Question: Where were most of the Japanese aircraft in the South Pacific redeployed to defend?

With Japanese and Allied forces occupying various parts of the island, over the following six months both sides poured resources into an escalating battle of attrition on land, at sea, and in the sky. Most of the Japanese aircraft based in the South Pacific were redeployed to the defense of Guadalcanal. Many were lost in numerous engagements with the Allied air forces based at Henderson Field as well as carrier based aircraft. Meanwhile, Japanese ground forces launched repeated attacks on heavily defended US positions around Henderson Field, in which they suffered appalling casualties. To sustain these offensives, resupply was carried out by Japanese convoys, termed the "Tokyo Express" by the Allies. The convoys often faced night battles with enemy naval forces in which they expended destroyers that the IJN could ill-afford to lose. Later fleet battles involving heavier ships and even daytime carrier battles resulted in a stretch of water near Guadalcanal becoming known as "Ironbottom Sound" from the multitude of ships sunk on both sides. However, the Allies were much better able to replace these losses. Finally recognizing that the campaign to recapture Henderson Field and secure Guadalcanal had simply become too costly to continue, the Japanese evacuated the island and withdrew in February 1943. In the sixth month war of attrition, the Japanese had lost as a result of failing to commit enough forces in sufficient time.

Answer: Guadalcanal

With Japanese and Allied forces occupying various parts of the island, over the following six months both sides poured resources into an escalating battle of attrition on land, at sea, and in the sky. <hl> Most of the Japanese aircraft based in the South Pacific were redeployed to the defense of Guadalcanal . <hl> Many were lost in numerous engagements with the Allied air forces based at Henderson Field as well as carrier based aircraft. Meanwhile, Japanese ground forces launched repeated attacks on heavily defended US positions around Henderson Field, in which they suffered appalling casualties. To sustain these offensives, resupply was carried out by Japanese convoys, termed the "Tokyo Express" by the Allies. The convoys often faced night battles with enemy naval forces in which they expended destroyers that the IJN could ill-afford to lose. Later fleet battles involving heavier ships and even daytime carrier battles resulted in a stretch of water near Guadalcanal becoming known as "Ironbottom Sound" from the multitude of ships sunk on both sides. However, the Allies were much better able to replace these losses. Finally recognizing that the campaign to recapture Henderson Field and secure Guadalcanal had simply become too costly to continue, the Japanese evacuated the island and withdrew in February 1943. In the sixth month war of attrition, the Japanese had lost as a result of failing to commit enough forces in sufficient time.

With Japanese and Allied forces occupying various parts of the island, over the following six months both sides poured resources into an escalating battle of attrition on land, at sea, and in the sky. Most of the Japanese aircraft based in the South Pacific were redeployed to the defense of <hl> Guadalcanal <hl>. Many were lost in numerous engagements with the Allied air forces based at Henderson Field as well as carrier based aircraft. Meanwhile, Japanese ground forces launched repeated attacks on heavily defended US positions around Henderson Field, in which they suffered appalling casualties. To sustain these offensives, resupply was carried out by Japanese convoys, termed the "Tokyo Express" by the Allies. The convoys often faced night battles with enemy naval forces in which they expended destroyers that the IJN could ill-afford to lose. Later fleet battles involving heavier ships and even daytime carrier battles resulted in a stretch of water near Guadalcanal becoming known as "Ironbottom Sound" from the multitude of ships sunk on both sides. However, the Allies were much better able to replace these losses. Finally recognizing that the campaign to recapture Henderson Field and secure Guadalcanal had simply become too costly to continue, the Japanese evacuated the island and withdrew in February 1943. In the sixth month war of attrition, the Japanese had lost as a result of failing to commit enough forces in sufficient time.

Most of the Japanese aircraft based in the South Pacific were redeployed to the defense of <hl> Guadalcanal <hl> .


Question: Where did Japanese ground attack repeatedly?forces

Answer: Henderson Field

With Japanese and Allied forces occupying various parts of the island, over the following six months both sides poured resources into an escalating battle of attrition on land, at sea, and in the sky. Most of the Japanese aircraft based in the South Pacific were redeployed to the defense of Guadalcanal. <hl> Many were lost in numerous engagements with the Allied air forces based at Henderson Field as well as carrier based aircraft. <hl> Meanwhile, Japanese ground forces launched repeated attacks on heavily defended US positions around Henderson Field, in which they suffered appalling casualties. To sustain these offensives, resupply was carried out by Japanese convoys, termed the "Tokyo Express" by the Allies. The convoys often faced night battles with enemy naval forces in which they expended destroyers that the IJN could ill-afford to lose. Later fleet battles involving heavier ships and even daytime carrier battles resulted in a stretch of water near Guadalcanal becoming known as "Ironbottom Sound" from the multitude of ships sunk on both sides. However, the Allies were much better able to replace these losses. Finally recognizing that the campaign to recapture Henderson Field and secure Guadalcanal had simply become too costly to continue, the Japanese evacuated the island and withdrew in February 1943. In the sixth month war of attrition, the Japanese had lost as a result of failing to commit enough forces in sufficient time.

With Japanese and Allied forces occupying various parts of the island, over the following six months both sides poured resources into an escalating battle of attrition on land, at sea, and in the sky. Most of the Japanese aircraft based in the South Pacific were redeployed to the defense of Guadalcanal. Many were lost in numerous engagements with the Allied air forces based at <hl> Henderson Field <hl> as well as carrier based aircraft. Meanwhile, Japanese ground forces launched repeated attacks on heavily defended US positions around Henderson Field, in which they suffered appalling casualties. To sustain these offensives, resupply was carried out by Japanese convoys, termed the "Tokyo Express" by the Allies. The convoys often faced night battles with enemy naval forces in which they expended destroyers that the IJN could ill-afford to lose. Later fleet battles involving heavier ships and even daytime carrier battles resulted in a stretch of water near Guadalcanal becoming known as "Ironbottom Sound" from the multitude of ships sunk on both sides. However, the Allies were much better able to replace these losses. Finally recognizing that the campaign to recapture Henderson Field and secure Guadalcanal had simply become too costly to continue, the Japanese evacuated the island and withdrew in February 1943. In the sixth month war of attrition, the Japanese had lost as a result of failing to commit enough forces in sufficient time.


Question: What did the Allies call the Japanese convoys supplying the ground forces attacking Henderson Field?

Answer: "Tokyo Express"

With Japanese and Allied forces occupying various parts of the island, over the following six months both sides poured resources into an escalating battle of attrition on land, at sea, and in the sky. Most of the Japanese aircraft based in the South Pacific were redeployed to the defense of Guadalcanal. Many were lost in numerous engagements with the Allied air forces based at Henderson Field as well as carrier based aircraft. Meanwhile, Japanese ground forces launched repeated attacks on heavily defended US positions around Henderson Field, in which they suffered appalling casualties. <hl> To sustain these offensives, resupply was carried out by Japanese convoys, termed the "Tokyo Express" by the Allies. <hl> The convoys often faced night battles with enemy naval forces in which they expended destroyers that the IJN could ill-afford to lose. Later fleet battles involving heavier ships and even daytime carrier battles resulted in a stretch of water near Guadalcanal becoming known as "Ironbottom Sound" from the multitude of ships sunk on both sides. However, the Allies were much better able to replace these losses. Finally recognizing that the campaign to recapture Henderson Field and secure Guadalcanal had simply become too costly to continue, the Japanese evacuated the island and withdrew in February 1943. In the sixth month war of attrition, the Japanese had lost as a result of failing to commit enough forces in sufficient time.

With Japanese and Allied forces occupying various parts of the island, over the following six months both sides poured resources into an escalating battle of attrition on land, at sea, and in the sky. Most of the Japanese aircraft based in the South Pacific were redeployed to the defense of Guadalcanal. Many were lost in numerous engagements with the Allied air forces based at Henderson Field as well as carrier based aircraft. Meanwhile, Japanese ground forces launched repeated attacks on heavily defended US positions around Henderson Field, in which they suffered appalling casualties. To sustain these offensives, resupply was carried out by Japanese convoys, termed the <hl> "Tokyo Express" <hl> by the Allies. The convoys often faced night battles with enemy naval forces in which they expended destroyers that the IJN could ill-afford to lose. Later fleet battles involving heavier ships and even daytime carrier battles resulted in a stretch of water near Guadalcanal becoming known as "Ironbottom Sound" from the multitude of ships sunk on both sides. However, the Allies were much better able to replace these losses. Finally recognizing that the campaign to recapture Henderson Field and secure Guadalcanal had simply become too costly to continue, the Japanese evacuated the island and withdrew in February 1943. In the sixth month war of attrition, the Japanese had lost as a result of failing to commit enough forces in sufficient time.


Question: What was the reason for the name "Ironbottom Sound" of the water stretches new Guadalcanal?

Answer: the multitude of ships sunk

With Japanese and Allied forces occupying various parts of the island, over the following six months both sides poured resources into an escalating battle of attrition on land, at sea, and in the sky. Most of the Japanese aircraft based in the South Pacific were redeployed to the defense of Guadalcanal. Many were lost in numerous engagements with the Allied air forces based at Henderson Field as well as carrier based aircraft. Meanwhile, Japanese ground forces launched repeated attacks on heavily defended US positions around Henderson Field, in which they suffered appalling casualties. To sustain these offensives, resupply was carried out by Japanese convoys, termed the "Tokyo Express" by the Allies. The convoys often faced night battles with enemy naval forces in which they expended destroyers that the IJN could ill-afford to lose. <hl> Later fleet battles involving heavier ships and even daytime carrier battles resulted in a stretch of water near Guadalcanal becoming known as "Ironbottom Sound" from the multitude of ships sunk on both sides. <hl> However, the Allies were much better able to replace these losses. Finally recognizing that the campaign to recapture Henderson Field and secure Guadalcanal had simply become too costly to continue, the Japanese evacuated the island and withdrew in February 1943. In the sixth month war of attrition, the Japanese had lost as a result of failing to commit enough forces in sufficient time.

