Question: Which Chinese dynasty was founded by Mongols?

Answer: Yuan

<hl> In 1274, the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty in China sent a force of some 40,000 men and 900 ships to invade Japan in northern Kyūshū. <hl> Japan mustered a mere 10,000 samurai to meet this threat. The invading army was harassed by major thunderstorms throughout the invasion, which aided the defenders by inflicting heavy casualties. The Yuan army was eventually recalled and the invasion was called off. The Mongol invaders used small bombs, which was likely the first appearance of bombs and gunpowder in Japan.

In 1274, the Mongol-founded <hl> Yuan <hl> dynasty in China sent a force of some 40,000 men and 900 ships to invade Japan in northern Kyūshū. Japan mustered a mere 10,000 samurai to meet this threat. The invading army was harassed by major thunderstorms throughout the invasion, which aided the defenders by inflicting heavy casualties. The Yuan army was eventually recalled and the invasion was called off. The Mongol invaders used small bombs, which was likely the first appearance of bombs and gunpowder in Japan.

question: Which Chinese dynasty was founded by Mongols?, context: In 1274, the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty in China sent a force of some 40,000 men and 900 ships to invade Japan in northern Kyūshū. Japan mustered a mere 10,000 samurai to meet this threat. The invading army was harassed by major thunderstorms throughout the invasion, which aided the defenders by inflicting heavy casualties. The Yuan army was eventually recalled and the invasion was called off. The Mongol invaders used small bombs, which was likely the first appearance of bombs and gunpowder in Japan.


Question: How many troops did the Yuan send to invade Japan?

Answer: 40,000

<hl> In 1274, the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty in China sent a force of some 40,000 men and 900 ships to invade Japan in northern Kyūshū. <hl> Japan mustered a mere 10,000 samurai to meet this threat. The invading army was harassed by major thunderstorms throughout the invasion, which aided the defenders by inflicting heavy casualties. The Yuan army was eventually recalled and the invasion was called off. The Mongol invaders used small bombs, which was likely the first appearance of bombs and gunpowder in Japan.

In 1274, the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty in China sent a force of some <hl> 40,000 <hl> men and 900 ships to invade Japan in northern Kyūshū. Japan mustered a mere 10,000 samurai to meet this threat. The invading army was harassed by major thunderstorms throughout the invasion, which aided the defenders by inflicting heavy casualties. The Yuan army was eventually recalled and the invasion was called off. The Mongol invaders used small bombs, which was likely the first appearance of bombs and gunpowder in Japan.

question: How many troops did the Yuan send to invade Japan?, context: In 1274, the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty in China sent a force of some 40,000 men and 900 ships to invade Japan in northern Kyūshū. Japan mustered a mere 10,000 samurai to meet this threat. The invading army was harassed by major thunderstorms throughout the invasion, which aided the defenders by inflicting heavy casualties. The Yuan army was eventually recalled and the invasion was called off. The Mongol invaders used small bombs, which was likely the first appearance of bombs and gunpowder in Japan.


Question: How many ships did the Yuan send to invade Japan?

Answer: 900

<hl> In 1274, the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty in China sent a force of some 40,000 men and 900 ships to invade Japan in northern Kyūshū. <hl> Japan mustered a mere 10,000 samurai to meet this threat. The invading army was harassed by major thunderstorms throughout the invasion, which aided the defenders by inflicting heavy casualties. The Yuan army was eventually recalled and the invasion was called off. The Mongol invaders used small bombs, which was likely the first appearance of bombs and gunpowder in Japan.

In 1274, the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty in China sent a force of some 40,000 men and <hl> 900 <hl> ships to invade Japan in northern Kyūshū. Japan mustered a mere 10,000 samurai to meet this threat. The invading army was harassed by major thunderstorms throughout the invasion, which aided the defenders by inflicting heavy casualties. The Yuan army was eventually recalled and the invasion was called off. The Mongol invaders used small bombs, which was likely the first appearance of bombs and gunpowder in Japan.

question: How many ships did the Yuan send to invade Japan?, context: In 1274, the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty in China sent a force of some 40,000 men and 900 ships to invade Japan in northern Kyūshū. Japan mustered a mere 10,000 samurai to meet this threat. The invading army was harassed by major thunderstorms throughout the invasion, which aided the defenders by inflicting heavy casualties. The Yuan army was eventually recalled and the invasion was called off. The Mongol invaders used small bombs, which was likely the first appearance of bombs and gunpowder in Japan.


Question: Where did the Yuan invade Japan?

Answer: northern Kyūshū

<hl> In 1274, the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty in China sent a force of some 40,000 men and 900 ships to invade Japan in northern Kyūshū . <hl> Japan mustered a mere 10,000 samurai to meet this threat. The invading army was harassed by major thunderstorms throughout the invasion, which aided the defenders by inflicting heavy casualties. The Yuan army was eventually recalled and the invasion was called off. The Mongol invaders used small bombs, which was likely the first appearance of bombs and gunpowder in Japan.

In 1274, the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty in China sent a force of some 40,000 men and 900 ships to invade Japan in <hl> northern Kyūshū <hl>. Japan mustered a mere 10,000 samurai to meet this threat. The invading army was harassed by major thunderstorms throughout the invasion, which aided the defenders by inflicting heavy casualties. The Yuan army was eventually recalled and the invasion was called off. The Mongol invaders used small bombs, which was likely the first appearance of bombs and gunpowder in Japan.

In 1274, the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty in China sent a force of some 40,000 men and 900 ships to invade Japan in <hl> northern Kyūshū <hl> .

question: Where did the Yuan invade Japan?, context: In 1274, the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty in China sent a force of some 40,000 men and 900 ships to invade Japan in northern Kyūshū. Japan mustered a mere 10,000 samurai to meet this threat. The invading army was harassed by major thunderstorms throughout the invasion, which aided the defenders by inflicting heavy casualties. The Yuan army was eventually recalled and the invasion was called off. The Mongol invaders used small bombs, which was likely the first appearance of bombs and gunpowder in Japan.


Question: How many samurai did Japan defeat the Yuan invasion with?

Answer: 10,000

In 1274, the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty in China sent a force of some 40,000 men and 900 ships to invade Japan in northern Kyūshū. <hl> Japan mustered a mere 10,000 samurai to meet this threat. <hl> The invading army was harassed by major thunderstorms throughout the invasion, which aided the defenders by inflicting heavy casualties. The Yuan army was eventually recalled and the invasion was called off. The Mongol invaders used small bombs, which was likely the first appearance of bombs and gunpowder in Japan.

In 1274, the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty in China sent a force of some 40,000 men and 900 ships to invade Japan in northern Kyūshū. Japan mustered a mere <hl> 10,000 <hl> samurai to meet this threat. The invading army was harassed by major thunderstorms throughout the invasion, which aided the defenders by inflicting heavy casualties. The Yuan army was eventually recalled and the invasion was called off. The Mongol invaders used small bombs, which was likely the first appearance of bombs and gunpowder in Japan.

question: How many samurai did Japan defeat the Yuan invasion with?, context: In 1274, the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty in China sent a force of some 40,000 men and 900 ships to invade Japan in northern Kyūshū. Japan mustered a mere 10,000 samurai to meet this threat. The invading army was harassed by major thunderstorms throughout the invasion, which aided the defenders by inflicting heavy casualties. The Yuan army was eventually recalled and the invasion was called off. The Mongol invaders used small bombs, which was likely the first appearance of bombs and gunpowder in Japan.


Question: What was built around Hakata Bay?

Answer: a great stone barrier

<hl> The Japanese defenders recognized the possibility of a renewed invasion, and began construction of a great stone barrier around Hakata Bay in 1276. <hl> Completed in 1277, this wall stretched for 20 kilometers around the border of the bay. This would later serve as a strong defensive point against the Mongols. The Mongols attempted to settle matters in a diplomatic way from 1275 to 1279, but every envoy sent to Japan was executed. This set the stage for one of the most famous engagements in Japanese history.

The Japanese defenders recognized the possibility of a renewed invasion, and began construction of <hl> a great stone barrier <hl> around Hakata Bay in 1276. Completed in 1277, this wall stretched for 20 kilometers around the border of the bay. This would later serve as a strong defensive point against the Mongols. The Mongols attempted to settle matters in a diplomatic way from 1275 to 1279, but every envoy sent to Japan was executed. This set the stage for one of the most famous engagements in Japanese history.

question: What was built around Hakata Bay?, context: The Japanese defenders recognized the possibility of a renewed invasion, and began construction of a great stone barrier around Hakata Bay in 1276. Completed in 1277, this wall stretched for 20 kilometers around the border of the bay. This would later serve as a strong defensive point against the Mongols. The Mongols attempted to settle matters in a diplomatic way from 1275 to 1279, but every envoy sent to Japan was executed. This set the stage for one of the most famous engagements in Japanese history.


Question: When did Japan begin building the Hakata Bay barrier?

Answer: 1276

<hl> The Japanese defenders recognized the possibility of a renewed invasion, and began construction of a great stone barrier around Hakata Bay in 1276 . <hl> Completed in 1277, this wall stretched for 20 kilometers around the border of the bay. This would later serve as a strong defensive point against the Mongols. The Mongols attempted to settle matters in a diplomatic way from 1275 to 1279, but every envoy sent to Japan was executed. This set the stage for one of the most famous engagements in Japanese history.

The Japanese defenders recognized the possibility of a renewed invasion, and began construction of a great stone barrier around Hakata Bay in <hl> 1276 <hl>. Completed in 1277, this wall stretched for 20 kilometers around the border of the bay. This would later serve as a strong defensive point against the Mongols. The Mongols attempted to settle matters in a diplomatic way from 1275 to 1279, but every envoy sent to Japan was executed. This set the stage for one of the most famous engagements in Japanese history.

