Question: Why did Yongle order the construction?

Answer: to facilitate trade with Tibet

<hl> Tsai writes that shortly after the visit by Deshin Shekpa, the Yongle Emperor ordered the construction of a road and of trading posts in the upper reaches of the Yangzi and Mekong Rivers in order to facilitate trade with Tibet in tea, horses, and salt. <hl> The trade route passed through Sichuan and crossed Shangri-La County in Yunnan. Wang and Nyima assert that this "tribute-related trade" of the Ming exchanging Chinese tea for Tibetan horses—while granting Tibetan envoys and Tibetan merchants explicit permission to trade with Han Chinese merchants—"furthered the rule of the Ming dynasty court over Tibet". Rossabi and Sperling note that this trade in Tibetan horses for Chinese tea existed long before the Ming. Peter C. Perdue says that Wang Anshi (1021–1086), realizing that China could not produce enough militarily capable steeds, had also aimed to obtain horses from Inner Asia in exchange for Chinese tea. The Chinese needed horses not only for cavalry but also as draft animals for the army's supply wagons. The Tibetans required Chinese tea not only as a common beverage but also as a religious ceremonial supplement. The Ming government imposed a monopoly on tea production and attempted to regulate this trade with state-supervised markets, but these collapsed in 1449 due to military failures and internal ecological and commercial pressures on the tea-producing regions.

Tsai writes that shortly after the visit by Deshin Shekpa, the Yongle Emperor ordered the construction of a road and of trading posts in the upper reaches of the Yangzi and Mekong Rivers in order <hl> to facilitate trade with Tibet <hl> in tea, horses, and salt. The trade route passed through Sichuan and crossed Shangri-La County in Yunnan. Wang and Nyima assert that this "tribute-related trade" of the Ming exchanging Chinese tea for Tibetan horses—while granting Tibetan envoys and Tibetan merchants explicit permission to trade with Han Chinese merchants—"furthered the rule of the Ming dynasty court over Tibet". Rossabi and Sperling note that this trade in Tibetan horses for Chinese tea existed long before the Ming. Peter C. Perdue says that Wang Anshi (1021–1086), realizing that China could not produce enough militarily capable steeds, had also aimed to obtain horses from Inner Asia in exchange for Chinese tea. The Chinese needed horses not only for cavalry but also as draft animals for the army's supply wagons. The Tibetans required Chinese tea not only as a common beverage but also as a religious ceremonial supplement. The Ming government imposed a monopoly on tea production and attempted to regulate this trade with state-supervised markets, but these collapsed in 1449 due to military failures and internal ecological and commercial pressures on the tea-producing regions.

question: Why did Yongle order the construction?, context: Tsai writes that shortly after the visit by Deshin Shekpa, the Yongle Emperor ordered the construction of a road and of trading posts in the upper reaches of the Yangzi and Mekong Rivers in order to facilitate trade with Tibet in tea, horses, and salt. The trade route passed through Sichuan and crossed Shangri-La County in Yunnan. Wang and Nyima assert that this "tribute-related trade" of the Ming exchanging Chinese tea for Tibetan horses—while granting Tibetan envoys and Tibetan merchants explicit permission to trade with Han Chinese merchants—"furthered the rule of the Ming dynasty court over Tibet". Rossabi and Sperling note that this trade in Tibetan horses for Chinese tea existed long before the Ming. Peter C. Perdue says that Wang Anshi (1021–1086), realizing that China could not produce enough militarily capable steeds, had also aimed to obtain horses from Inner Asia in exchange for Chinese tea. The Chinese needed horses not only for cavalry but also as draft animals for the army's supply wagons. The Tibetans required Chinese tea not only as a common beverage but also as a religious ceremonial supplement. The Ming government imposed a monopoly on tea production and attempted to regulate this trade with state-supervised markets, but these collapsed in 1449 due to military failures and internal ecological and commercial pressures on the tea-producing regions.


Question: What did Yongle want to trade with Tibet?

Answer: tea, horses, and salt

<hl> Tsai writes that shortly after the visit by Deshin Shekpa, the Yongle Emperor ordered the construction of a road and of trading posts in the upper reaches of the Yangzi and Mekong Rivers in order to facilitate trade with Tibet in tea, horses, and salt . <hl> The trade route passed through Sichuan and crossed Shangri-La County in Yunnan. Wang and Nyima assert that this "tribute-related trade" of the Ming exchanging Chinese tea for Tibetan horses—while granting Tibetan envoys and Tibetan merchants explicit permission to trade with Han Chinese merchants—"furthered the rule of the Ming dynasty court over Tibet". Rossabi and Sperling note that this trade in Tibetan horses for Chinese tea existed long before the Ming. Peter C. Perdue says that Wang Anshi (1021–1086), realizing that China could not produce enough militarily capable steeds, had also aimed to obtain horses from Inner Asia in exchange for Chinese tea. The Chinese needed horses not only for cavalry but also as draft animals for the army's supply wagons. The Tibetans required Chinese tea not only as a common beverage but also as a religious ceremonial supplement. The Ming government imposed a monopoly on tea production and attempted to regulate this trade with state-supervised markets, but these collapsed in 1449 due to military failures and internal ecological and commercial pressures on the tea-producing regions.

Tsai writes that shortly after the visit by Deshin Shekpa, the Yongle Emperor ordered the construction of a road and of trading posts in the upper reaches of the Yangzi and Mekong Rivers in order to facilitate trade with Tibet in <hl> tea, horses, and salt <hl>. The trade route passed through Sichuan and crossed Shangri-La County in Yunnan. Wang and Nyima assert that this "tribute-related trade" of the Ming exchanging Chinese tea for Tibetan horses—while granting Tibetan envoys and Tibetan merchants explicit permission to trade with Han Chinese merchants—"furthered the rule of the Ming dynasty court over Tibet". Rossabi and Sperling note that this trade in Tibetan horses for Chinese tea existed long before the Ming. Peter C. Perdue says that Wang Anshi (1021–1086), realizing that China could not produce enough militarily capable steeds, had also aimed to obtain horses from Inner Asia in exchange for Chinese tea. The Chinese needed horses not only for cavalry but also as draft animals for the army's supply wagons. The Tibetans required Chinese tea not only as a common beverage but also as a religious ceremonial supplement. The Ming government imposed a monopoly on tea production and attempted to regulate this trade with state-supervised markets, but these collapsed in 1449 due to military failures and internal ecological and commercial pressures on the tea-producing regions.

Tsai writes that shortly after the visit by Deshin Shekpa, the Yongle Emperor ordered the construction of a road and of trading posts in the upper reaches of the Yangzi and Mekong Rivers in order to facilitate trade with Tibet in <hl> tea, horses, and salt <hl> .

question: What did Yongle want to trade with Tibet?, context: Tsai writes that shortly after the visit by Deshin Shekpa, the Yongle Emperor ordered the construction of a road and of trading posts in the upper reaches of the Yangzi and Mekong Rivers in order to facilitate trade with Tibet in tea, horses, and salt. The trade route passed through Sichuan and crossed Shangri-La County in Yunnan. Wang and Nyima assert that this "tribute-related trade" of the Ming exchanging Chinese tea for Tibetan horses—while granting Tibetan envoys and Tibetan merchants explicit permission to trade with Han Chinese merchants—"furthered the rule of the Ming dynasty court over Tibet". Rossabi and Sperling note that this trade in Tibetan horses for Chinese tea existed long before the Ming. Peter C. Perdue says that Wang Anshi (1021–1086), realizing that China could not produce enough militarily capable steeds, had also aimed to obtain horses from Inner Asia in exchange for Chinese tea. The Chinese needed horses not only for cavalry but also as draft animals for the army's supply wagons. The Tibetans required Chinese tea not only as a common beverage but also as a religious ceremonial supplement. The Ming government imposed a monopoly on tea production and attempted to regulate this trade with state-supervised markets, but these collapsed in 1449 due to military failures and internal ecological and commercial pressures on the tea-producing regions.


Question: where did the trade route pass through?

Answer: through Sichuan and crossed Shangri-La County in Yunnan

Tsai writes that shortly after the visit by Deshin Shekpa, the Yongle Emperor ordered the construction of a road and of trading posts in the upper reaches of the Yangzi and Mekong Rivers in order to facilitate trade with Tibet in tea, horses, and salt. <hl> The trade route passed through Sichuan and crossed Shangri-La County in Yunnan . <hl> Wang and Nyima assert that this "tribute-related trade" of the Ming exchanging Chinese tea for Tibetan horses—while granting Tibetan envoys and Tibetan merchants explicit permission to trade with Han Chinese merchants—"furthered the rule of the Ming dynasty court over Tibet". Rossabi and Sperling note that this trade in Tibetan horses for Chinese tea existed long before the Ming. Peter C. Perdue says that Wang Anshi (1021–1086), realizing that China could not produce enough militarily capable steeds, had also aimed to obtain horses from Inner Asia in exchange for Chinese tea. The Chinese needed horses not only for cavalry but also as draft animals for the army's supply wagons. The Tibetans required Chinese tea not only as a common beverage but also as a religious ceremonial supplement. The Ming government imposed a monopoly on tea production and attempted to regulate this trade with state-supervised markets, but these collapsed in 1449 due to military failures and internal ecological and commercial pressures on the tea-producing regions.

Tsai writes that shortly after the visit by Deshin Shekpa, the Yongle Emperor ordered the construction of a road and of trading posts in the upper reaches of the Yangzi and Mekong Rivers in order to facilitate trade with Tibet in tea, horses, and salt. The trade route passed <hl> through Sichuan and crossed Shangri-La County in Yunnan <hl>. Wang and Nyima assert that this "tribute-related trade" of the Ming exchanging Chinese tea for Tibetan horses—while granting Tibetan envoys and Tibetan merchants explicit permission to trade with Han Chinese merchants—"furthered the rule of the Ming dynasty court over Tibet". Rossabi and Sperling note that this trade in Tibetan horses for Chinese tea existed long before the Ming. Peter C. Perdue says that Wang Anshi (1021–1086), realizing that China could not produce enough militarily capable steeds, had also aimed to obtain horses from Inner Asia in exchange for Chinese tea. The Chinese needed horses not only for cavalry but also as draft animals for the army's supply wagons. The Tibetans required Chinese tea not only as a common beverage but also as a religious ceremonial supplement. The Ming government imposed a monopoly on tea production and attempted to regulate this trade with state-supervised markets, but these collapsed in 1449 due to military failures and internal ecological and commercial pressures on the tea-producing regions.