With Japanese and Allied forces occupying various parts of the island, over the following six months both sides poured resources into an escalating battle of attrition on land, at sea, and in the sky. Most of the Japanese aircraft based in the South Pacific were redeployed to the defense of Guadalcanal. Many were lost in numerous engagements with the Allied air forces based at Henderson Field as well as carrier based aircraft. Meanwhile, Japanese ground forces launched repeated attacks on heavily defended US positions around Henderson Field, in which they suffered appalling casualties. To sustain these offensives, resupply was carried out by Japanese convoys, termed the "Tokyo Express" by the Allies. The convoys often faced night battles with enemy naval forces in which they expended destroyers that the IJN could ill-afford to lose. Later fleet battles involving heavier ships and even daytime carrier battles resulted in a stretch of water near Guadalcanal becoming known as "Ironbottom Sound" from <hl> the multitude of ships sunk <hl> on both sides. However, the Allies were much better able to replace these losses. Finally recognizing that the campaign to recapture Henderson Field and secure Guadalcanal had simply become too costly to continue, the Japanese evacuated the island and withdrew in February 1943. In the sixth month war of attrition, the Japanese had lost as a result of failing to commit enough forces in sufficient time.


Question: When did the Japanese give up trying to recapture Henderson Field?

Answer: February 1943

With Japanese and Allied forces occupying various parts of the island, over the following six months both sides poured resources into an escalating battle of attrition on land, at sea, and in the sky. Most of the Japanese aircraft based in the South Pacific were redeployed to the defense of Guadalcanal. Many were lost in numerous engagements with the Allied air forces based at Henderson Field as well as carrier based aircraft. Meanwhile, Japanese ground forces launched repeated attacks on heavily defended US positions around Henderson Field, in which they suffered appalling casualties. To sustain these offensives, resupply was carried out by Japanese convoys, termed the "Tokyo Express" by the Allies. The convoys often faced night battles with enemy naval forces in which they expended destroyers that the IJN could ill-afford to lose. Later fleet battles involving heavier ships and even daytime carrier battles resulted in a stretch of water near Guadalcanal becoming known as "Ironbottom Sound" from the multitude of ships sunk on both sides. However, the Allies were much better able to replace these losses. <hl> Finally recognizing that the campaign to recapture Henderson Field and secure Guadalcanal had simply become too costly to continue, the Japanese evacuated the island and withdrew in February 1943 . <hl> In the sixth month war of attrition, the Japanese had lost as a result of failing to commit enough forces in sufficient time.

With Japanese and Allied forces occupying various parts of the island, over the following six months both sides poured resources into an escalating battle of attrition on land, at sea, and in the sky. Most of the Japanese aircraft based in the South Pacific were redeployed to the defense of Guadalcanal. Many were lost in numerous engagements with the Allied air forces based at Henderson Field as well as carrier based aircraft. Meanwhile, Japanese ground forces launched repeated attacks on heavily defended US positions around Henderson Field, in which they suffered appalling casualties. To sustain these offensives, resupply was carried out by Japanese convoys, termed the "Tokyo Express" by the Allies. The convoys often faced night battles with enemy naval forces in which they expended destroyers that the IJN could ill-afford to lose. Later fleet battles involving heavier ships and even daytime carrier battles resulted in a stretch of water near Guadalcanal becoming known as "Ironbottom Sound" from the multitude of ships sunk on both sides. However, the Allies were much better able to replace these losses. Finally recognizing that the campaign to recapture Henderson Field and secure Guadalcanal had simply become too costly to continue, the Japanese evacuated the island and withdrew in <hl> February 1943 <hl>. In the sixth month war of attrition, the Japanese had lost as a result of failing to commit enough forces in sufficient time.

Finally recognizing that the campaign to recapture Henderson Field and secure Guadalcanal had simply become too costly to continue, the Japanese evacuated the island and withdrew in <hl> February 1943 <hl> .


Question: Where were the 40th, 3rd, and 6th divisions massed at in China?

In mainland China, the Japanese 3rd, 6th, and 40th Divisions massed at Yueyang and advanced southward in three columns and crossed the Xinqiang River, and tried again to cross the Miluo River to reach Changsha. In January 1942, Chinese forces got a victory at Changsha which was the first Allied success against Japan. After the Doolittle Raid, the Japanese army conducted a massive sweep through Zhejiang and Jiangxi of China, now known as the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, with the goal of searching out the surviving American airmen, applying retribution on the Chinese who aided them and destroying air bases. This operation started on 15 May 1942 with 40 infantry battalions and 15–16 artillery battalions but was repelled by Chinese forces in September. During this campaign, The Imperial Japanese Army left behind a trail of devastation and had also spread cholera, typhoid, plague and dysentery pathogens. Chinese estimates put the death toll at 250,000 civilians. Around 1,700 Japanese troops died out of a total 10,000 Japanese soldiers who fell ill with disease when their own biological weapons attack rebounded on their own forces. On 2 November 1943, Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the Imperial Japanese 11th Army, deployed the 39th, 58th, 13th, 3rd, 116th and 68th divisions, a grand total of around 100,000 troops, to attack Changde of China. During the seven-week Battle of Changde, the Chinese forced Japan to fight a costly war of attrition. Although the Japanese army initially successfully captured the city, the Chinese 57th division was able to pin them down long enough for reinforcements to arrive and encircle the Japanese. The Chinese army then cut off the Japanese supply lines, forcing them into retreat, whereupon the Chinese pursued their enemy. During the battle, in an act of desperation, Japan used chemical weapons. In the aftermath of the Japanese conquest of Burma, there was widespread disorder in eastern India, and a disastrous famine in Bengal, which ultimately caused up to 3 million deaths. In spite of these, and inadequate lines of communication, British and Indian forces attempted limited counter-attacks in Burma in early 1943. An offensive in Arakan failed, while a long distance raid mounted by the Chindits under Brigadier Orde Wingate suffered heavy losses, but was publicized to bolster Allied morale. It also provoked the Japanese to mount major offensives themselves the following year.

Answer: Yueyang

<hl> In mainland China, the Japanese 3rd, 6th, and 40th Divisions massed at Yueyang and advanced southward in three columns and crossed the Xinqiang River, and tried again to cross the Miluo River to reach Changsha. <hl> In January 1942, Chinese forces got a victory at Changsha which was the first Allied success against Japan. After the Doolittle Raid, the Japanese army conducted a massive sweep through Zhejiang and Jiangxi of China, now known as the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, with the goal of searching out the surviving American airmen, applying retribution on the Chinese who aided them and destroying air bases. This operation started on 15 May 1942 with 40 infantry battalions and 15–16 artillery battalions but was repelled by Chinese forces in September. During this campaign, The Imperial Japanese Army left behind a trail of devastation and had also spread cholera, typhoid, plague and dysentery pathogens. Chinese estimates put the death toll at 250,000 civilians. Around 1,700 Japanese troops died out of a total 10,000 Japanese soldiers who fell ill with disease when their own biological weapons attack rebounded on their own forces. On 2 November 1943, Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the Imperial Japanese 11th Army, deployed the 39th, 58th, 13th, 3rd, 116th and 68th divisions, a grand total of around 100,000 troops, to attack Changde of China. During the seven-week Battle of Changde, the Chinese forced Japan to fight a costly war of attrition. Although the Japanese army initially successfully captured the city, the Chinese 57th division was able to pin them down long enough for reinforcements to arrive and encircle the Japanese. The Chinese army then cut off the Japanese supply lines, forcing them into retreat, whereupon the Chinese pursued their enemy. During the battle, in an act of desperation, Japan used chemical weapons. In the aftermath of the Japanese conquest of Burma, there was widespread disorder in eastern India, and a disastrous famine in Bengal, which ultimately caused up to 3 million deaths. In spite of these, and inadequate lines of communication, British and Indian forces attempted limited counter-attacks in Burma in early 1943. An offensive in Arakan failed, while a long distance raid mounted by the Chindits under Brigadier Orde Wingate suffered heavy losses, but was publicized to bolster Allied morale. It also provoked the Japanese to mount major offensives themselves the following year.

In mainland China, the Japanese 3rd, 6th, and 40th Divisions massed at <hl> Yueyang <hl> and advanced southward in three columns and crossed the Xinqiang River, and tried again to cross the Miluo River to reach Changsha. In January 1942, Chinese forces got a victory at Changsha which was the first Allied success against Japan. After the Doolittle Raid, the Japanese army conducted a massive sweep through Zhejiang and Jiangxi of China, now known as the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, with the goal of searching out the surviving American airmen, applying retribution on the Chinese who aided them and destroying air bases. This operation started on 15 May 1942 with 40 infantry battalions and 15–16 artillery battalions but was repelled by Chinese forces in September. During this campaign, The Imperial Japanese Army left behind a trail of devastation and had also spread cholera, typhoid, plague and dysentery pathogens. Chinese estimates put the death toll at 250,000 civilians. Around 1,700 Japanese troops died out of a total 10,000 Japanese soldiers who fell ill with disease when their own biological weapons attack rebounded on their own forces. On 2 November 1943, Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the Imperial Japanese 11th Army, deployed the 39th, 58th, 13th, 3rd, 116th and 68th divisions, a grand total of around 100,000 troops, to attack Changde of China. During the seven-week Battle of Changde, the Chinese forced Japan to fight a costly war of attrition. Although the Japanese army initially successfully captured the city, the Chinese 57th division was able to pin them down long enough for reinforcements to arrive and encircle the Japanese. The Chinese army then cut off the Japanese supply lines, forcing them into retreat, whereupon the Chinese pursued their enemy. During the battle, in an act of desperation, Japan used chemical weapons. In the aftermath of the Japanese conquest of Burma, there was widespread disorder in eastern India, and a disastrous famine in Bengal, which ultimately caused up to 3 million deaths. In spite of these, and inadequate lines of communication, British and Indian forces attempted limited counter-attacks in Burma in early 1943. An offensive in Arakan failed, while a long distance raid mounted by the Chindits under Brigadier Orde Wingate suffered heavy losses, but was publicized to bolster Allied morale. It also provoked the Japanese to mount major offensives themselves the following year.


Question: What is the first river that the 40th, 3rd, and 6th Japanese divisions crossed while advancing southward?