The Japanese defenders recognized the possibility of a renewed invasion, and began construction of a great stone barrier around Hakata Bay in <hl> 1276 <hl> .

question: When did Japan begin building the Hakata Bay barrier?, context: The Japanese defenders recognized the possibility of a renewed invasion, and began construction of a great stone barrier around Hakata Bay in 1276. Completed in 1277, this wall stretched for 20 kilometers around the border of the bay. This would later serve as a strong defensive point against the Mongols. The Mongols attempted to settle matters in a diplomatic way from 1275 to 1279, but every envoy sent to Japan was executed. This set the stage for one of the most famous engagements in Japanese history.


Question: When did Japan finish building the Hakata Bay barrier?

Answer: 1277

The Japanese defenders recognized the possibility of a renewed invasion, and began construction of a great stone barrier around Hakata Bay in 1276. <hl> Completed in 1277 , this wall stretched for 20 kilometers around the border of the bay. <hl> This would later serve as a strong defensive point against the Mongols. The Mongols attempted to settle matters in a diplomatic way from 1275 to 1279, but every envoy sent to Japan was executed. This set the stage for one of the most famous engagements in Japanese history.

The Japanese defenders recognized the possibility of a renewed invasion, and began construction of a great stone barrier around Hakata Bay in 1276. Completed in <hl> 1277 <hl>, this wall stretched for 20 kilometers around the border of the bay. This would later serve as a strong defensive point against the Mongols. The Mongols attempted to settle matters in a diplomatic way from 1275 to 1279, but every envoy sent to Japan was executed. This set the stage for one of the most famous engagements in Japanese history.

Completed in <hl> 1277 <hl> , this wall stretched for 20 kilometers around the border of the bay.

question: When did Japan finish building the Hakata Bay barrier?, context: The Japanese defenders recognized the possibility of a renewed invasion, and began construction of a great stone barrier around Hakata Bay in 1276. Completed in 1277, this wall stretched for 20 kilometers around the border of the bay. This would later serve as a strong defensive point against the Mongols. The Mongols attempted to settle matters in a diplomatic way from 1275 to 1279, but every envoy sent to Japan was executed. This set the stage for one of the most famous engagements in Japanese history.


Question: How long was the Hakata Bay barrier?

Answer: 20 kilometers

The Japanese defenders recognized the possibility of a renewed invasion, and began construction of a great stone barrier around Hakata Bay in 1276. <hl> Completed in 1277, this wall stretched for 20 kilometers around the border of the bay. <hl> This would later serve as a strong defensive point against the Mongols. The Mongols attempted to settle matters in a diplomatic way from 1275 to 1279, but every envoy sent to Japan was executed. This set the stage for one of the most famous engagements in Japanese history.

The Japanese defenders recognized the possibility of a renewed invasion, and began construction of a great stone barrier around Hakata Bay in 1276. Completed in 1277, this wall stretched for <hl> 20 kilometers <hl> around the border of the bay. This would later serve as a strong defensive point against the Mongols. The Mongols attempted to settle matters in a diplomatic way from 1275 to 1279, but every envoy sent to Japan was executed. This set the stage for one of the most famous engagements in Japanese history.

question: How long was the Hakata Bay barrier?, context: The Japanese defenders recognized the possibility of a renewed invasion, and began construction of a great stone barrier around Hakata Bay in 1276. Completed in 1277, this wall stretched for 20 kilometers around the border of the bay. This would later serve as a strong defensive point against the Mongols. The Mongols attempted to settle matters in a diplomatic way from 1275 to 1279, but every envoy sent to Japan was executed. This set the stage for one of the most famous engagements in Japanese history.


Question: What happened to diplomatic envoys the Mongols sent to Japan?

Answer: executed

The Japanese defenders recognized the possibility of a renewed invasion, and began construction of a great stone barrier around Hakata Bay in 1276. Completed in 1277, this wall stretched for 20 kilometers around the border of the bay. This would later serve as a strong defensive point against the Mongols. <hl> The Mongols attempted to settle matters in a diplomatic way from 1275 to 1279, but every envoy sent to Japan was executed . <hl> This set the stage for one of the most famous engagements in Japanese history.

The Japanese defenders recognized the possibility of a renewed invasion, and began construction of a great stone barrier around Hakata Bay in 1276. Completed in 1277, this wall stretched for 20 kilometers around the border of the bay. This would later serve as a strong defensive point against the Mongols. The Mongols attempted to settle matters in a diplomatic way from 1275 to 1279, but every envoy sent to Japan was <hl> executed <hl>. This set the stage for one of the most famous engagements in Japanese history.

The Mongols attempted to settle matters in a diplomatic way from 1275 to 1279, but every envoy sent to Japan was <hl> executed <hl> .

question: What happened to diplomatic envoys the Mongols sent to Japan?, context: The Japanese defenders recognized the possibility of a renewed invasion, and began construction of a great stone barrier around Hakata Bay in 1276. Completed in 1277, this wall stretched for 20 kilometers around the border of the bay. This would later serve as a strong defensive point against the Mongols. The Mongols attempted to settle matters in a diplomatic way from 1275 to 1279, but every envoy sent to Japan was executed. This set the stage for one of the most famous engagements in Japanese history.


Question: When did Toyotomi Hideyoshi first send an army to Korea?

Answer: 1592

<hl> In 1592 , and again in 1597, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, aiming to invade China (唐入り) through Korea, mobilized an army of 160,000 peasants and samurai and deployed them to Korea. <hl> (See Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, Chōsen-seibatsu (朝鮮征伐?). Taking advantage of arquebus mastery and extensive wartime experience from the Sengoku period, Japanese samurai armies made major gains in most of Korea. Kato Kiyomasa advanced to Orangkai territory (present-day Manchuria) bordering Korea to the northeast and crossed the border into Manchuria, but withdrew after retaliatory attacks from the Jurchens there, as it was clear he had outpaced the rest of the Japanese invasion force. A few of the more famous samurai generals of this war were Katō Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, and Shimazu Yoshihiro. Shimazu Yoshihiro led some 7,000 samurai and, despite being heavily outnumbered, defeated a host of allied Ming and Korean forces at the Battle of Sacheon in 1598, near the conclusion of the campaigns. Yoshihiro was feared as Oni-Shimazu ("Shimazu ogre") and his nickname spread across not only Korea but to Ming Dynasty China. In spite of the superiority of Japanese land forces, ultimately the two expeditions failed (though they did devastate the Korean landmass) from factors such as Korean naval superiority (which, led by Admiral Yi Sun-shin, harassed Japanese supply lines continuously throughout the wars, resulting in supply shortages on land), the commitment of sizeable Ming forces to Korea, Korean guerrilla actions, the underestimation of resistance by Japanese commanders (in the first campaign of 1592, Korean defenses on land were caught unprepared, under-trained, and under-armed; they were rapidly overrun, with only a limited number of successfully resistant engagements against the more-experienced and battle-hardened Japanese forces - in the second campaign of 1597, Korean and Ming forces proved to be a far more difficult challenge and, with the support of continued Korean naval superiority, limited Japanese gains to parts southeastern Korea), and wavering Japanese commitment to the campaigns as the wars dragged on. The final death blow to the Japanese campaigns in Korea came with Hideyoshi's death in late 1598 and the recall of all Japanese forces in Korea by the Council of Five Elders (established by Hideyoshi to oversee the transition from his regency to that of his son Hideyori).

In <hl> 1592 <hl>, and again in 1597, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, aiming to invade China (唐入り) through Korea, mobilized an army of 160,000 peasants and samurai and deployed them to Korea. (See Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, Chōsen-seibatsu (朝鮮征伐?). Taking advantage of arquebus mastery and extensive wartime experience from the Sengoku period, Japanese samurai armies made major gains in most of Korea. Kato Kiyomasa advanced to Orangkai territory (present-day Manchuria) bordering Korea to the northeast and crossed the border into Manchuria, but withdrew after retaliatory attacks from the Jurchens there, as it was clear he had outpaced the rest of the Japanese invasion force. A few of the more famous samurai generals of this war were Katō Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, and Shimazu Yoshihiro. Shimazu Yoshihiro led some 7,000 samurai and, despite being heavily outnumbered, defeated a host of allied Ming and Korean forces at the Battle of Sacheon in 1598, near the conclusion of the campaigns. Yoshihiro was feared as Oni-Shimazu ("Shimazu ogre") and his nickname spread across not only Korea but to Ming Dynasty China. In spite of the superiority of Japanese land forces, ultimately the two expeditions failed (though they did devastate the Korean landmass) from factors such as Korean naval superiority (which, led by Admiral Yi Sun-shin, harassed Japanese supply lines continuously throughout the wars, resulting in supply shortages on land), the commitment of sizeable Ming forces to Korea, Korean guerrilla actions, the underestimation of resistance by Japanese commanders (in the first campaign of 1592, Korean defenses on land were caught unprepared, under-trained, and under-armed; they were rapidly overrun, with only a limited number of successfully resistant engagements against the more-experienced and battle-hardened Japanese forces - in the second campaign of 1597, Korean and Ming forces proved to be a far more difficult challenge and, with the support of continued Korean naval superiority, limited Japanese gains to parts southeastern Korea), and wavering Japanese commitment to the campaigns as the wars dragged on. The final death blow to the Japanese campaigns in Korea came with Hideyoshi's death in late 1598 and the recall of all Japanese forces in Korea by the Council of Five Elders (established by Hideyoshi to oversee the transition from his regency to that of his son Hideyori).