The trade route passed <hl> through Sichuan and crossed Shangri-La County in Yunnan <hl> .

question: where did the trade route pass through?, context: Tsai writes that shortly after the visit by Deshin Shekpa, the Yongle Emperor ordered the construction of a road and of trading posts in the upper reaches of the Yangzi and Mekong Rivers in order to facilitate trade with Tibet in tea, horses, and salt. The trade route passed through Sichuan and crossed Shangri-La County in Yunnan. Wang and Nyima assert that this "tribute-related trade" of the Ming exchanging Chinese tea for Tibetan horses—while granting Tibetan envoys and Tibetan merchants explicit permission to trade with Han Chinese merchants—"furthered the rule of the Ming dynasty court over Tibet". Rossabi and Sperling note that this trade in Tibetan horses for Chinese tea existed long before the Ming. Peter C. Perdue says that Wang Anshi (1021–1086), realizing that China could not produce enough militarily capable steeds, had also aimed to obtain horses from Inner Asia in exchange for Chinese tea. The Chinese needed horses not only for cavalry but also as draft animals for the army's supply wagons. The Tibetans required Chinese tea not only as a common beverage but also as a religious ceremonial supplement. The Ming government imposed a monopoly on tea production and attempted to regulate this trade with state-supervised markets, but these collapsed in 1449 due to military failures and internal ecological and commercial pressures on the tea-producing regions.


Question: Why does Van Praag believe the Ming court set up a diplomatic delegation with Tibet?

Answer: to secure urgently needed horses

<hl> Van Praag states that the Ming court established diplomatic delegations with Tibet merely to secure urgently needed horses . <hl> Wang and Nyima argue that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as a mandatory "corvée" tax, and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy". Sperling writes that the Ming simultaneously bought horses in the Kham region while fighting Tibetan tribes in Amdo and receiving Tibetan embassies in Nanjing. He also argues that the embassies of Tibetan lamas visiting the Ming court were for the most part efforts to promote commercial transactions between the lamas' large, wealthy entourage and Ming Chinese merchants and officials. Kolmaš writes that while the Ming maintained a laissez-faire policy towards Tibet and limited the numbers of the Tibetan retinues, the Tibetans sought to maintain a tributary relationship with the Ming because imperial patronage provided them with wealth and power. Laird writes that Tibetans eagerly sought Ming court invitations since the gifts the Tibetans received for bringing tribute were much greater in value than the latter. As for the Yongle Emperor's gifts to his Tibetan and Nepalese vassals such as silver wares, Buddha relics, utensils for Buddhist temples and religious ceremonies, and gowns and robes for monks, Tsai writes "in his effort to draw neighboring states to the Ming orbit so that he could bask in glory, the Yongle Emperor was quite willing to pay a small price". The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC lists the Tibetan tribute items as oxen, horses, camels, sheep, fur products, medical herbs, Tibetan incenses, thangkas (painted scrolls), and handicrafts; while the Ming awarded Tibetan tribute-bearers an equal value of gold, silver, satin and brocade, bolts of cloth, grains, and tea leaves. Silk workshops during the Ming also catered specifically to the Tibetan market with silk clothes and furnishings featuring Tibetan Buddhist iconography.

Van Praag states that the Ming court established diplomatic delegations with Tibet merely <hl> to secure urgently needed horses <hl>. Wang and Nyima argue that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as a mandatory "corvée" tax, and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy". Sperling writes that the Ming simultaneously bought horses in the Kham region while fighting Tibetan tribes in Amdo and receiving Tibetan embassies in Nanjing. He also argues that the embassies of Tibetan lamas visiting the Ming court were for the most part efforts to promote commercial transactions between the lamas' large, wealthy entourage and Ming Chinese merchants and officials. Kolmaš writes that while the Ming maintained a laissez-faire policy towards Tibet and limited the numbers of the Tibetan retinues, the Tibetans sought to maintain a tributary relationship with the Ming because imperial patronage provided them with wealth and power. Laird writes that Tibetans eagerly sought Ming court invitations since the gifts the Tibetans received for bringing tribute were much greater in value than the latter. As for the Yongle Emperor's gifts to his Tibetan and Nepalese vassals such as silver wares, Buddha relics, utensils for Buddhist temples and religious ceremonies, and gowns and robes for monks, Tsai writes "in his effort to draw neighboring states to the Ming orbit so that he could bask in glory, the Yongle Emperor was quite willing to pay a small price". The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC lists the Tibetan tribute items as oxen, horses, camels, sheep, fur products, medical herbs, Tibetan incenses, thangkas (painted scrolls), and handicrafts; while the Ming awarded Tibetan tribute-bearers an equal value of gold, silver, satin and brocade, bolts of cloth, grains, and tea leaves. Silk workshops during the Ming also catered specifically to the Tibetan market with silk clothes and furnishings featuring Tibetan Buddhist iconography.

Van Praag states that the Ming court established diplomatic delegations with Tibet merely <hl> to secure urgently needed horses <hl> .

question: Why does Van Praag believe the Ming court set up a diplomatic delegation with Tibet?, context: Van Praag states that the Ming court established diplomatic delegations with Tibet merely to secure urgently needed horses. Wang and Nyima argue that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as a mandatory "corvée" tax, and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy". Sperling writes that the Ming simultaneously bought horses in the Kham region while fighting Tibetan tribes in Amdo and receiving Tibetan embassies in Nanjing. He also argues that the embassies of Tibetan lamas visiting the Ming court were for the most part efforts to promote commercial transactions between the lamas' large, wealthy entourage and Ming Chinese merchants and officials. Kolmaš writes that while the Ming maintained a laissez-faire policy towards Tibet and limited the numbers of the Tibetan retinues, the Tibetans sought to maintain a tributary relationship with the Ming because imperial patronage provided them with wealth and power. Laird writes that Tibetans eagerly sought Ming court invitations since the gifts the Tibetans received for bringing tribute were much greater in value than the latter. As for the Yongle Emperor's gifts to his Tibetan and Nepalese vassals such as silver wares, Buddha relics, utensils for Buddhist temples and religious ceremonies, and gowns and robes for monks, Tsai writes "in his effort to draw neighboring states to the Ming orbit so that he could bask in glory, the Yongle Emperor was quite willing to pay a small price". The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC lists the Tibetan tribute items as oxen, horses, camels, sheep, fur products, medical herbs, Tibetan incenses, thangkas (painted scrolls), and handicrafts; while the Ming awarded Tibetan tribute-bearers an equal value of gold, silver, satin and brocade, bolts of cloth, grains, and tea leaves. Silk workshops during the Ming also catered specifically to the Tibetan market with silk clothes and furnishings featuring Tibetan Buddhist iconography.


Question: What shops were catered to the Tibetan market?

Answer: Silk workshops

Van Praag states that the Ming court established diplomatic delegations with Tibet merely to secure urgently needed horses. Wang and Nyima argue that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as a mandatory "corvée" tax, and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy". Sperling writes that the Ming simultaneously bought horses in the Kham region while fighting Tibetan tribes in Amdo and receiving Tibetan embassies in Nanjing. He also argues that the embassies of Tibetan lamas visiting the Ming court were for the most part efforts to promote commercial transactions between the lamas' large, wealthy entourage and Ming Chinese merchants and officials. Kolmaš writes that while the Ming maintained a laissez-faire policy towards Tibet and limited the numbers of the Tibetan retinues, the Tibetans sought to maintain a tributary relationship with the Ming because imperial patronage provided them with wealth and power. Laird writes that Tibetans eagerly sought Ming court invitations since the gifts the Tibetans received for bringing tribute were much greater in value than the latter. As for the Yongle Emperor's gifts to his Tibetan and Nepalese vassals such as silver wares, Buddha relics, utensils for Buddhist temples and religious ceremonies, and gowns and robes for monks, Tsai writes "in his effort to draw neighboring states to the Ming orbit so that he could bask in glory, the Yongle Emperor was quite willing to pay a small price". The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC lists the Tibetan tribute items as oxen, horses, camels, sheep, fur products, medical herbs, Tibetan incenses, thangkas (painted scrolls), and handicrafts; while the Ming awarded Tibetan tribute-bearers an equal value of gold, silver, satin and brocade, bolts of cloth, grains, and tea leaves. <hl> Silk workshops during the Ming also catered specifically to the Tibetan market with silk clothes and furnishings featuring Tibetan Buddhist iconography. <hl>

Van Praag states that the Ming court established diplomatic delegations with Tibet merely to secure urgently needed horses. Wang and Nyima argue that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as a mandatory "corvée" tax, and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy". Sperling writes that the Ming simultaneously bought horses in the Kham region while fighting Tibetan tribes in Amdo and receiving Tibetan embassies in Nanjing. He also argues that the embassies of Tibetan lamas visiting the Ming court were for the most part efforts to promote commercial transactions between the lamas' large, wealthy entourage and Ming Chinese merchants and officials. Kolmaš writes that while the Ming maintained a laissez-faire policy towards Tibet and limited the numbers of the Tibetan retinues, the Tibetans sought to maintain a tributary relationship with the Ming because imperial patronage provided them with wealth and power. Laird writes that Tibetans eagerly sought Ming court invitations since the gifts the Tibetans received for bringing tribute were much greater in value than the latter. As for the Yongle Emperor's gifts to his Tibetan and Nepalese vassals such as silver wares, Buddha relics, utensils for Buddhist temples and religious ceremonies, and gowns and robes for monks, Tsai writes "in his effort to draw neighboring states to the Ming orbit so that he could bask in glory, the Yongle Emperor was quite willing to pay a small price". The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC lists the Tibetan tribute items as oxen, horses, camels, sheep, fur products, medical herbs, Tibetan incenses, thangkas (painted scrolls), and handicrafts; while the Ming awarded Tibetan tribute-bearers an equal value of gold, silver, satin and brocade, bolts of cloth, grains, and tea leaves. <hl> Silk workshops <hl> during the Ming also catered specifically to the Tibetan market with silk clothes and furnishings featuring Tibetan Buddhist iconography.