Answer: Xinqiang River

<hl> In mainland China, the Japanese 3rd, 6th, and 40th Divisions massed at Yueyang and advanced southward in three columns and crossed the Xinqiang River , and tried again to cross the Miluo River to reach Changsha. <hl> In January 1942, Chinese forces got a victory at Changsha which was the first Allied success against Japan. After the Doolittle Raid, the Japanese army conducted a massive sweep through Zhejiang and Jiangxi of China, now known as the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, with the goal of searching out the surviving American airmen, applying retribution on the Chinese who aided them and destroying air bases. This operation started on 15 May 1942 with 40 infantry battalions and 15–16 artillery battalions but was repelled by Chinese forces in September. During this campaign, The Imperial Japanese Army left behind a trail of devastation and had also spread cholera, typhoid, plague and dysentery pathogens. Chinese estimates put the death toll at 250,000 civilians. Around 1,700 Japanese troops died out of a total 10,000 Japanese soldiers who fell ill with disease when their own biological weapons attack rebounded on their own forces. On 2 November 1943, Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the Imperial Japanese 11th Army, deployed the 39th, 58th, 13th, 3rd, 116th and 68th divisions, a grand total of around 100,000 troops, to attack Changde of China. During the seven-week Battle of Changde, the Chinese forced Japan to fight a costly war of attrition. Although the Japanese army initially successfully captured the city, the Chinese 57th division was able to pin them down long enough for reinforcements to arrive and encircle the Japanese. The Chinese army then cut off the Japanese supply lines, forcing them into retreat, whereupon the Chinese pursued their enemy. During the battle, in an act of desperation, Japan used chemical weapons. In the aftermath of the Japanese conquest of Burma, there was widespread disorder in eastern India, and a disastrous famine in Bengal, which ultimately caused up to 3 million deaths. In spite of these, and inadequate lines of communication, British and Indian forces attempted limited counter-attacks in Burma in early 1943. An offensive in Arakan failed, while a long distance raid mounted by the Chindits under Brigadier Orde Wingate suffered heavy losses, but was publicized to bolster Allied morale. It also provoked the Japanese to mount major offensives themselves the following year.

In mainland China, the Japanese 3rd, 6th, and 40th Divisions massed at Yueyang and advanced southward in three columns and crossed the <hl> Xinqiang River <hl>, and tried again to cross the Miluo River to reach Changsha. In January 1942, Chinese forces got a victory at Changsha which was the first Allied success against Japan. After the Doolittle Raid, the Japanese army conducted a massive sweep through Zhejiang and Jiangxi of China, now known as the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, with the goal of searching out the surviving American airmen, applying retribution on the Chinese who aided them and destroying air bases. This operation started on 15 May 1942 with 40 infantry battalions and 15–16 artillery battalions but was repelled by Chinese forces in September. During this campaign, The Imperial Japanese Army left behind a trail of devastation and had also spread cholera, typhoid, plague and dysentery pathogens. Chinese estimates put the death toll at 250,000 civilians. Around 1,700 Japanese troops died out of a total 10,000 Japanese soldiers who fell ill with disease when their own biological weapons attack rebounded on their own forces. On 2 November 1943, Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the Imperial Japanese 11th Army, deployed the 39th, 58th, 13th, 3rd, 116th and 68th divisions, a grand total of around 100,000 troops, to attack Changde of China. During the seven-week Battle of Changde, the Chinese forced Japan to fight a costly war of attrition. Although the Japanese army initially successfully captured the city, the Chinese 57th division was able to pin them down long enough for reinforcements to arrive and encircle the Japanese. The Chinese army then cut off the Japanese supply lines, forcing them into retreat, whereupon the Chinese pursued their enemy. During the battle, in an act of desperation, Japan used chemical weapons. In the aftermath of the Japanese conquest of Burma, there was widespread disorder in eastern India, and a disastrous famine in Bengal, which ultimately caused up to 3 million deaths. In spite of these, and inadequate lines of communication, British and Indian forces attempted limited counter-attacks in Burma in early 1943. An offensive in Arakan failed, while a long distance raid mounted by the Chindits under Brigadier Orde Wingate suffered heavy losses, but was publicized to bolster Allied morale. It also provoked the Japanese to mount major offensives themselves the following year.

In mainland China, the Japanese 3rd, 6th, and 40th Divisions massed at Yueyang and advanced southward in three columns and crossed the <hl> Xinqiang River <hl> , and tried again to cross the Miluo River to reach Changsha.


Question: How many Chinese civilians were estimated to have died during the Japanese Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign?

Answer: 250,000

In mainland China, the Japanese 3rd, 6th, and 40th Divisions massed at Yueyang and advanced southward in three columns and crossed the Xinqiang River, and tried again to cross the Miluo River to reach Changsha. In January 1942, Chinese forces got a victory at Changsha which was the first Allied success against Japan. After the Doolittle Raid, the Japanese army conducted a massive sweep through Zhejiang and Jiangxi of China, now known as the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, with the goal of searching out the surviving American airmen, applying retribution on the Chinese who aided them and destroying air bases. This operation started on 15 May 1942 with 40 infantry battalions and 15–16 artillery battalions but was repelled by Chinese forces in September. During this campaign, The Imperial Japanese Army left behind a trail of devastation and had also spread cholera, typhoid, plague and dysentery pathogens. <hl> Chinese estimates put the death toll at 250,000 civilians. <hl> Around 1,700 Japanese troops died out of a total 10,000 Japanese soldiers who fell ill with disease when their own biological weapons attack rebounded on their own forces. On 2 November 1943, Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the Imperial Japanese 11th Army, deployed the 39th, 58th, 13th, 3rd, 116th and 68th divisions, a grand total of around 100,000 troops, to attack Changde of China. During the seven-week Battle of Changde, the Chinese forced Japan to fight a costly war of attrition. Although the Japanese army initially successfully captured the city, the Chinese 57th division was able to pin them down long enough for reinforcements to arrive and encircle the Japanese. The Chinese army then cut off the Japanese supply lines, forcing them into retreat, whereupon the Chinese pursued their enemy. During the battle, in an act of desperation, Japan used chemical weapons. In the aftermath of the Japanese conquest of Burma, there was widespread disorder in eastern India, and a disastrous famine in Bengal, which ultimately caused up to 3 million deaths. In spite of these, and inadequate lines of communication, British and Indian forces attempted limited counter-attacks in Burma in early 1943. An offensive in Arakan failed, while a long distance raid mounted by the Chindits under Brigadier Orde Wingate suffered heavy losses, but was publicized to bolster Allied morale. It also provoked the Japanese to mount major offensives themselves the following year.

In mainland China, the Japanese 3rd, 6th, and 40th Divisions massed at Yueyang and advanced southward in three columns and crossed the Xinqiang River, and tried again to cross the Miluo River to reach Changsha. In January 1942, Chinese forces got a victory at Changsha which was the first Allied success against Japan. After the Doolittle Raid, the Japanese army conducted a massive sweep through Zhejiang and Jiangxi of China, now known as the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, with the goal of searching out the surviving American airmen, applying retribution on the Chinese who aided them and destroying air bases. This operation started on 15 May 1942 with 40 infantry battalions and 15–16 artillery battalions but was repelled by Chinese forces in September. During this campaign, The Imperial Japanese Army left behind a trail of devastation and had also spread cholera, typhoid, plague and dysentery pathogens. Chinese estimates put the death toll at <hl> 250,000 <hl> civilians. Around 1,700 Japanese troops died out of a total 10,000 Japanese soldiers who fell ill with disease when their own biological weapons attack rebounded on their own forces. On 2 November 1943, Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the Imperial Japanese 11th Army, deployed the 39th, 58th, 13th, 3rd, 116th and 68th divisions, a grand total of around 100,000 troops, to attack Changde of China. During the seven-week Battle of Changde, the Chinese forced Japan to fight a costly war of attrition. Although the Japanese army initially successfully captured the city, the Chinese 57th division was able to pin them down long enough for reinforcements to arrive and encircle the Japanese. The Chinese army then cut off the Japanese supply lines, forcing them into retreat, whereupon the Chinese pursued their enemy. During the battle, in an act of desperation, Japan used chemical weapons. In the aftermath of the Japanese conquest of Burma, there was widespread disorder in eastern India, and a disastrous famine in Bengal, which ultimately caused up to 3 million deaths. In spite of these, and inadequate lines of communication, British and Indian forces attempted limited counter-attacks in Burma in early 1943. An offensive in Arakan failed, while a long distance raid mounted by the Chindits under Brigadier Orde Wingate suffered heavy losses, but was publicized to bolster Allied morale. It also provoked the Japanese to mount major offensives themselves the following year.


Question: What is the river that the 40th, 3rd, and 6th Japanese divisions tried crossing to reach Changsha?

Answer: Miluo River

<hl> In mainland China, the Japanese 3rd, 6th, and 40th Divisions massed at Yueyang and advanced southward in three columns and crossed the Xinqiang River, and tried again to cross the Miluo River to reach Changsha. <hl> In January 1942, Chinese forces got a victory at Changsha which was the first Allied success against Japan. After the Doolittle Raid, the Japanese army conducted a massive sweep through Zhejiang and Jiangxi of China, now known as the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, with the goal of searching out the surviving American airmen, applying retribution on the Chinese who aided them and destroying air bases. This operation started on 15 May 1942 with 40 infantry battalions and 15–16 artillery battalions but was repelled by Chinese forces in September. During this campaign, The Imperial Japanese Army left behind a trail of devastation and had also spread cholera, typhoid, plague and dysentery pathogens. Chinese estimates put the death toll at 250,000 civilians. Around 1,700 Japanese troops died out of a total 10,000 Japanese soldiers who fell ill with disease when their own biological weapons attack rebounded on their own forces. On 2 November 1943, Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the Imperial Japanese 11th Army, deployed the 39th, 58th, 13th, 3rd, 116th and 68th divisions, a grand total of around 100,000 troops, to attack Changde of China. During the seven-week Battle of Changde, the Chinese forced Japan to fight a costly war of attrition. Although the Japanese army initially successfully captured the city, the Chinese 57th division was able to pin them down long enough for reinforcements to arrive and encircle the Japanese. The Chinese army then cut off the Japanese supply lines, forcing them into retreat, whereupon the Chinese pursued their enemy. During the battle, in an act of desperation, Japan used chemical weapons. In the aftermath of the Japanese conquest of Burma, there was widespread disorder in eastern India, and a disastrous famine in Bengal, which ultimately caused up to 3 million deaths. In spite of these, and inadequate lines of communication, British and Indian forces attempted limited counter-attacks in Burma in early 1943. An offensive in Arakan failed, while a long distance raid mounted by the Chindits under Brigadier Orde Wingate suffered heavy losses, but was publicized to bolster Allied morale. It also provoked the Japanese to mount major offensives themselves the following year.