In <hl> 1592 <hl> , and again in 1597, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, aiming to invade China (唐入り) through Korea, mobilized an army of 160,000 peasants and samurai and deployed them to Korea.

question: When did Toyotomi Hideyoshi first send an army to Korea?, context: In 1592, and again in 1597, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, aiming to invade China (唐入り) through Korea, mobilized an army of 160,000 peasants and samurai and deployed them to Korea. (See Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, Chōsen-seibatsu (朝鮮征伐?). Taking advantage of arquebus mastery and extensive wartime experience from the Sengoku period, Japanese samurai armies made major gains in most of Korea. Kato Kiyomasa advanced to Orangkai territory (present-day Manchuria) bordering Korea to the northeast and crossed the border into Manchuria, but withdrew after retaliatory attacks from the Jurchens there, as it was clear he had outpaced the rest of the Japanese invasion force. A few of the more famous samurai generals of this war were Katō Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, and Shimazu Yoshihiro. Shimazu Yoshihiro led some 7,000 samurai and, despite being heavily outnumbered, defeated a host of allied Ming and Korean forces at the Battle of Sacheon in 1598, near the conclusion of the campaigns. Yoshihiro was feared as Oni-Shimazu ("Shimazu ogre") and his nickname spread across not only Korea but to Ming Dynasty China. In spite of the superiority of Japanese land forces, ultimately the two expeditions failed (though they did devastate the Korean landmass) from factors such as Korean naval superiority (which, led by Admiral Yi Sun-shin, harassed Japanese supply lines continuously throughout the wars, resulting in supply shortages on land), the commitment of sizeable Ming forces to Korea, Korean guerrilla actions, the underestimation of resistance by Japanese commanders (in the first campaign of 1592, Korean defenses on land were caught unprepared, under-trained, and under-armed; they were rapidly overrun, with only a limited number of successfully resistant engagements against the more-experienced and battle-hardened Japanese forces - in the second campaign of 1597, Korean and Ming forces proved to be a far more difficult challenge and, with the support of continued Korean naval superiority, limited Japanese gains to parts southeastern Korea), and wavering Japanese commitment to the campaigns as the wars dragged on. The final death blow to the Japanese campaigns in Korea came with Hideyoshi's death in late 1598 and the recall of all Japanese forces in Korea by the Council of Five Elders (established by Hideyoshi to oversee the transition from his regency to that of his son Hideyori).


Question: When did Toyotomi Hideyoshi send an army to Korea a second time?

Answer: 1597

<hl> In 1592, and again in 1597 , Toyotomi Hideyoshi, aiming to invade China (唐入り) through Korea, mobilized an army of 160,000 peasants and samurai and deployed them to Korea. <hl> (See Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, Chōsen-seibatsu (朝鮮征伐?). Taking advantage of arquebus mastery and extensive wartime experience from the Sengoku period, Japanese samurai armies made major gains in most of Korea. Kato Kiyomasa advanced to Orangkai territory (present-day Manchuria) bordering Korea to the northeast and crossed the border into Manchuria, but withdrew after retaliatory attacks from the Jurchens there, as it was clear he had outpaced the rest of the Japanese invasion force. A few of the more famous samurai generals of this war were Katō Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, and Shimazu Yoshihiro. Shimazu Yoshihiro led some 7,000 samurai and, despite being heavily outnumbered, defeated a host of allied Ming and Korean forces at the Battle of Sacheon in 1598, near the conclusion of the campaigns. Yoshihiro was feared as Oni-Shimazu ("Shimazu ogre") and his nickname spread across not only Korea but to Ming Dynasty China. In spite of the superiority of Japanese land forces, ultimately the two expeditions failed (though they did devastate the Korean landmass) from factors such as Korean naval superiority (which, led by Admiral Yi Sun-shin, harassed Japanese supply lines continuously throughout the wars, resulting in supply shortages on land), the commitment of sizeable Ming forces to Korea, Korean guerrilla actions, the underestimation of resistance by Japanese commanders (in the first campaign of 1592, Korean defenses on land were caught unprepared, under-trained, and under-armed; they were rapidly overrun, with only a limited number of successfully resistant engagements against the more-experienced and battle-hardened Japanese forces - in the second campaign of 1597, Korean and Ming forces proved to be a far more difficult challenge and, with the support of continued Korean naval superiority, limited Japanese gains to parts southeastern Korea), and wavering Japanese commitment to the campaigns as the wars dragged on. The final death blow to the Japanese campaigns in Korea came with Hideyoshi's death in late 1598 and the recall of all Japanese forces in Korea by the Council of Five Elders (established by Hideyoshi to oversee the transition from his regency to that of his son Hideyori).

In 1592, and again in <hl> 1597 <hl>, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, aiming to invade China (唐入り) through Korea, mobilized an army of 160,000 peasants and samurai and deployed them to Korea. (See Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, Chōsen-seibatsu (朝鮮征伐?). Taking advantage of arquebus mastery and extensive wartime experience from the Sengoku period, Japanese samurai armies made major gains in most of Korea. Kato Kiyomasa advanced to Orangkai territory (present-day Manchuria) bordering Korea to the northeast and crossed the border into Manchuria, but withdrew after retaliatory attacks from the Jurchens there, as it was clear he had outpaced the rest of the Japanese invasion force. A few of the more famous samurai generals of this war were Katō Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, and Shimazu Yoshihiro. Shimazu Yoshihiro led some 7,000 samurai and, despite being heavily outnumbered, defeated a host of allied Ming and Korean forces at the Battle of Sacheon in 1598, near the conclusion of the campaigns. Yoshihiro was feared as Oni-Shimazu ("Shimazu ogre") and his nickname spread across not only Korea but to Ming Dynasty China. In spite of the superiority of Japanese land forces, ultimately the two expeditions failed (though they did devastate the Korean landmass) from factors such as Korean naval superiority (which, led by Admiral Yi Sun-shin, harassed Japanese supply lines continuously throughout the wars, resulting in supply shortages on land), the commitment of sizeable Ming forces to Korea, Korean guerrilla actions, the underestimation of resistance by Japanese commanders (in the first campaign of 1592, Korean defenses on land were caught unprepared, under-trained, and under-armed; they were rapidly overrun, with only a limited number of successfully resistant engagements against the more-experienced and battle-hardened Japanese forces - in the second campaign of 1597, Korean and Ming forces proved to be a far more difficult challenge and, with the support of continued Korean naval superiority, limited Japanese gains to parts southeastern Korea), and wavering Japanese commitment to the campaigns as the wars dragged on. The final death blow to the Japanese campaigns in Korea came with Hideyoshi's death in late 1598 and the recall of all Japanese forces in Korea by the Council of Five Elders (established by Hideyoshi to oversee the transition from his regency to that of his son Hideyori).

In 1592, and again in <hl> 1597 <hl> , Toyotomi Hideyoshi, aiming to invade China (唐入り) through Korea, mobilized an army of 160,000 peasants and samurai and deployed them to Korea.

question: When did Toyotomi Hideyoshi send an army to Korea a second time?, context: In 1592, and again in 1597, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, aiming to invade China (唐入り) through Korea, mobilized an army of 160,000 peasants and samurai and deployed them to Korea. (See Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, Chōsen-seibatsu (朝鮮征伐?). Taking advantage of arquebus mastery and extensive wartime experience from the Sengoku period, Japanese samurai armies made major gains in most of Korea. Kato Kiyomasa advanced to Orangkai territory (present-day Manchuria) bordering Korea to the northeast and crossed the border into Manchuria, but withdrew after retaliatory attacks from the Jurchens there, as it was clear he had outpaced the rest of the Japanese invasion force. A few of the more famous samurai generals of this war were Katō Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, and Shimazu Yoshihiro. Shimazu Yoshihiro led some 7,000 samurai and, despite being heavily outnumbered, defeated a host of allied Ming and Korean forces at the Battle of Sacheon in 1598, near the conclusion of the campaigns. Yoshihiro was feared as Oni-Shimazu ("Shimazu ogre") and his nickname spread across not only Korea but to Ming Dynasty China. In spite of the superiority of Japanese land forces, ultimately the two expeditions failed (though they did devastate the Korean landmass) from factors such as Korean naval superiority (which, led by Admiral Yi Sun-shin, harassed Japanese supply lines continuously throughout the wars, resulting in supply shortages on land), the commitment of sizeable Ming forces to Korea, Korean guerrilla actions, the underestimation of resistance by Japanese commanders (in the first campaign of 1592, Korean defenses on land were caught unprepared, under-trained, and under-armed; they were rapidly overrun, with only a limited number of successfully resistant engagements against the more-experienced and battle-hardened Japanese forces - in the second campaign of 1597, Korean and Ming forces proved to be a far more difficult challenge and, with the support of continued Korean naval superiority, limited Japanese gains to parts southeastern Korea), and wavering Japanese commitment to the campaigns as the wars dragged on. The final death blow to the Japanese campaigns in Korea came with Hideyoshi's death in late 1598 and the recall of all Japanese forces in Korea by the Council of Five Elders (established by Hideyoshi to oversee the transition from his regency to that of his son Hideyori).


Question: How many troops did Toyotomi Hideyoshi send to Korea?

Answer: 160,000

<hl> In 1592, and again in 1597, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, aiming to invade China (唐入り) through Korea, mobilized an army of 160,000 peasants and samurai <hl> and deployed them to Korea. (See Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, Chōsen-seibatsu (朝鮮征伐?). Taking advantage of arquebus mastery and extensive wartime experience from the Sengoku period, Japanese samurai armies made major gains in most of Korea. Kato Kiyomasa advanced to Orangkai territory (present-day Manchuria) bordering Korea to the northeast and crossed the border into Manchuria, but withdrew after retaliatory attacks from the Jurchens there, as it was clear he had outpaced the rest of the Japanese invasion force. A few of the more famous samurai generals of this war were Katō Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, and Shimazu Yoshihiro. Shimazu Yoshihiro led some 7,000 samurai and, despite being heavily outnumbered, defeated a host of allied Ming and Korean forces at the Battle of Sacheon in 1598, near the conclusion of the campaigns. Yoshihiro was feared as Oni-Shimazu ("Shimazu ogre") and his nickname spread across not only Korea but to Ming Dynasty China. In spite of the superiority of Japanese land forces, ultimately the two expeditions failed (though they did devastate the Korean landmass) from factors such as Korean naval superiority (which, led by Admiral Yi Sun-shin, harassed Japanese supply lines continuously throughout the wars, resulting in supply shortages on land), the commitment of sizeable Ming forces to Korea, Korean guerrilla actions, the underestimation of resistance by Japanese commanders (in the first campaign of 1592, Korean defenses on land were caught unprepared, under-trained, and under-armed; they were rapidly overrun, with only a limited number of successfully resistant engagements against the more-experienced and battle-hardened Japanese forces - in the second campaign of 1597, Korean and Ming forces proved to be a far more difficult challenge and, with the support of continued Korean naval superiority, limited Japanese gains to parts southeastern Korea), and wavering Japanese commitment to the campaigns as the wars dragged on. The final death blow to the Japanese campaigns in Korea came with Hideyoshi's death in late 1598 and the recall of all Japanese forces in Korea by the Council of Five Elders (established by Hideyoshi to oversee the transition from his regency to that of his son Hideyori).