question: What shops were catered to the Tibetan market?, context: Van Praag states that the Ming court established diplomatic delegations with Tibet merely to secure urgently needed horses. Wang and Nyima argue that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as a mandatory "corvée" tax, and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy". Sperling writes that the Ming simultaneously bought horses in the Kham region while fighting Tibetan tribes in Amdo and receiving Tibetan embassies in Nanjing. He also argues that the embassies of Tibetan lamas visiting the Ming court were for the most part efforts to promote commercial transactions between the lamas' large, wealthy entourage and Ming Chinese merchants and officials. Kolmaš writes that while the Ming maintained a laissez-faire policy towards Tibet and limited the numbers of the Tibetan retinues, the Tibetans sought to maintain a tributary relationship with the Ming because imperial patronage provided them with wealth and power. Laird writes that Tibetans eagerly sought Ming court invitations since the gifts the Tibetans received for bringing tribute were much greater in value than the latter. As for the Yongle Emperor's gifts to his Tibetan and Nepalese vassals such as silver wares, Buddha relics, utensils for Buddhist temples and religious ceremonies, and gowns and robes for monks, Tsai writes "in his effort to draw neighboring states to the Ming orbit so that he could bask in glory, the Yongle Emperor was quite willing to pay a small price". The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC lists the Tibetan tribute items as oxen, horses, camels, sheep, fur products, medical herbs, Tibetan incenses, thangkas (painted scrolls), and handicrafts; while the Ming awarded Tibetan tribute-bearers an equal value of gold, silver, satin and brocade, bolts of cloth, grains, and tea leaves. Silk workshops during the Ming also catered specifically to the Tibetan market with silk clothes and furnishings featuring Tibetan Buddhist iconography.


Question: What visual images and symbols were on furnishings from the silk workshops?

Answer: Tibetan Buddhist

Van Praag states that the Ming court established diplomatic delegations with Tibet merely to secure urgently needed horses. Wang and Nyima argue that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as a mandatory "corvée" tax, and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy". Sperling writes that the Ming simultaneously bought horses in the Kham region while fighting Tibetan tribes in Amdo and receiving Tibetan embassies in Nanjing. He also argues that the embassies of Tibetan lamas visiting the Ming court were for the most part efforts to promote commercial transactions between the lamas' large, wealthy entourage and Ming Chinese merchants and officials. Kolmaš writes that while the Ming maintained a laissez-faire policy towards Tibet and limited the numbers of the Tibetan retinues, the Tibetans sought to maintain a tributary relationship with the Ming because imperial patronage provided them with wealth and power. Laird writes that Tibetans eagerly sought Ming court invitations since the gifts the Tibetans received for bringing tribute were much greater in value than the latter. As for the Yongle Emperor's gifts to his Tibetan and Nepalese vassals such as silver wares, Buddha relics, utensils for Buddhist temples and religious ceremonies, and gowns and robes for monks, Tsai writes "in his effort to draw neighboring states to the Ming orbit so that he could bask in glory, the Yongle Emperor was quite willing to pay a small price". The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC lists the Tibetan tribute items as oxen, horses, camels, sheep, fur products, medical herbs, Tibetan incenses, thangkas (painted scrolls), and handicrafts; while the Ming awarded Tibetan tribute-bearers an equal value of gold, silver, satin and brocade, bolts of cloth, grains, and tea leaves. <hl> Silk workshops during the Ming also catered specifically to the Tibetan market with silk clothes and furnishings featuring Tibetan Buddhist iconography. <hl>

Van Praag states that the Ming court established diplomatic delegations with Tibet merely to secure urgently needed horses. Wang and Nyima argue that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as a mandatory "corvée" tax, and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy". Sperling writes that the Ming simultaneously bought horses in the Kham region while fighting Tibetan tribes in Amdo and receiving Tibetan embassies in Nanjing. He also argues that the embassies of Tibetan lamas visiting the Ming court were for the most part efforts to promote commercial transactions between the lamas' large, wealthy entourage and Ming Chinese merchants and officials. Kolmaš writes that while the Ming maintained a laissez-faire policy towards Tibet and limited the numbers of the Tibetan retinues, the Tibetans sought to maintain a tributary relationship with the Ming because imperial patronage provided them with wealth and power. Laird writes that Tibetans eagerly sought Ming court invitations since the gifts the Tibetans received for bringing tribute were much greater in value than the latter. As for the Yongle Emperor's gifts to his Tibetan and Nepalese vassals such as silver wares, Buddha relics, utensils for Buddhist temples and religious ceremonies, and gowns and robes for monks, Tsai writes "in his effort to draw neighboring states to the Ming orbit so that he could bask in glory, the Yongle Emperor was quite willing to pay a small price". The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC lists the Tibetan tribute items as oxen, horses, camels, sheep, fur products, medical herbs, Tibetan incenses, thangkas (painted scrolls), and handicrafts; while the Ming awarded Tibetan tribute-bearers an equal value of gold, silver, satin and brocade, bolts of cloth, grains, and tea leaves. Silk workshops during the Ming also catered specifically to the Tibetan market with silk clothes and furnishings featuring <hl> Tibetan Buddhist <hl> iconography.

question: What visual images and symbols were on furnishings from the silk workshops?, context: Van Praag states that the Ming court established diplomatic delegations with Tibet merely to secure urgently needed horses. Wang and Nyima argue that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as a mandatory "corvée" tax, and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy". Sperling writes that the Ming simultaneously bought horses in the Kham region while fighting Tibetan tribes in Amdo and receiving Tibetan embassies in Nanjing. He also argues that the embassies of Tibetan lamas visiting the Ming court were for the most part efforts to promote commercial transactions between the lamas' large, wealthy entourage and Ming Chinese merchants and officials. Kolmaš writes that while the Ming maintained a laissez-faire policy towards Tibet and limited the numbers of the Tibetan retinues, the Tibetans sought to maintain a tributary relationship with the Ming because imperial patronage provided them with wealth and power. Laird writes that Tibetans eagerly sought Ming court invitations since the gifts the Tibetans received for bringing tribute were much greater in value than the latter. As for the Yongle Emperor's gifts to his Tibetan and Nepalese vassals such as silver wares, Buddha relics, utensils for Buddhist temples and religious ceremonies, and gowns and robes for monks, Tsai writes "in his effort to draw neighboring states to the Ming orbit so that he could bask in glory, the Yongle Emperor was quite willing to pay a small price". The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC lists the Tibetan tribute items as oxen, horses, camels, sheep, fur products, medical herbs, Tibetan incenses, thangkas (painted scrolls), and handicrafts; while the Ming awarded Tibetan tribute-bearers an equal value of gold, silver, satin and brocade, bolts of cloth, grains, and tea leaves. Silk workshops during the Ming also catered specifically to the Tibetan market with silk clothes and furnishings featuring Tibetan Buddhist iconography.


Question: who were the Tibetan areas were ruled by?

Answer: the Ming

<hl> Van Praag states that the Ming court established diplomatic delegations with Tibet merely to secure urgently needed horses. <hl> Wang and Nyima argue that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as a mandatory "corvée" tax, and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy". Sperling writes that the Ming simultaneously bought horses in the Kham region while fighting Tibetan tribes in Amdo and receiving Tibetan embassies in Nanjing. He also argues that the embassies of Tibetan lamas visiting the Ming court were for the most part efforts to promote commercial transactions between the lamas' large, wealthy entourage and Ming Chinese merchants and officials. Kolmaš writes that while the Ming maintained a laissez-faire policy towards Tibet and limited the numbers of the Tibetan retinues, the Tibetans sought to maintain a tributary relationship with the Ming because imperial patronage provided them with wealth and power. Laird writes that Tibetans eagerly sought Ming court invitations since the gifts the Tibetans received for bringing tribute were much greater in value than the latter. As for the Yongle Emperor's gifts to his Tibetan and Nepalese vassals such as silver wares, Buddha relics, utensils for Buddhist temples and religious ceremonies, and gowns and robes for monks, Tsai writes "in his effort to draw neighboring states to the Ming orbit so that he could bask in glory, the Yongle Emperor was quite willing to pay a small price". The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC lists the Tibetan tribute items as oxen, horses, camels, sheep, fur products, medical herbs, Tibetan incenses, thangkas (painted scrolls), and handicrafts; while the Ming awarded Tibetan tribute-bearers an equal value of gold, silver, satin and brocade, bolts of cloth, grains, and tea leaves. Silk workshops during the Ming also catered specifically to the Tibetan market with silk clothes and furnishings featuring Tibetan Buddhist iconography.

