theSoviet Union produced over the years. And the United States has no way of knowing what Russiais doing with the rest of the uranium, regardless of any verbal assurances received from the Yeltsingovernment. Similarly, the Clinton Administration has noted that Russia does not plan to reuseplutonium from eliminated weapons because it has sought U.S. assistance with the construction ofa long-term storage facility for this material. Russian officials have stated that they did not needsuch a facility when they were reusing materials in new weapons. But, many observers have notedthat the United States does not know how much plutonium the Soviet Union produced, so it willnever know whether the plutonium placed in the storage facility came from old stockpiles ordismantled warheads.

In some cases, critics have questioned the conditions in the current legislation because they allow the recipient nations to pursue activities that can threaten U.S. national security. For example,when certifying that recipient nations are using their own resources to eliminate nuclear and otherweapons, the Administration has pointed to the progress that these nations have made in reducingtheir weapons under the START I Treaty. But some observers charge that Russia, in particular, mustnot be committing enough of its own resources to weapons dismantlement because it has continuedto commit resources to weapons modernization programs. They argue, similarly, that these ongoingmodernization programs indicate that Russia is not satisfying the condition that it forgo any militarymodernization that exceeds legitimate defense requirements. Critics claim that two programs inparticular -- the continuing production of the follow-on to the SS-25 ICBM (now designated theSS-27 ICBM) and reports of continuing work on a huge underground military complex at Yamanatauin the Urals Mountains -- provide evidence of excessive military modernization in Russia.

The Clinton Administration agreed that Russia was modernizing its ICBM force with the new, single-warhead SS-27 missile, but it argues that this program is neither prohibited by nor inconsistentwith Russia's obligations under arms control treaties. To the contrary, the United States has triedto craft arms control agreements so that the Soviet Union (now Russia) would replace its large,multiple warhead missiles with single-warhead systems. This is because most analysts believesingle-warhead missiles do not pose the same destabilizing first strike threat as multiple warheadsystems. And, because Russia has to eliminate so many multiple warhead missiles under STARTII, it can only keep its forces at the levels permitted by that treaty if it produces new single-warheadsystems. With respect to the underground facility at Yamanatau, the Clinton Administration hasnoted that this project seems misplaced in light of Russia's economic crisis, but it does not believethe complex is a threat to the United States at this time.

Proposals for Changes in the Linkage between U.S. Assistance andRussian Policies. Several members of Congress and analysts outside governmenthave suggested changes in the certification process and new links between U.S. assistance under theCTR program with Russian behavior in a number of areas.

Stricter Standards for Certification. Some have proposed that Congress alter the certification process by removing the "committed to" section oflegislation. This change could reduce the Administration's flexibility when determining whetherrecipients should continue to receive U.S. assistance because the certification might have to reflectongoing activities, without reference to stated intentions by officials in the recipient nations. Forexample, the United States would have to certify that the recipient nations were actually complyingwith all arms control agreements, not just committed to such compliance. Although Congress hasnot adopted this change for all arms control efforts, it did, in the FY1999 Defense Authorization Act,block expenditures on chemical weapons and biological weapons projects until the Administrationprovides such certifications with respect to chemical weapons and biological weapons agreements,or until the Administration certifies that these projects are in the U.S. national security interest.

Some have also proposed that Congress alter the legislation so that the United States would have to certify that Russia had ceased all nuclear modernization programs without reference towhether the U.S. deems the programs to be in excess of legitimate defense requirements. Those whofavor this approach see it as a response to concerns about whether U.S. assistance is subsidizingongoing military programs in Russia. (66)

Some supporters of CTR programs have objected to these proposed changes. They note that strict compliance with arms control agreements is an elusive objective. The United States andRussia often have questions about the other side's compliance records; most of the perceivedproblems are not central to the treaty's objectives or significant enough to justify a disruption inongoing CTR projects. And some have noted that CTR projects, such as the construction of achemical weapons destruction facility, could actually help the recipient nations meet their armscontrol obligations. Cutting off assistance in response to question's about Russia's compliance todate with chemical weapons agreements could actually prove counterproductive. CTR supportershave also noted the efforts to link CTR assistance to Russian nuclear weapons modernization couldproduce unintended consequences. They believe that, if forced to choose, Russia would continueits modernization programs and leave older weapons in place. This would not serve thelong-standing U.S. interest in eliminating Russia's large, multiple-warhead ICBMs.

Broader Linkage to Russian Defense and Foreign Policy. During debate over the FY1997 and FY1998 Defense AuthorizationBills, many Members of the House supported proposals to link U.S. assistance under CTR programsto a number of Russian foreign and defense policies. These included not only Russia's compliancewith arms control agreements and nuclear weapons modernization programs but also Russia'smilitary operations in Chechnya, its relationship with other former Soviet republics, its planned saleof short range missiles to China, and its cooperation programs with other nations including Cuba,Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. (67) Many whosupported efforts to link CTR assistance to this broadrange of issue areas believed that the United States could discourage Russian activities that wereinconsistent with U.S. security interests.

Others have argued that such links would be ineffective. They note that the value of U.S. CTR assistance, at around $400 million per year, is too low to provide the United States with muchleverage over Russian actions. And they argue that Russia would probably forgo U.S. aid if itbelieved it needed to pursue other actions to satisfy its national security needs. Others have statedthat the CTR program was the wrong place to raise these issues because the United States wouldundermine its own interests if it stopped the CTR programs to punish Russia for its behavior in otherareas. (68) Representative Dellums summarized thisperspective when he stated "If we have foreignpolicy concerns ... there are other places where we can fight that battle. But to use the CTR programas the vehicle to challenge on all these other bases I would suggest ... that it cuts off our nose to spiteour face." (69)

Conclusion

When Congress first passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment in November 1991, it sought toprovide U.S. assistance quickly in response to the expected collapse of nuclear control and securityin the Soviet Union. Even though the original impetus for U.S. assistance has passed, Congresscontinues to provide strong support for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Nevertheless,Congress has prohibited CTR expenditures on some demilitarization programs and has questionedprogress on several other projects. At the same time, Congress approved more money for CTRprograms to enhance the security of nuclear materials than the Administration requested.

The issues raised in the past few years are likely to reappear in future debates over CTR funding. As long as Members remain concerned about security at nuclear facilities and the potentialfor nuclear materials to leak to rogue nations or terrorist groups, many are likely to continue tosupport active U.S. involvement in efforts to secure these materials. But as long as Russia continuesto pursue programs and policies that run counter to U.S. preferences and interests, many Membersare likely to continue to question the net value of U.S. assistance to Russia and the other formerSoviet republics.

Appendix: Funding Status of CTR Programs

Source: CTR Program Office, Department of Defense