In 1592, and again in 1597, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, aiming to invade China (唐入り) through Korea, mobilized an army of <hl> 160,000 <hl> peasants and samurai and deployed them to Korea. (See Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, Chōsen-seibatsu (朝鮮征伐?). Taking advantage of arquebus mastery and extensive wartime experience from the Sengoku period, Japanese samurai armies made major gains in most of Korea. Kato Kiyomasa advanced to Orangkai territory (present-day Manchuria) bordering Korea to the northeast and crossed the border into Manchuria, but withdrew after retaliatory attacks from the Jurchens there, as it was clear he had outpaced the rest of the Japanese invasion force. A few of the more famous samurai generals of this war were Katō Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, and Shimazu Yoshihiro. Shimazu Yoshihiro led some 7,000 samurai and, despite being heavily outnumbered, defeated a host of allied Ming and Korean forces at the Battle of Sacheon in 1598, near the conclusion of the campaigns. Yoshihiro was feared as Oni-Shimazu ("Shimazu ogre") and his nickname spread across not only Korea but to Ming Dynasty China. In spite of the superiority of Japanese land forces, ultimately the two expeditions failed (though they did devastate the Korean landmass) from factors such as Korean naval superiority (which, led by Admiral Yi Sun-shin, harassed Japanese supply lines continuously throughout the wars, resulting in supply shortages on land), the commitment of sizeable Ming forces to Korea, Korean guerrilla actions, the underestimation of resistance by Japanese commanders (in the first campaign of 1592, Korean defenses on land were caught unprepared, under-trained, and under-armed; they were rapidly overrun, with only a limited number of successfully resistant engagements against the more-experienced and battle-hardened Japanese forces - in the second campaign of 1597, Korean and Ming forces proved to be a far more difficult challenge and, with the support of continued Korean naval superiority, limited Japanese gains to parts southeastern Korea), and wavering Japanese commitment to the campaigns as the wars dragged on. The final death blow to the Japanese campaigns in Korea came with Hideyoshi's death in late 1598 and the recall of all Japanese forces in Korea by the Council of Five Elders (established by Hideyoshi to oversee the transition from his regency to that of his son Hideyori).

question: How many troops did Toyotomi Hideyoshi send to Korea?, context: In 1592, and again in 1597, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, aiming to invade China (唐入り) through Korea, mobilized an army of 160,000 peasants and samurai and deployed them to Korea. (See Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, Chōsen-seibatsu (朝鮮征伐?). Taking advantage of arquebus mastery and extensive wartime experience from the Sengoku period, Japanese samurai armies made major gains in most of Korea. Kato Kiyomasa advanced to Orangkai territory (present-day Manchuria) bordering Korea to the northeast and crossed the border into Manchuria, but withdrew after retaliatory attacks from the Jurchens there, as it was clear he had outpaced the rest of the Japanese invasion force. A few of the more famous samurai generals of this war were Katō Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, and Shimazu Yoshihiro. Shimazu Yoshihiro led some 7,000 samurai and, despite being heavily outnumbered, defeated a host of allied Ming and Korean forces at the Battle of Sacheon in 1598, near the conclusion of the campaigns. Yoshihiro was feared as Oni-Shimazu ("Shimazu ogre") and his nickname spread across not only Korea but to Ming Dynasty China. In spite of the superiority of Japanese land forces, ultimately the two expeditions failed (though they did devastate the Korean landmass) from factors such as Korean naval superiority (which, led by Admiral Yi Sun-shin, harassed Japanese supply lines continuously throughout the wars, resulting in supply shortages on land), the commitment of sizeable Ming forces to Korea, Korean guerrilla actions, the underestimation of resistance by Japanese commanders (in the first campaign of 1592, Korean defenses on land were caught unprepared, under-trained, and under-armed; they were rapidly overrun, with only a limited number of successfully resistant engagements against the more-experienced and battle-hardened Japanese forces - in the second campaign of 1597, Korean and Ming forces proved to be a far more difficult challenge and, with the support of continued Korean naval superiority, limited Japanese gains to parts southeastern Korea), and wavering Japanese commitment to the campaigns as the wars dragged on. The final death blow to the Japanese campaigns in Korea came with Hideyoshi's death in late 1598 and the recall of all Japanese forces in Korea by the Council of Five Elders (established by Hideyoshi to oversee the transition from his regency to that of his son Hideyori).


Question: When was the Battle of Sacheon?

Answer: 1598

In 1592, and again in 1597, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, aiming to invade China (唐入り) through Korea, mobilized an army of 160,000 peasants and samurai and deployed them to Korea. (See Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, Chōsen-seibatsu (朝鮮征伐?). Taking advantage of arquebus mastery and extensive wartime experience from the Sengoku period, Japanese samurai armies made major gains in most of Korea. Kato Kiyomasa advanced to Orangkai territory (present-day Manchuria) bordering Korea to the northeast and crossed the border into Manchuria, but withdrew after retaliatory attacks from the Jurchens there, as it was clear he had outpaced the rest of the Japanese invasion force. A few of the more famous samurai generals of this war were Katō Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, and Shimazu Yoshihiro. <hl> Shimazu Yoshihiro led some 7,000 samurai and, despite being heavily outnumbered, defeated a host of allied Ming and Korean forces at the Battle of Sacheon in 1598 , near the conclusion of the campaigns. <hl> Yoshihiro was feared as Oni-Shimazu ("Shimazu ogre") and his nickname spread across not only Korea but to Ming Dynasty China. In spite of the superiority of Japanese land forces, ultimately the two expeditions failed (though they did devastate the Korean landmass) from factors such as Korean naval superiority (which, led by Admiral Yi Sun-shin, harassed Japanese supply lines continuously throughout the wars, resulting in supply shortages on land), the commitment of sizeable Ming forces to Korea, Korean guerrilla actions, the underestimation of resistance by Japanese commanders (in the first campaign of 1592, Korean defenses on land were caught unprepared, under-trained, and under-armed; they were rapidly overrun, with only a limited number of successfully resistant engagements against the more-experienced and battle-hardened Japanese forces - in the second campaign of 1597, Korean and Ming forces proved to be a far more difficult challenge and, with the support of continued Korean naval superiority, limited Japanese gains to parts southeastern Korea), and wavering Japanese commitment to the campaigns as the wars dragged on. The final death blow to the Japanese campaigns in Korea came with Hideyoshi's death in late 1598 and the recall of all Japanese forces in Korea by the Council of Five Elders (established by Hideyoshi to oversee the transition from his regency to that of his son Hideyori).

In 1592, and again in 1597, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, aiming to invade China (唐入り) through Korea, mobilized an army of 160,000 peasants and samurai and deployed them to Korea. (See Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, Chōsen-seibatsu (朝鮮征伐?). Taking advantage of arquebus mastery and extensive wartime experience from the Sengoku period, Japanese samurai armies made major gains in most of Korea. Kato Kiyomasa advanced to Orangkai territory (present-day Manchuria) bordering Korea to the northeast and crossed the border into Manchuria, but withdrew after retaliatory attacks from the Jurchens there, as it was clear he had outpaced the rest of the Japanese invasion force. A few of the more famous samurai generals of this war were Katō Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, and Shimazu Yoshihiro. Shimazu Yoshihiro led some 7,000 samurai and, despite being heavily outnumbered, defeated a host of allied Ming and Korean forces at the Battle of Sacheon in <hl> 1598 <hl>, near the conclusion of the campaigns. Yoshihiro was feared as Oni-Shimazu ("Shimazu ogre") and his nickname spread across not only Korea but to Ming Dynasty China. In spite of the superiority of Japanese land forces, ultimately the two expeditions failed (though they did devastate the Korean landmass) from factors such as Korean naval superiority (which, led by Admiral Yi Sun-shin, harassed Japanese supply lines continuously throughout the wars, resulting in supply shortages on land), the commitment of sizeable Ming forces to Korea, Korean guerrilla actions, the underestimation of resistance by Japanese commanders (in the first campaign of 1592, Korean defenses on land were caught unprepared, under-trained, and under-armed; they were rapidly overrun, with only a limited number of successfully resistant engagements against the more-experienced and battle-hardened Japanese forces - in the second campaign of 1597, Korean and Ming forces proved to be a far more difficult challenge and, with the support of continued Korean naval superiority, limited Japanese gains to parts southeastern Korea), and wavering Japanese commitment to the campaigns as the wars dragged on. The final death blow to the Japanese campaigns in Korea came with Hideyoshi's death in late 1598 and the recall of all Japanese forces in Korea by the Council of Five Elders (established by Hideyoshi to oversee the transition from his regency to that of his son Hideyori).