Van Praag states that <hl> the Ming <hl> court established diplomatic delegations with Tibet merely to secure urgently needed horses. Wang and Nyima argue that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as a mandatory "corvée" tax, and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy". Sperling writes that the Ming simultaneously bought horses in the Kham region while fighting Tibetan tribes in Amdo and receiving Tibetan embassies in Nanjing. He also argues that the embassies of Tibetan lamas visiting the Ming court were for the most part efforts to promote commercial transactions between the lamas' large, wealthy entourage and Ming Chinese merchants and officials. Kolmaš writes that while the Ming maintained a laissez-faire policy towards Tibet and limited the numbers of the Tibetan retinues, the Tibetans sought to maintain a tributary relationship with the Ming because imperial patronage provided them with wealth and power. Laird writes that Tibetans eagerly sought Ming court invitations since the gifts the Tibetans received for bringing tribute were much greater in value than the latter. As for the Yongle Emperor's gifts to his Tibetan and Nepalese vassals such as silver wares, Buddha relics, utensils for Buddhist temples and religious ceremonies, and gowns and robes for monks, Tsai writes "in his effort to draw neighboring states to the Ming orbit so that he could bask in glory, the Yongle Emperor was quite willing to pay a small price". The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC lists the Tibetan tribute items as oxen, horses, camels, sheep, fur products, medical herbs, Tibetan incenses, thangkas (painted scrolls), and handicrafts; while the Ming awarded Tibetan tribute-bearers an equal value of gold, silver, satin and brocade, bolts of cloth, grains, and tea leaves. Silk workshops during the Ming also catered specifically to the Tibetan market with silk clothes and furnishings featuring Tibetan Buddhist iconography.

question: who were the Tibetan areas were ruled by?, context: Van Praag states that the Ming court established diplomatic delegations with Tibet merely to secure urgently needed horses. Wang and Nyima argue that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as a mandatory "corvée" tax, and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy". Sperling writes that the Ming simultaneously bought horses in the Kham region while fighting Tibetan tribes in Amdo and receiving Tibetan embassies in Nanjing. He also argues that the embassies of Tibetan lamas visiting the Ming court were for the most part efforts to promote commercial transactions between the lamas' large, wealthy entourage and Ming Chinese merchants and officials. Kolmaš writes that while the Ming maintained a laissez-faire policy towards Tibet and limited the numbers of the Tibetan retinues, the Tibetans sought to maintain a tributary relationship with the Ming because imperial patronage provided them with wealth and power. Laird writes that Tibetans eagerly sought Ming court invitations since the gifts the Tibetans received for bringing tribute were much greater in value than the latter. As for the Yongle Emperor's gifts to his Tibetan and Nepalese vassals such as silver wares, Buddha relics, utensils for Buddhist temples and religious ceremonies, and gowns and robes for monks, Tsai writes "in his effort to draw neighboring states to the Ming orbit so that he could bask in glory, the Yongle Emperor was quite willing to pay a small price". The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC lists the Tibetan tribute items as oxen, horses, camels, sheep, fur products, medical herbs, Tibetan incenses, thangkas (painted scrolls), and handicrafts; while the Ming awarded Tibetan tribute-bearers an equal value of gold, silver, satin and brocade, bolts of cloth, grains, and tea leaves. Silk workshops during the Ming also catered specifically to the Tibetan market with silk clothes and furnishings featuring Tibetan Buddhist iconography.


Question: Wang and Nyima believed horses were collected from Tibet as what kind of tax?

Answer: a mandatory "corvée" tax

Van Praag states that the Ming court established diplomatic delegations with Tibet merely to secure urgently needed horses. <hl> Wang and Nyima argue that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as a mandatory "corvée" tax , and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy". <hl> Sperling writes that the Ming simultaneously bought horses in the Kham region while fighting Tibetan tribes in Amdo and receiving Tibetan embassies in Nanjing. He also argues that the embassies of Tibetan lamas visiting the Ming court were for the most part efforts to promote commercial transactions between the lamas' large, wealthy entourage and Ming Chinese merchants and officials. Kolmaš writes that while the Ming maintained a laissez-faire policy towards Tibet and limited the numbers of the Tibetan retinues, the Tibetans sought to maintain a tributary relationship with the Ming because imperial patronage provided them with wealth and power. Laird writes that Tibetans eagerly sought Ming court invitations since the gifts the Tibetans received for bringing tribute were much greater in value than the latter. As for the Yongle Emperor's gifts to his Tibetan and Nepalese vassals such as silver wares, Buddha relics, utensils for Buddhist temples and religious ceremonies, and gowns and robes for monks, Tsai writes "in his effort to draw neighboring states to the Ming orbit so that he could bask in glory, the Yongle Emperor was quite willing to pay a small price". The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC lists the Tibetan tribute items as oxen, horses, camels, sheep, fur products, medical herbs, Tibetan incenses, thangkas (painted scrolls), and handicrafts; while the Ming awarded Tibetan tribute-bearers an equal value of gold, silver, satin and brocade, bolts of cloth, grains, and tea leaves. Silk workshops during the Ming also catered specifically to the Tibetan market with silk clothes and furnishings featuring Tibetan Buddhist iconography.

Van Praag states that the Ming court established diplomatic delegations with Tibet merely to secure urgently needed horses. Wang and Nyima argue that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as <hl> a mandatory "corvée" tax <hl>, and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy". Sperling writes that the Ming simultaneously bought horses in the Kham region while fighting Tibetan tribes in Amdo and receiving Tibetan embassies in Nanjing. He also argues that the embassies of Tibetan lamas visiting the Ming court were for the most part efforts to promote commercial transactions between the lamas' large, wealthy entourage and Ming Chinese merchants and officials. Kolmaš writes that while the Ming maintained a laissez-faire policy towards Tibet and limited the numbers of the Tibetan retinues, the Tibetans sought to maintain a tributary relationship with the Ming because imperial patronage provided them with wealth and power. Laird writes that Tibetans eagerly sought Ming court invitations since the gifts the Tibetans received for bringing tribute were much greater in value than the latter. As for the Yongle Emperor's gifts to his Tibetan and Nepalese vassals such as silver wares, Buddha relics, utensils for Buddhist temples and religious ceremonies, and gowns and robes for monks, Tsai writes "in his effort to draw neighboring states to the Ming orbit so that he could bask in glory, the Yongle Emperor was quite willing to pay a small price". The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC lists the Tibetan tribute items as oxen, horses, camels, sheep, fur products, medical herbs, Tibetan incenses, thangkas (painted scrolls), and handicrafts; while the Ming awarded Tibetan tribute-bearers an equal value of gold, silver, satin and brocade, bolts of cloth, grains, and tea leaves. Silk workshops during the Ming also catered specifically to the Tibetan market with silk clothes and furnishings featuring Tibetan Buddhist iconography.

Wang and Nyima argue that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as <hl> a mandatory "corvée" tax <hl> , and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy".

question: Wang and Nyima believed horses were collected from Tibet as what kind of tax?, context: Van Praag states that the Ming court established diplomatic delegations with Tibet merely to secure urgently needed horses. Wang and Nyima argue that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as a mandatory "corvée" tax, and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy". Sperling writes that the Ming simultaneously bought horses in the Kham region while fighting Tibetan tribes in Amdo and receiving Tibetan embassies in Nanjing. He also argues that the embassies of Tibetan lamas visiting the Ming court were for the most part efforts to promote commercial transactions between the lamas' large, wealthy entourage and Ming Chinese merchants and officials. Kolmaš writes that while the Ming maintained a laissez-faire policy towards Tibet and limited the numbers of the Tibetan retinues, the Tibetans sought to maintain a tributary relationship with the Ming because imperial patronage provided them with wealth and power. Laird writes that Tibetans eagerly sought Ming court invitations since the gifts the Tibetans received for bringing tribute were much greater in value than the latter. As for the Yongle Emperor's gifts to his Tibetan and Nepalese vassals such as silver wares, Buddha relics, utensils for Buddhist temples and religious ceremonies, and gowns and robes for monks, Tsai writes "in his effort to draw neighboring states to the Ming orbit so that he could bask in glory, the Yongle Emperor was quite willing to pay a small price". The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC lists the Tibetan tribute items as oxen, horses, camels, sheep, fur products, medical herbs, Tibetan incenses, thangkas (painted scrolls), and handicrafts; while the Ming awarded Tibetan tribute-bearers an equal value of gold, silver, satin and brocade, bolts of cloth, grains, and tea leaves. Silk workshops during the Ming also catered specifically to the Tibetan market with silk clothes and furnishings featuring Tibetan Buddhist iconography.


Question: Who did the Ming trade horses with?

Answer: Tibet

<hl> While the Ming dynasty traded horses with Tibet , it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird sees as an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China." <hl> However, after Altan Khan (1507–1582)—leader of the Tümed Mongols who overthrew the Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony over the steppes—made peace with the Ming dynasty in 1571, he persuaded the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573. This provided the Chinese with a new supply of horses that the Mongols had in excess; it was also a relief to the Ming, since they were unable to stop the Mongols from periodic raiding. Laird says that despite the fact that later Mongols believed Altan forced the Ming to view him as an equal, Chinese historians argue that he was simply a loyal Chinese citizen. By 1578, Altan Khan formed a formidable Mongol-Tibetan alliance with the Gelug that the Ming viewed from afar without intervention.

While the Ming dynasty traded horses with <hl> Tibet <hl>, it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird sees as an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China." However, after Altan Khan (1507–1582)—leader of the Tümed Mongols who overthrew the Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony over the steppes—made peace with the Ming dynasty in 1571, he persuaded the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573. This provided the Chinese with a new supply of horses that the Mongols had in excess; it was also a relief to the Ming, since they were unable to stop the Mongols from periodic raiding. Laird says that despite the fact that later Mongols believed Altan forced the Ming to view him as an equal, Chinese historians argue that he was simply a loyal Chinese citizen. By 1578, Altan Khan formed a formidable Mongol-Tibetan alliance with the Gelug that the Ming viewed from afar without intervention.

While the Ming dynasty traded horses with <hl> Tibet <hl> , it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird sees as an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China."

question: Who did the Ming trade horses with?, context: While the Ming dynasty traded horses with Tibet, it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird sees as an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China." However, after Altan Khan (1507–1582)—leader of the Tümed Mongols who overthrew the Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony over the steppes—made peace with the Ming dynasty in 1571, he persuaded the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573. This provided the Chinese with a new supply of horses that the Mongols had in excess; it was also a relief to the Ming, since they were unable to stop the Mongols from periodic raiding. Laird says that despite the fact that later Mongols believed Altan forced the Ming to view him as an equal, Chinese historians argue that he was simply a loyal Chinese citizen. By 1578, Altan Khan formed a formidable Mongol-Tibetan alliance with the Gelug that the Ming viewed from afar without intervention.


Question: Who was the leader of the Tümed Mongols?