In mainland China, the Japanese 3rd, 6th, and 40th Divisions massed at Yueyang and advanced southward in three columns and crossed the Xinqiang River, and tried again to cross the <hl> Miluo River <hl> to reach Changsha. In January 1942, Chinese forces got a victory at Changsha which was the first Allied success against Japan. After the Doolittle Raid, the Japanese army conducted a massive sweep through Zhejiang and Jiangxi of China, now known as the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, with the goal of searching out the surviving American airmen, applying retribution on the Chinese who aided them and destroying air bases. This operation started on 15 May 1942 with 40 infantry battalions and 15–16 artillery battalions but was repelled by Chinese forces in September. During this campaign, The Imperial Japanese Army left behind a trail of devastation and had also spread cholera, typhoid, plague and dysentery pathogens. Chinese estimates put the death toll at 250,000 civilians. Around 1,700 Japanese troops died out of a total 10,000 Japanese soldiers who fell ill with disease when their own biological weapons attack rebounded on their own forces. On 2 November 1943, Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the Imperial Japanese 11th Army, deployed the 39th, 58th, 13th, 3rd, 116th and 68th divisions, a grand total of around 100,000 troops, to attack Changde of China. During the seven-week Battle of Changde, the Chinese forced Japan to fight a costly war of attrition. Although the Japanese army initially successfully captured the city, the Chinese 57th division was able to pin them down long enough for reinforcements to arrive and encircle the Japanese. The Chinese army then cut off the Japanese supply lines, forcing them into retreat, whereupon the Chinese pursued their enemy. During the battle, in an act of desperation, Japan used chemical weapons. In the aftermath of the Japanese conquest of Burma, there was widespread disorder in eastern India, and a disastrous famine in Bengal, which ultimately caused up to 3 million deaths. In spite of these, and inadequate lines of communication, British and Indian forces attempted limited counter-attacks in Burma in early 1943. An offensive in Arakan failed, while a long distance raid mounted by the Chindits under Brigadier Orde Wingate suffered heavy losses, but was publicized to bolster Allied morale. It also provoked the Japanese to mount major offensives themselves the following year.


Question: Who commanded the Imperial Japanese 11th Army on November, 1943?

Answer: Isamu Yokoyama

In mainland China, the Japanese 3rd, 6th, and 40th Divisions massed at Yueyang and advanced southward in three columns and crossed the Xinqiang River, and tried again to cross the Miluo River to reach Changsha. In January 1942, Chinese forces got a victory at Changsha which was the first Allied success against Japan. After the Doolittle Raid, the Japanese army conducted a massive sweep through Zhejiang and Jiangxi of China, now known as the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, with the goal of searching out the surviving American airmen, applying retribution on the Chinese who aided them and destroying air bases. This operation started on 15 May 1942 with 40 infantry battalions and 15–16 artillery battalions but was repelled by Chinese forces in September. During this campaign, The Imperial Japanese Army left behind a trail of devastation and had also spread cholera, typhoid, plague and dysentery pathogens. Chinese estimates put the death toll at 250,000 civilians. Around 1,700 Japanese troops died out of a total 10,000 Japanese soldiers who fell ill with disease when their own biological weapons attack rebounded on their own forces. <hl> On 2 November 1943, Isamu Yokoyama , commander of the Imperial Japanese 11th Army, deployed the 39th, 58th, 13th, 3rd, 116th and 68th divisions, a grand total of around 100,000 troops, to attack Changde of China. <hl> During the seven-week Battle of Changde, the Chinese forced Japan to fight a costly war of attrition. Although the Japanese army initially successfully captured the city, the Chinese 57th division was able to pin them down long enough for reinforcements to arrive and encircle the Japanese. The Chinese army then cut off the Japanese supply lines, forcing them into retreat, whereupon the Chinese pursued their enemy. During the battle, in an act of desperation, Japan used chemical weapons. In the aftermath of the Japanese conquest of Burma, there was widespread disorder in eastern India, and a disastrous famine in Bengal, which ultimately caused up to 3 million deaths. In spite of these, and inadequate lines of communication, British and Indian forces attempted limited counter-attacks in Burma in early 1943. An offensive in Arakan failed, while a long distance raid mounted by the Chindits under Brigadier Orde Wingate suffered heavy losses, but was publicized to bolster Allied morale. It also provoked the Japanese to mount major offensives themselves the following year.

In mainland China, the Japanese 3rd, 6th, and 40th Divisions massed at Yueyang and advanced southward in three columns and crossed the Xinqiang River, and tried again to cross the Miluo River to reach Changsha. In January 1942, Chinese forces got a victory at Changsha which was the first Allied success against Japan. After the Doolittle Raid, the Japanese army conducted a massive sweep through Zhejiang and Jiangxi of China, now known as the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, with the goal of searching out the surviving American airmen, applying retribution on the Chinese who aided them and destroying air bases. This operation started on 15 May 1942 with 40 infantry battalions and 15–16 artillery battalions but was repelled by Chinese forces in September. During this campaign, The Imperial Japanese Army left behind a trail of devastation and had also spread cholera, typhoid, plague and dysentery pathogens. Chinese estimates put the death toll at 250,000 civilians. Around 1,700 Japanese troops died out of a total 10,000 Japanese soldiers who fell ill with disease when their own biological weapons attack rebounded on their own forces. On 2 November 1943, <hl> Isamu Yokoyama <hl>, commander of the Imperial Japanese 11th Army, deployed the 39th, 58th, 13th, 3rd, 116th and 68th divisions, a grand total of around 100,000 troops, to attack Changde of China. During the seven-week Battle of Changde, the Chinese forced Japan to fight a costly war of attrition. Although the Japanese army initially successfully captured the city, the Chinese 57th division was able to pin them down long enough for reinforcements to arrive and encircle the Japanese. The Chinese army then cut off the Japanese supply lines, forcing them into retreat, whereupon the Chinese pursued their enemy. During the battle, in an act of desperation, Japan used chemical weapons. In the aftermath of the Japanese conquest of Burma, there was widespread disorder in eastern India, and a disastrous famine in Bengal, which ultimately caused up to 3 million deaths. In spite of these, and inadequate lines of communication, British and Indian forces attempted limited counter-attacks in Burma in early 1943. An offensive in Arakan failed, while a long distance raid mounted by the Chindits under Brigadier Orde Wingate suffered heavy losses, but was publicized to bolster Allied morale. It also provoked the Japanese to mount major offensives themselves the following year.

On 2 November 1943, <hl> Isamu Yokoyama <hl> , commander of the Imperial Japanese 11th Army, deployed the 39th, 58th, 13th, 3rd, 116th and 68th divisions, a grand total of around 100,000 troops, to attack Changde of China.


Question: What Allied command replaced the British India Command in August, 1943?

In August 1943 the Allies formed a new South East Asia Command (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibilities for Burma and India from the British India Command, under Wavell. In October 1943 Winston Churchill appointed Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as its Supreme Commander. The British and Indian Fourteenth Army was formed to face the Japanese in Burma. Under Lieutenant General William Slim, its training, morale and health greatly improved. The American General Joseph Stilwell, who also was deputy commander to Mountbatten and commanded U.S. forces in the China Burma India Theater, directed aid to China and prepared to construct the Ledo Road to link India and China by land.

Answer: South East Asia Command

<hl> In August 1943 the Allies formed a new South East Asia Command (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibilities for Burma and India from the British India Command, under Wavell. <hl> In October 1943 Winston Churchill appointed Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as its Supreme Commander. The British and Indian Fourteenth Army was formed to face the Japanese in Burma. Under Lieutenant General William Slim, its training, morale and health greatly improved. The American General Joseph Stilwell, who also was deputy commander to Mountbatten and commanded U.S. forces in the China Burma India Theater, directed aid to China and prepared to construct the Ledo Road to link India and China by land.

In August 1943 the Allies formed a new <hl> South East Asia Command <hl> (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibilities for Burma and India from the British India Command, under Wavell. In October 1943 Winston Churchill appointed Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as its Supreme Commander. The British and Indian Fourteenth Army was formed to face the Japanese in Burma. Under Lieutenant General William Slim, its training, morale and health greatly improved. The American General Joseph Stilwell, who also was deputy commander to Mountbatten and commanded U.S. forces in the China Burma India Theater, directed aid to China and prepared to construct the Ledo Road to link India and China by land.


Question: Who was appointed Supreme Commander of the SEAC in October, 1943?

Answer: Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten

In August 1943 the Allies formed a new South East Asia Command (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibilities for Burma and India from the British India Command, under Wavell. <hl> In October 1943 Winston Churchill appointed Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as its Supreme Commander. <hl> The British and Indian Fourteenth Army was formed to face the Japanese in Burma. Under Lieutenant General William Slim, its training, morale and health greatly improved. The American General Joseph Stilwell, who also was deputy commander to Mountbatten and commanded U.S. forces in the China Burma India Theater, directed aid to China and prepared to construct the Ledo Road to link India and China by land.

In August 1943 the Allies formed a new South East Asia Command (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibilities for Burma and India from the British India Command, under Wavell. In October 1943 Winston Churchill appointed <hl> Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten <hl> as its Supreme Commander. The British and Indian Fourteenth Army was formed to face the Japanese in Burma. Under Lieutenant General William Slim, its training, morale and health greatly improved. The American General Joseph Stilwell, who also was deputy commander to Mountbatten and commanded U.S. forces in the China Burma India Theater, directed aid to China and prepared to construct the Ledo Road to link India and China by land.


Question: Who was deputy commander to Mountbatten?

Answer: General Joseph Stilwell

In August 1943 the Allies formed a new South East Asia Command (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibilities for Burma and India from the British India Command, under Wavell. In October 1943 Winston Churchill appointed Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as its Supreme Commander. The British and Indian Fourteenth Army was formed to face the Japanese in Burma. Under Lieutenant General William Slim, its training, morale and health greatly improved. <hl> The American General Joseph Stilwell , who also was deputy commander to Mountbatten and commanded U.S. forces in the China Burma India Theater, directed aid to China and prepared to construct the Ledo Road to link India and China by land. <hl>

In August 1943 the Allies formed a new South East Asia Command (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibilities for Burma and India from the British India Command, under Wavell. In October 1943 Winston Churchill appointed Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as its Supreme Commander. The British and Indian Fourteenth Army was formed to face the Japanese in Burma. Under Lieutenant General William Slim, its training, morale and health greatly improved. The American <hl> General Joseph Stilwell <hl>, who also was deputy commander to Mountbatten and commanded U.S. forces in the China Burma India Theater, directed aid to China and prepared to construct the Ledo Road to link India and China by land.

