Date: 2018-11-14
Mr President, thank you for this opportunity to discuss a subject of tremendous importance for European and global security. The treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, in force since 1988, is among the key international agreements which marked the end of the Cold War. While neither the European Union nor any of the EU Member States are parties to the treaty, we do have a very high stake in its preservation and continued implementation. Thanks to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, some 3000 missiles with nuclear and conventional warheads have been removed and verifiably destroyed. For those who have the experience and memory of the Cold War, this was a truly historical moment. The tools for waging nuclear war were not only removed from our continent but irreversibly dismantled and destroyed. This happened under the mutual supervision, in the form of one-side inspections. So we are justified in declaring that the INF Treaty has not only contributed to the end of the Cold War, but it also constitutes one of the major pillars of European current security architecture. Calling it a Cold War-era agreement or a relic of the Cold War is a misinterpretation and a misunderstanding. The INF Treaty is always an important contribution to disarmament obligations under Article 6 of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. All EU Member States, whether or not they have nuclear weapons, both NATO members and non-NATO countries, all are state parties to the non-proliferation treaty. We are united in our support for the non-proliferation treaty as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The treaty has made a crucial contribution to international peace, security and stability over the past 50 years. Let me recall that all states party to the non-proliferation treaty are committed to pursuing the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. We, as the European Union, stressed the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article 6 of the non-proliferation treaty especially through an overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons. The states that possess the largest nuclear arsenals which are the Russian Federation and the United States have a special responsibility on this. The INF Treaty does not only cover nuclear-armed missiles. It is about an entire category of ballistic and cruise missiles, regardless of their warheads. In recent years, the development, test or use of ballistic missiles has been a destabilising factor in regional and international security. It creates an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion and adds uncertainty in international relations I am thinking, in particular, of the launches by North Korea, Iran and Syria. The INF Treaty is also a model to be followed and, as such, it is today more relevant than ever before. The current disarmament and non-proliferation architecture needs to become more universal as a guarantee for all. We Europeans are working at all levels to promote the universalisation of existing agreements, such as The Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation. The Hague Code does not prohibit the possession of missiles but aims to prevent proliferation and increases transparency for the benefit of subscribers. Subscribing states exchange information including pre-launch notifications. As of now, 139 countries have subscribed to The Hague Code. This is no small achievement as subscribers include the US and Russia, as well as all EU Member States. The EU has a long history of supporting the universalisation and effective implementation of The Hague Code, both diplomatically and financially, both the immediate contact point in the Austrian MFA and the rotating chairmanships benefit from EU-funded support programme. It is not by chance that very often it is EU Member States which hold the annual rotating chairmanships of The Hague Code, promoting its universalisation and chairing relevant meetings. Last year it was Poland, this year: Sweden. But let me stress that politically binding confidence-building measures like The Hague Code are not a substitute for legally binding arms control and disarmament agreements like the INF Treaty. It is for this reason that, in our view, the United States and the Russian Federation needs to remain engaged in constructive dialogue to preserve to INF Treaty and ensure its full and verifiable implementation, which is crucial for European and global security. We have asked the United States to consider the consequences of its possible withdrawal from the INF on its own security, and on our collective security and we expect the Russian Federation to address the serious concerns regarding its compliance with the INF Treaty. The world doesn't need a new arms race. That would benefit no one. On the contrary, it would only bring even more instability.