Answer: Altan Khan

While the Ming dynasty traded horses with Tibet, it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird sees as an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China." <hl> However, after Altan Khan (1507–1582)—leader of the Tümed Mongols who overthrew the Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony over the steppes—made peace with the Ming dynasty in 1571, he persuaded the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573. <hl> This provided the Chinese with a new supply of horses that the Mongols had in excess; it was also a relief to the Ming, since they were unable to stop the Mongols from periodic raiding. Laird says that despite the fact that later Mongols believed Altan forced the Ming to view him as an equal, Chinese historians argue that he was simply a loyal Chinese citizen. By 1578, Altan Khan formed a formidable Mongol-Tibetan alliance with the Gelug that the Ming viewed from afar without intervention.

While the Ming dynasty traded horses with Tibet, it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird sees as an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China." However, after <hl> Altan Khan <hl> (1507–1582)—leader of the Tümed Mongols who overthrew the Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony over the steppes—made peace with the Ming dynasty in 1571, he persuaded the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573. This provided the Chinese with a new supply of horses that the Mongols had in excess; it was also a relief to the Ming, since they were unable to stop the Mongols from periodic raiding. Laird says that despite the fact that later Mongols believed Altan forced the Ming to view him as an equal, Chinese historians argue that he was simply a loyal Chinese citizen. By 1578, Altan Khan formed a formidable Mongol-Tibetan alliance with the Gelug that the Ming viewed from afar without intervention.

question: Who was the leader of the Tümed Mongols?, context: While the Ming dynasty traded horses with Tibet, it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird sees as an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China." However, after Altan Khan (1507–1582)—leader of the Tümed Mongols who overthrew the Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony over the steppes—made peace with the Ming dynasty in 1571, he persuaded the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573. This provided the Chinese with a new supply of horses that the Mongols had in excess; it was also a relief to the Ming, since they were unable to stop the Mongols from periodic raiding. Laird says that despite the fact that later Mongols believed Altan forced the Ming to view him as an equal, Chinese historians argue that he was simply a loyal Chinese citizen. By 1578, Altan Khan formed a formidable Mongol-Tibetan alliance with the Gelug that the Ming viewed from afar without intervention.


Question: Who did Altan Khan overthrow?

Answer: the Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony

While the Ming dynasty traded horses with Tibet, it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird sees as an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China." <hl> However, after Altan Khan (1507–1582)—leader of the Tümed Mongols who overthrew the Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony over the steppes—made peace with the Ming dynasty in 1571, he persuaded the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573. <hl> This provided the Chinese with a new supply of horses that the Mongols had in excess; it was also a relief to the Ming, since they were unable to stop the Mongols from periodic raiding. Laird says that despite the fact that later Mongols believed Altan forced the Ming to view him as an equal, Chinese historians argue that he was simply a loyal Chinese citizen. By 1578, Altan Khan formed a formidable Mongol-Tibetan alliance with the Gelug that the Ming viewed from afar without intervention.

While the Ming dynasty traded horses with Tibet, it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird sees as an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China." However, after Altan Khan (1507–1582)—leader of the Tümed Mongols who overthrew <hl> the Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony <hl> over the steppes—made peace with the Ming dynasty in 1571, he persuaded the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573. This provided the Chinese with a new supply of horses that the Mongols had in excess; it was also a relief to the Ming, since they were unable to stop the Mongols from periodic raiding. Laird says that despite the fact that later Mongols believed Altan forced the Ming to view him as an equal, Chinese historians argue that he was simply a loyal Chinese citizen. By 1578, Altan Khan formed a formidable Mongol-Tibetan alliance with the Gelug that the Ming viewed from afar without intervention.

question: Who did Altan Khan overthrow?, context: While the Ming dynasty traded horses with Tibet, it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird sees as an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China." However, after Altan Khan (1507–1582)—leader of the Tümed Mongols who overthrew the Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony over the steppes—made peace with the Ming dynasty in 1571, he persuaded the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573. This provided the Chinese with a new supply of horses that the Mongols had in excess; it was also a relief to the Ming, since they were unable to stop the Mongols from periodic raiding. Laird says that despite the fact that later Mongols believed Altan forced the Ming to view him as an equal, Chinese historians argue that he was simply a loyal Chinese citizen. By 1578, Altan Khan formed a formidable Mongol-Tibetan alliance with the Gelug that the Ming viewed from afar without intervention.


Question: Who did Altan Khan make peace with?

Answer: the Ming dynasty

<hl> While the Ming dynasty traded horses with Tibet, it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird sees as an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China." <hl> However, after Altan Khan (1507–1582)—leader of the Tümed Mongols who overthrew the Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony over the steppes—made peace with the Ming dynasty in 1571, he persuaded the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573. This provided the Chinese with a new supply of horses that the Mongols had in excess; it was also a relief to the Ming, since they were unable to stop the Mongols from periodic raiding. Laird says that despite the fact that later Mongols believed Altan forced the Ming to view him as an equal, Chinese historians argue that he was simply a loyal Chinese citizen. By 1578, Altan Khan formed a formidable Mongol-Tibetan alliance with the Gelug that the Ming viewed from afar without intervention.

While <hl> the Ming dynasty <hl> traded horses with Tibet, it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird sees as an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China." However, after Altan Khan (1507–1582)—leader of the Tümed Mongols who overthrew the Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony over the steppes—made peace with the Ming dynasty in 1571, he persuaded the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573. This provided the Chinese with a new supply of horses that the Mongols had in excess; it was also a relief to the Ming, since they were unable to stop the Mongols from periodic raiding. Laird says that despite the fact that later Mongols believed Altan forced the Ming to view him as an equal, Chinese historians argue that he was simply a loyal Chinese citizen. By 1578, Altan Khan formed a formidable Mongol-Tibetan alliance with the Gelug that the Ming viewed from afar without intervention.

question: Who did Altan Khan make peace with?, context: While the Ming dynasty traded horses with Tibet, it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird sees as an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China." However, after Altan Khan (1507–1582)—leader of the Tümed Mongols who overthrew the Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony over the steppes—made peace with the Ming dynasty in 1571, he persuaded the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573. This provided the Chinese with a new supply of horses that the Mongols had in excess; it was also a relief to the Ming, since they were unable to stop the Mongols from periodic raiding. Laird says that despite the fact that later Mongols believed Altan forced the Ming to view him as an equal, Chinese historians argue that he was simply a loyal Chinese citizen. By 1578, Altan Khan formed a formidable Mongol-Tibetan alliance with the Gelug that the Ming viewed from afar without intervention.


Question: Who convinced the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573?

Answer: Altan Khan

While the Ming dynasty traded horses with Tibet, it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird sees as an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China." <hl> However, after Altan Khan (1507–1582)—leader of the Tümed Mongols who overthrew the Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony over the steppes—made peace with the Ming dynasty in 1571, he persuaded the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573. <hl> This provided the Chinese with a new supply of horses that the Mongols had in excess; it was also a relief to the Ming, since they were unable to stop the Mongols from periodic raiding. Laird says that despite the fact that later Mongols believed Altan forced the Ming to view him as an equal, Chinese historians argue that he was simply a loyal Chinese citizen. By 1578, Altan Khan formed a formidable Mongol-Tibetan alliance with the Gelug that the Ming viewed from afar without intervention.

While the Ming dynasty traded horses with Tibet, it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird sees as an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China." However, after <hl> Altan Khan <hl> (1507–1582)—leader of the Tümed Mongols who overthrew the Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony over the steppes—made peace with the Ming dynasty in 1571, he persuaded the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573. This provided the Chinese with a new supply of horses that the Mongols had in excess; it was also a relief to the Ming, since they were unable to stop the Mongols from periodic raiding. Laird says that despite the fact that later Mongols believed Altan forced the Ming to view him as an equal, Chinese historians argue that he was simply a loyal Chinese citizen. By 1578, Altan Khan formed a formidable Mongol-Tibetan alliance with the Gelug that the Ming viewed from afar without intervention.

question: Who convinced the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573?, context: While the Ming dynasty traded horses with Tibet, it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird sees as an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China." However, after Altan Khan (1507–1582)—leader of the Tümed Mongols who overthrew the Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony over the steppes—made peace with the Ming dynasty in 1571, he persuaded the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573. This provided the Chinese with a new supply of horses that the Mongols had in excess; it was also a relief to the Ming, since they were unable to stop the Mongols from periodic raiding. Laird says that despite the fact that later Mongols believed Altan forced the Ming to view him as an equal, Chinese historians argue that he was simply a loyal Chinese citizen. By 1578, Altan Khan formed a formidable Mongol-Tibetan alliance with the Gelug that the Ming viewed from afar without intervention.


Question: When did the Hongwu Emperor use military force in Tibet?

Answer: the 14th century

Patricia Ebrey writes that Tibet, like Joseon Korea and other neighboring states to the Ming, settled for its tributary status while there were no troops or governors of Ming China stationed in its territory. Laird writes that "after the Mongol troops left Tibet, no Ming troops replaced them." Wang and Nyima state that, despite the fact that the Ming refrained from sending troops to subdue Tibet and refrained from garrisoning Ming troops there, these measures were unnecessary so long as the Ming court upheld close ties with Tibetan vassals and their forces. <hl> However, there were instances in the 14th century when the Hongwu Emperor did use military force to quell unrest in Tibet. <hl> John D. Langlois writes that there was unrest in Tibet and western Sichuan, which the Marquis Mu Ying (沐英) was commissioned to quell in November 1378 after he established a Taozhou garrison in Gansu. Langlois notes that by October 1379, Mu Ying had allegedly captured 30,000 Tibetan prisoners and 200,000 domesticated animals. Yet invasion went both ways; the Ming general Qu Neng, under the command of Lan Yu, was ordered to repel a Tibetan assault into Sichuan in 1390.