The American <hl> General Joseph Stilwell <hl> , who also was deputy commander to Mountbatten and commanded U.S. forces in the China Burma India Theater, directed aid to China and prepared to construct the Ledo Road to link India and China by land.


Question: What was the name of the new link between India and China by land?

Answer: Ledo Road

In August 1943 the Allies formed a new South East Asia Command (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibilities for Burma and India from the British India Command, under Wavell. In October 1943 Winston Churchill appointed Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as its Supreme Commander. The British and Indian Fourteenth Army was formed to face the Japanese in Burma. Under Lieutenant General William Slim, its training, morale and health greatly improved. <hl> The American General Joseph Stilwell, who also was deputy commander to Mountbatten and commanded U.S. forces in the China Burma India Theater, directed aid to China and prepared to construct the Ledo Road to link India and China by land. <hl>

In August 1943 the Allies formed a new South East Asia Command (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibilities for Burma and India from the British India Command, under Wavell. In October 1943 Winston Churchill appointed Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as its Supreme Commander. The British and Indian Fourteenth Army was formed to face the Japanese in Burma. Under Lieutenant General William Slim, its training, morale and health greatly improved. The American General Joseph Stilwell, who also was deputy commander to Mountbatten and commanded U.S. forces in the China Burma India Theater, directed aid to China and prepared to construct the <hl> Ledo Road <hl> to link India and China by land.


Question: The British and Indian Fourteenth Army was formed to take on what force?

Answer: Japanese in Burma

the Japanese in Burma .

In August 1943 the Allies formed a new South East Asia Command (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibilities for Burma and India from the British India Command, under Wavell. In October 1943 Winston Churchill appointed Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as its Supreme Commander. The British and Indian Fourteenth Army was formed to face <hl> the Japanese in Burma . <hl> Under Lieutenant General William Slim, its training, morale and health greatly improved. The American General Joseph Stilwell, who also was deputy commander to Mountbatten and commanded U.S. forces in the China Burma India Theater, directed aid to China and prepared to construct the Ledo Road to link India and China by land.

In August 1943 the Allies formed a new South East Asia Command (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibilities for Burma and India from the British India Command, under Wavell. In October 1943 Winston Churchill appointed Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as its Supreme Commander. The British and Indian Fourteenth Army was formed to face the <hl> Japanese in Burma <hl>. Under Lieutenant General William Slim, its training, morale and health greatly improved. The American General Joseph Stilwell, who also was deputy commander to Mountbatten and commanded U.S. forces in the China Burma India Theater, directed aid to China and prepared to construct the Ledo Road to link India and China by land.


Question: What did the United States turn it's industry to in the two years folloing the Battle of Midway?

Midway proved to be the last great naval battle for two years. The United States used the ensuing period to turn its vast industrial potential into increased numbers of ships, planes, and trained aircrew. At the same time, Japan, lacking an adequate industrial base or technological strategy, a good aircrew training program, or adequate naval resources and commerce defense, fell further and further behind. In strategic terms the Allies began a long movement across the Pacific, seizing one island base after another. Not every Japanese stronghold had to be captured; some, like Truk, Rabaul, and Formosa, were neutralized by air attack and bypassed. The goal was to get close to Japan itself, then launch massive strategic air attacks, improve the submarine blockade, and finally (only if necessary) execute an invasion.

Answer: increased numbers of ships, planes, and trained aircrew

Midway proved to be the last great naval battle for two years. <hl> The United States used the ensuing period to turn its vast industrial potential into increased numbers of ships, planes, and trained aircrew . <hl> At the same time, Japan, lacking an adequate industrial base or technological strategy, a good aircrew training program, or adequate naval resources and commerce defense, fell further and further behind. In strategic terms the Allies began a long movement across the Pacific, seizing one island base after another. Not every Japanese stronghold had to be captured; some, like Truk, Rabaul, and Formosa, were neutralized by air attack and bypassed. The goal was to get close to Japan itself, then launch massive strategic air attacks, improve the submarine blockade, and finally (only if necessary) execute an invasion.

Midway proved to be the last great naval battle for two years. The United States used the ensuing period to turn its vast industrial potential into <hl> increased numbers of ships, planes, and trained aircrew <hl>. At the same time, Japan, lacking an adequate industrial base or technological strategy, a good aircrew training program, or adequate naval resources and commerce defense, fell further and further behind. In strategic terms the Allies began a long movement across the Pacific, seizing one island base after another. Not every Japanese stronghold had to be captured; some, like Truk, Rabaul, and Formosa, were neutralized by air attack and bypassed. The goal was to get close to Japan itself, then launch massive strategic air attacks, improve the submarine blockade, and finally (only if necessary) execute an invasion.

The United States used the ensuing period to turn its vast industrial potential into <hl> increased numbers of ships, planes, and trained aircrew <hl> .


Question: How were the bypassed Japanese strongholds neutralized?

Answer: air attack

Midway proved to be the last great naval battle for two years. The United States used the ensuing period to turn its vast industrial potential into increased numbers of ships, planes, and trained aircrew. At the same time, Japan, lacking an adequate industrial base or technological strategy, a good aircrew training program, or adequate naval resources and commerce defense, fell further and further behind. In strategic terms the Allies began a long movement across the Pacific, seizing one island base after another. <hl> Not every Japanese stronghold had to be captured; some, like Truk, Rabaul, and Formosa, were neutralized by air attack and bypassed. <hl> The goal was to get close to Japan itself, then launch massive strategic air attacks, improve the submarine blockade, and finally (only if necessary) execute an invasion.

Midway proved to be the last great naval battle for two years. The United States used the ensuing period to turn its vast industrial potential into increased numbers of ships, planes, and trained aircrew. At the same time, Japan, lacking an adequate industrial base or technological strategy, a good aircrew training program, or adequate naval resources and commerce defense, fell further and further behind. In strategic terms the Allies began a long movement across the Pacific, seizing one island base after another. Not every Japanese stronghold had to be captured; some, like Truk, Rabaul, and Formosa, were neutralized by <hl> air attack <hl> and bypassed. The goal was to get close to Japan itself, then launch massive strategic air attacks, improve the submarine blockade, and finally (only if necessary) execute an invasion.


Question: What blockade against Japan was to be improved on?

Answer: submarine blockade

Midway proved to be the last great naval battle for two years. The United States used the ensuing period to turn its vast industrial potential into increased numbers of ships, planes, and trained aircrew. At the same time, Japan, lacking an adequate industrial base or technological strategy, a good aircrew training program, or adequate naval resources and commerce defense, fell further and further behind. In strategic terms the Allies began a long movement across the Pacific, seizing one island base after another. Not every Japanese stronghold had to be captured; some, like Truk, Rabaul, and Formosa, were neutralized by air attack and bypassed. <hl> The goal was to get close to Japan itself, then launch massive strategic air attacks, improve the submarine blockade , and finally (only if necessary) execute an invasion. <hl>

Midway proved to be the last great naval battle for two years. The United States used the ensuing period to turn its vast industrial potential into increased numbers of ships, planes, and trained aircrew. At the same time, Japan, lacking an adequate industrial base or technological strategy, a good aircrew training program, or adequate naval resources and commerce defense, fell further and further behind. In strategic terms the Allies began a long movement across the Pacific, seizing one island base after another. Not every Japanese stronghold had to be captured; some, like Truk, Rabaul, and Formosa, were neutralized by air attack and bypassed. The goal was to get close to Japan itself, then launch massive strategic air attacks, improve the <hl> submarine blockade <hl>, and finally (only if necessary) execute an invasion.

The goal was to get close to Japan itself, then launch massive strategic air attacks, improve the <hl> submarine blockade <hl> , and finally (only if necessary) execute an invasion.


Question: What did submarines sinking Japanese ships do?

U.S. submarines, as well as some British and Dutch vessels, operating from bases at Cavite in the Philippines (1941–42); Fremantle and Brisbane, Australia; Pearl Harbor; Trincomalee, Ceylon; Midway; and later Guam, played a major role in defeating Japan, even though submarines made up a small proportion of the Allied navies—less than two percent in the case of the US Navy. Submarines strangled Japan by sinking its merchant fleet, intercepting many troop transports, and cutting off nearly all the oil imports essential to weapons production and military operations. By early 1945 Japanese oil supplies were so limited that its fleet was virtually stranded.

Answer: strangled Japan

U.S. submarines, as well as some British and Dutch vessels, operating from bases at Cavite in the Philippines (1941–42); Fremantle and Brisbane, Australia; Pearl Harbor; Trincomalee, Ceylon; Midway; and later Guam, played a major role in defeating Japan, even though submarines made up a small proportion of the Allied navies—less than two percent in the case of the US Navy. <hl> Submarines strangled Japan by sinking its merchant fleet, intercepting many troop transports, and cutting off nearly all the oil imports essential to weapons production and military operations. <hl> By early 1945 Japanese oil supplies were so limited that its fleet was virtually stranded.

U.S. submarines, as well as some British and Dutch vessels, operating from bases at Cavite in the Philippines (1941–42); Fremantle and Brisbane, Australia; Pearl Harbor; Trincomalee, Ceylon; Midway; and later Guam, played a major role in defeating Japan, even though submarines made up a small proportion of the Allied navies—less than two percent in the case of the US Navy. Submarines <hl> strangled Japan <hl> by sinking its merchant fleet, intercepting many troop transports, and cutting off nearly all the oil imports essential to weapons production and military operations. By early 1945 Japanese oil supplies were so limited that its fleet was virtually stranded.


Question: What type of vessels were part of a major role in defeating Japan?

Answer: submarines

U.S. <hl> submarines , as well as some British and Dutch vessels, operating from bases at Cavite in the Philippines (1941–42); Fremantle and Brisbane, Australia; Pearl Harbor; Trincomalee, Ceylon; Midway; and later Guam, played a major role in defeating Japan, even though submarines made up a small proportion of the Allied navies—less than two percent in the case of the US Navy. <hl> Submarines strangled Japan by sinking its merchant fleet, intercepting many troop transports, and cutting off nearly all the oil imports essential to weapons production and military operations. By early 1945 Japanese oil supplies were so limited that its fleet was virtually stranded.