Shimazu Yoshihiro led some 7,000 samurai and, despite being heavily outnumbered, defeated a host of allied Ming and Korean forces at the Battle of Sacheon in <hl> 1598 <hl> , near the conclusion of the campaigns.

question: When was the Battle of Sacheon?, context: In 1592, and again in 1597, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, aiming to invade China (唐入り) through Korea, mobilized an army of 160,000 peasants and samurai and deployed them to Korea. (See Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, Chōsen-seibatsu (朝鮮征伐?). Taking advantage of arquebus mastery and extensive wartime experience from the Sengoku period, Japanese samurai armies made major gains in most of Korea. Kato Kiyomasa advanced to Orangkai territory (present-day Manchuria) bordering Korea to the northeast and crossed the border into Manchuria, but withdrew after retaliatory attacks from the Jurchens there, as it was clear he had outpaced the rest of the Japanese invasion force. A few of the more famous samurai generals of this war were Katō Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, and Shimazu Yoshihiro. Shimazu Yoshihiro led some 7,000 samurai and, despite being heavily outnumbered, defeated a host of allied Ming and Korean forces at the Battle of Sacheon in 1598, near the conclusion of the campaigns. Yoshihiro was feared as Oni-Shimazu ("Shimazu ogre") and his nickname spread across not only Korea but to Ming Dynasty China. In spite of the superiority of Japanese land forces, ultimately the two expeditions failed (though they did devastate the Korean landmass) from factors such as Korean naval superiority (which, led by Admiral Yi Sun-shin, harassed Japanese supply lines continuously throughout the wars, resulting in supply shortages on land), the commitment of sizeable Ming forces to Korea, Korean guerrilla actions, the underestimation of resistance by Japanese commanders (in the first campaign of 1592, Korean defenses on land were caught unprepared, under-trained, and under-armed; they were rapidly overrun, with only a limited number of successfully resistant engagements against the more-experienced and battle-hardened Japanese forces - in the second campaign of 1597, Korean and Ming forces proved to be a far more difficult challenge and, with the support of continued Korean naval superiority, limited Japanese gains to parts southeastern Korea), and wavering Japanese commitment to the campaigns as the wars dragged on. The final death blow to the Japanese campaigns in Korea came with Hideyoshi's death in late 1598 and the recall of all Japanese forces in Korea by the Council of Five Elders (established by Hideyoshi to oversee the transition from his regency to that of his son Hideyori).


Question: When did Toyotomi Hideyoshi die?

Answer: 1598

In 1592, and again in 1597, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, aiming to invade China (唐入り) through Korea, mobilized an army of 160,000 peasants and samurai and deployed them to Korea. (See Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, Chōsen-seibatsu (朝鮮征伐?). Taking advantage of arquebus mastery and extensive wartime experience from the Sengoku period, Japanese samurai armies made major gains in most of Korea. Kato Kiyomasa advanced to Orangkai territory (present-day Manchuria) bordering Korea to the northeast and crossed the border into Manchuria, but withdrew after retaliatory attacks from the Jurchens there, as it was clear he had outpaced the rest of the Japanese invasion force. A few of the more famous samurai generals of this war were Katō Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, and Shimazu Yoshihiro. <hl> Shimazu Yoshihiro led some 7,000 samurai and, despite being heavily outnumbered, defeated a host of allied Ming and Korean forces at the Battle of Sacheon in 1598 , near the conclusion of the campaigns. <hl> Yoshihiro was feared as Oni-Shimazu ("Shimazu ogre") and his nickname spread across not only Korea but to Ming Dynasty China. In spite of the superiority of Japanese land forces, ultimately the two expeditions failed (though they did devastate the Korean landmass) from factors such as Korean naval superiority (which, led by Admiral Yi Sun-shin, harassed Japanese supply lines continuously throughout the wars, resulting in supply shortages on land), the commitment of sizeable Ming forces to Korea, Korean guerrilla actions, the underestimation of resistance by Japanese commanders (in the first campaign of 1592, Korean defenses on land were caught unprepared, under-trained, and under-armed; they were rapidly overrun, with only a limited number of successfully resistant engagements against the more-experienced and battle-hardened Japanese forces - in the second campaign of 1597, Korean and Ming forces proved to be a far more difficult challenge and, with the support of continued Korean naval superiority, limited Japanese gains to parts southeastern Korea), and wavering Japanese commitment to the campaigns as the wars dragged on. The final death blow to the Japanese campaigns in Korea came with Hideyoshi's death in late 1598 and the recall of all Japanese forces in Korea by the Council of Five Elders (established by Hideyoshi to oversee the transition from his regency to that of his son Hideyori).

In 1592, and again in 1597, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, aiming to invade China (唐入り) through Korea, mobilized an army of 160,000 peasants and samurai and deployed them to Korea. (See Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, Chōsen-seibatsu (朝鮮征伐?). Taking advantage of arquebus mastery and extensive wartime experience from the Sengoku period, Japanese samurai armies made major gains in most of Korea. Kato Kiyomasa advanced to Orangkai territory (present-day Manchuria) bordering Korea to the northeast and crossed the border into Manchuria, but withdrew after retaliatory attacks from the Jurchens there, as it was clear he had outpaced the rest of the Japanese invasion force. A few of the more famous samurai generals of this war were Katō Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, and Shimazu Yoshihiro. Shimazu Yoshihiro led some 7,000 samurai and, despite being heavily outnumbered, defeated a host of allied Ming and Korean forces at the Battle of Sacheon in <hl> 1598 <hl>, near the conclusion of the campaigns. Yoshihiro was feared as Oni-Shimazu ("Shimazu ogre") and his nickname spread across not only Korea but to Ming Dynasty China. In spite of the superiority of Japanese land forces, ultimately the two expeditions failed (though they did devastate the Korean landmass) from factors such as Korean naval superiority (which, led by Admiral Yi Sun-shin, harassed Japanese supply lines continuously throughout the wars, resulting in supply shortages on land), the commitment of sizeable Ming forces to Korea, Korean guerrilla actions, the underestimation of resistance by Japanese commanders (in the first campaign of 1592, Korean defenses on land were caught unprepared, under-trained, and under-armed; they were rapidly overrun, with only a limited number of successfully resistant engagements against the more-experienced and battle-hardened Japanese forces - in the second campaign of 1597, Korean and Ming forces proved to be a far more difficult challenge and, with the support of continued Korean naval superiority, limited Japanese gains to parts southeastern Korea), and wavering Japanese commitment to the campaigns as the wars dragged on. The final death blow to the Japanese campaigns in Korea came with Hideyoshi's death in late 1598 and the recall of all Japanese forces in Korea by the Council of Five Elders (established by Hideyoshi to oversee the transition from his regency to that of his son Hideyori).

Shimazu Yoshihiro led some 7,000 samurai and, despite being heavily outnumbered, defeated a host of allied Ming and Korean forces at the Battle of Sacheon in <hl> 1598 <hl> , near the conclusion of the campaigns.

question: When did Toyotomi Hideyoshi die?, context: In 1592, and again in 1597, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, aiming to invade China (唐入り) through Korea, mobilized an army of 160,000 peasants and samurai and deployed them to Korea. (See Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, Chōsen-seibatsu (朝鮮征伐?). Taking advantage of arquebus mastery and extensive wartime experience from the Sengoku period, Japanese samurai armies made major gains in most of Korea. Kato Kiyomasa advanced to Orangkai territory (present-day Manchuria) bordering Korea to the northeast and crossed the border into Manchuria, but withdrew after retaliatory attacks from the Jurchens there, as it was clear he had outpaced the rest of the Japanese invasion force. A few of the more famous samurai generals of this war were Katō Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, and Shimazu Yoshihiro. Shimazu Yoshihiro led some 7,000 samurai and, despite being heavily outnumbered, defeated a host of allied Ming and Korean forces at the Battle of Sacheon in 1598, near the conclusion of the campaigns. Yoshihiro was feared as Oni-Shimazu ("Shimazu ogre") and his nickname spread across not only Korea but to Ming Dynasty China. In spite of the superiority of Japanese land forces, ultimately the two expeditions failed (though they did devastate the Korean landmass) from factors such as Korean naval superiority (which, led by Admiral Yi Sun-shin, harassed Japanese supply lines continuously throughout the wars, resulting in supply shortages on land), the commitment of sizeable Ming forces to Korea, Korean guerrilla actions, the underestimation of resistance by Japanese commanders (in the first campaign of 1592, Korean defenses on land were caught unprepared, under-trained, and under-armed; they were rapidly overrun, with only a limited number of successfully resistant engagements against the more-experienced and battle-hardened Japanese forces - in the second campaign of 1597, Korean and Ming forces proved to be a far more difficult challenge and, with the support of continued Korean naval superiority, limited Japanese gains to parts southeastern Korea), and wavering Japanese commitment to the campaigns as the wars dragged on. The final death blow to the Japanese campaigns in Korea came with Hideyoshi's death in late 1598 and the recall of all Japanese forces in Korea by the Council of Five Elders (established by Hideyoshi to oversee the transition from his regency to that of his son Hideyori).


Question: Which military leader avoided sending his soldiers to Korea?

Answer: Tokugawa Ieyasu

<hl> It should be noted that many samurai forces that were active throughout this period were not deployed to Korea; most importantly, the daimyo Tokugawa Ieyasu carefully kept forces under his command out of the Korean campaigns, and other samurai commanders who were opposed to Hideyoshi's domination of Japan either mulled Hideyoshi's call to invade Korea or contributed a small token force. <hl> Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called Eastern Army, while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was Katō Kiyomasa, who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the Battle of Sekigahara, which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Eastern Forces, paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

It should be noted that many samurai forces that were active throughout this period were not deployed to Korea; most importantly, the daimyo <hl> Tokugawa Ieyasu <hl> carefully kept forces under his command out of the Korean campaigns, and other samurai commanders who were opposed to Hideyoshi's domination of Japan either mulled Hideyoshi's call to invade Korea or contributed a small token force. Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called Eastern Army, while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was Katō Kiyomasa, who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the Battle of Sekigahara, which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Eastern Forces, paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

question: Which military leader avoided sending his soldiers to Korea?, context: It should be noted that many samurai forces that were active throughout this period were not deployed to Korea; most importantly, the daimyo Tokugawa Ieyasu carefully kept forces under his command out of the Korean campaigns, and other samurai commanders who were opposed to Hideyoshi's domination of Japan either mulled Hideyoshi's call to invade Korea or contributed a small token force. Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called Eastern Army, while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was Katō Kiyomasa, who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the Battle of Sekigahara, which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Eastern Forces, paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate.