Patricia Ebrey writes that Tibet, like Joseon Korea and other neighboring states to the Ming, settled for its tributary status while there were no troops or governors of Ming China stationed in its territory. Laird writes that "after the Mongol troops left Tibet, no Ming troops replaced them." Wang and Nyima state that, despite the fact that the Ming refrained from sending troops to subdue Tibet and refrained from garrisoning Ming troops there, these measures were unnecessary so long as the Ming court upheld close ties with Tibetan vassals and their forces. However, there were instances in <hl> the 14th century <hl> when the Hongwu Emperor did use military force to quell unrest in Tibet. John D. Langlois writes that there was unrest in Tibet and western Sichuan, which the Marquis Mu Ying (沐英) was commissioned to quell in November 1378 after he established a Taozhou garrison in Gansu. Langlois notes that by October 1379, Mu Ying had allegedly captured 30,000 Tibetan prisoners and 200,000 domesticated animals. Yet invasion went both ways; the Ming general Qu Neng, under the command of Lan Yu, was ordered to repel a Tibetan assault into Sichuan in 1390.

question: When did the Hongwu Emperor use military force in Tibet?, context: Patricia Ebrey writes that Tibet, like Joseon Korea and other neighboring states to the Ming, settled for its tributary status while there were no troops or governors of Ming China stationed in its territory. Laird writes that "after the Mongol troops left Tibet, no Ming troops replaced them." Wang and Nyima state that, despite the fact that the Ming refrained from sending troops to subdue Tibet and refrained from garrisoning Ming troops there, these measures were unnecessary so long as the Ming court upheld close ties with Tibetan vassals and their forces. However, there were instances in the 14th century when the Hongwu Emperor did use military force to quell unrest in Tibet. John D. Langlois writes that there was unrest in Tibet and western Sichuan, which the Marquis Mu Ying (沐英) was commissioned to quell in November 1378 after he established a Taozhou garrison in Gansu. Langlois notes that by October 1379, Mu Ying had allegedly captured 30,000 Tibetan prisoners and 200,000 domesticated animals. Yet invasion went both ways; the Ming general Qu Neng, under the command of Lan Yu, was ordered to repel a Tibetan assault into Sichuan in 1390.


Question: When was the Marquis Mu Ying commissioned to quell?

Answer: November 1378

Patricia Ebrey writes that Tibet, like Joseon Korea and other neighboring states to the Ming, settled for its tributary status while there were no troops or governors of Ming China stationed in its territory. Laird writes that "after the Mongol troops left Tibet, no Ming troops replaced them." Wang and Nyima state that, despite the fact that the Ming refrained from sending troops to subdue Tibet and refrained from garrisoning Ming troops there, these measures were unnecessary so long as the Ming court upheld close ties with Tibetan vassals and their forces. However, there were instances in the 14th century when the Hongwu Emperor did use military force to quell unrest in Tibet. <hl> John D. Langlois writes that there was unrest in Tibet and western Sichuan, which the Marquis Mu Ying (沐英) was commissioned to quell in November 1378 after he established a Taozhou garrison in Gansu. <hl> Langlois notes that by October 1379, Mu Ying had allegedly captured 30,000 Tibetan prisoners and 200,000 domesticated animals. Yet invasion went both ways; the Ming general Qu Neng, under the command of Lan Yu, was ordered to repel a Tibetan assault into Sichuan in 1390.

Patricia Ebrey writes that Tibet, like Joseon Korea and other neighboring states to the Ming, settled for its tributary status while there were no troops or governors of Ming China stationed in its territory. Laird writes that "after the Mongol troops left Tibet, no Ming troops replaced them." Wang and Nyima state that, despite the fact that the Ming refrained from sending troops to subdue Tibet and refrained from garrisoning Ming troops there, these measures were unnecessary so long as the Ming court upheld close ties with Tibetan vassals and their forces. However, there were instances in the 14th century when the Hongwu Emperor did use military force to quell unrest in Tibet. John D. Langlois writes that there was unrest in Tibet and western Sichuan, which the Marquis Mu Ying (沐英) was commissioned to quell in <hl> November 1378 <hl> after he established a Taozhou garrison in Gansu. Langlois notes that by October 1379, Mu Ying had allegedly captured 30,000 Tibetan prisoners and 200,000 domesticated animals. Yet invasion went both ways; the Ming general Qu Neng, under the command of Lan Yu, was ordered to repel a Tibetan assault into Sichuan in 1390.

question: When was the Marquis Mu Ying commissioned to quell?, context: Patricia Ebrey writes that Tibet, like Joseon Korea and other neighboring states to the Ming, settled for its tributary status while there were no troops or governors of Ming China stationed in its territory. Laird writes that "after the Mongol troops left Tibet, no Ming troops replaced them." Wang and Nyima state that, despite the fact that the Ming refrained from sending troops to subdue Tibet and refrained from garrisoning Ming troops there, these measures were unnecessary so long as the Ming court upheld close ties with Tibetan vassals and their forces. However, there were instances in the 14th century when the Hongwu Emperor did use military force to quell unrest in Tibet. John D. Langlois writes that there was unrest in Tibet and western Sichuan, which the Marquis Mu Ying (沐英) was commissioned to quell in November 1378 after he established a Taozhou garrison in Gansu. Langlois notes that by October 1379, Mu Ying had allegedly captured 30,000 Tibetan prisoners and 200,000 domesticated animals. Yet invasion went both ways; the Ming general Qu Neng, under the command of Lan Yu, was ordered to repel a Tibetan assault into Sichuan in 1390.


Question: How many Tibetan prisoners did Mu Ying capture?

Answer: 30,000

Patricia Ebrey writes that Tibet, like Joseon Korea and other neighboring states to the Ming, settled for its tributary status while there were no troops or governors of Ming China stationed in its territory. Laird writes that "after the Mongol troops left Tibet, no Ming troops replaced them." Wang and Nyima state that, despite the fact that the Ming refrained from sending troops to subdue Tibet and refrained from garrisoning Ming troops there, these measures were unnecessary so long as the Ming court upheld close ties with Tibetan vassals and their forces. However, there were instances in the 14th century when the Hongwu Emperor did use military force to quell unrest in Tibet. John D. Langlois writes that there was unrest in Tibet and western Sichuan, which the Marquis Mu Ying (沐英) was commissioned to quell in November 1378 after he established a Taozhou garrison in Gansu. <hl> Langlois notes that by October 1379, Mu Ying had allegedly captured 30,000 Tibetan prisoners and 200,000 domesticated animals. <hl> Yet invasion went both ways; the Ming general Qu Neng, under the command of Lan Yu, was ordered to repel a Tibetan assault into Sichuan in 1390.

Patricia Ebrey writes that Tibet, like Joseon Korea and other neighboring states to the Ming, settled for its tributary status while there were no troops or governors of Ming China stationed in its territory. Laird writes that "after the Mongol troops left Tibet, no Ming troops replaced them." Wang and Nyima state that, despite the fact that the Ming refrained from sending troops to subdue Tibet and refrained from garrisoning Ming troops there, these measures were unnecessary so long as the Ming court upheld close ties with Tibetan vassals and their forces. However, there were instances in the 14th century when the Hongwu Emperor did use military force to quell unrest in Tibet. John D. Langlois writes that there was unrest in Tibet and western Sichuan, which the Marquis Mu Ying (沐英) was commissioned to quell in November 1378 after he established a Taozhou garrison in Gansu. Langlois notes that by October 1379, Mu Ying had allegedly captured <hl> 30,000 <hl> Tibetan prisoners and 200,000 domesticated animals. Yet invasion went both ways; the Ming general Qu Neng, under the command of Lan Yu, was ordered to repel a Tibetan assault into Sichuan in 1390.

question: How many Tibetan prisoners did Mu Ying capture?, context: Patricia Ebrey writes that Tibet, like Joseon Korea and other neighboring states to the Ming, settled for its tributary status while there were no troops or governors of Ming China stationed in its territory. Laird writes that "after the Mongol troops left Tibet, no Ming troops replaced them." Wang and Nyima state that, despite the fact that the Ming refrained from sending troops to subdue Tibet and refrained from garrisoning Ming troops there, these measures were unnecessary so long as the Ming court upheld close ties with Tibetan vassals and their forces. However, there were instances in the 14th century when the Hongwu Emperor did use military force to quell unrest in Tibet. John D. Langlois writes that there was unrest in Tibet and western Sichuan, which the Marquis Mu Ying (沐英) was commissioned to quell in November 1378 after he established a Taozhou garrison in Gansu. Langlois notes that by October 1379, Mu Ying had allegedly captured 30,000 Tibetan prisoners and 200,000 domesticated animals. Yet invasion went both ways; the Ming general Qu Neng, under the command of Lan Yu, was ordered to repel a Tibetan assault into Sichuan in 1390.


Question: How many animals did Mu Ying capture?

Answer: 200,000

Patricia Ebrey writes that Tibet, like Joseon Korea and other neighboring states to the Ming, settled for its tributary status while there were no troops or governors of Ming China stationed in its territory. Laird writes that "after the Mongol troops left Tibet, no Ming troops replaced them." Wang and Nyima state that, despite the fact that the Ming refrained from sending troops to subdue Tibet and refrained from garrisoning Ming troops there, these measures were unnecessary so long as the Ming court upheld close ties with Tibetan vassals and their forces. However, there were instances in the 14th century when the Hongwu Emperor did use military force to quell unrest in Tibet. John D. Langlois writes that there was unrest in Tibet and western Sichuan, which the Marquis Mu Ying (沐英) was commissioned to quell in November 1378 after he established a Taozhou garrison in Gansu. <hl> Langlois notes that by October 1379, Mu Ying had allegedly captured 30,000 Tibetan prisoners and 200,000 domesticated animals. <hl> Yet invasion went both ways; the Ming general Qu Neng, under the command of Lan Yu, was ordered to repel a Tibetan assault into Sichuan in 1390.