U.S. <hl> submarines <hl>, as well as some British and Dutch vessels, operating from bases at Cavite in the Philippines (1941–42); Fremantle and Brisbane, Australia; Pearl Harbor; Trincomalee, Ceylon; Midway; and later Guam, played a major role in defeating Japan, even though submarines made up a small proportion of the Allied navies—less than two percent in the case of the US Navy. Submarines strangled Japan by sinking its merchant fleet, intercepting many troop transports, and cutting off nearly all the oil imports essential to weapons production and military operations. By early 1945 Japanese oil supplies were so limited that its fleet was virtually stranded.

<hl> submarines <hl> , as well as some British and Dutch vessels, operating from bases at Cavite in the Philippines (1941–42); Fremantle and Brisbane, Australia; Pearl Harbor; Trincomalee, Ceylon; Midway; and later Guam, played a major role in defeating Japan, even though submarines made up a small proportion of the Allied navies—less than two percent in the case of the US Navy.


Question: What percent did submarines make up in the US Navy fighting Japan?

Answer: two percent

<hl> U.S. submarines, as well as some British and Dutch vessels, operating from bases at Cavite in the Philippines (1941–42); Fremantle and Brisbane, Australia; Pearl Harbor; Trincomalee, Ceylon; Midway; and later Guam, played a major role in defeating Japan, even though submarines made up a small proportion of the Allied navies—less than two percent in the case of the US Navy. <hl> Submarines strangled Japan by sinking its merchant fleet, intercepting many troop transports, and cutting off nearly all the oil imports essential to weapons production and military operations. By early 1945 Japanese oil supplies were so limited that its fleet was virtually stranded.

U.S. submarines, as well as some British and Dutch vessels, operating from bases at Cavite in the Philippines (1941–42); Fremantle and Brisbane, Australia; Pearl Harbor; Trincomalee, Ceylon; Midway; and later Guam, played a major role in defeating Japan, even though submarines made up a small proportion of the Allied navies—less than <hl> two percent <hl> in the case of the US Navy. Submarines strangled Japan by sinking its merchant fleet, intercepting many troop transports, and cutting off nearly all the oil imports essential to weapons production and military operations. By early 1945 Japanese oil supplies were so limited that its fleet was virtually stranded.


Question: What happened to the Japanese fleet when nearly all oil imports were cut off?

Answer: virtually stranded

U.S. submarines, as well as some British and Dutch vessels, operating from bases at Cavite in the Philippines (1941–42); Fremantle and Brisbane, Australia; Pearl Harbor; Trincomalee, Ceylon; Midway; and later Guam, played a major role in defeating Japan, even though submarines made up a small proportion of the Allied navies—less than two percent in the case of the US Navy. Submarines strangled Japan by sinking its merchant fleet, intercepting many troop transports, and cutting off nearly all the oil imports essential to weapons production and military operations. <hl> By early 1945 Japanese oil supplies were so limited that its fleet was virtually stranded . <hl>

U.S. submarines, as well as some British and Dutch vessels, operating from bases at Cavite in the Philippines (1941–42); Fremantle and Brisbane, Australia; Pearl Harbor; Trincomalee, Ceylon; Midway; and later Guam, played a major role in defeating Japan, even though submarines made up a small proportion of the Allied navies—less than two percent in the case of the US Navy. Submarines strangled Japan by sinking its merchant fleet, intercepting many troop transports, and cutting off nearly all the oil imports essential to weapons production and military operations. By early 1945 Japanese oil supplies were so limited that its fleet was <hl> virtually stranded <hl>.

By early 1945 Japanese oil supplies were so limited that its fleet was <hl> virtually stranded <hl> .


Question: What percentage of Japanese merchantmen were sunk by U.S. submarines?

U.S. submarines accounted for 56% of the Japanese merchantmen sunk; mines or aircraft destroyed most of the rest. US submariners also claimed 28% of Japanese warships destroyed. Furthermore, they played important reconnaissance roles, as at the battles of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) and Leyte Gulf (October 1944) (and, coincidentally,[clarification needed] at Midway in June 1942), when they gave accurate and timely warning of the approach of the Japanese fleet. Submarines also rescued hundreds of downed fliers, including future U.S. president George H.W. Bush.

Answer: 56%

<hl> U.S. submarines accounted for 56% of the Japanese merchantmen sunk; mines or aircraft destroyed most of the rest. <hl> US submariners also claimed 28% of Japanese warships destroyed. Furthermore, they played important reconnaissance roles, as at the battles of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) and Leyte Gulf (October 1944) (and, coincidentally,[clarification needed] at Midway in June 1942), when they gave accurate and timely warning of the approach of the Japanese fleet. Submarines also rescued hundreds of downed fliers, including future U.S. president George H.W. Bush.

U.S. submarines accounted for <hl> 56% <hl> of the Japanese merchantmen sunk; mines or aircraft destroyed most of the rest. US submariners also claimed 28% of Japanese warships destroyed. Furthermore, they played important reconnaissance roles, as at the battles of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) and Leyte Gulf (October 1944) (and, coincidentally,[clarification needed] at Midway in June 1942), when they gave accurate and timely warning of the approach of the Japanese fleet. Submarines also rescued hundreds of downed fliers, including future U.S. president George H.W. Bush.


Question: What percentage of Japanese warships were sunk by U.S. submarines?

Answer: 28%

U.S. submarines accounted for 56% of the Japanese merchantmen sunk; mines or aircraft destroyed most of the rest. <hl> US submariners also claimed 28% of Japanese warships destroyed. <hl> Furthermore, they played important reconnaissance roles, as at the battles of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) and Leyte Gulf (October 1944) (and, coincidentally,[clarification needed] at Midway in June 1942), when they gave accurate and timely warning of the approach of the Japanese fleet. Submarines also rescued hundreds of downed fliers, including future U.S. president George H.W. Bush.

U.S. submarines accounted for 56% of the Japanese merchantmen sunk; mines or aircraft destroyed most of the rest. US submariners also claimed <hl> 28% <hl> of Japanese warships destroyed. Furthermore, they played important reconnaissance roles, as at the battles of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) and Leyte Gulf (October 1944) (and, coincidentally,[clarification needed] at Midway in June 1942), when they gave accurate and timely warning of the approach of the Japanese fleet. Submarines also rescued hundreds of downed fliers, including future U.S. president George H.W. Bush.


Question: What future U.S. president was rescued by a submarine?

Answer: George H.W. Bush

U.S. submarines accounted for 56% of the Japanese merchantmen sunk; mines or aircraft destroyed most of the rest. US submariners also claimed 28% of Japanese warships destroyed. Furthermore, they played important reconnaissance roles, as at the battles of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) and Leyte Gulf (October 1944) (and, coincidentally,[clarification needed] at Midway in June 1942), when they gave accurate and timely warning of the approach of the Japanese fleet. <hl> Submarines also rescued hundreds of downed fliers, including future U.S. president George H.W. Bush . <hl>

U.S. submarines accounted for 56% of the Japanese merchantmen sunk; mines or aircraft destroyed most of the rest. US submariners also claimed 28% of Japanese warships destroyed. Furthermore, they played important reconnaissance roles, as at the battles of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) and Leyte Gulf (October 1944) (and, coincidentally,[clarification needed] at Midway in June 1942), when they gave accurate and timely warning of the approach of the Japanese fleet. Submarines also rescued hundreds of downed fliers, including future U.S. president <hl> George H.W. Bush <hl>.

Submarines also rescued hundreds of downed fliers, including future U.S. president <hl> George H.W. Bush <hl> .


Question: What was one of the important roles submarine played in the war?

Answer: reconnaissance roles

U.S. submarines accounted for 56% of the Japanese merchantmen sunk; mines or aircraft destroyed most of the rest. US submariners also claimed 28% of Japanese warships destroyed. <hl> Furthermore, they played important reconnaissance roles , as at the battles of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) and Leyte Gulf (October 1944) (and, coincidentally,[clarification needed] at Midway in June 1942), when they gave accurate and timely warning of the approach of the Japanese fleet. <hl> Submarines also rescued hundreds of downed fliers, including future U.S. president George H.W. Bush.

U.S. submarines accounted for 56% of the Japanese merchantmen sunk; mines or aircraft destroyed most of the rest. US submariners also claimed 28% of Japanese warships destroyed. Furthermore, they played important <hl> reconnaissance roles <hl>, as at the battles of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) and Leyte Gulf (October 1944) (and, coincidentally,[clarification needed] at Midway in June 1942), when they gave accurate and timely warning of the approach of the Japanese fleet. Submarines also rescued hundreds of downed fliers, including future U.S. president George H.W. Bush.

Furthermore, they played important <hl> reconnaissance roles <hl> , as at the battles of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) and Leyte Gulf (October 1944) (and, coincidentally,[clarification needed] at Midway in June 1942), when they gave accurate and timely warning of the approach of the Japanese fleet.


Question: What doctrine did Roosevelt give for submarines against Japan?

Allied submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. Within hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, in retribution against Japan, Roosevelt promulgated a new doctrine: unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or passenger ship in Axis-controlled waters, without warning and without help to survivors.[nb 13] At the outbreak of the war in the Pacific the Dutch Admiral in charge of the naval defense of the East Indies, Conrad Helfrich, gave instructions to wage war aggressively. His small force of submarines sank more Japanese ships in the first weeks of the war than the entire British and US navies together, an exploit which earned him the nickname "Ship-a-day Helfrich". The Dutch force were in fact the first to sink an enemy warship; On 24 December 1941, HNLMS K XVI torpedoed and sank the Japanese destroyer Sagiri.

Answer: unrestricted submarine warfare

Allied submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. <hl> Within hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, in retribution against Japan, Roosevelt promulgated a new doctrine: unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. <hl> This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or passenger ship in Axis-controlled waters, without warning and without help to survivors.[nb 13] At the outbreak of the war in the Pacific the Dutch Admiral in charge of the naval defense of the East Indies, Conrad Helfrich, gave instructions to wage war aggressively. His small force of submarines sank more Japanese ships in the first weeks of the war than the entire British and US navies together, an exploit which earned him the nickname "Ship-a-day Helfrich". The Dutch force were in fact the first to sink an enemy warship; On 24 December 1941, HNLMS K XVI torpedoed and sank the Japanese destroyer Sagiri.