Question: What force were most commanders opposed to the Korea invasion part of?

Answer: Eastern Army

It should be noted that many samurai forces that were active throughout this period were not deployed to Korea; most importantly, the daimyo Tokugawa Ieyasu carefully kept forces under his command out of the Korean campaigns, and other samurai commanders who were opposed to Hideyoshi's domination of Japan either mulled Hideyoshi's call to invade Korea or contributed a small token force. <hl> Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called Eastern Army , while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was Katō Kiyomasa, who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the Battle of Sekigahara, which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Eastern Forces, paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate. <hl>

It should be noted that many samurai forces that were active throughout this period were not deployed to Korea; most importantly, the daimyo Tokugawa Ieyasu carefully kept forces under his command out of the Korean campaigns, and other samurai commanders who were opposed to Hideyoshi's domination of Japan either mulled Hideyoshi's call to invade Korea or contributed a small token force. Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called <hl> Eastern Army <hl>, while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was Katō Kiyomasa, who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the Battle of Sekigahara, which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Eastern Forces, paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called <hl> Eastern Army <hl> , while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was Katō Kiyomasa, who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the Battle of Sekigahara, which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Eastern Forces, paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

question: What force were most commanders opposed to the Korea invasion part of?, context: It should be noted that many samurai forces that were active throughout this period were not deployed to Korea; most importantly, the daimyo Tokugawa Ieyasu carefully kept forces under his command out of the Korean campaigns, and other samurai commanders who were opposed to Hideyoshi's domination of Japan either mulled Hideyoshi's call to invade Korea or contributed a small token force. Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called Eastern Army, while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was Katō Kiyomasa, who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the Battle of Sekigahara, which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Eastern Forces, paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate.


Question: Which commander loyal to Hideyoshi was in the Eastern Army?

Answer: Katō Kiyomasa

It should be noted that many samurai forces that were active throughout this period were not deployed to Korea; most importantly, the daimyo Tokugawa Ieyasu carefully kept forces under his command out of the Korean campaigns, and other samurai commanders who were opposed to Hideyoshi's domination of Japan either mulled Hideyoshi's call to invade Korea or contributed a small token force. <hl> Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called Eastern Army, while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was Katō Kiyomasa , who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the Battle of Sekigahara, which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Eastern Forces, paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate. <hl>

It should be noted that many samurai forces that were active throughout this period were not deployed to Korea; most importantly, the daimyo Tokugawa Ieyasu carefully kept forces under his command out of the Korean campaigns, and other samurai commanders who were opposed to Hideyoshi's domination of Japan either mulled Hideyoshi's call to invade Korea or contributed a small token force. Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called Eastern Army, while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was <hl> Katō Kiyomasa <hl>, who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the Battle of Sekigahara, which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Eastern Forces, paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called Eastern Army, while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was <hl> Katō Kiyomasa <hl> , who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the Battle of Sekigahara, which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Eastern Forces, paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

question: Which commander loyal to Hideyoshi was in the Eastern Army?, context: It should be noted that many samurai forces that were active throughout this period were not deployed to Korea; most importantly, the daimyo Tokugawa Ieyasu carefully kept forces under his command out of the Korean campaigns, and other samurai commanders who were opposed to Hideyoshi's domination of Japan either mulled Hideyoshi's call to invade Korea or contributed a small token force. Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called Eastern Army, while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was Katō Kiyomasa, who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the Battle of Sekigahara, which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Eastern Forces, paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate.


Question: Where did the Eastern and Western armies battle?

Answer: Battle of Sekigahara

It should be noted that many samurai forces that were active throughout this period were not deployed to Korea; most importantly, the daimyo Tokugawa Ieyasu carefully kept forces under his command out of the Korean campaigns, and other samurai commanders who were opposed to Hideyoshi's domination of Japan either mulled Hideyoshi's call to invade Korea or contributed a small token force. <hl> Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called Eastern Army, while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was Katō Kiyomasa, who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the Battle of Sekigahara , which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Eastern Forces, paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate. <hl>

It should be noted that many samurai forces that were active throughout this period were not deployed to Korea; most importantly, the daimyo Tokugawa Ieyasu carefully kept forces under his command out of the Korean campaigns, and other samurai commanders who were opposed to Hideyoshi's domination of Japan either mulled Hideyoshi's call to invade Korea or contributed a small token force. Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called Eastern Army, while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was Katō Kiyomasa, who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the <hl> Battle of Sekigahara <hl>, which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Eastern Forces, paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called Eastern Army, while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was Katō Kiyomasa, who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the <hl> Battle of Sekigahara <hl> , which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Eastern Forces, paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

question: Where did the Eastern and Western armies battle?, context: It should be noted that many samurai forces that were active throughout this period were not deployed to Korea; most importantly, the daimyo Tokugawa Ieyasu carefully kept forces under his command out of the Korean campaigns, and other samurai commanders who were opposed to Hideyoshi's domination of Japan either mulled Hideyoshi's call to invade Korea or contributed a small token force. Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called Eastern Army, while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was Katō Kiyomasa, who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the Battle of Sekigahara, which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Eastern Forces, paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate.


Question: Which army won the Battle of Sekigahara?

Answer: Eastern Forces

It should be noted that many samurai forces that were active throughout this period were not deployed to Korea; most importantly, the daimyo Tokugawa Ieyasu carefully kept forces under his command out of the Korean campaigns, and other samurai commanders who were opposed to Hideyoshi's domination of Japan either mulled Hideyoshi's call to invade Korea or contributed a small token force. <hl> Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called Eastern Army, while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was Katō Kiyomasa, who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the Battle of Sekigahara, which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Eastern Forces , paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate. <hl>

It should be noted that many samurai forces that were active throughout this period were not deployed to Korea; most importantly, the daimyo Tokugawa Ieyasu carefully kept forces under his command out of the Korean campaigns, and other samurai commanders who were opposed to Hideyoshi's domination of Japan either mulled Hideyoshi's call to invade Korea or contributed a small token force. Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called Eastern Army, while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was Katō Kiyomasa, who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the Battle of Sekigahara, which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the <hl> Eastern Forces <hl>, paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called Eastern Army, while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was Katō Kiyomasa, who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the Battle of Sekigahara, which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the <hl> Eastern Forces <hl> , paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

question: Which army won the Battle of Sekigahara?, context: It should be noted that many samurai forces that were active throughout this period were not deployed to Korea; most importantly, the daimyo Tokugawa Ieyasu carefully kept forces under his command out of the Korean campaigns, and other samurai commanders who were opposed to Hideyoshi's domination of Japan either mulled Hideyoshi's call to invade Korea or contributed a small token force. Most commanders who did opposed or otherwise resisted/resented Hideyoshi ended up as part of the so-called Eastern Army, while commanders loyal to Hideyoshi and his son (a notable exception to this trend was Katō Kiyomasa, who deployed with Tokugawa and the Eastern Army) were largely committed to the Western Army; the two opposing sides (so named for the relative geographical locations of their respective commanders' domains) would later clash, most notably at the Battle of Sekigahara, which was won by Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Eastern Forces, paving the way for the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate.


Question: Who used arquebuses a lot?

Answer: Oda Nobunaga

<hl> Oda Nobunaga made innovations in the fields of organization and war tactics, heavily used arquebuses, developed commerce and industry and treasured innovation. <hl> Consecutive victories enabled him to realize the termination of the Ashikaga Bakufu and the disarmament of the military powers of the Buddhist monks, which had inflamed futile struggles among the populace for centuries. Attacking from the "sanctuary" of Buddhist temples, they were constant headaches to any warlord and even the Emperor who tried to control their actions. He died in 1582 when one of his generals, Akechi Mitsuhide, turned upon him with his army.

<hl> Oda Nobunaga <hl> made innovations in the fields of organization and war tactics, heavily used arquebuses, developed commerce and industry and treasured innovation. Consecutive victories enabled him to realize the termination of the Ashikaga Bakufu and the disarmament of the military powers of the Buddhist monks, which had inflamed futile struggles among the populace for centuries. Attacking from the "sanctuary" of Buddhist temples, they were constant headaches to any warlord and even the Emperor who tried to control their actions. He died in 1582 when one of his generals, Akechi Mitsuhide, turned upon him with his army.

question: Who used arquebuses a lot?, context: Oda Nobunaga made innovations in the fields of organization and war tactics, heavily used arquebuses, developed commerce and industry and treasured innovation. Consecutive victories enabled him to realize the termination of the Ashikaga Bakufu and the disarmament of the military powers of the Buddhist monks, which had inflamed futile struggles among the populace for centuries. Attacking from the "sanctuary" of Buddhist temples, they were constant headaches to any warlord and even the Emperor who tried to control their actions. He died in 1582 when one of his generals, Akechi Mitsuhide, turned upon him with his army.


Question: What did Oda Nobunaga value?

Answer: innovation

<hl> Oda Nobunaga made innovation s in the fields of organization and war tactics, heavily used arquebuses, developed commerce and industry and treasured innovation. <hl> Consecutive victories enabled him to realize the termination of the Ashikaga Bakufu and the disarmament of the military powers of the Buddhist monks, which had inflamed futile struggles among the populace for centuries. Attacking from the "sanctuary" of Buddhist temples, they were constant headaches to any warlord and even the Emperor who tried to control their actions. He died in 1582 when one of his generals, Akechi Mitsuhide, turned upon him with his army.