Patricia Ebrey writes that Tibet, like Joseon Korea and other neighboring states to the Ming, settled for its tributary status while there were no troops or governors of Ming China stationed in its territory. Laird writes that "after the Mongol troops left Tibet, no Ming troops replaced them." Wang and Nyima state that, despite the fact that the Ming refrained from sending troops to subdue Tibet and refrained from garrisoning Ming troops there, these measures were unnecessary so long as the Ming court upheld close ties with Tibetan vassals and their forces. However, there were instances in the 14th century when the Hongwu Emperor did use military force to quell unrest in Tibet. John D. Langlois writes that there was unrest in Tibet and western Sichuan, which the Marquis Mu Ying (沐英) was commissioned to quell in November 1378 after he established a Taozhou garrison in Gansu. Langlois notes that by October 1379, Mu Ying had allegedly captured 30,000 Tibetan prisoners and <hl> 200,000 <hl> domesticated animals. Yet invasion went both ways; the Ming general Qu Neng, under the command of Lan Yu, was ordered to repel a Tibetan assault into Sichuan in 1390.

question: How many animals did Mu Ying capture?, context: Patricia Ebrey writes that Tibet, like Joseon Korea and other neighboring states to the Ming, settled for its tributary status while there were no troops or governors of Ming China stationed in its territory. Laird writes that "after the Mongol troops left Tibet, no Ming troops replaced them." Wang and Nyima state that, despite the fact that the Ming refrained from sending troops to subdue Tibet and refrained from garrisoning Ming troops there, these measures were unnecessary so long as the Ming court upheld close ties with Tibetan vassals and their forces. However, there were instances in the 14th century when the Hongwu Emperor did use military force to quell unrest in Tibet. John D. Langlois writes that there was unrest in Tibet and western Sichuan, which the Marquis Mu Ying (沐英) was commissioned to quell in November 1378 after he established a Taozhou garrison in Gansu. Langlois notes that by October 1379, Mu Ying had allegedly captured 30,000 Tibetan prisoners and 200,000 domesticated animals. Yet invasion went both ways; the Ming general Qu Neng, under the command of Lan Yu, was ordered to repel a Tibetan assault into Sichuan in 1390.


Question: Who was ordered to force a Tibetan assault into Sichuan?

Answer: Ming general Qu Neng

Patricia Ebrey writes that Tibet, like Joseon Korea and other neighboring states to the Ming, settled for its tributary status while there were no troops or governors of Ming China stationed in its territory. Laird writes that "after the Mongol troops left Tibet, no Ming troops replaced them." Wang and Nyima state that, despite the fact that the Ming refrained from sending troops to subdue Tibet and refrained from garrisoning Ming troops there, these measures were unnecessary so long as the Ming court upheld close ties with Tibetan vassals and their forces. However, there were instances in the 14th century when the Hongwu Emperor did use military force to quell unrest in Tibet. John D. Langlois writes that there was unrest in Tibet and western Sichuan, which the Marquis Mu Ying (沐英) was commissioned to quell in November 1378 after he established a Taozhou garrison in Gansu. Langlois notes that by October 1379, Mu Ying had allegedly captured 30,000 Tibetan prisoners and 200,000 domesticated animals. <hl> Yet invasion went both ways; the Ming general Qu Neng , under the command of Lan Yu, was ordered to repel a Tibetan assault into Sichuan in 1390. <hl>

Patricia Ebrey writes that Tibet, like Joseon Korea and other neighboring states to the Ming, settled for its tributary status while there were no troops or governors of Ming China stationed in its territory. Laird writes that "after the Mongol troops left Tibet, no Ming troops replaced them." Wang and Nyima state that, despite the fact that the Ming refrained from sending troops to subdue Tibet and refrained from garrisoning Ming troops there, these measures were unnecessary so long as the Ming court upheld close ties with Tibetan vassals and their forces. However, there were instances in the 14th century when the Hongwu Emperor did use military force to quell unrest in Tibet. John D. Langlois writes that there was unrest in Tibet and western Sichuan, which the Marquis Mu Ying (沐英) was commissioned to quell in November 1378 after he established a Taozhou garrison in Gansu. Langlois notes that by October 1379, Mu Ying had allegedly captured 30,000 Tibetan prisoners and 200,000 domesticated animals. Yet invasion went both ways; the <hl> Ming general Qu Neng <hl>, under the command of Lan Yu, was ordered to repel a Tibetan assault into Sichuan in 1390.

Yet invasion went both ways; the <hl> Ming general Qu Neng <hl> , under the command of Lan Yu, was ordered to repel a Tibetan assault into Sichuan in 1390.

question: Who was ordered to force a Tibetan assault into Sichuan?, context: Patricia Ebrey writes that Tibet, like Joseon Korea and other neighboring states to the Ming, settled for its tributary status while there were no troops or governors of Ming China stationed in its territory. Laird writes that "after the Mongol troops left Tibet, no Ming troops replaced them." Wang and Nyima state that, despite the fact that the Ming refrained from sending troops to subdue Tibet and refrained from garrisoning Ming troops there, these measures were unnecessary so long as the Ming court upheld close ties with Tibetan vassals and their forces. However, there were instances in the 14th century when the Hongwu Emperor did use military force to quell unrest in Tibet. John D. Langlois writes that there was unrest in Tibet and western Sichuan, which the Marquis Mu Ying (沐英) was commissioned to quell in November 1378 after he established a Taozhou garrison in Gansu. Langlois notes that by October 1379, Mu Ying had allegedly captured 30,000 Tibetan prisoners and 200,000 domesticated animals. Yet invasion went both ways; the Ming general Qu Neng, under the command of Lan Yu, was ordered to repel a Tibetan assault into Sichuan in 1390.


Question: What did the mid Ming dynasty discussion focus mainly on?

Answer: recovery of the Ordos region

<hl> Discussions of strategy in the mid Ming dynasty focused primarily on recovery of the Ordos region , which the Mongols used as a rallying base to stage raids into Ming China. <hl> Norbu states that the Ming dynasty, preoccupied with the Mongol threat to the north, could not spare additional armed forces to enforce or back up their claim of sovereignty over Tibet; instead, they relied on "Confucian instruments of tribute relations" of heaping unlimited number of titles and gifts on Tibetan lamas through acts of diplomacy. Sperling states that the delicate relationship between the Ming and Tibet was "the last time a united China had to deal with an independent Tibet," that there was a potential for armed conflict at their borders, and that the ultimate goal of Ming foreign policy with Tibet was not subjugation but "avoidance of any kind of Tibetan threat." P. Christiaan Klieger argues that the Ming court's patronage of high Tibetan lamas "was designed to help stabilize border regions and protect trade routes."

Discussions of strategy in the mid Ming dynasty focused primarily on <hl> recovery of the Ordos region <hl>, which the Mongols used as a rallying base to stage raids into Ming China. Norbu states that the Ming dynasty, preoccupied with the Mongol threat to the north, could not spare additional armed forces to enforce or back up their claim of sovereignty over Tibet; instead, they relied on "Confucian instruments of tribute relations" of heaping unlimited number of titles and gifts on Tibetan lamas through acts of diplomacy. Sperling states that the delicate relationship between the Ming and Tibet was "the last time a united China had to deal with an independent Tibet," that there was a potential for armed conflict at their borders, and that the ultimate goal of Ming foreign policy with Tibet was not subjugation but "avoidance of any kind of Tibetan threat." P. Christiaan Klieger argues that the Ming court's patronage of high Tibetan lamas "was designed to help stabilize border regions and protect trade routes."

Discussions of strategy in the mid Ming dynasty focused primarily on <hl> recovery of the Ordos region <hl> , which the Mongols used as a rallying base to stage raids into Ming China.

question: What did the mid Ming dynasty discussion focus mainly on?, context: Discussions of strategy in the mid Ming dynasty focused primarily on recovery of the Ordos region, which the Mongols used as a rallying base to stage raids into Ming China. Norbu states that the Ming dynasty, preoccupied with the Mongol threat to the north, could not spare additional armed forces to enforce or back up their claim of sovereignty over Tibet; instead, they relied on "Confucian instruments of tribute relations" of heaping unlimited number of titles and gifts on Tibetan lamas through acts of diplomacy. Sperling states that the delicate relationship between the Ming and Tibet was "the last time a united China had to deal with an independent Tibet," that there was a potential for armed conflict at their borders, and that the ultimate goal of Ming foreign policy with Tibet was not subjugation but "avoidance of any kind of Tibetan threat." P. Christiaan Klieger argues that the Ming court's patronage of high Tibetan lamas "was designed to help stabilize border regions and protect trade routes."


Question: Who used the the Ordos region as a place to stage raids?

Answer: the Mongols

<hl> Discussions of strategy in the mid Ming dynasty focused primarily on recovery of the Ordos region, which the Mongols used as a rallying base to stage raids into Ming China. <hl> Norbu states that the Ming dynasty, preoccupied with the Mongol threat to the north, could not spare additional armed forces to enforce or back up their claim of sovereignty over Tibet; instead, they relied on "Confucian instruments of tribute relations" of heaping unlimited number of titles and gifts on Tibetan lamas through acts of diplomacy. Sperling states that the delicate relationship between the Ming and Tibet was "the last time a united China had to deal with an independent Tibet," that there was a potential for armed conflict at their borders, and that the ultimate goal of Ming foreign policy with Tibet was not subjugation but "avoidance of any kind of Tibetan threat." P. Christiaan Klieger argues that the Ming court's patronage of high Tibetan lamas "was designed to help stabilize border regions and protect trade routes."

Discussions of strategy in the mid Ming dynasty focused primarily on recovery of the Ordos region, which <hl> the Mongols <hl> used as a rallying base to stage raids into Ming China. Norbu states that the Ming dynasty, preoccupied with the Mongol threat to the north, could not spare additional armed forces to enforce or back up their claim of sovereignty over Tibet; instead, they relied on "Confucian instruments of tribute relations" of heaping unlimited number of titles and gifts on Tibetan lamas through acts of diplomacy. Sperling states that the delicate relationship between the Ming and Tibet was "the last time a united China had to deal with an independent Tibet," that there was a potential for armed conflict at their borders, and that the ultimate goal of Ming foreign policy with Tibet was not subjugation but "avoidance of any kind of Tibetan threat." P. Christiaan Klieger argues that the Ming court's patronage of high Tibetan lamas "was designed to help stabilize border regions and protect trade routes."

question: Who used the the Ordos region as a place to stage raids?, context: Discussions of strategy in the mid Ming dynasty focused primarily on recovery of the Ordos region, which the Mongols used as a rallying base to stage raids into Ming China. Norbu states that the Ming dynasty, preoccupied with the Mongol threat to the north, could not spare additional armed forces to enforce or back up their claim of sovereignty over Tibet; instead, they relied on "Confucian instruments of tribute relations" of heaping unlimited number of titles and gifts on Tibetan lamas through acts of diplomacy. Sperling states that the delicate relationship between the Ming and Tibet was "the last time a united China had to deal with an independent Tibet," that there was a potential for armed conflict at their borders, and that the ultimate goal of Ming foreign policy with Tibet was not subjugation but "avoidance of any kind of Tibetan threat." P. Christiaan Klieger argues that the Ming court's patronage of high Tibetan lamas "was designed to help stabilize border regions and protect trade routes."