Allied submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. Within hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, in retribution against Japan, Roosevelt promulgated a new doctrine: <hl> unrestricted submarine warfare <hl> against Japan. This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or passenger ship in Axis-controlled waters, without warning and without help to survivors.[nb 13] At the outbreak of the war in the Pacific the Dutch Admiral in charge of the naval defense of the East Indies, Conrad Helfrich, gave instructions to wage war aggressively. His small force of submarines sank more Japanese ships in the first weeks of the war than the entire British and US navies together, an exploit which earned him the nickname "Ship-a-day Helfrich". The Dutch force were in fact the first to sink an enemy warship; On 24 December 1941, HNLMS K XVI torpedoed and sank the Japanese destroyer Sagiri.


Question: Who was the Dutch Admiral in charge of the East Indies?

Answer: Conrad Helfrich

Allied submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. Within hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, in retribution against Japan, Roosevelt promulgated a new doctrine: unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. <hl> This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or passenger ship in Axis-controlled waters, without warning and without help to survivors.[nb 13] At the outbreak of the war in the Pacific the Dutch Admiral in charge of the naval defense of the East Indies, Conrad Helfrich , gave instructions to wage war aggressively. <hl> His small force of submarines sank more Japanese ships in the first weeks of the war than the entire British and US navies together, an exploit which earned him the nickname "Ship-a-day Helfrich". The Dutch force were in fact the first to sink an enemy warship; On 24 December 1941, HNLMS K XVI torpedoed and sank the Japanese destroyer Sagiri.

Allied submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. Within hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, in retribution against Japan, Roosevelt promulgated a new doctrine: unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or passenger ship in Axis-controlled waters, without warning and without help to survivors.[nb 13] At the outbreak of the war in the Pacific the Dutch Admiral in charge of the naval defense of the East Indies, <hl> Conrad Helfrich <hl>, gave instructions to wage war aggressively. His small force of submarines sank more Japanese ships in the first weeks of the war than the entire British and US navies together, an exploit which earned him the nickname "Ship-a-day Helfrich". The Dutch force were in fact the first to sink an enemy warship; On 24 December 1941, HNLMS K XVI torpedoed and sank the Japanese destroyer Sagiri.

This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or passenger ship in Axis-controlled waters, without warning and without help to survivors.[nb 13] At the outbreak of the war in the Pacific the Dutch Admiral in charge of the naval defense of the East Indies, <hl> Conrad Helfrich <hl> , gave instructions to wage war aggressively.


Question: What was the nickname given to the Dutch Admiral in charge of the East Indies?

Answer: "Ship-a-day Helfrich"

Allied submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. Within hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, in retribution against Japan, Roosevelt promulgated a new doctrine: unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or passenger ship in Axis-controlled waters, without warning and without help to survivors.[nb 13] At the outbreak of the war in the Pacific the Dutch Admiral in charge of the naval defense of the East Indies, Conrad Helfrich, gave instructions to wage war aggressively. <hl> His small force of submarines sank more Japanese ships in the first weeks of the war than the entire British and US navies together, an exploit which earned him the nickname "Ship-a-day Helfrich" . <hl> The Dutch force were in fact the first to sink an enemy warship; On 24 December 1941, HNLMS K XVI torpedoed and sank the Japanese destroyer Sagiri.

Allied submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. Within hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, in retribution against Japan, Roosevelt promulgated a new doctrine: unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or passenger ship in Axis-controlled waters, without warning and without help to survivors.[nb 13] At the outbreak of the war in the Pacific the Dutch Admiral in charge of the naval defense of the East Indies, Conrad Helfrich, gave instructions to wage war aggressively. His small force of submarines sank more Japanese ships in the first weeks of the war than the entire British and US navies together, an exploit which earned him the nickname <hl> "Ship-a-day Helfrich" <hl>. The Dutch force were in fact the first to sink an enemy warship; On 24 December 1941, HNLMS K XVI torpedoed and sank the Japanese destroyer Sagiri.

His small force of submarines sank more Japanese ships in the first weeks of the war than the entire British and US navies together, an exploit which earned him the nickname <hl> "Ship-a-day Helfrich" <hl> .


Question: What was the first Japanese warship to be sunk by submarine?

Answer: Sagiri

Allied submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. Within hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, in retribution against Japan, Roosevelt promulgated a new doctrine: unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or passenger ship in Axis-controlled waters, without warning and without help to survivors.[nb 13] At the outbreak of the war in the Pacific the Dutch Admiral in charge of the naval defense of the East Indies, Conrad Helfrich, gave instructions to wage war aggressively. His small force of submarines sank more Japanese ships in the first weeks of the war than the entire British and US navies together, an exploit which earned him the nickname "Ship-a-day Helfrich". <hl> The Dutch force were in fact the first to sink an enemy warship; On 24 December 1941, HNLMS K XVI torpedoed and sank the Japanese destroyer Sagiri . <hl>

Allied submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. Within hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, in retribution against Japan, Roosevelt promulgated a new doctrine: unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or passenger ship in Axis-controlled waters, without warning and without help to survivors.[nb 13] At the outbreak of the war in the Pacific the Dutch Admiral in charge of the naval defense of the East Indies, Conrad Helfrich, gave instructions to wage war aggressively. His small force of submarines sank more Japanese ships in the first weeks of the war than the entire British and US navies together, an exploit which earned him the nickname "Ship-a-day Helfrich". The Dutch force were in fact the first to sink an enemy warship; On 24 December 1941, HNLMS K XVI torpedoed and sank the Japanese destroyer <hl> Sagiri <hl>.

The Dutch force were in fact the first to sink an enemy warship; On 24 December 1941, HNLMS K XVI torpedoed and sank the Japanese destroyer <hl> Sagiri <hl> .


Question: When was the first Japanese warship sunk by a submarine?

Answer: 24 December 1941

Allied submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. Within hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, in retribution against Japan, Roosevelt promulgated a new doctrine: unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or passenger ship in Axis-controlled waters, without warning and without help to survivors.[nb 13] At the outbreak of the war in the Pacific the Dutch Admiral in charge of the naval defense of the East Indies, Conrad Helfrich, gave instructions to wage war aggressively. His small force of submarines sank more Japanese ships in the first weeks of the war than the entire British and US navies together, an exploit which earned him the nickname "Ship-a-day Helfrich". <hl> The Dutch force were in fact the first to sink an enemy warship; On 24 December 1941 , HNLMS K XVI torpedoed and sank the Japanese destroyer Sagiri. <hl>

Allied submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. Within hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, in retribution against Japan, Roosevelt promulgated a new doctrine: unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or passenger ship in Axis-controlled waters, without warning and without help to survivors.[nb 13] At the outbreak of the war in the Pacific the Dutch Admiral in charge of the naval defense of the East Indies, Conrad Helfrich, gave instructions to wage war aggressively. His small force of submarines sank more Japanese ships in the first weeks of the war than the entire British and US navies together, an exploit which earned him the nickname "Ship-a-day Helfrich". The Dutch force were in fact the first to sink an enemy warship; On <hl> 24 December 1941 <hl>, HNLMS K XVI torpedoed and sank the Japanese destroyer Sagiri.

The Dutch force were in fact the first to sink an enemy warship; On <hl> 24 December 1941 <hl> , HNLMS K XVI torpedoed and sank the Japanese destroyer Sagiri.


Question: What doctrine stated that only fleet battles could win naval campaigns?

While Japan had a large number of submarines, they did not make a significant impact on the war. In 1942, the Japanese fleet subs performed well, knocking out or damaging many Allied warships. However, Imperial Japanese Navy (and pre-war U.S.) doctrine stipulated that only fleet battles, not guerre de course (commerce raiding) could win naval campaigns. So, while the US had an unusually long supply line between its west coast and frontline areas, leaving it vulnerable to submarine attack, Japan used its submarines primarily for long-range reconnaissance and only occasionally attacked U.S. supply lines. The Japanese submarine offensive against Australia in 1942 and 1943 also achieved little.

Answer: Imperial Japanese Navy

While Japan had a large number of submarines, they did not make a significant impact on the war. In 1942, the Japanese fleet subs performed well, knocking out or damaging many Allied warships. <hl> However, Imperial Japanese Navy (and pre-war U.S.) doctrine stipulated that only fleet battles, not guerre de course (commerce raiding) could win naval campaigns. <hl> So, while the US had an unusually long supply line between its west coast and frontline areas, leaving it vulnerable to submarine attack, Japan used its submarines primarily for long-range reconnaissance and only occasionally attacked U.S. supply lines. The Japanese submarine offensive against Australia in 1942 and 1943 also achieved little.

While Japan had a large number of submarines, they did not make a significant impact on the war. In 1942, the Japanese fleet subs performed well, knocking out or damaging many Allied warships. However, <hl> Imperial Japanese Navy <hl> (and pre-war U.S.) doctrine stipulated that only fleet battles, not guerre de course (commerce raiding) could win naval campaigns. So, while the US had an unusually long supply line between its west coast and frontline areas, leaving it vulnerable to submarine attack, Japan used its submarines primarily for long-range reconnaissance and only occasionally attacked U.S. supply lines. The Japanese submarine offensive against Australia in 1942 and 1943 also achieved little.


Question: What was commerce raiding refered to as?

Answer: guerre de course

While Japan had a large number of submarines, they did not make a significant impact on the war. In 1942, the Japanese fleet subs performed well, knocking out or damaging many Allied warships. <hl> However, Imperial Japanese Navy (and pre-war U.S.) doctrine stipulated that only fleet battles, not guerre de course (commerce raiding) could win naval campaigns. <hl> So, while the US had an unusually long supply line between its west coast and frontline areas, leaving it vulnerable to submarine attack, Japan used its submarines primarily for long-range reconnaissance and only occasionally attacked U.S. supply lines. The Japanese submarine offensive against Australia in 1942 and 1943 also achieved little.