Oda Nobunaga made <hl> innovation <hl>s in the fields of organization and war tactics, heavily used arquebuses, developed commerce and industry and treasured innovation. Consecutive victories enabled him to realize the termination of the Ashikaga Bakufu and the disarmament of the military powers of the Buddhist monks, which had inflamed futile struggles among the populace for centuries. Attacking from the "sanctuary" of Buddhist temples, they were constant headaches to any warlord and even the Emperor who tried to control their actions. He died in 1582 when one of his generals, Akechi Mitsuhide, turned upon him with his army.

Oda Nobunaga made <hl> innovation <hl> s in the fields of organization and war tactics, heavily used arquebuses, developed commerce and industry and treasured innovation.

question: What did Oda Nobunaga value?, context: Oda Nobunaga made innovations in the fields of organization and war tactics, heavily used arquebuses, developed commerce and industry and treasured innovation. Consecutive victories enabled him to realize the termination of the Ashikaga Bakufu and the disarmament of the military powers of the Buddhist monks, which had inflamed futile struggles among the populace for centuries. Attacking from the "sanctuary" of Buddhist temples, they were constant headaches to any warlord and even the Emperor who tried to control their actions. He died in 1582 when one of his generals, Akechi Mitsuhide, turned upon him with his army.


Question: Who disarmed Japan's Buddhist monks?

Answer: Oda Nobunaga

<hl> Oda Nobunaga made innovations in the fields of organization and war tactics, heavily used arquebuses, developed commerce and industry and treasured innovation. <hl> Consecutive victories enabled him to realize the termination of the Ashikaga Bakufu and the disarmament of the military powers of the Buddhist monks, which had inflamed futile struggles among the populace for centuries. Attacking from the "sanctuary" of Buddhist temples, they were constant headaches to any warlord and even the Emperor who tried to control their actions. He died in 1582 when one of his generals, Akechi Mitsuhide, turned upon him with his army.

<hl> Oda Nobunaga <hl> made innovations in the fields of organization and war tactics, heavily used arquebuses, developed commerce and industry and treasured innovation. Consecutive victories enabled him to realize the termination of the Ashikaga Bakufu and the disarmament of the military powers of the Buddhist monks, which had inflamed futile struggles among the populace for centuries. Attacking from the "sanctuary" of Buddhist temples, they were constant headaches to any warlord and even the Emperor who tried to control their actions. He died in 1582 when one of his generals, Akechi Mitsuhide, turned upon him with his army.

question: Who disarmed Japan's Buddhist monks?, context: Oda Nobunaga made innovations in the fields of organization and war tactics, heavily used arquebuses, developed commerce and industry and treasured innovation. Consecutive victories enabled him to realize the termination of the Ashikaga Bakufu and the disarmament of the military powers of the Buddhist monks, which had inflamed futile struggles among the populace for centuries. Attacking from the "sanctuary" of Buddhist temples, they were constant headaches to any warlord and even the Emperor who tried to control their actions. He died in 1582 when one of his generals, Akechi Mitsuhide, turned upon him with his army.


Question: When did Oda Nobunaga die?

Answer: 1582

Oda Nobunaga made innovations in the fields of organization and war tactics, heavily used arquebuses, developed commerce and industry and treasured innovation. Consecutive victories enabled him to realize the termination of the Ashikaga Bakufu and the disarmament of the military powers of the Buddhist monks, which had inflamed futile struggles among the populace for centuries. Attacking from the "sanctuary" of Buddhist temples, they were constant headaches to any warlord and even the Emperor who tried to control their actions. <hl> He died in 1582 when one of his generals, Akechi Mitsuhide, turned upon him with his army. <hl>

Oda Nobunaga made innovations in the fields of organization and war tactics, heavily used arquebuses, developed commerce and industry and treasured innovation. Consecutive victories enabled him to realize the termination of the Ashikaga Bakufu and the disarmament of the military powers of the Buddhist monks, which had inflamed futile struggles among the populace for centuries. Attacking from the "sanctuary" of Buddhist temples, they were constant headaches to any warlord and even the Emperor who tried to control their actions. He died in <hl> 1582 <hl> when one of his generals, Akechi Mitsuhide, turned upon him with his army.

question: When did Oda Nobunaga die?, context: Oda Nobunaga made innovations in the fields of organization and war tactics, heavily used arquebuses, developed commerce and industry and treasured innovation. Consecutive victories enabled him to realize the termination of the Ashikaga Bakufu and the disarmament of the military powers of the Buddhist monks, which had inflamed futile struggles among the populace for centuries. Attacking from the "sanctuary" of Buddhist temples, they were constant headaches to any warlord and even the Emperor who tried to control their actions. He died in 1582 when one of his generals, Akechi Mitsuhide, turned upon him with his army.


Question: Who caused Oda Nobunaga's death?

Answer: Akechi Mitsuhide

Oda Nobunaga made innovations in the fields of organization and war tactics, heavily used arquebuses, developed commerce and industry and treasured innovation. Consecutive victories enabled him to realize the termination of the Ashikaga Bakufu and the disarmament of the military powers of the Buddhist monks, which had inflamed futile struggles among the populace for centuries. Attacking from the "sanctuary" of Buddhist temples, they were constant headaches to any warlord and even the Emperor who tried to control their actions. <hl> He died in 1582 when one of his generals, Akechi Mitsuhide , turned upon him with his army. <hl>

Oda Nobunaga made innovations in the fields of organization and war tactics, heavily used arquebuses, developed commerce and industry and treasured innovation. Consecutive victories enabled him to realize the termination of the Ashikaga Bakufu and the disarmament of the military powers of the Buddhist monks, which had inflamed futile struggles among the populace for centuries. Attacking from the "sanctuary" of Buddhist temples, they were constant headaches to any warlord and even the Emperor who tried to control their actions. He died in 1582 when one of his generals, <hl> Akechi Mitsuhide <hl>, turned upon him with his army.

He died in 1582 when one of his generals, <hl> Akechi Mitsuhide <hl> , turned upon him with his army.

question: Who caused Oda Nobunaga's death?, context: Oda Nobunaga made innovations in the fields of organization and war tactics, heavily used arquebuses, developed commerce and industry and treasured innovation. Consecutive victories enabled him to realize the termination of the Ashikaga Bakufu and the disarmament of the military powers of the Buddhist monks, which had inflamed futile struggles among the populace for centuries. Attacking from the "sanctuary" of Buddhist temples, they were constant headaches to any warlord and even the Emperor who tried to control their actions. He died in 1582 when one of his generals, Akechi Mitsuhide, turned upon him with his army.


Question: When were samurai becoming less warrior-like?

Answer: During the Tokugawa shogunate

<hl> During the Tokugawa shogunate , samurai increasingly became courtiers, bureaucrats, and administrators rather than warriors. <hl> With no warfare since the early 17th century, samurai gradually lost their military function during the Tokugawa era (also called the Edo period). By the end of the Tokugawa era, samurai were aristocratic bureaucrats for the daimyo, with their daisho, the paired long and short swords of the samurai (cf. katana and wakizashi) becoming more of a symbolic emblem of power rather than a weapon used in daily life. They still had the legal right to cut down any commoner who did not show proper respect kiri-sute gomen (斬り捨て御免?), but to what extent this right was used is unknown. When the central government forced daimyos to cut the size of their armies, unemployed rōnin became a social problem.

<hl> During the Tokugawa shogunate <hl>, samurai increasingly became courtiers, bureaucrats, and administrators rather than warriors. With no warfare since the early 17th century, samurai gradually lost their military function during the Tokugawa era (also called the Edo period). By the end of the Tokugawa era, samurai were aristocratic bureaucrats for the daimyo, with their daisho, the paired long and short swords of the samurai (cf. katana and wakizashi) becoming more of a symbolic emblem of power rather than a weapon used in daily life. They still had the legal right to cut down any commoner who did not show proper respect kiri-sute gomen (斬り捨て御免?), but to what extent this right was used is unknown. When the central government forced daimyos to cut the size of their armies, unemployed rōnin became a social problem.

<hl> During the Tokugawa shogunate <hl> , samurai increasingly became courtiers, bureaucrats, and administrators rather than warriors.

question: When were samurai becoming less warrior-like?, context: During the Tokugawa shogunate, samurai increasingly became courtiers, bureaucrats, and administrators rather than warriors. With no warfare since the early 17th century, samurai gradually lost their military function during the Tokugawa era (also called the Edo period). By the end of the Tokugawa era, samurai were aristocratic bureaucrats for the daimyo, with their daisho, the paired long and short swords of the samurai (cf. katana and wakizashi) becoming more of a symbolic emblem of power rather than a weapon used in daily life. They still had the legal right to cut down any commoner who did not show proper respect kiri-sute gomen (斬り捨て御免?), but to what extent this right was used is unknown. When the central government forced daimyos to cut the size of their armies, unemployed rōnin became a social problem.


Question: When had samurai last been used in battle?

Answer: the early 17th century

During the Tokugawa shogunate, samurai increasingly became courtiers, bureaucrats, and administrators rather than warriors. <hl> With no warfare since the early 17th century , samurai gradually lost their military function during the Tokugawa era (also called the Edo period). <hl> By the end of the Tokugawa era, samurai were aristocratic bureaucrats for the daimyo, with their daisho, the paired long and short swords of the samurai (cf. katana and wakizashi) becoming more of a symbolic emblem of power rather than a weapon used in daily life. They still had the legal right to cut down any commoner who did not show proper respect kiri-sute gomen (斬り捨て御免?), but to what extent this right was used is unknown. When the central government forced daimyos to cut the size of their armies, unemployed rōnin became a social problem.