Question: Where were the Mongols trying to raise?

Answer: Ming China

<hl> Discussions of strategy in the mid Ming dynasty focused primarily on recovery of the Ordos region, which the Mongols used as a rallying base to stage raids into Ming China . <hl> Norbu states that the Ming dynasty, preoccupied with the Mongol threat to the north, could not spare additional armed forces to enforce or back up their claim of sovereignty over Tibet; instead, they relied on "Confucian instruments of tribute relations" of heaping unlimited number of titles and gifts on Tibetan lamas through acts of diplomacy. Sperling states that the delicate relationship between the Ming and Tibet was "the last time a united China had to deal with an independent Tibet," that there was a potential for armed conflict at their borders, and that the ultimate goal of Ming foreign policy with Tibet was not subjugation but "avoidance of any kind of Tibetan threat." P. Christiaan Klieger argues that the Ming court's patronage of high Tibetan lamas "was designed to help stabilize border regions and protect trade routes."

Discussions of strategy in the mid Ming dynasty focused primarily on recovery of the Ordos region, which the Mongols used as a rallying base to stage raids into <hl> Ming China <hl>. Norbu states that the Ming dynasty, preoccupied with the Mongol threat to the north, could not spare additional armed forces to enforce or back up their claim of sovereignty over Tibet; instead, they relied on "Confucian instruments of tribute relations" of heaping unlimited number of titles and gifts on Tibetan lamas through acts of diplomacy. Sperling states that the delicate relationship between the Ming and Tibet was "the last time a united China had to deal with an independent Tibet," that there was a potential for armed conflict at their borders, and that the ultimate goal of Ming foreign policy with Tibet was not subjugation but "avoidance of any kind of Tibetan threat." P. Christiaan Klieger argues that the Ming court's patronage of high Tibetan lamas "was designed to help stabilize border regions and protect trade routes."

Discussions of strategy in the mid Ming dynasty focused primarily on recovery of the Ordos region, which the Mongols used as a rallying base to stage raids into <hl> Ming China <hl> .

question: Where were the Mongols trying to raise?, context: Discussions of strategy in the mid Ming dynasty focused primarily on recovery of the Ordos region, which the Mongols used as a rallying base to stage raids into Ming China. Norbu states that the Ming dynasty, preoccupied with the Mongol threat to the north, could not spare additional armed forces to enforce or back up their claim of sovereignty over Tibet; instead, they relied on "Confucian instruments of tribute relations" of heaping unlimited number of titles and gifts on Tibetan lamas through acts of diplomacy. Sperling states that the delicate relationship between the Ming and Tibet was "the last time a united China had to deal with an independent Tibet," that there was a potential for armed conflict at their borders, and that the ultimate goal of Ming foreign policy with Tibet was not subjugation but "avoidance of any kind of Tibetan threat." P. Christiaan Klieger argues that the Ming court's patronage of high Tibetan lamas "was designed to help stabilize border regions and protect trade routes."


Question: Why did P. Christiaan Klieger believe that the Ming court supported high Tibetan lamas?

Answer: to help stabilize border regions and protect trade routes

Discussions of strategy in the mid Ming dynasty focused primarily on recovery of the Ordos region, which the Mongols used as a rallying base to stage raids into Ming China. Norbu states that the Ming dynasty, preoccupied with the Mongol threat to the north, could not spare additional armed forces to enforce or back up their claim of sovereignty over Tibet; instead, they relied on "Confucian instruments of tribute relations" of heaping unlimited number of titles and gifts on Tibetan lamas through acts of diplomacy. Sperling states that the delicate relationship between the Ming and Tibet was "the last time a united China had to deal with an independent Tibet," that there was a potential for armed conflict at their borders, and that the ultimate goal of Ming foreign policy with Tibet was not subjugation but "avoidance of any kind of Tibetan threat." <hl> P. Christiaan Klieger argues that the Ming court's patronage of high Tibetan lamas "was designed to help stabilize border regions and protect trade routes ." <hl>

Discussions of strategy in the mid Ming dynasty focused primarily on recovery of the Ordos region, which the Mongols used as a rallying base to stage raids into Ming China. Norbu states that the Ming dynasty, preoccupied with the Mongol threat to the north, could not spare additional armed forces to enforce or back up their claim of sovereignty over Tibet; instead, they relied on "Confucian instruments of tribute relations" of heaping unlimited number of titles and gifts on Tibetan lamas through acts of diplomacy. Sperling states that the delicate relationship between the Ming and Tibet was "the last time a united China had to deal with an independent Tibet," that there was a potential for armed conflict at their borders, and that the ultimate goal of Ming foreign policy with Tibet was not subjugation but "avoidance of any kind of Tibetan threat." P. Christiaan Klieger argues that the Ming court's patronage of high Tibetan lamas "was designed <hl> to help stabilize border regions and protect trade routes <hl>."

P. Christiaan Klieger argues that the Ming court's patronage of high Tibetan lamas "was designed <hl> to help stabilize border regions and protect trade routes <hl> ."

question: Why did P. Christiaan Klieger believe that the Ming court supported high Tibetan lamas?, context: Discussions of strategy in the mid Ming dynasty focused primarily on recovery of the Ordos region, which the Mongols used as a rallying base to stage raids into Ming China. Norbu states that the Ming dynasty, preoccupied with the Mongol threat to the north, could not spare additional armed forces to enforce or back up their claim of sovereignty over Tibet; instead, they relied on "Confucian instruments of tribute relations" of heaping unlimited number of titles and gifts on Tibetan lamas through acts of diplomacy. Sperling states that the delicate relationship between the Ming and Tibet was "the last time a united China had to deal with an independent Tibet," that there was a potential for armed conflict at their borders, and that the ultimate goal of Ming foreign policy with Tibet was not subjugation but "avoidance of any kind of Tibetan threat." P. Christiaan Klieger argues that the Ming court's patronage of high Tibetan lamas "was designed to help stabilize border regions and protect trade routes."


Question: What policy does Luciano Petech and Sato Hisashi claim the Ming held towards the Tibet?

Answer: divide-and-rule

<hl> Historians Luciano Petech and Sato Hisashi argue that the Ming upheld a " divide-and-rule " policy towards a weak and politically fragmented Tibet after the Sakya regime had fallen. <hl> Chan writes that this was perhaps the calculated strategy of the Yongle Emperor, as exclusive patronage to one Tibetan sect would have given it too much regional power. Sperling finds no textual evidence in either Chinese or Tibetan sources to support this thesis of Petech and Hisashi. Norbu asserts that their thesis is largely based on the list of Ming titles conferred on Tibetan lamas rather than "comparative analysis of developments in China and Tibet." Rossabi states that this theory "attributes too much influence to the Chinese," pointing out that Tibet was already politically divided when the Ming dynasty began. Rossabi also discounts the "divide-and-rule" theory on the grounds of the Yongle Emperor's failed attempt to build a strong relationship with the fifth Karmapa—one which he hoped would parallel Kublai Khan's earlier relationship with the Sakya Phagpa lama. Instead, the Yongle Emperor followed the Karmapa's advice of giving patronage to many different Tibetan lamas.

Historians Luciano Petech and Sato Hisashi argue that the Ming upheld a "<hl> divide-and-rule <hl>" policy towards a weak and politically fragmented Tibet after the Sakya regime had fallen. Chan writes that this was perhaps the calculated strategy of the Yongle Emperor, as exclusive patronage to one Tibetan sect would have given it too much regional power. Sperling finds no textual evidence in either Chinese or Tibetan sources to support this thesis of Petech and Hisashi. Norbu asserts that their thesis is largely based on the list of Ming titles conferred on Tibetan lamas rather than "comparative analysis of developments in China and Tibet." Rossabi states that this theory "attributes too much influence to the Chinese," pointing out that Tibet was already politically divided when the Ming dynasty began. Rossabi also discounts the "divide-and-rule" theory on the grounds of the Yongle Emperor's failed attempt to build a strong relationship with the fifth Karmapa—one which he hoped would parallel Kublai Khan's earlier relationship with the Sakya Phagpa lama. Instead, the Yongle Emperor followed the Karmapa's advice of giving patronage to many different Tibetan lamas.

Historians Luciano Petech and Sato Hisashi argue that the Ming upheld a " <hl> divide-and-rule <hl> " policy towards a weak and politically fragmented Tibet after the Sakya regime had fallen.

question: What policy does Luciano Petech and Sato Hisashi claim the Ming held towards the Tibet?, context: Historians Luciano Petech and Sato Hisashi argue that the Ming upheld a "divide-and-rule" policy towards a weak and politically fragmented Tibet after the Sakya regime had fallen. Chan writes that this was perhaps the calculated strategy of the Yongle Emperor, as exclusive patronage to one Tibetan sect would have given it too much regional power. Sperling finds no textual evidence in either Chinese or Tibetan sources to support this thesis of Petech and Hisashi. Norbu asserts that their thesis is largely based on the list of Ming titles conferred on Tibetan lamas rather than "comparative analysis of developments in China and Tibet." Rossabi states that this theory "attributes too much influence to the Chinese," pointing out that Tibet was already politically divided when the Ming dynasty began. Rossabi also discounts the "divide-and-rule" theory on the grounds of the Yongle Emperor's failed attempt to build a strong relationship with the fifth Karmapa—one which he hoped would parallel Kublai Khan's earlier relationship with the Sakya Phagpa lama. Instead, the Yongle Emperor followed the Karmapa's advice of giving patronage to many different Tibetan lamas.