While Japan had a large number of submarines, they did not make a significant impact on the war. In 1942, the Japanese fleet subs performed well, knocking out or damaging many Allied warships. However, Imperial Japanese Navy (and pre-war U.S.) doctrine stipulated that only fleet battles, not <hl> guerre de course <hl> (commerce raiding) could win naval campaigns. So, while the US had an unusually long supply line between its west coast and frontline areas, leaving it vulnerable to submarine attack, Japan used its submarines primarily for long-range reconnaissance and only occasionally attacked U.S. supply lines. The Japanese submarine offensive against Australia in 1942 and 1943 also achieved little.


Question: What was the primary use of Japanese submarines?

Answer: long-range reconnaissance

While Japan had a large number of submarines, they did not make a significant impact on the war. In 1942, the Japanese fleet subs performed well, knocking out or damaging many Allied warships. However, Imperial Japanese Navy (and pre-war U.S.) doctrine stipulated that only fleet battles, not guerre de course (commerce raiding) could win naval campaigns. <hl> So, while the US had an unusually long supply line between its west coast and frontline areas, leaving it vulnerable to submarine attack, Japan used its submarines primarily for long-range reconnaissance and only occasionally attacked U.S. supply lines. <hl> The Japanese submarine offensive against Australia in 1942 and 1943 also achieved little.

While Japan had a large number of submarines, they did not make a significant impact on the war. In 1942, the Japanese fleet subs performed well, knocking out or damaging many Allied warships. However, Imperial Japanese Navy (and pre-war U.S.) doctrine stipulated that only fleet battles, not guerre de course (commerce raiding) could win naval campaigns. So, while the US had an unusually long supply line between its west coast and frontline areas, leaving it vulnerable to submarine attack, Japan used its submarines primarily for <hl> long-range reconnaissance <hl> and only occasionally attacked U.S. supply lines. The Japanese submarine offensive against Australia in 1942 and 1943 also achieved little.


Question: When was the Japanese submarine offensive against Australia?

Answer: 1942 and 1943

While Japan had a large number of submarines, they did not make a significant impact on the war. In 1942, the Japanese fleet subs performed well, knocking out or damaging many Allied warships. However, Imperial Japanese Navy (and pre-war U.S.) doctrine stipulated that only fleet battles, not guerre de course (commerce raiding) could win naval campaigns. So, while the US had an unusually long supply line between its west coast and frontline areas, leaving it vulnerable to submarine attack, Japan used its submarines primarily for long-range reconnaissance and only occasionally attacked U.S. supply lines. <hl> The Japanese submarine offensive against Australia in 1942 and 1943 also achieved little. <hl>

While Japan had a large number of submarines, they did not make a significant impact on the war. In 1942, the Japanese fleet subs performed well, knocking out or damaging many Allied warships. However, Imperial Japanese Navy (and pre-war U.S.) doctrine stipulated that only fleet battles, not guerre de course (commerce raiding) could win naval campaigns. So, while the US had an unusually long supply line between its west coast and frontline areas, leaving it vulnerable to submarine attack, Japan used its submarines primarily for long-range reconnaissance and only occasionally attacked U.S. supply lines. The Japanese submarine offensive against Australia in <hl> 1942 and 1943 <hl> also achieved little.


Question: What did the Japanese submarine offensive against Austrailia achieve?

Answer: little

While Japan had a large number of submarines, they did not make a significant impact on the war. In 1942, the Japanese fleet subs performed well, knocking out or damaging many Allied warships. However, Imperial Japanese Navy (and pre-war U.S.) doctrine stipulated that only fleet battles, not guerre de course (commerce raiding) could win naval campaigns. So, while the US had an unusually long supply line between its west coast and frontline areas, leaving it vulnerable to submarine attack, Japan used its submarines primarily for long-range reconnaissance and only occasionally attacked U.S. supply lines. <hl> The Japanese submarine offensive against Australia in 1942 and 1943 also achieved little . <hl>

While Japan had a large number of submarines, they did not make a significant impact on the war. In 1942, the Japanese fleet subs performed well, knocking out or damaging many Allied warships. However, Imperial Japanese Navy (and pre-war U.S.) doctrine stipulated that only fleet battles, not guerre de course (commerce raiding) could win naval campaigns. So, while the US had an unusually long supply line between its west coast and frontline areas, leaving it vulnerable to submarine attack, Japan used its submarines primarily for long-range reconnaissance and only occasionally attacked U.S. supply lines. The Japanese submarine offensive against Australia in 1942 and 1943 also achieved <hl> little <hl>.

The Japanese submarine offensive against Australia in 1942 and 1943 also achieved <hl> little <hl> .


Question: What did the US Navy rely on?

The U.S. Navy, by contrast, relied on commerce raiding from the outset. However, the problem of Allied forces surrounded in the Philippines, during the early part of 1942, led to diversion of boats to "guerrilla submarine" missions. As well, basing in Australia placed boats under Japanese aerial threat while en route to patrol areas, reducing their effectiveness, and Nimitz relied on submarines for close surveillance of enemy bases. Furthermore, the standard-issue Mark 14 torpedo and its Mark VI exploder both proved defective, problems which were not corrected until September 1943. Worst of all, before the war, an uninformed US Customs officer had seized a copy of the Japanese merchant marine code (called the "maru code" in the USN), not knowing that the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) had broken it. The Japanese promptly changed it, and the new code was not broken again by OP-20G until 1943.

Answer: commerce raiding

<hl> The U.S. Navy, by contrast, relied on commerce raiding from the outset. <hl> However, the problem of Allied forces surrounded in the Philippines, during the early part of 1942, led to diversion of boats to "guerrilla submarine" missions. As well, basing in Australia placed boats under Japanese aerial threat while en route to patrol areas, reducing their effectiveness, and Nimitz relied on submarines for close surveillance of enemy bases. Furthermore, the standard-issue Mark 14 torpedo and its Mark VI exploder both proved defective, problems which were not corrected until September 1943. Worst of all, before the war, an uninformed US Customs officer had seized a copy of the Japanese merchant marine code (called the "maru code" in the USN), not knowing that the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) had broken it. The Japanese promptly changed it, and the new code was not broken again by OP-20G until 1943.

The U.S. Navy, by contrast, relied on <hl> commerce raiding <hl> from the outset. However, the problem of Allied forces surrounded in the Philippines, during the early part of 1942, led to diversion of boats to "guerrilla submarine" missions. As well, basing in Australia placed boats under Japanese aerial threat while en route to patrol areas, reducing their effectiveness, and Nimitz relied on submarines for close surveillance of enemy bases. Furthermore, the standard-issue Mark 14 torpedo and its Mark VI exploder both proved defective, problems which were not corrected until September 1943. Worst of all, before the war, an uninformed US Customs officer had seized a copy of the Japanese merchant marine code (called the "maru code" in the USN), not knowing that the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) had broken it. The Japanese promptly changed it, and the new code was not broken again by OP-20G until 1943.


Question: What led to guerrilla submarine missions in early 1942?

Answer: Allied forces surrounded in the Philippines

The U.S. Navy, by contrast, relied on commerce raiding from the outset. <hl> However, the problem of Allied forces surrounded in the Philippines , during the early part of 1942, led to diversion of boats to "guerrilla submarine" missions. <hl> As well, basing in Australia placed boats under Japanese aerial threat while en route to patrol areas, reducing their effectiveness, and Nimitz relied on submarines for close surveillance of enemy bases. Furthermore, the standard-issue Mark 14 torpedo and its Mark VI exploder both proved defective, problems which were not corrected until September 1943. Worst of all, before the war, an uninformed US Customs officer had seized a copy of the Japanese merchant marine code (called the "maru code" in the USN), not knowing that the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) had broken it. The Japanese promptly changed it, and the new code was not broken again by OP-20G until 1943.

The U.S. Navy, by contrast, relied on commerce raiding from the outset. However, the problem of <hl> Allied forces surrounded in the Philippines <hl>, during the early part of 1942, led to diversion of boats to "guerrilla submarine" missions. As well, basing in Australia placed boats under Japanese aerial threat while en route to patrol areas, reducing their effectiveness, and Nimitz relied on submarines for close surveillance of enemy bases. Furthermore, the standard-issue Mark 14 torpedo and its Mark VI exploder both proved defective, problems which were not corrected until September 1943. Worst of all, before the war, an uninformed US Customs officer had seized a copy of the Japanese merchant marine code (called the "maru code" in the USN), not knowing that the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) had broken it. The Japanese promptly changed it, and the new code was not broken again by OP-20G until 1943.

However, the problem of <hl> Allied forces surrounded in the Philippines <hl> , during the early part of 1942, led to diversion of boats to "guerrilla submarine" missions.


Question: What did Admiral Nimitze rely on submarines for?

Answer: close surveillance of enemy bases

The U.S. Navy, by contrast, relied on commerce raiding from the outset. However, the problem of Allied forces surrounded in the Philippines, during the early part of 1942, led to diversion of boats to "guerrilla submarine" missions. <hl> As well, basing in Australia placed boats under Japanese aerial threat while en route to patrol areas, reducing their effectiveness, and Nimitz relied on submarines for close surveillance of enemy bases . <hl> Furthermore, the standard-issue Mark 14 torpedo and its Mark VI exploder both proved defective, problems which were not corrected until September 1943. Worst of all, before the war, an uninformed US Customs officer had seized a copy of the Japanese merchant marine code (called the "maru code" in the USN), not knowing that the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) had broken it. The Japanese promptly changed it, and the new code was not broken again by OP-20G until 1943.

The U.S. Navy, by contrast, relied on commerce raiding from the outset. However, the problem of Allied forces surrounded in the Philippines, during the early part of 1942, led to diversion of boats to "guerrilla submarine" missions. As well, basing in Australia placed boats under Japanese aerial threat while en route to patrol areas, reducing their effectiveness, and Nimitz relied on submarines for <hl> close surveillance of enemy bases <hl>. Furthermore, the standard-issue Mark 14 torpedo and its Mark VI exploder both proved defective, problems which were not corrected until September 1943. Worst of all, before the war, an uninformed US Customs officer had seized a copy of the Japanese merchant marine code (called the "maru code" in the USN), not knowing that the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) had broken it. The Japanese promptly changed it, and the new code was not broken again by OP-20G until 1943.

As well, basing in Australia placed boats under Japanese aerial threat while en route to patrol areas, reducing their effectiveness, and Nimitz relied on submarines for <hl> close surveillance of enemy bases <hl> .