During the Tokugawa shogunate, samurai increasingly became courtiers, bureaucrats, and administrators rather than warriors. With no warfare since <hl> the early 17th century <hl>, samurai gradually lost their military function during the Tokugawa era (also called the Edo period). By the end of the Tokugawa era, samurai were aristocratic bureaucrats for the daimyo, with their daisho, the paired long and short swords of the samurai (cf. katana and wakizashi) becoming more of a symbolic emblem of power rather than a weapon used in daily life. They still had the legal right to cut down any commoner who did not show proper respect kiri-sute gomen (斬り捨て御免?), but to what extent this right was used is unknown. When the central government forced daimyos to cut the size of their armies, unemployed rōnin became a social problem.

With no warfare since <hl> the early 17th century <hl> , samurai gradually lost their military function during the Tokugawa era (also called the Edo period).

question: When had samurai last been used in battle?, context: During the Tokugawa shogunate, samurai increasingly became courtiers, bureaucrats, and administrators rather than warriors. With no warfare since the early 17th century, samurai gradually lost their military function during the Tokugawa era (also called the Edo period). By the end of the Tokugawa era, samurai were aristocratic bureaucrats for the daimyo, with their daisho, the paired long and short swords of the samurai (cf. katana and wakizashi) becoming more of a symbolic emblem of power rather than a weapon used in daily life. They still had the legal right to cut down any commoner who did not show proper respect kiri-sute gomen (斬り捨て御免?), but to what extent this right was used is unknown. When the central government forced daimyos to cut the size of their armies, unemployed rōnin became a social problem.


Question: What was another name for the Tokugawa era?

Answer: the Edo period

During the Tokugawa shogunate, samurai increasingly became courtiers, bureaucrats, and administrators rather than warriors. <hl> With no warfare since the early 17th century, samurai gradually lost their military function during the Tokugawa era (also called the Edo period ). <hl> By the end of the Tokugawa era, samurai were aristocratic bureaucrats for the daimyo, with their daisho, the paired long and short swords of the samurai (cf. katana and wakizashi) becoming more of a symbolic emblem of power rather than a weapon used in daily life. They still had the legal right to cut down any commoner who did not show proper respect kiri-sute gomen (斬り捨て御免?), but to what extent this right was used is unknown. When the central government forced daimyos to cut the size of their armies, unemployed rōnin became a social problem.

During the Tokugawa shogunate, samurai increasingly became courtiers, bureaucrats, and administrators rather than warriors. With no warfare since the early 17th century, samurai gradually lost their military function during the Tokugawa era (also called <hl> the Edo period <hl>). By the end of the Tokugawa era, samurai were aristocratic bureaucrats for the daimyo, with their daisho, the paired long and short swords of the samurai (cf. katana and wakizashi) becoming more of a symbolic emblem of power rather than a weapon used in daily life. They still had the legal right to cut down any commoner who did not show proper respect kiri-sute gomen (斬り捨て御免?), but to what extent this right was used is unknown. When the central government forced daimyos to cut the size of their armies, unemployed rōnin became a social problem.

With no warfare since the early 17th century, samurai gradually lost their military function during the Tokugawa era (also called <hl> the Edo period <hl> ).

question: What was another name for the Tokugawa era?, context: During the Tokugawa shogunate, samurai increasingly became courtiers, bureaucrats, and administrators rather than warriors. With no warfare since the early 17th century, samurai gradually lost their military function during the Tokugawa era (also called the Edo period). By the end of the Tokugawa era, samurai were aristocratic bureaucrats for the daimyo, with their daisho, the paired long and short swords of the samurai (cf. katana and wakizashi) becoming more of a symbolic emblem of power rather than a weapon used in daily life. They still had the legal right to cut down any commoner who did not show proper respect kiri-sute gomen (斬り捨て御免?), but to what extent this right was used is unknown. When the central government forced daimyos to cut the size of their armies, unemployed rōnin became a social problem.


Question: What was the samurai's long sword called?

Answer: katana

During the Tokugawa shogunate, samurai increasingly became courtiers, bureaucrats, and administrators rather than warriors. With no warfare since the early 17th century, samurai gradually lost their military function during the Tokugawa era (also called the Edo period). By the end of the Tokugawa era, samurai were aristocratic bureaucrats for the daimyo, with their daisho, the paired long and short swords of the samurai (cf. <hl> katana and wakizashi) becoming more of a symbolic emblem of power rather than a weapon used in daily life. <hl> They still had the legal right to cut down any commoner who did not show proper respect kiri-sute gomen (斬り捨て御免?), but to what extent this right was used is unknown. When the central government forced daimyos to cut the size of their armies, unemployed rōnin became a social problem.

During the Tokugawa shogunate, samurai increasingly became courtiers, bureaucrats, and administrators rather than warriors. With no warfare since the early 17th century, samurai gradually lost their military function during the Tokugawa era (also called the Edo period). By the end of the Tokugawa era, samurai were aristocratic bureaucrats for the daimyo, with their daisho, the paired long and short swords of the samurai (cf. <hl> katana <hl> and wakizashi) becoming more of a symbolic emblem of power rather than a weapon used in daily life. They still had the legal right to cut down any commoner who did not show proper respect kiri-sute gomen (斬り捨て御免?), but to what extent this right was used is unknown. When the central government forced daimyos to cut the size of their armies, unemployed rōnin became a social problem.

question: What was the samurai's long sword called?, context: During the Tokugawa shogunate, samurai increasingly became courtiers, bureaucrats, and administrators rather than warriors. With no warfare since the early 17th century, samurai gradually lost their military function during the Tokugawa era (also called the Edo period). By the end of the Tokugawa era, samurai were aristocratic bureaucrats for the daimyo, with their daisho, the paired long and short swords of the samurai (cf. katana and wakizashi) becoming more of a symbolic emblem of power rather than a weapon used in daily life. They still had the legal right to cut down any commoner who did not show proper respect kiri-sute gomen (斬り捨て御免?), but to what extent this right was used is unknown. When the central government forced daimyos to cut the size of their armies, unemployed rōnin became a social problem.


Question: What was the samurai's short sword called?

Answer: wakizashi

During the Tokugawa shogunate, samurai increasingly became courtiers, bureaucrats, and administrators rather than warriors. With no warfare since the early 17th century, samurai gradually lost their military function during the Tokugawa era (also called the Edo period). <hl> By the end of the Tokugawa era, samurai were aristocratic bureaucrats for the daimyo, with their daisho, the paired long and short swords of the samurai (cf. katana and wakizashi ) becoming more of a symbolic emblem of power rather than a weapon used in daily life. <hl> They still had the legal right to cut down any commoner who did not show proper respect kiri-sute gomen (斬り捨て御免?), but to what extent this right was used is unknown. When the central government forced daimyos to cut the size of their armies, unemployed rōnin became a social problem.

During the Tokugawa shogunate, samurai increasingly became courtiers, bureaucrats, and administrators rather than warriors. With no warfare since the early 17th century, samurai gradually lost their military function during the Tokugawa era (also called the Edo period). By the end of the Tokugawa era, samurai were aristocratic bureaucrats for the daimyo, with their daisho, the paired long and short swords of the samurai (cf. katana and <hl> wakizashi <hl>) becoming more of a symbolic emblem of power rather than a weapon used in daily life. They still had the legal right to cut down any commoner who did not show proper respect kiri-sute gomen (斬り捨て御免?), but to what extent this right was used is unknown. When the central government forced daimyos to cut the size of their armies, unemployed rōnin became a social problem.

By the end of the Tokugawa era, samurai were aristocratic bureaucrats for the daimyo, with their daisho, the paired long and short swords of the samurai (cf. katana and <hl> wakizashi <hl> ) becoming more of a symbolic emblem of power rather than a weapon used in daily life.

question: What was the samurai's short sword called?, context: During the Tokugawa shogunate, samurai increasingly became courtiers, bureaucrats, and administrators rather than warriors. With no warfare since the early 17th century, samurai gradually lost their military function during the Tokugawa era (also called the Edo period). By the end of the Tokugawa era, samurai were aristocratic bureaucrats for the daimyo, with their daisho, the paired long and short swords of the samurai (cf. katana and wakizashi) becoming more of a symbolic emblem of power rather than a weapon used in daily life. They still had the legal right to cut down any commoner who did not show proper respect kiri-sute gomen (斬り捨て御免?), but to what extent this right was used is unknown. When the central government forced daimyos to cut the size of their armies, unemployed rōnin became a social problem.


Question: Who were most samurais' lords?

Answer: daimyo

<hl> Theoretical obligations between a samurai and his lord (usually a daimyo ) increased from the Genpei era to the Edo era. <hl> They were strongly emphasized by the teachings of Confucius and Mencius (ca 550 BC), which were required reading for the educated samurai class. Bushido was formalized by several influential leaders and families before the Edo Period. Bushido was an ideal, and it remained fairly uniform from the 13th century to the 19th century — the ideals of Bushido transcended social class, time and geographic location of the warrior class.

Theoretical obligations between a samurai and his lord (usually a <hl> daimyo <hl>) increased from the Genpei era to the Edo era. They were strongly emphasized by the teachings of Confucius and Mencius (ca 550 BC), which were required reading for the educated samurai class. Bushido was formalized by several influential leaders and families before the Edo Period. Bushido was an ideal, and it remained fairly uniform from the 13th century to the 19th century — the ideals of Bushido transcended social class, time and geographic location of the warrior class.

Theoretical obligations between a samurai and his lord (usually a <hl> daimyo <hl> ) increased from the Genpei era to the Edo era.

question: Who were most samurais' lords?, context: Theoretical obligations between a samurai and his lord (usually a daimyo) increased from the Genpei era to the Edo era. They were strongly emphasized by the teachings of Confucius and Mencius (ca 550 BC), which were required reading for the educated samurai class. Bushido was formalized by several influential leaders and families before the Edo Period. Bushido was an ideal, and it remained fairly uniform from the 13th century to the 19th century — the ideals of Bushido transcended social class, time and geographic location of the warrior class.