Clinical trial NCT04849208: NEUROR: Exploring the Neural Basis of Reasoning
Official title: Exploring the Neural Basis of Reasoning
Study type: OBSERVATIONAL
Overall status: COMPLETED
Conditions: Healthy
Keywords: fMRI
Reasoning
Dual process theory
decision making
Lead sponsor: Centre Hospitalier St Anne
Sponsor class: OTHER
First posted: 2021-04-19
Enrollment: 63
Sex: ALL
Minimum age (years): 18
Maximum age (years): 45
Standard ages: ADULT
Accepts healthy volunteers: yes
Observational model: OTHER
Time perspective: OTHER
Sampling method: NON_PROBABILITY_SAMPLE
Study population: Healthy adults

Brief summary: Decades of research have long established that people's reasoning can be biased by their intuitions and deviate from logical norms. Popular dual process models that characterize thinking as an interaction between intuitive and deliberate thought processes have presented an appealing explanation for this observation. Within this account logical reasoning is traditionally considered as a prototypical example of a task that requires effortful deliberate thinking. In recent years, however, a number of findings obtained with new behavioral paradigms have questioned the traditional dual process characterization. A key observation is that people can process logical principles in classic reasoning tasks intuitively without deliberation.

The fast or intuitive logic findings have far stretching theoretical implications for dual process theories and our view of human rationality. However, the nature of this newly discovered fast logical reasoning is not clear. One limitation is that its neural basis has not been explored. The primary goal of this project is to address this shortcoming in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study. In the study adult participants will solve classic reasoning problems (i.e., variants of the bat-and-ball problem) in the scanner. Half of the trials will be traditional "Slow" trials in which participants get ample time to deliberate (i.e., 20 s). The other half of the trials will be "Fast" trials in which people do not get sufficient time to deliberate (i.e., 4 s deadline) and need to rely on intuitive processing.

All participants in the fMRI study will be healthy adults aged between 18-45. In addition to contrasting correct responders' brain activation during fast and slow trials, we will also contrast the fast and slow activations for correct and incorrect responses. This will allows us to identify brain regions associated with both correct and incorrect fast and slow logical responses and reach our study objective.


Eligibility criteria: Inclusion Criteria:

* right-handed
* signed informed consent form
* medical, neurological, neuroradiological healthy
* social security number
* use of contraception for female subjects

Exclusion Criteria:

* standard contra-indication for MRI examination (pacemaker, metallic implants/dental braces, claustrophobia, pregnancy)
* chronic drug or alcohol user
* cognitive disorders linked to cardiovascular accidents
* chronic neurological or psychiatric disorder
* history of major illness (diabetes, metabolic, cancer, immunological)
* use of medicines that can potentially interfere with cerebral imaging (psychotropic drugs, hypnotics, anxiolytics, neuroleptics, anti-parkinson drugs, benzodiazepines, steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, antiepileptics, anti-histamines, central analgesics and muscle relaxants)
* dyschromatopsia
* pregnant female
* non-MRI compatible tattoo

Primary outcomes:
measure: fMRI results
timeFrame: 2 years
Secondary outcomes:
Other outcomes:
Locations:
city: Paris
country: France
facility: GHU PAris - Psychiatrie & Neurosciences
Study officials:
affiliation: Groupe Hospitalier Universitaire Paris - Psychiatrie & Neurosciences (GHU Paris)
name: Catherine OPPENHEIM, Pr
role: PRINCIPAL_INVESTIGATOR
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